Gen. Brunson:

Everybody sleep on the bus. Yeah, okay. Hey, David is going to be sort of moderating this today, and you're going to have some questions for me, I'm sure, and I will answer to the best of my ability. I told you all before when I came to see you all—bless you. Got one more, just two. That normally comes in threes when people sneeze. I told you that I would always be honest with you, and all I can do is tell you the truth as I know the truth, and I will do that always.

But there are certain things that I can't answer. You may ask me questions about the Republic of Korea government—I can't answer that. I'm not in the Republic of Korea government. You may ask me questions about the United States government. While I'm from the United States, I'm not a member of the United States government. So I can't answer those things.

What I am is a military commander. What I am is a commander who is charged with unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral operations on the Korean Peninsula. That's who I am. That's what I do. There are things that happen in and around me that I can control, but there's a great many things, believe it or not, that I can't control.

So it's sort of like being married. I can suggest to my wife that we do certain things for vacation, but at the end of the day, she tells me where I'm going to go, and that's where I go. That's why I'm still married after 30 years. Okay? So it's a lot like that. And that might sound like a convenient excuse, but it's not an excuse at all.

I've found over the course of my 58 years of life that the people whom I respect as leaders are, one, those who are first consistent, and two, are those who know their job and do their job. Okay? That fair? All right, over to you.

 

Moderator:

We will now begin the on-the-record interview with General Brunson.

We'll begin with the commander's opening remarks, followed by a Q&A session.

Simultaneous translation will be provided for the commander's remarks and sequential translation for reporters' questions. The commander's remarks are on the record and may be quoted. For any follow-up, please contact the Public Affairs Office.

Now we'll begin the Q&A session. If you'd like to ask a question, please raise your hand.

Once called, please state your name and outlet.

 

Reporter:

(Lee Min Ji from Yonhap English)

It's an honor to meet you once more after you visited the newsroom last time.

Recently, we've seen buzzwords or keywords floating around in the name of "Alliance Modernization." It seems like a very far-fetched or expansive concept.

So in your thoughts, Commander, what is your concept when they say "Alliance Modernization"? And in line with that, what are USFK's roles and capacities?

 

Gen. Brunson:

When we look at things like "Alliance Modernization," those words, I think, are contextual. I think they take advantage of the fact that the Republic of Korea is in a different place than it was 75 years ago. The United States is certainly in a different place than we were 75 years ago.

And I think that what Alliance Modernization really does for us is it ensures that it reflects the fact that we have two great societies who have changed. It also reflects the recognition that the world's changed around us.

And I think that one of the things I always tell our staff here is that context is key. And contextually, the region—Northeast Asia—is markedly different. We have a nuclear-armed adversary who's north of the border of us.

Here we have increasing involvement of Russia, along with the DPRK, and we also have the Chinese and the threat that they pose to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

And I think Alliance Modernization is a rational look by two great militaries to say: How might we do this differently to deal with the operating environment that we find ourselves in now, which is different than any other time in history?

And that might sound trite, but think about it—when last we discussed anything to do with this alliance, probably in 2015–2016, where we came to an agreement on things like strategic flexibility—we've not come back together recently to really sit down and talk about what is this alliance and where is it going.

We looked at, for the first time in over 10 years, the communication system that the ROK military uses—it’s being upgraded. That's a change. And as those things continue to change, as we look at things like even OPCON transfer, I think we should not be reticent to move towards change, especially if it makes things safe.

The bottom line is simply this: protecting the homeland remains my number one priority. And that's not just the United States—that's the Republic of Korea.

And I think that Alliance Modernization is something that ensures that our alliance remains ready, that we remain relevant, and that we remain able to best deal with any of the evolving security challenges that might pose us—together.

Did I answer your questionnaire?

 

Reporter:

Yeah. Can you elaborate those changes on capabilities?

 

Gen. Brunson:

Yes. So, one of the things that I continue to talk with Adm. Paparo about, and that I talk with the chairman about—and you know the chairman was just here for the Tri-Chod—and one of the things that he and I talked about is my belief that… and this is what I believe, you know, there’s things I believe, there’s things that I think, and there’s things that I know.

Like, I know I have to wear glasses or I would not see. That's a fact, right?

I think that there needs to be changes within USFK. That's my thoughts as a commander.

