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<p>REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 731034</p>	
<p>TITLE CHIF YONG-NI: Defense of south sector of 23d Regimental Combat Team Perimeter by Company G 13-15 February 1951.</p>	
<p>OFFICE OF ORIGIN</p> <p>4th Historical Detachment Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) United States Army Forces, Far East Capt. Edward C. Williamson</p>	<p>CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: CONFIDENTIAL</p>
<p>Authority <i>The Commanding General 8th U.S. Army dtd 29 Jan 54</i></p>	<p>AUTHORITY</p>
<p><i>Reel A-157</i></p>	<p>OFFICE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY OCHM</p>
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Dr. Morton Kupperman
2, Stoughton Avenue
Leicester
LE2 2DR

BESSELS, SHROTON,
BLANDFORD, DORSET.
CHILD OKEFORD 303.

23 October 1977

Dear Norton.

As someone is coming here this week from the India Office library, I have been sorting my husband's papers, most of which I hope the library will take over. It is fascinating - & so much that I had forgotten has come up for air - so many names & so many happenings.

Amongst the few papers
which are here, covering
D's doings in the war - are
the enclosed, which I believe
you may like to have -

We shall have no
just - Dorse is looking
her best just now -

Nanon wishes to you both,
Stephane.

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CHIP'YONG-NI: Defense of south sector of
23d Regimental Combat Team Perimeter by
Company G 13-15 February 1951

13 Feb 1951

74

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William S. ...

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AUTHORITY: *The Commanding General
Hqs 8th U.S. Army dtd 29 June 54*

4TH HISTORICAL DETACHMENT

Copy #1

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Items enclosed

1/10/11

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
 AND
 FAR EAST COMMAND

ROUTING SLIP

FROM: Military History Sec. DATE: 11 January 1952

TO:

Commander-in-Chief _____	Ordnance _____
Aide-de-Camp _____	PM _____
Chief of Staff _____	PIO _____
DCofS FEC _____	Ryukyus Civ Adm _____
DCofS SCAP _____	QM _____
SGS _____	Signal _____
Comptroller _____	Sp Services _____
G-1 _____	Trans _____
G-2 _____	TI&E _____
G-3 _____	Civ Aff _____
G-4 _____	Civ Comm _____
JSPOG _____	Civ Historical _____
AG XXXXX _____	CI&E _____
Antiaircraft _____	Civ Int _____
Central Purchasing O _____	Civil Property Custodian _____
Chaplain _____	Civ Trans _____
Chemical _____	Diplomatic _____
Civ Personnel _____	ESS _____
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IG _____	NRS _____
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

Military History Section, Special Staff

11 January 1952

SUBJECT: Transmittal of After-Action Interview


TO: Chief, Military History Section
119 D Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.
ATTENTION: Capt. Russell A. Gugeler

In compliance with par 3 b (1), Ltr Department of the Army, AGAO-
CS 314.7 (3 Aug 51) HIS dated 9 August 1951, the following original copy
of one (1) Historical Interview submitted by Headquarters, Eighth United
States Army (EUSAK) is forwarded herewith:

CHIP'YONG-NI

FOR THE CHIEF, MILITARY HISTORY SECTION

1 Incl
as listed above


JAMES M. MILLER
Lt Colonel, Inf
Executive Officer

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4th Historical Detachment
APO 301

28 November 1951

SUBJECT: Set of Interviews: Company G, 23d Infantry Regiment

TO: Commanding Officer
Eighth Army Historical Service Detachment (Provisional)

1. In accordance with Memorandum, HQ, Eighth Army Historical Service Detachment (Prov) dated 9 October 1951, this officer contacted the commanding officer, 3d Historical Detachment, and relieved him of the responsibility of preparing a set of interviews on Company G, 23d Infantry Regiment, at CHIP'YONG-NI from 13 to 15 February 1951. Enclosed is the set of interviews.
2. The original request of the Chief, Military History Section, GHQ, FEC, to the Army Historian stated, "Capt Gugeler would like to get the Infantry action and particularly Lt Heath's estimate of the effectiveness of the Artillerymen in the defense of their own perimeter, and his appraisal of the action and leadership of a Capt Elledge."
3. On 17 October this officer contacted HQ, 23d Infantry Regiment, and learned that 1st Lt Thomas Heath, formerly commanding officer of Company G, had been killed in action, 22 September 1951. Consequently, a substantial portion of the ^{story} of this action was secured from 1st Lt Paul J McGee, 3d Platoon Leader, Company G.
4. Following is the particular information Capt Gugeler wished to know. This information should be used in conjunction with the enclosed interview study. Capt Carl F Haberman, who at the time of the action was 4th Platoon Leader, Company G, volunteered the following: Capt John Elledge did a superior job in leading small groups of men from Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, in defense of the perimeter. However, other officers and non-commissioned officers in Battery B failed to show the same spirit and few enlisted men from the battery fought on their own initiative without Capt Elledge's leadership. Capt Haberman made one visit to a squad tent in the Battery B position on the second night of fighting and, although the tent was filled with able-bodied artillery men, he was unable to get a single volunteer to climb the hill. 1st Lt Paul J McGee stated that at 2350 hours, 14 February, fifteen

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men from Battery B climbed the hill and arrived at his platoon. When these men were taken under enemy fire all but three departed. McGee also stated that on February when his company, assisted by the Rangers and Company F, was counterattacking, he had about ten Artillerymen with his platoon. He further stated that he was unable to get these Artillerymen to move forward with his platoon when his company attacked.

Lt McGee was bitter concerning the action of the Artillerymen. He also was critical of the action of M/Sgt Emory S Toth, commanding the 1st Platoon, who stayed in a rear CP during the action and he criticized the failure of the company wire corporal to restore communications to his platoon. McGee felt that the company commander, who at the time was on R&R, and a clique of key non-coms had been running the company prior to the attack in a partial fashion. The key non-coms remained in the rear when the fighting of this action occurred.

Edward C Williamson

EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty
Commanding

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EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty
Commanding

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For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

73103

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

DAMH-HSG

Request for Review of Classification of Documents

TO DAAG-ASR-S
FORRESTAL BLDG

FROM DAMH-HS
TEMPO ABC

DATE 18 SEP 73
CMT 1
Miss Zeidlik/dm/31234

Mr. Roy Appleman requested that we submit the following documents for possible regrading to UNCLASSIFIED.

- a. Breaking the Hongchon Defense Line, March 1951 (8-5.1A, BA 30) CONFIDENTIAL.
- b. Hwachon Dam (8-5.1A, BA 34) CONFIDENTIAL.
- c. CHIP'YONG-NI: Defense of South Sector of 23d Regimental Combat Team Perimeter by Company G, 13-15 February 1951 (8-5.1A, BA 74) CONFIDENTIAL.
- d. Activities of 3d TMRS Initial Phase - Withdrawal from Pyongyang (8-5.1A, BA 77) CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl
as

Walter L. McMahon
WALTER L. MCMAHON
Colonel, Infantry
Chief, Historical
Services Division

DAAG-ASR-S (18 Sep 73) (73103)

SUBJECT: Request for Review of Classification of Documents (U)

TO: DAMH-HSG
Tempo "C"

FROM: DAAG
FOR BG

DATE: 1 OCT 1973
CMT 2
Mr. Abb/31847

The four attached documents have been regraded UNCLASSIFIED. There is no objection to their release.

FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

4 Incl
nc

Cyrus H. Fraker
for R. W. HAMPTON
Colonel, AGC
Dir of Admin Svcs

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Sgt Herbert G Ziebell(then Cpl), 3d Platoon Rifleman

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103d Field Artillery Battalion

Battery B

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8th US Army
299

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Edward C Williamson
EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty
Commanding 4th Hist Det

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1 Narrative Report

CHIP'YONG-NI: Defense of the south sector of 23d Regimental Combat Team perimeter by Company G; 13-15 February 1951

After the "Twin Tunnels" operation, the 23d Regimental Combat Team, 2d US Infantry Division, continued the attack to the battered key communication center of CHIP'YONG-NI (CS 8048) which was secured during the late afternoon on 3 February 1951. To have formed a perimeter on the six hills which dominate the terrain around CHIP'YONG-NI would have required more troops than were available to combat team commander Col Paul J Freeman. Therefore, he established a perimeter on lower, less desirable ground, placing the battalions around the town in a clock-like fashion; the 1st Battalion generally held the northwest sector, the 3d Battalion the northeast and east sector, the 2d Battalion the south sector, and the French Battalion the west sector. The regimental reserve, composed of Company B and the 1st Ranger Company, was rendezvoused behind the 1st Battalion. The weather was cold and snow lay on the ground.¹

Company G, commanded by 1st Lt Thomas Heath, held the 500 yard right flank arc of the 2d Battalion sector, tying in with the French Battalion at the MSR on the west and with Company F in a rice paddy on the east. Heath's CP was located in a small Korean hut fifty yards east of the MSR. Communication wire was laid to the platoons which were generally 150 yards to the south. Taking advantage of the steep (south) slope of a small group of hills six hundred yards south of the town, 1st Lt Paul J McGee's 3d Platoon keystoneed the MIR in the Company G sector. 1st Lt Kenneth Finn's 2d Platoon on the left was in a rice paddy. The 3d Platoon CP was in the center of its MIR. The 2d Platoon CP was in a cave 75 yards

1. Annex vi: Extract from Command Report, 23 Infantry Regiment, February 1951; Sketch #1: 23d Regimental Combat Team perimeter, 13-15 February 1951

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to the rear of the platoon M&K.² Lt Carl F Haberman's 4th platoon had its three 60 mm mortars set up on the gentle reverse (north) slope 70 yards behind the 3d platoon.³

The 1st platoon, also located on the forward slope of the small group of hills, held the right flank. The platoon commander, m/sgt Emery Roth, had his CP in a Korean hut five yards from the company CP. Without informing Heath, Roth remained in the hut and did not establish a forward CP after the fighting began. He did maintain wire communication with SFC Donald R Schmitt of the 1st Platoon who was up on the hill.⁴

In taking defensive measures Heath had the men prepare two man covered foxholes and set up flares and trap expedients in front of the positions. The 2d Battalion A&P platoon mined the M&K with nine anti-tank mines at the Company G-French Battalion contact point where the drop to the MSR forms a v in the small hill mass. The A&P platoon also set up two dugasses: the first on the M&K and the second in front of the 2d platoon. Under A&P platoon supervision Company G men strung wire on the MSR and in front of the 1st platoon. The company was at all times on a 50% alert; this means that during the night one man was awake and one asleep in each foxhole. The 2d platoon in the Mat rice paddy had good fields of fire; however, the 1st and 3d platoons up on the small hills lacked a satisfactory final protective line. From the 3d platoon's hilltop McGee had excellent observation to the south with one exception, a dead spot in the dry creek bed just below the 3d and 1st Platoons.⁵

