

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**SPECIAL ACTION REPORT INCHON-SEOUL
VOL III OF III FIRST MARINE DIVISION,
FMF [NOTE: FOLDER 2 OF 2]**

ANNEX ROGER ROGER - TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
7th Marines
1st Marine Division, FMF
In the Field, Masan, Korea
2 January 1951

From: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF
Subj: Special Action Report for period (17 August - 7 October 1950)
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION.

a. This is a report of the activities of the 7th Marines (Reinforced) from date of activation (17 August 1950) at Camp Pendleton to the conclusion of the Inchon-Seoul Campaign (7 October 1950).

b. The personnel came from four principal sources:

- (1) 1822 officers and men from 2d Marine Division who formed the nucleus of the various units.
- (2) 1972 officers and men of the Marine Corps Reserve.
- (3) 735 officers and men of 3d Battalion (Reinforced), 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division who were on duty in the Mediterranean and who joined the 7th Marines (Reinforced), at Kobe, Japan.
- (4) 1109 officers and men from the Rear Echelon, 1st Marine Division and Marine Corps Posts and Stations.

c. Missions assigned and accomplished were as follows:

(1) At Camp Pendleton
To organize, train, equip, and embark by 3 September, the 7th Marines (Reinforced). Mission completed and unit sailed from San Diego by 1 September.

(2) At Kobe, Japan
To assimilate 3d Battalion (Reinforced), 6th Marines, reload shipping as necessary, and sail for Inchon, Korea by 19 September. Mission completed and unit sailed 17 September, arriving 21 September.

(3) At Inchon, Korea
Between 22 and 25 September, various missions in connection with protection of north and west flanks of 1st Marine Division were assigned and were completed with several successful minor skirmishes.

(4) Northwest of Seoul
To attack on 26 September, the northern defense of Seoul on the left of the 1st Marine Division front. On 26-27 September the 7th Marines made a deep penetration eastward which outflanked the northern defenses of the city. Strong resistance was overcome on these two days. Mission completed 29 September when juncture was made with 1st Marines northeast of city, and the enemy's main escape route to the north was cut.

(5) Northeast of Seoul, 30 September, 1950

To capture Uijongbu and establish blocking positions on X Corps final phase line. Mission completed by 3 October after overcoming strong enemy rearguards.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: Period 17 August - 11 September 1950

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>NAME</u>
RCT-7 (Reinf)	4754	Col H. L. LITZENBERG JR
H&SCo 7th Marines	303	Major J. D. SMITH
4.2 Mortar Company	139	Major S. D. LOW
A-T Company	108	Capt D. M. MANFULL
1st Battalion, 7th Marines	1066	LtCol R. G. DAVIS
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines	1123	LtCol T. M. HINKLE
Augmentation group for 3dBn	515	Major W. MORRIS
Co "B" 1st Medical Battalion	107	Lt E. M. GROVER (USN)
Co "D" 1st Engineer Battalion	163	Capt B. C. TURNER
Co "D" 1st Tank Battalion	132	Capt L. T. CHASE
Co "C" 1st Shore Party Bn	196	Major J. C. BREEN
3d Battalion, 11th Marines	697	Major F. F. PARRY
Anglico Detachment	116	Capt D. HALLAMEYER
Co "D" 1st Motor Transport Bn	89	Capt WHITELOCK

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: Period 11 September - 21 September 1950

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>NAME</u>
RCT-7 (Reinf)	4641	Col H. L. LITZENBERG JR
H&SCo 7th Marines	303	Major J. D. SMITH
4.2 Mortar Company	139	Major S. D. LOW
A-T Company	108	Capt D. M. MANFULL
1st Battalion, 7th Marines	1066	LtCol R. G. DAVIS
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines	1123	LtCol T. M. HINKLE
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	1097	Major M. E. ROACH
Co "E" 1st Medical Battalion	107	Lt E. M. GROVER (USN)
Co "D" 1st Engineer Battalion	163	Capt B. C. TURNER
Co "D" 1st Tank Battalion	132	Capt L. T. CHASE
Co "C" 1st Shore Party Bn	196	Major F. F. PARRY
Anglico Detachment	116	Capt D. HALLAMEYER
Co "D" 1st Motor Transport Bn	89	Capt WHITELOCK

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: Period 3 October 1950

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>NAME</u>
7th Marines (Reinf)	4648	Col H. L. LITZENBERG JR
H&SCo 7th Marines	295	Capt N. L. SHIELDS
4.2 Mortar Company	139	Major S. D. LOW
A-T Company	106	1stLt E. R. DE LONG
1st Battalion, 7th Marines	969	LtCol R. G. DAVIS
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines	940	Major W. D. SAWYER
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	951	Major M. E. ROACH
Co "B" 1st Motor Transport Bn	89	Capt CAMP
Co "D" 1st Tank Battalion	132	Capt L. T. CHASE
Co "D" 1st Engineer Bn	163	Capt B. C. TURNER
Co "C" 5th KMC Battalion	167	Capt KIM
3rd Bn, 11th Marines	697	Major F. F. PARRY

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3. PLANNING

The Regimental Commanding Officer and key members of the 7th Marines Staff were flown from Camp Pendleton on 2 September, 1950 to Japan, arriving at ITAMI Airforce Base on 6 September, 1950.

During an interim stop at Pearl Harbor, T. H., the Regimental Commanding Officer and staff were given a briefing on the current Korean situation by members of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, staff at FIFPac Headquarters.

Upon arrival at ITAMI Airforce Base the group went to KOBE, Japan, to report to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. The Regiment Commander received verbal orders from the Commanding General on 6 September, 1950, to make plans for an administrative landing at INCHON, Korea, by 3 October, 1950. Further, the regiment was to become Division reserve on landing, and was to prepare for further operations ashore as directed.

Such plans as were necessary for the accomplishment of the assigned mission were made by the regimental staff at KOBE, Japan, during the period 6 September, 1950. The regimental plan was published as 7th Marines Operations plan 1-50.

4. TRAINING

The training period of the 7th Marines (Reinforced) consisted of a period of 15 days at Tent Camp #2, Camp Pendleton, California, extending from the date of activation on 17 August, 1950 to the embarkation on 1 September, 1950.

A training program (7th Marines (Reinforced) Training Order Number 1-50) was prepared and was executed by the regimental units simultaneously with the reception and equipping of troops. The training program in general included small unit tactics, firing of individual and crew served weapons and physical conditioning. Small unit tactics training consisted of practical work in the field from the fire team to company level. Firing of individual weapons included: (1) a course of 40 rounds per individual on the rifle range for all individuals who had fired previously the weapon with which armed, on either a familiarization or qualification course, and (2) a course of 250 rounds per individual for all individuals who had never fired the weapon with which armed on either a familiarization or qualification course. All crew served weapons were fired sufficiently to train coordinated gun crews. In addition each man threw at least two live hand grenades. Physical conditioning included morning calisthenics and conditioning hikes to and from training areas.