And one of the things I think about is not about numbers at all. I think about capabilities.

I think about things like a Multi-Domain Task Force—in particular, the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion—being here, because it would help us to see, sense, and understand our environment better.

I think about fifth-gen fighters being on the Peninsula.

I think about all those things because I'm looking at how we might shape the environment by bringing new capabilities here.

I think that at the strategic level, we have to think about capabilities.

I think at the operational and tactical level, you could talk about numbers—that's what those commanders do—but at the strategic level, we've gotta think about the host of capabilities that are resident to be operated in a combined function, that we might be able to do the things that we need to do here to deal with the evolving threats.

 

Reporter:

I have two questions. Thank you for inviting us and responding—or accommodating us—today.

First part of the question is: we are aware that on and around April, some Patriot batteries under USFK were repositioned to the Middle East. Is there a timeline for them to be redeployed to the Korean Peninsula? And has there been any complementary or supplementary forces to sustain the readiness in that absence or gap in air defense?

Second question is: your thoughts on the expansion of activities in the West Sea by the PRC?

The PRC has claimed that they have flown stealth fighters in or through the Korean Strait, and the Fujian carrier has also been deployed around the West Sea.

Has there been any efforts or measures to boost readiness in response to this—multilaterally, bilaterally with ROK, or unilaterally by USFK?

 

Gen. Brunson:

Okay, pretty much everything that you just asked me—we'd have to answer in another room, and I wouldn't be able to tell you.

But I'm gonna just talk around it, if I could.

And this is one of those things where I want to always be sensitive to protecting the things that we ought to protect. Sometimes that's individuals, sometimes that's concepts for our operations in and around the Korean Peninsula.

So first, on the Patriot batteries. One of the conversations that I had early on as I made notification that we were going to have to move those batteries was to first really explain to people my three jobs.

You know, as the UN Commander, I was very upset about having to move the Patriot.

As the CFC Commander, I was very upset about having to move the Patriot.

But as the U.S. Forces Korea Commander, I took the order from my Secretary of Defense, and I moved those Patriots—and told the other two commanders to just be quiet.

Okay? I wear three hats here, and they all have three different responsibilities that are all inherently unique. And so, we moved those Patriots out.

But then my job as the CFC Commander and the UNC Commander is to adjust assets—again, strategic flexibility, right?—to move assets around the peninsula to ensure that the things that the ROK JCS, the Minister of Defense, myself, and even your President think are important to ensure that we have full coverage.

My job is also to bring additional assets to the peninsula.

This might be transparent to you, but we've had 5th-gen fighters on the peninsula for the past six months, and that's covered the gap that would have been carried by that air defense artillery force.

And so, I won't talk about when they're coming back. I will just simply say: they are coming back to the Peninsula.

They will get some of the newest Army upgrades to their equipment when they do come back.

There’ll be a New Equipment Transition Team that'll be here that will help to upgrade their systems and give them additional capabilities.

And as it relates to the West Sea: Yes, we are doing something about that. And you should all feel very comfortable in the fact that our ability to see, to sense, to understand—and even target—some of those assets is without peer.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance remains strong, and we continue to watch what's going on there.

It looks eerily reminiscent to things that we saw in the South China Sea.

And that's what we all have to be witting to—the fact that Korean sovereignty can be impugned by actions taken by other nations, and that we can't allow.

 

Reporter:

Hi. First of all, thank you for having us here.

I know it's a rare chance for us to be here, so thank you.

OPCON transfer has been a discourse that has been ongoing for many years, and seems to really pick up speed as new administrations have come in—both countries.

I believe it is really important that South Korea knows its military readiness in order to prevent deterrence against North Korea from weakening.

How do you, as a Commander, assess South Korea's military capabilities regarding OPCON transfer?

And what aspects need to be improved? And also, when do you expect this to happen—if it is going to happen in the near future?

 

Gen. Brunson:

Yeah, I don't have a crystal ball, so I don't know when it's going to happen.

But I know that what we do have is a bilaterally agreed-upon OPCON transfer plan—bilaterally agreed upon—and it was conditions-based.

And so there are certain conditions that must be met for us to go from an Interim Operational Capability, to a Full Operational Capability, to a Fully Mission Capable posture.

