

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**A REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF FLEET
MARINE FORCE PACIFIC FROM 25 JUNE
1950 TO THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON
INCHON HEADQUARTERS, FMF, PACIFIC**

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**A Report on the activities of
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25 June 1950 to the Amphibious
Assault at Inchon**



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6 December, 1950

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A REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
FROM 25 JUNE 1950 TO THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AT INCHON

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

1. General

a. The purpose of this report is to present briefly the principal factors which enabled the Marine Corps to place two effective Marine air-ground fighting teams in the Far East at two critical phases of the combat in Korea. It is not the intent of this paper to describe the combat operations of the units concerned. Rather it is intended to outline certain major factors which contributed to the success of those operations and therefore discusses events leading up to the active engagement of Marines in Korea.

b. The magnitude of the task accomplished by the Marine Corps in the first ten weeks of the conflict may be judged from the fact that on 30 June, 1950, the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) at Camp Pendleton had an actual strength of six hundred forty-one (641) officers and seven thousand one hundred and forty-eight (7,148) enlisted and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, a strength of four hundred seventy-four (474) officers and three thousand two hundred fifty-nine (3,259) enlisted. On 2 August, 1950, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade comprising some five thousand three hundred (5,300) ground officers and enlisted from the Division and 1,300 aviation officers and enlisted from the Wing was moving into combat in the hard pressed Pusan bridgehead in South Korea, and on 15 September, 1950, the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced),

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some 26,000 strong and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, of 3,800 men launched an amphibious assault at Inchon, Korea.

The considerable task involved in this rapid expansion, augmentation and movement could not have been successfully accomplished, nor even undertaken, had there not been constantly present in the minds of those involved the confident assurance that the units so formed and delivered to Commander in Chief, Far East would be outstandingly successful in combat. This assurance came primarily from an awareness of the general professional competence of the personnel involved.

A grasp of the sources of that assurance is considered essential to this evaluation and to an understanding of the succeeding segments of this report. Therefore, a brief review is presented of the significant pre-Korean activities of those Marine Corps elements, regular and reserve, that ultimately comprised the Brigade, the Wing and the Division.

2. Training Activities of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

On 1 October, 1949, the 1st Marine Division was reorganized from the "J" Series Tables of Organization to the present "K" Series Tables of Organization and immediately initiated an intensive training program in conjunction with the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Highlights of the air and ground training programs were as follows:

Oct 1949: Air lift field exercise involving the air movement to San Nicholas Island, California, by a reinforced battalion and a Marine air command. One Marine Aircraft Group was

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carrier embarked for participation in
Operation MIKI.

Nov 1949: Comprehensive field exercise involving a
reinforced regiment and supporting aircraft.

Dec 1949: Combined field exercise involving all prin-
cipal elements of the 1st Marine Division
(Reinforced) and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
This exercise extending over a seven (7) day
period, was a simulated amphibious assault
and involved preparation of complete amphib-
ious plans.

Jan-Feb 1950: Participation by 1st Marine Division ele-
ments in MICOWEX 50. This operation stressed
the use of the transport submarine and heli-
copter in amphibious reconnaissance in sub-
arctic conditions.

Feb 1950: Landplane and seaplane air lift exercise in-
volving the seizure of San Nicholas Island,
California, by a reinforced battalion and a
Marine Air Command. The exercise marked the
first tactical use of the JRM-2 as a trans-
port seaplane.

Mar 1950: Field exercise involving a reinforced regi-
ment with supporting air.

May 1950: Execution of DEMON III, a painstakingly pre-
pared amphibious demonstration for the stud-

[REDACTED] ents of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. A majority of both Division and Wing elements participated in the excellent training offered by this demonstration.

Field exercise (conducted upon completion of DEMON III) involving a reinforced regiment supported by entire 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and involving extensive overland movement.

Extended air exercise. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing utilized the opportunity offered by DEMON III to conduct a major advanced base field exercise of 2 weeks duration. Wing Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Control Group 2 and Marine Aircraft Group 33 embarked in DEMON III shipping, landed all ground elements and supplies over the Aliso Canyon beaches and established an advance base air field at the Camp Pendleton airstrip. Marine Aircraft Group 12 moved overland to Ream Field south of Coronado, California, and established an advance base air field which thereafter was supplied by air from El Toro by Marine Aircraft Group 25. The period in the field was devoted to intense training in close air support and air defense.

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misc:

During the period October - June there were numerous lesser ground, air, and air-ground training problems, field exercises and command post exercises. Particularly significant were the reinforced infantry battalion and regimental exercises which habitually employed close air support. It was through these problems that ground commanders, staffs and troops acquired a wealth of first hand knowledge and confidence in the employment and capabilities of close air support. At the same time aviation commanders, pilots and forward air controllers were gaining invaluable experience in identification of friendly and enemy ground forces, target location and identification and close air support techniques.

Throughout the period the Division conducted a continuing program of development of tactics and techniques for landing forces embarked in transport submarines.

During the period the Wing continued its carrier qualification program despite limited carrier availability.

One VMR squadron of Marine Air Group 25 received invaluable training in transpacific

[REDACTED] air operations through being attached to the Pacific Division of MATS for about one year. This duty was concluded in December, 1949.

Throughout April, May and June the staffs of the Division and Wing were engaged in preliminary planning for MAJEX '50 with the naval commanders and staffs involved.

3. Training activities of the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.

While detailed information concerning the training activities of 2d Marine Division (which also reorganized under the "K" Tables on 1 October), and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing is not available, it is known that they conducted the following significant amphibious exercises:

Operation CANID at Little Creek, Virginia. An amphibious demonstration bearing some similarity to DEMON III.

Battalion level cold weather amphibious exercises at Argentia, Newfoundland.

One Marine Aircraft Group was embarked aboard a carrier in the Mediterranean for approximately 6 months.

2d Division and 2d Wing conducted an amphibious assault exercise (Operation CROSSOVER) at Camp Lejeune in the spring of 1950.

Elements of the 2d Wing participated in Operation PORTREX, an Army-Navy amphibious exercise in the Caribbean and in Operation SWARMER, an Army-Air Force airborne exercise in North Carolina.

[REDACTED] Elements of the Division and Wing participated in May, 1950, in the Marine Corps Schools annual Amphibious Command Post Exercise conducted at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

One reinforced battalion was maintained on station in the Mediterranean (with rotation every four (4) months and had frequent opportunity for amphibious exercises.

As in the case of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific units, there was a continuing sequence of smaller ground, air and air-ground exercises.

4. Marine Corps Posts and Stations.

a. Posts and Stations conducted annual weapons qualification firing and that individual military training required annually by Marine Corps General Order No. 10. This training is intended to maintain and extend the basic military proficiency of Marines not serving with the Fleet Marine Force, and places particular emphasis on familiarity with weapons as well as on practical rifle marksmanship.

b. Of significance is the fact that a high proportion of the troops at the various posts and stations had reported to that duty from a tour in the Fleet Marine Force, as a part of the Commandant of the Marine Corps' rotation policy.

5. Organized Marine Corps Reserve.

a. The Organized Marine Corps Reserve units were fortunate in possessing considerable cadres of Marine veterans of World War II. They further had attracted large numbers of young men of high potential combat effectiveness and imbued them with traditional Marine Corps esprit.

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b. The Reserve training program was vigorous and well planned, both in armory and summer active duty training. Of particular interest was the fact that Reserve air and ground units conducted their summer active duty training under the guidance of similar type Fleet Marine Force units. The latter units either 'adopted' the Reserve unit and supervised its training or provided it with officer and enlisted instructors and advisors. In some cases, Tables of Organization deficiencies in Reserve units were filled by Marines from Fleet Marine Force units.

c. The rapid post-war achievement of near Table of Organization strength by reserve units in conjunction with their cadre of veterans enabled many of them to progress beyond basic training into advanced individual and unit training. A number of those units who completed active duty training in June and July, 1950, could accurately be classified as "nearly combat-ready" upon outbreak of the Korean crisis.


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The foregoing paragraphs depict the practical backdrop against which all of the succeeding efforts were projected. The effect of these pre-Korean preparations on operations of the Fleet Marine Force in the field will be evident in the sections to follow.



PART II

ACTIVATION AND EMBARKATION OF THE 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE
BRIGADE (REINFORCED)

1. General
 2. Events leading to activation of the Brigade
 3. Organization and Embarkation of the Brigade
 4. Arrival of the Brigade in Far East Command
 5. Significant matters related to the Brigade occurring during this period
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PART II

ACTIVATION AND EMBARKATION OF THE 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE
BRIGADE (REINFORCED)

1. General.

The onset of fighting in Korea on 25 June, 1950, found the existing elements of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific prepared to fulfill whatever role they might be called upon to play in the conflict. As a result of the preceding year's comprehensive training program, all units were in an exceptionally high state of training and materiel readiness for combat. The fact that the Division, Wing and Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, were undergoing their annual personnel turnover period, with a number of key command and staff positions involved, was the single factor tending to lower the combat effectiveness of the units concerned. (See Appendices 2 and 4 for the organization and strength of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing on 30 June, 1950).

As soon as Eighth Army troops from Japan and Naval forces Far East elements were committed to combat in Korea, there was a general conviction in the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, that Marines would soon be called upon to perform their traditional expeditionary role in support of national policy. As a result, there was an instinctive move throughout all elements of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to conclude the final preparations for combat.

(Footnotes cited in text are consolidated in Appendix 16)

2. Events leading to activation of the Brigade.

On 1 July, 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations queried Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet as to how soon a reinforced battalion or reinforced regiment from the 1st Marine Division could be ready to embark for duty in Far East Command (1). Following consultation with the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, replied on the same day that either of the units mentioned were available immediately and could sail within six (6) days (battalion) and ten (10) days (regiment). In anticipation of orders to come, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, sent a warning order to Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, to be prepared to embark a reinforced regiment for combat duty in the Far East Command (2).

Orders to move were received the following day, 2 July, 1950, when the Chief of Naval Operations directed Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to prepare a reinforced regiment with supporting air for immediate embarkation (3).

Details of organization, equipment, embarkation, movement and resupply of the task force were quickly arranged by Pacific Fleet and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Commanders and Staffs. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, immediately prepared Operation Plan 2-50, dated 5 July, 1950, covering task organization, mission and instructions covering embarkation, equipment and supplies. The plan was carried to Camp Pendleton by officer courier and was preceded by a dispatch brief (6). Previous information on the final ground and air

[REDACTED]
elements to comprise the task organization had been forwarded by dispatch (4)(5). (See Appendix 6 for organization and strength of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force (Reinforced)).

