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
COMMAND REPORT

HEADQUARTERS, 23D INFANTRY REGIMENT
2d Infantry Division
APO 248, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

FROM: 1 February 1951

TO: 28 February 1951

APPROVED BY:


JOHN H. CHILES
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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Authority 785101
By 86 NARA Date 5/14/10

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NARRATIVE HISTORY
PERIOD 1 FEBRUARY - 28 FEBRUARY 1951

On 26 January the 23d RCT with the French Battalion attached was given the mission of patrolling the area around the Wonju-Mokkyedong road. The 3d French Battalion patrolled in the vicinity of the MSR while the 2d and 1st Battalions were dispatched to the towns of Munmang-Ni and Iho-Ri respectively, to set up patrol bases. On 29 January 1951 a motorized patrol from the 1st Battalion making a reconnaissance of the "Twin Tunnels" area, was ambushed by a large enemy force. The patrol, which was surrounded by the enemy, was finally rescued by "F" Company, 23d Infantry, after a long conflict with the enemy. The rescue company also had run into approximately two battalions of the enemy on its way to the beleaguered patrol. The result of this contact with the enemy in force, was that the 23d RCT was given the mission of seeking out and destroying the enemy in the "Twin Tunnels" area, CS8344. Therefore, on 30 January, 1951, the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, and the French Battalion, which was attached to the RCT, moved up to an assembly area four (4) miles South of the "Tunnels" area.

At 0630 hours, on 31 January, the 23d Regimental Combat Team (-), consisting of the 3d Battalion; the French Battalion; the 37th FA Battalion minus one (1) Battery which remained with the 2d Battalion; and "B" Battery, 82d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion moved from the assembly area to the Line of Departure. The attacking Battalions crossed the advance LD at 1000 hours with the French Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right. The attacking forces secured the successive intermediate objectives without ground contact with the enemy. At 1630 hours, the 23d RCT (-) established a tight perimeter defense for the night. At the same time that the attacking battalions were advancing North, "E" Company moved North from the 2d Battalion positions and West so as to screen the right flank. After contacting the 3d Battalion at 1830 hours, "E" Company returned by truck to the 2d Battalion positions at MUNMANG-NI. "B" Company moved up from the 1st Battalion positions at IHO-RI to provide security for the 37th FA Battalion (-).

At 0450 hours on the morning of 1 February 1951, an estimated two (2) enemy regiments attacked the perimeter of the 23d RCT located at the

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Authority 785101
By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

"Twin Tunnels" area (CS8344). The enemy initially assaulted "L" Company's positions.¹ Later, during the first hours of daylight, the blowing of bugles, whistles and horns and strong infantry assaults characterized the enemy attack.

At 0900 hours the enemy began to attack the perimeter on the Southwest sector held by the French Battalion. By 0930 hours, the French Battalion was engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy on Hill 453 (CS840425). By 1023 hours, the enemy had forced "L" Company to give up some ground, but the fighting had slackened somewhat on the West sector. However, in the French sector the hand-to-hand fighting continued to rage.² At 1200 hours, "L" Company had retaken its lost ground, but was still under strong enemy pressure. Casualties on both sides were heavy because of the close-in fighting of the opposing forces.³

Upon learning of the steadily increasing tempo of the attacks, the Commanding General of the 2d Division ordered that the perimeter be reinforced. Consequently, the 1st Battalion, 23d RCT at IHO-RI began to move towards the perimeter at 0830. The 2d Battalion at MUNMANG-NI began to move at 1430 hours to IHO-RI to replace the 1st Battalion, while the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, began its move to replace the 2d Battalion, 23d RCT. Also the 23d Tank Company started towards the perimeter to provide its much needed assistance.⁴

The enemy dispatched company-size probing units, which reached "B" Company, 1st Battalion, providing security for the 37th FA Battalion.⁵ The 37th FA Bn kept firing steadily in support of the 23d RCT (-), while "B" Company fought and successfully repulsed the enemy. The 37th FA Bn had been taking under fire, large enemy groups which endeavored to come around both flanks of the perimeter.

With the mission of holding the high ground around the "Twin Tunnels" area, the 23d RCT requested and received two (2) air drops of ammunition,

1. S-3 (Fwd) Journal, entry #7, Hq 23d Inf. 1 Feb 51.
2. S-3 (Fwd) Journal, entry #18, Hq 23d Inf. 1 Feb 51.
3. S-3 (rear) Journal, entry #42, Hq 23d Inf. 1 Feb 51.
4. S-3 (rear) Journal, entry #19, 20, 21, 22. 1 Feb 51.
5. S-3 (rear) Journal, entry #24, Hq 23d Inf. 1 Feb 51.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

rations, water, gasoline, and radio batteries. Also, during the day, more than eighty (80) planes supported the 23d RCT with ground strikes. Enemy pressure had materially subsided by 1800 hours and at 2045 hours the new three (3) Battalions (plus) Combat Team was no longer engaged with the enemy.

During the day's fighting, the enemy, using his standard encircling tactics, had set up two (2) fire blocks on the road to the South. The 2d Reconnaissance Company, operating from the vicinity of IHO-RI, engaged these road blocks.⁶ At 1830 hours, with the 23d RCT still intact, the 1st Battalion began to arrive at the perimeter, having cleared the road from the South in conjunction with the 2d Recon Company. At 1900 hours, one (1) company of the 2d Battalion arrived with the remainder of the battalion on the way, expecting to arrive by 0200 hours the following morning. Also the remaining Battery of the 37th FA Bn, which had been with the 2d Battalion, joined the other Batteries of the 37th FA Bn to increase their fires.⁷

The following day, 2 February, all units readjusted and consolidated their positions and conducted vigorous patrols to maintain contact with the enemy. Tanks placed fire on a village at CS815463. This action flushed many enemy personnel out of the buildings and then artillery fire was placed on them with excellent results. The artillery also placed a concentration upon Hill 319, CS821459 with excellent results. Friendly harassing artillery fire was placed around the perimeter throughout the day and night. An undetermined number of enemy located near the village of SINDAE, CS813465, fired upon a patrol which had been sent to the vicinity of CHIPYONG-NI. This patrol observed small enemy groups and reported them back to the artillery, which placed them under fire.