- * hand grenade with pin straightened and trip wire attached
- 2. Interview #3: 1st Lt Paul J McGee, Company G; Sketches #2, #3, #4, #5; Supplemental interview with Lt McGee
- 3. Interview #2; Capt Carl F Haberman, Company G
- 4. Interview #3: Lt McGee
- 5. Ibid; Supplemental interview with Lt McGee

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Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm how), was in position 100 yards behind the 1st Platoon, Company G, and 200 yards behind the 3d Platoon. In preparation for the defense of the sector Capt John A Elledge, artillery liaison officer of Battery B, came to the Company G CP and furnished Neath with a list of all his battery's weapons and ammunition. Elledge, Neath and Haberman worked out a plan for defense, taking into account the use of artillerymen as riflemen in the event the position was penetrated. The coordinated defense provided for skeleton crews to man the howitzers. An infantry-artillery machine gun post was set up on the east side of the MSR at the Company G-French Battalion contact point. Here a four man crew manned a 50 caliber and a 30 caliber machine gun.⁶

Daily Col Freeman sent company sized patrols in all directions for a distance of three miles. Patrols to the north and northwest made contact with enemy groups. On the night of 12-13 February men of the 23d Infantry Regiment observed increased enemy flare activity on all sides of the perimeter; however, the night passed without the enemy attacking. Normal patrols during the daylight hours on 13 February discovered enemy build-ups close to the perimeter in three directions: north, east and west. The 23d Infantry Regiment air OP observed enemy groups converging on the perimeter from the north and east, and IACP directed forty flights of aircraft against these groups.⁷

The same day the 116th CCF Division, southeast of CHIP'YONG-NI, pushed westward toward the MSR at CHUAM-NI (CS8239) where it assaulted the 2d Reconnaissance Company and Company L, 9th Infantry Regiment. After a fire fight the 2d U S Infantry Division force withdrew southward, leaving

6. Interview #2: Capt Haberman; Interview #8: Capt John A Elledge, Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion; Photographs #1, #8

7. Annex VI: Extract from Command Report, 23d Infantry Regiment, February 1951

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the 23d Regimental Combat Team in an isolated position.⁸

That night at around 2000 as PFC Donald E Nelson of the 2d squad 2d Platoon, Company G, was sitting in his foxhole arguing with Pvt Jack Ward over who would pull guard first, both men heard the sound of digging 600 yards to the south. A shrill whistle caused them both to jump out of their hole and grab their bazooka.⁹

What had happened? Two squads of Chinese were attempting to envelop the 3d Platoon position. By 2220 one squad had succeeded in crawling 75 yards up the small spur to the vicinity of Cpl Eugene L Ottesen's machine gun. The enemy threw three grenades and opened up on Ottesen with small arms fire. Ottesen returned the enemy fire. At the same time another enemy squad 200 yards to the west took advantage of the dead spot in the creek bed, climbed the hill and attacked the foxhole of the BAR man in Sgt Franklin H Curry's squad.¹⁰

Hearing the firing, PFC Herbert Ziebell of the 1st squad, 3d Platoon, awakened his foxhole buddy, PFC Roy F Benoit, and said, "There is some firing going on. Get up and get ready." Ziebell did not fire immediately because he could not see anyone to fire at, and he felt that the flash of his M-1 would draw enemy fire.¹¹

Pvt Kenneth C Green in the 3d squad, 3d Platoon, also heard the firing on his left. He awakened his foxhole partner, Pvt Henry Heimerl, and both men sat in the darkness, awaiting the Chinese.¹²

8. Ibid; Annex V: Headquarters U S X Corps: Critique of tactics employed in the first encounter with the enemy
9. Interview #4: Group interview, Company G
10. Interview #3: Lt McGee; Photographs #3,#4
11. Interview #4: Group interview, Company G
12. Ibid

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The Chinese, blowing whistles and bugles, attacked the 3d Platoon four times that night. All attacks were repelled.¹⁷

As dawn was breaking on 14 February, Platoon Sergeant Bill Kluttz in the foxhole next to McGee spotted five Chinese in the creekbed. He fired several tracers at them. Suspecting the presence of other Chinese, McGee ordered him to have the rocket launcher fired at the creekbed. Kluttz was unable to get the rocket launcher men oriented on the target; therefore, he took the weapon and fired a round himself. The rocket hit a tree, making an airburst over the creekbed. About 40 Chinese came out of the creekbed and began walking across the rice paddies. The 2d squad and the 1st Platoon opened fire on the withdrawing enemy.¹⁸

In the night's fighting Company G lost three killed; four wounded were evacuated. Two of the wounded were from the 3d Platoon.¹⁹

A captured enemy document later revealed that during the night the 115th CCF Division commenced an enveloping maneuver against the CHIP'YONG-NI defenders. It pushed forward from KUDUN(CS 8443) northwest toward CHIP'YONG-NI and joined the 126th CCF Division and a regiment of the 119th CCF Division. This combined enemy force succeeded during the night in surrounding the 23 Regimental Combat Team.²⁰

At 0900 McGee took out a patrol which captured five Chinese hiding in a culvert and seven more who were wounded and lying in the rice

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.; Photograph #6

19. Ibid.; Annex VII: Extract from 23d Infantry Regiment Casualty Status List

20. Annex V: Headquarters U S X Corps: Critique of tactics employed in the first encounter with the enemy at CHIP'YONG-NI

[REDACTED]

paddies south of the company position, McGee counted eighteen enemy bodies. Near MASAN (CS974467) McGee walked up to a small haystack near an abandoned enemy machine gun. A wounded Chinese raised up in the haystack to shoot McGee; Kluttz shot and killed him. Another Chinese, although handicapped by a badly wounded leg, was still attempting to operate a Russian burp gun when Cpl Boleslow N Sander bayoneted him.²¹

While McGee was out with the patrol, Capt Stanley Terrell, Lt Charles F Heady and Lt Leonard Napier from Company F made a reconnaissance of Company G's defensive positions. It was planned that either Napier's 1st Platoon or Heady's 3d Platoon would reinforce any sector of Company G in case of penetration, since it was apparent that the enemy would launch a stronger attack on Company G that night.²²

During the day the 23d Regimental Combat Team received 24 air drops of ammunition. In the afternoon the TACP brought three air strikes to the south where the enemy had increased his activity. Inside the perimeter intermittent enemy mortar rounds fell.²³

Company G had a quiet day. Hot meals were served. Some of the men of the 3d Platoon thought that perhaps the Chinese had withdrawn.²⁴

Enemy activity early that night quickly shattered that hope. Soon after darkness at 1800, the men heard bugles and saw flares. Twenty minutes later Ottesen's machine gun position was hit, and the gunner was wounded. Ottesen took over the gun and found himself in contact with a squad of

21. Interview #3: Lt McGee; Photograph #5

22. Interview #1: 1st Lt Charles F Heady, Company F; Annex IV: Letter, 1st Lt Donald O Miller to Major Roy Appleman 18 October 1951

23. Annex VI: Extract from Command Report, 23 Infantry Regiment

24. Interview #3: Lt McGee

~~_____~~

Chinese who were getting overhead support by a machine gun at the base of HILL 397 (CS802457).²⁵

Down at the kitchen the mess crew heard the firing. They had failed to dig foxholes and the only place they could find protection was the garbage pit. Cpl Bernard Jack and the seven other members of the mess crew crowded into the sump. No one made any funny remarks about the smell.²⁶

Up on the hill McGee had his hands full. Two enemy squads succeeded in penetrating the company position at the contact point on the knoll between the 1st and 3d Platoons. The line was further weakened when aggressive Chinese, gaining a foothold on the hill, planted pole charges in two 1st Platoon holes. The explosions resulting killed three American soldiers and one Korean volunteer.* The Chinese, now in control of the left side of the 1st Platoon sector, set up a machine gun and started firing across the 3d Platoon's right flank. A BAR man was hit, and McGee placed the BAR in his hole.²⁷

Because of the enemy fire coming from the 1st Platoon area, McGee began to wonder whether or not the platoon was holding. Phoning Heath he asked, "Heath, is the 1st Platoon still in position?" Heath was in contact with Toth who had contact with Schmitt up on the hill. Schmitt was holding in the right sector of the 1st Platoon, and so Toth reported to Heath that the 1st Platoon was still up on the hill. He did not explain that the left sector of the 1st Platoon had collapsed. Heath, thinking that the 1st Platoon was still tied in with the 3d Platoon, relayed Toth's information to McGee.

* This Korean had attached himself to the company and had been furnished a rifle

25. Ibid.; Photograph #4

26. Interview #4: Group interview, Company G

27. Interview #3: Lt McGee; Photograph #7

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McGee, however, was in doubt. He and Kluttz shouted over to the 1st Platoon area, "Anyone from the 1st Platoon?" There was no answer.²⁸

Activities in his own area now took up McGee's interest as Chinese soldiers overran a foxhole to his right. On the extreme right flank of his platoon sector, he could see four Chinese soldiers with shovels strapped on their bodies crawling on their hands and knees fifteen feet above and behind Sgt Querry's hole. By this time the sound powered telephone to Querry was out, and McGee shouted to Querry, "There are four of them at the rear of your hole, toss a grenade up and over."²⁹

A burst from the enemy machine gun in the 1st Platoon area prevented Querry from rising and lobbing the grenade. McGee and the other occupant of his foxhole, runner Pvt Cletis D Inmon, firing a BAR and a M-1 respectively, killed the four Chinese soldiers. The time was now 2210.³⁰

Querry's troubles were not yet over. McGee looked down the slope and saw fifteen or twenty Chinese crawl out of the dry creekbed and start up the hill toward Querry's hole. McGee called to him, "About fifteen or twenty of them are coming up to your right front." Querry would not stick his head up. McGee and Inmon with BAR and M-1 fire attempted to pin down the advancing Chinese. The Chinese continued to crawl toward Querry. They threw several potato smasher type grenades at Querry's hole. Querry and a sergeant in his hole climbed out and ran to McGee's hole. They jumped in on top of McGee. The sergeant was hit on the way over. The Chinese then threw a satchel charge into Querry's old hole and killed a private who had remained there.³¹

With Querry on top of him McGee could not fire. He said, "Get the

28. Interview #3: Lt McGee
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.

[REDACTED]

hell out of here and get back with your squad." Query did not budge, and McGee repeated the order. Query then jumped out and was immediately shot through the shoulder. McGee called for a litter team, and the two sergeants were evacuated under enemy fire.³²

Chinese soldiers started to crawl up the slope toward McGee's position. One threw three hand grenades at McGee before McGee cut him down with the BAR. The BAR was now jamming on every tenth round, and McGee was using his pen knife to evacuate the shell. Finally, he dropped the knife, and in the darkness could not find it. Inmon offered his messkit knife; however, it would not work in the slot. Therefore, McGee abandoned the BAR and attempted to fire his carbine at a Chinese who had crawled up to within ten feet of the platoon CP. As the Chinese raised up on his knees, McGee pulled back the bolt. The cold oil prevented the bolt from going home.* McGee grabbed hold of the operating handle and pushing it with the palm of his hand, slammed the bolt in and fired four rounds at the Chinese. McGee killed him. Three other Chinese were also killed by the CP group at this time.³³

