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# COMMAND REPORT



**HEADQUARTERS  
2D INFANTRY DIVISION**

**1 FEB 51 - 28 FEB 51**

**COPY NO 1**

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## NARRATIVE SUMMARY

(February 1951)

On 25 January, the United Nations launched what Lieutenant General Matthew B Ridgway, Eighth Army Commander, announced as a "limited objective attack." This was to consist primarily of aggressive patrols directed to penetrate enemy held areas to depths of 12 miles from firmly established bases. The patrol base line assigned to the 2d Infantry Division was the X Corps M-M Line in its sector. This was a line which ran from a point several miles north of Yoju in an easterly arc through the village of Anchang-ni to a point approximately four miles southeast of Wonju. The 2d Division was the left flank unit of the American X Corps. The 24th Division, which was on the IX Corps right flank advanced abreast of the 2d Division. To the right flank of the 2d Division was the 8th ROK Division.<sup>1</sup>

As the February period opened, the 125th CCF Division was reacting violently to a probing attack by the 23d RCT on the tunnels area four miles south of Chipyeong, employing its 373d and 374th CCF Regiments in the holding action and counter-attack. It was immediately obvious that the enemy was committed to hold this area--which was the key to a complex road network and which, in the United Nations hands, would threaten the entire CCF positions south of the Han River,<sup>2</sup>

The 3d Battalion and attached French Battalion of the 23d RCT (supported by the 37th FA Battalion (-) and Battery B, 82d AAA Battalion) were placed under heavy attack at 0450 hours on 1 February. When the information was received by division, it instructed the 9th Infantry, which was in division reserve, to

1. App D-2: POR 507, 1 Feb 51
2. X Corps PIR, 1 Feb 51

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relieve the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, at the village of Munmang-ni. The 2d Battalion, 23d RCT was then instructed to displace to Iho-ri to take over the commitments of the 1st Battalion which commenced immediate movement to the tunnels area to reinforce its parent organization.

The heaviest fighting during the day occurred in the sector of the French Battalion on Hill 453 (CS8442). The enemy attacks were here repulsed in hand to hand fighting. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion brought heavy fire to bear on the attacking units, ammunition resupply (as well as resupply of rations, gasoline, and signal equipment) being effected by air drop.\* By the end of the day, the 1st Battalion had joined the defending force and the enemy pressure had decreased.<sup>1</sup>

A very important factor in the successful defense of the tunnels area had been the tactical air support. Over 80 sorties were flown against the attacking enemy in the tunnels area and against the enemy roadblocks established along the Yoju--Chipyong road which the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, and the 2d Reconnaissance Company had been forced to destroy before they could effect a reinforcement of the surrounded unit.<sup>2</sup>

Enemy losses were very severe during the fighting of 1 February in the tunnels area. Over 1,300 enemy dead were counted and total casualties from the combined ground, artillery, and air action were estimated to be over 3,600.<sup>3</sup>

The heavy attack against the 23d RCT did not affect the planning for a newly projected operation designated as "Oper-

\*The rugged terrain forced heavy reliance on air drops and carrying parties throughout the period.

1. App D-2: POR 507, 1 Feb 51
2. App G-1: After Action Report, 23d RCT, 29 Jan 51-16 Feb 51
3. App D-2: POR 508, 2 Feb 51

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ation Roundup." It was contemplated that the 2d Division would establish its main defense line along the X Corps Q-Q Line, a curved line from Chipyong to Chedong-ni which followed the old P-P Line closely except at its western projection where it curved to the north to include the village of Chipyong. The western flank of the 2d Division was also extended at this time to include the town of Hajin and extending north to BM 856 CS7463. The 2d Division was to support the 8th ROK Division in its drive north along the Hoengsong--Hongchon axis from its defense base on the Q-Q Line. Support forces, consisting of artillery and supporting infantry units, and tank and infantry teams were to be attached to the ROK division for tactical control. Supply of these Support Teams was to remain with the 2d Division supply agencies.

The movement to the Q-Q Line was completed by 1200 hours on 3 February. The 187th A/B RCT had relieved the 8th ROK Division in its former sector to the right flank of the 2d Division and the 8th had begun to assemble in the general area of Sokong-ni--Nopyong-ni five miles to six miles in the rear of the Q-Q Line. The 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry established defenses at Yanghyon-ni while the 2d Battalion assumed the responsibility for security of the mountain pass in the vicinity of CS9025 through which passed the MSR to the 2d Battalion positions and to the 23d RCT. The 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, patrolled the Wonju--Yuju road.

The 38th RCT concentrated its forces in the Hoengsong area during the first few days of the period preparatory to carrying out its proposed commitments in support of the 8th ROK Division.