And I think that as long as we continue to move along the azimuth that's been set, we'll be in good stead.

Now, if we choose to take shortcuts, that could endanger the readiness of the force here on the Peninsula.

So I think that our approach has to be one that is, again, bilaterally managed, bilaterally considered, and bilaterally assessed in order to get to that point.

The hope is—the hope has always been—that OPCON transfer would happen at some point in the future when the conditions are met.

And I think that what we can't do is change the conditions as we're moving.

The conditions were set for particular reasons—whether that be in command and control, whether that be in munitions, whether that be in capabilities—those things still remain.

And so, I think that to rush to do something just to say that it was done is not in the best interest of any of our homelands.

And so we have to stick with the plan that we're on—unless a new plan is negotiated, dropped by transfer—and that, too, I believe, militarily, ought to have conditions to ensure that we're able to maintain the peace of the Korean Peninsula.

 

Reporter:

(Hwang Ju Young from Korea Herald)

Just a question from Korea Herald. You've mentioned some security threat elements within the Northeast Asian region.

We talked about North Korea, North Korean nuclear weapons, the conflict between China and Taiwan, and you mentioned also activities of China and Russia.

How is our alliance—or the USFK—boosting up their readiness in response to that?

Do you think we need more training, or is there any set plan or measures to deal with them, address these threats per scenario?

And as a Korean, it feels like the U.S. is asking for Korea to participate in addressing the Taiwan issue in advance.

For instance, it's been the traditional stance of the U.S.—when Korea says "let's take preemptive or in-advance actions against North Korea"—the U.S. would respond, "we can't because it would provoke China."

The concern stems from this sentiment—from Koreans—that the U.S. might be asking this of Korea because North Korea has explicitly said and used rhetoric threatening Korea that we'll see a "sea of fire" in South Korea.

However, the PRC, or China, has not really said anything threatening in terms of rhetoric towards South Korea.

So if this is politically sensitive to answer, then let's take this in the military spectrum.

If there is a conflict between Taiwan and China, would there be a spread of that threat—or security instability or conflict—to the Korean Peninsula as well?

Gen. Brunson:

First of all, it was Kim Jong Un’s sister who, during the last FS exercise, said that Seoul was going to burn. It was the position of his government—it’s based on their constitution whole—and their constitution names South Korea as their number one adversary. So, I just want to make sure that we're all flat on that.

The second thing is, when we look at the host of adversaries in the region, there's recognition—some things which are economic. Like, if you were to draw a triangle from Tokyo to Seoul to Manila, about 52 percent of the global trade comes through that area. And I think there's a recognition that we all ought to have that if something happens in the region, there's going to be a call for nations to react accordingly.

There's recognition that sometimes it's lost on people—that things would happen in this region in isolation—and I think that that's a dangerous thought. Isolationism is dangerous. When you have the ROK-U.S. alliance, we don't name an adversary. In any of our documents, no adversary is named. We see North Korea because they're the closest alligator to the boat.

And so when you look at a North Korean threat, extend to that is Russia. They're exchanging weapons back and forth, technology back and forth, so that now makes Russia a threat. Yes or no? I'm asking you now. Yes or no. Yes, right?

So most recently, we saw the Russian fleet come out—and this was reported in open source. The Russian fleet came out and came south through the East Sea. And what did the Chinese fleet do? They came around Korea, south of Jeju, sailed around to link up to go to Vladivostok. That's dangerous. That's dangerous that those two nations would come together.

We know that every time the Chinese do an exercise, their exercises are truly a rehearsal. And so the most important thing that we can do is to continue to exercise—not against a specific threat—but to exercise our collaborative operations, to continue to work interoperability at the human, at the procedural, and at the technical level, to ensure that we're ready for whatever happens here.

And the governments are going to make decisions based on their own national interests—always.

And so I don't think it should be considered a foregone conclusion that we're saying, “Hey, if we go to Taiwan, you're going to Taiwan too.” That's not the case.

What's being asked of Korea is to be stronger against DPRK—that we might have the flexibility as we modernize our alliance so that we could go do other things.

And it's no different from the strategic flexibility demonstrated by taking a Patriot battery from here on the Korean Peninsula—who is the most ready force, largely because of the training that we're able to accomplish here on the Korean Peninsula—and take them and send them to the Middle East.