Wire communications were out after 2300. McGee ordered platoon runner PFC John N Martin, who shared a foxhole in the platoon rear with the 60 mm mortar observer, to return to the company CP and inform Heath that the platoon badly needed men, ammunition and a litter team. Martin delivered McGee's message and returned to the platoon at 2350 bringing fifteen men from the 503d Field Artillery Battalion. As the field artillery men crossed the crest of the hill they were taken under fire by enemy who had infiltrated the platoon sector. McGee watched with a sinking

* A carbine will not fire unless the bolt is completely closed

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

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sensation thirteen of the reinforcing group "take off." Of the ~~three~~ remaining, a mortar round killed one and wounded a second.³⁴

Martin then returned to the rear area and guided the company wire team, carrying ammunition up to the platoon.³⁵

At 2300, shortly after an eight man carrying party had arrived with ammunition for the two machine guns, an enemy mortar shell scored a direct hit on the company contact point on the right flank. Two men were killed and eight wounded. Cpl Russell M Stiltner, who was not hit, continued to man one of the machine guns.³⁶

By 2400 the 356th Regiment had made two unsuccessful assaults on the Company G position. At 2400 the 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment, 115th CCF Division jumped off in an attack on the southern sector of the 23d Regimental Combat Team perimeter. This attack also failed. The Chinese suffered heavy casualties in the attacks.³⁷

As the 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment, began its assault of Company G, an enemy machine gun, firing from a position in the former sector of Company G's 1st Platoon, sent a bullet through Inmon's left eye. Inmon started shouting, "I'm hit in the face. I'm hit in the face. I don't want my mother to see me this way. Get me back off this hill." Blood spurted from his eye as McGee attempted to calm him down. McGee said, "Lay down, I can't take you out now." Two Chinese behind the CP prevented Inmon's evacuation. McGee then called to his platoon sergeant, "Hey Klutz, send the medic over. Inmon's been hit." The aid man came over in two or three minutes and bandaged Inmon's head. McGee now asked Inmon if he could still fire his M-1. Inmon replied, "No. I can't see." McGee said, "Can you load

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Interview #8: Capt Elledge; Photograph #8

37. Annex V: Headquarters U S X Corps: Critique of tactics employed in the first encounter with the enemy at CHIP'YONG-NI

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the magazines for my carbine?" Inmon said he would try, but he didn't know. Inmon then went ahead loading the magazines as McGee was firing.³⁸

At about 0020 on 15 February McGee asked the aid man if Inmon got over the crest of the hill could the aid man walk him to the rear. Inmon's right eye was now cleared, and the runner thought he could make it all right. The aid man and Inmon got over the crest of the hill, and McGee observed the aid man start running and began to drag Inmon. The two made it to the company CP. The aid man did not return even though McGee had asked him to.³⁹

At 0030 two Chinese succeeded in enveloping Ottesen's hole. These Chinese tossed two grenades in the hole and knocked out the machine gun.* No longer hearing the machine gun, McGee called to Klutz, "What's happened to the machine gun? It has stopped firing." Klutz replied that Ottesen's position had been overrun and the machine gun knocked out. He reported that Chinese were coming through between Ottesen's squad and Cpl Raymond Bennett's squad. Bennett, holding left flank of the platoon, had not been attacked. McGee called him on the sound powered telephone and ordered him to send several men to fill the gap caused by Ottesen's having been overrun.⁴⁰

McGee then sent Martin back to the company CP to find out whether the 1st Platoon was still in position. Heath called Toth who replied that they were still there since Schmitt with one squad was holding on the extreme right flank. Martin returned to McGee with this information.⁴¹

Below the 1st Platoon was an eight to twelve foot high cliff with barbed wire between the cliff and the road. The CCF had penetrated the barbed wire using bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges, climbed the

* Cpl Eugene L Ottesen is listed as missing in action

38. Interview #3: Lt McGee

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.; Supplemental interview with Lt McGee

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hill and occupied the left flank of the 1st Platoon sector. McGee sent Martin to the CP a second time and McGee finally convinced Heath that these Chinese were there and were firing at the 3d Platoon. McGee requested ammunition and replacements because the platoon had quite a few wounded and was getting low in personnel.⁴²

At 0045 Heath ^{contacted} ~~called~~ McGee and informed him that a squad was on the way from Company F. Klutz was now firing the machine gun, giving protective fire to Bennett's squad which had succeeded in closing the gap caused by the penetration in Ottesen's sector. The Chinese here had a bugler with them whom Bennett shot as he tooted his second note. In the melee, however, Bennett was first hit by a hand grenade which blew part of his hand off. Then he was wounded in the shoulder by a bullet, and a piece of shrapnel struck him on the head. The sound powered telephone went out, and McGee lost touch with Bennett's squad.⁴³

Starting at 0100 the 3d Battalion, 344th CCF Regiment launched an attack on the southern sector of the perimeter, occupying the first hilltop ^{*} within 40 minutes.⁴⁴

Acting on McGee's request, Heath obtained Sgt Kenneth G Kelly's 3d squad from the 3d Platoon of Company F. At ⁰²⁰⁰ 0100 Kelly's squad arrived, and Kelly contacted Klutz. As Klutz started to take Kelly's squad over to the gap between the 3d and 1st Platoons, two Chinese with burp guns fired at him but missed. Klutz disposed of them with his M-1. Soon afterwards Klutz returned to McGee and reported that all the men in Kelly's squad were wounded. Klutz said, "McGee, we have to stop them."⁴⁵

The CCF continued to attack the 3d Platoon. At ⁰³⁰⁰ 0200 the 2d Platoon which was not under fire pulled back, thus taking away Warf's machine gun which was supporting the 3d Platoon.⁴⁶

* This was probably the knoll on the left flank of the 1st Platoon position.

42. Interview #3: Lt McGee

43. Ibid.

44. Annex V: Headquarters US X Corps: Critique of tactics employed in the first encounter with the enemy at CHIP'YONG-NI

45. Interview #3: Lt McGee; Interview #1: Lt Heady

46. Interview #3: Lt McGee

McGee shouted over to Kluttz and asked him if he knew how Bennett's squad was making out. Kluttz replied, "I think three or four are still left."⁴⁷

The Chinese continued to attack. McGee was low on ammunition and Kluttz was having trouble with his machine gun. Growing discouraged McGee called to Kluttz, "It looks like they have got us." Kluttz called back, "Let's kill as many of these s-ns of b-tchs as we can before they get us." At ⁴⁵0215 Kluttz's machine gun jammed and McGee called to him, "Let's try to get out." They threw what grenades they had left and climbed over the crest of the hill. On the reverse slope they joined Bennett, Benoit and Ziebell. The 3d Platoon survivors then withdrew to the 60 mm mortar position.⁴⁸

Lt Haberman, attempting to get reinforcements from Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, walked into one of their squad tents which was filled with men. "Hell," he said, "a squad tent won't stop a bullet." He succeeded in persuading five or six men to accompany him. These went outside with Haberman, but none climbed the hill with him.⁴⁹

An estimated four or five Chinese were firing on the 60 mm mortar position from the knob on the right flank of the 3d Platoon. Therefore, Haberman moved two guns into a ditch 100 yards back of their position. Four men in the 4th Platoon had been wounded, one by an enemy 60 mm mortar round and three by small arms. Most of the enemy mortar rounds were falling on the ridge where the 1st and 3d Platoons formerly were.⁵⁰

Sgt Schmitt and the twenty men who had been holding the right flank of the 1st Platoon came off the hill at 0300.⁵¹

Lt Col James W Edwards, commanding the 2d Battalion, ordered Heath to retake the hill. McGee collected Kluttz and four men of the forthcoming assault. McGee told Heath, "Get a couple of tanks to help us. We can't

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.; Interview #4: Group interview, Company G

49. Interview #2: ~~Capt~~ Haberman; Photograph #1

50. Interview #2: Capt Haberman; Photograph #7

51. Interview #3: Lt McGee

do it with what men we have." Eight or ten men from Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, led by Capt Elledge, joined them.⁵² Lt Heady was alerted by Capt ~~Tyrell~~ who told him to get the rest of his platoon over to Company G which was being overrun. Heady and his men reached Company G at 0330, and Heady contacted Heath at the bottom of the hill at 0345.⁵³

The attacking force was supplemented by a platoon of rangers who arrived at 0400 and five Sherman tanks from the 23d Regimental Tank Company under 1st Lt Charles W Hulburt. Capt John H Ramsburg came down from the 2d Battalion staff and took command of the composite group. For the attack Heady's platoon was on the left, the rangers in the center and Company G on the right. Ramsburg arranged for a tank to sweep the top of the hill with 50 cal machine gun fire and for a 60 mm mortar to fire a three to four minute barrage on the hill. The minute the mortar fire lifted, the attack was to be made.⁵⁴

Heady's platoon lay down a base of fire for the attack using two light 30 cal machine guns. The enemy replied with fifteen mortar rounds ranging from 60's to 120's, wounding three men, two from McGee's emaciated platoon. McGee now had Klutz, Martin and one other man. The rangers succeeded in getting a few men to the top of the hill; however, the superior fire power of the enemy forced them off. The Chinese were effectively using small arms, mortars, grenades and machine guns. During the action the ranger platoon leader was killed, Lt Heath and Capt Ramsburg wounded. Lt Haberman took over command of Company G. Heady's platoon had twenty-two wounded and one missing. Five men were unscathed as the platoon withdrew from the hill at 0800.⁵⁵

52. Ibid.

53. Interview #1: Lt Heady; Annex IV: Letter, Lt Miller to Major Applemen

54. Ibid.; Interview #1: Lt Heady; Interview #2: Capt Haberman; Interview #3: Lt McGee; Interview #7: 1st Lt Charles W Hulburt, 23d Regimental Tank Company

55. Interview #1; Lt Heady; Interview #2; Capt Haberman; Interview #3: Lt McGee; Annex IV: Letter, Lt Miller to Major Applemen

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Col Freeman then ordered Company B committed to restore the break in the line caused by Company G's collapse.⁵⁶

On the MSR between Company G and the French Battalion, 1st Lt Arthur J Junot, 1st Platoon commander, had three tanks: his, M/Sgt Andrew Reyna's, and SFC Kenneth P Pitlick's. Ten Frenchmen crossed the road after the failure of Ramsburg's force to retake the hill and requested grenades. These Frenchmen then proceeded up the hill supported by the 50 cal machine gun on Junot's tank. Twenty yards from the crest the French got in to a grenade fight with ten Chinese in the old Company G foxholes. Three more Frenchmen and Capt Elledge, carrying a BAR, arrived. Two enemy machine guns pinned down the French on top of the hill. The French kept shouting for reinforcements. At about 0820 they were forced to withdraw.⁵⁷