The X Corps plan for Operation Roundup envisaged a double envelopment of the enemy in the vicinity of Hongchon. The 5th and 8th ROK Divisions were to be employed in the at-

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support teams were to operate under the operational control of the Commanding General of the 8th ROK Division.

Operation Roundup commenced on 5 February, the 38th RCT limiting its activities to close-in patrolling to prevent any possibility of fights caused by improper identification of the Korean units during the period that the 8th ROK Division moved through its zone.<sup>1</sup>

The 23d RCT, after the "Twin Tunnels" operation of 1 February, had continued its attack on Chipyeong on 3 February. The town was secured late in the day against sporadic resistance. The regiment began to build a perimeter defense around the city immediately, concentrating its defenses on the high ground which surrounded it. The defensive positions were not on the most dominating terrain. To defend the highest terrain features in the Chipyeong area would have required more troops than were available. The Regimental Commander, therefore, concentrated on a tight perimeter defense on inferior ground improved to the maximum for a defensive stand. The 1st Ranger Company, attached to the 23d RCT, and Company B comprised the regimental reserve.<sup>2</sup> Those hills which were too distant to be easily defensible were covered by the fire of supporting 105mm and 155mm batteries.

As the 8th ROK Division seemed to lack aggressiveness during its initial maneuverings, the Commanding General of the 2d Division alerted the 38th RCT Commander to prepare his 3d Battalion for possible commitment in the Saemal area to support and energize the Korean division. This was not to be done, however, unless the 8th Division failed to advance or bogged down during the 6th of February.<sup>3</sup>

1. App D-1b: J-70, G-3 Journal, 4 Feb 51
2. App G-1: After Action Report, 23d RCT, 29 Jan 51-16 Feb 51
- c. App D-1c: J-114, G-3 Journal, 5 Feb 51

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The situation along the 25 mile front was very fluid during the early period of Operation Roundup. As it was impossible to cover the entire area from fixed defensive positions, the 9th RCT continued its constant aggressive patrols which combed the central sector in an attempt to wipe out the great numbers of small, infiltrating enemy units. The constant threat to the division sector from enemy along the Han River corridor to the Division left flank made it imperative that the 9th be immediately available should this threat develop.<sup>1</sup>

Although the GCF 125th Division withdrew completely from the 23d RCT area after its abortive attempt to drive the regiment from the tunnels area, there were constant probing attacks of North Korean units which frequently infiltrated to considerable depth. Enemy patrols in the Hoengsong area were particularly active.<sup>2</sup>

In an attempt to inflict casualties and create confusion while conserving divisional manpower, the use of air support and artillery fires was greatly increased by the division. The FSCC, functioning at Division Headquarters, proved its great value as a coordinating agency during this period.

The 8th ROK Division ran into trouble shortly after launching its attack and reports were soon received by 2d Division Headquarters of attacks by a GCF division. KMAG officials, when queried as to the validity of the reports, said that they had been greatly exaggerated. 2d Division Artillery reported that a ROK unit had stampeded when some 9th Infantry Tanks fired into a small enemy patrol group to their rear.<sup>3</sup> There was, however, little doubt that a considerable number

1. App D-1c: J-114, G-3 Journal, 6 Feb 51
2. App C-2: PIR 107, 6 Feb 51
3. App D-1d: J-98, G-3 Journal, 7 Feb 51

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of enemy patrols were continuing a reconnaissance of the area along the Q-Q Line.

The 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, launched an attack against the town of Sogu, approximately five miles east of Chipyong on the 7th to eliminate the automatic weapons which had been located in this area. This attack was coordinated with the 3d Battalion, 23d RCT, which advanced on the same objective from the west. The enemy resisted these attacks stubbornly, utilizing an unusual number of automatic supporting weapons. Although the attacking elements were successful in taking enemy held hills in the approaches to the town, they were unsuccessful in taking Sogu. They did, however, succeed in localizing this enemy unit and confining it to a constricted sector.<sup>1</sup>

On 9 February, the 3d ROK Division was attached to the X Corps for operational control and directed to move by motor marches to an assembly area immediately northwest of Hoengsong. It was to report to the assembly area no later than 0800 hours on 11 February prepared for immediate tactical employment.<sup>2</sup>

Weather conditions and visibility were adverse on the 9th and attacks launched by the 23d and 9th RCTs made little progress. Patrols of the 38th RCT reported no enemy contact.<sup>3</sup>

By the 10th of February, it had become obvious that there was a large enemy build-up north of the 23d RCT and it became apparent that the enemy was preparing an offensive not only to drive the 23d from its perimeter in the Chipyong area but to push back the entire front. Thousands of enemy troops moving south, had been observed from planes operating in the area. There had been numerous reports from friendly agents

1. App D-1d: J-118, G-3 Journal, 8 Feb 51
2. App D-1e: J-20, G-3 Journal, 9 Feb 51
3. App D-2: POR 516, 9 Feb 51

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of continuous movements into the area and indications of a pre-assault concentration of troops during the daylight hours of the 10th.

