


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HEADQUARTERS X CORPS

OPERATION



CHROMITE

15 AUGUST - 30 SEPTEMBER

1950

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
HEADQUARTERS I CORPS
WAR DIARY SUMMARY
FOR
OPERATION CHROMITE
15 AUGUST TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1950

APPROVED BY:
COMMANDING GENERAL



EDWARD M. ALLMOND
Lt Gen USA

OFFICIAL:



JOHN S. GOTHERIE
Colonel GSC
Chief of Staff

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* See attached books. (Issued with Copies 1-6)

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN KOREA - 1 AUGUST TO 15

SEPTEMBER 1950

By the 1st of August 1950, the United Nations Forces in Korea found themselves compressed into a tight perimeter. The south flank of this line rested just west of MASAN, the center curved around TAEGU, and the northern flank ran east to the sea north of POHANG. The perimeter was held by elements of five US Divisions - the 24th, 25th, and 2d Infantry Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Marine Brigade of the 1st Marine Division, and six Republic of Korea Divisions. (1)

On 7 August, the first sustained counterattack of the war by US troops was launched on the south flank of the perimeter to drive the enemy back from positions which threatened PUSAN. The 1st Brigade, US Marines participated in this successful attack. (2)

To make up for these losses in the south, the enemy attacked strongly towards TAEGU and captured POHANG on the east coast from the South Koreans. After POHANG was recaptured with the aid of a US Task Force and the attack on TAEGU stopped, the indications were that the enemy had made his last big effort. But these indications proved to be very misleading when in the first two weeks of September, the North Koreans launched an all out offensive which seriously threatened TAEGU frontally and by envelopment from the east; the entire UN line between TAEGU and POHANG was pushed back until an enemy breakthrough seemed likely. Only by the greatest skill and maneuver, did the Eighth Army prevent disaster. It was at this critical point that one of the most daring and successful amphibious operations of modern warfare reversed the tide of war completely. (3)

OPERATION CHROMITE

Operations Plan 100 B with code name CHROMITE was conceived less than two weeks after the war started, when General of the Army Douglas

- (1) EUSAK Periodic Operations Report for 1 August 1950.
- (2) EUSAK Periodic Operations Report for 7 August 1950.
- (3) Congratulatory Message, President Truman and Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur.

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MacArthur told his Chief of Staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, to begin considering a plan for an amphibious assault on the east or west coast of Korea. Inchon was determined upon as the amphibious landing area after an exhaustive study had been completed. (1)

As a result of General MacArthur's directive, CINCPAC Operation Plan 100 B was prepared and published on 12 August. The plan boldly called for the committing of the GHQ Reserve and the 1st Marine Division in an amphibious operation to seize the Inchon-Seoul area and cut the main line of enemy communications and supply to his armies in the south. In conjunction with this seaborne envelopment, Eighth Army was to launch a major offensive from the south, and driving in a northwesterly direction along the axis Taegu-Taefon-Suwon, to effect a juncture with the amphibious forces at Seoul. (2) The Navy (3) and the Air Force had important roles of transportation, security, naval gunfire support, carrier aircraft support, and strategic bombing. The tactical air cover was to be furnished by the 1st Marine Air Wing (attached to the landing force) and some naval carrier aircraft support. The objective of Plan 100 B was the destruction of the North Korean Army south of the line Inchon-Seoul-Utchin. (4)

THE ORGANIZATION OF X CORPS

As a cover for the organization of the invasion force, General Almond continued as Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC. His new staff had the title, Special Planning Staff, GHQ, and his command was carried under GHQ reserve. The command was to be designated X Corps and the final assignment of forces was published in Operation Order No. 1, GHQ, UNC 30 August 1950. The major units assigned were the 1st Marine Division, which included the battle tested 1st Marine Brigade from Eighth Army, the 7th Infantry Division, 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How), the 96th Field Artillery

- (1) Statement of Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond
- (2) Map A.
- (3) Commander Amphibious Group One and Commander Attack Force CTF 90 Opn Order 14-50
- (4) CINCPAC Operation Plan 100 B, 12 August 1950.

Battalion (155 How), the 50th AAA AW Battalion (SP), Co A Reinf, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, the 19th Engineer Combat Group, and the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. Service units brought the strength of the X Corps to 69,450. The 3d Infantry Division and the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team were retained in GHQ, UNC Reserve for future employment with X Corps. The 17th ROK Infantry Regiment joined the Corps at INCHON on 23 September.

When Major General Clark L. Ruffner, General Almond's Chief of Staff, assembled the nucleus of X Corps Headquarters on 15 August 1950, it marked the beginning of one of the most successful races against time in military annals. The target date was 15 September, just one month away. Failure to meet that deadline meant almost a month's delay before another landing attempt could be made. For only a short period each month, would tidal conditions at INCHON permit an assault landing across the beaches. The tide varied over 31 feet between ebb and flow. (1) But a month's delay could have meant defeat for UN Forces in South Korea. On the other side of the scales was the fact that amphibious doctrine called for at least 160 days to plan and mount such a large scale operation. (2) In spite of the great odds against it and the serious doubts of many experts, the X Corps of almost 70,000 men was organized and equipped, moved to staging areas, embarked and transported to Korea in time to make a successful amphibious assault at INCHON on ~~the~~ Day, the 15th of September.

THE TERRAIN*

I - GENERAL DESCRIPTION

SEOUL area is one of the few lowland tracts in mountainous Korea. The City of SEOUL, with its port of INCHON, combine to make a focal point. The HAN-gang passes through SECUL but flows into the sea north of the area.

- (1) Annex B, par 2, Opn Plan, Com 7th Flt No. 9-50.
- (2) Amphibious Operations Manual, US Army.

*Extracts Terrain Handbook No. 65, FEC.

Sections of the river-plain are undulating. South of Inchon, hills appear close to the shore; the coastline is sometimes steep and high. Extensive drying mud-flats, up to eight miles wide, fringe the coastline and surround the off-lying islands, making navigation difficult. The Inchon area is subject to one of the most extreme tidal ranges in the world, exceeding 31'.

A hilly island, Wolmi-do, about one mile by half a mile, protects Inchon harbor. Approaches to the mainland are restricted by other small islands, and channeled by the multitude of mud-flats.*

Inchon is located on a hilly promontory dissected by small flat stream valleys and is backed by rough terrain. Farther inland are extensive valley flats and lowlands planted in rice. The rice fields, wet in summer, impede cross country movement.

Near Seoul, the valley is of irregular width, generally varying between one-two miles. The inland hills are steeper than those near the coast, rising to approximately 2700 feet. The main road and rail routes are winding and restricted.

Seoul is the main commercial center of Korea and is a major road and railroad junction. Principal roads run south to Taejon, southeast to Chungju and Pusan, west to Inchon, northwest to Pyongyang and northeast to Wonsan.

The Han-gang at Seoul is from 200-500 yards wide, and is a barrier to N/S movement. The current is moderate to swift; banks are steep and frequently diked; the channel is nearly 1000 yards wide near the mouth.

Korea has an abundant water supply, which however, requires purification. Rainfall varies from 20 inches a year in the north to 60 inches in the south. June - September is the rainy season. On the small off-shore islands water is very scarce.

Seoul and Inchon have municipal water works. The Han-gang is the main source of supply, and is purified for domestic consumption.

*Extracts Terrain Handbook Number 65, FEC.

Irrigation is extensively employed. Seasonal flooding of rice paddies hinders military operations.

II - MILITARY IMPORTANCE

A. Significance.

The Seoul-Inchon area lies in a commanding position at the head of most major transportation and communication arteries of Korea. Topographic corridors radiate from the lower Han-gang valley to the east towards Wonsan, to the north towards Pyongyang, and to the south towards Taejon. A force occupying this area is in a position to block almost all routes of North-South or East-West movement at the waist of the Korean peninsula.

The Inchon area is important in its location at the head of the broad, shallow Imperatrice Gulf, which offers shelter and ice-free anchorage for large numbers of vessels. Inchon is the major port of central Korea and Seoul is the most important city. The fertile Han-gang valley is the most important food producing area in Korea.

B. Military Development.

Developments of the North Korean Forces included light and temporary fortifications and emplacements. The Kimpo Airfield is the only major airfield in the area.

THE ENEMY*

Enemy forces in the Inchon-Seoul area consisted principally of major headquarters, a replacement center, anti-aircraft defenses, operating personnel for an airfield, minor port, coastal defenses, and an army garrison force. In addition, in this area the North Koreans drafted replacements for North Korean forces; however, the state of training and mental attitude of these hastily mobilized "recruits" did little to increase the enemy potential in the objective area. UN prisoners of war were interrogated in Seoul, at the prisoner of war enclosure located in the city. ROK cities and towns occupied by North Korean forces had

*Extracts from X Corps Intelligence Summaries for August and September 1950

political advisory groups of approximately 5 Soviets, and had counter-espionage groups of 7 or 8 Soviets. The total enemy strength in SEOUL was estimated to consist of approximately 5,000 troops; enemy strength at INCHON was reported on 25 July as 1,000; enemy strength at KIMPO Airfield estimated at about 500; enemy strength at UIJONGBU, undetermined, consisted of a "large" replacement training center. The 107th Regiment occupied three locations northeast of SEOUL. Enemy forces, capable of reinforcing the INCHON - SEOUL objective area, consisted of uncommitted reserve divisions in rear of the line of contact with EUSAK, line-of-communication type regiments in occupied territory, and small garrison forces still located in North Korea. The enemy was incapable of organizing additional combat divisions of the standard engaging EUSAK. However, provisional regimental combat teams, brigades, or defensive commands were within his capabilities for reinforcement. Estimates of enemy strength proved to be very accurate as the operation progressed.

For what the three highest ranking North Korean POW's thought of the INCHON - SEOUL Operations, see attached interrogations beginning p 26.

TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

The details of the amphibious assault landing by the 1st Marine Division were published in Operation Order 2, 1st Marine Division and Operations Orders 14 and 15 CTF 90, USN.

A Battalion Landing Team of the 1st Marine Division was to make an initial landing on WOLMI-DO (GREEN BEACH) at 0630 hours, D-Day, to secure that Island prior to the major landing by the balance of the division. This step was essential because of the commanding position of the Island in relation to the Inchon shoreline. (2)

After the Wolmi-do landing the principal landings were to be made at 1730 hours, D-Day, on RED, YELLOW, and BLUE beaches at Inchon by the 1st Marine Division (less one Regimental Combat Team) (Reinforced) landing in amphibious assault. This division was then to seize a beachhead in the Inchon area. The beachhead was to be expanded rapidly by the 1st Marine Division to include Kimpo Airfield and the Han River line west of Seoul. The advance was to continue to seize and secure the city of Seoul, the terrain commanding Seoul, and measures taken to secure the Corps left flank.

The 7th Infantry Division (Reinforced) plus X Corps troops, were to land administratively from second and third echelon Navy convoys in the city of Inchon at a time to be designated after D-Day. The 7th Infantry Division was given the mission of protecting the Corps right flank and expanding the beachhead to the south of Seoul as far as Osan if necessary. (3) This Division was to provide one Regimental Combat Team for Corps Reserve.

The 17th ROK Infantry Regiment was to occupy Seoul on order after its capture by the 1st Marine Division.

The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was to prepare for airborne or ground operations, or act as Corps Reserve depending on how the operation developed.

Logistical support was to be initially the responsibility of the 1st Marine Division until the Inchon Base Command could effect a relief. The Kimpo Task Force was to establish an air base at Kimpo Airfield and provide for its defense. The Seoul Area Command was to be prepared to assume administrative responsibilities for the City of Seoul, and to work with the South Korean Government in the city's rehabilitation.

(1) Operation Order No 1, X Corps, 28 August 1950 (2) ~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~ (3) ~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS

1. The Inchon Landing by the 1st Marine Division, 15 Sep 1950
2. The Capture of Kimpo Airfield by the 5th Marine Regiment,
17 Sep 1950
3. First Han River Crossing by 5th Marine RCT, 20 Sep 1950
4. Capture of Suwon by 32d RCT, 21 Sep 1950
5. Capture of Yongdungpo by the 1st Marine RCT, 23 Sep 1950
6. Second Han River Crossing by the 1st Marine RCT, 24 Sep 1950
7. Third Han River Crossing by the 32d RCT, 25 Sep 1950
8. Juncture with 8th Army by the 31st RCT, 26 Sep 1950
9. Capture of Seoul by the 1st Marine Division and elements 7th
US Infantry Division, 26 Sep 1950

THE I CORPS OPERATIONS 15-30 SEPTEMBER

1. INCHON LANDING

At 0628 hours 15 September 1950 the 3d Battalion Landing Team (BLT 3) of the 5th Marine Regiment crossed the line of departure and initiated the first amphibious assault landing (1) of American Forces against an enemy since Easter Sunday 1945 when the US Tenth Army landed on Okinawa.

Beginning at 0602, naval air made the first strike of the day against WOLMI-DO followed by more air strikes on the island and targets of opportunity inland. Beginning at 0624, heavy shelling of WOLMI-DO by Cruiser Division 5 effectively reduced enemy gun and other emplacements covering Green Beach. At 0633 the first wave was on the beach and within 88 minutes the 3d BLT Commander reported WOLMI-DO secured.

Late in the morning, the 3d BLT began to advance on SO-WOLMI-DO, a small promontory extending south from WOLMI-DO. The North Koreans began a trial escape from the island, but were bombed on the causeway leading to INCHON, and those who attempted to swim toward land were strafed. By 1100 the Marines were cleaning up what little enemy resistance was left on SO-WOLMI-DO.

At 1645 hours the 1st wave of the 1st Marine Regiment (reinforced) consisting of Armored Amphibious Tractors of Company "A", 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, USA, crossed the line of departure and headed for Blue Beach. The landing wave of the regimental reserve (BLT-1/1) landed on the sea wall enclosing the salt flats well to the left of Blue Beach. This mistake was due to great clouds of dust and smoke which hid the beach and navigational aides. Succeeding waves, including some LVTs carrying troops of assault elements, were diverted in time and led to the proper beaches. (2)

At 1732 hours, 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marine Regiment, designated assault elements, commenced landing on Blue Beach. Assault troops were forced to climb over the fifteen foot high sea wall adjoining Blue Beach 2, using aluminum scaling ladders designed for the purpose. With the assault troops, a


(1) Support Air Control Center, USN Teletype Report 15 Sept

(2) 5th Marines Special Action Report 6 Sept - 7 Oct 1950

SKETCH OF LANDING BEACHES
"SEA WALL" HULMI-DO, INCHEON,
SOUTH KOREA



SKETCH OF LANDING AREA
AT BLUE BEACH, INCHEON, KOREA.



On 17 September, after a quiet night the 5th Marine Regiment was attacked at 0600 by 6 enemy T-34 tanks and approximately 200 Infantry in the zone of the 2d Battalion. All the tanks were destroyed by Marine Tanks, recoilless rifles, and rocket launchers; all enemy infantry were either killed or wounded. The enemy tanks were allowed to advance without opposition until they came in sight of the tank and anti-tank positions; when friendly tanks opened fire, Marine Infantry elements closed in on three sides to complete the destruction.

For the remainder of the day friendly attacks advanced against light opposition to seize Objectives Baker and Easy.

2. KIMPO AIRFIELD CAPTURED 17 SEPTEMBER 1950

As soon as Objective Baker was passed by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, the 2d Battalion pushed north, with 2 platoons of tanks attached, to seize KIMPO Airfield. At 2020, under cover of darkness, KIMPO Airfield was secured against moderate resistance.

