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SPEECH | Nov. 17, 2025

Gen. Brunson's written interview responses with MND Press Corps

 

Link: Gen. Brunson’s East-Up Map Article

 

Q1. What advantages does the Korea-Japan-Philippines triangular framework offer compared to existing bilateral alliance structures such as the ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan alliances? In essence, is it about achieving a more collective defensive posture for implementing a denial strategy against China, and what strengths or limitations do you see in this framework?

 

A1. The strength of that framework is that it is complementary instead of being in competition with our existing alliances. When viewed through the East-Up lens, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines form a connected network rather than three separate bilateral lines. Each partner brings a distinct capability: Korea’s central depth, Japan’s technological advantage and maritime reach, and the Philippines’ access to key southern sea lanes.

 

This is not about forming a new alliance, nor about any single country. It’s about recognizing geographic relationships that already exist and finding practical ways to coordinate. That geometry strengthens the collective ability to preserve stability across the region while reinforcing the enduring mission that begins here on the peninsula; the credible combined deterrence that keeps aggression, particularly from the North, in check.

 

Q2. The East-Up Map redefines the Korean Peninsula not as a “forward-deployed area” but as an “interior position,” highlighting its cost-imposition capabilities against both Russian and Chinese forces. What message would you like Korean audiences to take from this concept? Was your intention to underscore the peninsula’s enduring strategic centrality in regional stability?

 

A2. My intent was not to assign new labels, but to encourage a new way of seeing. For decades, the Korean Peninsula has been described as a forward-deployed area, something exposed or distant. But when we shift the perspective, we see that it is actually central: a position of access, reach, and influence.

 

That message should resonate with our Korean partners. It highlights that their geography is not a vulnerability but an advantage. Forces positioned here represent the most tangible form of deterrence on the peninsula. That presence underwrites regional stability, demonstrating that peace in Northeast Asia starts with credible strength in Korea.

 

Q3. You wrote that forces on the Korean Peninsula are already “inside the defensive perimeter,” suggesting existing deployments may hold greater strategic value than often recognized. How could this East-Up perspective influence how USFK and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command visualize contingency planning, sustainment, or operational wargaming in practice?

 

A3. When you understand that our forces are already inside the defensive perimeter, it changes how you plan. It’s not about moving units but about how we think about their positioning. The East-Up perspective encourages us to leverage proximity to build sustainment plans, exercises, and wargames that reflect the reality that we are already in the decisive space.

 

For Combined Forces Command, it reinforces the need for integration: logistics synchronized across both nations, planning that anticipates combined joint all-domain operations, and rehearsal that validates deterrence every day. We’re not projecting power from afar; we’re operating from within.

 

Q4. The article notes that Korea can impose costs on the Russian Northern Fleet, China’s Northern Theater Command, and North Korean forces. From a practical military operations standpoint, how might this geographic positioning function as an integrated or three-way defense structure?

 

A4. Geography gives Korea a unique ability to influence multiple axes of competition -- north toward the DPRK, west toward China, and northeast toward Russia. That positioning enables the alliance to shape behavior through presence and readiness, without dividing focus.

 

Every action that strengthens deterrence here naturally contributes to stability beyond it.  Maintaining a posture that can impose cost on aggression in any direction ensures that the first line of defense on the peninsula remains firm.

 

 

Q5. As operational control eventually transitions and the center of the combined command structure shifts toward the ROK military, how would the “peninsula-as-pivot” concept translate into concrete terms—such as adjustments to operational plan structures or command design?

 

A5. As the Alliance moves toward conditions-based OPCON transition, leadership roles will continue to evolve, but the foundation of combined defense remains constant. The peninsula-as-pivot concept underscores that geography continues to provide advantage when matched with capable, interoperable forces.

 

In practical terms, transition will mean continued refinement of command relationships, clearer operational linkages across domains, and deeper integration of planning processes. The Alliance will remain unified and fully capable of deterring and defeating DPRK aggression while maintaining regional stability.

 

Q6. In the recent Security Consultative Meeting, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stressed the need for flexibility in addressing regional contingencies. What do you view as the most pressing threats that could evolve into such contingencies in the Indo-Pacific, and how does the East-Up Map framework help prepare for them? Also, what feedback have you received on this concept from Washington or other military counterparts?

 

A6. Flexibility is the currency of readiness. It is what keeps deterrence credible and responsive in a changing environment. In the Indo-Pacific, threats evolve across domains and borders -- from the DPRK’s advancing missile capabilities to broader state and non-state challenges. The East-Up framework helps planners visualize those interconnections and recognize where proximity creates opportunity rather than risk.

 

What I have heard from counterparts in Washington, Seoul, and across the region is genuine interest. They see that this perspective clarifies the peninsula’s central role within the broader theater. It is not about shifting focus away from Korea; it is about recognizing that the deterrence we maintain here extends outward to sustain peace across the Indo-Pacific.

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