Air, artillery and ground action inflicted an estimated 3600 enemy casualties during the enemy attack of 1 February. Immediately to the front of the perimeter, an actual count of the enemy dead revealed 600

6. S-3 (rear) Journal, Entry #23, Hq 23d Inf. 1 Feb 51.

7. S-3 (rear) Journal, Entry #19, Hq 23d Inf. 1 Feb 51.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 95 NARA Date 5/14/10

in front of the 3d Battalion, 300 on Hill 453, and 400 around the remainder of the perimeter for a total of 1300 enemy dead.⁸

After the "Twin Tunnels" operation, the 23d Regimental Combat Team continued the attack to the Key communication center of CHIPYONG-NI on 3 February 1951. The 23d RCT secured the town in the late afternoon with only sporadic enemy resistance from the vicinity of Hill 506. By 2000 hours, the 23d RCT had occupied defensive positions on the high ground surrounding the town. During the period 2-12 February, the 23d RCT continued its consolidation of positions on the perimeter with the mission of holding CHIPYONG-NI to: (1) Deny the enemy the use of the road net; (2) To hold the left flank of line 2-2 until the 3d ROK Division in X Corps reserve could deploy along this line and attack to the North. The 23d RCT conducted vigorous patrolling in all directions for a distance of three (3) miles. Company-size patrols were dispatched daily, which engaged various size enemy groups to the North and Northwest.^{9,10}

Six (6) hills, which were desirable to occupy: 345 to the Northwest; 503 to the Northeast; 149 and 319 to the Southeast; 397 to the South and 248 to the West, dominated the area around CHIPYONG-NI. A perimeter formed on these hills would have required more troops than were available to the Regimental Commander. Therefore a smaller perimeter had to be established on lower, less desirable ground. To accomplish his mission and still maintain a reserve, the Regimental Commander had placed the rifle companies of the 23d RCT around the perimeter in a clock-like fashion. 1st Battalion at 12:00 and 1:00 o'clock; 3d Battalion from 2:00 to 5:00 o'clock; 2d Battalion from 5:00 to 7:00 o'clock, and the French Battalion from 7:00 to 11:00 o'clock. The Regimental Commander retained "B" Company of the 1st Battalion and the 1st Ranger Company as the regimental reserve, within the perimeter, behind "A" and "C" Companies. With the units in these positions, the night of 12-13 February passed with no enemy contact. However, units on all

8. S-2 Journal, Entry #4, Hq 23d Inf.
9. S-2 Journal, Hq 23d Inf. 4-12 Feb 51.
10. S-3 Journals, Hq 23d Inf. 4-12 Feb 51.

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Authority 785101
By RLS NARA Date 5/14/10

sides of the perimeter reported intense flare activity.

Normal patrols for the daylight hours of 13 February reported increased enemy activity close to the perimeter in three directions, North, East, and West. Air OP reported enemy groups to the North and East moving toward the perimeter¹¹ and TACP directed forty (40) flights of aircraft against the enemy, when it was not possible to place artillery upon them. The 2d Recon Company, reinforced by "L" Company, 9th Regiment, reported enemy moving from Southeast of CHIPYONG-NI, Westward toward the MSR. They engaged the enemy in a fire fight and were forced to withdraw to a position South of the perimeter, where the 2d Recon Company reverted to Division control.¹² Observers on all sides of of the perimeter again reported flare activity during the late afternoon and early evening. Between 2200 - 2300 hours, enemy small arms and mortar fire began to fall on the perimeter from the Northwest, North and Southeast.¹³ Shortly thereafter, enemy troops attacked the 1st Battalion which was occupying the Northern sector of the perimeter.¹⁴ Heavy mortar and artillery fire preceded this attack. As midnight approached, activity spread in other directions until the 3d Battalion on the Southwest was the only unit not in contact with the enemy.¹⁵ Mortar and artillery also fell in the Regimental Command Post, Field Artillery and Heavy Mortar Company areas. As at the "Twin Tunnels" area, the enemy frequently blew on whistles, horns and bugles. As the activity subsided somewhat after midnight, a quick check revealed that a portion of the 1st Battalion CP was burning and a M-16 half-track on the Southeast part of the perimeter had been damaged.¹⁶

At 0100 hours of 14 February, the enemy launched another strong attack from the North and then from the Northwest.¹⁷ The defending troops of the perimeter repulsed these attacks but the enemy could be heard digging in. Observers noted much activity to the North where

11. S-3 Journal, Entry #20, 21, Hq 23d Inf. 13 Feb 51.
12. S-3 Journal, Entry #90, Hq 23d Inf. 13 Feb 51.
13. S-3 Journal, Entry #112, Hq 23d Inf. 13 Feb 51.
14. S-3 Journal, Entry #115, Hq 23d Inf. 13 Feb 51.
15. S-3 Journal, Entry #122, Hq 23d Inf. 13 Feb 51.
16. S-3 Journal, Entry #8, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.
17. S-3 Journal, Entry #16, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

they also detected enemy mortar positions. At about 0215 hours, the enemy launched new attacks from the Southwest and Southeast, with the enemy force from the Southeast making a desperate frontal assault against the positions of "K" Company.¹⁸ At 0245 hours friendly troops were still holding both areas, therefore the enemy attacked from the Northwest against the positions held by the French Battalion. Fifteen (15) minutes later, the enemy hit "C" Company again but the defending troops repulsed all efforts.¹⁹ By 0530 hours, most of the pressure was off the troops in the perimeter, except for the French who were still receiving attacks from the Northwest, which they repulsed.²⁰ "G" Company had regained its positions but "K" Company was fighting fiercely to hold their sector. The stubborn enemy launched another attack from the North against "C" Company's positions at 0545 hours but was repulsed. In the South, the enemy had made unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate through the lines.²¹

At 0630 hours, the fighting flared up again, the 2d Recon Company and "L" Company, 9th Infantry, reported that they were being attacked on three sides.²² The enemy attacked the perimeter from the Southeast again, but was driven off by "K" and "I" Companies.

Elsewhere on the perimeter, the enemy was feinting at the lines and withdrawing. At 0730 hours, "K" Company on the southeast was still fighting and the French Battalion on the Northwest was hit again, but shortly after, the enemy broke physical contact on the entire perimeter. Observers reported occasional enemy activity during the rest of the morning and intermittently, mortar rounds fell inside the perimeter. During the afternoon of 14 February, the TACP brought in three (3) air strikes to the South and the 23d RCT received twenty-four (24) air drops of ammunition.²³ Also the enemy increased his activity to the South.

The first enemy action of the evening occurred at 2030 hours, when

18. S-3 Journal, Entry #33, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.
19. S-3 Journal, Entry #43,44, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.
20. S-3 Journal, Entry #81, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.
21. S-3 Journal, Entry #82,83; Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.
22. S-3 Journal, Entry #86, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.
23. S-3 Journal, Entry #150,159, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By SL NARA Date 5/14/10

"K" Company received a mortar barrage.²⁴ At 2130 hours, "C" Company reported sounds of the enemy digging in to their front. The Regimental CO ordered conservation of ~~SECRET~~ all types of small arms ammunition as the supply was critically short in spite of the air drops. There was no reserve of 8-round clips for the M-1 rifles other than that in the company stocks at this time.

Simultaneously with an attack from the South on the 2d Battalion area, the enemy brought the 23d CP under heavy Self-propelled Gun, Mortar and small arms fire. This continued for approximately an hour and the impact area spread out to include Mortar Company and the French Battalion trains area. Fighting increased around the perimeter until the 2d and 3d Battalions to the South and Southeast were engaged in fierce close combat.²⁵ Bugles sounded on the hills to the North and 120-mm heavy mortar rounds began to fall in the Regimental CP area. The fighting abated for a short period but at 0130 hours, the 15th of February, "K" Company repulsed two (2) attacks, while pressure increased on the South and Southwest against "G" Company.