Though this training period was by no means sufficient to insure a high state of combat readiness within the regiment, it did provide the basic needs to weld a combat regiment from a group of both regular and reserve Marines whose individual training for the most part was good. The necessity of receiving and equipping of troops simultaneously with training increased many fold the problems of providing adequate training of the individual and the unit. Every available hour was devoted to training, and by the time the regiment embarked much had been accomplished toward increasing individual proficiency, and the combat efficiency of the regiment as a whole.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Period covered from the departure from San Diego, California, to Inchon, Korea landing.

On 22 August, 1950, Ship Embarkation Officers from Transportation Division 21 reported to Representative, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Camp Pendleton, and began embarkation planning with Regimental Embarkation Officer. The following ships were assigned for the lift:

- (1) USS BAYFIELD (APA-33)
- (2) USS THOMAS JEFFERSON (APA-30)
- (3) USS OKANOGAN (APA-220)
- (4) USS ALGOL (AKA-54)
- (5) USS WINSTON (AKA-94)
- (6) USS TITANIA (AKA-13)
- (7) USS CATAMOUNT (LSD-17)
- (8) USS COLONEAL (LSD-16)

On 23 August, 1950, Embarkation Officers from all units reported for planning. During the period 23 to 25 August, 1950, Loading Plans were completed. Due to the exceptionally large amount of equipment and supplies to be embarked, loading was, perforce "commercial" in almost every case except that of the USS BAYFIELD, which had a modified combat unit load; in the other ships, vehicles and certain organizational equipment were more easily accessible than other bulk loaded cargo.

On 25 August, 1950, staging of equipment and supplies commenced at Navy Pier and Naval Station, San Diego, California. Many difficulties were experienced during staging due to the shortage of cargo-carrying vehicles from Camp Pendleton to San

Diego. Civilian tractor trailers were used to augment Marine Corps and borrowed Navy vehicles. In using civilian trucks, additional delay was encountered due to the requirements for careful cargo manifesting and the desirability of sending only cargo of great bulk per unit weight via these carriers. From 25 to 27 August 1950, the USS JEFFERSON was loaded and sailed on 28 August, 1950. Other ships loaded ammunition at North Island. During the period 28 August to 2 September, 1950 all ships except USS TITANIA completed loading and sailed by 2000, 2 September, 1950.

On 4 September, 1950, the USS TITANIA sailed. The bulk of her cargo was destined for units other than RCT-7, and was slated for other ports of call. On 9 September, 1950, the Third Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced), arrived at Kobe, Japan, from the Mediterranean area in the USS MONTAGUE (APA-98), and USS BEXAR (APA-237), and unloading was commenced.

On 14 September, 1950, the USS THOMAS JEFFERSON, containing augmentation personnel and a complete issue of Class II for BLT 3/6 (subsequently redesignated 3/7), arrived and was unloaded to the extent necessary to permit the reorganization and re-equipping of that BLT.

From 14 to 17 September, 1950 the USS MONTAGUE and USS BEXAR were reloaded with a modified "combat unit load" for BLT 3/7 and other equipment and supplies as directed by Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

On 16 September, 1950 the USS JEFFERSON loaded elements of RCT-7, Division Administration Echelon, MAG-33, and the 205th U. S. Army Signal Repair Detachment. All ships assigned, except the USS TITANIA, arrived from United States with remainder of the major elements of RCT-7. From 17 to 21 September, 1950 ships were enroute from Kobe, Japan, to Inchon, Korea.

During the period 21 to 27 September, 1950, assigned shipping was completely unloaded, except the USS TITANIA which arrived at Inchon on 26 September, 1950 and commenced unloading. The Second and Third Battalions were landed by 1830, 21 September, 1950; the First Battalion furnished portions or all ship's platoons for several of the vessels. Unloading proceeded as rapidly as possible, under the circumstances, by lightering all equipment and supplies ashore by LST, LSU, and smaller amphibious craft. The LST's and LSU's could beach only at high tide, and the unloading points for the smaller craft were so crowded that great delays were encountered. Port facilities were so limited that the volume of traffic could not be expeditiously handled. As ships completed unloading the ships' platoons were landed and sent to their parent units.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA

All units of the 7th Marines (Reinforced), except the 3d Battalion were embarked at San Diego, California, in ships of Transport Division 21 and one additional ship the USS TITANIA (AKA-13). The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines which was to be redesignated the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was enroute to KOBE, Japan, from the Mediterranean via Suez.

Embarkation in Transport Division 21 was completed on 1 September, 1950, two days earlier than required by verbal orders of Representative, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. The vessels departed in pairs on completion of loading, the last two sailing at 2030 on 1 September. The TITANIA sailed on 5 September.

On 9 September, 1950, the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, embarked in the USS BEXAR (APA-237) and the USS MONTAGUE (APA-98), arrived at KOBE, Japan, and reported to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. 1st Marine Division General Order #15 dated 9 September, 1950, directed this battalion to report to the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines for duty.

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The 3d Battalion disembarked and moved to Camp SAKAI near OSAKA, Japan, for training, equipping, and building to war strength. The augmentation group and equipment for the 3d Battalion arrived in KOBE, on the USS THOMAS JEFFERSON (APA-30) on 12 September, 1950. The THOMAS JEFFERSON was unloaded and the personnel and equipment joined the 3d Battalion at Camp SAKAI.

The ships of Transport Division 21 arrived in KOBE on 16 September, 1950. Certain re-adjustments of cargo and troops were made on these ships. The 3d Battalion was reloaded on the DEKAR and MONTAGUE for the move to the objective area.

The 7th Marines (Reinforced) except for those elements in the TITANIA departed KOBE on 17 September on these ships. On 21 September, 1950, the units arrived at INCHON, Korea, two days earlier than required by verbal orders of Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

The movement from San Diego to INCHON was made without incident. The movement, including time spent at KOBE, Japan, required a total of 20 days from 1 September to 21 September, 1950. Training was conducted by all units while embarked.

7. OPERATIONS

On arrival at INCHON, Korea, the 7th Marines began debarking as directed by 1st Marine Division Operational Order 8-50 and verbal orders of Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, which designated assembly areas for the regiment. Debarking of personnel began at 211525I. All except 1st Battalion personnel, were landed on WOLMI-DO Island and INCHON by 212130I. The 1st Battalion remained aboard ship to furnish ships' platoon for unloading.

Upon landing, troops were shuttled by train and trucks to assigned assembly areas. The 2d Battalion, which began debarking first, was shuttled by truck to an assembly area on the high ground (TA 0660-0661) on the southwest side of the HAN River, a distance of nineteen miles northeast of INCHON. The 2d Battalion closed its assembly area by 212200I. Regimental M&S Company and the 3rd Battalion were shuttled by train and truck to an assembly area in the vicinity of the town of WCNJUNG-NI (TA 0655), fifteen miles northeast of INCHON. The regimental Command Post opened at 212100I in a school house in the town. These elements closed the assembly area by 220100I the following morning.