Shortly thereafter Capt George E Votom, tank company executive, arrived and with Junot made a brief reconnaissance for the forthcoming Company B attack. They decided that they would be able to get two tanks up on the ridgeline. Capt Sherman Pratt, commanding Company B, and Junot worked out a plan for the operation of the tanks.⁵⁸

In preparation for supporting the Company B attack Haberman reorganized Company G. The remainder of the 1st Platoon, plus the CP group, plus the cooks amounting to 21 men went into the line. The 2d Platoon, which had not been hit, added 35 men more. The 3d Platoon now consisted of McGee, Kluttz and Martin. In the 4th Platoon, only two mortars were manned under Cpl Maurice McCormick. SFC Vernon Eggenburg acted as mortar observer. Lt William H Gibson, the artillery F.O., and part of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, were with Company G.⁵⁹ The battery's guns sat abandoned in a no man's land between Company G and the Chinese.⁶⁰

56. Interview #2: Capt Haberman; Interview #3: Lt McGee; See interview with Col Paul J Freeman 23 February 1951(not included in this report)

57. Interview #6: 1st Lt Arthur J Junot, 23d Regimental Tank Company

58. Ibid.

59. Interview #2: Capt Haberman; Interview #3: Lt McGee

60. Interview #4: Group interview, Company G; Interview #8: Capt Elledge

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At 1000 Company B jumped off, Company G laying down a base of fire. Pratt succeeded in getting his company almost to its objective when heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the reverse slope drove them from the hill. Slippery going caused by snow plus an enemy 75 mm recoilless rifle prevented the tanks from gaining the ridgeline in support of Company B.⁶¹

At 1715 that evening the 5th Cavalry Regiment entered the perimeter, having broke through the enemy. The enemy immediately withdrew.⁶² That night Company G was relieved by Company B, the 2d Platoon being attached to Company F and remaining in position.⁶³

In the fighting at CHIP'YONG-NI Company G had forty-eight wounded, fourteen killed and ten missing.⁶⁴

61. Interview #6: Lt Junot
62. Annex V: Headquarters US X Corps: Critique of tactics employed in the first encounter with the enemy at CHIP'YONG-NI; Annex VI: Extract from Command Report, 23d Infantry Regiment, February 1951; See 3d Historical Detachment report: Task Force Crombez
63. Interview #2: Capt Haberman
64. Annex VII: Notes from Company G, 23d Infantry Regiment MRU Roster and Morning Reports 13-22 February 1951; Extract from 23 Infantry Regiment Casualty Status List

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Edward C Williamson
EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty
Commanding 4th Hist Det

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
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PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
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- 1. 23d Regimental Combat Team
Perimeter: G-3, 2d US Infantry
Division 13-15 February 1951

APPROX LOCATION OF
ELMS 23d INF REGT
CHIPYONG-NI PERIM
13-15 FEB 1951
MAP: KOREA 1:50,000
SHEET 6726 III

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PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
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PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
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1st Lt Charles F Heady, Inf, 01540619, 3d Platoon Leader, F Co.
Dale Ind.

INTERVIEWER: Capt Edward C Williamson

181635 Oct 51

UCRUM-NI, KOREA

On the nite of the 13th. It was sometime after midnight on the 14th I was alerted the 3d Plat over to reinforce G Co; however, that order was changed and I was to send only one squad, G was holding.

On the morning of the 14 Capt Stanley Terrell had Lt Leonard Napier and myself reconnoitered George and Easy Co positions, easiest routes. Nite of the 14th. A little after midnight I was alerted to get Kenneth G Sgt Kelly's 2d squad, he was gone about 0300 they called and said get the rest of the platoon over G Co is being overrun, Capt Terrell told me. I got to G Co about 0330. moved back, underunderpass and asked for G Co. cmdr., arrived at CP told to go up hill and report to Lt Thomas Heath.

I contacted Lt Heath at the bottom of the hill. At that time 0345 G Co position had been overrun entirely. So at that stage they decided that I had arrived with my platoon and there were some rangers. Decided to hold a line at the base of the hill. A platoon of fox co was placed to the left and the rangers and the rest of g.co extended to the right. At that time Capt Ramsburg from battalion came and took charge of the operation at between 0415 and 0430. His info he had made arrangements for a tank to sweep the top of the hill with 50 cal. one 60 mm mortar 3 - 4 minute barrage on the top of the hill. Minute barrage lifted we were to make our assault. I received those instructions 75 yds from my plat as I was on my way back to them. We started getting in mortars 81's , 82's and 60's. Not too heavy. ~~xxxxxxx~~ 15 mortar rounds. Just as we started moving up walking, I was wounded by a mortar. Attacked in line.

Edward C Williamson

EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty

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Capt Carl F Haberman, Inf, 01287519, Platoon Leader 4th Platoon,
Company G, 23d Infantry Regiment, Great Bend, Mo.

As far as the artillery was concerned they could fire on some of these hills that were some distance from the perimeter; however, the perimeter was fairly small and after our positions were attacked they were too close for the arty to fire on them.

8 or ten of the arty men joined the 1st Platoon. first night. They sent about a dozen men. Before the action we talked with Capt ^{Elledge} John A Elledge and prior to the first attack, Capt ^{Elledge} came to the CP and gave Lt Heath a list of all the weapons and ammo he had, and we figured out a plan that ^{we} we could use them. Once ^{the enemy} they got into our perimeter we couldn't use the arty and we would use the men for riflemen. Skeleton crews ^{would be} were kept with the arty.

Another group ^{of artillerymen} about a squad, between 2300 and 2400 sent up to the 3d Platoon. Some were wounded before they got there, the balance returned to the arty position, about $\frac{1}{2}$ dozen, straggling back and went to several ^{although a squad tent obviously offers no protection from enemy action} squad tents. I went down there and looked in one squad tent. It was full of men. As far as I know that group never did come back out. At 0200 or ^{went in and} 0300, I asked for some ~~asked for~~ some men. 5 or 6 came outside with me, but didn't follow me up the hill.

^{Elledge} Capt ~~*~~ had crew on a machine gun, a dozen others reached the 1st Platoon. About 2100 or 2200. Capt Elledge's leadership and action was excellent. If he had someone to place in charge of the group to 3d Platoon who could ^{had} ~~we~~ held them together, it would have worked out.

The first night I had the fourth Platoon. Both nights M/Sgt Toth was back by the CP 300 yds away, although the platoon CP was on the hill. The second nite toward morning 0300 or 0400 I caught on that Toth was not on the hill. McGee's platoon Mc plus 3 or 4 men I had reinforced ^{with 6} ammunition bearers ^{Ronald J.} under Sgt Weader. At 0200 we filled in holes to the left flank of the left platoon, GCF were firing from there into our mortar position.

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At 0300 ^{from} ~~the~~ ^{on a knob} holes on the right flank of the 3d platoon ^{on stic 62 4 or 5} CCF were firing ~~from a knob~~ on our mortar position. ~~An estimated 4 or 5~~. We finally withdrew our two guns furtherest south. There was a ditch 100 yds south of them. Moved two of them back ^{into it.} ~~but~~ PFC Lucas ^{and} PFC Harris ^{were} firing ^{at} from the knoll. I had four men wounded. 3 small arms, one by mortar round ^{by} (60 mm mortar). Most mortar rounds were falling on ridge ^{although}. Mortar rounds were falling into the valley to the east of us.

Originally our perimeter ~~was~~ extended from the ridge east of the valley but when the 503d moved ⁱⁿ we extended our perimeter.

The first night we fire ^c about 500 60 mm mortar rounds
 2d " " " " 700 " " "

Targets were the approaches or fingers leading into the 1st and 3d Platoons ~~plus~~ plus a small hill 150 yds south of the 3d Platoon ~~s~~, they kept setting up machine guns and mortars on that hill. Cpl McCormack, ^{60 mm mortar obsr,} saw them moving from Hill 397 with machine guns and setting up on the small hill in front of us. ^{McCormack} ~~Capt~~ was with Cpl ^{McCormack}. We were registering some concentrations, Lt ^{William H} Gibson from the 37th FA Bn was also there ^{and} fired some artillery on the finger leading down from ^{Hill} 397, just at dusk. 105 ^{in rounds} about 20 rounds.

During the action Bn sent Capt ^{John H} Ramsburg to take charge of the company. ^S Ramsburg was wounded slightly in the foot about the time that Heath was hit. ^{most of the men in} 1st

After ^{the} 3d Platoon and the left flank of the ~~left~~ platoon were wounded or killed, the whole hill mass did not have anyone on it. The right flank of the 1st Platoon ^{with} about 20 men ^{was} still intact. About 0300. We tried to retake the hill mass ^{with a platoon from Company F, platoon of, in the process Asall} ~~plat from F co, plat rangers, process~~ ^{Heath and Ramsburg} were wounded, ^e Lt Heath commanding the ranger ^{platoon} was killed.

we evacuated the wounded and moved back to the ridge by the valley. I took charge of the company. we still had all three mortars but we only had enough men to man two of them. ^{with} What was left of the 1st ^{platoon} Plat plus CP

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group plus cooks, we set up line; ^{a total of} 21 on line, 2 on each mortar, ~~170gt~~
 SFC Eggenberg, platoon sgt of the 4th Platoon, acted as FO;
 McCormack gunned the mortar. 2d Platoon never ~~got~~ hit, 35 men.
 Lt Gibson, FO, moved back with me. Stayed there following day,
 put down base of fire for ~~B Co.~~ ^{Company B} attack plus mortar support.
 B Co attacked from behind the hill, got almost to the top,
 forced to pull back. Part of the 503 pulled back to the ridge with us.
 arty pieces sitting abandoned could be covered from ridge, ²⁰⁰ 400 yds ~~away~~.
 G Co relieved that night by B Co. The 2d Plat was attached to F Co and
 stayed in its position.

The 503 fired point-blank after the 1st nite, just after daylight in
 front of the French. CCF attempting to withdraw to the southwest.
 I took out a patrol on the 16th at 0800, and I counted 200, mostly arty.
 The 2d Platoon lost 4 WIA, the 3d Platoon 4 men and an officer left, lost
 30 KIA and wounded, 1st Platoon 15 KIA and WIA. 4th Platoon 25 WIA 1 KIA

Most of the foxholes were covered with logs and ~~ix~~ dirt. The CCF
 were laying TNT charges on top of the holes.

3d Platoon, 2d night 0230 one soldier captured by the CCF was being
 taken to the rear when the group taking him ~~over~~ was overrun by a 2d group
 of CCF banzaing up the hill. the soldier joined them and when they got to
 the top of the hill continued on and rejoined the company.

PFC Brown story. I was sent out to try to find bodies. We found 3 bodies,
 none from G Co. ~~All~~ bodies had been stripped and one man was castrated.

