

Authority 785101
By CEL NARA Date 5/18/10



WAR DIARY
SEVENTH INFANTRY DIVISION

1 September 1950 to 30 September 1950

Assigned to Japan Logistical Command from 1 September 1950 to 7 September 1950.

Assigned to I Corps from 8 September 1950 to 30 September 1950.

Approved by:

DAVID G. BARR
Commanding General
7th Infantry Division from 1 September 1950 to 30 September 1950.

606

copy 2

NARRATIVE SUMMARY
1 September 1950 - 30 September 1950
Inclusive

At the beginning of September all organic elements of the Seventh Division were located in widely separated training areas in central Japan. The movement of the units from their permanent camps in northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO and from garrison of permanent camps in southern HONSHU and KYUSHU was accomplished by rail without undue incident.

Camp FUJI, Camp KAMATA, Camp BREW and Camp AAMA were used by the division units for pre-embarkation training and for final supply and equipment distribution. Camp FUJI was particularly crowded, having been designed for a RCT camp but now two (2) RCT's and the Republic of Korea (ROK) troops stationed there increased both the training and logistic problems.

During this resupply and training period, the division strength was increased from a low of 7,900 in August to an embarkation strength of approximately 16,500 organic troops. The increase was in both officer and enlisted personnel. In addition 8,600 ROK untrained volunteers were received. The increase of organic strength was attained by the diversion of a percentage of the FEC replacements to the division and by the diversion of the entire replacement stream of Infantry and Artillery personnel from 23 August to 4 September.

The 8,600 ROK "troops" presented many staggering problems. Not one per company sized unit could speak even a smattering of English. Virtually none had previous military training. None had any military clothing or equipment and most were considerably smaller in size than American troops. Medical screening had been most cursory, as also had been the political screening.

All ROK's arrived within a three day period and were immediately placed under a fourteen day quarantine. They were immediately bathed, deloused and given a medical examination by army doctors. Their old civilian clothing was disposed of and new issued. Most of them had never worn leather shoes and the combat boots irritated their feet, necessitating the procurement of "tennis" shoes on the Japanese market. Instruction in the wearing of American clothing and use and care of American weapons and equipment was given at once.

A majority of the Koreans had to be wormed. Even though placed on the same diet as the American soldier, most of the ROK's at first complained of being hungry because the American diet, although of much higher caloric content than their native diet, did not have the bulk they were accustomed to getting in their rice. During this quarantine period, intensive basic military training was given to the

ROK's, the instructors using demonstrations, sign language and Japanese and the trainees learning through emulation and repetition.

At the completion of the quarantine period, the ROK's were integrated into units down to and including squads in all line units. The "Buddy" system was utilized whereby each American soldier was made responsible for one to three ROK's and continued their training and integration. Despite many basic differences, the Korean soldiers learned rapidly and were willing to spend long hours in training. Two companies of former Korean Police, integrated as ROK Army personnel, screened all the Korean soldiers and some communists and subversives were found. These were returned to South Korea.

The 17th and 32d RCTs completed RCT combat exercises but the 31st RCT was unable to complete theirs due to lack of time prior to embarkation. All units continued training until actual departure for the ports of embarkation. Demonstration teams gave instruction in amphibious landings and use of the new 3.5 rocket launcher to each unit. A tank-infantry demonstration was given to each RCT. Technical services continued issue of equipment received from supply agencies until the last minute and performed maintenance until equipment or vehicles moved to ports.

The first elements started embarkation on 6 September. Units completed loading on the night of 10 September. The convoy sailed from YOKAHAMA Harbor at 1105M, September. The division tail remained at Camp ZAMA to be transported on the turnaround of the first ships released after the landing in Korea.

Several problems of messing and billeting developed due to the overcrowding of the transport ships. A partial solution was achieved by feeding and sleeping in shifts. However, discomfort remained throughout the voyage. The 17th Infantry Regiment was detached and transported to PUSAN where it became the Eighth Army reserve. The voyage to KOREA was uneventful except for a typhoon which caused one cargo ship to return to JAPAN after its cargo had shifted.

The convoy arrived at the rendezvous area off INCHEON, KOREA, on 16 September 1950. Elements of division headquarters debarked on 17 September followed on 18 September by the first troop elements of RCT 32, 7th Recon Co and a part of the 73d Tank Bn which made the first enemy contact near INCHEON.