At 0700, the 1st Marine Regiment had jumped off in the attack and met with stiffer resistance than they had previously experienced. By 1300 the BHL was reached by 1st and 2d Battalions with the aid of supporting fires.

By 0910, G Company, 1st Marine Regiment, mounted on tanks of B Company, 1st Tank Battalion, spearheaded a drive along the SEDUL - INCHON Highway, toward RCT-1 objective and ran into heavy resistance. The troops dismounted for the assault. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, loaded on DUKWs, followed at 1600, and by 1830 all elements were dug in for the night.

On 18 September the 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment received artillery fire in the early morning. At 0645, the 1st and 3d Battalions, supported by tanks, jumped off in an attack. The 2d Battalion followed the 3d Battalion. Progress was steady against enemy small arms fire. Casualties for the day were light.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, in the early morning hours received a series of uncoordinated counterattacks until 0500, when the enemy, approximately 200 strong, attacked fanatically. This attack was also repulsed by a well executed defense in depth, and the enemy suffered heavy casualties. By 0800 hours, 18 September, the KIMPO area (Map C)

was completely cleared of enemy.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment continued to attack at day break and occupied Objective FOI overlooking YONGDUNGPO by 0930. Just before noon the 2d Battalion reached positions (Objective DCG) overlooking the HAN River.

The 5th Marine Regimental CP displaced to KIMPŎ Airfield at 1245.

On 18 September elements of the 7th Division consisting of the 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Reconnaissance Company, and part of the 73d Tank Battalion had landed at INCHON.

On 19 September the 1st Marine Regiment attacked in zone at 1030 with two Battalions abreast. The 3d Battalion, on the left, made rapid advances against resistance consisting of small arms and mortar fire. The 2d Battalion met a well organized center of resistance immediately after the jump off.

The 1st Marine Regiment had met increasingly heavy resistance each day. From the line of departure forward the greater portion of the INCHON - SEOUL Highway was found to be mined in well selected locations.

At 1200, 32d Infantry Regiment, attached to the 1st Marine Division, relieved the 1st Marine Division elements on the right flank. The 2d Battalion of the 32d Infantry Regiment relieved the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment south of the INCHON - SEOUL Highway. The enemy continued to withdraw slowly to the hills south of the SEOUL - INCHON Highway, where the terrain is favorable for defensive tactics.

BLT 1/5 had been ordered late 18 September to prepare to attack and seize Hills 80 and 85 at 0700 the next morning. Before the scheduled attack on the 19th, Company C began to receive heavy small arms and sporadic mortar fire at 0615 from Hill 118. At dawn small groups were observed advancing toward the airfield in front of Company C and other groups were moving across the rice paddy to the front of the Company's position. Action was promptly taken to cut off the attack. While the enemy attack was being held by Company C, Company B began an attack to envelop Hill 118. After a heavy artillery concentration and air strike, Company B succeeded in taking the objective. This enabled Company C to move forward and take the ridge to the left. By 1055 Hill 118 was secured.

While awaiting the arrival of tanks, Company C and Company B consolidated

their positions before beginning the attack on Hills 80 and 85. The enemy was routed from Hill 80 by an air strike. Hill 85 was seized and occupied and the villages to the rear were cleared. When enemy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire were directed against the Marine positions on Hills 80 and 85, a perimeter defense was set in on the reverse slopes of the two hills. 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment was relieved by 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment.

3. FIRST HAN RIVER CROSSING

The 5th Marine Regiment began hurried preparations for the crossing of the HAN River. At 1900 a reconnaissance patrol departed from KEMFC and arrived on the near bank of the HAN River at 1950. 14 swimmers departed for the far side of the river and reached the opposite bank at 2040 hours. A patrol reconnoitered the village and the high ground on the right with no contact; the patrol then returned to the river bank as planned and at 2100 gave the signal for the remainder of the reconnaissance company to cross the HAN River. The Company embarked in nine (9) amphibious tractors. At midstream, the enemy, which had been hidden on the high ground, opened fire with machine guns and mortars. The LVTs were ordered to return to the south bank. The swimmers were being fired upon and were also directed to return to the south bank.

The Marine swimmers determined that the beach location on the far bank at the old ferry site was suitable for the landing of LVTs.

During the day additional elements of the 7th Division came ashore and moved to support the 32d Infantry Regiment which continued to attack to the east. The 7th Reconnaissance Company maintained contact with the 1st Marine Division on the 7th Division north (left) flank.

On 20 September the 5th Marine Regiment (Reinf) crossed the HAN River at 0545, in column of battalions and turned southeast toward SEOUL. After the crossing, the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion and the 1st Shore Party Battalion conducted ferrying operations in the sector. The 3d KMC Battalion assisted the river crossing operations by patrolling to the north on the south bank of the HAN River and protecting the 1st Marine Division's left flank. (1)

The enemy offered stiff delaying action after the crossing of the HAN River. Initially the enemy held his fire, but upon reaching HAN:GJU he began fighting in the streets and on the slopes of the small hill to the east.

The 5th Marine Regiment forced the enemy in this area to withdraw to the southeast under cover of another enemy battalion occupying prepared positions on the ridge line 3,000 yards southeast of the crossing site. After the initial phase, the enemy offered only slight resistance to the advance. Aided by very heavy naval and aerial bombardment, the Marines advanced to a point within four miles of SEOUL.

To the south the 1st Marine Regiment had advanced along the INCHON - SEOUL Highway against stiffening resistance; at 0430, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, received an attack by an estimated enemy battalion northeast of the village of SOSA. The attack was stopped by front line units with rifle fire, bayonets, bazookas, and grenades. Later the 2d Battalion became heavily engaged with the advance elements of an attacking enemy force. Following artillery concentrations the 2d Battalion started a strong counterattack which inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The remainder of the day all Marine units held their positions on the outskirts of YONGDUNGPO. During the afternoon and throughout the night friendly air and artillery continued to bomb and shell the town in preparation for an assault the following morning.

During the same day the 7th Infantry Division opened its CP ashore. The 31st RCT debarked and concentrated in the area of CHANGSU-RI to secure the area to the south and protect the Division south flank. The 32d RCT advanced to the east taking Objectives Baker, Charlie, Dog, and Easy against stiffening enemy resistance.

The enemy conducted a delaying action through skillful employment of anti-tank mines in conjunction with small arms, machine guns, and mortar fire. In the course of the action, the 32d Infantry Regiment seized the commanding ground overlooking YONGDUNGPO from the west and south. The X Corps had now gained positions from which to begin an assault on SEOUL.

On 21 September at 0630 the 1st Marine Regiment continued its advance along the INCHON - SEOUL Highway to YONGDUNGPO and attacked the enemy with 3 Battalions; two from the northwest and one along the INCHON Road. The attack progressed against light resistance at first, but became increasingly heavy. The 1st Bn attacking from the NW was slowed in its advance by heavy casualties.

"A" Company maneuvered the night and entered the town from the southwest. This maneuver was successful and by nightfall "A" Company had reached the road overlooking the airstrip. The Company held this position all night against enemy attacks killing 275 of the attackers. During the night the remainder of the regiment prepared plans to renew the attack towards "A" Company's position the next day.


The 5th Marine Regiment continued to enlarge the bridge head across the HAN River driving southeast along the general axis of the railroad leading into the city of SECUL. The advance was slowed by artillery and mortar fire. The greater part of the opposition was soon reduced. However, during this period, the enemy continued to attempt crossings of the HAN River in various sectors and to extend their guerrilla activities.

4. CAPTURE OF SUWON 21 SEPTEMBER 1950


On 21 September the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment captured the strategic hill mass, Objective F, easing the pressure on the 1st Marine Regiment attacking YONGDUNGPO. The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment captured the important communications center of ANYANG-NI, cutting the withdrawal route of enemy units to the south and preparing the fall of SUWON with its excellent airfield. After taking ANYANG-NI, the 7th Reconnaissance Company continued to the south and entered SUWON at 1830. The enemy in the city were caught completely by surprise. The Reconnaissance Company was immediately reinforced by a Task Force consisting of Company "K", 32d RCT, Company "A", 73d Tank Battalion, and a platoon of Engineers from Company "B", 13th Engineer Battalion. The G-3 of the 7th Division was killed on a reconnaissance near the SUWON Airfield.

On 22 September at 0800, the 1st Marine Regiment continued their attack and advanced through YONGDUNGPO linking up with "A" Company, 1st Marine Regiment. The enemy had apparently withdrawn all organized forces from the city during the night and the only opposition met was from sniper fire and long range mortars. The enemy had withdrawn across the HAN River leaving only a covering force south of the river.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, after debarking at TCHON, assumed



2 CORPS CP BUCHEON CITY, KOREA



SKETCH OF AIR-LIFTED PANTOON BRIDGE
ACROSS HAN RIVER BETWEEN SEOUL AND
YONGUNPO.

responsibility in the zone of action of 3d Battalion, KMC. With the latter unit, and X Corps Special Operations Company attached, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment protected the Corps left flank south and west of the HAN River. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, remained in Corps Reserve while the 1st Battalion continued unloading.

During the day SUWON Airfield was captured and placed in Operational status. Elements of the 31st Infantry Regiment moved to the SUWON area to relieve a Task Force of the 32d Infantry Regiment made up of Company "K" and tanks from the 73d Tank Battalion, already in that area. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 32d Infantry Regiment continued to advance to the east and north in the 7th Division zone against moderate to light resistance.

The 5th Marine Regiment line west of SEOUL and north of the HAN River extended from Hill 296 to SOGANG. On 23 September at 0700 the 1st Battalion, KMC, began an attack on enemy positions to its front in order to straighten out the line. Meanwhile, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marine Regiment, supported the advance by fire. In the advance only slight gains were made and the 1st Battalion, KMC, was unable to seize the objective. 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, was ordered to pass through the 1st Battalion, KMC, at 1500 hours to continue the attack. After this maneuver the 1st Battalion, KMC, moved to an assembly area. The attack was then continued against fierce resistance with heavy friendly casualties.

The attacking force was ordered to halt and consolidate its minor gains. The entire attack was held up pending the reduction of the heavily fortified enemy position in front of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment.

The enemy launched a counterattack at 1535 hours against the 5th Marine Regiment positions. This attack was repulsed. The left flank of the 5th Marine Regiment north of the river crossing site, remained quiet throughout the day.

5. THE CAPTURE OF YONGDUNGPO

At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, had seized the HAN River bridge approaches. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marine Regiment attacked and drove some 4000 yards through YONGDUNGPO to positions along the south bank of the HAN River. During the night the enemy launched two counterattacks against the 1st Marine Regiment.

The 7th Marine Regiment had little activity in its zone. The 7th Marine Regimental Headquarters and the 3d Battalion moved to assembly areas north of the HAN River.

The 7th Division was generally quiet at the front during this period with only minor activity against small units of the 9th NK Division. However, in the zone of the 32d Infantry Regiment the enemy was putting up stubborn resistance but was forced slowly to give ground. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the Regiment now occupied positions east of the hill mass south of the HAN River opposite SEOUL.

X Corps TAC (Marine Air Group 33) furnished close air support for the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. Total number of sorties flown was 78. Total number of aircraft reported on station for close air support was 78. An estimated 400 enemy troops were destroyed in two tunnels on the north edge of SEOUL.

On 24 September the 5th Marine Regiment was subjected to enemy mortar and artillery fire. At 0520 the Regiment received a counterattack by 3 enemy regiments which was repulsed. (1) The 2d Battalion at 0640 resumed the attack against heavy resistance after a 20 minute artillery and air preparation. The 1st Battalion commenced moving slowly toward regimental objective 2 at 0700. At 0810, 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, began movement down the east spur of Hill 296 to attempt to outflank the heavy resistance in front of the 2d Battalion and to gain better observation to support the 2d Battalion by fire.

With stiff resistance facing them, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, advanced toward Hill 105 sustaining heavy casualties. In order that the 3d Battalion could continue its attack in support of the 2d Battalion, the 1st Battalion was directed to move their reserve company from the right to the left flank, to relieve elements of the 3d Battalion on Hill 216. By 1430 the 2d Battalion had seized the objective (Hill 105) suffering its heaviest casualties of the Korean war.

6. SECOND HAN RIVER CROSSING: 24 September

The 1st Marine Regiment began preparation for the crossing of the HAN River at YONGDUNGPO by sending reconnaissance elements to the crossing site early on the morning of 24 September. At first light, the Engineers attacked

(1) Periodic Intelligence Report, X Corps, 24 September 1950

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to the 1st Marine Regiment, began clearing the crossing area. The crossing of the initial battalion was delayed by mines at the crossing site.

By 0800 a reconnaissance party and the assault elements of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, had crossed the HAN against sporadic mortar fire. Contact was made with the 5th Marine Regiment north of the river. The 2d Battalion moved rapidly into positions on the right flank of the 5th Marine Regiment and after the crossing the 2d Battalion began advancing on the hill mass of Hill 79. This advance was continued by the 1st Battalion, which executed a passage of lines of the 2d Battalion to seize Hill 79, in the face of heavy small arms, mortar and automatic fire. By 1600 the 3d Battalion was released from Division Reserve and crossed the HAN to join other Marine elements. During this period the Marine Battalions had advanced approximately 2000 yards. The Marines now held an almost solid line along the western side of SEOUL. (1)

The 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, began preparation to debark at INCHON. Meanwhile the 31st Infantry Regiment continued to consolidate defensive positions south of the airstrip at SUWON and astride the SEOUL-TAEJON Highway. The opposition continued light in that sector. Late that night an enemy road block and five tanks were knocked out in the SUWON area.

The 32d Infantry Regiment, after making a surprise predawn attack with the 2d Battalion, continued to move east against light enemy resistance and gained approximately 3000 yards.

The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT, landed at KIMPO airfield and began relief of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, on the Corps left flank south and west of the HAN River.

X Corps TAG destroyed 7 enemy tanks in SEOUL, destroyed several mortar and machine gun emplacements and destroyed and dispersed troops along the front. Eighty-one sorties were flown.

On 25 September, prior to daylight, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, moved forward in column of companies through the 2d Battalion and gained contact with the 1st Battalion on the right. This movement involved a 90 degree turn in the direction of the attack. The 1st Battalion was required to withdraw slightly and pivot on its left flank, yet remaining within its new zone.

Reorientation of the Regiment was particularly difficult due to passage of lines, a change in the Regimental direction of attack, and the unfavorable positions for supporting artillery on the opposite side of the HAN River. These problems were overcome however, without loss of control and by 0700 the attack to the east was underway into SEOUL. By noon the attack had gained momentum and continued forward with the support of tanks. At one point in the advance the 1st Battalion ran into an enemy position manned by approximately 1000 men. Concentration by 4.2 mortars flushed several hundred enemy troops from road blocks into the open where 1st Battalion machine gunners cut them down. The 3d Battalion was able to reach Hill 97 where contact was made with the 1st Battalion. All during the daylight hours there was heavy house to house fighting and the advance was hampered by fires in the city. At about 1930 hours the Marines tied in their positions for night defense. The regiment had advanced approximately 2300 yards during the period. (1)

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marine Regiment, had attacked at 0700, 25 September to seize that portion of SEOUL in the regimental zone. Resistance was light and the 3d Battalion was supported by the 2d Battalion in its advance on Hill 105. At 1335, 2d Battalion seized Hill 72 and continued to attack to seize Hill 105. The Division Reconnaissance Company occupied Hills 216 and 296 relieving elements of the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion assembled in the rear of the 3d Battalion in order to make the final attack for the capture of SEOUL in the regimental zone. The 3d Battalion later received a counterattack which was repulsed. (2) This counterattack delayed the immediate pursuit of the enemy who was withdrawing rapidly to the North.