At 0230 hours, the enemy penetrated "I" Company positions but were driven out with the aid of "L" Company, after vicious, close-in fighting.²⁶ The overwhelming number of enemy forced the "G" Company line to withdraw at 0315 hours with heavy losses. The Regimental CO ordered counter-attacks to retake the lost ground. A composite force of Rangers, one platoon of "F" Company, and the troops, which remained from "G" Company, was assembled to accomplish this mission.²⁷ While they were forming, "A" and "C" Companies repulsed another severe attack from the North. Ammunition stocks in the companies had become so low that commanders ordered their men not to fire unless they could actually see and hit the enemy. At this time, the supply trains contained less than 140 rounds of 4.2 mortar and 90 rounds of 81-mm mortar ammunition. The commitment of the Ranger Company left only "B" Company, 1st Battalion, in regimental

24. S-3 Journal, Entry #175, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.

25. S-3 Journal, Entry #4-13, Hq 23d Inf. 14 Feb 51.

26. S-3 Journal, Entry #29, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51.

27. S-3 Journal, Entry #37,38,41, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51.

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reserve. The counter-attack to retake "G" Company positions commenced at 0615 hours. At 0800 hours, the enemy repulsed the counter-attacking composite force with heavy losses to the friendly troops. The Regimental CO ordered "B" Company to the "G" Company area to retake the vital lost ground, and thus secure the integrity of the perimeter. Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the reverse slopes of "B" Company's objective prevented them from taking and holding the position. Supporting tanks were unable to gain positions for assault fire because the roads were heavily mined. At 1400 hours, "B" Company was still unable to move so the TACP brought in air strikes and napalm drops which routed the enemy and enabled "B" Company to proceed to their objective.

Meanwhile the 23d RCT Commander notified "B" Company of the 2d Engineers that they were now the Regimental Reserve.²⁸ With the coming of full daylight the activity on the remainder of the perimeter ceased and air drops began to resupply the almost completely exhausted stocks of ammunition.²⁹ An enemy mortar fired into the drop zone and the Regimental CP area throughout the morning, inflicting heavy casualties on the crews that were recovering the supplies. Counter-battery by 4.2 mortars and artillery silenced this enemy mortar at 1130 hours.

Also during this day's activity, a radio contact had been established with the 5th Cavalry Regiment which was approaching CHIPYONG-NI from the Southwest. Later, at 1230 hours, the air OP reported that the leading elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment were about 9000 yards Southwest of the perimeter, moving slowly.³⁰ By 1630 hours, "B" Company, now secure in defensive positions, could see the leading elements of the 5th Cavalry Task Force approaching from the Southwest.³¹ The men within the perimeter could see the enemy fleeing to the hills as the column drew nearer and nearer. These fleeing troops were taken under artillery fire. At 1700 hours, the Regimental Commander ordered all units to hold their fire as ammunition stocks of every type were almost depleted. Reports of large enemy groups to the North and Northwest

28. S-3 Journal, Entry #69,70,72,73,95,103,119, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51
29. S-3 Journal, Entry #74, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51.
30. S-3 Journal, Entry #96, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51.
31. S-3 Journal, Entry #129, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 96 NARA Date 5/14/10

continued to come in. The 23d RCT reported to the 2d Division that a total of 131 sorties had been flown in support for the day of 15 February.³² A night drop by 19 aircraft was necessary to resupply the RCT with small arms and mortar ammunition. The last air drop was at 0300 hours.

The 5th Cavalry Task Force entered the perimeter at 1715 hours. At 2115 hours "B" Company withdrew to positions closer to the town of CHIPYONG-NI and closed the perimeter for the night.³³ Other than flare activity, the enemy did not indicate any desire to attack, in spite of reports that indicated that he was digging in to the Northeast and Southwest. No enemy contact was made during the rest of the night.

The crisis of the battle of CHIPYONG-NI had definitely passed by the morning of 16 February. During the morning hours, only sporadic enemy harassing artillery fire fell within the confines of the 23d RCT perimeter. A patrol dispatched by "C" Company to the North, encountered SP fire in the vicinity of the village of KOSAN.³⁴ This was the only patrol of those sent out by the 23d RCT to contact or sight the enemy. At 1635 the supply element with the 5th Cavalry Regiment arrived at the 23d RCT perimeter. The vehicles upon discharging their cargo, immediately were loaded with wounded personnel and dispatched to YOJU to place the wounded in medical channels. These vehicles made the trip to and from the perimeter without enemy contact. Foot elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment moved North from KOKSU-RI toward the 23d RCT perimeter, sweeping the high ground on either side of their route of advance, with no enemy opposition and by 2400 hours were within 3000 yards of the perimeter.

On the 17th of February, company-size patrols were dispatched in all directions from the perimeter with the following results: The 1st Battalion patrol, dispatched to WOLPA, CS805498 came under automatic weapons, small arms and mortar fire from an estimated enemy company dug in on a ridge (CS8800504 - CS813504). The patrol withdrew and returned to the perimeter at 1600. Artillery and 4.2 Mortar fire was

32. S-3 Journal, Entry #139, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51.

33. S-3 Journal, Entry #135,152, Hq 23d Inf. 15 Feb 51.

34. S-3 Journal, Entry #42, Hq 23d Inf. 16 Feb 51.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

placed on this enemy group. The 2d Battalion patrol, dispatched to Hill 397, CS802457, contacted a five man enemy patrol at SUKPOL, CS-808457, killing 2 and dispersing 3. The 3d Battalion patrol to Hill 506, CS830487, reached the top of the hill and came under small arms and automatic weapons fire from the flanks, the patrol withdrew and an air strike was placed on the enemy position.³⁵

At 1200 hours, the 23d Infantry was attached to the IX Corps for operational control since the location of the 23d Was within the IX Corps sector of responsibility.³⁶ On 18 February, the 23d RCT was relieved by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, and at 1100 hours began its movement from CHIPYONG-NI, to return to the 2d Division sector of responsibility. This movement was handled in a most expeditious and efficient manner, and by 2400 hours, all elements of the 23d RCT, less the 1st Battalion and elements of the Service trains, had closed in the WONJU area, CS0833.³⁷ The time of closing of the 1st Battalion in the WONJU area was 0030. The 23d RCT reverted to the operational control of the 2d Division at 2200 hours.

On 19 February, the units of the 23d RCT were located as follows: The first Battalion of the French Battalion was in assembly positions on the Southwest road from WONJU. The second and third Battalions were in assembly positions on the Southeast road from WONJU. The French Battalion was placed under the operational control of the 187th Airborne RCT at 1200 hours. Local patrols were sent out by the 23d RCT with no reported enemy contact.³⁸

On 20 February, orders were issued to the 23d Infantry to move, upon being relieved by elements of the 1st Marine Division, to an assembly area in the vicinity of NODONG-NI (DS3316) and North of CHECHON; to prepare for offensive operations as ordered by Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division. In compliance with the above order, the 2d Battalion departed at 1705 hours, followed, as transportation became available, by the 3d Battalion, Special Units, and Regimental Command Group, 1st Battalion,

- 35. S-2 Journal, Hq 23d Inf. 16 Feb 51.
- 36. S-3 Journal, Entry #35, Hq 23d Inf. 16 Feb 51.
- 37. S-3 Journal, Entry #60-69, Hq 23d Inf. 16 Feb 51.
- 38. S-2 Journal, Hq 23d Inf. 19 Feb 1951.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 95 NARA Date 5/14/10

and the remainder of Regimental Headquarters.³⁹ There was no enemy contact during this movement. All units except Tank Company and the 1st Battalion closed at 0545 hours.