Unloading of supplies and equipment was begun immediately following debarking of troops. Unloading proceeded as rapidly as possible under the circumstances, by lightening of all equipment ashore with LST, LSU, and smaller amphibious craft. The largest of these could beach only at high tide. Unloading points for small craft were limited and port facilities were so inadequate that the volume of traffic could not be handled expeditiously.

As supplies of all classes except Class II organic equipment and supplies came ashore, they were turned over to the Engineer Special Brigade for sorting, storage, and final delivery to units indicated. Vehicles were sent to the units immediately on landing. The move ashore and unloading proceeded without unusual incident.

During the night two rounds of enemy artillery of undetermined size fell in the vicinity of the regimental Command Post. In the 2d Battalion area a few rounds of rifle fire were exchanged with infiltrating enemy.

The landing and movement into position placed the regiment (less the 1st Battalion) ashore in positions from which it could protect the Division left flank on the southwest side of the HAN River. Little organic supplies and equipment were ashore in the hands of the units the first day, and the necessity of commercial loading in the U. S. was to cause critical shortages of certain supplies within the next few days. These points, along with the fact that the 1st Battalion was furnishing ships' platoons, were to limit the ability of the regiment to accomplish normal combat assignments.

At 221015I, 22 September, 1950, the 7th Marines received a fragmentary order from the 1st Marine Division directing that the 2d Battalion be employed under the tactical control of the division in the assigned zone of the 3d Battalion, Korean Marine Corps Regiment. The mission assigned the 2d Battalion with the 3d Battalion, Korean Marine Corps Regiment attached, was to clear the town of KUMPO (TA 8866) of enemy troops reportedly there, and protect the division's left flank in that vicinity. In accordance with these orders the 2d Battalion began movement at 221030I to an assembly area in the CHON-DONG area (TA 0363) and at 221300I the 2d Battalion was initiating patrolling to its front and flanks in that area. The 3d Battalion, Korean Marine Corps Regiment was not contacted immediately since it was not in the area designated by the 1st Marine Division.

Headquarters of the 1st Battalion and its Weapons Company came ashore and rejoined the regiment at WONJANG-NI during the morning. At 221100I the regiment received another fragmentary order from 1st Marine Division directing that the regiment (less the 2d Battalion) move to the assembly area (TA 0660-0661) vacated earlier that day by the 2d Battalion. In addition, the regiment was to relieve elements of the 1st Marines on Hill 79 (TA 0960), outpost that hill, and be prepared to cross the HAN River on order. At 221130I the move on foot to the new assembly area was begun with the 3d Battalion leading. Loading elements of that battalion began entering the new assembly area at 221300I. At 221310I George Company, less one reinforced rifle platoon, began to move into position to outpost Hill 79. No elements of the 1st Marines were there to be relieved. A reinforced rifle platoon of that company moved into an outpost position on Hill 21 (TA 0563).

The regimental command post opened in the new assembly area in a position 300 yards north of the town of CHONG-GONG-NI (TA 0660) at 221500I. Rear elements including the elements of the 1st Battalion then ashore closed the new assembly area at 222100I that night. The 1st Marine Division directed that the regiment provide a detail of about platoon size to provide security at a bridging site on the HAN River eight miles to the southeast. The detail was to return to the regiment area the following morning at daylight. A detail of 35 men and 1 officer from the 3d Battalion left at 222230I to fulfill this mission.

Little organic supplies and equipment reached the regiment during the day because of the delays in unloading, necessity of segregating and sorting ashore, and the traffic difficulties encountered on the narrow, dusty roads.

No enemy contacts were made during the day. Reports from higher echelon indicated a general build up of enemy troops in the KUMPO area.

This day's move placed the regiment (less elements of the 1st Battalion still unloading ship) in position to protect the 1st Marine Division left flank south of the HAN, including division rear elements, KUMPO airfield, and the ferry crossing site.

At 231030I orders were received from 1st Marine Division directing the 7th Marines, less 2d Battalion, to cross HAN River in the vicinity of HAENG-JA (TA 0762), relieve elements of the 5th Marines, Reinforced, northwest of CHUNGSANMA (TA 1460), seize objectives 12, 11, and 10, prepare for further operations to seize objectives 9 and 8, and maintain contact with the 5th Marines (1st Marine Division Operation Order 9-50). The order further directed the 7th Marines to leave one battalion in the present assembly area (TA 0661) to cross the HAN on division order. The objectives listed in the order lay generally along a ridge line extending from the ferry crossing on the HAN river to the north of SEOUL. The objectives were located as follows: (1) objective 12 -- the ridge line (TA 0854-0865) northeast of the town of RYOKOKU (TA 0765); (2) Objective 11 -- Hill 88 (TA 1167); (3) Objective 10 -- Hill 236 (TA 1566); (4) Objective 9 -- ridge line (TA 1766-1767-1867); and (5) Objective 8 -- the palace (TA 2167).

At 231130I Regimental Headquarters and Service Company and the 3d Battalion began the shuttle by LVT across the HAN River at the ferry crossing site. The 3d Battalion moved into blocking positions on objective 12 with How Company on the left and Item Company on the right. George Company, in battalion reserve, went into a blocking position in the vicinity of Hill 36 near the town of SOJONG (TA 1064). Regimental Headquarters and Service Company followed the 3d Battalion in crossing and went into an assembly area in the vicinity of the town of SONMAJON (TA 1264) about three and one half miles east of the ferry crossing. The regimental command post opened at 231710I in that area. All units completed crossing and were in positions designated by 231830I. Patrol contact was established with the 5th Marines on the right at the 5th Marines command post in the town of KANJA-DONG (TA 1361).

The 1st Battalion, less elements still aboard ship, went into positions on Hill 131 (TA 0661) on the south side of the ferry crossing. As elements of the 1st Battalion completed their task of unloading ship, they were returned to the parent unit. By the end of this day about 50% of the 1st Battalion was ashore.

The 2d Battalion continued its mission of patrolling in its sector. Contact was established with the 3d Battalion Korean Marine Corps Regiment near the town of KUMPO (TA 9866). An investigation of the town of KUMPO was made as had been directed but no enemy troops were found. Early in the afternoon of this day the 2d Battalion received a report from an aerial observer that a column of eight enemy tanks had been sighted moving south along a road in (TA 9569). An air strike was called in on the column and artillery of the 3d Battalion, Korean Marine Corps Regiment was used. No definite results were recorded.

No intelligence data on the enemy known to be in the vicinity was gathered during the day because no actual enemy contacts were made.