After the day's actions the regiments were occupying positions approximately 2500 yards east of their original positions.

During the day the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment was relieved by the 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT. The 7th Marine Regiment then attacked east in the vicinity of Hill 285 in coordination with other elements of the 1st Marine Division meeting little or no resistance.

7. THIRD HAN RIVER CROSSING: 25 SEPTEMBER

- (1) 1st Marine Special Action Report, 1-30 September 1950
- (2) 5th Marine Special Action Report, 6 September - 7 October 1950

The 32d Infantry, 7th Division, attacked across the HAN River tightening the ring around SEOUL. Within one hour after the beginning of the crossing at 0630, the 2d Battalion had crossed the river in the face of enemy fire and by 1030 was on the slopes of the dominating hill mass of the first objective. By 1900 all primary objectives had been seized and the heights immediately south of SEOUL were in the hands of the 32d RCT. The 17th ROK Regiment crossed the river behind the 32d RCT to positions east of the 32d RCT. The rapid advance of the 32d RCT aided the Marine Units to continue their advance. (1)

RCT 17 off-loaded at INCHON and moved by foot and rail to positions near ANYANG-NI. Aerial observation reported the beginnings of an apparent withdrawal from SEOUL by the enemy.

I Corps TAC placed main effort on South Mountain in SEOUL. The area was neutralized and enemy troops dispersed. 114 sorties were flown during the day and 4 during the hours of darkness.

The time of attack of the 1st Marine Regiment for 26 September had been set for 0630, but on the night of 25 September the unit was alerted by CG I Corps for an attack at 0145. There immediately followed a hasty coordination with the 5th Marine Regiment. As the assault was to be preceded by artillery fire and as the preparations for this were found inadequate the assault battalions were notified to stand fast, and the attack time was reset at 0200. However, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment received a heavy enemy attack shortly before 0200 on their left flank. The main force of the attack was directed down the SEOUL Highway from the northeast. The Battalion, due to extensive preparations for the jump off, was extremely well prepared to meet the enemy. The enemy rushed in several tanks which were blasted by the Marines. This engagement cost the enemy 7 tanks destroyed and 3 damaged. The attacking force was estimated at 12 T-34 tanks, at least two self-propelled assault guns, and a heavily reinforced infantry battalion, supported by 120mm mortars. These efforts on the part of the enemy continued until 0540 when the force was finally repulsed. By 0900 the 2d Battalion,

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th US Infantry Division, 1-30 September 1950

1st Marine Regiment, continued the attack in conjunction with the 1st Battalion on the right.

For the remainder of the day the advance through SEOUL was painstakingly slow. By 1300 physical contact was established between 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment and elements of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment on the 1st Marine Division right boundary. Patrols from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, met patrols from the 5th Marine Regiment at about the same time. (2) As soon as the attack against the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, had been repulsed at 0445 a patrol was sent east to contact the 1st Marine Regiment. This was an attempt to coordinate pursuit of enemy elements to the north. Due to heavy enemy resistance the 1st Marine Regiment was unable to advance to the point of contact. However, by 1140, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, launched an attack in coordination with elements of the 1st Marine Regiment, after making contact. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment that afternoon advanced 500 to 600 yards against light resistance. The 2d Battalion mopped up in its zone, while the 1st Battalion, 1MC, mopped up in the areas to the rear of the regimental front line. It was generally quiet throughout the rest of the night in the 5th Marine Regiment zone.

The 7th Marine Regiment continued to protect the Division left flank and the HAN River crossing site.

The Division Reconnaissance Company remained on H⁴11 296.

The 3d Battalion, 187th Abn RCT, with the 3d Korean Marine Corps Battalion attached, continued the mission of protecting the Corps left flank on the KUMPO Peninsula. 1st and 2d Battalions assembled in the vicinity of KIMPO Airfield.

Shortly after daybreak 26 September, Company "L" 32d RCT observed a large column of enemy moving east of SEOUL and promptly launched a local attack. The rest of the RCT moved into Objective 2 against moderate enemy resistance. The 2d Battalion was counterattacked, but gave no ground and all units continued to move forward. (1)

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th US Infantry Division, 1-30 Sept 50.

(2) 1st Marines Special Action Report, 1-30 Sept 50.

The enemy continued to resist the 32d RCT attack SEOUL by heavy to moderate sniper fire and street fighting. The Regiment advanced 2000-3000 yards to the vicinity of CHONGNYON-30. Elements of the 17th RCT protected the HAN River crossing site and engaged in mopping-up operations.

The 2d Battalion, 31st RCT, reinforced by one company of the 1st Battalion, attacked south of SUWON and met well organized defensive positions supported by tanks and mortars. The attack progressed slowly. General Barr that evening ordered the 31st RCT to conduct a coordinated regimental attack to clear the enemy hill position south of SUWON. At this time the Regimental Commander had departed with a task force on a wide flanking movement to the south and east. The orders were delivered to this column near OSAN-NI. (1)

8. JUNCTURE WITH EIGHTH ARMY: 26 September 50

At 262320 September, elements of the 7th Infantry Division met elements of the 1st Cavalry Division about five miles south of SUWON. The last leg of the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division elements originated in the vicinity of CHONGJU. This juncture cut off North Korean Forces located in southwest Korea and marked the first meeting of the Eighth Army units from the south of Korea and I Corps units in the INCHON-SEOUL area.

9. CAPTURE OF SEOUL: 26 September 50

During the day General MacArthur issued the following communique:

"SEOUL, Capital of the Republic of Korea, is again in friendly hands. United Nations Forces, including the 17th Regiment of the ROK Army and elements of the U.S. 7th and 1st Marine Divisions, have completed the envelopment and seizure of the city.

While U.S. and ROK Marines and special troops drove to the northwest astride the HAN River to expand perimeter defenses, other Marine Units pushed into SEOUL from the northwest. Meanwhile, the 32d U.S. Regiment of the 7th Division, with the 17th ROK Regiment, in a bold sweep along the southern bank of the HAN, accomplished a second crossing of the river southeast of the city and occupied the commanding terrain on the outskirts, forcing the enemy garrison to flee in disorder to the north.

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th US Infantry Division, 1-30 Sept 50

The liberation of the city was conducted in such a manner as to cause the least possible damage to civil institutions." (1)

On 27 September, in the early morning, units of the 1st Marine Division resumed their attack against the enemy in the eastern portion of the City of SEOUL. In the 1st Marine Regiment zone the advance was made by the 1st and 2d Battalions against strong well organized resistance until the enemy position began to deteriorate late that afternoon. Approximately 3000 yards were gained in the fighting.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment advanced against light resistance and by 1015 hours had driven to the Russian Consulate Building. At 1610 the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment raised the American Flag over the Capitol Building. During the day the 7th Marine Regiment continued to protect the Corps left flank and repulsed a counterattack of battalion strength with the assistance of close air support at 1345. The 5th and 7th Marine Regiments made a link-up at 1500 hours.

On the KUMPO Peninsula, the 187th Airborne RCT conducted extensive patrolling.

By 1045 the 32d RCT was able to link-up with the 1st Marine Regiment after overcoming moderate enemy resistance. There were heavy enemy casualties in the sector and much enemy equipment was either captured or destroyed. To the east of SEOUL, the 17th ROK Regiment continued mopping-up operations.

In the 31st RCT sector, just prior to daylight, the task force under the 31st Infantry Regimental Commander was attacked by enemy tanks in USAN-NT, but they were driven off with bazooka fire and one tank destroyed. While proceeding north, a heavy fire fight developed, holding up the task force.

During the morning, the 31st RCT, minus parts of the 3d Battalion and the task force with the Regimental Commander, resumed the attack to the south from the SUWON area. This attack moved against a strong and determined enemy who was supported by artillery, mortars, and tanks. Progress was slow.

The Close Air Support Group attacked enemy machine gun, mortar, and artillery positions along the entire Corps front. Twenty-seven (27) requests

(1) Official Communique Number 9, dated 26 September 1950.

for strikes were received and sixteen (16) were flown for a total of seventy-eight (78) close support sorties. In addition, one (1) night close support mission was flown.

On 28 September elements of the 31st Regiment attacked north from OSAM-NI to eliminate the enemy cutting the road at MASSAMI-RI. The assault north from SUWON was also continued. An air strike was called on Hills 118, 92, and a tunnel in this area with excellent results. The 57th and 92d Field Artillery Battalions fired heavy concentrations accounting for about half of the enemy casualties. The RCT, after overcoming heavy resistance, occupied all objectives by 1625 hours. (1)

In the 1st Marine Division Sector at 0645, 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marine Regiment, continued to clear the remainder of SEOUL and seize Hill 133 and the commanding ground to the northeast. In the 1st Marine Division zone of action the enemy appeared to be broken and the division as a whole was engaged in mopping-up operations. The enemy had withdrawn all his forces from SEOUL except for small elements which had been left behind to fight a delaying action.

In the 5th Marine Regiment zone, patrols encountered no enemy resistance. As the Regiment's zone had been cleared and all assigned objectives were secured, the 5th Marine Regiment was pinched out by the 1st Marine Regiment from the right and the 7th Marine Regiment on the left as planned.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment provided security for the ceremony in SEOUL at which the government of South Korea was returned to the Capitol at SEOUL. By 2050 hours, mopping-up operations in the 5th Marine Regiment zone were completed.

The 3d Battalion, 32d RCT continued its advance north and cut the main highway running east from SEOUL. By 0200 hours, the 7th Division sector within SEOUL was cleared. X Corps then directed reconnaissance in force east of the TONSHON River.

1st and 2d Battalions, 187th Abn RCT were in Corps Reserve. The 3d Battalion (Reinforced) was designated Task Force Able with mission of pro-

(1) War Diary Summary, 7th U. S. Infantry Division, 1-30 Sept 50.

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testing the Corps left (north) flank. Security and Reconnaissance patrols from TF Able reported no enemy contact.

Close Air Support missions were conducted along the entire Corps front and consisted mainly of strikes against enemy mortar and machine gun positions and troops concentrations. All aircraft available were utilized.

By 29 September, X Corps had achieved its main objective in the SEOUL-INCHON area. There yet remained the clearing of the KUMPO Peninsula and the seizure of UIJONGBU which was the refuge of North Korean troops fleeing to the north. X Corps activities consisted of patrol action. There were instances of weak counterattacks by the enemy which were quickly repulsed. On 29 September, at SEOUL, a liberation ceremony was held at the Capitol Building where General MacArthur turned over the government to South Korean President Syngman Rhee.

At 1800 hours on 30 September the 7th Division was relieved of responsibility in the SEOUL area and the RCT's prepared to move into new areas.

As the month of September ended, Operation Chromite was brought to a completely successful conclusion. Although some mopping-up was continued into October, decisive results had been achieved in the brief space of fifteen (15) days since the landing at INCHON on 15 September. The victory had been won at the cost of only 3,498 UN casualties as opposed to 14,000 enemy killed and 7,000 captured.

PFC TAKEUCHI

CHANG CHUL

Capt (Seoul Regiment)

15 Sept 50 PW was attached to the Seoul Regiment located in Seoul. PW first learned on 16 September 1950 that US Troops had landed in Inchon. However no information was released in detail. At this time PW was acting commanding officer of 1st Company (1st Battalion, Seoul Regiment) 19 September 1950. The Regiment received orders to move to their assigned defense positions in Seoul City and vicinity. The Seoul Regiment was the only known unit in Seoul at this time. Nothing was heard as to receiving reinforcements for the Seoul Regiment.

According to hearsay, on the southern front, the North Korean Army was closing in on Pusan, their last objective.

PW was told from higher commander to lecture his troops "to die if necessary for the defense of Seoul".

The Inchon landing was quite a surprise to the troops of the Regiment who at no time were given any information concerning the battle situation. The Regiment was commanded by Col Lee Kyong U., who was last seen in Seoul.

American air attack and Arty caused the most casualties among North Korean troops. PW had no actual combat experience. Men of the Seoul Regiment received anywhere from 15 days to 2 months of military training. Heard that the South Korean people voluntarily worked for the North Korean Army and were paid by the North Korean government. PW had no knowledge as to who or what General MacArthur was.

The Seoul Regiment was ordered to die if necessary to defend the city of Seoul. The Regiment received no reinforcements. PW had given up hope of holding Seoul on 22 September 1950 due to heavy air attack resulting in large North Korean casualties.

North Korean Army now has no possibility of defeating the United Nations Forces. There is no comparison between the American and Russian supplied North Korean weapons and equipment.

The North Korean people as a whole have no desire to have war. However, information revealed that the South Korean Army had attacked North

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Korea by crossing the 38th parallel.

The North Korean Army presently is poorly equipped and only limited numbers of trained soldiers remain in North Korea.

THE CIVIL KUN

Lt. Col. 27th Brigade (No serial Number)

On 15 September 1950, the 27th Brigade was located in Kunshon above Seoul. PW was attached to this brigade as Chief of Cultural section.

During the early part of September 1950, it was rumored among high ranking officers of the brigade that U.S. Forces would make a landing at Wonsan, Inchon, or Mokpo in the very near future. After the landing of U.S. Forces in Inchon, the 27th Brigade was ordered to defend an area 24 kilometers north of Seoul, parallel to the 38th parallel. The purpose of this defense line was to block any advancing U.S. troops heading north after the capture of Seoul. Designations of major North Korean units located in Seoul at this time were unknown.


Received no information concerning reinforcements in this area. Due to the poor communication system, no information was available concerning the situation on the southern front.

PW lectured his troops frequently, "to die if necessary to hold their position". Also informed them that the 27th Brigade would not receive reinforcements (did not receive any from south). PW believed it was difficult to defend the Inchon-Seoul area without any planes. However, stated that with planes available the North Korean Air Forces would defend this area. There was no disagreement between PW and his Senior Commander what-so-ever.

The 27th Brigade was commanded by Brig. General KANG YON KIL and Asst Colonel SHIM RI BON. Their present location is unknown.

American planes and tank guns caused the most casualties among North Korean troops. In a combat area U.S. Infantry should not be loaded on trucks, because they look so conspicuous and are very easily spotted for targets. Believes that guerrilla tactics were most successful against U.S. troops.

As an average, the men of the 27th Brigade received about 20 days of military training. According to hearsay the U.S. 1st Marine Division was considered as giving the greatest threat to North Korean Units. The North Korean Army while in Seoul received very little cooperation from South Korean civilians. Very few of the civilians voluntarily cooked meals for troops in their homes.



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FW frequently lectured his troops that the South Korean Army had already been annihilated and therefore their enemy now was the United States. He told his troops to "die if necessary to protect their country from US aggression". FW gave no information to troops concerning the United Nations. General MacArthur was believed to be the Commander-in-Chief of the US troops in the Pacific Theater.

FW stated that the North Korean Army has still an adequate military strength (remaining in North Korea) to defeat the UN Forces. In the event this incident cannot be settled peacefully as North Korea desires the North Korean Army will continue to fight by guerrilla tactics for the next 10 to 20 years (even after being defeated by the United Nations Forces). FW has confidence that North Korea will eventually defeat the United Nations Forces. Every North Korean citizen has an unfavorable feeling towards America. It is always spoken and known among North Korean people that the war would have been over long ago without any damage or destruction of personal property if the United States had not aided the South Koreans and bombed the North Koreans.