Pending approval of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, designated the RCT-MAG task force as the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force (Reinforced), on 5 July (7), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved this designation on the same day (8). The ground elements were thereafter entitled "1st Provisional Marine Brigade" and the air elements "Marine Aircraft Group 33 (Reinforced)" which title was later changed to "Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing". Brigadier General E. A. CRAIG, USMC., the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division was designated Commanding General of the Reinforced Brigade and Brigadier General T. J. CUSHMAN, USMC., the Deputy Commander, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, as Deputy Brigade Commander, and Commanding General, Marine Aircraft Group 33 (Reinforced).

3. Organization and embarkation of the Brigade.

1st Marine Division General Order No. 9, dated 6 July, 1950, formally activated the Brigade on the 7th of July. Based on the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, warning order of the 2d of July, both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had commenced planning and had made preliminary arrangements with the appropriate local Navy and Marine

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commands for the organization, equipment and embarkation of both ground and air elements. This prior planning resulted in swift action as soon as the Brigade came into being.

Personnel to fill shortages began arriving from Marine Barracks, Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, and from West Coast posts and stations on the 7th of July, while supplies began to move into Camp Pendleton, El Toro and the staging areas at San Diego and Seal Beach. (Marine Corps Supply Depot, Camp Joseph H. Pendleton; Naval Ammunition Depot, Fallbrook; Naval Supply Depot, Long Beach; Naval Ammunition Depot, Port Chicago and Barstow Annex, DOS, San Francisco, were the principal sources of supply). Embarkation plans were complete and loading began on 9 July, 1950, as soon as the first ships were available.

Upon announcement of the task organization, immediate efforts were initiated by the Brigade and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to rectify the outstanding weakness which existed in the peace Table of Organization Infantry Battalion. It will be recalled that the battalion included only two (2) rifle companies, each comprising two (2) rifle platoons. It is revealing to note at this point that the peace strength Marine battalion included twenty-seven (27) officers and five hundred forty-three (543) enlisted Marines as opposed to a war strength of forty-one (41) officers and one thousand forty (1040) enlisted Marines. A request from Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade for personnel to

[REDACTED]

form three (3) rifle companies of three (3) platoons each was initially disapproved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. However, on the 5th, the Commandant subsequently authorized the formation of the third rifle platoon in the existing companies.

Organization of the Brigade and bringing its components to authorized strength was seriously affected -- and its combat efficiency lowered -- by a directive from the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 3 July, 1950, requiring that all Sergeants and below whose enlistments were to expire before 28 February, 1951, be transferred from the Brigade. This action involved several hundred valuable men and was saved from being a crippling blow only by the availability of other well-trained men in the Division and Wing and by the excellent quality of the Marines ordered to the Brigade from Camp Pendleton and West Coast posts and stations. (The Commandant of the Marine Corps had authorized Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (who was also Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Camp Joseph H. Pendleton) to transfer personnel from the Marine Barracks to the Brigade as necessary (10).

Meanwhile embarkation was proceeding smoothly. To permit Brigade elements to conduct final training of newly joined personnel the Division and Wing supervised the embarkation and provided necessary working parties. The first ships, two LSDs sailed on 12 July, exactly ten days after receipt of the first warning. Loading was completed and all remaining troops embarked on the 13th. Final embarkation was

[REDACTED]

witnessed by Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The convoy sailed on the 14th. Generals Craig and Cushman and principal staff members departed that day by air for Tokyo to report to Commander-in-Chief, Far East and to initiate planning for employment of the Brigade.

The shipping available was not adequate to load all of the Brigade's organic vehicles. As a result, about 200 assorted pieces of transportation were left behind. This shortage of vehicles was later to be seriously felt during operations in Korea. The problem was met in part by the assignment of United States Army vehicles and by the capture of North Korean vehicles.

4. Arrival of Brigade in Far East Command.

At the beginning of July it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to disembark the Brigade at Kobe, Japan, and to retain it in that area temporarily, since it was his tentative plan to employ the Brigade in an amphibious assault in the enemys' rear as soon as the position of the Eighth Army could be stabilized. However, the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Pusan bridgehead in late July made it imperative that the Brigade be committed in that area at once. Accordingly, the ground elements of the Brigade sailed directly to Pusan, arriving and beginning unloading on 2 August. Air elements debarked at Kobe and proceeded to

[REDACTED]
Itami airfield where VMF-214 and VMF-323, embarked in CVEs SICILY and BADOENG STRAIT, began active operations on 30 July, 1950.

On 7 August, 1950, the ground and air elements of the Brigade were ordered to attack to the westward to seize Chinju in order to relieve the pressure by North Korean forces on the diminishing Pusan beachhead. The twenty mile advance made by the 1st Marine Brigade in this operation was the first successful counterattack by American troops since the commencement of hostilities. Later the Brigade twice played a vital role in the defense of Pusan by counter-attacking enemy forces which had crossed the Naktong River and in a hard fought action decisively defeated two North Korean Divisions.

5. Significant matters related to the Brigade occurring during this period.

a. Activities of Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific:

On 7 July, 1950, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and principal staff members departed by air for Tokyo to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on the employment of the Brigade. Problems relating to the organization, embarkation and employment of a full division and wing were discussed in anticipation of the possibility that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might order such Marine units to the Far East Command.

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The Commanding General returned to his Headquarters at Pearl on the 11th and departed for Camp Pendleton the same day to confer with Commandant of the Marine Corps, Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and to witness the embarkation of Brigade troops. He returned to Headquarters at Pearl on the 14th.

b. 1st Provisional Casual Company and 1st Supply Regulating Detachment:

It was early apparent that certain Service Command type units would be needed in Japan to support the Brigade. Accordingly, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 18 July, 1950, initiated recommendations to activate a Provisional Casual Company and a Supply Regulating Detachment. (11) These recommendations were approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commander Naval Forces, Far East.

As a result, the 1st Supply Regulating Detachment was formed on 25 July, 1950, from the 1st Combat Service Group at Camp Pendleton (12). The Detachment Commanding Officer and advance party departed immediately by air for Kobe, which port had been designated as the destination for Marine Corps material. The Detachment was directed to control the unloading, storage and reloading of Marine Corps resupply.

The 1st Provisional Casual Company was activated on 9 August, 1950, from 1st Marine Divisional personnel. (13).

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The Commanding Officer and advance party departed immediately by air for Japan. The Casual Company was initially to be located at the United States Fleet Activity, Yokosuka, in order to utilize billeting space available there, receive administrative and logistic support from the Marine Barracks, as well as to be near the hospitals in the area. (The Casual Company was later moved to Camp Otsu, Japan, due to overcrowding at Yokosuka and to the excellent training facilities at Otsu -- a former Army Regimental Combat Team camp).

The Casual Company was directed to receive, administer and train, as necessary, all Marine Corps casualties or drafts proceeding to or coming from Japan and Korea and to maintain liaison with all hospitals treating Marines.

c. Replacement Drafts.

The early commitment of the Brigade and the heavy casualties it suffered induced a critical replacement problem. When the Brigade was activated, Commandant of the Marine Corps immediately began organizing a replacement draft (1st Replacement Draft) of approximately eight hundred (800) officers and enlisted at the Marine Barracks, Treasure Island. This draft was scheduled to arrive in the Far East by 1 September (14). The personnel involved, however, were absorbed into the 1st Marine Division when it was ordered to organize at war strength.

A subsequent replacement draft (also designated 1st Replacement Draft) of over three thousand (3000) officers

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and men was later ordered formed at Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton. Personnel assigned to or intended for this draft were also soon absorbed into the Division or 7th Marines (Reinforced).

To meet the replacement requirements of the Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 3 August, 1950, directed the 1st Division to send ten (10) officers and two hundred ninety (290) enlisted replacements to the Brigade via airlift assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Far East. The draft was directed to be ready for movement from the Camp Pendleton airfield by MATS planes on 9 August. MATS failed to pick up the draft however, and not until 14 August was it finally moved to San Francisco by rail and thence to Japan by air.

On 22 August, 1950, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, issued a warning order to Marine Barracks, U. S. Naval Base, Pearl Harbor; Marine Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu; Marine Barracks, U. S. Naval Operating Base, Guam; Marine Barracks, Yokosuka and Headquarters and Service Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, to prepare to provide a total of ten (10) officers and three hundred (300) enlisted replacements ready for airlift to Japan by 25 August. These troops were to be replaced by a like number of "non-combat-ready" Reserve officers and men airlifted from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Troops, Camp Pendleton. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet directed Commander Western Sea Frontier to provide the necessary air transportation. The movement was ordered executed on 23 August and proceeded smoothly (15).

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On 2 September, 1950, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, again directed Marine Barracks, U. S. Naval Base, Pearl Harbor; Marine Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu; Naval Air Station, Barber's Point; Marine Barracks, U. S. Naval Operating Base, Guam; Marine Barracks, Yokosuka; Marine Detachment, Naval Air Station, Sangley Point and Marine Detachment, Naval Station, Subic Bay, to provide a total of ten (10) officers and three hundred (300) enlisted replacements to be airlifted to Japan upon arrival of like numbers of "non-combat-ready" reserves from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Troops, Camp Pendleton. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Troops was directed to have the Reserves ready for airlift on 5 September. He was further directed to have ten (10) officers and two hundred ninety (290) enlisted replacements ready for airlift to Japan by 15 September, 1950. Commander Western Sea Frontier again provided air transportation (16).

PART III

REORGANIZATION AND EMBARKATION OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION
(REINFORCED) (LESS 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE AND 7TH
MARINES (REINFORCED))

1. General.
2. Expansion of the Division to War Strength.
3. Equipment and Embarkation.

PART III

REORGANIZATION AND EMBARKATION OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION
(REINFORCED) (LESS 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE AND 7TH
MARINES (REINFORCED))

1. General.

The activation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on 7 July, 1950, had stripped the Division of its principal operating elements and left it with a strength of only 3,386 officers and enlisted. Elements remaining in the Division, all greatly understrength, included the Division Headquarters Battalion (less detachments), the Headquarters and Service Battery of the 11th Marines (less detachments), the 1st Combat Service Group (less detachments) and the Headquarters and Service Companies of the various battalions of Division Troops (all less detachments).

Although the division now possessed little effective combat strength, it nevertheless included most of the headquarters units which are vital to rapid expansion. These trained units, indoctrinated with Division and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific operating principles, and familiar with local conditions and experienced in working with other Marine and Navy commands in the area, were a major factor in the subsequent expansion and embarkation of the Division.

2. Expansion of the Division to War Strength.

On 12 July, 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations warned Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, that the 1st Marine Division would probably be expanded to full peace

[REDACTED]

strength, including the ground elements of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) (18). (See Appendix 3 for organization and strength of a full peace strength Marine division). Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, promptly directed the Division to extend the work day and work week, intensify training and make preparations to expand (19).