Unloading and assembly of regimental supplies was continued at INCHEON. The first additional transportation assigned the regiment was assigned this day - a total of thirteen trucks of Company "D", 1st Motor Transport Battalion. These vehicles were distributed among the various units of the regiment and were used in displacing organizational equipment and to supplement the partial unit distribution of supplies by 1st Marine Division. A regimental supply dump was established near the 1st Battalion Command Post on the southwest bank of the HAN River. This dump was set up to receive gear from INCHEON, and to serve as a storage area and distributing point to the using units. A forward dump was established across the HAN River in TA 1264 in the afternoon to facilitate supply of the units on the northeast side of the river.

This day's move resulted in occupation of 1st Marine Division Objective 12 near the town of RYOKU and accomplished relief of elements of and contact with the 5th Marines. It placed the regiment in a position to protect the division left flank on the northeast side of the HAN River, and along a front of nearly 10,000 yards extending from the ferry crossing site to the 5th Marines zone.

During the 24th of September, the 7th Marines continued its mission of protecting the 1st Marine Division left flank as directed in 1st Marine Division Operation Order 10-50 by patrolling to the north and northeast. With the 1st and 2d Battalions on the southwest side of the HAN, the regiment did not have available the necessary strength to begin seizure of the objectives assigned the regiment by 1st Marine Division Operational Order 9-50.

The 1st Battalion remained in defensive positions on the southwest side of the HAN River. The 2d Battalion continued patrolling in its sector. The 3d Battalion patrolled to the north in its sector. At about 241130I that day a tank-infantry team of the 3d Battalion operating along a road northwest of the town of RYOKU encountered a group of 75 to 100 enemy troops dug in on Hill 41 (TA 0568) near the town of PAKSONG-NI (TA 0567). The patrol became heavily engaged with the enemy and the fire fight lasted nearly three hours. Air and artillery were called in by the patrol. The enemy finally withdrew to the north. Another 3d Battalion patrol encountered a small enemy group near the town of HWAJONG-NI (TA 0968). The patrol opened fire and the enemy withdrew northward without returning fire. During the course of the day other enemy patrols were sighted to the northwest of the 3d Battalion, but no other physical contacts were made.

An air strike was called in on enemy troops sighted in caves near Hill 51 (TA 0768) by an aerial observer. Air reported the enemy routed and civilians stated many were killed.

At noon on this day information was received from 1st Marine Division that 2d Battalion was to be relieved during the afternoon by elements of the 137th Airborne Regiment,

U. S. Army, and that the 2d Battalion was to return to tactical control and rejoin the regiment on the northeast side of the HAN. Relief of the 2d Battalion was completed by 241530I. The battalion moved the distance of approximately five miles to the ferry crossing and was across by 241730I. The battalion, less Fox Company, assembled (TA 1065) near George Company. In view of the contacts in the 3d Battalion sector, Fox Company was placed under 3d Battalion control and went into positions to fill in the gap between the 3d Battalion blocking positions and the HAN River.

About midafternoon, the 1st Marine Division released the 1st Battalion from its mission of protecting the ferry crossing site. The 1st Battalion crossed the river following the 2d Battalion, and entered an assembly area near HAENG-JU. The crossing was completed at 242030. By this time the 1st Battalion had received nearly 70% of its personnel from the ships.

Throughout this day, the activity of the enemy to the north confirmed reports of a general enemy build up in the area 3000 yards north of the ferry crossing. This build up consisted of two enemy battalions later identified as the 36th North Korean Regiment and the 1st Battalion, Railroad Company, 78th or 98th North Korean Regiment. Both units were elements of the SŌUL defense forces, and were supported by an undetermined number of 14.5mm Anti-Tank guns, 45mm guns, and 82mm mortars.

Documents captured later revealed that these elements were charged with the responsibility of retaking the ferry crossing and KUMPO airfield.

Logistical support of the regiment was assigned to the 1st Marine Division Shore Party elements operating the ferry crossing as elements of the regiment crossed. Due to the constantly changing priorities many of the 7th Marines vehicles were held up as much as three days at the crossing site. Thus many of the vehicles assigned the regiment were not actually available for use. Some supplies, particularly medical, were obtainable only in insufficient quantities.

Small dumps of Class I, III and IV supplies were set up in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post. These units which were closer to the Shore Party at the ferry crossing than the Regimental Command Post drew directly from the Shore Party. Most items of supply requested by using units were available at the dumps or were made available within a few hours. Issue of 5 in 1 rations was begun in view of the shortage of "C" rations, but this ration was not practicable for use of any more than 30% of the command in view of the fluidity of the situation. Evacuation was established through the Shore Party in the 5th Marines Area.

This day's moves brought the regiment together on the north side of the HAN. The regiment now had the necessary strength to carry out the mission of seizing the 1st Marine Division Objectives assigned on 23 September.

The 7th Marines received orders from 1st Marine Division to continue protecting the division left flank in zone and to seize objective CHARLIE (1st Marine Division Operational

Order 11-50), Objective CHARLIE corresponded in general to objectives 9 and 10 assigned by 1st Marine Division Operational Order 9-50 and replaced those objectives.

At 250630 the regiment jumped off in the attack to seize Objective CHARLIE and Objective 11. The 2d Battalion was directed to seize Objective CHARLIE and the 3d Battalion was directed to seize Objective 11. The 1st Battalion was in regimental reserve and was directed to move into an assembly area in TA 1164 prepared to support the attack on order.

The 2d Battalion jumped off with Dog and Easy Companies in the assault and Fox in reserve. Fox Company had been returned to 2d Battalion control and moved to the 2d Battalion assembly area prior to jump off. Progress was steady against no enemy resistance. By midafternoon Objective CHARLIE was secured. The attack was made over rough terrain with a steady climb upward to the high ground in the vicinity of Objective CHARLIE.

George Company moved out simultaneously with the 2d Battalion and seized Objective 11 on the right flank of the 3d Battalion against no enemy resistance at 250930I. Other units of the 3d Battalion continued patrolling to the front during the day with no enemy contacts.

The 1st Battalion moved into the designated assembly area at 250930I but was not committed in the attack.

Small unit patrolling was conducted by the enemy during the day along the 3d Battalion front but no physical contacts were made. It was during this day that contact was made with a BOX guerrilla force operating in the area to the regimental front. This force appeared to be reliable and strongly anti-communist. It was thought that this unit could be valuable to the regiment in the future in view of their agent network and familiarity with the area.

The logistical support of the regiment remained much the same as the day before. A three day post exchange ration was received and distributed.

This day's action expanded the corridor north of the HAN River from a front of 10,000 yards to a front of nearly 19,000 yards.

Most important, however, was the fact that seizure of Objective CHARLIE cut the PYONGYANG-SEOUL highway, and the seizure of Objective 11 cut the secondary road running west from PYONGYANG-SEOUL highway. The cutting of these routes prevented their further use by the enemy for purposes of reinforcement or evacuation of SEOUL.

The 7th Marines began the next day by conducting patrols to the north and by sending one company to establish physical contact with front line elements of the 5th Marines.