A company of the French Battalion came under extremely heavy enemy fire and was able to extricate itself only after considerable artillery had been placed on the enemy positions. Priority of fire of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion was returned to the 23d RCT to permit the greatest volume of fire on the massing enemy forces.<sup>1</sup>

There was little activity along the division front on the 11th. Nevertheless, Eighth Army was anticipating a heavy attack along the entire front, and X Corps was notified that the 8th ROK Division was to remain in position. There was to be no further movement north or west unless cleared by Eighth Army. Later in the day, a report was received that the route of withdrawal had been cut behind the 10th and 16th ROK Regiments. Enemy activity began to increase toward nightfall.

The 23d RCT had planned an attack on Hill 583 to be launched on the morning of the 12th but this was cancelled by division and all units were instructed to limit their activities to short range combat patrols. Heavy enemy attacks were soon launched along the entire line and the 38th Infantry reported that there was increasing evidence of a ROK collapse. Its Support Team had fallen back to positions behind the 3d Battalion bringing wounded soldiers with it. The 1st Battalion, a part of Support Force 21, under 8th ROK control, was still not heavily engaged on the evening of 11 February but desired instructions as it no longer had liaison with the 8th ROK Division. X Corps, when queried, granted permission for Support Force 21 to withdraw to the bridge near Haktam-

1. App D-1e: J-102, G-3 Journal, 10 Feb 51

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ni, approximately four miles north of Hoengsong.<sup>1</sup> The Support Force was to secure the bridge to permit withdrawal of the UN units still north of Hoengsong. The direction for the withdrawal of the Support Force and the Support Team had been given at 0230 hours on the morning of 12 February. At this time, the ROK Division, which had faced the attack of four Communist Divisions and had lost over 8,000 men, was disintegrated. By 0300 hours, the outposts of the Support Force were under general attack.<sup>2</sup>

The withdrawing Support Force 21 came under immediate heavy fire from both hills and rice paddies adjacent to the Hongchon--Hoengsong road. Trucks were knocked out, the drivers killed or captured. Wrecked equipment, blocking the road, forced the eventual abandonment of 14 105mm howitzers and five 155mm howitzers.\* The bridge site to which the Support Force had been directed to move was already under enemy control and, at 1100 hours, the Support Force was directed to push its way through the enemy block and continue its withdrawal to Hoengsong.

The 38th Infantry Commanding Officer had been notified by Division at 0950 hours, 12 February, to do all in his power to cover the withdrawal of Support Force 21. The X Corps, however, did not return the units to control of the 2d Division until 1107 hours when instructions were issued directing the division to reconstitute the 38th RCT and attach to it all elements of Support Force 21.<sup>3</sup>

In an attempt to clear the road for the withdrawing unit, the Commanding Officer of the 38th Infantry directed a relief force to the 3d Battalion to link up with the Sup-

\*Seven 105mm howitzers and all of the 155mm howitzers were recovered in March by recovery teams operating under the direction of G-4.

1. App D-1f: J-14, G-3 Journal, 12 Feb 51
2. App D-2: POR 518, 12 Feb 51
3. App D-1g: J-58, G-3 Journal, 12 Feb 51

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port Force. Over half of the members of this relief element were either killed or wounded. The Support Force, which had been driven back 500 yards after its initial attempt to penetrate the enemy block and make contact with the 3d Battalion of the 38th RCT, made another attempt in the late afternoon and successfully completed the link-up and the continuation of the withdrawal into Hoengsong. All 2d Division Artillery Forward Observers with the 8th ROK Division had been lost during the fighting and artillery support during the withdrawal was controlled by aerial observers.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the disorganization of the 8th ROK Division, and the danger of a major Communist breakthrough, X Corps directed the 187th A/B RCT to reinforce the 2d Division units in the north of Wonju. The 8th Division at this time was in the process of assembling its remnants at Chupo-ri.<sup>2</sup>

As the defense of the road hub, supply points, and G-47 Landing Strip at Wonju was vital to the success of the defense against the attacking forces, the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General George C Stewart, was directed to take charge of all units in the Wonju area and organize the defense. His orders were to hold Wonju, whatever the cost.