(The 23d Infantry Regiment CP was visited by General Mark Clark, Chief of Army Field Forces, and General Almond, Commanding General of the X Corps, from 1040-1100 hours). At 2205 hours the 23d Regiment was directed to have a minimum of one battalion at CHUCHON-NI by 1000 hours, 22 February. The closing of the French Battalion into Division Reserve at CHECHON at 1300 hours, completed the movement of the 23d RCT from the WONJU area.⁴⁰

On the morning of 22 February, the 23d Infantry "jumped-off" in the attack at 0920 hours, with the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left.⁴¹ The forward movement of these leading elements was stopped opposite CHUCHON-NI (DS3524) where elements of the 17th Infantry were struggling to cross a four-foot deep, rapidly moving river. By using tanks as ferries to shuttle the troops across this rain-swollen river, the 1st and 3d Battalions were able to cross and continue the attack in their assigned sector.⁴² However, the wheeled vehicles were unable to cross there with their units. The advance continued until 1800 hours, when the 3d Battalion stopped for the night at DS325295, and 2000 hours, when the 1st Battalion stopped for the night 1000 yards South of Hill 642, DS378319. One company from the 2d Battalion and Tank Company were located across the river while the remainder of the 2d Battalion, Regimental CP and Hqs Company, the 37th FA (reinforced) Battalion and Heavy Mortar Company were established on the South side of the river at DS348236.

The engineers attached to the 23d RCT worked continuously until 1500 hours 23 February, to construct a ford across the CHUCHON river to carry vehicles forward in support of the 1st and 3d Battalions. The 1st and 3d Battalions continued to advance along the high ground on the

- 39. S-3 Journal, Entry #35,38, Hq 23d Inf 19 Feb 51.
- 40. S-3 Journal, Entry #14, Hq 23d Inf. 19 Feb 51.
- 41. S-3 Journal, Entry #27,30, Hq 23d Inf. 22 Feb 51.
- 42. S-3 Journal, Entry #45, Hq 23d Inf. 22 Feb 51.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

sides of the North-South Corridor in the regimental zone. This advance, which was being made cross-country over the rugged mountain peaks of Central Korea, indicated that ~~U.S. Troops~~ ~~SECRET~~ are not dependent on road nets to successfully maneuver and fight against the enemy. The rate of advance was not fast but the rugged terrain and rain, mud, cold, and lack of rations are not unsurmountable obstacles to a determined unit, providing that the unit has confidence in itself and its leaders.

At 1600 hours, the 1st and 3d Battalions buttoned up for the night at DS379330 and DS339326, respectively.⁴³ Battery "C", 37th FA Battalion; Battery "B", 503d FA Battalion; one platoon of Tank Company; 23d RCT CP and Headquarters, and Company "F", 23d Infantry moved to new positions in the vicinity of DS409271. The 2d Battalion, minus "F" Company, remained in position in the vicinity of DS350230. Although there was no enemy resistance for the 1st and 3d Battalions, the terrain, mud, swollen rivers and absence of roads presented serious obstacles to resupply and delayed their advance.

The 1st and 3d Battalions jumped off at 0700 hours the morning of 24 February, moving over extremely rugged terrain, with all equipment pack-carried.⁴⁴ At 1640 hours, the 1st Battalion stopped for the night at DS385380, and the 3d Battalion stopped at DS357341. The 1st Battalion received rations by Liaison Aircraft drop.⁴⁵ The 3d Battalion sent one company back to the Battalion supply base as a carrying party to bring forward additional rations. At 2015 hours, the 23d RCT received instructions from G-3, 2d Division that it would remain in the positions now occupied by its forward elements until receiving further orders from Division Headquarters.⁴⁶

On the 25th of February, since the 23d RCT was directed to remain in place, the emphasis was on the supply of the troops occupying the high, precipitous mountains. Through the use of indigeneous carrying parties and air drops from liaison aircraft, rations and changes of socks

- 43. S-3 Journal, Entry #60, 64, Hq 23d Inf, 23 Feb 51.
- 44. S-3 Journal, Entry #24, Hq 23d Inf, 24 Feb 51.
- 45. S-3 Journal, Entry #51, Hq 23d Inf, 24 Feb 51.
- 46. S-3 Journal, Entry #65, Hq 23d Inf. 24 Feb 51.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

were delivered to the 1st and 3d Battalions.⁴⁷

During the morning hours of 26 February, the 3d Battalion utilized carrying parties to resupply ~~the 1st Battalion~~ preparatory to continuing the Northward advance. Simultaneously, the 2d Battalion; Special Units; Company "B", 2d Engineer Bn; Battery "B", 82d AAA AW Battalion, and the 37th FA Battalion moved through the 7th Infantry Division sector to positions in the vicinity of DS4742 from which to drive West and link up with the 1st Battalion.⁴⁸ During the early afternoon hours, an enemy radio intercept indicated that the enemy in the Division zone was short of ammunition and planned to withdraw.⁴⁹ Therefore, the 1st Battalion was ordered to move to the vicinity of DS3742 to establish blocking positions and to patrol East toward the 2d Battalion, 23d Regiment. The 1st Battalion succeeded in advancing to DS3739 where they secured positions for the night. All supplies had to be hand-carried by the 1st Battalion across a 4000 foot mountain which materially affected their rate of advance. The 3d Battalion remained in position in the vicinity of DS3534.

The 1st Battalion departed from its last positions to continue its advance over mountainous terrain to seize the objective South of the East-West lateral road in the vicinity of DS370418. One Company was dispatched to the Northeast to establish contact with elements of the 2d Battalion moving to seize Hill 825 (DS405433). At 1740 hours, the 1st Battalion had reached its objective encountering no enemy resistance during their advance.⁵⁰ The company which had departed to establish contact with the 2d Battalion was unsuccessful in accomplishing its mission and was ordered to rejoin the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion departed at 0700 hours and advanced to seize Hill 825. As the Battalion advanced to seize , the leading elements encountered an estimated enemy company in the vicinity of DS4143. Air strikes, Artillery fire and aggressive attacks by friendly foot elements routed the enemy from this position and the 2d Battalion secured Hill 825 by 1555.⁵¹ The 2d Battalion

47. S-3 Journal, Entry #62,63, Hq 23d Inf. 25 Feb 51.

48. S-3 Journal, Entry #56,57, Hq 23d Inf. 26 Feb 51.

49. S-2 Journal, Entry #4, Hq 23d Inf. 26 Feb 51.

50. S-3 Journal Entry #71, Hq 23d Inf. 27 Feb 51.

51. S-3 Journal, Entry # 58 Hq 23d Inf. 27 Feb 51.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By RS NARA Date 5/14/10

continued its advance to the West, securing Hill 801, DS397430, and then on to Hill 692, DS385424, which was secured by 1800 hours. The Battalion halted here and prepared night defensive positions.⁵² The 3d Battalion departed at 0900 hours enroute to CHUCHON-NI, DS351243, closing at 1750 hours.⁵³

On The morning of 28 February, the 1st Battalion attacked at 0750 hours to secure the village of UNGO-RI, DS3742.⁵⁴ The objective was secured and the 1st Battalion linked up with the 2d Battalion at 1115 hours. Company "A" then advanced to Pass 823, DS342418, where the lead platoon was "pinned down" by automatic weapons and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy dug in on the high ground overlooking the pass.⁵⁵ With the help of Air and Artillery support, "A" Company was able to withdraw and rejoin the 1st Battalion at UNGYO-RI, closing in at 1810 hours. The 2d Battalion moved towards its objective, Hill 884, DS3543, stopping just short of its objective at 1800 hours to prepare positions for the night.⁵⁶ The 2d Battalion made no enemy contact. The 3d Battalion was alerted to rejoin the Regiment, leaving its present location at 010600I March. The French Battalion, still in 2d Division Reserve, continued the local defense of CHECHON.