Dog Company moved out at 260630I southeast along the PYONGYANG-SEOUL highway to make this contact. The company moved rapidly for a distance of nearly four and one half miles until halted near Hill 78 (TA 1960) by heavy enemy fire coming from the vicinity of the prison further to the southeast. Dog Company was unable to move further that day.

At 0910I, the 7th Marines received a fragmentary order

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from 1st Marine Division directing that the regiment less one battalion move to an assembly area in the vicinity of the village of HAENJEOE-RI (TA 1861-1862) and await further orders, leaving a minimum force to protect the road block at Objective CHARLIE.

Regiment directed the 2d Battalion (less two companies) to move out and reconnoiter the hill mass (TA 1863) northeast of HAENJEOE-RI. One company (Fox) was to remain on Objective CHARLIE until relieved by elements of the 1st Battalion.

The 3d Battalion was directed to move by road on foot from positions occupied on the northwest flank to an assembly area in the vicinity of HAENJEOE-RI. The 1st Battalion was directed to relieve the 3d Battalion in its positions and Fox Company on Objective CHARLIE.

The 2d Battalion moved out with Easy Company leading and at noon was reconnoitering hill mass as directed. The 1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion with Able Company and one platoon of Baker Company occupying the How and Item Company positions, and Charlie Company in reserve. Baker Company less one platoon relieved Fox Company on Objective CHARLIE. The 3d Battalion moved out on foot at 261100I to move the distance of eight and one half miles to its assembly area. The regimental command post and Headquarters and Service Company displaced about noon to a new position about 500 yards west of the road junction with the PYONGYANG-SEOUL highway in TA 1762. The command post opened at 261230I.

At about noon the 7th Marines received 1st Marine Division Operation Order 12-50 which directed the regiment to seize Objectives DOG, EASY, FOX, GEORGE, that portion of the city of SEOUL in zone, and objective BAKER without delay, coordinating the advance with the 5th Marines on the right. The Objectives were as follows: (1) DOG - Hill 338 (TA 1960); (2) EASY - Hill 342 (TA 2161); (3) FOX - Hill 131 (TA 2261); (4) GEORGE - Hill 343 (TA 2262); and (5) BAKER - Hill 171 (TA 2464). All of these objectives lay along the north side of SEOUL. The division directed the attachment of the Division Reconnaissance Company and the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion to the 7th Marines.

The regiment prepared to move out in the attack as rapidly as possible. The 2d Battalion moved out after Fox Company rejoined the battalion with Fox and Easy in the assault at about 261400I from the hill mass to seize Objective GEORGE. They moved about 1000 yards to the southeast when halted by heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire coming from Objective DOG.

No further progress was made. Dog Company, which was cut off from the battalion by its move earlier in the morning, was placed under the tactical control of the regiment. Dog Company continued in the attempt to establish contact with front line elements of the 5th Marines but no further progress was made. Wire contact with the regimental command post was established in the late afternoon with Dog Company by a Tank Wire Laying Team. Food, ammunition, and water were air dropped to the company just before dark.

The 3rd Battalion moved into jump-off positions at 1645 at the bridge (TA 186L) just south of HAENJEOE-RI and jumped off in the attack to Objective DOG five minutes later with George Company leading the assault. George advanced about 600 yards when halted by heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire from the Objective. How Company, which was following George Company, moved up on the right of George Company in an attempt to envelope Objective DOG, but was also halted by the same fire. Itom Company remained in reserve near the jump-off position. No further progress was made during the day.

The 1st Battalion consolidated its positions on the north-west flank during the day and conducted patrols to the front. No enemy contacts were made by the 1st Battalion.

The Division Reconnaissance Company attached to the regiment remained in positions occupied previously on Hill 216 (TA 176L) and Hill 226 (TA 186O).

The 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion, which was in an assembly area near the 7th Marines command post, was directed to remain in that area as regimental reserve.

No enemy unit identifications were made during the day. The only resistance encountered in the regimental zone was that encountered in the attack of our 2d and 3d Battalions. This attack met heavy resistance by well armed, well entrenched, enemy troops. Some resistance was encountered during this night from small bands of well organized enemy.

Supply and evacuation continued through the Shore Party at the ferry crossing. However, critical shortages of Class II supply were requested from the INCHON cargo sorting and storage area, and were delivered by truck from that point.

The regiment received five additional trucks on a loan from Company "C", 1st Motor Transport Battalion.

This day's action committed the 7th Marines to the battle for SEOUL on the north flank of 1st Marine Division and on the left of the 5th Marines who were attacking the western edge of the city. The movement of 2d Battalion eastward of the PYONGYANG-SEOUL road outflanked the defenses of SEOUL and threatened the enemy's main escape corridor, the one leading northeast to ULJONGBU.

The 7th Marines continued the attack at 270630I to the east to seize the objectives assigned by 1st Marine Division Operation Order 12-50. The 2d and 3d Battalions were in the assault with the 3d on the right. The 1st Battalion was protecting the division's north flank near the ferry crossing and at Objective CHARLIE; and the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion was in reserve.

Initially the 2d Battalion, less Dog Company, furnished supporting fires on Objective DOG to assist the advance of the 3d Battalion. At 1000 the 2d Battalion moved out to seize objective GEORGE. The jump-off was made with Easy on the right and Fox on the left. The advance was slow over rough terrain and against determined enemy resistance. By nightfall Easy Company had seized Objective GEORGE, constituting a move of nearly 2,500 yards for the battalion during the day.

The 3d Battalion moved out in the attack, with fire support from the 2d Battalion, at 0630 to seize Objective DOG with How and George Companies in the assault, How on the right.

They moved slowly until about noon against very heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. They were halted short of the objective and pinned down by the heavy fire. Item Company was brought up on the left of George Company to launch an attack on the enemy right flank. Later in the day, George Company moved deep into the enemy's rear in a flanking action which placed George on the left of Item Company, and in a position to enfilade the eastern slopes of the hill mass on which lay Objective DOG. The 3d Battalion advanced a total of about 600 yards during the day.

The 1st Battalion continued limited patrolling in its sector. At about noon enemy troops consisting of two groups of 50 to 100, launched an attack south along the road from HWAJONG-NI (TA 0968) toward 1st Battalion positions at RYOKOKU. Their intent was apparently to recapture the ferry crossing. Charlie Company was committed in the gap between Able Company and the platoon of Baker Company on the right to block possible penetrations. A heavy fire fight ensued with the battalion employing all available arms against enemy equipped only with small arms and automatic weapons. The fight lasted only a short time, with the enemy withdrawing from our superior fire. One company of the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion was dispatched by truck from their assembly area to support the 1st Battalion in the event of an enemy break through. The fire was over prior to their arrival.

Dog Company, which remained under regimental tactical control during most of the day, was directed to assist the advance of the 5th Marines by fire. This company delivered flanking fire across the front of the 5th Marines until the fires were masked by the advance. Dog Company was withdrawn late in the afternoon, entered an assembly area near the town of HAENJEOE-NI, and reverted to 2d Battalion control.