Arriving on the evening of 12 February, General Stewart called together all commanders of local units (including technical and service organizations) and instructed them that defenses were to be established and that they would be held-- there was to be no withdrawal, no evacuation. He then commenced the establishment of a perimeter defense of the Wonju area. In order to provide the maximum disruption of the advancing GCF units, supporting artillery was placed in positions from which it could mass fires on every approach to the Wonju

1. Conference Notes, After Action Critique, Chupo-ri, 5 March 51
2. App D-1f: J-86, G-3 Journal, 12 Feb 51

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defenses. A small reserve was maintained to counter-attack any enemy penetrations and did successfully close the gaps the Chinese were able to force in the defense perimeter. Liaison pilots were instructed to remain in the air throughout the daylight hours with the mission of keeping the closest possible surveillance of enemy movement to prevent surprise attack or massing of enemy troops.

The primary defense line established by General Stewart followed the high ground approximately 4,000 yards north of Wonju. The Netherland's Detachment (which had lost its commanding officer during the desperate fighting on the previous day) was on the left, with the 2d Battalion of the 38th RCT and the 3d and 1st Battalions of the 187th A/B RCT to the right, in that order. The 2d Battalion of the 187th A/B was the reserve force for these defenses. The 18th ROK Regiment established defensive blocks to the east and a ROK Ranger Company established defensive blocks to the west. The 2d Battalion of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, which had been guarding a pass on the Wonju--Chechon road assumed responsibility for the rear. The enemy was strangely quiet on the 13th, and the defenders worked feverishly to prepare for the assault they knew would soon come.

At 0330 hours on the morning of the 14th, a heavy enemy attack was launched in the 2d Battalion, 38th RCT, area and Company G was forced to give way. Company K of the 187th was thrown into the gap and the position was restored. The Netherlanders also were forced to give a little ground in the face of heavy pressure, after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.

At first light, the liaison pilots took off and soon reported an enemy column of troops, estimated at two divisions, moving down the Som River, evidently to encircle the positions.

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As they moved down the river, segments would leave the column to move towards Wonju. The order was given to bring all available supporting fires on the advancing troops. Enemy losses during the hours that followed were staggering and the pilots reported that the stream literally ran red with the blood of the dead and dying Chinese. Still, the column advanced. The carnage continued until the afternoon when the pilots reported that it was breaking up and that what appeared to be leaderless bands of survivors were attempting to escape to the north.

It had been a decisive victory, the enemy abandoning Wonju as a primary target and shifting his main effort to the west. General Stewart turned over the defense of the no longer seriously threatened city to the Commanding General of the 187th A/B RCT.

With the shift in effort, the 23d RCT faced greatly increased pressure. X Corps had notified the division on 11 February to prepare to move its 9th RCT to Yoju on three hours notice. At this time it was anticipated that the 2d would again establish its defense line along the arc between Yoju and Wonju. The division was also told to prepare blocking positions between Munmang-ni and Hungho-ri. On the morning of the 13th, the 2d Division expressed its concern to X Corps at the exposed position of the 23d RCT. Corps replied that it desired and had recommended a general withdrawal to the Yoju--Wonju line but that it was the personal desire of the Commanding General of Eighth Army that the Chipyeong perimeter be held at all costs.<sup>1</sup>

By evening of the 13th, it was evident that the enemy had decided to eliminate the 23d RCT perimeter at Chipyeong. The 23d was at this time placed under heavy small-arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. A direct hit on the Command

1. App D-1g: J-56, G-3 Journal, 13 Feb 51

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Post had killed the S-2 and wounded the Commanding Officer. To prevent enemy infiltration, B-26 bombers dropped flares over the area throughout the night.<sup>1</sup>

The Commanding General, Eighth Army, visited X Corps on the morning of 14 February where he oriented the Corps Staff on the overall situation, and listed specific requirements to be followed by all units in the defense: (1) Major units were to be maintained intact. (2) No equipment was to be abandoned. (3) Wonju was to be held and the enemy attack checked in that area at whatever cost. (4) The 23d Infantry was to remain in the Chipyeong area and the highest priority was to be given to the opening of the MSR to this cut-off unit. General Ridgway then promised that Eighth Army would give all possible aid in stemming the attack and reminded the staff that all echelons were to be impressed with the importance of every hour--and that the action of one small, determined unit could, by an unyielding defense, influence the entire situation.