Unloading of personnel, equipment and supplies continued at a slow rate for the next ten days. Limited wharfage and beach space, tides of over thirty feet and extensive mud flats delayed off loading.

The 32d RCT relieved the 1st Marine Division of sectors within the 7th Division zone of responsibility on 19 September. On 20 September the Division CP opened ashore. The 31st RCT debarked and concentrated in the area of CHANGSU-NI to secure the area to the south and protect the division south flank. One battalion 31st Inf composed the division reserve. The 32d RCT advanced to the north, taking four objectives against stiffening enemy opposition. Enemy mine fields were encountered in the north sector. Enemy rifle fire was heavy and sniping continuous although the small number of casualties from small arms indicated poor marksmanship. Mortar and tank fire of the enemy proved accurate.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Lt Gen Shepherd, US Marine Corps; Maj Gen Almond, X Corps and Maj Gen Barr met at SOSA for a short conference.

The 7th Recon Co, followed by the 1st and 2d Battalions of RCT 32 captured ANIANG-NI on 21 September, cutting one of the principal north-south supply routes of the North Korean forces to the Eighth Army front. This denied considerable materiel to the North Korean forces at a critical period.

The 7th Recon Co continued to the south and entered SUWON at 1820, followed by a task force consisting of a company of infantry from 32d RCT, a company of Tanks from 73d Tank Bn and a plat of engineers from 13th Engr Bn. Lt Col Henry Hampton, G-3, was killed when a jeep reconnaissance element was over run by enemy tanks. Because of the critical situation caused by the slow unloading of supplies, the off loading of personnel from ships was halted temporarily until the unloading of trucks, ammunition and food could catch up with the tactical situation.

Two task forces, "Hannun" and "Daugherty" were organized from the 73d Tank Bn. Task Force Hannun was to secure the SUWON airfield and Task Force Daugherty to reconnoiter in force a route from the north to SUWON farther east than the one in use. Both forces were successful. RCT 32 continued its principle mission to the east along the INCHON-SEOUL highway and maintained liaison with the 1st Marine Division in the north.

The screening and handling of Korean refugees constituted a serious problem while the division continued fighting in heavily populated areas. All units set up screening posts along principle roads. The MP Company, attached ROK Police unit and intelligence agencies directed their efforts to screening North Korean soldiers from the civilian refugees. The effort was complicated by the movement being in two directions; southward from SEOUL and northward from the southern front. The civilian population generally appeared friendly, although sniping at night was constant. It could not be ascertained whether the nightly sniping was by partisans or by small groups of fleeing North Korean soldiers. Civilian reports led to the capture of many hiding North Korean soldiers who generally surrendered without a fight.

Authority 785101
 By CEL NARA Date 5/18/10

RCT 31 took over the southern part of the division sector, relieving elements of the 32d, who moved north and joined the main force of the RCT. The 3d Bn of the 31st RCT became Division reserve. Heavier enemy resistance was encountered by the 32d RCT moving north toward the HAN River and SEOUL. Counterattacks on both the 1st Marine Division on our north and the 32d RCT became more frequent and severe. The Recon Co screened south of the 31st RCT towards OSAN-NI. Air and artillery support was prompt, accurate and effective.

The division continued to fight in both a north and south direction with the two fronts separated by an air line distance of 35 miles and much more by road. The Ordnance and Quartermaster companies worked all personnel on a round the clock basis to continue supplies and maintenance for the units because of the shortage of transportation, still hampered by slow unloading of ships, and the long road network.

On the morning of the 24th, a warning order from I Corps was received that the 7th division might attack north across the HAN River into SEOUL to assist the 1st Marine Division which had been stalled in their attack for two days. The order to attack SEOUL with the 32d RCT at 0630, 25 Sept was received at 241415 Sept. at division leaving only a few hours to regroup the 32d RCT which had elements as far as eight miles apart. The 17th ROK Regiment and 57th Amphibious Tractor Battalion were attached to the division for the attack. In the southern division sector, the 2d Bn, 31st Inf was heavily attacked by an enemy force supported by tanks along the OSAN-NI highway and were driven back.

In the pre dawn of the 24th, the 2d Bn of the 32d RCT attacked an enemy position to their front, south of the HAN River, and achieved complete surprise, catching the enemy asleep. Large numbers of enemy were killed and much equipment captured. The heavy loss and confusion among the enemy as a result of this attack materially aided the assault across the HAN the next day by the RCT.