One company of the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion relieved Baker Company on the road block at Objective CHARLIE during the morning. Company "C" of the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion was attached to the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines during the day and moved into a blocking position near HAENJEOE-RI. The company that was sent to aid the 1st Battalion joined the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion on Objective CHARLIE placing the battalion (less one company) in blocking positions there. The Division Reconnaissance Company moved from Hills 216 and 226 to establish outposts to the north and northeast of the 2d Battalion positions on Objective EASY. This was intended to prevent enemy infiltration into the 2d Battalion rear during the night.

The heavy fire of the 1st Battalion on the enemy attack from the north is believed to have discouraged the units in that area from further attempts at retaking the ferry crossing. Later information revealed that these units withdrew to the FAESONG area. The strength of the units opposing the 7th Marines in the northwest sector was believed to be about 800. Of this number 375 were killed in action up to and including 27 September. 34 prisoners were taken, and 4 heavy machine guns, six rifles and 600 bayonets during the period 23-27 September.

Supply and evacuation were normal. All special staff officers of the Logistics section reported to the regimental command post during the day. As the regiment spread out over the rough ter-

rain on the north side of SEOUL the problems of supply increased. Both unit and supply point distribution were employed.

All trucks on loan were returned to their parent organization. Ten additional trucks were issued the regiment during the day to augment regimental transportation. Issue of trucks was made to the units of the regiment.

The results of this day's action showed that the regiment was successfully outflanking and overcoming the enemy defenses of the north side of SEOUL. The fire delivered by Dog Company in support of the 5th Marines assisted that unit in entering the city of SEOUL in its zone.

The 7th Marines continued the attack at 220030 to seize assigned objectives with the 2d Battalion and 3d Battalion attacking to the east from positions occupied the night before. Company "C" 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion remained attached to the 3d Battalion. The Korean Marine Corps Battalion (less Company "C") remained on the road block and the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, less Able Company, remained in blocking positions in the northwest sector. During the morning Able Company moved to the regimental command post area as regimental reserve.

The 2d Battalion, with Division Reconnaissance Company attached, jumped-off in the attack to seize Objective FOX and BAKER at 0630. Easy Company remained in battalion reserve on Objective GEORGE. Fox Company seized its objective at 281115I against only light small arms fire, none of which was coming from the objective. Fox Company continued the advance to clear the northern sections of SEOUL in the regimental zone. This company established contact at 281150I with the forward elements of the 5th Marines at the edge of SEOUL in TA 2361.

Dog Company, with the Division Reconnaissance Company protecting its north flank, proceeded slowly over tortuous terrain and against moderate enemy resistance. The enemy consisted mainly of small bands who were attempting only to delay the advance with small arms and automatic weapons fire. At noon the company had reached Hill 285 in the POT'U-HYON area (TA 2263). The attack was continued and at 281520I the company began entering Objective BAKER. The attack was halted suddenly by heavy fire including mortars from the objective. The Reconnaissance Company moved out to reconnoiter Hill 224 to the north to carry out its mission of protecting the flank of Dog Company. The company was halted about half way up the slopes of Hill 224 on the southwest side by heavy enemy fire including mortars. No further advances were made by these two units that day.

Easy Company remained on Objective GEORGE most the day. Late in the afternoon, however, Easy Company reinforced with an Anti-Tank assault section and the heavy machine guns of the Weapons Company were moved from Objective GEORGE to positions in the vicinity of Dog Company on Objective BAKER. At dark, the Division Reconnaissance Company was moved to the same area. These moves were made to insure holding the ground gained by Dog Company during the day.

Company "C", 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion, was sent out in the afternoon from the 3d Battalion to reconnoiter and clear the parts of SEOUL in the regimental zone. Fox Company was relieved of this job by Company "C" at 281630I and returned to Objective FOX for the night.

The 3d Battalion jumped-off at 280630I, simultaneously with the 2d Battalion, to complete the seizure of Objective DOG. George and Item Companies were in the assault with George on the left. How Company became battalion reserve, remaining in positions occupied the night before. Resistance in the 3d Battalion zone was very light and the Objective was seized at 280730I. The attack was continued to seize Objective EASY further to the east against continued light resistance. Item Company reverted to battalion reserve and remained on Objective DOG. How Company moved up on the right of George Company and was scaling the old wall west of Objective EASY at 281015. At 281030 How Company occupied Objective EASY against no enemy resistance.

Company "C", 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion advanced rapidly through the outskirts of SEOUL reaching the town of CHONGHUNG-NI at nightfall. Few enemy were encountered. The 1st Battalion (less Able Company) with the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion (less Company "C") attached, continued patrolling to the north and northeast from positions in the northwest sector; but no enemy contacts were made.

Total advance for the day ranged from 1500 yards in the 3d Battalion zone to 2600 yards in the 2d Battalion zone.

This day's action clearly showed that the enemy defenses encountered the day before had been broken, and that the enemy had apparently withdrawn to positions in the vicinity of Objective BAKER. During this day only light resistance was encountered until reaching Objective BAKER, and the resistance that was encountered was only small groups who often withdrew immediately on being fired upon. The stiff resistance encountered at Objective BAKER, however, indicated that the enemy was intending to protect the escape route from SEOUL to ULJONGBU.

The problems of supplying the assault battalions increased as the distance between them and supply dumps increased. Many supplies had to be delivered the last leg of the journey by jeep or on the backs of the men of front line companies.

During the night the Regimental Surgeon with a convey of three jeep ambulances made an evacuation trip through SEOUL in the 1st Marines zone to evacuate casualties of Dog Company. Rations and water were sent up on these ambulances. The evacuation was successful and the ambulances returned to the Regimental Command Post at 290400I.

Seventy-five tons of U. S. made dynamite and explosives were captured by the assault battalions near the north edge of SEOUL. These explosives were believed to have been released by Allied Forces to the Republic of Korea following the cessation of World War II occupation. Apparently Republic of Korea forces were forced to abandon them following the Red invasion of South Korea. A report was made to Division Salvage on these explosives.

This day's action carried the regiment to its final objective along the northern edge of SEOUL. The move pinched off the 5th Marines in their zone of action as had been planned (1st Marine Division Operation Order 12-50) and relieved them from further action in SEOUL.

At about 290600I, the enemy launched a counterattack from the vicinity of Hill 224 against our positions on Objective BAKER, apparently unaware that Dog Company had been reinforced during the night by Easy Company and Division Reconnaissance Company. The counterattack was preceded by heavy enemy mortar fire from Hill 224. The attack was repulsed within a half hour. 200 to 300 enemy were observed moving northward toward Hill 224 after the attack.