The Commanding General, X Corps, held a conference of his division commanders that afternoon to discuss General Ridgway's comments and a new operation order. Lieutenant Colonel John H Chiles, X Corps G-3, was at this time released by Corps and assigned to the 2d Division to replace the wounded Colonel Paul L Freeman as commanding officer of the 23d RCT.<sup>2</sup>

The 27th British Brigade was attached to the 2d Division effective 1200 hours with the sole mission of clearing the MSR between Tho-ri and Chipyeong in conjunction with the 5th Cavalry Regiment.<sup>3</sup> The 5th Cavalry was to take the road from Koku-ri to Chipyeong which paralleled the road taken by the British Bri-

1. App D-1g: J-128, G-3 Journal, 13 Feb 51
2. Daily Summary, C/S Office, X Corps, 14 Feb 51
3. App D-2: Daily Summary, G-3 Journal, 14 Feb 51

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gade but was to the west of it.

The devastating effect of the massed and accurately placed artillery fire and the excellent tactical air support had halted the attacking enemy forces and it was decided to establish a defense line between Chipyeong and Wonju. The ROK 6th Division and the 27th British Brigade were attached to the 2d Division and Operations Instructions published at 1500 hours directed that disposition of the units would be with the left flank anchored by the 23d RCT with the remaining front-line units, in order of their position along the line, being the 27th British Brigade, the 6th ROK Division, the 9th RCT and the 38th RCT.<sup>1</sup>

The 6th ROK Division moved into Yoju shortly before midnight prepared to take over its defense positions on the morning of the 15th.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after midnight on the morning of the 15th, the 23d RCT requested an emergency airdrop of ammunition as the enemy was again hitting the perimeter from all sides and the ammunition shortage was critical. This request was immediately acted upon by G-4 and cargo planes began loading in Japan for an airdrop at first light.<sup>3</sup>

Shortly before noon, the 23d RCT reported that the 5th Cavalry was at Koku-ri, approximately five miles south of Chipyeong, and advancing slowly. Early in the afternoon, in response to a query from the 2d Division, the X Corps delineated the boundary between the 2d and the 187th A/B on the main defense line as being DS0236, a little over four miles west of Wonju.<sup>4</sup> At this time the entire 38th RCT was placed

1. App D-4: OI 30, 141500 Feb 51
2. App D-1g: J-120, G-3 Journal, 14 Feb 51
3. App D-1h: J-18, G-3 Journal, 15 Feb 51
4. App D-1h: J-58, G-3 Journal 15 Feb 51

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in division reserve and moved into an assembly area in Munmang-ni.<sup>1</sup>

Late in the afternoon, the 23d RCT reported that the 5th Cavalry was within 1,000 yards of the Chipyeong perimeter and that the enemy was fleeing in panic. Very heavy casualties were inflicted on the retreating Chinese, the 23d utilizing all weapons to the maximum. By nightfall, 20 tanks and approximately 200 accompanying infantrymen of the 5th Cavalry Regiment had entered the perimeter and the enemy activity had ceased.<sup>2</sup>

There was little activity on the 16th. Everything was quiet in the 23d RCT sector and the supply trains of the 23d finally reached Chipyeong where some were immediately loaded with wounded and returned to the rear under a tank escort.<sup>3</sup> Shortly before midnight, X Corps notified the 2d Division that its boundary would be changed at noon on the 17th. The boundary change was to greatly narrow the 2d Division front. The left limiting point of the new Division front was to be at CS-9435, the right limiting point at DS0236, a front of less than 8,000 meters compared to its previous front of 39,000 meters. From its new defense line on the X Corps L-L Line (an east-west line running just north of Anchang-ni in the 2d Division sector), it was to patrol to the J-J Line approximately five to seven miles north. The 27th British Brigade and the 6th ROK Division were released from attachment and attached to IX Corps. The 23d RCT and attachments were also attached to IX Corps and further attached to the 1st Cavalry Division. It was to remain under IX Corps control until the 1st Cavalry could take over its defense perimeter at Chipyeong at which time the 23d RCT and attachments were to return to 2d Division

1. App D-lh: J-69, G-3 Journal, 15 Feb 51
2. App D-lh: J-102, G-3 Journal, 15 Feb 51
3. App D-lh: J-87, G-3 Journal, 16 Feb 51

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The 9th and 38th RCTs began to take over their new defense commitments on the 17th while the 23d prepared for its move from Chipyeong to Wonju via Yoju, Iho-ri and Munmang-ni.<sup>2</sup> The 9th moved its 1st and 2d Battalions to the defense line on the left of the division sector while the 2d Battalion took over the right.

The primary problem on the 18th was the movement of the 23d RCT from its position at Chipyeong into the 2d Division zone responsibility. It was directed to move into the Wonju sector and relieve the 187th A/B RCT which was scheduled to move to Chupo-ri from where it was to launch an attack to the north-east.<sup>3</sup>

The movement of the 23d RCT was completed by nightfall of the 18th and X Corps extended the 2d Division zone to the east another 8,000 meters at 0800 on 19 February. This placed Wonju and Hoengsong back in the 2d Division sector. Two battalions of the 187th were attached to the 2d Division effective on 1200 hours 19 February with instructions that they were to remain until relief of front line units by the 23d RCT could be effected.