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KIM YCNH MO

LT COL (107th Regt)

The 107 Regiment was located in KIMPO 15 September 1950. PW was temporarily attached to this regiment as Chief of Staff.

The regiment received no information concerning the INCHON landing, however, due to heavy naval gun fires and plane activities, the invasion was expected on or about 14 September 1950.

The 107 Regiment was originally ordered to defend the west coast excluding the Inchon area (west coast along the KIMPO area). However, immediately after the INCHON invasion the regiment was ordered to move and defend the entire area 4 kilometers northeast of INCHON.


At this time the 18th Division and the 64th Regiment were the only known North Korean units located in SEOUL. Heard that the 18th Division would receive an adequate number of reinforcements to defend SEOUL. No definite information was available on the southern front, however, informed sources indicated the North Korean Army was retreating in the TAEJON area.

PW had no opportunity to lecture any troops, however, according to hearsay from Battalion Commanders, the troops' morale was very high and they had confidence in defending the INCHON - SEOUL area.

Knowing the present military strength in the SEOUL area, PW had no confidence in defending the INCHON - SEOUL area, however, with two well trained and equipped North Korea Corps the mission could have been accomplished. The 107 Regiment was under the SEOUL Security unit commanded by Col Kim ---. Regimental Commander was Lt Col Che Han. After the INCHON invasion Lt Col Che Han ordered his regiment to retreat heading north without proper orders from higher headquarters in SEOUL. Therefore, he was arrested and was believed to have been court-martialed in SEOUL.

Air attacks and naval gun fire caused greater casualties among North Korean units. Air attack was the only type of US attack feared by North Korean troops (PW did not have any actual combat experience).

According to hearsay the American Infantry advance in the combat area was very slow and always gave North Koreans adequate time to reorganize in the front lines.



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The men of the 107th Regiment received an average of 20 to 30 days of military training. PW believed that very little cooperation was given by South Korean civilians which was believed to be compulsory. South Korean civilians were employed and paid by the North Korean government.

Heard that General MacArthur was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces in Korea. No intelligence reports were received concerning the U.S. Han River crossing, however, was expected and that a Marine Unit would cross by amphibious tractors and landing craft.

While attending a military school, PW learned American strategy through Korean translated Russian books. PW had given up hope of defending Seoul when he first learned the landing of U.S. troops at Inchon. North Korean Army has no possibility of defeating the United Nations Forces. What little military strength remains in North Korea is very poorly trained and equipped and is not sufficient to be used in combat. However, he believes that guerrilla activities will continue for quite some time.

The North Korean people had confidence in victory, however, did not desire war.

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CATALOGUE OF PLANS AND ORDERS

The following Plans and Orders initiate the INCHON-SEOUL operations:

CINCFE

1. Operation Plan 100B published 12 August 1950 was the first plan to develop the concept of an amphibious landing at INCHON combined with a drive by 8th Army from the South, the two forces making a junction at Seoul.
2. Operation Plan 100A published 5 August 1950 was an alternate plan to 100B in that it could be used as a feint to support a landing at INCHON, or could be used as the principal plan. Plan 100A involved an amphibious assault landing N of KUNSAM followed by a drive inland to seize the center of TAEJON.
3. CINCFE Operations Order # 1, published 30 August 1950 ordered CINCFE plan 100B put in execution. X Corps was ordered to land over beaches in the INCHON area; seize and secure INCHON, KIMPO Afd and SECUL and block enemy forces south of the line: SUWON-INCHON. Sever enemy communications in SEOUL area.

X CORPS

1. From CINCFE Plan 100B the X Corps Staff developed Staff Study 100B published 24 August 1950 in which the details of an amphibious assault landing at INCHON and the capture of SEOUL were worked.
2. From CINCFE Plan 100A the X Corps Staff developed Staff Study 100A, published 3 September 1950, in which the details of a ground, airborne, and air transported operation in the PIEN-TAN-TAEJON area were worked out.
3. Headquarters X Corps published Operations Order # 1 on 28 August based on CINCFE Operation Plan 100B, X Corps Staff Study 100B, and CINCUSC Operations Order # 1. The order initiated ground operations in the INCHON-SECUL area and set up airborne, or air landed operations to be executed on order.

CATALOGUE OF PLANS AND ORDERS

The following Plans and Orders were published by X Corps Headquarters during or immediately before the HICHON-SEOUL operation.

PLANS

1. Operation Plan Charlie was developed 12 September 1950, aboard ship. It modified Operation Order No. 1 in that it temporarily delayed the crossing of the HAN River in favor of a strong drive to the East and South to block the enemy retreat from the South.
2. Operation Plan 2 published 16 September 1950 provided for offensive operations by X Corps to seize KIMPO Airfield, the HAN River line West of SEOUL, and prepare to cross the HAN River, seize and secure SEOUL and the high ground North of the city.
3. Operation Plan 3 published 24 September 1950 developed more detailed plans for the seizure and securing of SEOUL.
4. An unnumbered Operation Plan was also published 24 September 1950 providing for an X Corps attack to the East to seize the HICHON-WONJU line and make a juncture with 8th Army.
5. Operation Plan 4 published 25 September 1950 was based on the assumption that a juncture with 8th Army would be along the SUWON-PYONGTAEK axis or the HICHON-CHUNGJU axis. The scheme of maneuver provided for: (a) The 7th Division to attack South thru HICHON (b) the 1st Mar Div to attack Southeast thru HICHON and West to HICHON (c) Task Force 1: 187th Abn REG and 17th ROK REG to secure SEOUL and the Corps North Flank and advance a task force to CHUNGHON (d) both the 7th Division and the 1st Mar Div were to prepare to push forward Task forces to meet 8th Army elements.

ORDERS

1. No order was published based on this plan, due to the rapid advance of X Corps units in the beachhead following the amphibious landing on 15 September 1950.
2. During the period 18-23 September five Operations Instructions were published (OI's 1-5) by Headquarters X Corps implementing Operation Plan 100B, Staff Study 100B, and Operation Plan 2.
3. Operations Instruction No. 6, published 24 September 1950 implemented Plan 3 and ordered a crossing of the HAN River and an envelopment of SEOUL from the SOUTH by the 32d Inf and the 17th ROK REG in conjunction with the 1st Marine Division attack from the West.
4. Operations Instructions No. 7 published 25 September 1950 ordered extensive patrolling and establishment of blocking positions beyond the Corps advance.

5. Operation Plan 5 published 26 Sep 1950 provided for a Corps defense line with blocking positions beyond this perimeter to intercept and destroy the enemy.

6. Operations Order No. 2 was published 28 September 1950 and ordered the establishment of a Corps defense line with blocking positions and straggler lines located on an outer perimeter.

Operations Instructions Numbers 8, 9, and 10 published on 1, 3, and 4 October respectively ordered limited mopping-up operations, relief procedure by 8th Army elements, and the assembling of units for the next operation.

DISCUSSION OF PLANS AND ORDERS

1. CINCFE OPN Plan 100A dated 12 August 1950 was the initial plan furnished to X Corps as guidance for the planning of the INCHON operation. Based on this plan X Corps produced Staff Study 100 dated 24 Aug 1950. This study was the initial concept of projected X Corps operations in the INCHON-SEOUL Area.

2. As stated in the above cited staff study, Phase line A-A, the initial phase line east of INCHON, was predicated on the assumption that the initial landing was to be made on the possible beaches along the western water front of the city of INCHON and on the island of WOLMI-DO which is immediately west of and connected by a causeway to INCHON. Phase line A-A represented a front of approximately two and one-half miles on the first favorable high ground east of INCHON. It was visualized that this line would be held until forces could be built up to attack and reach the next objective. (1)

3. Phase line B-B was designed to secure the high ground and the necessary beachhead to prevent enemy artillery fire from reaching landing beaches from inland. Also phase line B-B was to provide maneuver room and to secure a base from which to launch the attack to seize KIMPO Airfield. The Commanding General, from the inception of planning, had determined that the seizure of KIMPO was of vital importance both from a logistic and operation point of view. Consequently the scheme of operations ashore was designed with this objective in view. (2)

4. Phase line C-C was selected in order to expand and secure the beachhead and to secure KIMPO Airfield. In view of the known limitations of the beach and port facilities in the INCHON area, the paramount requirement for an operating Airbase to land supplies and troops dictated this element of the scheme of operations.

5. Phase line D-D secured KIMPO Airfield, possible sites for a river crossing, and the favorable hill masses south of SEOUL. It was anticipated that the main effort of enemy reaction would be to the north on the OSAN-SUWON axis. Hence the early organization of a defensive position on phase line D-D was indicated. Actually, due to the aggressive and successful action of the 7th Div South of SUWON and due to the Eighth Army's rapid advance from the south, the anticipated enemy reaction did not materialize to the extent anticipated.

6. Phase line DD-EE included the commanding terrain both north and south of SEOUL. The site and manner of crossing at the HAN River was not finally determined until the X Corps had established Headquarters ashore. However, it was anticipated that a crossing would be made north of KILPO at the temporary crossing site. It was subsequently decided to cross at this location.

7. Phase line F-F was to be occupied as rapidly as the situation permitted. As the situation actually developed this phase line was occupied as planned except that strong points were established south and west of the line at KUNYANG JANG-YI, INCHON, and WONJU.

8. Subsequent to the issuance of CINCFE OPN Plan 100B, CINCFE issued OPN Order No 1. This order directed the INCHON-SEOUL operation. Based on this order X Corps prepared and disseminated X Corps operation order # 1 which followed the concept of ground operations as outlined in X Corps Staff Study 100B described above.

- (1) For phase lines see Annex A to X Corps Staff Study 2d Edition dated 24 August 1950
- (2) Para 3, Staff Study, 2nd Edition, X Corps dated 24 August 1950

THE CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS

15	August 1950	Section activated as the G-3 Section, Special Planning Staff, ONHQ.
1 - 3	September 1950	Section participated in CFX at Camp Drake and Atsugi, Japan.
10	September 1950	Section embarked on USNS Buckner at Yokohama, Japan.
11	September 1950	USNS Buckner sailed for Inchon, Korea.
15	September 1950	USNS Buckner joined invasion fleet off Inchon, Korea. This was D-Day.
19	September 1950	Section Advance Party landed at Inchon and established CP.
20	September 1950	Section closed on shore.
21	September 1950	Vice Admiral Struble turned over command of land operations to General Almond.
22	September 1950	Section Advance Party moved to Ascom City.
23	September 1950	Section closed in Ascom City and CP opened in new location at 1200 hours.

Maps: Annex B

Task Orgn: Annex J

28 Aug 50

1. a. Annex B.
 - b. UN Forces: EIGHTH ARMY conducts offensive Opns on TAEJON-SUWON axis. NAVFE and FEAF Spt EIGHTH ARMY and X Corps.
 2. X Corps initiates landing on D-Day to seize and secure INCHON-KIMPO AFld area; Adv to secure SEOUL; Adv to Phase Line E-E, Annex A, and prepares for further offensive Opns.
 3. a. 1st Mar Div (Reinf):
 - (1) Rept to Atk Force Cdr as Landing Force, assault INCHON D-Day, H-Hour.
 - (2) Conduct RH Opns on Atk Force O, Coord w/Corps plan of Opns, Annex A. Revert to Corps control on O.
 - (3) Seize and protect KILPO AFld at once, then Adv to HAN River line west of SEOUL, Phase Lines C-C and D-D, Annex A, in Z.
 - (4) On O, seize SEOUL and commanding Grd north of SEOUL, Phase Line E-E, Annex A, protecting, w/not less than 1 RCT, approaches to SEOUL leading from north and northeast.
 - (5) Adv on O to Phase Line F-F, Annex A, in Z, conduct Rm in force to south and southeast, prepare to advance (-1 RCT) through INCHON.
 - (6) Protect Corps left flank.
 - (7) Furn Log Spt all forces ashore until Reld by INCHON Base Cnd on Corps O.
 - b. 7th Inf Div (Reinf):
 - (1) Land INCHON area on O, Adv and seize commanding Grd south of SEOUL, Phase Line D-D, Annex A, in Z, protect Corps right flank.
 - (2) Adv on O to Phase Line F-F, Annex A, in Z, conduct Rm in force to south, prepare to Adv through OSAN.
 - (3) Provide 1 RCT as Corps Res, to be released on O.
 - c. 17th ROK Inf Regt: Occupy SEOUL on O, after seizure by 1st Mar Div (Reinf).
 - d. Corps Res: Initially 1 RCT, 7th Inf Div, INCHON area pending arrival 1 RCT, 3d Inf Div.
 - e. 1 RCT, 3d Inf Div: Land INCHON area on O as Corps Res.
 - f. 187th Abn RCT: Prepare for Abn or Grd Opns on O.
 - g. Corps Arty: Furn Spt as O - Annex G.
 - h. Corps AAA: Furn Spt as O.
 - i. Corps Engr Gp: Furn Spt as O.
 - j. KIMPO TP: Establish KIMPO AFD and provide AA Def therefor.
 - k. SEOUL Area Comd: On O Mv to SEOUL and discharge assigned responsibilities.
 - l. INCHON Base Comd:
 - (1) On O assume Comd shore party Elms.
 - (2) Provide beach and AA Defense INCHON area.
 - (3) Spt Corps, establish initial Supply Level of 15 days.
 - x. (1) D-Day, H-Hour to be announced.
 - (2) Contact, right to left.
4. Admin O #1.
5. a. Comd relationships, Annex I.
 - b. CPs: X Corps, AGC 7: Others - report location.
 - c. Com: Annex D.
 - d. Zone time, ITEM.