At the same time, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, advised the Commandant of the Marine Corps concerning the composition of cadres desired to facilitate rapid activation and expansion of 1st Division units (20) (21). These requests were based upon the premise that only limited numbers of troops could be spared from the 2d Marine Division due to the existing situation. Concurrently, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, prepared and forwarded to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, a detailed list of personnel requirements necessary to accomplish the expansion (22). In conjunction with the foregoing personnel planning, preliminary steps for equipping the new units were undertaken. The 1st Division set about preparing the necessary requisitions and Marine Corps supply installations had been alerted as to the nature of the demands to be made upon them.

On 22 July, 1950, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed that plans be initiated to form and embark on 10 August, 1950, the units and personnel necessary to bring the ground and air elements of the 1st Provisional Marine

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brigade (Reinforced) to war strength. (23). Planning was immediately begun by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 1st Division and Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for the organization, equipment, training and embarkation of the augmentation detail.

On 25 July, 1950, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, by dispatch, directed that initial preparations be made to bring the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) to full war strength, (including the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and less one reinforced regiment). The Division was to be prepared to embark during the period 10-15 August, 1950, for duty in the Far East Command (24). (This warning was confirmed by Chief of Naval Operations directive, which also confirmed the augmentation for the Brigade and further directed that one VMF Squadron and one-half (1/2) VMF(N) Squadron from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be embarked for duty with MAG-33 (25). A detailed directive on the expansion of the Division was simultaneously sent to the Division and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, by courier. (26). Thereupon the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and a staff party departed Pearl Harbor for Camp Pendleton on the night of the 25th to confer with the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division and with representatives of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

It subsequently developed that the personnel required to bring the Division to its prescribed strength were to come from four sources:

[REDACTED]

(a) 2d Marine Division troops. On 25 July, 1950, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, to transfer certain 2d Marine Division units to the Division. These units, when redesignated, would form the basis of the new 1st Marine Division units.

(b) Organized and Reserve units. On 19 July, 1950, Commandant of the Marine Corps initiated action to begin mobilizing Organized Marine Corps Reserve ground units.

(c) Posts and Stations. The Commandant of the Marine Corps ordered Marines from one hundred five (105) continental United States posts and stations to the 1st Marine Division.

(d) The 1st Replacement Draft. This unit, about 900 strong, had been activated at Marine Barracks, Treasure Island, to provide replacements for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

As a result of the planning efforts of all staffs concerned, the 1st Marine Division issued its General Order No. 10, on 26 July, 1950, setting forth the detailed plan for bringing the Division to strength. Concurrent with planning for the reception of personnel and activation of new units, plans were made and directives issued covering the equipment and training of the new units and the embarkation of the Division.

[REDACTED]

Marines from posts and stations began to arrive almost immediately, and by 4 August, 1950, approximately one hundred thirty (130) officers and three thousand five hundred (3,500) enlisted men had reported to the Division. These men were rapidly absorbed in the new Division units and the Brigade augmentation.

Organized Reserve units began arriving on 31 July, and by 7 August, approximately ten thousand (10,000) men had reported to Camp Pendleton. The Division screened each service record for combat-readiness, rank and MOS qualification, and by 8 August, had absorbed the impressive total of ninety-one (91) officers and two thousand eight hundred (2,800) enlisted Reserves, who thereafter were viewed in all respects as simply Marines.

Troop Trains bringing organized units with their equipment from the 2d Marine Division began arriving on 3 August, 1950. The movement was completed by 6 August, 1950. During this ninety-six (96) hour period, four hundred thirty-one (431) Marine Officers, and six thousand four hundred (6,400) Marine Enlisted and sixty-seven (67) Navy Officers and two hundred eighty-four (284) Navy Enlisted entered the post. (See Appendix 15 for the 2d Marine Division units involved and their subsequent 1st Marine Division designation). In fact, since receipt of the Commandant of the Marine Corps' directive, the Division had joined over thirteen thousand (13,000) officers and men, over nine thousand (9,000) of

[REDACTED]

whom joined during the period 1-5 August. The receipt, classification and assignment of these men in such a brief period of time constituted a phenomenal administrative accomplishment.

The Division had put a seven day work week into effect as soon as its expansion started and soon its units were working around the clock. As rapidly as units were activated they set forth on the previously prepared programs for organization, equipment, training and embarkation. While staffs were engaged in accomplishing details relative to equipping and preparing to embark, units at the company and platoon level were busy conducting the maximum practicable amount of training.

While the Division was engaged in expansion in compliance with the original directive from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a further directive was received to activate the 7th Marines (Reinforced) and embark it not later than 1 September. (27). (The activation of the 7th Marines is covered in Part V). Accordingly the Division transferred approximately 1,000 officers and men to the Division Rear Echelon as a cadre upon which to build that unit as soon as the Division proper had departed Camp Pendleton. Unfortunately, this valuable source of personnel was soon seriously reduced by a requirement to provide men to form the Training and Replacement Regiment, Marine Barracks, Camp Joseph H. Pendleton.

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3. Equipment and Embarkation.

Concurrent with the arrival of personnel from posts and stations throughout the Marine Corps, it was necessary to consider the problems involved in equipment and resupply of a Marine Division at war strength. The question of individual equipment was of no great moment initially as it transferred with the men. Then too, those units arriving from the Second Division carried certain items of organic equipment. These items were left in the railroad cars after personnel had debarked at Camp Pendleton, and were taken directly to San Diego and designated staging areas where it was unloaded, segregated and remarked for shipment. This procedure, while momentarily taking equipment and supplies from control of the various organizations, did eliminate the necessity for off-loading and reloading at Camp Pendleton and resulted in a considerable saving of time. As additional equipment was received for these units it was forwarded directly to San Diego and placed with the equipment already there.

In an attempt to reduce embarkation time to a minimum, heavy equipment was staged and loaded at the Naval Station, while ammunition was loaded at North Island, and the remaining gear and troops embarked through the Recruit Depot and Navy Piers.

The supply of certain items of ordnance equipment, as well as motor transport, food, etc., did present a very real problem. Most of the heavy equipment was in "moth balls"

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at the Supply Depot, Annex, Barstow, California, and was rapidly reconditioned, only through extraordinarily well coordinated efforts by that activity, for use in the field. A group of some five hundred (500) civilians were employed to assist in this tremendous undertaking and a representative was dispatched from Headquarters Marine Corps to assist in coordinating activities of the Depot of Supplies in San Francisco, the Annex at Barstow, and the Quartermaster General in Washington. As equipment was made ready for service at the Depot some was shipped to San Diego on flat cars while some items of motor transport were driven over the road, both for expediency and as a road test to determine the adequacy of the reconditioning.

With the assembling of all items of initial supply, the problem was by no means answered. Inasmuch as the 1st Marine Division would be operating under Army control, it was necessary to fix the policy upon which the unit would receive its resupply. It was concluded that the procedure adopted for the Brigade would also be used in connection with the Division. By this scheme, the Army would furnish all of those items which are not peculiar to the Marine Corps. The latter would be provided automatically in three (3) increments, making a total of one hundred twenty (120) days resupply. After that point, supply was to be requisitioned as needed. (28 (29)).

~~REDACTED~~ there was no service command as such, the G-4 Section of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, was required to assume the responsibilities of preparing and submitting resupply requisitions for all items peculiar to the Marine Corps for all Fleet Marine Force units in the Far East. (30). This proved to be a considerable task, as will be seen from the fact that despite the composition of the G-4 Section as a planning and not an operating agency, a total of eighty-two (82) requisitions were prepared and submitted. (31).

The embarkation of both personnel and equipment was rendered more difficult by the necessity for employing several commercial ships. While the general characteristics of these vessels were well known, no one was familiar with modifications that might have been made for their use in a commercial capacity. Then too, the scarcity of stevedores, winch operators in particular, for loading commercial ships further complicated the loading process. In many cases, Division personnel were waiting on the docks with their material for shipping to come. To provide manpower for accelerating loading operations, personnel were obtained from the Marine Corps Recruit Depot and Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton. An around-the-clock loading schedule was instituted and the first cargo ships sailed on 10 August, 1950, in accordance with the initial instructions from the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The first APA was loaded and sailed on 14 August, 1950, while loading was completed 21 August, 1950 and the last ship sailed some three (3) days



later. Throughout the loading period maximum use was made of both commercial and Navy motor transport in order to minimize the requirement for the already over burdened transportation of both 1st and 2d Division units.

As embarkation appeared to be progressing in a satisfactory manner, the first echelon of the Division Staff was air lifted to Japan in order to make plans to receive the Division at that end. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Embarkation Officer remained and assisted throughout the entire embarkation period.

PART IV

ORGANIZATION AND EMBARKATION OF 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
(LESS MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-33 (REINFORCED)).

1. General.
2. Organization of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Less Marine Aircraft Group-33 (Reinforced)).
3. Expansion of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to War Strength.
4. Embarkation.

~~SECRET~~

PART IV

ORGANIZATION AND EMBARKATION OF 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
(LESS MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-33 (REINFORCED))

1. General

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units remaining at the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro (Santa Ana), California, were partially stripped to bring Marine Aircraft Group-33 (Reinforced) up to strength prior to its departure with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

To assist in bringing the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units remaining at El Toro and those units in Marine Aircraft Group-33 up to war strength, personnel from various reserve squadrons were detached from their parent squadron and ordered to El Toro. In each case, the squadron designation remaining at the home station.

2. Organization of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (less Marine Aircraft Group-33 (Reinforced))

The units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing remaining at El Toro after the departure of Marine Aircraft Group-33 were as follows:

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Headquarters Squadron-1 (-Forward Echelon)

Marine Wing Service Squadron-1

Marine Training Squadron-2

Marine Air Control Group-2

Group Headquarters, Marine Tactical Air
Control Squadron-2

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-3

Marine Aircraft Group-12

[REDACTED]

Headquarters Squadron-12

Service Squadron-12

Marine Fighter Squadron-311

Marine Fighter Squadron-312

Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron-513 (-Forward Echelon).

Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron-542

Marine Aircraft Group-25 (Provisional)

Headquarters

Marine Transport Squadron-152 (-Forward Echelon)

Marine Transport Squadron-352

3. Expansion of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to War Strength.

The Chief of Naval Operations on 29 July, 1950, ordered the activation of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-3 and Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-2 at the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro (32). These units were activated on 3 August, 1950.

During the period 1-7 August, 1950, the personnel from Marine Reserve Fighter Squadrons-111, -123, -141, -213, -221, -241 and Marine Reserve Ground Control Intercept Squadrons -16, -18, -22 were mobilized and transferred to the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro. The personnel from the Reserve Fighter Squadrons were initially assigned to Marine Training Squadron-2, while personnel from the Reserve Ground Control Intercept Squadrons were assigned to Marine Air Control Group-2.