That's what's going to be required in the future: to take a whole holistic view of where our forces are apportioned, where they're sitting currently, and then how we might apply them to solve bigger problems.

And if you heard Chairman Kim, when he did his press conference, he was talking about the air defense artillery battalion that came from here. And on the night of Midnight Hammer, they defended the whole base—those soldiers—for you.

 

And so make sure you all know: when they do come back—I can't tell you when they're coming back right now—but once we get that all set and they get back, those are soldiers you ought to talk to about the things that they learned in training here in Korea, which enabled them to do their wartime this year.

 

Reporter:

So, because North Korea and South Korea—we're in an adversarial relationship. Russia is supplying things to North Korea. I can comprehend the fact that Russia could be conceived as a threat because of that relationship.

However, just because the PRC—their navy—is linking up around South, passing the South Sea to link up with the Russians in the West Sea, and just because there might be a potential conflict with Taiwan—asking for an alliance or an Allied response to that may seem too far-fetched of a measure, or a “too-step-forward” measure, for direct translation.

You've mentioned the economic risks that follow, but before we go to the "M measures," there might be D or E measures—something non-lethal—that could be more productive as a countermeasure.

 

Gen. Brunson:

Clausewitz said that war is an extension of politics. "Extension"—that means that there's something that came before.

So there might be diplomacy and information and economic concerns that happen first, when we try to deal. So sanctions—then sanctions.

Information—when we talk about the fact that we exercise in a purely defensive fashion to ensure that we're ready. There are readiness concerns.

We have diplomacy—where we try to talk about everything from trade to how nations deal with one another and follow established norms.

But when you have people who violate those things—and the aim is there, because it's an extension—the goal here is no war.

Across the Tri-Command, the goal is no war.

But that does not relieve you of the responsibility to be ready. It does not relieve you of the responsibility of the diplomacy that happens between our two nations to discuss how we might act in the event of a crisis or a conflict.

And I think that as long as our nations are continuing to have those conversations, then militarily I can do what I'm supposed to do—which is to ensure that the most ready forces are ready for whatever might come.

That's what I owe to the Korean people. That's what I owe to the people of the United States—plain and simple.

My job never changes. Despite whatever decisions are made by our governments, my job never changes.

And it's to be ready. Because when something happens, you don't want to hear from me, “Hey, sorry about that, we just weren't ready for it.” I've gotta be ready.

So when those boats do move—I'm watching it.

Whether I have to watch it unilaterally, or whether I have to watch it bilaterally—I'm watching.

And fortunate for us, we've got great partners across the Republic of Korea military—in particular with the current Chairman—who understands the context that's occurring in the region and how dangerous this could be.

To wait and do nothing is the wrong move—wholly the wrong move.

We've got to stay prepared. We've got to stay ready.

Because we don't know. You don't get to choose when diplomacy fails. You don't get to choose.

When all economic measures have failed, you don't get to choose. When, informationally, you find yourself upside down—the only question is: are you ready to go or not?

And so that's what we have to do.

 

Reporter:

The question is: we're expecting a ROK-U.S. summit meeting to be held around the end of this month, and we believe the key theme would be strategic flexibility.

If, for the sake of strategic flexibility, we face a USFK reduction in forces, what is the realistic measure that will be taken to reduce the footprint of USFK?

Wall Street Journal came out and said that there is a possibility of deploying about 4,500 troops under Eighth Army.

Some say it won't be ground troops—it will be the Air Force that will withdraw first.

So if, for the sake of strategic flexibility, there's a change in USFK footprint, what is the realistic first step that the U.S. will take?

 

Gen. Brunson:

Here's why this is a tough conversation to have with people—it's because I think that the conversation ought not be about numbers. It ought to be about capabilities.

So, say for example, you have fifth-gen fighters—there’s sort of like a coefficient of means that you could use to determine one fifth-gen fighter equals two fourth-gen fighters. You could say something like that.

So is it the capabilities that's most important, or the numbers most important?

I would tell you that I find myself now, as a four-star commander, thinking about the capabilities that I have and how I might integrate those capabilities with the capabilities of my ally to achieve an effect. That's where I find myself thinking more often than not.

I will not—and I refuse—to get into a conversation about numbers.

I want to talk about capabilities, because there are certain things that I owe to the people of two nations that I require certain capabilities for.