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BY COMMAND OF LWJGR GENERAL ALMOND:

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG 72/13 (3)

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Hq X Corps
APO 909
28 Aug 50

ANNEXES:


- A - Opns Overlay
- B - Int
- C - Civil Affairs
- D - Com
- E - NGF Spt
- F - Air Spt
- G - Arty
- H - Coord Sptng Arms
- I - Comd Relationships
- J - Task Orgn
- K - Air Defense
- L - Engr
- X - Distribution

OFFICIAL:


J. H. CHILES
Lt Col GSC
G-3

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG 73/13 (3)

~~Top Secret~~



ANNEX "J"

TASK ORGANIZATION

Command Group

Hq & Hq Co X Corps

- 4th Sig Bn
- 1 Honor Guard Platoon
- X Corps MP Co Prev (reinf)
- 1 ea Civil Assistance Team

a. 1st Mar Div Reinf - - - - - Maj Gen O P Smith

- 1st Mar Div FMP
- 17th ROK Inf Regt
- 1st Am Trac Bn FMP (-1 Co)
- 1st Am Trk Co FMP
- 1st Armd Amph Bn FMP (-2 Cos)
- Btry C, 1st 4.5 Rkt Bn FMP
- 7th M T Bn FMP (-)
- 1st Combat Serv Gp FMP
- Carr Plat FMP
- Mar Air Contl Gp 2
- Naval Beach Gp 1 (-UDT)
- Co A 56th Amph Tnk & Trac Bn (reinf) USA
- 96th FA Bn, USA
- 2nd Engr Spec Brig USA
- 73rd Engr (C) Bn USA
- 60th Engr Port Const Co, USA
- 65th Ord Ammo Co USA
- Det 205th Sig Rep Co
- Det 4th Sig Bn
- 1 ea Civil Assistance Team

b. 7th Inf Div Reinf - - - - - Maj Gen D B Barr

- 7th Inf Div
- 92nd Armd FA Bn
- Det 205th Sig Rep Co
- Det 4th Sig Bn
- 1 ea Civil Assistance Team

c. 3d Inf Div (Reinf) - - - - - Maj Gen Robt B Soule

d. 187th Abn RCT - - - - - Col P J Howan

- 2348th QM Air Pckg & Supply Co

e. Corps Arty - - - - - Col E C Burkart

- Hq & Hq Btry 5th FA Gp
- 96th FA Bn (On order)
- 92nd Armd FA Bn (on order)
- 56th Amph Tnk & Trac Bn (-)
- 50th AAA AW Bn (SP)

f. Corps Engr Gp (19 Engr Gp (C) - - - - - Col F H Forney

- Hq & Hq Co 19th Engr (C) Gp
- 185th Engr (C) Bn
- 91st Water Sup Co
- 76th Engr Dp Trk Co
- 44th Engr Const Bn
- 62nd Engr Coast Bn
- 538th Engr Maint Co
- 630th Engr Lt Equip Co
- 528th Engr Panel Bridge Co
- 58th Engr Roadway Bridge Co
- 573rd Engr Pontoon Bridge Co

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TASK ORGANIZATION

- g. KIMPO Task Force - - - - - Col F Gray
(AF Elements)
811 Avn Engr Bn
Btry "A" 50 AAA AW Bn (On call from Corps Arty)
- h. SEOUL Area Command - - - - - Col J H Hagan
Hq & Hq Det Area Comd
1 Honor Guard Platoon (On order)
- i. INCHON Base Comd - - - - - Brig Gen G C Stewart
1st Mar Div Shore Party (on order)
2nd Engr Sp Brig (on order)
73rd Engr (C) Bn (on order)
50th Engr Port Constr Co (on order)
65th Ord Ammo Co (on order)
82nd Engr Pet Dist Co
712th Engr Depot Co
181st Signal Depot Co
205th Signal Repair Co
272nd Signal Const Co
581st Radio Relay Co
Sig Opns Co (Prov)
1st Mbl Surg Hosp
4th Fid Hosp
121st Evac Hosp
421st Med Coll Co
560th Med Amb Co
618th Med Clr Co
Sec Bld Dist Co 6th Med Dep
Adv Plat 6th Med Dep
Det Hq & Hq 163rd Med Bn
Det 150th Vet Food Insp Co
Hq & Hq Det 74th Ord Bn
Hq & Hq Det 328th Ord Bn
1st Ord Med Maint Co
7th Ord Med Maint Co
82nd Ord Hvy Maint Co
330th Ord Depot Co
538th Ord MAM Co
Det 508th Ord Tech Intl Co
15th Ord E D Squad
69th Ord Ammo Co
Hq & Hq Co 60th Ord Gp
Hq & Hq Co 52nd Trans Trk Bn
377th Trans Trk Co
396th Trans Trk Co
505th Trans Trk Co
514th Trans Trk Co
558th Trans Amph Trk Co
Hq & Hq Co 55th Trans Trk Bn
Hq & Hq Co 14th Trans Port Bn
155th Trans Port Co
20th QM Sub-Supply Co
130th QM Bkry Co (Mbl)
527th QM Serv Co
537th QM Laundry Co (SMbl)
549th QM Laundry Co (SMbl)
565th QM Graves Reg Co (1 Plat only)
Det Hq & Hq 6th QM Gp
58th QM Salv Co
Det Hq & Hq 142nd QM Bn
506th QM Pet Supply Co (Mbl)
6th QM Pet Prod Lab

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EXCER 22C ARMY BY 12672113 (3)

Op O #1

~~1075 [unclear]~~
ANNEX "J"

11g Corp.
APO 404
28 Aug 50

TASK ORGANIZATION

- 564th QM Clo & GS Co (1 Plat only)
- Det Hq & Hq Co 4th Cml Sm Gen Bn
- 69th Cml Smoke Gen Co
- Det 504th Cml Serv Co
- 21st Cml Decon Co (Cadre only)
- Det Hq & Hq Co 110th Repl Bn
- 369th Repl Co
- 52nd Repl Co
- 55th Repl Co
- 51st APU Type F
- 66th APU Type F
- 112th APU Type F
- 117th APU Type F
- 105th Fin Disb Sec
- 106th Fin Disb Sec
- 1 ea Civil Assistance Team

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ALMOND:

CLARK L. RUFFNER
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. H. Chiles
J. H. CHILES
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC
Asst Chief of Staff, G-3

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG 72113 (3)

~~Top Secret~~

Opn Plan CHARLIE

X Corps
APO 939
11 Sep 50

Maps: KOREA 1:50000, Sheets J 52N, J 52M

Task Orgn: Annex 1

1. General Situation: X Corps is advancing to objective area in accordance with X Corps Opn U 1.

- a. En forces: See current Int Summary
- b. Friendly forces: CTF 90 Spt X Corps. Joint Exp Force Comdr. FEAF provides air spt in deep penetrations.
- c. Assumptions: Annex 2
 - (1) X Corps is on phase line C-C and CG X Corps has taken command of forces ashore.
 - (2) En facing Eighth Army is withdrawing N on routes E of SEOUL and is organizing defensive posns on N bank Han River.

2. MISSION: X Corps Adv to HAN River, phase line D-D and mv to phase line D1-F1. objs 1 and Z in order to block En adv to N.

3. a. 1st MAR DIV: 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn;
Atchd: 73d Engr Combat Bn; 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn; 96th FA Bn
Det: 17th ROK Inf Regt
 - (1) Adv to HAN River and phase line D-D in Z.
 - (2) Secure KELPO Afld.
 - (3) Prepare to cross HAN River on U.
- b. 7th INF DIV:
Atchd: 17 ROK Inf Regt; 92d Armd FA Bn; 377, 396 Trk Cos.
Det: 17 Inf Regt.
 - (1) Adv phase line D-D in Z
 - (2) Seize Objs 1, 2 and 3
 - (3) Block En Adv N phase line D1-F1
- c. 187th ABN RCT (Reinf)
 - (1) Airland AEMRO Afld on O
 - (2) Prepare airdrop Vic ICHON 6226, seize com center ICHON atchd 7th Div on contact.
- d. INCHON Base Comd:
Det: 73d Engr C Bn
377th Trans Trk Co
396th Trans Trk Co
56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn
Atchd: 50th AAA AW Bn (-)
 - (1) Defend INCHON from air atk and counter landing.
- e. KELPO Task Force
Atchd: Btry A, 50th AAA Bn
 - (1) Mv to place in Opn status KELPO afld.
- f. CORPS ARTY:
Det: 92d Armd FA Bn.
96th FA Bn
50th AAA Bn.

- g. CORPS MGR:
Prepare spt 1st Mar Div in river crossing.
- h. 1st Mar Air Wg:
Cent close air spt.
- i. CORPS RES: 17th Inf Regt:
 - (1) Prepare Adv on SUWON.
 - (2) Prepare Atchmt to 1st Mar Div.
 - (3) Prepare revert 7th inf Div.
- x. 1. INCHON Base Com coordinate routes of Liv of Det units with 1st Mar Div and X Corps FM.
- 2. KIMPO TF: Report CG 1st Mar Div for routes and timing of Mv, coord X Corps MP.

4. Annex 3

- 5. a. CP's: X Corps N/C; other Rpt Locs.
- b. Axis of Sig Com: Opn Uwan, Annex 4.

ALIXED
Maj Gen

Annexes:

- 1-Task Orgn
- 2-Assumption
- 3-Admin (NOT ISSUED)
- 4-Ops Overlay
- 5-Airty (NOT ISSUED)
- 6-Engr (NOT ISSUED)
- 7-Coord Spt Arms (NOT ISSUED)

Authenticated

J. H. CHILES
Lieutenant Col, GSC
Asst Chief of Staff G-3

Annex 1, Task Orgn to
Opn Plan CHARLIE

X Corps
APO 909
11 Sep 50

1st Mar Div Reinfc Maj Gen O. P. Smith
Atchd: 73d Engr C Bn
56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn
96th FA Bn

7th Inf Div Maj Gen D. D. Barr

Det: 17th Inf Regt
Atchd: 17th ROK Inf Regt
92d Armd FA Bn
377, 396 Trk Cos.

187th Abn RCT Col F. S. Bowen

ENGINE Base Comd Brig Gen G. C. Stewart
Det: 73rd Engr C Bn; 377, 396 Trans Trk Cos; 56 Amph Tk & Trac Bn

KRFO Task Force Col J. D. Lee

Atchd: Btry A, 50th AAA Bn

Corps Arty Col W. F. Ennis

Det: 92d Armd FA Bn
96th FA Bn
50th AAA Bn

Corps Engr. Col F. H. Forney

East Mar Air Wg Maj Gen Gield Hains

Annex 2. Assumptions to
Opn Plan CHARLIE

X Corps
AFO 909
11 Sep 50

ASSUMPTIONS

1. CG Dive will not be used S of 38th Parallel.
2. Eighth Army attacks, combined with the psychological and material effects of X Corps landing, has made the enemy decide to withdraw to the N bank of the HAN River.
3. En route is E of SEOUL avoiding U. S. forces.
4. CCRNAVPE & FEAF cont. spt.

ANNEX A

INTELLIGENCE PLAN

MAPS: See Annex B to Opn C #1, X Corps, 27 Aug 50.

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

See Appendix A, Intelligence Estimates.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. What is the nature, extent, and strength of enemy defensive positions between the line of contact and the general line NAMJANG-DAI (TA 2165) - SEOUL - KWAKAK-SAN (TA 2045)?

b. Will the enemy attempt to halt our eastward advance by the movement of reinforcements from SEOUL, or will he merely delay our advance with forces presently in contact while establishing a strong defensive position east and north of the HAN River?

c. Will the enemy reinforce the elements now in the objective area with the elements of the 107th Regt northwest of SEOUL, with replacements from UIJONGBU, with elements of the 105th Regt at ~~...~~, or with elements of security regiments from CHUNGJU and SIJU? If so, when will these reinforcements arrive, and what route will they take?

d. Will the enemy initiate air attacks against our forces? If so, in what strength and what is the nationality of the pilots and the source of the aircraft?

e. Will the Chinese Communists openly intervene, or will they provide CCF-trained North Korean replacements?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

a. 1st Marine Division will: (in addition to intelligence missions assigned in Intelligence Annex to Opn C #1)

(1) Report the nature, extent, and strength of enemy defensive installations in zone with particular attention to the general lines: TA 0655 - TA 0754 - TA 0550 - TA 0346.

(2) Report by FLASH message new identifications, with particular reference to the 27th and 33rd Bns of the 107th Regiment, and elements of the 105th Regiment.

b. 7th Infantry Division will: (upon assignment of a zone of operations, and in addition to intelligence missions assigned in Intelligence Annex to Opn C #1)

(1) Report the nature, extent, and strength of enemy defensive installations in zone with particular attention to the general lines: TA 0549 - TA 0545 - TA 0342, and TA 1150 TA 1047 - TA 1141.

(2) Report by FLASH message new identifications, with particular reference to elements of the 105th Regiment.

c. Marine Air Group 23 will perform or otherwise arrange for:

(1) Daily visual reconnaissance of the following areas and routes of communications, paying particular attention to troop, rail and motor movements and troop concentrations:

(Open Plan #2. Hq. X Corps, dtd 15 Sep 50 cont'd)

- (a) SEOUL-KUMPO-ANYANGNI (37-23, 125-55) ICHHAN Area.
- (b) SEOUL-KAESONG-SARIWON-PYONGYANG.
- (c) KAESONG-HANJU-SARIWON-PYONGYANG-SINGYE (38-30, 125-32).
- (d) SEOUL-YONGCHON (38-05, 127-04) SINGYE-YANGDOK (39-10, 125-54).
- (e) SUWON-PYONGTAEK (37-00, 127-05) TAEJON-NONSAN (35-12, 127-04) PYONGTAEK.
- (f) SEOUL-ICHON (37-15, 127-26) CHUNGJU (35-58, 127-55) HANGTANG (35-33, 128-10).
- (g) SEOUL-WONJU (37-20, 127-55) TANYANG (35-55, 128-20) ANDONG (35-34, 128-44).
- (h) SEOUL-CHUNGHON (37-53, 127-43) HWANGGURI (38-18, 128-33) YANGYANG (38-04, 128-37) INJE (30-05, 128-10).
- (i) UIJONGBU (37-45, 127-03) KUMHWA (38-18, 127-27) KOJO (38-57, 127-53) WONSAN (39-10, 127-27).
- (j) The HAN River from a point 15 miles west of SEOUL to a point 10 miles east of SEOUL, to include bridges and known ferry sites. Flights at 0500-1100-1500-1900, until under our control.

(2) Nightly Visual Reconnaissance:

- (a) Route (b) above.
- (b) Route (c) above.
- (c) Route (e) above.
- (d) Route (g) above.
- (e) Route SEOUL-UIJONGBU-YONGCHON.

(3) Photo Reconnaissance:

- (a) Photograph the following towns daily until taken by friendly troops. Scale 1:8000.

1. HAEJU - (38-02, 125-42)
2. KAESONG - (37-58, 125-34)
3. SARIWON - (38-30, 125-44)
4. SEOUL - (37-52, 125-55)
5. SINGYE - (38-30, 125-32)
6. KUMHWA - (38-18, 127-28)
7. CHUNGHON - (37-52, 127-44)
8. WONJU - (37-20, 127-56)
9. PYONGTAEK - (37-00, 127-05)
10. CHUNGJU - (35-58, 127-56)
11. TANYANG - (35-56, 128-20)
12. HANGTANG - (35-34, 128-10)
13. TAEJON - (35-20, 127-05)
14. ANDONG - (35-35, 128-44)

(Opn Plan #2 Hq X Corps, 300 15 Sep 50 cont'd)

(b) Photograph SOGA-(37-28, 125-43)-SEOUL Road, 1:8000, until captured.

(c) Photograph the following roads and rail lines at approximately 1:8000-1:10,000, three(3) times weekly:

1. SEOUL-CHUNGHOM
2. SEOUL-CHUNGSU
3. SEOUL-TAEJON
4. SEOUL-SARIWON
5. SEOUL-KUMHWA -FYONGGANG-UIJONGSU

(3) Photograph, upon request, enemy front lines.

(e) Print requirements.

1. Sorties of principal towns in two(2) sets
2. Sortie of SOGA-SEOUL in two(2) sets.
3. Road sorties listed in paragraph (3)(c) above in two(2) sets.
4. Front line sorties in five(5) sets.

3. For intelligence missions requested of higher Hqs and Eighth Army, see Intelligence Annex to Opn O #1.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL.

See X Corps SOP.

5. MAPS, MODELS, AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

See X Corps SOP and Appendix 3 to Intelligence Annex, Opn O #1

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

See X Corps SOP and Appendix 2 to Intelligence Annex, Opn O #1.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

See X Corps SOP.

8. AUXILIARY AGENCIES.

By separate distribution.

BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN ALMOND

+

CLARK L. RUFFNER
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

QUINN

M. W. QUINN

Lieutenant Colonel, 300
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

APPENDIX 1: Intelligence Estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan #2

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Operation 2

Hq X Corps
APO 909
16 Sep 50

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO 8

MAPS: KOREA, 1:250,000, AMS L551, Sheets J-52-M, J-52-N
KOREA, 1:50,000, AMS L751, Sheets 6526 I, II, III, IV and 6626 III and IV.

1. MISSION - X Corps initiates offensive operations to seize Kimpo Airfield, Han River line west of Seoul, high ground south of Seoul; prepares to cross Han River; seizes and secures Seoul and high ground north thereof on order.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. (1) See Estimate of the Enemy Situation Nos 1 - 7, X Corps.