There was, at this time, a noticeable decrease of enemy activity in the division sector and the X Corps notified division that it was to gain and maintain contact with the enemy.<sup>4</sup>

X Corps published its Operation Order 14 at 1800 hours on the 19th which called for a coordinated attack by the IX and X Corps to destroy the enemy in the Hoengsong, Pyongchang, Wonju area. (This was the operation which was to be given wide publicity as "Operation Killer," the code designation

1. App D-11: J-26, G-3 Journal, 17 Feb 51
2. App D-11: J-81, G-3 Journal, 17 Feb 51
3. App D-11: J-60, G-3 Journal, 18 Feb 51
4. App D-1j: J-5, G-3 Journal, 19 Feb 51

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first announced on 21 February).<sup>1</sup> Enemy forces remaining in this area were still estimated at a total of 67,000 of which all but 28,000 were Chinese remnants of the 39th, 40th, 42d, and 66th Chinese Armies. The III ROK Corps was to protect the right flank of the X US Corps. The 2d Infantry Division was to continue its defense of the L-L Line until the 1st Marine Division passed through its defense line at which time the Division (-) was to assemble in the Sillim-ni--Chupo-ri--Chechon areas. The 38th RCT was to assemble in Chupo-ri where it was to remain as X Corps reserve. The 2d Battalion of the 187th A/B RCT was to be returned to its parent organization at Mudo-ri.<sup>2</sup>

Activity during the 19th was limited to preparations for the new mission. Contact patrols sent out during the day returned with negative results. No enemy contacts were reported.<sup>3</sup>

On February 20th, X Corps announced that D-Day and H-Hour of "Operation Killer" would be 1100 hours on 21 February. The 2d Division was to begin movement to its new positions by 1100 hours on the 21st. The 2d Division was to attack at D-Day plus one.<sup>4</sup> All units were to be clear of Mokkye-dong by 1800 hours as the Marines were to be passing up the road towards Wonju with a 300 vehicle convoy at that time.<sup>5</sup>

The 2d Division published its Operation Order 24 at 1400 hours. This directed the 9th RCT to move to an assembly area near Sillim-ni from where it was to attack north on order to Haanhung-ni via Songgye-ri. The 23d was to move via Chupo-ri and Chechon to an assembly area at No-dong from where it

1. App D-1k: J-50, G-3 Journal, 21 Feb 51
2. App D-1j: J-19, G-3 Journal, 19 Feb 51
3. App D-1j: Daily Summary, G-3 Journal, 19 Feb 51
4. App D-1j: J-42, G-3 Journal, 20 Feb 51
5. App D-1j: J-13, G-3 Journal, 20 Feb 51

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was to launch an attack against Ungyo-ri. The French Battalion was to move to Chechon as division reserve. The 38th RCT was to assemble at Chupo-ri as X Corps reserve while the Netherland's Detachment assumed responsibility for the local security of Chechon. The 2d Division Command Post was to move from Noda-ri to Chupo-ri.<sup>1</sup>

The 23d RCT, which was to be on the right of the 2d Division commenced its move to No-dong that afternoon. From this assembly area, the 23d was to strike north to Ungyo-ri, a village on the important road between Hoengsong and Pangsni.<sup>2</sup>

The 2d Division jumped off on schedule on 22 February. Although no enemy opposition was encountered, the advance was slow because of the difficult terrain and the quagmired roads resulting from sudden thaws and a heavy rain the previous evening. Visibility was limited throughout the day and truck traffic was brought to a standstill by mid-afternoon. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion commenced a training program on the 22d to bring its proficiency up to the high standards achieved prior to its heavy losses north of Hoengsong. The 38th Infantry also initiated a training program to integrate the replacements which were filling its depleted ranks.<sup>3</sup>

The first enemy resistance, consisting of small arms and AW fire, encountered by the 2d Division on "Operation Killer" was directed at the 9th RCT by an entrenched enemy approximately eight miles northeast of Sillim-ni. The enemy positions were blanketed with mortar and artillery fire and the enemy withdrew.<sup>4</sup>

High water continued to be a problem and the bridge

1. App D-3: Op O 24, 20 Feb 51
2. App D-1j: J-23, G-3 Journal, 20 Feb 51
3. App D-2: POR 527, 22 Feb 51
4. App D-11: J-34, G-3 Journal, 23 Feb 51