Morale of the men- good .

Quite a bit of SP and mortar both nights. 60 to 120.

Edward C Williamson
 EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
 Capt Arty

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INTERVIEWER: Capt Edward C Williamson

LF

Lst Paul J McGee, Inf 0967870, 3d Platoon Leader, Company G, 23d Infantry Regiment, Route 7, Box 82, Charlotte, NC
~~1st Lt Arthur J Junot, Armer, 02021122, 1st Platoon Leader, Tank Company, 23d Infantry Regiment, 367 Ave A, Port Allen, La.~~

181030 October

FIA-RI, KOREA

We moved into Chipyeong from twin tunnels, Company G. At that time Capt Hitchens was company commander, Col Paul Freeman was commanding the regiment Lt Col Edwards was commanding the 2d Bn. We moved in on 7 Feb 1951. Weather was cold with snow on the ground. When we first moved in we set up a perimeter and started patrolling. We tied in with the French at the road on our right flank. When we moved in the 3d Plat was on hill 803475 just south of the village. Later we shifted over on the 9th.

The town of Chipyeong was battered, at least 50% well beat up. Small town. railroad ran south to town proper, ran on fill, higher than the town. Morale was excellent.

Underpass under railroad pass. Forward CP in a house. On this side of railroad track rice paddies. As we went under the underpass rear CP. ^{Low} ridge where rangers tied in (last day) before Rangers and Company B in reserve. Battery B, Capt John Elledge, (now with Service Btry). in area. Lt Gibson, FWD OBSR, We came down by railroad track, went south across RR tied in across rice paddies on. 3d Platoon in reserve. On second day 2d Plat tied in with the French 789457. 3d Platoon in center. Weapons Platoon in center of platoon. 503 behind weapons and 1st Plat. 100 yds behind 1st 2d yds back of 3d Plat. Moved in and commenced preparing def pos., trip flairs, mined the road. A & P plat ^{from} ~~form~~ bn put in 9 AT ^{traps on} road where we tied in with the French. 4th or 5th day. Also put out fugasses, one on road one in front of 2d Plat. Dug in two man fox holes. Company CP in house not dug in. Men were sleeping in holes, We had a 50% alert at all times. One man sleep, one man on alert until the fight started when everybody was awake. F Co on left.

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We put out barbed wire on road and in front of the 1st Platoon. 1st Plat on hill overlooking road. ~~xxx~~ Lt Col Edwards instructed us to put wire out A & P Platoon helped. 4 or 5th day. First expected the attack to come from the north. On 12 Feb we were told by Capt Ramsberg, S2. came from regiment. you were going to be attacked from the south. About that time we had been hit from the north the French.

The night of the 12th was the first time that we were attacked. 2d Plat in the flat with goods field of fire. Other platoons on hills did not have a very good final protective line. We had good observation. One bad spot dry creek bed between 3d and 1st Plat. The first night they came off Hill 397, about ²²²⁰~~1020~~ came up ridge by little spur where I had a ^{30 cal lite} mg. CPL Ottesen's ~~squad~~ ^{team} CCF about 1 squad. Moved up and three grenades and fired at the mg. ^{sgd} came up thru creekbed to right flank of 3d Plat. had a BAR Sgt Querry's squad. Hit us in those two spots 4 attacks hr 1/2 break between attacks. 3d Platoon 2 cas WIA, CPL Moguet & med.

McGee was in the center of the platoon. Cpl ~~was~~ Moguet had a rifle ^{sgd} on my left. He was wounded by grenade in his foxhole. He came over to where I was at 2300, hollering for me letting me know that they were being hit pretty hard, wounded in the calf. ^{He was} ~~xxx~~ kinda upset and CCF getting pretty close. about a squad of CCF there and about a squad in front of us. As he came across two CCF chased him throwing grenades. A grenade fragment tore the stock off his rifle, he held on to his rifle, knocked it out of his hand. Two boys in his squad shot the CCF, Cpl M was shouting, "Lt Magee, I'm hit." ^{the Chinks are} and there hitting us on the left. I talked with him a minute and he said, "I am not hit bad." and returned to his squad. We were on the forward slpe, CCF were about 20 yds below us, 2300 to 2400 three 20 grenades, squad small arms. two sixty in rice paddy, 300 yeds south. Could see the flash, fired 20 rounds. hitting around holes. Cpl Otteson's MG killed 8 chinese. Chinese were blowing whistles, bugles

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and hollering banzai. After Cpl M hollered my name, one of the chinese also hollered it below me. I checked with ~~the~~ BAR man, and then rolled a grenade ^{wounded} at the CCF, he rolled over and fired at me with his rifle. I took the BAR and fired a burst at him, killing him. Two more attacks before daylight.

Lt Heath was notified that we were being hit by phone. I had sound powered telephones to my squads. EEB to the company CP. He asked *about the attack*. First we heard a bugle to our front, 1000. I called Lt Heath and told him I just heard a bugle on the forward slope of Hill 397. He said keep all the men alert. We were alerted because the French on our right flank were being hit. perimeter swung so that French were at out rear facing southwest and west.

When I heard my mg open up I called all three squad leaders and told them that Cpl ^{Ottosen} ~~Ott~~'s squad was being hit: ^{rolled up} Sgt Querry's squad, Cpl Bennett's squad and a third. Watch for the enemy do not fire unless you see them. Because we had to watch our ammo supply. We were low on ammo and resupplied by air. Hard to get ammo up at night fight and conserve ammo until daylight. After it started getting light my plat ^{Bill} Sgt Klutz in the hole next to mine. He shouted to me that he saw five in the creek bed and he fired a couple of tracers. I told him to fire a 3.5 bazooka. He couldn't get bazooka men to pick up enemy position. He fired and round hit tree, making air burst and 40 Chinese came out of creek bed and began withdrawing south across the rice paddy. Chinese were walking. ^{The} ~~Sgt~~ 2 squad of my plat and 1st Plat fired at them. We counted at 0900 with a patrol captured 5 not wounded in culvert. got seven WIA, counted 18 KIA. One to right of MG had been wounded and climbed into small haystack. I walked up to the haystack and CCF raised up and Sgt K shot him. Wounded crawled up to rice paddy banks. Cpl Sanderx from the 2d Platoon bayoneted one armed with a Russian burp gun, laying against rice paddy bank leg badly shot. Kept circulating in field picking up wounded, one of prisoners was the bugler.

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Artillery support too far out. They were too close to us. None of the men in field were killed by artillery fire. Artillery fire to right of Hill 397 and up on Hill 397.

I kept calling for 81 mm support and they would fire two or three rounds and then cease. They did not realize that we were being hit as hard as ~~were~~ we were.

The next day there was a airdrop and we ^{were} resupplied with ammo.

The next morning 1100 airdrop, one bundle hit right on top of the tank Co CP. I sent back 8 men two from each squad. We were feeding hot chow at the company CP 50% at a time.

Everything was quiet during the day and we thought that they had withdrawn. We went out and picked up wounded Chinese. 2 60mm mortars. two machine guns. a few rifles.

The night of the action 13: next day 14

Early that night, it got dark (at 1800) day had been sunny although the snow remained on the ground. Heard bugles. horn. Dark saw flares. 20 minutes after dark hit us, hit some place, Cpl ^{Offesen's} ~~ottie~~ machine ~~gun~~ ^{gunner} was wounded and Cpl O took over the gun. ^{medic worth} About ^{one of} ~~the~~ squad, firing rifles, machine guns sitting just off Hill 397 giving them overheard support, 2 squads hit between where I tied in with the 1st Plat. The 1st Plat was also under attack. They knocked out 2 positions of 1st Plat. 2 foxholes by pole or satchel charges, killing 4 men, one a Korean civilian who was carrying a rifle. Set a machine gun and started firing across the 3d Platoon's right flank. My BAR man was hit. I took the BAR and put it in my hole. when I had joined the 3d Plat Jan 22 they did not have a 3d Plat and it was a new plat. The 3 squad leaders and plat ldr were all old men who had seen combat.

I called Lt Heath and asked him if the 1st plat was still up there.

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About 2200 when they broke thru

"Heath, is the 1st Platoon still up in position?" Heath said, "Yes."
Heath was in contact with Toth who had contact with SFC Donald R Schmitt up on the hill.

Sgt ~~Klotz~~ Klotz and I shouted, "Anyone from the 1st Platoon." At that time the CCF overran the foxhole on my right flank and I could see 4 CCF over and to the rear of Sgt Query's hole. I yelled over to him to ^{back over his hole} throw some grenades. Communications with the squads was out except Cpl Bennett, and I still had communication with Lt Heath.

"There are four of them at the rear of your hole, toss a grenade up and over. I knew that they were CCF because they were on their knees and I could see the shovel on their backs."

About that time the mg in the first platoon area fired across the 3d Plat and Sgt Query couldn't rise to throw a grenade. I took my AR and my runner ~~PFC Enman.~~ from my hole fired on 4 CCF with BAR and M-1, killing the 4 CCF about 5 or ten minutes after 1st breakthrough. I looked down and saw about 15 or 20 crawling from dry creekbed toward Sgt Query's hole. Cpl Ott~~sen~~ ^{platoon} was engaging a ~~squad~~ ^{squad} with his mg. ~~I saw about 15~~ I told Query that they were coming. I said, "About 15 or 20 of them are coming up to your right front. He wouldn't stick his head up. I opened up with my BAR and the runner fired his M-1. They kept working until they got up on the hill, crawling ^{and} throwing small potato smashers, ^{while} firing a fizzing grenade. I told Query to toss a couple of grenades out. 3 in hole, wprivate killed, Sgt hit. Sgt Q and the other sgt ran over and jumped in ^{my} ~~it~~ ^{me,} hole on top of ~~him~~. The Chinese threw a satchel charge in Sgt Q hole killing the private who remain.

Other sgt hit on way over. I told Sgt Query, "Get the hell out of here and get back with your squad." I couldn't fire. I told him twice. He jumped out and was shot through the sholder. I got a litter team to evacuate the two sergeants.

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The Chinese started crawling toward my position tossing grenades as they came. One ^{threw} ~~three~~ two and ~~hit~~ shot him. The BAR jammed on the 10th round.

I used my pen knife to evacuate the shell but I dropped it and couldn't find it. Enman took his messkit knife but it wouldn't work in the slot. So I started to fire my carbine. One was 10 ft. raising on his knees, carbines snapped on me oil was cold and didn't go all the way home. I grabbed ahold of the operating handle and pushed it by hand shoved it with the palm of my hand and slammed the bolt in and shot 4 rounds at him, killing him. we killed about 3 or 4.

MG firing across from 1st Plat at 2400 hit runner in eye. He started shouting, " I am hit in the face Lt ~~Klutz~~ ^{I don't want my mother to see me this way."} I am hit in the face." Blood Get me back off the hill." sputtered from his eye. I quieted him down. " Lay down, I can't take you out now."