To this time the personnel losses of the division have been light.

At 250630 September the 32d RCT started the HAN River crossing. Within one hour the first battalion had crossed the river in the face of enemy fire and by 1030 was on the southern slopes of the dominating hill mass that was the first objective. The entire operation moved forward rapidly and by 1300 the 7th Recon Company was lightly holding the hills north of the river and by 1400 objective one was secured by the 32d RCT. By 1900 all primary objectives were gained and the RCT held the heights immediate-south of SEOUL, overlooking and dominating the city.

Authority 785 101
 By CEL NARA Date 5/18/10

The 17th ROK Regiment had crossed the Han River and was taking objectives one to four on the east of the 32d RCT. General Barr was on the spot observing the assault and General Hodges had opened a forward CP on the scene and was directing operations. The effect of the rapid advance of the assault was reflected in the Marine zone where the Marine units were enabled to resume their advance after the heights dominating SEOUL had been captured by the 32d RCT.

Meanwhile enemy activity in the SUWON area was increasing, evinced by small enemy groups supported by tanks attacking our positions.

RCT 17 offloaded at INCHON on the morning tide and moved by foot and rail to positions near ANYANG-NI. The 2nd Bn, 17th RCT moved into the area south of the Han River vacated by the 32d RCT. An airlift was initiated to the SUWON airfield to expedite supply to the 31st RCT.

Shortly after daybreak 26 September Co L of RCT 32 observed a large column of enemy moving east of SEOUL and promptly launched a local attack. The attack was highly successful, taking 90 POW's, killing 500 and destroying a headquarters group. The rest of the RCT moved onto objective Two (2) against moderate enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion was strongly counterattacked but gave no ground and all units continued forward. The fate of SEOUL was sealed on 26 September.

The 3d Battalion took Objective Three, killing 550, destroying five tanks and 48 vehicles and capturing two ammunition dumps. The 31st and 48th FA Battalions supported the attack of RCT 32 and materially assisted them. By 1445 the 17th ROK Regiment had proceeded north to the Regimental boundary. By 2335 all objectives were cleared and secured and only intensive mopping up of some city areas remained. General Barr was present with the RCT and assisted in the evacuation of some of the wounded.

The 2d Battalion RCT 31, reinforced by one company of the 1st Battalion, launched an attack south of SUWON and met well organized defensive positions supported by tanks and mortars. The attack progressed slowly. General Barr in the evening of 26 September ordered RCT 31 to conduct a coordinated regimental attack to clear the enemy hill position south of SUWON. The officer carrying this order found that the regimental commander had departed with a mixed force on a wide flanking movement to the south and east. The order was delivered to this column near OSAN-NI. This force was attacked by tanks in OSAN-NI just prior to daylight, but they were fought off with bazooka fire and one tank was destroyed. While proceeding north, a heavy fire fight developed, holding up the force.

At 262315 September, elements of the 7th Division, (Commanded by Lt Cole of the 7th Reconnaissance Company) met elements of the 1st Cavalry (Infantry) Division (commanded by Lt Baker of the 79th Tank Battalion) about five miles south of SUWON. This marked the first meeting of 8th Army units from the south of KOREA and X Corps units from the INCHON-SEOUL area.

Authority 785101
 By CEL NARA Date 5/18/10

Rear elements of the division sailed from JAPAN for KOREA.

On the morning of 27 September, the 31st RCT, minus parts of the 3d Battalion and the task force with the regimental Commander, attacked to the south from the SUWON area. At 1000, 2d Battalion of RCT 17 attacked to the north, jumping off from the southern part of SEOUL and by 1200 had secured their first objective. The 17th ROK Regiment continued mopping up within their zone. The 48th FA Battalion destroyed a number of enemy vehicles fleeing SEOUL.

In the southern part of the division zone, RCT 31 continued its two pronged north and south attack against a strong and determined enemy who was supported by artillery, mortars and tanks. Progress was slow.

On the 28th, the 2nd Battalion RCT 17 continued its northerly advance and cut the main highway running east from SEOUL. RCT 32 and the 17th ROK Regiment continued their mopping up action against numerous sniper groups within the city, but by 2000 the 7th Division sector within SEOUL was clear. X Corps then directed reconnaissance in force east to the TONGSHON River.