(2) See Sketch No 1 for enemy disposition in Seoul.

b. Enemy opposition to the initial assault of the 1st Marine Division on Wolmi-do was light. Elements of the 3d Bn, 226 Regiment were identified as the Wolmi-do garrison. The regiment itself was reported to be the garrison of Inchon. The second assault of the 1st Marine Division met with stiff resistance from the enemy on Red Beach west of Inchon. During the night of 15 Sep and during the morning of the 16th, a portion of the Inchon garrison was cut off in the city and was being cleared out slowly. Those elements which escaped from the city were driven to the east as far as the line TA9648 - TA9644 by noon of the 16th. Enemy reaction to the operation has consisted only of a small scale tank attack along the Sosa - Inchon axis in which six or seven enemy tanks were destroyed.

c. Enemy forces capable of reinforcing the objective area consist of two battalions of the 107th Regt at Munsan and Kaesong, four battalions of the 106th Regt in the general area of Hongsong, and elements of security regiments at Chungju and Wonju. Distant reserves consist of divisions and other combat elements in contact with Eighth Army, untrained recruits and unidentified garrisons north of the objective area, and Chinese Communist elements reported along the Manchurian border.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. The enemy can continue to delay our advance with the forces now in contact, including the battalion of the 107th Regt on the north flank, while employing the Seoul garrison of approximately 5,000 troops to establish a defensive line east and north of the Han River.

b. The enemy is capable of reinforcing the forces now in contact by employing the Seoul garrison force and establishing hastily organized defensive positions on high ground crossing the Inchon - Seoul highway.

c. The enemy is capable of reinforcing the objective area by:

(1) Committing an unknown number of poorly trained recruits from the replacement pipe line.

(2) Committing the 3rd and 27th Bns of the 107th Regt, last reported at Munsan and Kaesong respectively.

(3) Moving to the objective area the four battalions of the 106th Regt at Hongsong, and elements of other security regiments at Chungju and Wonju.

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~~Secret~~

(4) Moving south unidentified and unlocated garrison forces from north of the 38th parallel.

(5) The overt intervention of Chinese Communist Forces from Manchuria.

d. The enemy is capable of conducting limited and sporadic air attacks.

4. DISCUSSION

a. Based on the opposition encountered to date, the enemy forces known to exist west and south of the Han River within our zone are physically capable of accomplishing no more than a delaying action. For this type of action, however, this terrain provides good delaying positions on the many prominent hills which command the road west; in addition, the paddy land restricts vehicular movement to the roads, which will aid the enemy in the establishment of road blocks.

b. There have been no reports indicating that forces known to be located in Seoul have moved across the Han River for the purpose of opposing our advance to the east. Should the enemy decide on this course of action, sufficient pontoon bridges, small boats and ferries are believed to be in operational condition to permit this movement.

c. Route reconnaissance along roads leading to the objective area from the location of known troop concentrations has revealed no major effort to reinforce the objective area. A truck column reported just north of Kaesong on the night of D-1 had disappeared by D-Day; a motor convoy moving north from Ansong on D-1 had also disappeared by D-Day; a large vehicle concentration, including 30 tanks, moving south from Antung gives evidence, however, of reinforcement of materiel and possibly personnel from the Manchurian border. It is anticipated that the enemy is resorting to his previously successful method of moving reinforcements over back roads at night. In view of this possibility, the capability of an undetected reinforcement continues to exist.

d. In spite of continuing preparations to receive aircraft at advance airfields in the ROK, the reinforcements have not yet arrived. This serious threat to the success of the North Korean campaign may presage the long awaited aircraft; or may even prompt intervention on the part of the Chinese Communists.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Based on information presently available, it is estimated that the enemy will conduct a delaying action with the forces presently located west and south of the Han River in our zone, and will defend the north and east bank of the Han River with the Seoul garrison pending the arrival of reinforcements from the north or south. It is estimated, however, that the Eighth Army attack which was launched on 16 Sep 50 will preclude any major reinforcement of our objective area from the south.

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G-2

Inclosure:
Sketch - Enemy dispositions
in Seoul


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CODED SEC ARMY BY 126-72113 (5)

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ENEMY DISPOSITIONS IN TROIL
(See Sketch #1 Attached)

1. 3 AA guns & trenches
2. 2 20 mm AA guns
3. 3 AA guns
4. 2 Ponton Bridges
5. 4 AA Emplacements, unoccupied
a/o 30 Aug 50
6. 2000 Troops (Recruits)
7. 1500 Troops
8. 8 Tanks & 15 Trucks
9. Fire trench system w/uncovered
weapons pits
10. AA Guns
11. Personnel Shelter, above ground
12. 3 Foss AA guns and trenches
13. Pillbox
14. Strong Point
15. 2 AA guns
16. 7 covered weapons pits
17. 4 AA guns and trenches
18. AA guns
19. 1000 Troops
20. 7 Covered weapons pits
21. AA Guns
22. 4 Dual purpose guns
23. 3 AA guns
24. AA guns and trenches
25. 2000 Troops (Volunteers)
26. GHQ, 19th NK Army
27. 3 Dual purpose guns
28. 4 Dual purpose guns
29. 500 Troops
30. 2 Covered weapons pits
31. AA guns and trenches
32. 5 Dual purpose guns and Communication Trenches

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ENEMY DISPOSITIONS IN SEOUL
 SKETCH NO 1
 FOR INTEL EST NO 8
 SCALE 1: 50,000

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
 NO DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC

Secrets

Secrets

X Corps
1st Lt (9551) Korea
24110

Opn Plan

Map: NK22K, 1:1,000,000

Task organization

1st Mar Div
7th Inf Div (-)
187th Abn RCT
Atch 17th Rok Regt
1st, 2d, 3d ROK Mar Bns

Task Force 17

17th RCT
Corps Res
32d RCT
Corps Arty
92d Armd FA Bn
96th FA Bn

1. a. Periodic Intelligence Report.
b. (1) Eighth Army Cont Off Opns on TAEJU-SANGJU-CHUNJU-ICHON axis.
(2) NAVFE and FEAF Spt Eighth Army and X Corps
c. Assumption: X Corps has seized SEOUL; 17 ROK and 187 Abn RCT have landed.
2. a. X Corps Atks in Z to seize ICHON-WONJU line and make juncture with Eighth Army.
3. a. 1st Mar Div
(1) Cross to S side of river.
(2) Atk in Z.
(3) Seize ICHON, YOJU, and WONJU in that order.
b. 7th Inf Div (-) secure SUWON-ICHON line.
c. 187th Abn RCT (✓) relieve 1st Mar Div in position, protect Corps M flank.
d. Task Force 17 atk from ICHON S along CHUNJU-SANGJU road to make juncture with Eighth Army.
e. Corps Arty
(1) 92d Armd FA Bn G/S with priority to 187th Abn RCT.
(2) 96th FA Bn D/S 1st Mar Div.
f. Other Units N/C
g. Corps Res 32d RCT
x. TF 17 has priority on traffic to and thru ICHON for first two hours after its seizure.
4. Adm O 2-50.
5. a. Signal Instruction
(1) Current SOI
(2) 4th Sig Bn will furnish to TF 17 three HF radio teams for Corps Command Net, Corps Overload net and contact with 1st Cav Div. One AM/IRC-3 for a point to point voice circuit between TF 17 and 1st Mar Div.
b. Command Post
Corps at ASCO...
1st Mar Div at ...
7th Inf Div at ...
187th Inf RCT at ...
c. Communications
X Corps HQ at ...
7th Inf Div at ...
187th Inf RCT at ...

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Annex: A - Opn Overlay

Distr: A, C and D
32d RCT (7th Inf Div) - 1

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G-3

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251200 Sep 50

Opn Plan 4

Map: KOREA, 1:1,000,000

1. SITUATION:

- a. The enemy confronting Eighth Army is disintegrating. Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division were at POUN, 20 miles NW of TAEJON as of 241700 Sep 50. The enemy is attempting to withdraw his heavy equipment including tanks, trucks and artillery, over the main north-south routes. To this end he is attempting to fight delaying actions with infantry elements. The Corps Engineer's analysis shows that there are five main routes of withdrawal. These are: Route 1 - The SEOUL-SUFON-TAEJON axis; Route 2 - The CHUNJU-SEOUL axis; Route 3 - The CHUNGJU-CHUNCHEON axis; Route 4 - The TANYANG-INSJE axis; Route 5 - The east coast road. Of these five routes land 2 are already blocked by X Corps, 4 is a secondary route and 5, the east coast route, is subject to interdiction by naval and air action. The major route of withdrawal therefore is route 3, the CHUNGJU-CHUNCHEON axis.
- b. X Corps launched an attack to seize SEOUL on the morning of 25 September utilizing the 1st Mar Div, the 52d Inf Regt, 7th Div and the 17th ROK Inf Regt. On the assumption that this attack will result in the taking of SEOUL by 1800 hours on 28 September the following forces become available for further X Corps operations:
 - 1st Mar Div plus 3 KMG Bns.
 - 17th ROK Inf
 - 7th Inf Div (including 17th Inf Regt)
 - Elements of 187th Abn RCT
- c. The 187th Abn RCT will close at KINPO on or about 1 Oct. The CO, Col BQHEM, states that his unit would not be ready for an air drop before 7 October. One Inf Bn, 187th is available now, one battalion arrives on the 23th, and thereafter the regimental RCT arrives in daily increments closing on 1 Oct.

2. Courses of Action Open to X Corps:

- a. The mission of all UN forces in KOREA is to destroy the NKPA south of the 38th parallel. Under these conditions X Corps must block routes of advance north preventing the enemy from withdrawing his heavy equipment. In addition X Corps should be prepared for an early link up with Eighth Army elements in order that operations of the two UN ground commands in KOREA may be closely coordinated.
- b. Blocking Positions:
 - (1) Routes 1 and 2 (Overleaf attached) are blocked by the capture of SEOUL. These routes can be further blocked by a X Corps advance on OSAN and ICHON.
 - (2) The east coast route (5) is not accessible to the bulk of UN forces.
 - (3) There remains one major route to be closed; the CHUNGJU-CHUNCHEON axis. In accordance with the Corps Engineer's estimate there are three blocking positions on this route in the following order of preference: CHUNGJU; WONJU; CHUNCHEON. Access to any one of the three requires bridging for heavy traffic.
 - (4) Based on the above, courses of action open to X Corps to block the one major remaining avenue of retreat are:
 - (a) Move a force from SEOUL to CHUNCHEON.
 - (b) Attack through ICHON and thence east to WONJU.
 - (c) Attack SE through ICHON to CHUNGJU.
- c. Junctionure with Eighth Army:
 - (1) Eighth Army was ordered to make its main effort on the KUNCHEON-TAEJON axis. Elements of the Eighth Army are now in a position to envelope TAEJON from the North. Considering the terrain and road net there are the logical routes on which a juncture might be effected. These are (1) the TAEJON-CUNCHEON axis and (2) the KUNCHEON-CHUNCHEON axis.

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72/13

- (.) Either the above two juncture routes in consonance with the blocking mission. The blocking mission is best supported by a link-up on the KUNCHON-CHUNGJU axis.
- (c) Logistic considerations:
In general an RCT can be logistically supported at any distance from INCHON. Support will be by air drop and/or by truck convoy. Little or no interference with air supply to KIMPO will be involved.
- (4) Communications:
 - (a) No voice circuits or telephone communications will be available to the RCT task force. Communication will be entirely by continuous wave radio.
 - (b) Call signs and frequencies of the Eighth Army element effecting the juncture must be obtained from Eighth Army. (A message has been dispatched requesting call signs and frequencies of the 1st Cavalry Division).
 - (c) The 4th Sig Bn will furnish one ECF-399 team for the Corps Command Net. The parent Division of the task force will furnish two SCR-198 teams: one for Corps and one for TF to contact Eighth Army element effecting juncture.
 - (d) CW Communication can be maintained to any distance the TF might be sent.

3. Operations:

Based on the assumption that the juncture will be effected on either the SUNON-PYONGTAEK axis (Route 1) or the INCHON-CHUNGJU axis (Route 2) the following is scheme of maneuver:

- a. 7th Inf Div attacks south through SUNON.
- b. 1st Mar Div attacks SW through INCHON and west to WONGJU.
- c. TF BOJEN; 187th Abn RCT and 17th ROK Inf Regt secures SOUL and Corps N flank and advances a TF to CHUNGHON.
- d. Both the 7th Div and 1st Mar Div are prepared to push forward a task force to effect juncture with Eighth Army elements.

4. Conclusions:

- a. A planning message should be sent to Eighth Army.
- b. The decision on task force organization must be made early enough to permit an exchange of call signs and frequencies with Eighth Army. 36 hours should permit such an exchange.

5. Recommendations:

- a. That scheme of maneuver be approved.
- b. That message to Eighth Army attached be approved.

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Annexes:

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DATE 10-10-01 BY 72113 (3)

~~SECRET~~

FROM: CG I Corps

TO: CO Army 8

INFO: CINCYE
NAFFE
FEAF
COM 7 FLT

X Corps attacks south and east to block retreating enemy. Request information on Eighth Army routes of advance to plan juncture with I Corps elements. Designation of Eighth Army unit or units and frequencies and call signs of units or unit requested for planning purposes. Corresponding information will be forwarded by this command as situation develops.

APPROVED:

CLARK L. RUFFNER
Maj Gen GSC
Chief of Staff

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GROUP THE ARMY BY 72113 (3)

~~SECRET~~

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Opn Plan 5

Map: KOREA, 1:250,000
Sheets J52, N, H, O, S, T, U.

1. a. Annex 1, Int (issued separately).
b. FFAF and MAFFE Spt X Corps. Eighth Army conducts offensive Opns.
2. a. X Corps Def phase line G, establishes blocking Pans, with Inf and tanks, phase line H and destroys Zn phase line H.
b. Annex 2, Ground Opn Overlay.
Annex 3, Air Opn Overlay.
3. a. 1st Mar Div:
Atch: 1st, 2d, 161 KMC Bns.
.17 ROK Inf Regt.
50th AAA Bn (-Btry C)
(1) Def Corps phase line G in Z.
(2) Block Zn adv, Pan 1, patrol to and block Zn Adv Pan 2, annex 2, Opn Overlay.
(3) Secure SEOUL.
(4) Prep Atk E to blocking Pan 1, Phase line H, on O.
(5) Prep Atk on SEOUL-WONJU axis on O.
(6) Prep Atk N and W employing not less than two US Mar Bn.
b. 7th Inf Div:
Det: 17th Inf Regt.
One Co, 73d Tk Bn.
(1) Defend phase line G in Z.
(2) Block Zn Adv Pan 4,5.
(3) Day patrol Pan 3 in force, Annex 2, Opn Overlay.
(4) Mv 17th Inf Regt Assy area Vic P'AN'GYO-RI (332138) as Corps Res.
(5) Prep Atk S and B to phase line H.
c. 187th RCT
Atch: 3d KMO Bn.
Btry C, 50th AAA Bn.
One Co, 73d Tk Bn.
(1) Defend phase line G in Z.
(2) Prep Atk on SUXON-OSAN axis.
d. 1st, 2d, 161 KMC Bns: Atch 1st Mar Div.
e. 17th ROK Inf Regt: Atch 1st Mar Div.
f. 50th AAA AW Bn (-Btry C): Atchd 1st Mar Div. Btry C: Atch 187th Abn RCT.
g. One Co, 73d Tk Bn: Atch 187th ABN RCT.
h. Corps Arty:
(1) 982 Armd FA Bn: G/S
(2) 96th FA Bn: G/S
(3) 50th AAA AW Bn (-C Btry) atchd 1st Mar Div. C Btry atchd 187th RCT.
(4) 56th Amph Tr & Trnc Bn (-): Atchd INCH'ON Base Command.
(5) Annex 4, Corps Arty.
i. X Corps TAC Air Comd:
(1) Furnish close air Spt.
(2) Day and Night interdiction Vic WONJU.
(3) Day and Night interdiction roads leading into Phase line H.
(4) Annex 3, Air Opn Overlay.
j. Corps Engrs: 19th Engr C Gp:
(1) Spt 1st Mar Div w/1 Engr C Co.
(2) Spt 7th Inf Div w/1 Engr C Bn.
(3) Rep & maintain road: ICHON-YOJU-WONJU.
(4) Prep Spt 187th Abn RCT w/1 Engr C Co on O.
(5) Maintain Corps MSR.