[REDACTED]

On 12 August, 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered Marine Aircraft Group-15 to Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro (33). Marine Aircraft Group -15 was to comprise Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron-15, Service Squadron-15, and Marine Fighter Squadron-212. Their arrival dates at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, were 19 August, 1950, for the flight echelon and 20 August, 1950 for the surface echelon.

On 4 August, 1950, the Commanding General, Marine Air Reserve Training, directed the Marine Air Detachments at Naval Air Stations, Atlanta, Willow Grove, Grosse Isle and Anacostia, to mobilize the personnel of their Ground Control Intercept Squadrons on 21 August, 1950, for transfer to Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, not later than 31 August, 1950. (34)(35). These units included Ground Control Intercept Squadrons-15, -17, -19 and -24.

4. Embarkation.

Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the need for rapid transportation of personnel and equipment across the Pacific became acute. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, on 7 July, 1950, requested that ten (10) Marine R5D planes be made available to assist in the airlift of urgently needed personnel and equipment to the Far East (36). At this time, however, most Marine R5D aircraft were being utilized to airlift Marine Air Reserve Squadrons to Marine Corps Air

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Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, so it was not until 10 July, 1950, that the Commandant of the Marine Corps was able to release the ten (10) R5D planes for duty in the Pacific (37). The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on 13 July, 1950, directed the Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to comply with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet request that the ten (10) R5D be based at Naval Air Station, Barber's Point, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii (38)(39) and a detachment of Marine Transport Squadron-152 began operating in the airlift to the Far East from Barber's Point on 15 July, 1950. On 26 July, 1950, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, ordered the remaining five (5) R5D planes of Marine Transport Squadron-152 to Barber's Point (46).

On 21 July, 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that all available Navy and Marine Corps R5D aircraft operating in continental limits of the United States operate in the trans-Pacific airlift as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (47). Marine Transport Squadron-352, on 26 July, 1950, was directed to operate in the trans-Pacific airlift between Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California and Barber's Point while continuing to base at El Toro. The Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, notified the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific that Marine Transport Squadron-352

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would begin operating one (1) R5D per day commencing on 27 July, 1950, increasing to two (2) R5D per day beginning 30 July, 1950. (48)(49).

On 2 August, 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Marine Fighter Squadron-312 and the Rear Echelon of Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron-513 prepare to embark during the period 10-15 August, 1950. (50). These units departed on or about 31 August, 1950, in the CVE USS SITKOH BAY, arriving in Japan on or about 15 September, 1950.

To provide additional Marine aircraft in the theater of operations, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered Headquarters Squadron, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Aircraft Group-12 and augmentation personnel for Marine Aircraft Group-33 to the Far East. They were embarked and departed by surface transportation on or about 1 September, 1950, arriving in Japan on or about 15 September, 1950. Marine Aircraft Group-12 comprised Headquarters Squadron-12, Service Squadron-12, Marine Fighter Squadron-212 and Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron-542. Approximately sixty (60) percent of the Naval Aviators in the augmentation unit were Reserve personnel.

Three fighter squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group-12-VMF 212, VMF 312 and VMF (N) 542 began operations from Kimpo airfield immediately after it was secured by ground elements of the 1st Marine Division. These squadrons were attached to Marine Aircraft Group-33 whose carrier borne squadrons were in turn transferred to Marine Aircraft Group-12.

[REDACTED]

PART V

ACTIVATION AND EMBARKATION OF THE 7TH MARINES
(REINFORCED)

1. General.
2. Activation and Composition.
3. Embarkation.

PART V

ACTIVATION AND EMBARKATION OF THE 7TH MARINES (REINFORCED)

1. General.

On 10 August, 1950, a representative from the G-1 Section, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, delivered orders to Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, directing the activation of the 7th Marines (Reinforced)(52).

On the evening of 12 August, 1950, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and members of his staff departed for the West Coast for the purpose of witnessing the embarkation of the 1st Marine Division as well as discussing with the Commandant of the Marine Corps the numerous problems involved in activating the 7th Marines (Reinf).

2. Activation and Composition.

The 7th Marines (Reinforced) was activated at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton on 17 August, 1950, with Colonel Homer L. LITZENBERG, USMC., designated as Commanding Officer. (51)
The unit included the following:

7th Marines (Less 3rd Battalion) (Including normal ANGLICO detachments)
3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
Company "D", 1st Tank Battalion
Company "D", 1st Engineer Battalion
Company "C", 1st Shore Party Battalion (Including two (2) Shore Party Communication Teams from Signal Company, Signal Battalion).

[REDACTED]

Company "D", 1st Motor Transport Battalion
Company "E", 1st Medical Battalion

Basically, the personnel for the 7th Marines were provided by the 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The 6th Marines, at peace strength, and less two battalions, was transferred from Camp Lejeune and arrived at Camp Pendleton on 16 August, 1950, thereafter to form the nucleus of the 7th Marines. To bring the regiment up to strength, augmentation was provided from regular Marine Corps personnel, from Security Forces within the continental limits of the United States and personnel from organized Reserve units that had been mobilized at Camp Pendleton. Only those Reserve personnel who met the standards prescribed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as far as being "combat ready" were utilized in bringing these units up to strength.

As the build-up was taking place at Camp Pendleton, the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, then stationed in the Mediterranean, was ordered to proceed through the Suez Canal to Japan (53). On arrival in Yokosuka, Japan, this battalion was redesignated as the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, and integrated into the 1st Marine Division. Augmentation personnel to bring the battalion up to war strength were included with the 7th Marines when that unit departed the United States.

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3. Embarkation.

On 17 August, 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the 7th Marines to embark for the Far East not later than 3 September, 1950 for duty (54). Shipping was arranged for by Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, through Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and embarkation was completed on 1 September, 1950 -- two (2) days in advance of the established deadline. The embarkation of the 7th Marines was greatly expedited through the efforts of the Embarkation Officer, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific who prepared the bulk of the embarkation plans while the regimental staff was involved in the multitudinous problems of activation and equipping the various units of the combat team.

With the departure of the 7th Marines, the last remaining 1st Marine Division unit, from Camp Pendleton, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and members of his staff departed on 18 August, 1950 for the Far East for conferences with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, as well as with senior Army and Navy commands.

PART VI

ACTIVATION OF FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC TROOPS, CAMP
JOSEPH H. PENDLETON

1. General.
2. Activation.

PART VI

ACTIVATION OF FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC TROOPS, CAMP JOSEPH
H. PENDLETON

1. General.

In compliance with directives from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the following Fleet Marine Force, Pacific units were to be organized at Camp Pendleton:

- 7th Engineer Battalion, FMF.
- 1st 155mm Gun Battalion, FMF.
- 7th Tank Battalion, FMF.
- 1st Floating Bridge Company, FMF.
- 1st Fixed Bridge Company, FMF.
- Company "D", 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF.
- 1st Signal Operations Company, FMF.
- 1st 4.5" Rocket Battalion, FMF (-Battery "C").
- 1st AAA-AW Battalion, FMF.
- 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company, FMF.
- 1st Evacuation Hospital, FMF.
- Headquarters Company, FMFPacific Troops.

Colonel B. H. KIRK, USMC., Commanding Officer of the Division Rear Echelon, was also designated as Representative of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and assumed the responsibility for activating these units and bringing them to a combat ready condition.

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2. Activation.


It was originally anticipated that some two hundred (200) regular officers and one thousand (1,000) enlisted, mostly regulars, would be left in the Rear Echelon as cadre troops for the 7th Marines (Reinforced) and other Force Troops. The numbers finally left were considerably less than those indicated above due to the numerous demands on the 1st Division for personnel. Marine Barracks required fifty (50) officers and three hundred fifty (350) enlisted for the Training Battalions of the Training and Replacement Regiment and one (1) three hundred man (300) replacement draft for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade came out of this meager number.

Along with the influx of reserve personnel into Camp Pendleton, the salvage, sorting and disposition of excess equipment left behind by the Division became increasingly complex. This function, together with preparations for activation and training of Force Troops grew into a problem of considerable magnitude. It was therefore decided by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to increase his representation at Camp Pendleton by sending his Deputy Commander, Brigadier General I. W. MILLER, USMC., to the mainland as Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Representative, Camp Pendleton, to exercise command of all Force Troops in that area.

[REDACTED]

Reserve personnel reported to Camp Pendleton in various states of readiness for combat and it was therefore necessary to segregate those units requiring further training. Personnel were classed as "combat-ready" or "non-combat ready" based on required standards of training and either further trained in the Training and Replacement Command or assigned to combat units at that time (56). The fact that approximately fifty (50) percent of Reserve personnel met the "combat ready" standards did much to contribute to the combat efficiency of the Division.

On 14 August, 1950, Major General A. H. NOBLE, USMC., Commanding General, Camp Pendleton, reported as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Representative, Camp Pendleton (additional duty) in order to release the Deputy Commander for duty with Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. This move was necessitated from realization that a permanent representative would be required at Camp Pendleton to coordinate the activities of the Force Troops remaining in that area. Due to the technical skills required, and the over-riding demands levied by the several replacement drafts, the growth of Force Troops was a slow process. By mid-November they still averaged no more than thirty (30) percent strength, which fact, coupled with the urgency of the Korean situation induced the Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct that these units be brought to full combat strength regardless of the MOS carried by the personnel assigned.



PART VII

ACTIVITIES OF THE SECURITY FORCES.

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC



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PART VII
SECURITY FORCES

Immediately preceding the beginning of the Korean conflict, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, had under its administrative control eight (8) Security Force units, located as follows: Naval Base, Pearl Harbor; Naval Air Station, Barber's Point, Oahu; Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu; Naval Operating Base, Kwajalein; Guam, M.I.; Sangley Point, R. P.; Subic Bay, R. P.; and Yokosuka, Japan. These units were under the operational control of the various naval commands where stationed and had as a primary mission the security of those stations. An additional function of Marine Barracks, Kwajalein and Marine Barracks, Guam was the provision of NCO's for the training of native constabularies on Majuro, Ponape, Truk, Saipan and Koror (Under the High Commissioner, Trust Territories, Pacific).


The authorized personnel strength of the Security Force units on 25 June, 1950, was two thousand eighty (2080) and the actual strength was one thousand nine hundred thirty-nine (1939). The normal summer transfers of officer personnel were taking place as was the normal rotation of enlisted personnel in accordance with established policy.

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, all Security Force units assumed a greatly increased workload resulting from requirements for additional security. With a few exceptions this necessitated a running guard and the consequent curtailment of training programs.