RCT 31 continued its assault south from SUWON and north from OSAN-NI. An air strike utilizing strafing, bombs and napalm was called on hills 113, 92 and the tunnel there with excellent results. The 57th and 92d FA Battalions fired heavy concentrations, accounting for about half of the enemy casualties. The RCT against heavy enemy resistance occupied all objectives by 1625.

Starting at 0200 of the 29th, the 17th ROK Regiment received three counterattacks which forced them back a short distance. Supported by fire of the 31st FA Battalion, the regiment attacked again and regained the ground lost.

A task force was sent from the 2nd Battalion, 17th RCT, on the road east from SEOUL and ran into an ambush with enemy forces on hills on both sides of the road. The force was pinned down and the commander wounded. The remainder of the battalion was sent forward and by 2050 the enemy positions were taken and had been consolidated. On two occasions during the night, large numbers of enemy were seen approaching but were dispersed by artillery fire.

At noon a liberation ceremony was held in the Government building at SEOUL. General MacArthur, representing the United Nations, turned over the City of SEOUL to Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of South Korea. General Barr and several other officers of the division attended the ceremony.

On 30 September the division zone was quiet for the first time since off loading at INCHON, the only action being mopping up of isolated pockets of enemy resistance. At 1800 the division was relieved of responsibility in the SEOUL area and the RCT's prepared to move into new areas. General Barr presented awards to members of the command at

Authority 785101
 By CEC NARA Date 5/18/10

a ceremony on the crest of NORTH MOUNTAIN, SEOUL. Among those receiving awards were Brig Gen Hodges, Assistant Division Commander; Col Beauchamp, Commanding Officer 32d RCT; Lt Cole Faith, Mount, Shulman, Battalion Commanders of the 32d Infantry and Lt Col Baker, Commanding Officer of 2d Battalion 17th Infantry Regiment.

The performance of the Special Troops and Technical Services of the division were outstanding and have contributed materially to the success of the operation.

Losses for the month were:

	KIA	MIA	MIA	TOTAL
US	67	318	21	406
ROK	<u>39</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>166</u>
TOTAL	106	409	57	572

GENERAL COMMENTS FOR
PERIOD

1. The following reduced the effectiveness of operations for the period:

a. Vessels assigned for the movement of the Division from Japan to Inchon, Korea were inadequate in number to accommodate the number of personnel involved without serious crowding and discomfort to the troops involved.

b. Unloading of ships at Inchon, particularly supplies, equipment, ammunition and vehicles was slow, due to tidal and docking conditions, and seriously hampered combat operations.

c. Infantry small units (Platoons and Companies) were slow in following artillery preparation, and thereby reduced the effectiveness of the preparatory fire and allowed enemy troops to recover from the shock effect and man their positions after the concentrations.

d. Full use was not made of artillery time fire on dug in enemy positions and crew manned weapons.

e. In many instances ROK personnel with the units were a detriment rather than a help, due to the following causes: (1) Lack of comprehension of tactical movements and (2) Reluctance to expose themselves to enemy fire, (3) Lack of understanding of English.

f. The flow of informations from lower units to higher units left something to be desired especially from an elapse time viewpoint. A more extensive use could have been made of air pick-up and existing commercial communication facilities.

2. The following are examples of excellent operations:

a. The coordinated Han River crossing was made of approximately eighteen hours notice and involved large troop movements, some over considerable distances; extensive movement of supplies and equipment to support the operation under almost impossible transport conditions; rapid and accurate staff and command planning and dissemination of orders at all levels in an absolute minimum of time. The crossing was a model of this type of combat operation.

b. The use of air support by units was excellent and timely.

c. Integral communications were from an overall standpoint excellent.

d. Civilian control by Military Police and CIC was excellent; no large disorders were noted at any time.

Authority 785101
By CEL NARA Date 5/18/10

- e. Maintenance of the MSR by the Engineer Battalion was superior.
- f. Medical installations were well placed and functioned in an excellent manner and were at all times adequate giving rapid medical service. Full use was made of air evacuation facilities.
- g. Reconnaissance by the Reconnaissance Company and the Light Aviation Section was superior.
- h. Ordnance maintenance and supply was exceptional considering the rough roads, long hauls and lengthy daily operation time of vehicles.
- i. Quartermaster operation was outstanding despite limited amounts of transportation, long hauling distances and poor road nets.