I called to Sgt ^{Klutz} ~~Klutz~~, "Hey Sgt Klutz, send the medic over ^{Enman's} ~~Enman's~~ been hit." At that time I couldn't get him out because a couple ^{of CCF} were behind my hole.

The medic came over immediately 2-3 minutes and bandaged him up. I asked him if he could still fire his M-1. He said, No, I can't see. I said, "Can you load the magazines for my carbine?" He said that he would try. he didn't know. He went ahead loading them while I was firing.

I asked the Medic if I got him over the top of the hill (about 12 ft to the top, could he get him back. we got his right eye cleared and he said that he could make it. I told the medic to take him over the hill. ^{and to return.} The medic got over the hill and started running and dragged him to the CP and did not return ^{as I had requested}

By this time about 0030. two CCF enveloped Cpl Ott~~sen's~~ ^{Klutz.} hole and threw grenades in his hole 2, knocking out the mg. I hollered over to Sgt Klutz.

"What's happened to the machine gun. it has stopped firing." He said that they have overrun his position. ^{Ottosen's} ~~Ottison~~ position is knocked out and the CCF were coming in between ^{Ottosen} ~~Ott~~ and Cpl Bennett. I called Bennett ^{alone} on extreme left flank. Bennett had not yet been hit I told him to take a cpl men and try to fill gap where Cpl O had been knocked out. I called Lt Heath, "Heath is the

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M/Sgt

1st Platoon still there?" Heath asked the 1st Platoon sgt who was in a little house by the CP whether they were on the hill? He said, Yes. *since he was in contact with* Sgt Schmidt ^{who} kept one squad from the 1st Plat on the right portion of the platoon sector. ~~at~~ Cliff 8 to 12 ft hi, CCF came up, barbed wire beside road blown up by CCF using bangalore torpedoes and ~~mines~~ satchel charges.

~~both~~ I said that ~~their~~ left flank was not there because there were CCF there firing at my position. I convinced him that they were up there. I told him that he would have to send some ammo and replacements as we were getting low on ammo and had quite a few wounded.

At 045 he called back and said that a squad was on the way from F Co. Sgt Klotz was firing the 2d mg at the gap. Cpl O

Cpl Bennett closed the gap which Cpl O tison. Cpl Bennett shot bugler on 2d note. Bennett hit by a grenade, part of hand blown off, hit in shoulder by bullet, in head by shrapnel and I lost ^{communication} ~~contact~~ with him.

¹⁰⁰ ~~0045~~ Squad leader from F Co contacted Sgt Klotz. ^{Klotz} Sgt Klotz started to take them to gap in 1st Plat, two CCF with burp guns right behind my hole not ten feet from Sgt Klotz fired at him and he killed both with his M-1. He left his mg. ^{entire} The ~~entire~~ squad was wounded trying to fill gap.

^{Klotz} Sgt Klotz returned to his machine gun and said, "McGee, we have to stop them. They have all been hit." The CCF started to come towards us ^{again} ~~again~~ ^{By} this time all the positions on our right and left had been knocked out as far as I could see. We were doing all the firing. ^{the} 2d Platoon did have one mg in support of us. They were not being attacked. 2d Platoon mg ceased firing and pulled back at 0200.

^{Klotz} I hollered over to ~~Klotz~~ and asked him if he knew how Bennett's squad was making out. He said, "I think that three or four are still left." They ~~(the~~ CCF) kept working in from the left and right and I was getting out of ammo. Sgt ^{Klotz} Klotz was having trouble with his machine gun. I hollered at ^{Klotz} Klotz. "It

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Klutz

It looks like they have got us ~~Klotz~~. He replied, "Let's kill as many of the sb as we can before they get us." Machine gun jammed with a cartridge in the chamber. At 0215, I hollered over to him, "Let's try to get out." Let's throw what ~~grenades~~ ^{grenades} we have left, fire what we can and try to get back over the hill toward ~~Ottison's~~ ^{Bennett's} squad. We ~~go~~ ^{went} over the top of hill, hollered for Bennett, found 3 men from his squad on the reverse slope and returned to the 60's.

the 3rd Platoon runner was in the van with the 60mm mortar observer.
 Martin was in the rear runner with 60mm obser. had been sent to ~~Communicators~~ Heath. Commo went out at 2300. Sent him back after 2300. 2d time ^{at} ~~One time~~ 2350 started up with 15 men from 503 FA Bn, sent some up to 1st platoon. Got to top of hill CCF opened up and all took off but three. He made several trips assisted ^{company} by wire team carrying ammo. Two were wounded by mortar round. One died before we got him off hill, the third disappeared.

During the nite the CCF took 4 wounded toward west of Hill 397. Men were not working fast enough and they threw grenades behind them to make them walk faster. Finally, 3 were shot with rifles and killed. First picked ^{PFC Donald H} Brown up he was wounded in left arm and legs, few more wounds from grenades. tried to get Brown to shake hands, refused, broke his arm. told him to go over hill to Chinese CP. went to right to road late afternoon 1615 picked up by tankers on side of road.* (story of Brown to medic to 1st Sgt to McGee.)

Klutz

The Col Edward ~~ordered~~ ^{ordered} Heath to retake the hill. I got Sgt ~~Klotz~~ and 4 men. The CP was by the 60 mm. We started to round up what people we could it was around 0300. I got my 5 boys, another platoon arrived from F Co. I told Heath, "Get a couple of tanks to help us but we couldn't do it with what men we had." He tried to get the tanks but failed.

Just before daybreak we moved our tanks up to the cut

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Platoon from F Co was to go to left. Tried to get 503 man. Contacted
and officer 8 or 10. Some officer, Capt Ramsberg ran some out with a pistol
0430* that is hearsay.

About 0345 we are making our attack F Co laid down a base with 2 lite mg.
120 mm mortars, 15, 60 mm rite back of F Co , 3 men wounded. Mortars wounded
2 of McGee's men. left Mc, Sgt K, runner Martin and one man. Platoon of
F Co failed to get hill. Ranger ~~Co~~ Platoon arrived at 0400. tried to take
hill. Lt Heath went up on hill with them. Heath got hit. machine gun
frontal assault. Artillery not firing too close. Rangers got a few men on
top. pulled back. small arms, mortars, grenades, mags. pulled back to next
rdige line.

Next attack to be from left. Lt Mc only had Sgt K and runner.
started to make assault. Baker Co. ~~had~~ to make the assault. ~~Capt Pratt~~
~~came up and I worked liaison from on operation of tanks. We didn't jump~~
G Co made attack. We started moving across ridge line Sgt Klotz got
shot. I went down to the CP.

After we got off the hill, at daybreak the 503 fired point blank at hill.

Edward C Williamson

EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty

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PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
(PMSE)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INTERVIEWER: Capt Edward C Williamson

181835 October at WORUN-NI, KOREA

~~Sgt Thomas M. Fortney~~, RA16335501, Inf, Rifleman in 3d Platoon,
Company G, 23d Infantry Regiment, 118 Swartz St Martinsburg, W. VA.

~~Sgt Harold T. Nelson~~, Inf, RA16327522, Rifleman in 3d Platoon 2d squad
2200 Femwrite Drive, Madison, Wisc

~~ppc~~

Cpl Kenneth C Green, Inf, RA16278410, Rifleman in 3d Platoon, 3d squad
Route 1, Eau Claire, Wisc

~~ppc~~

Cpl Roy F Benoit, Inf, RA11169452, Rifleman in 3d Platoon, 1st squad
21 1/2 Curtis St, Worcester, Mass

~~(the ppc)~~

Sgt Donald E Nelson, Inf, RA17281741, Rifleman in 2d squad, 2d Plat
914 15 Ave S, Minneapolis, Minn.

Cpl Bernard Jack, Inf, RA16324092, Baker in the kitchen,
3161 Washington Blvd, Indianapolis, Ind.

~~cpl~~

ER

Sgt Herbert G Ziebell, Inf, RA16244234, Rifleman in 1st squad, 3d Plat.
400 Brockway, Oshkosh, Wisc.

Sgt Donald Nelson, whole bn went on patrol, went out thru 3d Bn.
started to come back in, enemy in village. N of Chipyeong Pangmi-san.
Got back into position about 2100. 2210 the enemy hit.

Sgt Ziebell- I was just going on my hour of guard. Two men in
a hole. sitting in a foxhole, about 5x5 in foxhole with Cpl Benoit.
Ziebell woke up Cpl Benoit when they started firing. "There is some
firing going on over by the rest of the platoon. Get up and get ready."
I didn't start firing right away. I didn't fire because I didn't see
anybody to fire at the darkness would draw fire.

Cpl Green was pulling guard, heard firing to the left of him. I woke
up Pvt Henry Heimerl and another boy. I told them to wake up that there
there was firing. They got up and we sat there and waited.

Sgt Nelson, I was in a hole with Pvt Jack Ward arguing who would
pull guard first. We could hear digging 600 yeds south of us.
I heard a whistle, We both jumped out of our hole and got our bazooka
We were across a rice paddy. Our 4th squad mg opened up. Pvt Andrew C
Warf. We took our bazooka. Ward threw a couple of rounds in the bazooka

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fired at some flashes 800 yards to the south near some rocks. He fired 3 rounds. On the 3d round the back-blast came out the side, the powder burying his face. The next morning we fired two more rounds with the bazooka. Late the next morning we fired one round with the bazooka over where they were digging in and 12 ran out.

→ There were at least 3 air drops the next day. We were right by the airfield and mortar rounds came in near the kitchen one every 10 minutes. 82's.

They hit us about 2145. A few were sleeping. Sgt Ziebell heard yelling. ~~up to~~ Cpl Benoig heard digging on a knoll 100 yds to the front.

Cpl Benoig heard a mg to his front, shooting to the right. We had a mg 20yds 3d Plat, and mg 150 yds to the left 2d Plat. Those mg fired back. 15 min. en mg silenced.

About 0245, the enemy got into the 1st Plat area, Sgt Klotz pulled the 1st squad of the 3d Plat under Cpl Raymond Bennett out of their holes, and a squad from Fox Co. Cpl Benoig and Sgt Ziebell went walked 30 yds spread out and reached the ridge line, the enemy were on the other side of the hill. The CCF were firing automatic weapons and were on our right flank in the 1st Platoon holes. About 20 min later SGT K told the 2 squads to pull off the hill. We got a 1/3 way down and the CCF opened fire on us. Cpl Benoig was hit by bullet in the legs. I walked behind the 503 and the medics, Cpl Bennett was also wounded left leg and right hand both went together.

Almost at the bottom of the hill, Lt Heath came up and attempted to organize Sgt Ziebell, 1st Squad, squad from F Co. and some men from the 503. He had almost 30 men. Attempting to block hole. "We have to retake the hill." Mortars were falling in 5 or 6, 82 mm every 10 minutes. We started up the hill and got halfway. Mortars and small arms broke up the attack, At 0415 they came off the hill. They attempted 3 or 4 times to take the hill back. During the next day, pulled back on next ridge line.