So those decisions will be made.

And I don't know that the conversation will be wholly about—my sense is that it won't be wholly about just numbers.

I think it'll be more about the capabilities that we have resident here to do things.

And I won't get into the specifics on the things that we would have to do from the Peninsula.

But I think that if we start talking about the capabilities, that also leads to the earlier question on OPCON transfer.

 

There's Fully Operational Capability, there's Fully Mission Capable posture—that we've got to achieve.

My job is to help get us to the right posture on the Peninsula.

If I think about posture, I think about it's more than just position.

I think we have an undeniable position here on the Peninsula.

When you look at the map that I showed you all when I was in the press room—if you think about where we sit—we sit inside the First Island Chain.

We sit on the Asian continent. We are in close proximity to all the adversaries in Northeast Asia—as well as our allies in Northeast Asia, the Japanese.

And you understand, I'm sure, the trilateral cooperation that's going on amongst our nations—highlighted by the TRI-CHOD, which happened recently.

And so, when I look at those things, I think that our posture is built on the capabilities that we have here, the authorities that I have to use those capabilities, and then the positioning of those capabilities.

So even in the Republic of Korea, I'm thinking now about how I move things to different places to offer best protection—which is a warfighting function that we don't talk about a lot.

We talk about achieving offensive effects and defending, but we don't think about protection.

And moving those capabilities around might offer greater protection.

Using the things that we do have in different ways might offer better protection.

So I think that any conversation about numbers and people on the Peninsula is made less when we don't talk about the capabilities that are also on the Peninsula.

And that's why I continue to try to drive people to talk about capabilities—not numbers.

So, I don't know what'll come up at the summit.

I'm just excited about the fact that President Lee's been invited to the White House, and that he'll get to sit down with my Commander in Chief for them to have discussions.

I think that's important. I think that's also unique amongst nations—that we would do these things.

That's not what you see happening with DPRK and Russia.

It's somebody below the level of the President or the Chief Executive of the nation.

And we're going to have two Chief Executives sitting down together to discuss not only the security situation in the region, but the security situation in the world, I would believe.

But for us, it's about the capabilities.

We want to have the right capabilities resident on the Peninsula.

Reporter:

This question is regarding ISR assets. We've heard from reports from the Stateside. First, we have United States Forces Korea Army assets that are in and around the MDL, surveilling North Korean or KPA activities. Some assets of mine would be the RC-12X Guardrail or EO-5C Crazy Horse.

A recent report from Stateside said that these assets might be decommissioned by the end of this year.

If this report is true, then we expect a large gap that might happen in our frontline ISR capabilities.

And if this is true, what are some plans to address this—follow-on measures or any replacement assets that are coming in for USFK?

 

Gen. Brunson:

This is a question that I'd like to just say: Do you trust me?

Yeah, you trust me. I know you trust me.

So, there are assets that have been on the Peninsula for years and years, and I won't get into specifics here.

I would ask to indulge your patience with me in that regard, because I don't want to talk about specific systems.

There are systems that have left, and there are systems that have come.

I will tell you that I can see better now than I could with those systems before.

I've got new and improved capabilities that we've brought that are partnered with ROK capabilities, that allow us to have the same visibility, if not better, than we had before.

And what we're doing is—we're trying to take a holistic look at the theater and work at the terrestrial layer, the aerial layer, and the space layer.

And that's where our greatest collaboration is coming in now—by operating within the space layer to allow us to see change detection, to see where things are different.

As a matter of fact, we're looking at the MDL by using the space layer—by pushing back to national collect in the United States, by working alongside the ROK NGA equivalent—so that we can see things better.

So, I have no concerns right now with those systems being retired—especially because they're being replaced.

We are in a unique position here on the Peninsula that affords us the ability to see further than most at the aerial layer.

And we're also bringing more assets into the Republic right now to help us in the aerial layers.

But our focus, in collaboration with our ally—the ROK military—we want to make sure that we are continuing to take best advantage of what space offers us in terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

 

Moderator:
Now we'll take one or two more questions.

 

Gen. Brunson:
You've got to be more aggressive. If you want the microphone, you've got to be more aggressive. Just stand up.