At 0730I Easy Company attacked Hill 224 supported by fire of Dog Company. Dog remained on Objective BAKER. At first light that morning Fox Company was moved by truck from HAENJEOE-RI through SEOUL, to Objective BAKER arriving there at about 290800I. On arrival of Fox Company, Dog Company reverted to battalion reserve and remained in positions on Objective BAKER. Fox Company took up positions on Objective BAKER.

Easy Company's progress was slow against heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire and occasional mortar fire. By nightfall, Easy Company had one platoon on Hill 224. Fox was moved up during the late afternoon to insure holding the ground gained. Easy dug in for the night. Positions were consolidated on Objective BAKER by Dog Company, and Fox Company remained in positions in rear of Easy Company. Easy Company had advanced about 1000 yards from Objective BAKER to Hill 224.

The 3d Battalion relieved elements of the 2d Battalion on Objectives GEORGE and FOX, consolidated positions on Objectives DOG, FOX, and EASY during the day to protect the regiment's flank in that area.

The 1st Battalion remained in positions on the northwest flank until relieved by elements of the 5th Marines late in the afternoon. A Korean Marine Corps company patrol engaged in an inconclusive fire fight about 8,000 yards Northeast of Objective CHARLIE in the afternoon. The 5th Marines had been directed by 1st Marine Division Operation Order 12-50 to relieve our 1st Battalion when pinched off in SEOUL. Because of a growing threat in the area, Baker Company and the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion were directed by regiment to remain in positions in this sector under the tactical control of the 5th Marines until more troops could be moved into the area. The 1st Battalion (less Baker Company) moved into an assembly area near the town of HAENJEOE-RI. Able Company reverted to 1st Battalion control at that time.

In order to maintain communications with assaulting units and establish control, an advance command post was set up near the tomb in TA 2462 during the afternoon.

The resistance received during the day from Hill 224 was apparently from remnants of the units opposing our advance along the north side of SEOUL. A North Korean Officer captured during the day reported many thousands of enemy troops were leaving SEOUL for ULSONGBU to the north.

Intelligence information gathered during the past few days indicated that the 7th Marines were opposed by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 17th North Korean Division. Estimated enemy strength was placed at 1100 infantry supported by one battalion of artillery. Of those enemy, it was estimated that the 7th Marines killed 200; one hundred and forty prisoners were taken.

Supply and evacuation were normal. Supplies to units on Objective BAKER were moved through the 1st Marines zone in SEOUL.

This day's action cleared most of the enemy resistance from the portions of SEOUL in the 7th Marines zone, and cut the route of egress from SEOUL to UIJONGDU.

In absence of further orders from Division, the regiment continued the attack at 300630I with 2d Battalion in the assault to complete the seizure of Hill 224, and the ridge running northeast from that hill and Hill 498 (TA 2366) to the northwest, those being the areas from which the 2d Battalion elements on Hill 224 had been receiving fire during night. The 1st Battalion (less Baker Company) had been directed to move out at first light by truck to an assembly area to the southeast of Objective BAKER. Baker Company was to rejoin the battalion as soon as possible after 300800I, the time at which they were to be relieved in the 5th Marines sector. The 3d Battalion was directed to hold positions occupied the day before.

At 300730I an order was received from Division directing that the regiment, with Company "C", 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion attached, seize Objectives 4 and 3 and prepare for the advance on UIJONGDU. (1st Marine Division Operation Order 13-50). Division Reconnaissance Company and 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion (less Company "C") were detached from the regiment.

The 2d Battalion jumped off from Hill 224 with Fox Company to clear the ridge to the northeast. Easy to clear and seize Hill 498, and Dog in battalion reserve in rear of Hill 224. Progress was slow against heavy enemy mortar fire. Artillery and air were called on enemy positions on the ridge and on Hill 498 during the day. By nightfall, Fox Company had occupied the ridge. Easy Company was unable to reach the top of Hill 498, and dug in for night about half way from Hill 224 to Hill 498. Total advance for day was about 1000 Yards.

The 1st Battalion (less Baker Company) arrived in the vicinity of Objective BAKER at 300730I and jumped off from positions on the east side of Objective BAKER to seize Objective 4, at 300830I. Seizure of Objective 4 was completed against moderate enemy small arms fire just after noon. Baker rejoined the 1st Battalion about mid morning and became battalion reserve. The battalion was directed to send one platoon to reconnoiter Objective 3 and determine the enemy strength there. The platoon was pinned down by fire in the flat ground between Objectives 4 and 3. The battalion was directed to launch an attack to seize Objective 3 and to continue the attack to seize Hill 105 to northwest (TA 2668). At 1645 the attack was launched with Baker Company in the assault. Objective 3 was secured

against moderate enemy small arms fire at dark. The Battalion was unable, however, to reach the road northwest of Objective 3 against heavy small arms fire from Hill 105. Battalion dug in for night on Objective 3. Total advance from morning jump-off positions was about 4000 yards.

The 3d Battalion was moved by truck through SEOUL and entered a new assembly area on Objective 4 at about 1530. The battalion dug in this area for the night and sent a patrol to Hill 97 (TA 2865) to the east that night.

The rear command post and Regimental Headquarters and Service Company joined the forward command post at the tomb (TA 2462) during the morning and the command post opened there at 1100.

Company "C", 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion conducted patrols during the after noon and night to the east along the boundary with the 1st Marines as far as the town of CHANGWI-RI (TA 2865), clearing villages in the area.

Supply and evacuation were normal. All supplies in dumps on the northeast side of the HAN River were consolidated in one dump near the new Regimental Command Post. Those supplies still remaining in dumps on the southeast side of the ferry crossing could not be moved because of a lack of transportation.

This day's action consisted of mopping up enemy rear guard elements in that area, and placing the regiment in position to begin the advance on UIJONGBU. From the resistance encountered, it appeared that the enemy was determined to continue a stiff rear guard action up the corridor to UIJONGBU.

Advance on UIJONGBU

The 7th Marines received orders from Division to advance rapidly to seize blocking positions in the vicinity of UIJONGBU (TA 2898) (1st Marine Division Operation Order 14-50). The following units were attached to the regiment for this advance: 3d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company "D", 1st Tank Battalion; Company "D", 1st Engineer Battalion; Company "D", 1st Motor Transport Battalion; and Company "C", 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion.

The regiment, now Regimental Combat Team - 7, issued orders to advance on UIJONGBU in a column of battalions, the 3d Battalion leading. The 1st Battalion was directed to move out from Objective 3 and clear Hill 105 to the northwest prior to the time the advance started up the road to UIJONGBU, then to make a feint on a broad front to cover the entry of the 3d Battalion into the defile through which ran the road.

The 1st Battalion completed the seizure of Objective 3 and continued the attack to Hill 105 against moderate small arms fire. Hill 105 was secured at about 011030L. The 3d Battalion, augmented by tanks and engineers, and followed by Regimental Headquarters and Service Company

[REDACTED]

moved out about 011110I in column to enter the defile to the north leading to UIJONGBU with the intention of advancing in the defile as rapidly as possible.