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503 firing point black where French were forced off and by us.
 At 0415 the 503 left their guns because they were under enemy fire.
 Guns sitting there by themselves between the two ridgelines.

Cpl Green got wounded at 0300 was up on top of hill waiting for the
 two squads to come up, ricochet of bullet hit him on side of the nose.
 I walked down to the bottom of the hill.

0800 when the firing started.
 Down at the kitchen the only hole was the sump hole and the kitchen
 personnel 8 crowded in there. Nobody remarked about the smell.

When the troops came down for breakfast it was a problem trying
 to fry the flapjacks between mortar rounds and airdrops.

Edward C Williamson


EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
 Capt Arty

43
 4
 48 rounds
 14 shells
 10 miss.

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PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
(PMSE)



INTERVIEWER: Capt Edward C Williamson

Supplemental Interview

1st Lt Paul J McGee, Inf, 0967870, 3d Platoon Leader, Company G,
23d Infantry Regiment, Route 7, Box 82, Charlotte, NC

191500 November 1951 CHIP'YONG-NI, KOREA

Down the slope in front of my foxhole I placed a hand
grenade with trip wire attached. It was exploded by a Chinese.

The Chinese were on the first night on the knoll just above
Cpl ~~Querry's~~ hole, about fifteen feet

After 2300 we no longer had communications, and I sent
Martin back to the CP with messages concerning the situation
and also to clarify whether or not the 1st Platoon was in
position. Heath was doubting me when I informed him through
Martin that the 1st Platoon was no longer tying in with the
3d Platoon. He would call Toth each time and tell Martin
what Toth told him.

Lt Finn had his CP in a cave 75 yards to the rear of
his MLR. (Lt McGee and the interviewer located the cave
and also the foxholes whose positions are shown in the
sketch of the 3d Platoon position).

Edward C Williamson
EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty



5

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
(PM00)

[Redacted]

1st Lt Arthur J Junot, Armor, O2021122, 1st Platoon Leader, Tank Company, 23d Infantry Regiment, 367 Ave A, Port Allen, La.

9/

by

1st

Junot

181300 October

PJA-RI

INTERVIEWER: Capt Edward C Williamson

During the nite we sat 2000 moved tanks two, mine and Sgt 1st Cl Wm Brown moved in between 503 and 60mm . and trained our guns on the hill in case of a brakethrew. Sgt Brown's tank had a bad starter and we stayed hooked up throughout the nite. A few minutes before daybreak somebody from the hill yelled there they go across the paddies, get a few tanks up here. So I gave Sgt Brown a pull and started his tank. Moved out to the road just me, just forward of the Co G and F² contact pt. 50 cal mg nest there 503's One had been killed during the nite and was lying in road. The MG boys pointed out targets by firing burst and we would crack down on them with 76. We fired 60 rounds HE and ~~snake~~ WP. I moved back and Sgt Brown moved his tank up and fired at them. 55 rounds 0900 couldn't see anymore targets

Orders from company to report back to tank co. ammos, gassed , pulled maintl
M/Sgt Andrew Reyna

1600 reg requested 2 tks with G Co. My platoon sgt requested to go up.

I sent his section ^{and} SFC Pitlick. They went into position SFC Pitlick in gap at contact. SR Reyna 65 yds covering draw behind FRch.

At daybreak I went up with my section to join them. Nobody but Gooks on the hill. I got ahold of Reyna and he said that there had been a hell of a ff and that the 503 was firing pointblank on the hill

* Right on nose could see one or two at a time. About 10 Frenchman 0645 asked tanks for grenades. Frenchmen began climbing hill where 1st Plat had been; had w/d about 0230 or 0300. Got about 20 yds from top grenade fight. I ran one tank to corner and started shooting on back side of hill. Shooting 50 and 30 couldn't raise 76 hi enough. I could see about 10 CCF on top of hill in holes G Co every now and then one would throw a grenade. nose stuck out mine filed kept me within a small section. We ^{killed} ~~lost~~ an estimated 10. French go on top. mg in culvert firing on Fr. tank unable to fire on mag. mg about 2 60 yards from the top protected by knoll. 3 more FR and Capt Ellage from 503 with BAR and we couldn't do anymore good. I took Thompson

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2 mech fire, Fr pinned down, run back. killed 4-5 enemy along road.
returned to contact point. Almost 0800. Then 10 Fr pulled back from hill.
about 0820. Fr kept yelling to get somebody to reoccupy it. ^{tk col e xec} Capt Vontom
from Tk Co. He said that B Co was going to counterattack and wanted tk support.
we looked it over and decided to get ~~axik~~ 2 tanks on ridge line and
Baker to envelop from right and George from left.

About 1000 jumped off. Baker got almost to the top of the nose
I tried to pull my tank up on the nose. Sgt Pitlick went around draw to go
up on ridge. I lost sight of him as he went around draw. I got just about
up to crest, hadn't fired a round didn't see any CCF. I looked out into the
muzzle of a 75 recoilless. My tank started slipping and slid to the bottom.
That made the hill slipperty tried another time and couldn't get any traction
at all. I got a radio mes from SFC Pitlack that his tank couldn't pull up the
~~ridge~~ ridge. I called sgt Rena and had his tk and Sgt Doyle Smith had those
two tks fire oj targets of opportunity all along the ridge and Sgt P and me
kept moving around area seeking targets. we tried four other places to get up
on the ridge without success. Something a dud hit the ridge in front. Sgt
two more hit, Sgt Rena called me on the radio, "It get the hell out of there."
went on back and he told me an SP was firing. Pulled tanks back to ridge where
G Co was. were in the process of ammoing up. sniper shot in area all day long.
never hit anybody. Continued to shoot on ridge. returned to tk co to ammo up
1300 or 1330.

Capt Pratt came up before the company B assault and he and I worked out
a plan for the operation of the tanks.

Edward C Williamson
EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICIAL BUSINESS



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INTERVIEWER: Capt Edward C Williamson

1st Lt Charles W Hulbert, Armor, 061331, 4th Platoon Leader,
23d Regimental Tank Company, 23d Infantry Regiment, Anoka, Minn.

171600 October

WORUN-NI, KOREA

I came in on the following morning after company G had withdrawn to its final position. At that time company G was counter-attacking with company B and the 1st Ranger Company. I was sent down the road with five M48 Sherman tanks from the 4th Platoon of the 23d Regimental Tank Company. The road was on company G's right flank. Our counter-attack very nearly secured the crest when the enemy on the rear slope, throwing grenades and aided by crossfire from a hill to the west, drove us back. We finally secured a toehold on the hill at 1400 hrs.

The major obstacle to tankers were our own mines which forced us to cut under the bluff. The Chinese threw fragmentation grenades on us from the bluff.

Edward C Williamson

EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICIAL BUSINESS



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INTERVIEWER: Capt Edward C Williamson

Capt John A Elledge, Arty, O1042282, Liaison Officer to 37th Field Artillery Battalion, Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, Redding, Cal.

311300 October 1951

CHIPO-RI, KOREA

We were in a virtually separate perimeter. The 503d's Company B had four killed and twenty-eight wounded.

At the contact point between Company G and the French located in the road, there was a 30 cal machine gun and a 50 cal machine gun. It was manned by a four man crew.

Between 0400 and 1500 the next day, the 503d gun position was in no-man's land. Just before daylight the CCF got into the gun positions, blew horns, started motors and shot out windshields. The gun crews withdrew.

At 2300 an enemy mortar shell scored a direct hit on the company contact point on the right flank, shortly after an eight man carrying party had arrived with ammunition for the two machine guns. Two men were killed and eight wounded. Cpl Russell M Stiltner who was not hit continued to man one of the machine guns.

Edward C Williamson

EDWARD C WILLIAMSON
Capt Arty

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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IV

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Copy of letter, 1st Lt Donald C Miller
to Major Roy Appleman 18 Oct 51

Korea, 18 October 1951

Dear Sir,

To the best of my knowledge and with the help of F Co. after action report (which I wrote) the following action happened at CHIP-YONG-NI, (Korea), on the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th of February 1951

At this time, I have been unable to secure a map of the area, thus I am unable to give you the fine point ^{coordinates} ~~coordinates~~ of the platoon positions, hoping that you will be able to do so from other information.

On the 13th of February 1951, Fox Co. was in a defensive position at CHIP-YONG-NI, with the 1st and 2nd platoon on line with the 3rd platoon in support; the weapons platoon in position directly behind the 3rd platoon. The 2nd platoon tied in with the 2nd platoon of G Co. on the right and the 1st platoon with E Co. on the left.

The day of the 13 February 1951 the Company was occupied laying mines and trip flares in front of their positions, the day was quiet as far as enemy action was concerned, but at 2200 hrs. small arms fire was heard in the French sector, and increased steadily. It became apparent that the enemy was launching a huge attack, activity was noted around hill 397 (80-45); artillery and mortar fire was directed on this hill by Fox Co. O.P., at approximately 0130 hrs., 14 February; one squad of the 3rd platoon was sent over to G Co. to assist in case of an enemy penetration. The enemy withdrew at 0530 hrs. At 0900 hrs. Fox Co. C.O. and the 1st and 3rd platoon leaders made a reconnaissance of G Co. defensive positions, and plans were made at this time for either the 1st or 3rd platoon to reinforce any sector of G Co. ~~SECRET~~

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who under enemy pressure should be penetrated, as it was apparent the enemy would launch a stronger attack on G Co. when night comes. At 2330 hrs the enemy again launched a heavy attack on G Co. position, the attack was launched with such force G Co. was forced to withdraw to the next small hill approximately 300 yds. to their rear. At 0300 hrs. the 15th of February, the 3rd platoon of Fox Co. was ordered over to assist G Co. in retaking the ground lost. Upon reaching G Co. the 3rd platoon joined a platoon of Rangers and was ordered to attack and regain the lost terrain; both platoons went immediately into action, the enemy repulsed the attack with mortar, machine gun and small arms fire, the casualties were so high it forced the 3rd platoon and the Rangers platoon to withdraw, the 3rd platoon had 22 W.I.A. , 1 M.I.A. and 5 men were left. The Ranger platoon casualties were unknown, but it was apparent that they were ineffective due to heavy casualties. It was estimated at this time that the enemy had at least one Regiment on G Co. old position. At approximately 0700 hrs B Co. started into the attack for the position with two tanks but was driven back at 0900 hrs. G Co. had only the 2nd platoon left, and they had not been hit by the enemy, this platoon was then attached to F Co. at this time, during the daylight hours of the 15th of February , I was on F Co. O.P. and could with no trouble look down upon the enemy on G Co. old position. 50M/G , 60 and 80 mm mortar and artillery was directed on the enemy from F Co. O.P. The Air Corps appeared and it was found that the Fox Co. O.P. was the only place the air strikes on the enemy could be directed most effectively. Thus F Co. O.P. directed all of the air strikes on the enemy with excellent results. At approximately 1430 hrs. lead tanks from the 5 Cav. Regt. came in behind the enemy and total confusion fell on the enemy , breaking up the enemies attacks, the enemy started to withdraw under terrific fire from the tanks, artillery, mortar, M/G and small arms fire. The enemy withdrew towards hill 397 and to the West suffering

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heavy casualties. On the 16th of February F Co. remained in position and supported E Co. and B Co. who sent out patrols with the mission to search out the ridge-lines running to and including the top of hill 397. No enemy was encountered.