- 52. S-3 Journal, Entry #77, Hq 23d Inf. 27 Feb 51.
- 53. S-3 Journal, Entry #78, Hq 23d Inf. 27 Feb 51.
- 54. S-3 Journal, Entry #37, Hq 23d Inf. 28 Feb 51.
- 55. S-3 Journal, Entry #48, Hq 23d Inf. 28 Feb 51.
- 56. S-3 Journal, Entry #47,69 Hq 23d Inf. 28 Feb 51.

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By 815 NARA Date 5/14/10~~SECRET~~

II

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Personnel Report

The main problem, during the month of February was that of Replacements. The following observations are noted:

1. The flow of Replacements and Returnees has not been sufficient to fill the 23d Infantry up to strength.
2. A factor which contributes to lower the combat efficiency of 23d, is that of the Replacements sent forward, some, are assigned an MOS for which they are not trained, or physically fit to carry out the duties. Furthermore, merely because the man holds a non-commissioned officer's rating, does not mean he should be a squad leader or a platoon Sergeant, he may be a specialist, who has little or no infantry training, and no troop leadership experience. A man over 35, no matter how much personal courage he may have, does not have the physical stamina, to last in combat, in the rugged Korean terrain.
3. The front line unit is still being used as a punishment instead of the 104th Article of War, by rear echelon Commanders. Thus, the malingerers, the "8" balls, are sent out as replacements, who do not contribute to the combat effectiveness of their new unit, and who often lower the morale of their fellow soldiers.
4. Finally, many men are sent back from the hospitals, before their wounds are fully healed, and these men can not be sent to rifle companies. Also some men have arrived as Replacements, carrying a Re-Profile slip of 3. These men are evacuated to the rear again through medical channels, but time and money had been spent on them, without, adding to the strength of the unit.
5. The 23d RCT received 665 replacements and 210 hospital returnees.
6. 9 Officers and 53 EM were sent to Japan on R and R.
7. Recommendations: To increase the morale of the troops, a Money-order team consisting of three men, would be a big factor. These men could operate one to each of the battalions and then to special units, with much greater efficiency than is obtained under the

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By RLS NARA Date 5/14/10

present method. Another morale boosting factor, would be the presentation to the individual, the award itself, which he has earned, not merely a copy of the orders.

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Intelligence Report

1-3 February. The 23d Infantry Regiment located in the Twin Tunnels area, was engaged in mopping up operations in the Tunnels Area and movement into the CHIPYONG-NI area. During this period, statements from PW's taken by the French Battalion and 3d Battalion indicated that the CCF 125th Division had been in that area for some 20 days. X Corps G-2 stated that Essential Elements of Information for the period was to fix the boundary between NKPA and CCF. At 032110 February 1951, 3d Battalion reported that information received from two wounded ROK soldiers left in CHIPYONG-NI that the CCF troops had passed through CHIPYONG-NI on the night of 2 February, moving North. Civilian reports at the same time indicated that several thousand CCF had gone to the ONGNIUN-SAM area in the past few days.

On the 040830 Feb 1951, all the battalions in the perimeter were ordered to send out strong patrols, 1st Battalion to Hill 345, 2nd Battalion to Hill 397 with one squad to Hill 129, 3d Battalion to Hill 506 and Hill 471. French Battalion to Hill 281. At 041015 February 1951, 1st Battalion reported observing small enemy group on Hill 345. At 040145, 1st Battalion patrol reported many foxholes occupied on West slope of Hill 345. Patrol withdrew and artillery fire was called in. At 041235, 3d Battalion reported that its patrol ("K" Co reinforced) was in a fire fight on Hill 506. Patrol withdrew and artillery called in. The 2nd and French Battalions reported no enemy contact. Air continued to report several hundred enemy in widely separated areas to the North and Northwest.

On 151010 February 1951, the Commanding General, 2nd Division, directed extensive patrolling in zone. Patrols were carried out with little or no enemy contact.

By 060900 February 1951, all patrols had departed Regimental Area. At 0930 hrs, 3d Battalion patrol in enemy contact on Hill 506. At 1208 hrs 3d Battalion patrol received fire from two sides on Hill 506, also

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Authority 785101
By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

reported that there was much activity at 2d and 3d Battalions patrols destinations. At 1300 hours the French patrol had reported sighting small groups of enemy in their patrol area, and had brought them under artillery fire. The 2d Battalion patrol reached Hill 397 without enemy contact at 1420 hours, but at 1500 hours, reported that they were unable to reach Northern part of objective due to enemy small arms fire. Patrol returned to Battalion area after having engaged and destroyed forty enemy. The 3d Battalion patrol reported that they were receiving mortar and small arms fire on Hill 506, and were returning to area. At 1645 hours, Air OP reported sighting from 500-600 enemy troops in valley near HAGGOSONG. Air strike and artillery fire placed on enemy.

The period 7 February to 13 February 1951, the 23d Regiment continued aggressive patrolling in sector with from light to heavy contact reported by patrols to the North, Northwest, and Northeast. Air OP's continued to report enemy activity throughout period. The largest group reported was one enemy regiment with supply dump at CS815534. On 10 February, Air Strikes and artillery fire were placed on enemy with good results. During this period, there was noted a sharp increase in enemy mortar fire, most of which was estimated to be 60MM. During night of 11 and 12 February, increased flare activity, but received no attack.