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- k. INCHON Base Comd:
Atch: 56 Amph Bn and Trac Bn (-).
- l. KIMPO TF: N/C
- m. SEOUL Area Comd: Mv to and discharge responsibilities in SEOUL.
- n. Corps Post: 17th Inf Post: Prep and submit C Atk plans in Z 7th Inf Div and 187th Abn RCT.
- x. (1) This plan effective for planning purposes on receipt and for Opns on O.
(2) 1st Mar Div Prep furnish one KMC Bn to President, ROK, as honor guard in SEOUL.
(3) CO 187th Abn RCT Coord plans Def INCHON with INCHON Base Commander.
(4) 7th Inf Div, 1st Mar Div inform X Corps Tactical Air Comd of exact location of US forces Vic WONJU-CHUNGHON road.

4. Adm O 3-50

5. a. Signal Instructions:
(1) Current SOI.
(2) 187th Abn RCT will report in Corps Command Net with their radio equipment.

b. Command Posts:

Hqs	Location
X Corps	Ascom City
1st Mar Div	Oeosu-ri
7th Inf Div	Anyang-ni
187th Abn RCT	Kimpo AB

c. Axis of Signal Communications:
X Corps - Ascom City, Toksan-ni.
1st Mar Div - Oeosu-ri, Seoul, Kuri-myon.
7th Inf Div - To be announced.
187th Abn RCT - Remain vic Kimpo AB.

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Annexes: 1 - Int (issued separately)
2 - Gd Opns Overlay
3 - Air Opns Overlay
4 - Corps Arty
5 - Distribution

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X Corps
ASCOM CITY 9851 KOREA
282400 Sep 50

Opn O 2

Map: KOREA, 1:250,000, Sheets J52, M, N, O, S, T, U.

Task Orgn: Annex 4.

1. a. Annex 1, Int.
b. FEAF and NAVFE Spt X Corps. Eighth Army conducts offensive Opns.
2. a. X Corps Def phase line G, establishes blocking and straggler line Pns with Inf and tanks on phase line H, destroys En in Z.
b. Annex 2, Opn Overlay.
Appendix 1 to Annex 2: Air Opn.
3. a. 1st Mar Div (Reinf): Def phase line G in Z; Atk, destroy En KIMPO Peninsula, KANGHWA-DO and satellite islands in Z, phase line H; block En Adv, Psn 8 to 10 Incl.
b. 7th Inf Div (Reinf): Def phase line G in Z; block En Adv phase line H, Psn 2 to 5 Incl.
c. 187th Abn RCT (Reinf): Def phase line G in Z; block En Adv, phase line H, Psn 1; Liv one Bn Vic ANSAN 313136 as Corps Res.
d. 17th ROK Inf Regt: Atch to SEOUL Area Comd.
e. Corps Arty: 92d Armd FA Bn, 96th FA Bn: G/S; Annex 3, Corps Arty.
f. X Corps Tac Air Comd: Furnish close air Spt, day and night interdiction roads leading into phase line H, Appendix 1 to Annex 2, Air Opn.
g. Corps Engrs: Rep and Maint Rd ICHON-YOJU; Maint Corps MSR; Spt Corps Combat Ems.
h. 3d Log Comd: Def in Z.
i. KIMPO TF: Operate KIMPO Afld.
j. SEOUL Area Comd: Exercise Admin responsibilities in SEOUL and operational control 17th ROK Inf Regt.
k. Corps Res: One Bn, 187th Abn RCT Vic ANSAN 313136.
x. (1) This O effective 301800 Sep 50.
(2) 3d Log Comd Coord with CO, 187th Abn RCT for Def INCHON area.
(3) Establish straggler lines on and near phase line H. Search all individuals and groups entering Z. Apprehend all NK personnel, armed or unarmed. Process as PWs.
4. Admin O 3-50.
5. a. Sig Inst: Current SOL.
b. CEs: X Corps TOKSAN-NI 1448; Others: Rep Locs.

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Annexes: 1 - Int
2 - Opn Overlay
3 - Corps Arty
4 - Task Orgn
5 - Dist

OFFICIAL:

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Annex 1 (Intell) to Opns O #2

Maps: Korea, 1:250,000, Sheets J 52 M, N, O, S, T, U

1. ENEMY SITUATION

See current Periodic Intelligence Reports.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Will the enemy forces being driven to the northwest by Eighth Army operations develop an offensive capability against the south flank of the X Corps sector and attempt to launch an attack along the Inchon-Seoul axis or the Suwon-Seoul axis? If so, what is the strength of the enemy forces and when is the attack imminent?

b. Will the enemy forces being driven to the north by Eighth Army operations attempt to drive through the blocking positions along the Yoju-Uijungbu axis in an effort to reach positions along the 38th parallel? If so, what is the strength of the enemy force, and when is contact imminent?

c. Will the enemy forces in the south, upon being confronted with our defense perimeter and blocking positions, attempt to avoid contact by discarding uniforms and military equipment, travelling over back-trails, and infiltrating through our positions to the 38th parallel?

d. Will the enemy forces in the south, upon being confronted with a "hammer and anvil" maneuver, surrender in large numbers as military units or as individuals?

3. INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS TO SUBORDINATE AND ADJACENT COMMANDS

a. 1st Marine Division will: (in addition to intelligence missions assigned in Intelligence Annex to Opn O No. 1)

(1) Report large scale movements of persons in civilian clothes to the north through its sector of responsibility as far to the east as the blocking positions.

(2) Report discovery of large quantities of abandoned military supplies, equipment or uniforms.

(3) Report acts of hostility by guerrilla elements against military or civilian personnel in its zone.

b. 7th Inf Division will: (in addition to intelligence missions assigned in Intelligence Annex to Opn O No. 1)

(1) Report build-up in enemy forces or activities along the Suwon-Seoul axis and the Ichon-Seoul axis, to include identification of units, existing strength of units, and morale and combat efficiency of units encountered.

(2) Report large scale movements of persons in civilian clothes to the north through its sector of responsibility as far to the east as the blocking positions.

(3) Report discovery of large quantities of abandoned military supplies, equipment or uniforms.

(4) Report acts of hostility by guerrilla elements against military or civilian personnel in its zone.

c. 187th Abn RCT will:

Conduct intelligence missions assigned in Intelligence Annex to Opn O #1.

d. X Corps Tactical Air Command will:

(1) Conduct visual and photographic reconnaissance missions in accordance with X Corps Air Reconnaissance Plan dated 23 Sep 50.

(2) Arrange for day and night armed reconnaissance of the road TAEYANG-CHECHONG-YONGTOL-PYONGCHANG-CHANGDONG-NI (44.5-416.3)-SINCHON (42.3-417.8) - YONGPO (42.8-419.7).

(3) Conduct additional day and night armed reconnaissance flights in the area beyond the X Corps perimeter as required.

e. Inchon Base Command, Seoul Area Command, and 17th U.S. Inf Regt will:

(1) Report the time and location of enemy air attacks to include marking of aircr aft, type of aircraft, and nationality of any downed pilot.

(2) Report acts of sabotage or subversive activities conducted against military or civilian personnel or installations within its area of responsibility.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL

a. See X Corps SOP.

b. The number of prisoners being taken daily is far beyond the capabilities of the language detachments to completely interrogate. However, a minimum requirement exists with respect to each prisoner captured. Major subordinate commands will submit to G-2, X Corps a daily "log" on which will be indicated for each prisoner or for each group of prisoners taken at the same date and place:

(1) The prisoner's unit.

(2) The time and date of capture.

(3) The place of capture.

c. Prisoners selected by subordinate units for a detailed interrogation will be accompanied, upon evacuation to Corps interrogation units by two copies of the interrogation report prepared by the subordinate unit.

5. MAPS, MODELS, AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

a. See X Corps SOP.

b. Map coverage, scale 1:50,000, of areas beyond the line of blocking positions will be distributed in increments as obtained, beginning approximately 30 Sep.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

See X Corps SOP.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. See X Corps SOP.

b. Paragraph 7a (2) is rescinded and the following is substituted

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teletype as of 0600, 1400 and 2100 hours daily. Intelligence Summaries will conform to the paragraph numbering of the intelligence missions assigned in appropriate intelligence annexes, and will include both positive and negative information.

c. Paragraph 7a (4) is rescinded and the following is substituted therefore: PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORTS will be submitted in written form as of 1800 hours daily. The form for the periodic intelligence report is contained in FM 101-5. Reports will invariably include an overlay of the enemy situation at the close of the period.

8. AUXILIARY AGENCIES

By separate distribution.


BY COMMAND OF MAJ GEN ALMOND

CLARK L. RUFFNER
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/ W. W. QUINN
t/ W. W. QUINN
Lt Col, CSC
Asst Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Opn Plan



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X Corps
ASCOM CITY 9851 KOREA
272400 Sep 50

Annex 3 (Arty) to Opn O 2
Map: KOREA, 1:250,000, INCH'ON-CH'UNCH'ON
Firing Chart: KOREA, 1:50,000 A.M.S. L751

1. Annex 1, Int.
 2. Arty with the Corps Spts action of the Corps.
 3. a. 1st Mar Div:
Atchd: 50th AAA AW Bn (-)
b. 7th Inf Div:
c. 187th RCT:
Atchd: Btry C 50th AAA AW Bn
d. 92d Armd FA Bn:
G/S
e. 96th FA Bn:
G/S
f. 50th AAA AW Bn:
Bn (-C Btry) Atchd 1st Mar Div. C Btry Atchd 187th RCT.
g. 56th Amph Tk and Trac Bn (-):
Atchd UICH'ON Base Command
x. (1) 92d Armd FA Bn select assembly area Psn Vic ANYONG-NI 315141.
Reconnoiter, survey, and prepare two (2) Psn Vic SUWON
324126, and 320126; two (2) Psn Vic CHUGYO-RI 312169, and
312170; and two (2) Psn Vic TUBONG-SAN 323172, and 323173;
and two (2) Psn Vic KOCH-ON-LYON 300165, and 302165.
(2) 96th FA Bn select assembly area Psn Vic ANYONG-NI 314141.
Reconnoiter, survey, and prepare two (2) Psn Vic KYONGAN-N 344139,
and 344140; two (2) Psn Vic TONGBU-LYON 342155, and 343155;
and, two (2) Psn Vic KUREONG-NI Vic 342165, and 342167.
(3) Recon for Psn except assembly Psn will include facilities
for one (1) reinforcing Bn at each Psn.
(4) During Recon for Psn areas make road, ground, and Psn area
studies throughout sector. Rpt information.
(5) Ln from right to left between Div Artys.
(6) Corps Bns be prepared to move to firing Psn on four (4)
hours notice.
4. Admin O 3-50.
 5. a. SOI Index 1-3 (Change 4, 26 Sep)
b. CPs: TOKSAN-NI 1448. Units Rpt Locs.

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s/ CHIES

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X Corps
ASCOM CITY 9051 KOREA
202400 Sep 50

Annex 4, Task Orgn. to Opn O 2

1. 1st Mar Div:
Atch: KMC Regt (less 1st and 3d Bns)
50th AAA Bn (-Btry C)
2. 7th Inf Div:
Atch: 1st Bn, KMC Regt
Det : 17th ROK Inf Regt
1 Co, 73 Tk Bn.
3. 187th Abn RCT:
Atch: 3d Bn, KMC Regt
Btry C, 50th AAA Bn
Sp Opns Gp
One Co, 73 Tk Bn
Det : One Bn, 187th Abn RCT.
4. KMC Regt (less 1st and 3d Bns): Atch to 1st Mar Div.
5. Sp Opns Gp: Atch to 187th Abn RCT.
6. 50th AAA AW Bn (-Btry C): Atch to 1st Mar Div; Btry C: Atch to 187th Abn RCT.
7. 1st Bn, KMC Regt: Atch 7th Inf Div.
8. 3d Bn, KMC Regt: Atch 187th Abn RCT.
9. 17th ROK Inf Regt: Under Opn control SEOUL area Comd.
10. One Co, 73d Tk Bn: Atch 187th Abn RCT.
11. Corps Arty:
 - a. 92d Armd FA Bn, 96th FA Bn: G/S
 - b. 50th AAA AW Bn (-Btry C): Atch 1st Mar Div. Btry C Atch 187th Abn RCT.
 - c. 56th Amph Tk and Trac Bn (-) Atch 3d Log Comd.
12. Corps Engrs: 19th Engr Gp.
13. 3d Log Comd:
Atch: 56th Amph Tk and Trac Bn (-).
14. Corps Res: One Bn, 187th Abn RCT.
15. Others: N/C.

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X Corps
 ASOM CITY 9851 KOREA
 282400 Sep 50

Annex 5, Dist, to Opn 0 2.

<u>Recipient</u>	<u>No. Copies</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
<u>Hq, X Corps:</u>		
CG	2	1-2
C/S	1	3
DC/S	1	4
G-1	1	5
G-2	1	6
G-3	10	7-16
G-4	1	17
Arty	1	18
FGCC	1	19
Engr	1	20
Sig	1	21
Ord	1	22
Trans	1	23
CI	1	24
Surg	1	25
War Room	1	26
Provost Marshal	1	27
Hq Comdt	1	28
AG	1	29
<u>X Corps Subordinate Comds:</u>		
1st Mar Div	3	30-32
7th Inf Div	3	33-35
187th Abn RCT	2	36-37
INIC Regt	1	38
17th ROK Inf Regt	1	39
Sp Opns Gp	1	40
X Corps Tac Air Comd	3	41-43
19th Engr C Gp	1	44
8024 Engr Const Gp	1	45
3d Log Comd	2	46-47
KIMPO TF	1	48
SEOUL Area Comd	1	49
50th AAA AV Bn	1	50
<u>Other Commands:</u>		
CINCPAC	5	51-55
Eighth Army	3	56-58
NAVFAC	2	59-60
FEAF	2	61-62
JLC	2	63-64
Com 7 Flt	2	65-66
Com Phib Gru 3	2	67-68
1st Mar Air Wg (ITAMI, JAPAN)	2	69-70
FEAF Combat Cargo Comd	2	71-72


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X Corps
APO 909
182000 Sep 50

OI 1

Task Orgn: N/C

1. X Corps Cont Off Opns, crosses HAN River, seizes and secures SEOUL and high Grd N thereof.
2. 1st Mar Div:
 - a. Initiate Ron of HAN River crossings in Z at once, cross HAN River early 20 Sep.
 - b. Env Eny Posn N bank HAN River Vic SECUL, seize and secure SEOUL and high Grd N thereof.
3. 7th Inf Div:
 - a. Assume responsibility 7th Inf Div Z by 191000 Sep.
 - b. Cont Off in accordance with previous instructions.
4. Corps Engr Gp: One Co 73d Engr Bn and all bridging Equip ashore to be utilized by 1st Mar Div for crossing HAN River.
5. Others: N/C.