 

Reporter:
Sir, I'm a reporter that was on leave but gave up my leave because I was invited here today.
You've mentioned the capabilities and readiness, praised the ROK military's capabilities and readiness posture, and as a world-class military. I believe some in CONUS side have also mentioned this, such as Under Secretary Colby, and recently Deputy Secretary Dazey has mentioned something along those lines as well.
It is somewhat embarrassing to ask this question as a Korean, but since you've been here, you've seen a lot of incidents or accidents pertaining to the ROK Armed Forces, such as you were there at Nightmare Range when the Air Force ironously dropped a bomb in the village side, not on the range.
And I've also recently had the opportunity to observe the training from the cadets.
I've saw that a cadet was surprised or scared from the blank fire that he or she shot.
So, but if you think as a combined force, USFK forces or US troops have to believe that their partners, the ROK forces, have their backs.
I would like to ask your objective, clear-eyed, or aggressively objective assessment on the level of readiness or level of training that the ROK Armed Forces have. Since as a partner, we have to take the mission on together.
And the second question is, we've seen Chinese citizens or Chinese people taking surveillance footage in and around USFK bases or even ROK installations, and they've been arrested.
How much of a concern or what is your assessment of that?

 

Gen. Brunson:
Okay. So the ROK Armed Forces, in some of those training incidents that you mentioned, I would ask of you all that every time you want to talk about accidents that have occurred in training, that you also remember this is the same ROK military that, when the flood struck down South — and they're still dealing with those things down there — showed up to help the people of their nation.
So anytime you want to write about training accidents, I want you to write about the fact that their presence changed the lives of people and helped them out, and that that's the highest calling of any soldier: is to be able to care for the people that they're responsible for. It's to wear the cloth of your nation and recognize that the nation may need you to do things other than things that are martial. They may need you to do humanitarian assistance and relief and aid.
Those things are important as well.
And I think that sometimes, for the sake of discussing a flash event, we default to forgetting all the good that the military does.
I've had great opportunities here to not only do training but to talk with Admiral Kim and other members of the joint staff about the things that the ROK military is doing to make lives better for the Korean people.
I get kind of emotional about the fact that everybody thinks about the accidents, and they don't talk about the fact that we were doing all the things that are absolutely necessary to keep people safe.
Okay, so that's the first part.

What I find is that when we train, we're better.
Over the course of my 35 years in uniform, I spent six years of those 35 in combat, either in Iraq or Afghanistan.
I was always better when I had somebody to stand next to me.
And when we do have these incidents, it's incumbent on us — U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, UN Command — to stand beside our ally so that we can recognize that mistakes might have been made, but that we're going to get better and we're not going to stop training.
We have to continue to train.
You know, the question I answered earlier — we have to be ready.
There is no substitute for being ready.
So you have to continue to do those things.

And even in the incident that you spoke of at Nightmare Range, the first people on site were people from the corps in that region.
They were out there to help the people that were covered.
I'm not trying to make excuses for anyone, but it's this sense of responsibility that I'm trying to drive into my own force — to be responsible for the people you're pledged to protect.
I want my force to be more like that.
And so I think that as long as we continue to train, as long as we recognize where we've fallen short, we improve those things, we change the way that we act in training — I think we're going to be okay.

What I find is an extremely professional force that it's my honor to, at a certain point in time, get to command. Nobody else in the world has the opportunities that I do in terms of command — nobody.
I don't care if you go across NATO, I don't care if you look in other places in the region.
Nobody has a more capable partner than I do in the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.
And nobody enjoys the opportunity and has the great honor to command forces the way that I do here on the Korean Peninsula.
That's markedly different from anywhere else that you'll see in the world.
And so I want us to make sure that we don't lose sight of the fact that this is both of us going together — "Katchi Kapshida," right? That's what this is.
And so you take good and bad — "Katchi Kapshida."
It's not like I only want "Katchi Kapshida" when things are good.
You want "Katchi Kapshida" all the time.
So we go together — good times, bad times, whatever — because that's what this was born out of.
This was born out of blood and fire and war, and it's remained for over 75 years, and that's unlike anything else in the world.
And so that would be my answer on that part.