On 13 February, patrols were ordered to go no further than 5,000 yards from perimeter. Patrols returned with no enemy contact, but Agents and Civilians reports continued to come in at 2100 hours. Service Company, 23d Infantry called saying that refugees reported 4,000 CCF troops in vicinity of YANG-DONG CS912426. At 2114 hours the French Battalion reported seeing lights on Hill 248. At 2207 hours a platoon of "C" Company reported receiving automatic weapons and mortars fire. At this time reports began to come in from units that they could hear whistles and bugles and could see flares. At 2217 hours "G" Company reported hearing tracked vehicles in the town to their front, at 2303 hours, "G" Company reported that they were receiving direct artillery fire from Hill 129. At 2250 hours, from reports of firing and the amount of signals, the main attack seemed to be centered between "A" and "G" Companies. At 140225 February, "G" Company

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reported being hit hard in center of their sector. At 0228 hours "K" Company was being attacked. At 0245 hours, the 1st French Company was under heavy attack. B Company, 82d AAA reported that at 0250 hours there were from 50-100 enemy attacking from the South along the Main Supply Route. At 0253 hours, the French Battalion reported being hard pressed. At 0258 hours, "C" Company was assaulted by estimated company of enemy. At 0340 hours, 2d Battalion reported that an unknown number of enemy had broken through the center of "G" Company. By 0400 hours the 23d Infantry was completely surrounded. "E" Company reported that the enemy was trying to slip through our lines. However the enemy was stopped in this attempt after he had blown a gap in the protective wire using hand grenades and bangalore torpedos. At 0658 hours, "G" Company reported hearing bugles being blown, the enemy appeared to be withdrawing. At 0815 hours, 200-250 enemy were seen moving West over Hill 397.

During the night 13-14 February, the entire Regimental Perimeter was subjected to heavy mortar, artillery and direct artillery fire. The enemy moved his 60MM Mortars and small caliber weapons very close to the front lines and fired in battery from defilade positions. One artillery battery was located only 2500 yards Northeast of the Perimeter. This was the first time since early in the war that the 23d Regimental Combat Team had been subjected to "Timed Over Target" fires. There seemed to be no special communication between batteries, but weapons opened fire at a prearranged time to land indiscriminately over the entire perimeter with the most concentrated fires falling in and around the Air Strip, Regimental Command Post, and Mortar Company positions. The different types of weapons known to have been used were American 60MM and 81MM Mortars, plus Chinese 50MM, 60MM, 81MM, 82MM, and 120MM Mortars and 75MM or 76MM artillery. It is believed that the enemy also employed US 105 Howitzers.

Throughout day of 14 February, short patrols were sent out from the perimeter. The French patrol made contact with enemy on Northeast slope of Hill 248, and were ordered back within the perimeter. At 1008 hours, the 2d Battalion reported an estimated enemy company on Hill 397.

Division G-2 reported that during night of 13-14 February, the 2d Reconnaissance Company had been hard hit by approximately 400 enemy, but were able to hold out until daylight and made a run for YOJU.

At 1300 hours, the 2d Battalion reported being hit with unknown size mortar fire with three second delayed fuses.

Enemy losses up to 1500 ~~troops~~ ~~with~~ 10 Prisoners of War. Prisoners reported to 3d Battalion that there were 2,000 CCF troops on Hill 506, and would attack night of 14 February. Also that 7000-8000 CCF troops on the hill to the North had not been hurt by air strike. On 141917 February, the reports again began to come in of whistles and bugles. Mortar fire also began to fall within the perimeter. At 2025 hours the enemy launched a probing attack directed at "K" Company. At the same time, 2d Battalion reported what appeared to be a search light on Hill 248, and "G" Company reported sounds of digging to their front. At 2119 hours, 2d Battalion reported enemy attack coming from Hill 397. At 150002, 1st French Company was reported under attack. At 0110 hours, bugles and tin horns heard on Hill 397. Attack on "G" Company continuing. At 0130, "A" Company, "E" and "F" Companies under probing attack. At 0215 hours, "C" Company reported estimated two enemy companies attacking their positions. At 0340 hours, 2d Battalion reported that there had been a penetration in the right sector of "G" Company. Enemy continued to exploit this penetration, moving automatic weapons and mortars into the positions left vacant by "G" Company. At one time, there was reported six enemy 60MM Mortar positions at the base of the hill which "G" Company had occupied. The enemy held doggedly to his gains from the position. Reports continued to come in from Battalions of enemy groups on hills to their front. 5th Cavalry patrol reported to Division that large numbers of enemy were dug in on ridges North of CHIPYONG-NI.

Air OP's continued to report enemy movement around CHIPYONG-NI. At 1700 hours, Tank column from 5th Cavalry arrived in perimeter. The enemy on Hill 397 began to stream South and East and heavy small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire were placed on them with good effect. During the evening of 16 February, Battalions reported a considerable amount of enemy equipment captured, also a large amount of American equipment left by the routed CCF. During the night 16-17 February, there was considerable enemy movement and flares around CHIPYONG-NI, but an attack failed to materialize; however, there was still some mortar fire coming into the Regimental Perimeter, but not in such volume as had ~~been~~ the case on the previous nights. On 17

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By 915 NARA Date 5/14/10

February patrols were again sent out. The patrols to the North and North-east drew fire soon after leaving their positions. "E" Company patrol moved to Hill 397 without enemy contact. The Company Commander reported from 2,000-3,000 foxholes on Hill 397. Some were very well constructed and appeared to be fighting holes while others were shallow and appeared to be only for temporary protection from air or artillery fire. The 3d Battalion patrol to Hill 506 drew fire and returned to the Company area. Air OP's continued to report large numbers of enemy to the North and North-east. Prisoners of War taken by the French Battalion reported that KOSON G-NI had been used as the assembly area for the CCF 120th, 121st, and 123d Divisions - Units used against the perimeter. No further attacks were made on CHIPYONG-NI, and the Regiment moved to the WONJU area on 19 February 1951, after being relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division.

At WONJU, the French Battalion was committed in support of the 187th Airborne Infantry. The remainder of the 23d Infantry moved to CHECHON, and was directed to attack North on the left of the 7th US Division. The 23d Regimental Combat Team was able to advance to UNGYO-RI. The 1st Battalion made no enemy contact; the 2d Battalion encountered 500 enemy on Hill 825. The 9th Infantry on the left was hitting resistance. Civilians reported to the 1st Battalion on 22 February that there had been 150 North Koreans in that vicinity, the day before. The 3d Battalion reported seeing 20 enemy at DS3231 and artillery was placed on them with excellent results. On 23 February, the 17th Infantry S-2 informed the 23d Infantry S-2 that TLO Agents reported that on 21 February, the North Koreans were seeking refuge in gold mine shafts on PAEKTOK-SAN DS3738, also were hiding equipment and rations there. Investigation by 1st Battalion failed to confirm this report. At 231935 February, 1st Battalion reported taking 3 Prisoners of War (former ROK's) from the 7th North Korean Division. The 7th North Korean Division's mission was to take CHECHON, but for some unknown reason, the 7th North Korean Division was moving North.

On 24 February, 17th Infantry S-2 reported possible enemy build-up along East-West road (42 E-W grid line.) Prisoners of War taken by 3d Battalion (ROK escapees) reported that the 6th and 12th North Korean

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Authority 785101
By RL NARA Date 5/14/10

Divisions were in area CHUNCHON, digging in with log-covered emplacements. Several units infected with typhus. Unit strength low, also stated that six CCF Officers had inspected front lines several days ago. On 27 February, "E" Company made contact with estimated platoon of enemy on East-West road. At 1047 hours. At 1345 hours, "E" Company reported 100 enemy moving from Hill 825. At 1535 hours, the Regimental Communication Officer reported increased enemy radio traffic. At 2400, X Corps reported that the II North Corps assembly area was located vicinity DS5249. III North Korean Corps deployed on line vicinity DS4246-DS5145. The V North Korean Corps had 1 Division at DS2750, 1 Division at DS2941, and one Division along line through DS5145.