Miso:

- a. CTF 90 has agreed to land:
 - (1) Balance 32d RCT and portion 31st Inf Regt 18 Sep.
 - (2) 1st Prov Raider Co and Corps MP Co early 19 Sep.
 - (3) Balance of 31st Inf Regt 19 Sep.
- b. MP functions for INCHON area to be assumed by Corps PM 191800 Sep.
- c. 17th ROK Regt/available INCHON O/A 23 Sep.
- d. Adv Ech Corps Hq to be established 915478 by 191200 Sep.
- e. Landing strips to be established immediately; one Vic Adv Ech Corps Hq, one at KIMPO Afd.

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X Corps
INCHON 9148 KOREA
201900 Sep 50

OI 2

Map: KOREA, 1:250,000 AMS L551, Sheets J52M and J52N.

1. 1st Mar Div:
 - a. Cont Adv, seize SEOUL and high Grd N thereof, to include Phase Line O - O in Z (Annex 1, Cpn Overlay).
 - b. Patrol N to SEOUL-KAESONG highway.
 - c. Protect Corps N (left) flank.
 - d. Displace one medium Arty Bn to Vic UJANG-SAN 0957 Prep to fire on targets in SEOUL.
 - e. Prep to displace other medium Arty Bn as soon as high Grd at YONGDUNGPO 1454 is taken, to cover SEOUL.
 - f. One medium Arty Bn will be given the secondary mission of being able to Reinf fires of 7th Inf Div Arty on O.
2. 7th Inf Div:
 - a. Adv in Z in conformity with the Adv of 1st Marines, 1st Mar Div, to include Phase Line O - O in Z.
 - b. Patrol S from ANGYANG 1640 toward SUNON.
 - c. Protect Corps S (right) flank.
 - d. Provide one Bn Inf as Corps Res in Vic 998458.
3. X Corps TAC: Ren:
 - a. KUMPO PENINSULA N KUMPO River 0267.
 - b. SEOUL-KAESONG highway.
 - c. SEOUL-YONCHON road and railroad.
 - d. SEOUL-PYONGTAEK-TAEJON highway.
 - e. SEOUL-ICHON-CHUNGJU highway.
 - f. SEOUL-WONJU railroad.
4. Corps Res: One Bn Inf Vic 998458.
5. Others: N/C
6. Admin:
 - a. Evac - Air Evac from KUMPO Afd as required.
 - b. Admin O to be issued.
7. CG, X Corps Prep to assume Comd all forces ashore 211800 Sep 50.

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Annex: 1 - Opr Overlay

DISTR: A, C, and D


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32 + 13



X Coys
INCHON 2148 KOREA

(Map Overlay) to OI No 2
ORD, 1:250,000, A&B 1551, Sheets J52M and J52N

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Maj Gen

A, C and D

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Summary

X Corps
INCHON 15th MARCH
2100Z 22 Sep 50

013

1. Intel indicated extensive in preparation for determined defense of TA2256, TA2257, TA2356, and TA2357.
2. X Corps, by employing X Corps TAC and 1st Arty Atchd 1st Mar Div neutralizes En Crd Crgn in area TA2256, TA2257, TA2356, and TA2357 to assist Adv 1st Mar Div.
3. 1st Mar Div:
 - a. Conduct 155mm Arty harrassing fire, expending 200 Rds, between 210000 and 220600 on TA2256, TA2257, TA2356, and TA2357.
 - b. Conduct observed 155mm Arty fire beginning daylight 22 Sept to destroy dual purpose gun TA2257K, AA gun TA2257N, three light AA guns TA2257R5, pillbox TA2256U, and entrenchments and emplacements (300 yard area) TA2356U.
 - c. Deliver directed Arty fire at times other than during scheduled air strikes.
4. X Corps TAC:
 - a. Request maximum AD and fighter bomber support by GFF-7 22 Sep in TA2256, TA2257, TA2356, and TA2357, with specific strikes pillbox TA2256U, dual purpose gun TA2257K, AA gun TA2257N, three light AA guns TA2257R5, and entrenchments and emplacements (300 yards in diameter) TA2356U
 - b. Plan Negat in effect.
 - c. Times of attack:
 - Strike A - 0700 - 0730
 - Strike B - 0900 - 0915
 - Strike C - 1000 - 1015
 - Strike D - 1100 - 1115
 - Strike E - 1200 - 1215
 - d. Aircraft loading: Two Egle.

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X Corps
INCHON 9148 KOREA
222030 Sep 50

OI 4

1. X Corps Spts Adv 1st Mar Div through SEOUL, employing X Corps TAC and Arty fire, with particular attention to TA1757, TA2256, TA2257, TA2356, and TA2357, CJTF 7 Spts X Corps.
2. 1st Mar Div:
 - a. Cont crossing HAN River, invest SEOUL, clear SEOUL of hostile Elns.
 - b. BOK SEOUL police officials available to 1st Mar Div at KIMPO Afd.
 - c. Protect Corps N (left) flank, employ not less than one Bn Inf W of HAN River.
 - d. 2d Bn, 7th Marines cross HAN River only on Corps O.
3. 7th Inf Div:
 - a. Adv left flank immediately along left Bdy to position 2252.
 - b. Assist Adv right flank 1st Mar Div by fire.
 - c. 3d Bn, 31st Inf, relieved from Corps Res, revert to 7th Inf Div.
 - d. Secure line 1126 - 2419 - 3127 and Rcn to S and E therefrom.
4. 19th Engr C Gps:
 - a. Const semi-permanent expedient 1 WGL5 Br Vic SEOUL 191535.
 - b. Maintain Corps MSR.
5. 2d ASB: Atch INCHON Base Cmd.
6. Corps Res:
 - a. 2d Bn, 7th Marine Prep to be employed as Corps Res on O.
 - b. 3d Bn, 31st Inf relieved from Corps Res.
7. Others: N/C
8. Corps CP closes 9140 at 231200, opens 9651 at 231200.

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3d Bn, 31st Inf

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A CERTIFIED COPY:

LEE L. STEWART
Major ACC
Admin Officer

162

X Corps
ASCOM CITY 9851 AOREA
231900 Sep 50

OI 5

Task Orgn: N/C except:

3d Bn 187th Abn Regt Atchd 1st Mar Div on arrival KIMPO AFB 24 Sep.
17th ROK Inf Regt Atchd 1st Mar Div on arrival INCHON 24 Sep.

1. 1st Mar Div:
 - a. 2d Bn 7th Mar released to 1st Mar Div.
 - b. Cont Atk. seize and secure SEOUL.
 - c. Employ 3d Bn. 187th Abn Regt W of HAN River only.
 - d. Move 17th ROK Inf Regt by motor from INCHON to YONGDUNGPO.
 - e. Protect Corps N (left) flank.
2. 7th Inf Div:
 - a. Adv left flank to 2252, Reconn to bridge across HAN River Vic 245543.
 - b. Asst Atk 1st Mar Div by fire, Coord with 1st Mar Div.
 - c. Prepare to cross HAN River between 2353 and 2655 on O, to Asst seizure of SEOUL.
 - d. Cont secure present Posns in Z.
 - e. Protect Corps S (right) flank.
3. Corps Arty: All Med Arty with the Corps Spt Opns to seize SEOUL.
4. X Corps TAC: Spt Opns to seize SEOUL, particularly by strikes on TA 2256, TA 2356, TA 2257 and TA 2357.
5. Corps Engrs: Spt HAN River crossings, Prep to construct bridge across HAN River, on O, between 190534 and 250547.
6. 3d Bn 187th Abn Regt: Atchd 1st Mar Div on arrival KIMPO Afb.
7. 17th ROK Inf Regt: Atchd 1st Mar Div on arrival INCHON.
8. Others: N/C

ALMOND
Maj Gen

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3d Bn 187th Abn Regt .. 1
17th ROK Inf Regt .. 1

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Hq X Corps
AGCOM CITY 9851 Korea
241700 Sep 50

ANNEX 2 (Arty) to OI 6

Maps: Map of Korea, REC L 25-52, 1:25,000
Map of Korea, A.M.S. L751, 1:50,000

1. SITUATION: See Periodic Intelligence Report #5
 2. MISSION: Artillery with the Corps provides maximum support to the Corps cont atk 250630 Sep 50 to seize and secure SEOUL.
 3. a. Division Artillery:
 - (1) 1st Mar Div - Atch 96th FA Bn.
Emplace one med FA Bn and one light FA Bn to place the bulk of their fires as far E as the line 3254-3268. Coordinate movement and posn areas with 7th Div Arty. Priority of posn areas in 7th Div Z adjacent to boundary between divs to med arty with 1st Mar Div. Be prepared to fire in Z A of 7th Div on call.
 - (2) 7th Inf Div - Atch 92d Armd FA Bn
Support attack with max arty effort. One medium & one lt Bn to be emplaced to fire as far east as the line 3254-3268.
 - (3) Artillery with Corps will fire a 20 min prep H-90 to H-10.
 - b. Corps Artillery:
 - (1) 92d Armd FA Bn atchd to 7th Inf Div.
 - (2) 96th FA Bn attached to 1st Mar Div.
 - (3) Hq and Hq Btry 5th FA Gp
 - (a) Performs duties of Corps Arty Hq & Hq Btry.
 - (b) Prepares to assume control of Arty in C/S of Corps.
 - (c) Coordinates air, naval gunfire, and arty support.
 - (4) 50th AAA AW Bn (Afloat)
 - 5) 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn - Atch 7th Inf Div.
 - c. Artillery with the Corps.
 - (1) Firing Chart: Map of Korea, REC 125-52, 1:25,000 or
Map of Korea, A.M.S. L751, 1:50,000.
 - (2) Position areas and zones of fire: Par 3a.
 - d. No fire line. Will be 500 yards on either side of boundary between divisions - fire closer than 500 yards to the boundary between divisions must be cleared with adjacent units.
 - e. All units will maintain air sentries at OBS and Btry positions to check fire when friendly aircraft are being endangered.
 - f. AA weapons with FA units will not fire at air targets unless units attacked by low flying aircraft.
4. a. See Administrative Order #2-50.
b. Ammunition: See X Corps Arty SOP.
 5. a. See para 5. on Opn Plan.

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ASCOM NOKRA. 1:50,000. AMS 1751

Task Orgn: M/C except:

a. 161st ROK Mar Bn, Atch 1st Mar Div.

b. Task Group Able is formed, Lt Col Munson commanding:
3d Bn, 187th Abn Regt.
3d Bn, ROK Mar.
Sp Opns Co.
Btry C, 874th Abn FA Bn (upon arrival).
One Plat, Co A, 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn.
One Plat, 73d Tk Bn.

1. 7th Inf Div;

a. Conduct continuous Ren in force W, S and E from SUWON area to the Gen line 093142 to 287124 to 410218, to include the following routes:

- (1) SUWON, E to SANGCHON 3226, KUMGANGJANG 4121.
- (2) SUWON, S to JEAN 2812, HAPUNG 2808.
- (3) SUWON, SW to TOKCHONG 1717, PARAN 1410, NW to KUMCHON 1115 and W to HWALCHO 0815.

b. Establish road block Vic 410218.

c. Employ not less than one Inf Bn S of HAN River E of 245543 to protect crossing sites on river in 2.

d. Dispatch, by 260900, TF Tks and Inf to destroy assembled NK armed refugees at AMSANDONG 1218, PARYANGHI 2220, and KUMYANGJANG 4121.

2. Task Gp Able:

a. Protect Corps N (left) flank S of HAN River along Gen line 0066 to 9361.

b. Protect KILPO Aflid.

3. Corps Engrs:

a. Cons 1 WCL5 expedient Br Vic SEOUL.

b. Prop to Cons CL60 Br Vic SEOUL.

4. Sp Opns Co: Det 1st Mar Div; Atch 3d Bn, 187th Abn Regt.

5. 3d Bn, ROK Mar: Det 1st Mar Div; Atch 3d Bn, 187th Abn Regt.

6. 73d Tk Bn: Det one Plat 7th Inf Div; Atch 3d Bn 187th Abn Regt.

7. Co A, 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn: Det one Plat 7th Inf Div; Atch 3d Bn, 187th Abn Regt.

8. Others: M/C.

DISTR: A, C and D

3d Bn, 187th Abn Regt - 1

3d Bn, ROK Mar - 1

Sp Opns Co - 1

874th Abn FA Bn (upon arrival) - 1

Co A, 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn - 1

73d Tk Bn - 1

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ASCOM CITY 9851 KOREA
011600 Oct 50

OI 8

Map: KOREA, 1:50,000, A/S L751

Task Orgn: N/C except:

- a. Co A, 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn; Det 187th Abn RCT, revert 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn.
 - b. 96th FA Bn; Det 187th Abn RCT, revert to control Corps Arty.
 - c. Btry C, 50th AAA AW Bn; Det 187th Abn RCT, revert to 50th AAA AW Bn.
 - d. Co C, 73d Tk Bn; Det 187th Abn RCT, revert to 73d Tk Bn.
 - e. 3d Bn KMC; Det 187th Abn RCT, Atch 1st Mar Div.
 - f. Sp Opns Co; Det 187th Abn RCT, revert to Corps Res.
 - g. 3d Bn 187th Abn RCT; Rel Corps Res, revert to 187th Abn RCT.
 - h. One Regt'l NGLO Team and two Bn SFGP Teams; Det 187th Abn RCT, revert to 1st Mar Div.
1. 1st Mar Div:
Atch: 3d Bn KMC
 - a. Assume Resp KUMPO Peninsula.
 - b. Cont mission assigned Z.
 2. 187th Abn RCT: Assemble Corps Res SE KIMPO Afd. Rpt location.
 3. Sp Opn Co; Assemble Corps Res Via Corps CP (9851).
 4. - Corps Arty:
96th FA Bn; Revert Corps Arty control Via ASCOM CITY, Prep for G/S.
 5. Corps Res:
187th Abn RCT
Sp Opn Co
 6. Others: N/C.

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DISTR: A, C and D
Co A, 56th Amph Tk & Trac Bn - 1
96th FA Bn - 1
Co C, 73d Tk Bn - 1
3d Bn KMC - 1
Sp Opns Co - 1
3d Bn 187th Abn RCT - 1

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X Corps
APO 909
031600 Oct 50

OI 3

Task Orgn. N/C, Exempt:

- a. 7th Lt Bn, FMF (-); Det 3d Log Comd; revert to 1st Mar Div.
 - b. 8214 Army Unit, Armed Forces Radio Sv Det; Atoh SEOUL Area Comd for Admin and Log Spt. Operational control is retained by X Corps.
 - c. 17th CID Atoh SEOUL Area Comd.
- 1. 1st Mar Div;
 - a. Initiate movement to assembly area designated by CG 3d Log Comd in INCHON area.
 - b. Priority of movement to heavy materiel and units not in contact with enemy.
 - 2. Others N/C.

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X Corps
..PO 909
041530 Oct

01 10

Task Org: N/C

1. 1st Mar Div:
Forward ELMS of 1st Mar Div will be relieved of responsibility for the defense of individual Regt'l sectors when a minimum of one Bn of friendly troops has passed through the forward areas of these Regt'l sectors.
2. Others: N/C

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DISTR: " 1st Mar Div -5

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