Now, this other part is a significant concern to me.
And it's one of these things where, in New York City after 9/11, there were signs that went up all over the place that said, "If you see something, say something."
And this has got to be the holistic approach that we go about together so that we can ameliorate any threats that might come in the region.
And here's what I mean by that: All over the world, we've seen instances where adversaries have put up drones, they've impeded things, and we have to carry that to its far conclusion. What happens if a drone comes on an active runway and damages either a Republic of Korea or a U.S. aircraft in either takeoff or landing? What happens if — in watching the things that we do — again, we are the envy of the world here with the ROK–U.S. alliance. The envy of the world. The only way to get inside of that is to do things to damage not only the relationship but to understand how we come together, how we train, and how we operate. Our asymmetric advantage is our alliance. That counters anything that DPRK has. That counters anything that China has.
It counters anything that Russia has. It's being in alliance. And I think that that's what you're seeing — is a growing understanding of the power of alliance and what it means to them and their ambitions in Northeast Asia.

 

Gen. Brunson:
Can I just take the questions for the record or something, and then get back and give my answers? Because I think there's still more questions — can we do that?

 

Reporter:
A question from CBS. If we look at some of your previous comments or statements, you said that USFK should no longer be just solely focused on defeating North Korea, which kind of leans towards strategic flexibility.
The question is: how much of a consensus or how much discussion has been made within the U.S. military leadership on this matter?
And we expect the National Defense Strategy to be officially published later this year or around the fall time.
Will the final stance of the U.S. be reflected on the new NDS document?
And if the U.S. does go towards strategic flexibility for USFK, will this entail a revision or amendment of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea?
And also, for now, the USFK is more Army-focused.
We have more Army troops within the constitution of the USFK, but with strategic flexibility USFK is turning towards China.
Will that mean that there will be a restructuring — which seems like an arduous thing to pull off?
So will there be a reduction of Army or an increase in Navy or Air Force footprint for that matter?
And how much of a consensus is there amongst the U.S. military leadership on this problem?
The second question is regarding the SMA. There is still a lot of money or budget that hasn't been spent regarding the Special Measures Agreement.
And even so, do you think it's rational or reasonable to ask for increased burden-sharing from the Republic of Korea?
And third — it's not a question of burden request — our PAO officials of the three Commands, we believe they're not allowed to have their phones on them on post, which kind of hinders immediate communication or timely communication with the reporters.
I request that some kind of measure be taken so that there's more fluent communication with the reporters and your PAO staff.

 

Gen. Brunson:
Okay. The only thing that's arduous is that question. The rest of this is not arduous at all.
Ryan, take that for action. Okay, I don't know about phones. I don't know — I don't deal with that stuff.

So, but onto your question: you have to really think about the core competencies of our forces. So, the Army sets theaters. Part of setting the theater is not only the NEO response but the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Those are things that the Army is responsible for. The Joint Command, U.S. Forces Korea is made up of Marine Forces Korea, the Combined Naval Forces Korea, the Seventh Air Force, as well as the Eighth Army. Those are the four components. Now, what I will tell you is: again, focus on the core competencies of what services are supposed to do. And were you privy to the war plan, you would see that large forces — large-scale forces — would be recepted, received here. They would be staged here. They would be moved to positions to conduct their operations and be integrated into the theater. So while sitting here it may appear that the command is all green, but the command itself is actually purple — which is the color of joint forces. So that's on that — why it might appear to be USFK is more Army than not. It comes down to the competencies of the services and responsibilities and roles inherent therein.

On to the NDS — the NDS has not been published yet, but I would again point back to the example of moving air defense artillery from Asia to the Middle East. That is strategic flexibility — the ability to be able to place your forces in space and time and need. That's strategic flexibility. That is what we seek to always be able to do.

My job is to help solve problems to maintain peace in this region — in particular, Northeast Asia — but more specifically, I would speak to the entirety of the Indo-Pacific, because we have capabilities here that are unlike anyplace else.

To say that they are moored in place is not militarily expedient, and I think that we have to always look at the fact that as long as we can do one thing and another thing, then we ought to be considered okay.

Our alliance is built not only on the fact that there are the requisite capabilities in both forces here, but it's an understanding of what we might need to do in order to protect the Korean Peninsula. So those things that happen are necessary things that happen, and they're all done with the full weight and knowledge.

 

For example, before we sent the air defense artillery out, I spoke to the former MINDEF, spoke to the Chairman, to let them know that I was being directed to do something.