When approximately six hundred (600) regular Marines were transferred from Security Force units to the 1st Marine Division and were replaced by "non-combat-ready" Marine Reserves, the need for a greatly accelerated training program was indicated. Consequently, a training plan was promulgated by this Headquarters which directed Security Force units to insure that all officers received training equivalent to the course of instruction in the Basic School and all enlisted personnel received training equivalent to that received in Recruit Training (36).

As early as May of 1950 the presence of large numbers of subversive elements in the Philippines necessitated an increase in the personnel ceiling of the two Marine units located in that area by a total of sixty-five (65) enlisted Marines (58). A further increase of one hundred eleven (111) enlisted was requested by Commander Naval Forces, Philippines to meet his increased security requirements after the outbreak of hostilities (59). Personnel were not available at that time so the request was held in abeyance (60). In lieu of the requested Marine personnel, Insular police and qualified civilians were used to augment the guard detachment and placed under operational control of Marine Barracks personnel.

On 3 July, 1950, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved a new table of organization for Marine Barracks, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, which was occasioned by an altera


tion in the mission of that unit. This mission, as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, included the additional duty of functioning as an anti-aircraft artillery-automatic weapons battalion. The necessary specialist personnel to accomplish this new mission were ordered by the Commandant of the Marine Corps direct to Marine Barracks, Yokosuka. This increased the strength by approximately one hundred (100) men.

Due to the increased security requirements, a Marine Detachment was established at the U. S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Japan, on 11 August, 1950. As in the case of other security forces, personnel for this detachment were selected from "non-combat-ready" personnel who could be trained for combat duty while serving with the security forces.

PART VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Operations and Training.
 - a. General.
 - b. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific unit training.
 - c. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, ground combined arms training and air-ground training.
 - d. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific - Naval forces combined training.
2. Logistics.
3. Personnel Administration.
4. Posts and Stations.
5. Organized Marine Corps Reserve.

PART VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CONCLUSIONS RELATIVE TO OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

a. General

(1) Despite the absence of mobilization plans covering a situation similar to the one encountered, the fact that all requirements and deadlines established by the Theater Commander were met, demonstrates factually the ability of the Marine Corps to provide air-ground expeditionary forces of amphibiously trained troops under emergency conditions, by the employment of procedures which are accepted as standard within the Marine Corps.

(2) The successful organization, equipment and embarkation of the units involved indicates the overall soundness of the command structure of Fleet Marine Force units, the command relations existing between Fleet Marine Force, Pacific elements and appropriate elements of the Pacific Fleet and with the Marine Corps Supporting Establishment.

(3) The brilliant combat performance of the units involved attests to a general excellence in the doctrines, tactics and techniques, training methods, equipment and organization employed by the Fleet Marine Force.

b. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific unit training.

(1) The ground units that so decisively defeated the enemy at Inchon comprised largely a hasty amalgamation of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and Fleet Marine Force,

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Atlantic units, augmented with Organized Reserve and Security Forces personnel, and embarked for combat after an exceedingly brief period of training. Their subsequent success in action appears to validate the tactical doctrines and techniques of the ground combat arms and services. The homogeneity of the Marine Corps moreover, insured that these doctrines were held and understood throughout the Corps, largely through the medium of instruction at the Marine Corps Schools coordinated with practical application in the Fleet Marine Force. Pains-taking adherence to this practice made it possible for units to be assembled from widely diverse sources and committed to combat with confidence, although they had participated in far less than the optimum amount of unit training. Despite the fact that in many cases units were not able to exercise in the many coordinate details which must be perfected to insure effective combat performance, there was nevertheless a justifiable assurance that all hands knew what to do and how to do it because of a uniform Marine Corps program of instruction and training.

(2) A further justifiable conclusion of major significance relates to the fundamental Marine Corps conviction that unit training must develop and emphasize leadership in junior officers and in non-commissioned officers. It is unquestionable that even the most competent commanders and staffs in the higher echelons could not have accomplished the detailed planning and supervision of the multitude of

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tasks involved in the rapid organization, equipment, training and embarkation of the forces involved. The basic high level plans and principal high level directives were made effective only through the medium of a group of aggressive subordinate leaders, possessing a common background of training and experience, and conditioned in the habitual exhibition of initiative and leadership. Furthermore, every Marine was imbued with the determination and will to win, a most important factor in a military organization.

(3) The intensity, diversity and realism of the pre-Korean unit training conducted in the 1st Marine Division was a major factor in the combat success of the Brigade and later the Division. During this training there was a continued insistence on realistic operations under combat conditions for both combat and service units. For combat units, frequent live firing training problems were a requirement. Exercises emphasizing camouflage and concealment, fortification, maintenance, logistic support and local security of all installations against enemy patrols or partisan forces were required of all units.

(4) The carrier qualification program of the Wing, although hampered by lack of carrier availability, resulted in a combat performance of inestimable value. Two Marine fighter squadrons, operating from CVEs close off the south coast of Korea, were able to provide superior close air support to the Brigade and other elements of the Eighth U. S. Army at a time when all shore based aircraft were forced to operate from Japan.

[REDACTED]

(5) The Inchon Operation was a timely demonstration of the value of field training in advanced base operations as practiced by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Marine Aircraft Group 33 which, in the latter half of May, had participated in an extended advanced base problem in Southern California, was operating from Kimpo airfield in Korea under actual advanced base conditions in the latter half of September.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Marine Corps must continue unremittingly to indoctrinate all officers and men, through frequent schooling and Fleet Marine Force duty, in the tactical doctrines and techniques which motivate operations of the Marine air and ground combat arms and their related services. This is a primary requisite to the successful emergency mobilization of an expeditionary force which is adequately trained for amphibious and other operations.

2. The development of initiative, professional competence and leadership in junior officers and in non-commissioned officers must continue to be a fundamental element in all training programs. The success or failure of combat operations is dependent largely upon the quality, confidence and resourcefulness of junior leaders. Their importance is magnified under emergency conditions when detailed instructions from -- or supervision by -- higher echelons will in many cases be lacking.

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It is in such instances that the esprit de corps with which Marines are inculcated throughout their service becomes such an important factor. It should be continuously borne in mind during training periods.

3. Fleet Marine Force unit training programs must be based upon an assumption that expeditionary duty involving combat is imminent. Training must be as realistic as peacetime safety and budgetary considerations permit. Field training should be stressed. It should cover extended periods, include operations in adverse weather and terrain conditions and must repeatedly introduce situations taxing the capabilities of units and individuals.

4. Fleet Marine Force aviation training programs must insure that all close support squadrons conduct a maximum of practical training with Fleet Marine Force ground elements, and that they are at all times carrier qualified.

c. Conclusions related to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ground combined arms training and air-ground training.

(1) The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced), a peace strength unit of regular Marines was invariably able to impose its will upon a numerically superior and battle experienced enemy under conditions favoring the enemy's tactics, technique, equipment and armament. In each of three (3) decisive actions the Brigade completely routed the enemy. This remarkable combat achievement of the ground and air elements of the Brigade was in large part due to the skillful full exploitation and use of the maximum capabilities of the

[REDACTED]

supporting arms and services. That this potential was fully realized may be attributed to the effective combined exercise of the various ground arms and services with supporting air.

(2) The influence of this training was likewise apparent in the successful conduct of the difficult Inchon-Seoul campaign by the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (Although the Division had been built to war strength with 2d Marine Division, Organized Reserves and Posts and Stations personnel its command structure was still predominantly that of the pre-Korean 1st Division. The Wing, of course, was essentially unchanged. The combat performance of 2d Marine Division personnel and units indicates that their training policies and programs were similar to those of the 1st Division).

(3) Marine operations in Korea justify the conclusions that if doctrines, techniques, organization, equipment and unit training are sound, intensive combined training is the catalyst required to produce a successful team in combat. Where an effective training team can become the combat team, as was true in the case of the air and ground elements of the 1st Brigade, operations in combat can be conducted with a maximum of efficiency. Likewise, where separate training teams must be merged into one combat formation, as in the case of the 1st Division, the result will still produce an effective combat team if the component elements have had the benefit of realistic and thorough team training.

[REDACTED]

In substantiation of this conclusion it is significant to note that in the six (6) months period prior to 25 June, 1950, that both of the Divisions and Wings had conducted frequent combined arms and air-ground exercises on the reinforced battalion, reinforced regiment and division level. In the case of the Brigade it is particularly noteworthy that in mid-May, 1950, the ground element of the Brigade, the 5th Marines (Reinforced), and the air elements, MAG 33 (Reinf), had both participated in a three (3) day amphibious-land combined field exercise, over mountainous terrain and culminating in a live firing phase. (See paragraph 2, Part I). A salient feature of the exercise was the stress it placed upon close air support in order that it might demonstrate to the ground forces the impressive capabilities of close air support and provide intensive close air support training to the air elements involved.

(4) A final, and manifest, conclusion related to combined training appears to be that to produce superior air-ground expeditionary forces under emergency conditions, the Marine Corps must, in peacetime, maintain combined arms and services ground forces of division size and air wings of proper composition. Ground and air forces must be located in proximity to each other and train together. The requisite elements of the combined air-ground team must be present in sufficient numbers to conduct remunerative training, and there must be constant air-ground association and operations.

[REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Fleet Marine Force continue to include ground forces of the combined arms and services of division size.
2. That the Fleet Marine Force continue to include supporting air elements of Wing size and of proper composition.
3. That the ground and air elements be located in proximity to each other and be under a common Marine Corps superior.
4. That the ground and air training programs stress realistic and varied field exercises of extended duration for the air-infantry-tank-artillery-supporting services team at battalion, regiment and division level.
5. That both ground and air elements foster and develop the close association of air and ground staffs and officers and a philosophy of mutual approach to the problems confronting Marine Forces in amphibious or ground combat.

d. Conclusions relating to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific - Naval Forces Combined Training and Operation.

The amphibious assault at Inchon provides a clear illustration of the necessity for trained amphibious forces in being. The operation itself presented seemingly insurmountable technical obstacles; information of the hydrography, terrain and enemy was incomplete, the planning time available was far less than the generally accepted minimum for an operation of such scope and complexity, and the naval and landing forces involved were hurriedly assembled from all over the world. That the operation succeeded brilliantly may be attributed mainly to the following:

[REDACTED]

(1) The soundness of the doctrines and techniques established by various Navy Department amphibious publications.

(2) The presence of significant numbers of officers and men of all ranks who were experienced in the preparation for and conduct of amphibious operations.

(3) The planning for and conduct of the operation by staffs and individual commanders who had worked together before. In this connection the presence of an Amphibious Force at San Diego and a Landing Force (1st Marine Division) and Tactical Air Command (1st Marine Aircraft Wing) in the same area established a most valuable close personal and operational association among the principal and subordinate commanders and staffs involved.