The casualties inflicted on F Co. for this period : 13th to 16th of February were: 1 K.I.A., 1 M.I.A. and 30 W.I.A.

The casualties inflicted on the enemy between the 13th and 16th of February were: 250-300 killed or wounded.

I hope this will help you in some small way, in writing the true picture of this action, I am sorry, I cannot be more specific on certain details as so much time has elapsed since the action occurred.

Sincerely,



DONALD O. MILLER
1st Lt. Inf

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p. 8. After the "Twin Tunnels" operation, the 23d Regimental Combat Team continued the attack to the Key communication center of CHIPYONG-NI on 3 February 1951. The 23d RCT secured the town in the late afternoon with only sporadic enemy resistance from the vicinity of Hill 506. By 2000 hrs, the 23d RCT had occupied defensive positions on the high ground surrounding the town. During the period 2-12 February, the 23d RCT continued its consolidation of positions on the perimeter with the mission of holding CHIPYON-NI to: (1) Deny the enemy the use of the road net; (2) To hold the left flank of line 2-2 until the 3 ROK Division in X Corps reserve could deploy along this line and attack to the North. The 23d RCT conducted vigorous patrolling in all directions for a distance of three (3) miles. Company-size patrols were dispatched daily, which engaged various size enemy groups to the North and Northwest.

Six hills which were desirable to occupy: 345 to the northwest; 503 to the northeast; 149 and 319 to the southeast; 397 to the south and 248 to the west, dominated the area around CHIPYONG-NI. A perimeter formed on these hills would have required more troops than were available to the Regimental Commander. Therefore a smaller perimeter had to be established on lower, less desirable ground. To accomplish his mission and still maintain a reserve, the Regimental Commander had placed the rifle companies of the 23 RCT around the perimeter in a clock-like fashion. 1st Battalion at 12:00 and 1:00 o'clock; 3d Battalion from 2:00 to 5:00 o'clock; 2d Battalion from 5:00 to 7:00 o'clock, and the French Battalion from 7:00 to 11:00 o'clock. The Regimental Commander retained "B" Company of the 1st Battalion and the 1st Ranger Company as the regimental reserve, within the perimeter, behind "A" and "C" Companies. With the units in these positions, the night of 12-13 February passed with no enemy contact. However, all units on all sides

p. 9 sides of the perimeter reported intense flare activity.

Normal patrols for the daylight hrs of 13 Feb reported increased enemy activity close to the perimeter in three directions, North East and west. Air OP reported enemy groups to the North and East moving toward the perimeter and TACP directed forty flights of aircraft against the enemy, when it was not possible to place artillery upon them. Enemy were reported moving southeast of CHIPYONG-NI westward toward the MSR where the 2d Recon Company, reinforced by L Co, 9th Inf engaged in a fire fight withdrawing to a position south of the perimeter.

Between 2200-2300 hrs, enemy small arms and mortar fire began to fall on the perimeter from the northwest, north and southeast. Shortly thereafter, enemy troops attacked the 1st Bn which was occupying the northern sector of the perimeter. Heavy mortar and artillery fire preceded this attack. As midnight approached, activity spread in other direction until the 3d Battalion on the Southwest was the only unit not in contact with the enemy. Activity subsided somewhat after midnight.

At 0100 hrs of 14 Feb the enemy launched another strong attack from the north and then from the northwest which were repelled.

p. 10 At 0215, the enemy launched new attacks from the southwest and southeast, with the enemy force from the southeast making a desperate frontal assault against the positions of "K" Company. At 0245 hrs friendly troops were still holding both areas, therefore the enemy attacked from the northwest against the positions held by the French Battalion. Fifteen minutes later, the enemy hit C Co again but the defending troops repulsed these efforts. By 0530 hrs, most of the pressure was off the troops in the perimeter, except for the French who were still receiving attacks from the NW which they repulsed. C Co had regained its positions but K Co was fighting fiercely to hold their sector. The stubborn enemy launched another attack from the north against C Co at 0545 but was repulsed. In the south the enemy had made unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate through the line.

At 0630 the enemy attacked the perimeter from the SE but was driven off by K and I Co. Elsewhere on the perimeter, the enemy was feinting at the lines and withdrawing. At 0730 K Co was on the SE still fighting and the Fr Bn was hit again on the NW, but shortly after, the enemy broke physical contact on the entire perimeter. Observers reported occasional ~~sporadic~~ enemy activity during the rest of the morning and intermittently, mortar rounds fell inside the perimeter. During the afternoon of 14 Feb, the

TACP brought in three air strikes to the south and the 23d RCT received 24 air drops of ammo. Also the enemy increased his activity to the south.

The 1st enemy action of the evening occurred at 2030, when p. 11 K Co received a mortar barrage. At 2130 C Co reported sounds of enemy digging in to their front.

Simultaneously with an attack from the S on the 2d Bn area the enemy brought the 23d CP under heavy SP gun, mortar and SA fire. The fighting abated for a short period but at 0130, the 15 of Feb. K Co repulsed two attacks, while pressure increased on the south and southwest against G Co.

At 0230 hrs the enemy penetrated I C but were driven out with the aid of L Co. G Co w/d at 0315 having heavy losses. The Regt CO ordered counter-attacks to retake the lost ground. A composite force of Rangers, one platoon of F Co and the troops, which remained from G Co was assembled to accomplish this mission. While they were forming, A and C Companies repulsed another severe attack from the North. The counter- p.12 attack to retake "G Co positions commenced at 0615. At 0800 the enemy repulsed the counter-attacking composite force with heavy losses to the friendly troops. The Regimental CO ordered "B Co to the G Co area to retake the vital lost ground, and thus secure the integrity of the perimeter. Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the reverse slopes of B Co objective prevented them from taking and holding the position. Supporting tanks were unable to gain positions for assault fire because the roads were heavily mined. At 1400 B Co was still unable to move so the TACP brought in air strikes and napalm drops which routed the enemy and enable B Co to proceed to their objective.

With the coming of full daylight the activity on the remainder of the perimeter ceased and air drops began to resupply the almost completely exhausted stocks of ammunition.

By 1630 B Co could see leading element of the 5 Cav Task force approaching from the SW. The men within the perimeter could see the enemy fleeing to hills as the column drew nearer and nearer. These fleeing troops were taken under artillery fire. *The 5th Cav entered the perimeter at 1715 p; 13

----- Command Report
Headquarters, 23d Infantry Regiment
2d Infantry Division
February 1951

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VIII
PHOTOGRAPHS

VIII

~~SECRET~~

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VII



ANNEX VII

Lt Col James W Edwards
 Capt Ramsberg Capt John H Ramsburg, John H
 Cpl Mequet Cpl James C Meugeat
 Sgt Querry Sgt Franklin H Querry
 Cpl Ottesen Cpl Eugene L Ottesen
 Cpl Bennett, Raymond
 SGT Kletz SFC Bill C Kluttz
 Cpl Sanders Sgt Beleslew N Sander
 PFC Ennan Pvt Cletis D Inman
 Sgt Schmidt SFC Donald R Schmitt
 Martin PFC John N and PVT Alexander Leander (MIA)
 PFC Brown, Donald H
 Capt Pratt, B Co. Capt Venton SFC Pitlick
 M/Sgt Teth, M/Sgt Emery S Teth
 Sgt Weider Sgt Renald J Weider
 PFC Lucas Pete Jr
 PFC Harris PFC Charles D
 Cpl McCornack Cpl Maurice McCormick
 SFC Eggenberg SFC Vernen Eggenburg
 Lt Gibsen, 37 FA Bn
 Pvt Henry Heimerl PVT Herman Heimerl
 Pvt Jack Ward
 Pvt Andrew C Warf Cpl Andrew C Warf

 PFC Roy F Benoit
 Pvt Kenneth Green
 PFC Donald E Nelson
 Spix Herbert Ziebell, PFC

WIA and evacuated: 13 Feb 4, 14 Feb 1, 15 Feb 43
 KIA 13 Feb 3, 15 Feb 11
 MIA 15 Feb 10. Casualty Status List, 23 Inf Regt

Morning Report

13 Feb. 60, 4 present 2 abs. 200 EM assigned 7 att. 178 present for duty, 24 sk 3 AWO
3 TD DS

Company sent out two reinforced platoons on patrol Departed 0930 hrs returned at 1230 hrs. No casualties Remainder of day was spent training weather cold, morale excellent. 17 ROK enlisted men

14 Feb 22

15 Feb 51 Unit counterattacked by CCF 0015 Co withdrew 300 yds 1 Off 37 EM Wia
31 EM MIA -attack continued until 0730. 2d Plt attach to E Co for dy rest of Co in mobile reserve for bk

SFC Kenneth P Pitlick

Pratt, Sherman Capt.

Vontom, George E Capt

2d Lt William H Gibson

1st Kenneth Finn

*Cpl Russell M Stiltner,
Grandview, Va.*

#PT 1, Box 21,






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#1- Company G Rear Area
(1) Company G CP
(2) 1st Platoon CP
(3) Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, gun position
(4) Battery B squad tent



#2- 2d Platoon MIR
(5) Foxholes
(6) Company F position

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#3- MASAN (CS797467)
(7) 3d Platoon MLR
(8) Direction of 1st Chinese assault on both nights:
13 and 14 February 1951



#4- Ridge leading to Cpl Eugene L Ottesen's machine gun position
(9) Direction of 1st Chinese assault on both nights:
13 and 14 February 1951
(10a) Cpl Ottesen's squad location



#5- Terrain south of Company G position
(10b) Direction of Chinese withdrawal 14 February 1951
(11) Culvert
(12) MSR used by Task Force Crombez
(13) Dead spot in dry creek bed

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#6- Clump of trees overlooking dry creek bed
(14) Ruins Chinese shelter
(15) Dead spot in dry creek bed

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#7- Knoll on small hill mass occupied by 1st Platoon on right
flank of 3d Platoon
(16) Holes dug by CCF during the attack
(17) MIR of 1st Platoon

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#8- V cut where MSR crosses small hill mass
(18) Artillery-infantry machine gun post
(19) Mine field
(20) Barbed wire
(21) 1st Platoon position
YHROHTUA

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CHON'GOK




CHIPYO NG-NI
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○ HILL 229

French

*Railroad
Company
positions*



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