But again, whenever those things happen — whenever things of strategic flexibility happen — I think that the onus is on this command, read me, to ensure that our allies understand what I'm doing. Along with that, we can't leave our missions uncovered. But there's nothing that says that we can't move to where we need to be in support of allied nations and our own objectives.

 

Moderator:

Any additional questions that you have, please send us an email and we will provide.

 

Gen. Brunson:

We're gonna use your phone so you can send an email, okay?

 

Moderator:

Any remarks before we close? Yeah, the MND press corps lead coordinator.

 

Reporter:

A reporter from Herald Economy, the Head Coordinator of the MND Press Pool.

Thank you for keeping — living up to your promise that you made to us in Yongsan approximately 100 days ago.

I'd like to thank Colonel Donald and Mr. David Kim and all the staff at the PAO office for setting this up.

Since I have the mic, I'd like to take advantage of this opportunity to give you a short question regarding UFS.

There have been some adjustments made to the — there are statements made about the adjustments within Korea about UFS.

I'd like to hear your thoughts briefly on that.

And second, in the past, some of our press — the MND press or journalists — were allowed the opportunity to visit the UNC rear bases.

These were valuable opportunities for us, for the journalists, to understand the UNC mission set and more broadly the roles and missions that the U.S. forces have in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, I believe this has been suspended or stopped after or during the time of COVID, so if you might positively review yourself, we will be thankful.

Lastly, just a comment, sir. I believe this is a historic number of reporters that we see here in Pyeongtaek.

I believe we had high expectations for you in this interview session, so thank you for the invite.

 

Gen. Brunson:

So first of all, thank you all for being willing to take your time to come out here.

There's nothing in my mind more important than being able to tell your story from your perspective and having other people understand. And so thank you all for taking the time to do that.

Second of all, on the exercise, I will share with you the conversations that I had with Minister Ahn and with Chairman Kim.

And what I was asked was: would I be okay with moving things because of some of the natural disasters that are going on?

I think this is the hottest July on record for many, many years that's been here.

You know, we had soldiers up on the DMZ — they were impacted by heat and had to be evacuated from the DMZ area. I think that the floods as well play into that, and that a great bit of the military is being employed to assist families in the South who are dealing with flooding right now. Again, the height of what we do wearing the uniform is caring for the people in our charge.

I think that's the absolute height of what we do. And so in order to care for the people who I'm supposed to be protecting — again, my Line of Effort 1 is to protect our homelands, that's this place — Korea and the United States. And if the Korean people have need of the military, then we can get around that by changing our exercise a bit. But again, to my earlier point — we've got to be ready. So there will be training that will still occur. There will be some things that we'll train unilaterally to ensure that Forces Korea is prepared for any eventual reality in the future. But at this point in time, it was important — you know, sort of signifies that the Korean people do matter. And so I can't stand in the way of that. So we've made some adjustments to the exercise, but we will still exercise fully because of the need to remain ready. So I think that that's where I sit on that. I feel comfortable with the decisions that were made and that I was a part of.

And again, when I talked earlier about the fact that I'm in a unique situation — that I would be talking to folks within the government of the Republic of Korea to help make decisions on how we're going to exercise — again, that's rare. You don't see that anywhere else around the globe, especially for someone like myself, who's a general — that you're actually talking to the political leadership to help make a decision.

So I feel like we're in a good place to be exercised as we go forward. And there are a lot of transitions that are going to occur soon too. I would imagine that just helps us to build the baseline that's going to carry us forward in the future.

Ah, the question on getting back to UNC rear in Japan — and for those of you who don't know, there are seven bases that I have access to in Japan that function with my UN Command rear responsibilities. Families from here would move to and through Japan in order to get back to the Continental United States. And so what I believe you're speaking about is seeing some of those facilities, those seven bases, and understanding more about the roles and responsibilities inherent in my UN Command capacity. We'll look at that. Ryan mentioned to me this morning that that was going to be a question that was going to be asked. And so what I would imagine — and I'm not saying that we'll be able to do this — but what I would imagine is, when I go back to Japan for our Ambassador's Round Table again — where I pull in the UN Command ambassadors who are in Japan to make them aware of things going on in Korea — we'll see if we can find some way to tie those two things together. So we'll continue to look at that.