As a result of the foregoing, when Phib Group One, the 1st Marine Division, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were confronted with the complex Inchon task no time was lost in establishing staff relationships and in attacking the problem. Common doctrine, training and SOP's solved many routine problems without the necessity for lengthy planning or orders and provided a point of departure for the attack of the more difficult problems, while still enabling subordinate commanders to proceed intelligently in the absence of instructions. In the execution of the embarkation and assault, the same essential background enabled commanders and staffs of all echelons to solve unforeseen problems quickly, as well as to correct planning errors or omissions arising from inadequate or incorrect planning information.

[REDACTED]

Had the corresponding commanders and staffs at all levels of the attack force and landing force not been thoroughly experienced in amphibious operations, it is manifest that the operation could not have been launched on the target date.

Likewise, apparent is the fact that inclusion of amphibious training in the Organized Marine Corps Reserve training program was particularly beneficial. Some of the same Reserve units incorporated into the Division had actually embarked at San Diego in Amphibious Group One ships and conducted assault landings at Camp Pendleton during their summer training.

The presence in Pearl Harbor of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, during the critical planning period was fortuitous. At this time the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet benefitted materially from a close and continuing association with Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Major decisions relative to employment of Fleet Marine Force units and the ships involved in their transportation were made rapidly and effectively -- largely because of the relationship described above.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That all of the essential elements of a Naval Attack Force be maintained at effective strength in time of peace.
2. That the components of these forces be located in a single general area.

[REDACTED]

3. That they conduct frequent amphibious planning problems and landing exercises.

4. That Organized Marine Corps Reserve units continue to receive amphibious training.

5. That Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, be retained in close proximity to that of the Pacific Fleet.

2. CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO LOGISTICS.

(a) The maintenance of Fleet Marine Force organizational equipment in a "ready-to-go" status, and the similar maintenance of their supplies by local Marine and Naval Supply Depots was a determining factor in enabling the Brigade, Division and Wing to meet the established sailing dates. As of 30 June, 1950, the materiel readiness for combat of the Division was 98.3% and the Wing 95.6%.

(b) The maintenance of up to date UP&T Tables, ship's characteristics and other essential embarkation data by all Fleet Marine Force units proved to be of great importance in the rapid preparation of embarkation plans for overseas movement.

(c) The ability of Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to assume the burden of preparing automatic re-supply requisitions relieved the logistics and supply sections of the 1st Division staff of a task they could not have undertaken at the time, and facilitated the work of supply agencies in assembling and preparing the supplies for embarkation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Marine Corps continue its present practice of maintaining organization equipment and expeditionary supplies in a "ready-to-go" status.

3. CONCLUSIONS RELATIVE TO PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

(a) The order of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the effect that sergeants and below with less than eight (8) months to serve were not to be embarked with ground or air elements of the Brigade had an adverse effect on its combat efficiency. On the eve of combat this order transferred from the Brigade several hundred men who had just completed a vigorous training program. Happily, the Brigade's misfortune was the good fortune of units to come later, since the men left behind by the Brigade proved to be excellent cadre or augmentation personnel for other units.

(b) Personnel administration within the Division was complicated by the inability of Headquarters, Marine Barracks, Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, effectively to receive, process and transfer the large numbers of Reserves that poured into the post in July and August. Division facilities were also taxed with the burden of absorbing the 2d Marine Division units and receiving, classifying and assigning the Marines reporting from Posts and Stations.

As a result of the above factors personnel mis-assignment was common and many personnel records were lost.

[REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That only those men with a very short time (one to two months) to serve in their current enlistment be transferred from an expeditionary force prior to embarkation.

2. That major training posts, such as Camp Pendleton, maintain an up-to-date plan to cover all aspects of personnel reception, classification, equipment, billeting and assignment in a rapid mobilization situation.

3. That thoroughly tested indoctrination and training plans be maintained at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune for processing incoming personnel in periods of emergency.

4. CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO POSTS AND STATIONS.

(a) The officers and men from Posts and Stations received by the Division or sent to the Brigade as replacements were of uniformly high quality. Commanders concerned commented upon the professional excellence of these men and the readiness with which they fitted into combat units.

(b) The requirements of Marine Corps General Order No. 10 and those relative to small arms marksmanship insured that the basic military skills of the Marines assigned were maintained while they performed routine security duties. Previous tours of Fleet Marine Force duty qualified them to fill quickly and competently responsible billets in Brigade and Division Units.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the policies of Marine Corps General Order Number 10 be adhered to and vigorously pursued by all non-

[REDACTED]
Fleet Marine Force units.


2. That the program of formal small arms marksmanship continue to be emphasized in all its aspects.

5. CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO THE ORGANIZED MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The organization and embarkation of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and the subsequent organization of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Troops units were dependent upon the existence of a vigorous and well trained Reserve. Such a Marine Corps Reserve organization is the means by which the Corps can meet emergency expeditionary requirements as peacetime economy measures reduce the strength of the Fleet Marine Force. Based on that fact the following conclusions appear pertinent:

(a) The Marine Corps Reserve must maintain a high state of unit and individual combat readiness. This requires inclusion of significant numbers of men with prior service in the Marine Corps, in either peace or war, in Reserve units and the prosecution of training programs which stress the fundamentals of combat employment.

(b) The conduct of summer active duty training under the supervision, or with the assistance of, similar type Fleet Marine Force ground and air units not only materially raises the state of training but immeasurably facilitates the integration of reserve personnel into Fleet Marine Force units. In this emergency, Reserve personnel were familiar with the Fleet Marine Force unit organization, equipment and Standing Operating Procedures. Fleet Marine Force units, in turn,



were familiar with the state of training and abilities of Reserve personnel. Close personal relationships had frequently been established between Reserve and Regular personnel during the summer training period. In many cases it was possible to immediately assign a "combat ready" Reserve to a T/O billet based upon a knowledge that he was capable of fulfilling it without further training.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Marine Corps continue its policy of maintaining a strong Organized Reserve.
2. That Reserve recruiting policy endeavor to recruit the maximum number of former Marines living in the community
3. That the Reserve training program stress those items which are essential to preparing both the individual and unit for their combat roles.
4. That Reserve summer training continue to be conducted with Fleet Marine Force units of like type.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
25 JUNE - 15 SEPTEMBER 1950

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>EVENT</u> |
|-------------|---|
| June 25 | Outbreak of Korean conflict. |
| July 2 | Fleet Marine Force, Pacific issued warning order to 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to prepare to organize and embark a reinforced regiment with supporting air for combat duty in Korea |
| July 2 | Directive from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to organize and embark a Regimental Combat Team and a Marine Aircraft Group for duty in the Far East Command. |
| July 4 | Directive from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific to 1st Marine Division and Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to activate, embark and sail 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced). |
| July 4 | Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, designated Marine Aircraft Group 33 (Reinforced) as the air element of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinf). |
| July 7. | 1st Marine Division activated 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (5th Marines (Reinforced)). |
| July 7 | Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, departed for Far East Command to confer with Commander-in-Chief, Far East and Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. |

- [REDACTED]
- July 11 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, returned to Pearl Harbor from Far East Command.
- July 11 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, departed for Camp Pendleton and El Toro to confer with Commandant of the Marine Corps, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.
- July 12 Initial elements of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade departed San Diego, California, for Far East Command. (Remainder sailed 14 July).
- July 12 Warning Order from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising that 1st Marine Division might be expanded to full peace strength.
- July 13 Directive from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific to transfer a ten (10) plane detachment of VMR-152 immediately to Naval Air Station, Barber's Point, Oahu, T. H., for duty under Commander, Fleet Logistical Aircraft Wing, Pacific, in Trans-Pacific airlift. (Remaining five (5) planes of squadron were ordered to Barber's Point on 27 July).
- July 14 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, returned to Pearl Harbor from Camp Pendleton.
- July 14 Warning Order from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to 1st Marine Division to prepare to expand to peace strength T/O (including 1st Provisional Marine Brigade).

- [REDACTED]
- July 14 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, advised Commandant of the Marine Corps on cadre requirements to expand 1st Marine Division to peace strength.
- July 25 Directive from Commandant of the Marine Corps to 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) to make preparations to organize at war strength, less one (1) Regimental Combat Team, and to embark during period 10-15 August, 1950 for duty in Far East Command.
- July 25 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, departed for Camp Joseph H. Pendleton and El Toro to confer with representatives of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division and Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
- July 27 Directive from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific to have VLR-352 report for duty with Commander, Fleet Logistical Air Wing, Pacific in Trans-Pacific airlift; squadron to remain based at El Toro.
- July 28 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, returned to Pearl Harbor from Camp Joseph H. Pendleton.
- July 29 Directive from Chief of Naval Operations to activate Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-3 and Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-2 at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro and assign to Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

- [REDACTED]
- July 30 Marine Fighter Squadrons 214 and 323 began operation off CVE's SICILY and BADOENG STRAIT respectively.
- July 31 Organized Reserve units began arriving Camp Joseph H. Pendleton. "Combat Ready" reserves transferred to 1st Marine Division as necessary to fill vacancies.
- August 1 Organized Reserve units began arriving at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro. "Combat Ready" reserves transferred to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as necessary to fill vacancies.
- August 2 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived Pusan, Korea.
- August 2 Directive from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to organize and embark the following units for duty in Far East Command: 1st Marine Division (Reinforced)(less 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and one (1) Regimental Combat Team); one (1) Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF-312) and one-half (1/2) Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron (VMF-513(N)); augmentation personnel to bring ground and air elements of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to war strength.
- August 4 Directive from Commandant of the Marine Corps to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to activate 7th Marines (Reinforced) and certain Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Troops units.

- [REDACTED]
- August 7 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) launched air-ground attack toward Chinju, Korea.
- August 12 Directive from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to transfer Marine Aircraft Group 15. (-) from Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic to Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to arrive El Toro by 20 August.
- August 12 Commandant of the Marine Corps directed Reserve squadrons VMF-232 and VMF-235 mobilized as units at home base on 18 September for movement to El Toro on 25 September. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific assigned squadrons to Marine Aircraft Group 15 upon arrival.
- August 12 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and members of staff departed for Camp Pendleton to confer with Commandant of the Marine Corps and witness troop embarkation of 1st Marine Division.
- August 14 First elements of 1st Marine Division departed San Diego, California, for duty in Far East Command. Loading of all ships was completed on 21 August, 1950.
- August 15 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, returned to Pearl Harbor from Camp Pendleton.
- August 17 7th Marines (Reinforced)(-) activated.
- August 20 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific departed Pearl Harbor for Far East Command to confer with Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

[REDACTED]

August 25 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, returned to Pearl Harbor from Far East Command.