28 February 1st Battalion in contact with estimated 500 enemy Northwest of UNGYO-RI.

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By RS NARA Date 5/14/10

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IV

Operations Report

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The 23d RCT was given the mission of seeing out and destroying the enemy in the "Twin Tunnels" area on 30 January 1951. To carry out this mission, the French Battalion, which was attached to the RCT, and the 3d Battalion attacked on 31 January. The attacking elements encountered stiff enemy resistance but reached their objective and set up a perimeter defense, by nightfall, with the 1st and 2d Battalions plus one Battery of the 37th FA Battalion coming up that night to complete the RCT. The enemy repeatedly attacked the 23d RCT on the night of 31 Jan-1 Feb, but was repulsed with heavy losses, and withdrew as daylight came. Patrols sent out from the RCT contacted the enemy in considerable force northwest of the Tunnels area around the town of CHIPYONG-NI, so on division order, the 23d moved to this town, set up a strong perimeter defense and maintained daily contact with the enemy by means of numerous patrols sent in all directions. Intelligence reports from patrols, air OP and civilians, indicated that the enemy was massing elements of 6 CCF divisions in the area just north of CHIPYONG-NI. Consequently when the enemy first attacked the perimeter of CHIPYONG-NI, the RCT was well prepared. The tanks and AAA vehicles, had reconnoitered all possible routes of approach to the perimeter and had established positions in every sector of the perimeter to provide maximum supporting defensive fire. Each Battalion had made a thorough reconnaissance of the other Battalion's positions in the perimeter so that reinforcements and reliefs could be made most expeditiously, when necessary. The perimeter was made sufficiently compact so as to leave each rifle company with one platoon in reserve and leave, initially, two companies ("B" Company 23d Inf and 2d Ranger Company) as Regimental Reserve.

In his attack plan the enemy had apparently followed the doctrine of: Isolate; Surround; and then Annihilate. He continually kept probing, during his attacks on the first night, trying to find an open flank, thinking he was fighting against a front not a perimeter. When the third

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Authority 785101
By RS NARA Date 5/14/10

main attack launched against the perimeter from the South proved unsuccessful, he tried "to split the perimeter in half by driving a wedge through a weak spot, making his strongest attacks at this time".

These attacks were supported by extremely intense, heavy mortar and Self-propelled gun fire. This fire, landing in such a small area as the perimeter, would have caused severe casualties if the defenders had not dug deep, well camouflaged fox holes, and stayed in them. The discipline of the troops under such trying circumstances was excellent. There was no unnecessary movement on the open ground, and each man performed his job.

During the air drops, especially those made at night, the pathfinder (not provided for in the TO of an Inf Regt) who was with the 2d Ranger Company attached to the 23d RCT was extremely useful in contacting, guiding, and controlling the large planes. It is recommended that a "Pathfinder" be attached to the Inf Regt, to work with the TACP.

After leaving the CHIPYONG-NI area, on 18 Feb, the 23d RCT was assigned the mission of attacking North through the mountainous terrain to the West of CHECHON. This attack was made in spite of inclement weather, and rugged terrain, which was a test in itself especially logistically (see V). During the month, a patrol school was conducted (see Appendix D-3) for the order and schedule. Also Recommendations for changes in the TO and E of the Rifle and Weapons Companies (see next page) were submitted to higher headquarters. For the Battalion Recommendations which were incorporated into that of the Regimental S-3, (see Appendix D-2).

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By RLS NARA Date 5/14/10HEADQUARTERS 23D INFANTRY
APO 248, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California~~SECRET~~

20 February 1951

SUBJECT: Recommended Changes in ~~Rifles~~ and Heavy
Weapons CompaniesTO: Commanding General
2d Infantry Division
APO 248, C/O Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif
(ATTN: AC of S, G-3)

1. Recommended Changes and Distributions of Weapons in Rifle Companies: None.
2. Recommended Additions or Deletions as to Number or Types of Authorized Weapons in a Rifle Company:
 - a. Addition of three (3) more LMGs, one (1) per rifle platoon.
 - b. Add one (1) BAR to each rifle squad.
 - c. Add one LMG (A-6) to each weapons squad to be manned by Rocket Launcher crew when the situation does not warrant the use of a Rocket Launcher.
 - d. Issue one (1) Cal. 50 MG each with pedestal mount and ground mount on the basis of one (1) per 1/4T truck to rifle companies.
3. Recommended Changes in the Weapons Company T O & E concerning the 81mm Mortar and the MG Platoons:
 - a. Add a section to the 81mm Mortar Platoon making a total of six (6).
 - b. Add a MG Platoon to the Weapons Company.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

JOHN B. DUMAINE
Major Infantry
S-3~~SECRET~~

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V

LOGISTICS REPORT

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During the first part of the month of February, supply was maintained through normal procedure, utilizing motor transportation. When the Regiment was located in the CHIPYONG-NI Area, normal logistical supply was impossible due to the fact that the enemy had bisected the Main Supply Route from the Service Trains. At "Twin Tunnels" and CHIPYONG-NI, the only method of supply available was by means of air drops from the Cargo Command located in Japan. Coordination of all types of supply was initiated from Regimental level and channeled through Division, Corps, and Army to the Japan Logistical Command. The major items of supply which were critical in a perimeter defense were Classes I and III (food and ammunition) and signal, and medical supplies. It was determined that immediate emergency resupply by means of pre-packaged cargo-drops did not satisfy the critical requirements of the RCT, although the time factor precluded the packing of specified amounts and classes of supply. At least twelve hours preparation was the minimum time required for delivery of specified drops, due to the geographical location of the supply point in Japan and the time spent assembling and preparing the cargo load.

Difficulties in communication with the incoming Cargo Planes were encountered by the TAC party, within the perimeter, because of insufficient information concerning radio sending and receiving channels. This situation necessitated that "mosquito" or Artillery liaison planes be used as guides to the drop zone. Difficulties in hitting the drop zone were experienced by lack of communication (as previously mentioned) and strong prevailing winds which caused considerable drift. Therefore, it was necessary to organize recovery teams in sufficient numbers to retrieve the widely scattered cargo drops, and bring them to a central distributing point.

Communications were a necessity for a successful night drop. The drop zone had to be clearly defined by means of vehicle headlights representing the extremities of the drop zone. This practice was extremely

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 785101
By 96 NARA Date 5/14/10

hazardous as it presented a defined target for enemy artillery and mortar fire.

Lessons learned during the period 3-16 February, which included both day and night drops, show that close liaison between TAC party and Cargo Ships is an essential factor for successful approach to, and control of drops within the zone. All supply personnel should be familiar with recovery and classification procedure. Definite control measures should be established to insure the delivery of all the dropped material to a central distributing point. Promiscuous looting, especially at night, of certain types of supply by personnel not engaged in recovery, was experienced, which resulted in an unequal distribution of a specified class of supply. As close a surveillance as possible must be kept over the drop area.