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across the Han River near Chungju was washed away. The displacement of artillery was halted by the deep mud. A request was made to X Corps for an air drop of supplies to the forward units but this request was denied. The division then notified X Corps that the paramount problem during the advance was one of logistics and recommended one of the following three alternatives as the only solution to the logistic problem: (1) That ROK personnel be provided as supply bearers. (2) That the 2d Division be supplied by air drop. (3) That the 2d Division advance be halted until the necessary road networks could be built. In reply, X Corps stated that air drops were doubtful but that bearers would be provided, In any event, the advance was to be continued.<sup>1</sup>

Lengthy advances were made on 24 February despite the extremely adverse weather and terrain conditions. By nightfall both the 9th and 23d RCTs had crossed the X Corps L-L Line in the division sector, and were approaching the important road between Haanhung-ni and Ungyo-ri.<sup>2</sup>

On 25 February the X Corps directed the 2d Division to continue its advance to the Arizona Line where it was to establish blocking positions to deny its use to the enemy. This line followed the Hoengsong--Pangnim-ni road, an important route of withdrawal for enemy forces to the east. Hoengsong was, at this time, already in the hands of the 1st Marine Division. Both the 23d and the 9th continued their advances during the day and the 9th RCT was within a short distance of Haanhung-ni on the J-J Line.<sup>3</sup>

On 26 February, the 2d Division requested that one of the four battalions attached to the 38th RCT be released to

1. App D-11: J-71, G-3 Journal, 23 Feb 51
2. App D-1m: Daily Summary, G-3 Journal, 24 Feb 51
3. App D-1m: Daily Summary, G-3 Journal, 25 Feb 51

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Division control as the commitment of the 38th had reduced the Infantry strength available for the advance by 45 percent. This request was turned down. The 9th RCT succeeded in taking Haanhung-ni in the early afternoon and sent one battalion east on the road to Ungyo-ri to contact the 23d RCT which had not yet taken its objective because of the difficult terrain.<sup>1</sup>

The 23d moved its 2d Battalion and 37th Field Artillery Battalion into the 7th Division zone into positions from which it could launch an attack west to link up with the 9th and complete the destruction of the enemy in the area.<sup>2</sup>

The direction of the attack changed from northeast to due north on the 27th of February. The boundary between the IX and X Corps was now a north-south line approximately four miles east of Hoengsong. The 3d ROK Division was the left flank of the X Corps. The boundary between the 2d Division and the 3d ROK Division was the Chunchon River (inclusive to the 2d) to the Arizona Line and from the Arizona Line it went north up a valley to DS3152. All X Corps units were directed to expend every effort to close the enemy escape route by securing the Hoengsong--Pangnim-ni road and seizing the high ground north of the road.<sup>3</sup>

The 23d RCT moved its 1st Battalion to the road to block the enemy forces driven from Yngyo-ri by the 2d Battalion which was attacking from the east. The 9th Infantry remained in position throughout the day and made preparations to send a meeting force to the 72d Tank Battalion which had been halted by snipers while bringing supplies to the advancing regiment. On the following morning, the 1st Battalion of the 23d RCT entered Ungyo-ri and commenced movement to the west to join forces with the 9th RCT.<sup>4</sup>

1. App D-1m: J-34, G-3 Journal, 26 Feb 51
2. App D-1m: Daily Summary, G-3 Journal, 26 Feb 51
3. App D-1n: J-4, G-3 Journal, 27 Feb 51
4. App D-1n: J-22, G-3 Journal, 28 Feb 51

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At 1300 hours, the division was informed by X Corps that its right boundary between it and the 7th US Division was to be extended to the east approximately 5,000 meters in a line roughly north from Ungol. The new mission of the 2d Division was to drive north to the Arizona Line in its assigned sector, build up strong defensive patrol bases, and patrol north to the T-T Line (an east-west combat patrol boundary paralleling and approximately 5,000 meters north of the Arizona Line).<sup>1</sup>

The primary effort on the last day of the period was the readjustment of positions and preparations for the continuation of the drive to the Arizona Line. To increase the frontline units for the widened division front, the 38th Infantry took over the security commitment of the French Battalion in Chechon, releasing the French to the operational control of the 23d RCT.<sup>2</sup>

The 2d Infantry Division had fought superbly during the month of February and sustained heavy losses. Now, rapidly replacing its losses, it was again moving forward in the attack.