August 28 First elements of 1st Marine Division (Reinforced)(-) arrive Kobe, Japan. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade relieved from duty with Eighth Army.

Sep 1 7th Marines (Reinforced)(-) departed San Diego.

Sep 1 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-) departed San Diego.

Sep 7 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, departed Pearl Harbor for Far East Command to join Commander-in-Chief, Far East for movement to Inchon Landing.

Sep 8 Air elements VMF-312 and VMF(N)-513 arrive Kobe. (Ground elements arrived 29 August).

Sep 11 3d Battalion (Reinforced), 6th Marines arrived Kobe, from the Mediterranean and was redesignated 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced).

Sep 12 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sailed from Pusan.

Sep 13 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) disbanded and elements returned to Division and Wing.

Sep 14 First elements 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-) arrived Kobe, Japan.


Sep 15 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing launched amphibious assault at Inchon.

- 
- Sep 15 7th Marines (Reinforced)(-) arrived Kobe, Japan.
- Sep 15 Commander-in-Chief, Far East, confirmed tentative assignment of Camp Otsu for use by 1st Provisional Casual Company.
- Sep 17 7th Marines (Reinforced)(-) departed Kobe for Inchon.
- Sep 21 7th Marines (Reinforced)(-) arrived Inchon.

ACTIVATION OF FMFPAC UNITS

1 DEC 1950

| <u>UNIT</u> <u>FORMER DESIGNATION</u> | <u>ACTIVATED BY</u> | <u>REFERENCE</u> | <u>DATE</u> <u>EFFECTIVE</u> |
|---|---------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|
| <u>Co B, 1stMedBn</u> <u>Co A, 2dMedBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | GenOrd #10 | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co D, 1stMedBn</u> <u>Co B, 2dMedBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | GenOrd #10 | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co E, 1stMedBn</u> <u>Co C, 2dMedBn</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Co C, 1stMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 292151Z Jul | 29Jul50 |
| <u>Co D, 1stMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 292151Z Jul | 29Jul50 |
| <u>Co B, 1stSPBn</u> <u>Co B, 2dSPBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 060021Z Aug | 6Aug50 |
| <u>Co C, 1stSPBn</u> <u>Co A, 2dSPBn</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Co B, 1stEngrBn</u> <u>ServCo, 2dEngrBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 051821Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co C, 1stEngrBn</u> <u>Co A, 2dEngrBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 051821Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co D, 1stEngrBn</u> <u>Dets HqCo, ServCo & Co B,</u> <u>2dEngrBn</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Co B, 1stTkBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 010027Z Aug | 1Aug50 |
| <u>Co C, 1stTkBn</u> <u>Co A, 2dTkBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052249Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co D, 1stTkBn</u> <u>Dets HqCo, ServCo & Co B,</u> <u>2dTkBn</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |



| | | | |
|--|--------------|-------------|---------|
| <u>2dBn, 11thMar</u> 1stBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>HqBtry, 2dBn, 11thMar</u> HqBtry, 1stBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>ServBtry, 2dBn, 11thMar</u> ServBtry, 1stBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>Btry D, 2dBn, 11thMar</u> Btry A, 1stBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>Btry E, 2dBn, 11thMar</u> Btry B, 1stBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>Btry F, 2dBn, 11thMar</u> Btry C, 1stBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>3d Bn, 11thMar</u> 2dBn, 10thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>HqBtry, 3dBn, 11thMar</u> HqBtry, 2dBn, 10thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>ServBtry, 3dBn, 11thMar</u> ServBtry, 2dBn, 10thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar</u> Btry D, 2dBn, 10thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Btry H, 3dBn, 11thMar</u> Btry E, 2dBn, 10thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| Btry I, 3dBn, 11thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| <u>4thBn, 11thMar</u> 3d Bn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>HqBtry, 4thBn, 11thMar</u> HqBtry, 3dBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>ServBtry, 4thBn, 11thMar</u> ServBtry, 3dBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>Btry K, 4thBn, 11thMar</u> Btry G, 3dBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>Btry L, 4thBn, 11thMar</u> Btry H, 3dBn, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| Btry M, 4thBn, 11thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug | 4Aug50 |





1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
2dMar

H&SCo, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
H&SCo, 2dMar

4.2" MortCo, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 052017Z Aug 5Aug50
4.2" MortCo, 2dWpnsBn

AntitankCo, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 052017Z Aug 5Aug50
75mmRecoilGunCo, 2dWpnsBn

1stBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
1stBn, 2dMar

H&SCo, 1stBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
H&SCo, 1stBn, 2dMar

WpnsCo, 1stBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
WpnsCo, 1stBn, 2dMar

Co A, 1stBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
Co A, 1stBn, 2dMar

Co B, 1stBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
Co B, 1stBn, 2dMar

Co C, 1stBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 282331Z Jul 28Jul50

2dBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
2dBn, 2dMar

H&SCo, 2dBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
H&SCo, 2dBn, 2dMar


WpnsCo, 2dBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
Wpns Co, 2dBn, 2dMar

Co D, 2dBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
Co D, 2dBn, 2dMar

Co E, 2dBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
Co E, 2dBn, 2dMar

Co F, 2dBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 282331Z Jul 28Jul50

3dBn, 1stMar CG1stMarDiv 050033Z Aug 4Aug50
1stBn, 6thMar



| | | | |
|---|--------------|-------------|---------|
| <u>H&SCo, 3d Bn, 1stMar</u> <u>H&SCo, 1stBn, 6thMar</u> | CG1stMarDiv | 050033Z Aug | 4Aug 50 |
| <u>WpnsCo, 3dBn, 1stMar</u> <u>WpnsCo, 1stBn, 6thMar</u> | CG1stMarDiv | 050033Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>Co G, 3dBn, 1stMar</u> <u>Co A, 1stBn, 6thMar</u> | CG1stMarDiv | 050033Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>Co H, 3dBn, 1stMar</u> <u>Co B, 1stBn, 6thMar</u> | CG1stMarDiv | 050033Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| Co I, 3dBn, 1stMar | CG1stMarDiv | 282331Z Jul | 28Jul50 |
| <u>4.2" MortCo, 5thMar</u> <u>4.2" MortCo, 1stWpnsBn</u> | CG1stMarDiv | 060023Z Aug | 5Aug 50 |
| <u>antitank Co, 5thMar</u> <u>75mmRecoilGunCo, 1stWpnsBn</u> | CG1stMarDiv | 060023Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| Co C, 1stBn, 5thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 282331Z Jul | 28Jul50 |
| Co F, 2dBn, 5thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 282331Z Jul | 28Jul50 |
| Co I, 3dBn, 5thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 282331Z Jul | 28Jul50 |
| 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>H&SCo, 7thMar</u> <u>H&SCo, 6thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>4.2" MortCo, 7thMar</u> <u>4.2" MortPlat, 4.2" MortCo,</u> <u>2dWpnsBn</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| AntitankCo, 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| 1stBn, 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| H&SCo, 1stBn, 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| wpnsCo, 1stBn, 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| Co A, 1stBn, 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| Co C, 1stBn, 7thMar | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |


APPENDIX 15

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|--|--------------|----------------|---------|
| <u>2dBn, 7thMar</u> <u>2dBn, 6thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>H&SCo, 2dBn, 7thMar</u> <u>H&SCo, 2dBn, 6thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>WpnsCo, 2dBn, 7thMar</u> <u>WpnsCo, 2dBn, 6thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Co D, 2dBn, 7thMar</u> <u>Co D, 2dBn, 6thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Co E, 2dBn, 7thMar</u> <u>Co E, 2dBn, 6thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #2 | 17Aug50 |
| <u>Co F, 2dBn, 7thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| <u>3dBn, 7thMar</u> <u>3dBn, 6thMar</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 110226Z Sep | 11Sep50 |
| <u>H&SCo, 3dbn, 7thMar</u> <u>H&SCo, 3dbn, 6thMar</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 110226Z Sep | 11Sep50 |
| <u>WpnsCo, 3dbn, 7thMar</u> <u>WpnsCo, 3dbn, 6thMar</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 110226Z Sep | 11Sep50 |
| <u>Co G, 3dbn, 7thMar</u> <u>Co G, 3dbn, 6thMar</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 110226Z Sep | 11Sep50 |
| <u>Co H, 3dbn, 7thMar</u> <u>Co H, 3dbn, 6thMar</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 110226Z Sep | 11Sep50 |
| <u>Co I, 3dbn, 7thMar</u> | CGFMFPacTrps | GenOrd #1 | 14Aug50 |
| <u>1stAirDelPlat, SC, FMF</u> <u>(on west coast)</u> | CMC Ltrs: | 03C20550 Jul | 25Jul50 |
| <u>1stAirDelPlat, SC, FMF</u> <u>(on east coast)</u> | | & 03A21250 Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>7thMTBn, SC, FMF</u> <u>2dMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052015Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>H&SCo, 7thMTBn, SC, FMF</u> <u>H&SCo, 2dMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052015Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co A, 7thMTBn, SC, FMF</u> <u>Co A, 2dMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052015Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co B, 7thMTBn, SC, FMF</u> <u>Co B, 2dMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052015Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co C, 7thMTBn, SC, FMF</u> <u>AutoSupCo, 2dMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052015Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co D, 7thMTBn, SC, FMF</u> <u>AutoMaintCo, 2dMTBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052015Z Aug | 5Aug50 |

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| [REDACTED] | | | |
| 1stAmTrkBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) | 30Sep50 |
| H&SCo, 1stAmTrkBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) | 30Sep50 |
| 1stAmTrkCo, FMF | CGLstMarDiv | 050035Z Aug | 4Aug50 |
| <u>1stPlat, 1stAmTrkCo, FMF</u> <u>1stAmTrkPlat, FMF</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 060023Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>2dPlat, 1stAmTrkCo, FMF</u> <u>2dAmTrkPlat, FMF</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 060023Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co A, 1stAmTrkBn, FMF</u> <u>1stAmTrkCo, FMF</u> | CMC | 142056Z Aug | |
| 1stAmTracBn, FMF | CGLstMarDiv | 052323Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>H&SCo, 1stAmTracBn, FMF</u> <u>HqCo, 2dWpnsBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052017Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co A, 1stAmTracBn, FMF</u> <u>1stAmTracCo, FMF</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052323Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>Co B, 1stAmTracBn, FMF</u> <u>2dAmTracCo, FMF</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052323Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| Co C, 1stAmTracBn, FMF | CGLstMarDiv | 052323Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| Co D, 1stAmTracBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) | 30Sep50 |
| 1stArm'dAmphBn, FMF | CGLstMarDiv | 060019Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>HqCo, 1stArm'dAmphBn, FMF</u> <u>HqCo, 2dTrkBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052249Z Aug | 5 Aug50 |
| <u>ServCo, 1stArm'dAmphBn, FMF</u> <u>ServCo, 2dTrkBn</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052249Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| Co A, 1stArm'dAmphBn, FMF | CGLstMarDiv | 060019Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| <u>1stPlat, Co A, 1stArm'dAmph</u> <u>Bn, FMF</u> <u>LVT(A)Plat, 1stAmTracCo, FMF</u> | CGLstMarDiv | 052323Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| Co B, 1stArm'dAmphBn, FMF | CGLstMarDiv | 060019Z Aug | 5Aug50 |
| 1st 4.5" RktBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) | 30Sep50 |
| H&SCo, 1st4.5"RktBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) | 30Sep50 |