From the end of the battle of CHIPYONG-NI until the 23d RCT reached the Chuchon-ni River, in the Vicinity of CHECHON, in its newly assigned sector of attack, all supply was handled by normal means; however the Chuchon-ni River was in a flood stage, due to a heavy rain fall, and a rise in the temperature which caused the snow and ice to melt. The ford across this river was inadequate for wheeled vehicles, and thus prohibited the natural processing of supplies forward in support of the advancing battalions.

The 1st and 2d Battalions respectively had missions to attack along the ridges leading to a limited objective just short of the Arizona line, the name given to a X Corps phase line. There were no routes of supply in the mountainous terrain to both attacking battalions, therefore, a means of supplying Classes I and IV Supplies had to be devised. The distance from the Regimental Supply Base to the attacking battalions increased daily with their advance and the difficulties of getting supplies across the river. Both battalions did not actively engage the enemy, which resulted in a major supply problem of rations only. The distance from the Regimental Supply Point to the Battalions supply points, which were established on the third day of the advance, was about 8 miles, over very rugged terrain. This distance was excessive in this mountainous terrain for troops to carry rations by hand. Plans were made through Division

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Authority 785101
By 25 NARA Date 5/14/10

G-4 to supply by Air-drops. All coordination was accomplished but the drop only proved 50% successful, due to varying cross-winds, and lack of suitable drop zones. The remaining 50% dropped into canyons and ravines where recovery was impossible. The first attempted drop was completely unsuccessful due to the fact that the plane, a C119 didn't approach the area until after dark and close air-ground liaison couldn't be established, which resulted in the cargo drop being made in the adjoining 9th Infantry sector.

Attempts to augment the battalion rations were made by means of drops from Artillery liaison L-5 planes, which proved too slow, as only 5 cases or 30 rations could be dropped in one trip. Therefore, Native Korean carrying parties were employed. A Regimental Supply Point was established across the ford from which a carrying party moved supplies forward to a Battalion Supply Base which was in the valley at the base of Hill 642. Another native carrying party, operating from this Battalion Supply point, carried rations up the hills to the Battalion perimeter distributing point. A total of 150 native laborers was found necessary for the daily resupply of the 2 battalions. The Regiment minus the 1st and 3d Battalions was employed in an enveloping movement from the right, through the 7th Division Sector, to attack the Regimental objective from the East flank. The 3d Battalion was withdrawn by X Corps order to an assembly area near the CHUCHON-NI river ford. The 1st Battalion was ordered to advance to the Regimental objective. Native Carriers, escorted by a squad from "A" Company, were transporting the necessary supplies for their advance in the rear of the Battalion. The carrying party stopped for a rest halt to allow readjustment of cargo on the carriers. This cargo, including a bag of 1st Class mail for the 1st Battalion, was placed on a porch of a building during the rest period.

Without warning, an estimated group of 30 NK Soldiers attacked the carrying party. A number of the native carriers were killed, the building was set on fire and the remainder of the carriers and the infantry squad were dispersed. The squad and four carriers escaped and later reported the surprise raid and the resulting loss to Regimental Hqs. A patrol lead by an officer and guided by the squad leader concerned,

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 785101
By 26 NARA Date 5/14/10

returned to the scene of the raid the following day, in an attempt to recover the 90 cases of rations and the bag of 1st Class Mail. Upon arriving at the scene, rations and mail had been totally destroyed by fire.

An important factor to be noted concerning the use of air drops for resupply is that the cargo chutes must be gathered up and returned through the proper channels as soon as possible. This ties up a considerable amount of transportation; for example the 23d used 15 - 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T trucks to remove the parachutes from the CHIPYONG-NI area. If this task of returning parachutes is delayed, men must be placed to guard them, if the situation is of a tactical nature, the parachutes - carrying trucks are not given priority over the roads, and consequently the problem of bucking lines of traffic in order to return from the front is a serious one.

With the equipment in their TO&E the Engineers gave maximum support to the operations of the 23d RCT during the month of February. However, lack of Heavy Equipment (See VII Recommendations) slowed down their supporting efforts and restricted their operations to some extent. Valuable time was lost in the construction of passes, fords, air-strips, and emplacements.

The problems of the 23d Medical Company, other than these brought out in the perimeter defense of CHIPYONG-NI (See Appendix D-1) were mainly caused by the terrain and the weather. In the RCT operation from 20 - 28 Feb, the lack of a usable road not in the sector of attack, plus the extremely rugged terrain which even prohibited the use of hand-carrying the individual to be evacuated, any distance, made the employment of helicopter service, mandatory. Even then the helicopter pilot had difficulty at times in locating a landing spot near the casualty because there were so many trees, and so few open flat areas.

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Authority 785101
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VI

EVALUATION

1. Platoon-size Patrols, when motorized, are of insufficient strength in the mountainous Korean terrain with its very limited road nets.
2. The present amount of organic transportation allotted to the Infantry Battalion is not sufficient to support more than one long-distance motorized patrol.
3. It is evident, by what happened to the 23d RCT patrol sent to the "Twin Tunnels" area, 29 Jan 51, that no patrol of any type or size should be sent on two (2) consecutive days to the same destination, over the same routes of approach, even if ordered out by Higher Headquarters.
4. On the "Twin Tunnels" action, the 23d RCT stopped its advance and "buttoned up", in a tight perimeter defense at 1600 hours, even though there was no enemy contact at the time. This practice has been a standard operating procedure during the Korean Campaign, because the perimeter is the ideal security measure against surprise attack by an enemy whose whereabouts is unknown.
5. The battle of CHIPYONG-NI demonstrated that an RCT properly equipped and entrenched, with sound leadership, is a strong force, and is capable of defending itself when being supplied by air. Also, the fact that as long as the troops have the proper mental attitude, being cut-off is not as difficult physically as making a normal attack. A perimeter formed on the more favorable ground in the vicinity of CHIPYONG-NI would have required more troops than were available to the Regimental Company. Therefore a smaller perimeter on less desirable ground had to be established. The operation of the 23d in the "Twin Tunnels" and "CHIPYONG-NI" area interrupted the enemy's offensive action and was instrumental in stopping his advance as the action took place on the key shoulder of the mountains through which he was moving. The concentrated, defensive fire power of the RCT, made the CCF attack too expensive even for their great

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Authority 785101
By RS NARA Date 5/14/10

numerical superiority.

6. CHUCHON-NI proved that there is no such thing as impassible terrain.

The Infantry Battalion stripped of all its vehicles can still move over rugged terrain, and carry out its mission if properly supported logistically.

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Authority 785101

By RS NARA Date 5/14/10

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VII

Recommendations

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1. Recommend that : Combat patrols in open warfare should be at least Company-size.
2. Recommend that : Supply installations in the immediate battle area, be dug in.
3. Recommend that : In a perimeter defense, reserves be distributed rather than maintaining a central reserve, since it is more often a question of reinforcing a perimeter at several points, simultaneously, than counter-attacking with a strong force.
4. Recommend that : The Ordnance Repair teams be located with the RCT, so that when it goes into a perimeter defense, they will be readily available.
5. Recommend that : The Engineers be given more heavy equipment; Namely more and larger size bulldozers and some types of steam roller or device to compact the surface of reconditioned or new roads.

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