1. App D-1n: J-29, G-3 Journal, 28 Feb 51
2. App D-1n: Daily Summary, G-3 Journal, 28 Feb 51

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OPERATIONS

Staff Section Report of G-3, 2d Infantry Division

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for

February 1951

The month of February divides itself into four distinct actions, each of which provides the basis for extensive discussion which can be found in the narrative summary of the command report for the month. These four actions are briefly the RCT 23 defense of the twin tunnels area; the momentous defense of the Chipyeong-ni communication center; the calamitous employment of support forces with ROK units; and the determined defense of the Wonju area by RCT 38 and the 187th Airborne RCT.

Each of the February actions highlights operational lessons worthy of discussion.

The twin tunnels defense was waged by two infantry battalions against an enemy possessing tremendous superiority in numbers. In this action the forces involved were assured from the beginning by the Division Commander that "If necessary, the entire division will be moved up to do the job." The knowledge of this wholehearted support is believed to have been a very significant moral prop against despair. The careful selection of defensive positions and integration of defensive fires paid good dividends during the action. Enemy roadblocks to the South of the perimeter caused little concern to a force assured that reinforcements were forthcoming.

As RCT 23 completed the twin tunnels action and attacked into the Chipyeong-ni area, an operation Roundup spearheaded by ROK forces was launched in a double envelopment of Hongchon. The employment of strong support forces with ROK units was undertaken in the nature of an experiment to explore another possible means of obtaining more dependable performance from ROK's. Operation Roundup progressed slowly from the outset

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and heavy enemy counterattacks on 11-12 February produced the complete disintegration of the 8th ROK Division exposing 2d Division support forces ~~SECRET~~ to the main enemy onslaught. The breakdown of the ROK Division chain of command and communications marked the final stages in the loss of control. These support forces were compelled by circumstance to fight through enemy roadblocks to the south where a link up was effected with small northbound armor-infantry forces. Personnel losses of over 1400 men, four batteries of artillery, and vast quantities of equipment attest the fallacy of this method of support.

The withdrawal of support force remnants to vicinity of Wonju completed, plans were put into effect to defend and hold the enemy north of Wonju. The Wonju defense force was comprised primarily of RCT 38 and the 187th Airborne RCT. A unified command in the Wonju area was clearly in order and was accomplished by placing the Assistant Division Commander, 2d Division in full command. Subsequent demands for rapid decision and action validated the soundness of singularity of command responsibility.

To the west of Wonju the historic battle for Chipyeong-ni was under way. This action conclusively demonstrated the prowess of a U.S. Infantry RCT in a perimeter defense. The ground held by RCT 23 was not the commanding terrain, however, the meticulous selection and organization of tight defensive positions rendered the perimeter invulnerable so long as resupply was possible. Resupply was accomplished entirely by air drop and was not altogether successful. Air drop of pre-packaged emergency supplies omitted or provided inadequate quantities of certain items of ammunition. Unfavorable weather conditions caused grave concern and at times seriously jeopardized the operation by limiting resupply capabilities. Enemy mortar fire on the drop zone further complicated the supply recovery problem. It is considered doubtful that the RCT could have held through

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an additional night without supplies in supplement to those air dropped. The successful relief of the Chipyeong-ni bastion by armored elements from outside the perimeter demonstrated the effectiveness of armor in such a mission and the desirability of constantly maintaining some armor in deep reserve positions for relief type missions.

Two instances wherein friendly patrols were ambushed pointed up the dangers of extremely long range motorized patrols and reaffirmed the necessity for patrol movement by bounds in which the moving element is always covered by a stationary base of fire. Prompt and severe retaliatory measures were taken against enemy ambush forces in each instance.

In February, the practice of numbering letters of instructions was begun to facilitate reference and accounting for these publications. These letters of instructions covered a multitude of subjects including the attendance of select personnel at a X Corps patrol leaders course and subsequent courses by divisional units; minefield reporting; utilization of the Ranger Company; security of supplies and equipment; B-29 and B-26 night bombardment support for infantry units; and massing of artillery and tank weapons. The system of publishing instructional matter in letters of instructions proved a highly satisfactory administrative development in that these letters are authenticated by AC of S G-3 instead of the Adjutant General. Also, the system establishes a separate, oft used file dealing with operational matters as distinguished from the administrative.

Liaison commitments for February were abnormally heavy as in addition to two officers for lateral liaison, three officers were required on occasion to X Corps Headquarters.

The continuation of the practice, initiated in January, of attaching mimeographed 1:250,000 situation overlays to each Periodic Operations Report did much to give a clear, graphic picture of the day to day action free of the non-essentials which so often obscure the big picture of larger scale overlays.

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The weather during February was for the most part adverse for operations. Heavy ground ~~SECRET~~ thaws seriously hampered vehicular movement and produced swollen streams as additional obstacles to movement. In all, only seven days were favorable for ground and air operations.

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