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| <u>Btry A, 1st 4.5" RktBn, FMF</u> 4.5" RktBtry, 11thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug 4Aug50 |
| Btry B, 1st 4.5" RktBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| <u>Btry C, 1st 4.5" RktBn, FMF</u> 4.5" RktBtry, 10thMar | CG1stMarDiv | 050031Z Aug 4Aug50 |
| 1st Fixed Bridge Co, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| 1st Floating Bridge Co, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| 1st Evacuation Hosp, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| 1st Explosive Ord Disp Co, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| 7th EngrBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 291610Z Sep(Conf) 29Sep50 |
| HqCo, 7th EngrBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 291610Z Sep(Conf) 29Sep50 |
| ServCo, 7th EngrBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 291610Z Sep(Conf) 29Sep50 |
| Co A, 7th EngrBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 291610Z Sep(Conf) 29Sep50 |
| Co B, 7th EngrBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 291610Z Sep(Conf) 29Sep50 |
| Co C, 7th EngrBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 291610Z Sep(Conf) 29Sep50 |
| Co D, 7th EngrBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 291610Z Sep(Conf) 29Sep50 |
| 7th TankBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| HqCo, 7th TkBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| ServCo, 7th TkBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Co A, 7th TkBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Co B, 7th TkBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Co C, 7th TkBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps | 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |





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| 1st 155mmGunBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| HqBtry, 1st 155mmGunBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| ServBtry, 1st 155mmGunBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Btry A, 1st 155mmGunBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Btry B, 1st 155mmGunBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Btry C, 1st 155mmGunBn, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |


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|------------------------------------|--|
| 1stAAA-AWbN (MOBILE), FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| H&SBtry, 1stAAA-AWbN, (MOBILE) FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Btry A, 1stAAA-AWbN (MOBILE), FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Btry B, 1stAAA-AWbN (MOBILE), FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Btry C, 1stAAA-AWbN (MOBILE), FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
| Btry D, 1stAAA-AWbN (MOBILE), FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |

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|-------------------|--|
| 1st SigOpnCo, FMF | CGFMFPacTrps 302054Z Sep(Conf) 30Sep50 |
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| 1stProvHistPlat, FMF | CMC Spdltr 1215192 Aug 2Aug50 |
| 1stProvCasCo, FMF | CGFMFPac GenOrd #81 9Aug50 |
| 1stSupRegDet, FMFPac | CGFMFPac Spdltr 4896 Jul 25Jul50 |
| HqCo, FMFPacTroops, CamPen | RepCGFMFPacCamPen GenOrd #3 1Sep50 |

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| MedRon 2, MACG-2, AirFMFPac | CGAirFMFPac 211620Z Sep 20Sep50 |
| MTACS 3, MACG-2, AirFMFPac | CGAirFMFPac 142309Z Sep 3Aug50 |
| MGCIS 2, MACG-2, AirFMFPac | CGAirFMFPac 142309Z Sep 3Aug50 |
| VMF 235, MAG 15, AirFMFPac | CGAirFMFPac 270010Z Sep 27Sep50 |





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| <u>VMF 311, MAG 15, AirFMFPac</u> <u>VMF 311, MAG 12</u> | CGAirFMFPac | 281822Z Aug | 28Aug50 |
| <u>MAG 15, AirFMFPac (to West Coast)</u> <u>MAG 15 (on East Coast)</u> | CGAirFMFLant | 181910Z Aug | 25Aug50 |
| Hedron 15 | CGAirFMFLant | 181910Z Aug | 25Aug50 |
| Servron 15 | CGAirFMFLant | 181910Z Aug | 25Aug50 |
| <u>VMF 212, MAG 12, 1stMAW</u> <u>(to West Coast)</u> <u>VMF 212, MAG 15 (on East Coast)</u> <u>Coast)</u> | CGAirFMFPac | 222311Z Aug | 19Aug50 |
| <u>VMF 212, MAG 33, 1stMAW</u> <u>VMF 212, MAG 12</u> | CG1stMAW | SpdLtr Ser 153a-50 of 20Sep50 | 21Sep50 |
| <u>VMF 312, MAG 33, 1stMAW</u> <u>VMF 312, MAG 12</u> | -do- | -do- | -do- |
| <u>VMF(N) 542, MAG 33, 1stMAW</u> <u>VMF(N) 542, MAG 12</u> | -do- | -do- | -do- |
| <u>VMF 214, MAG 12, 1stMAW</u> <u>VMF 214, MAG 33</u> | -do- | -do- | -do- |
| <u>VMF 323, MAG 12, 1stMAW</u> <u>VMF 323, MAG 33</u> | -do- | -do- | -do- |
| <u>VMF(N) 513, MAG 12, 1stMAW</u> <u>VMF(N) 513, MAG 33</u> | -do- | -do- | -do- |

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| <u>1stProvMarBrig, FMF (Reinf)</u> | <u>CG1stMarDiv</u> | <u>GenOrd #9</u> | <u>7Jul50</u> |
| <u>MarDet, USFltct, Casebo, Japan</u> | <u>CGFMFPac</u> | <u>GenOrd #83</u> | <u>11Aug50</u> |



APPENDIX 16.

LIST OF DISPATCHES AND ORDERS CITED

1. CNO dispatch to CinCPacFlt 011941Z July (TOP SECRET)
2. CG FMFPac dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 022240Z July (TOP SECRET)
3. CNO dispatch to CinCPacFlt 021621Z July (TOP SECRET)
4. CG FMFPac dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 050101Z July (RESTR)
5. CG AirFMFPac dispatch to CG FMFPac 050320Z July (SECRET)
6. CG FMFPac dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 052200Z July (RESTR)
7. CG FMFPac dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 050101Z July (RESTR)
8. CMC dispatch to CG FMFPac 051609Z July (SECRET)
9. CG 1stMarDiv dispatch to CG FMFPac 032125Z July (TOP SECRET)
10. CMC dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 031520Z July (SECRET)
11. CG FMFPac dispatch to ComNavFE 190110Z July (RESTR)
12. CG FMFPac speedletter to CG 1stMarDiv Serial 4896 dtd 25 July (RESTR)
13. FMFPac General Order No. 81 dtd 9 August 1950 (RESTR)
14. CMC speedletter to CG MarPac Serial MC-120866 dated 15 July, 1950.
15. CG FMFPac dispatch 240345Z August (SECRET)
16. CG FMFPac dispatch 030022Z August (SECRET)
17. CG FMFPac dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 150635Z July (SECRET)
18. CNO dispatch to CinCPacFlt 121912Z July (SECRET)
19. CG FMFPac dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 150635Z July (SECRET)
20. CG FMFPac dispatch to CMC 150440Z July (SECRET)
21. Ltr CG FMFPac to CMC Serial 0184-50 dated 16 July, 1950 (CONFIDENTIAL)
22. Ltr CG 1stMarDiv to CG FMFPac Serial 0154-50 dated 15 July, 1950 (CONFIDENTIAL)

- [REDACTED]
23. CMC dispatch to CG FMFPac 222010Z July (SECRET)
 24. CMC dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv 251439Z July (CONF)
 25. CNO dispatch to CinCPacFlt 021631Z (SECRET)
 26. CMC ltr to CG 1stMarDiv, CG FMFPac dtd 25 July, 1950.
(SECRET)
 27. FMFPac Operation Order No. 3-50 dated 11 August, 1950
(CONFIDENTIAL).
 28. CMC to CG FMFPac dispatch 142036Z July (CONFIDENTIAL)
 29. CG FMFPac dispatch to CG 1stMarDiv, AirFMFPac, 1stProv-
MarBrig 022022Z August (RESTRICTED)
 30. Notes on the CG's weekly conference (SECRET)
 31. FMFPac Historical Diary 1-31 August, 1950 (SECRET)
 32. CNO dispatch 291541Z of July (RESTR)
 33. CNO dispatch 121646Z of August (SECRET)
 34. CO MART dispatch 041856Z of August (PLAIN)
 35. CMC dispatch 032115Z of August (PLAIN)
 36. CinCPacFlt dispatch 070802Z of July (RESTR)
 37. CMC dispatch 102043Z of July (RESTR)
 38. CG FMFPac dispatch 130215Z of July (RESTR)
 39. CinCPacFlt dispatch 120901Z of July (RESTR)
 40. CG AirFMFPac dispatch 140030Z of July (RESTR)
 41. CG FMFPac dispatch 142135Z of July (RESTR)
 42. CinCPacFlt dispatch 152327Z of July (PLAIN)
 43. CG FMFPac dispatch 182135Z of July (RESTR)
 44. CG AirFMFPac dispatch 012343Z of August (RESTR)
 45. CG FMFPac dispatch 042320Z of August (RESTR)
 46. CinCPacFlt 262154 of July (RESTR)

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47. CNO dispatch 211421Z of July.
 48. CG FMFPac 270335Z of July (PLAIN)
 49. CG AirFMFPac 272330Z of July (RESTR)
 50. CNO Dispatch 021631Z of August (SECRET)
 51. HqRep, FMFPac, CJHP, Gen O # 2 dtd 17 Aug 50 (RESTR)
 52. FMFPac Operation Order 3-50 of 11 Aug 1950 (SECRET)
 53. CNO to CincNELM 102011Z August (SECRET)
 54. CNO dispatch to CINCPACFLT 162232Z August (SECRET)
 55. CG FMFPac ltr Serial 0197-50 dtd 1 Aug 50 (CONF)
 56. FMFPac Trng Bul 3-50 dtd 2 Sep 1950 (RESTR)
 57. CMC dispatch to CG, IB, Camp Pendleton 292059 Nov (RESTR)
 58. CNO dispatch to CG FMFPac 121830Z May 1950 (SECRET)
 59. ComNavPhib dispatch to CNO 280844Z June, 1950 (CONF)
 60. CNO dispatch to ComNavPhib 052130 July, 1950 (CONF)