The 2d Battalion remained in positions occupied the day before, prepared to move into the column.

The column advanced on the road to a position between Objective 3 and Hill 105 when it was held up for an hour while Engineers cleared mines in that area. Foot troops of 3d Battalion continued the advance into the defile against sporadic enemy fire until halted by heavy enemy fire from the ridge to the northwest of NUWON-NI in the mid-afternoon. The battalion was halted just south of that town. The 1st Battalion, which had moved out at the time the column was held up by mines, launched a feint against the hills on either side of the defile leading to UIJONGBU, simulating an attack by a regiment on a broad front. Much heavy fire was received from small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, and anti-tank guns in hills on the west side of the defile. The 1st Battalion moved into the defile in rear of the 3d Battalion and both were halted for the night in this vicinity.

After Regimental Headquarters and Service Company passed Hill 105, 2d Battalion moved into the rear of the column. The entire column was halted along the road when the 3d Battalion was halted at NUWON-NI. When it became evident that no further advance could be made during the day, the 2d Battalion and Regimental Headquarters and Service Company moved into assembly areas just north of MUSO-DOG (TA 2771). 3d Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to positions just north of the town of YUNAN-NI (TA 2769) to furnish support.

Realizing that the loss of SEOUL was imminent, the enemy changed his tactics from defense of the South Korean Capital to a determined rear guard defense of the SEOUL-UIJONGBU corridor. Well entrenched enemy supported by armor, artillery, mortars, and normal small arms were encountered during the day substantiating this.

Company "B", 1st Motor Transport Battalion was attached to Regimental Combat Team - 7 this day to provide the necessary transportation for moving supplies over the lengthening supply route to UIJONGBU.

This day's action placed the regiment over half the distance from the outskirts of SEOUL in the advance on UIJONGBU, and uncovered the main enemy blocking positions along that road.

Regimental Combat Team - 7 continued the attack at 0630 with the 3d Battalion on the left, the 1st Battalion on the right, and the 2d Battalion in regimental reserve. The 3d Battalion was directed to seize the nose of the ridge extending eastward of Hill 717 (TA 2573). The 1st Battalion was directed to cross the stream to the east, move into jump-off position near the town of CHOAN-DONG (TA 2870), and seize Hill 225 (TA 2972) to the north.

The initial advance of the 3d Battalion was rapid but soon bogged down with heavy enemy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, from the Objective. Air, artillery, and mortar fires were called, but they failed to alleviate the situation enough to advance. Tanks were directed to move in to support the 3d Battalion but they were stopped by mines on the road in the town of NUWON-NI. Engineers were unable to clear the mines due to heavy enemy small arms fire.

[REDACTED]

The 3d Battalion continued pouring fire into the enemy positions throughout the day, but no further advances were made. Total advance for the day was about 300 yards.

The 1st Battalion crossed the stream at 0830 and jumped-off in the attack to seize Hill 228 on the east side of the dofile against moderate enemy resistance. Hill 228 was secured late in the afternoon with a total advance of nearly 2,000 yards.

The 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve in defensive position along the rear perimeter of the regimental command post.

Company "C", 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion patrolled during the day along the ridge line 2000 yards northwest of the assaulting units. Two enemy groups were dispersed with 40 enemy including one woman in uniform reported killed.

This day's action proved that the enemy was holding the blocking positions in force.

Regimental Combat Team - 7 continued the attack at 030630I with the 3d Battalion on the high ground west of the road, 1st Battalion on the high ground east of the road, and 2d Battalion in reserve. The attack moved rapidly against moderate opposition. At 030930I the 2d Battalion with tanks and engineers in support moved out of their assembly area with the mission of advancing up the road between the 1st Battalion and 3d Battalion to UIJONGBU. It became apparent that the enemy blocking position on the west had been broken when two 120mm mortars, one anti-tank gun, and a supply dump were captured.

All three battalions advanced rapidly side by side against moderate resistance, small arms, and sporadic mortar fire through out the day.

By 031710I, the 2d Battalion had occupied the town of UIJONGBU. The 3d Battalion had secured positions on the ridges (TA 2577-2677) west of UIJONGBU. The 1st Battalion had secured positions on the ridge (TA2978-3078) east of UIJONGBU. The regimental command post was displaced to a position near the town of CHANGAM-NI (TA 2874).

Identifications during the day showed that Regimental Combat Team - 7 had been engaged with the 3d, 4th, and 5th Battalions, 31st Regiment, 31st North Korean Division. Other units were security units of the SEOUL Division. Also encountered were elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d Regiment, 17th North Korean Division and the 26mm Artillery Battalion of this division. One enemy tank battalion of 13 tanks also participated, of which 4 were destroyed by air attacks and 2 were later captured in a damaged condition.

The regimental train moved during the day to the old Regimental Command Post near MUSO-DONG. A motor park was maintained at the command post, although the majority of the vehicles were returned to the rear at night and started moving supplies forward the following morning.

[REDACTED]

This day's action culminated in the capture of ULJONGBU and the completion of the mission assigned. This advance of over three miles for the day resulted in the cutting of the lateral communications to the east and west of ULJONGBU, and secured an important blocking position on the X Corps final phase line.

Late that afternoon Regimental Combat Team -7 received information that the 6th Republic of Korea Division was to relieve Regimental Combat Team -7 in place.

The regiment continued consolidation of positions in the area and continued patrolling to the front and flanks, on 4 Oct. Company "C", 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion, sent two platoons to reconnoiter and establish defensive positions on the hill mass (TA 2880-2980) to the northeast of ULJONGBU. The other platoon was sent to reconnoiter and establish defensive positions on Hill 221 (TA 2578) west of ULJONGBU.

The 3d Battalion moved one company into positions in the low ground extending from Hill 221 to ULJONGBU. The rest of the 3d Battalion consolidated positions in the vicinity occupied the night before. The 2d Battalion continued occupation of the town with two companies and sent one company to establish out posts along the ULJONGBU-SEOUL road as far south as the town of MUSO-DONG (TA 2771) to prevent enemy infiltration to the rear. The 1st Battalion remained in positions occupied the day before. The Regimental Command Post displaced to a former South Korean Army Camp just east of Hill 22 near the town of ORUNG-NI (TA 2679).

No enemy was encountered during the day. Identifications made during the day indicated that in addition to units of enemy forces employed in the corridor, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 578th North Korean Regiment were occupying ULJONGBU. The overall estimated strength of the units encountered in the operation to capture ULJONGBU was estimated at 5500 men supported by tanks, 82mm and 120mm mortars, 76mm and 120mm guns, and 2 AAA (light) guns, many of which were captured and destroyed.

During this day small bands of enemy forces continued to roam the hills to our flanks in attempts to escape to the north. Though no physical contacts with enemy troops were made, occasionally the regimental area was harassed with mortar and anti-tank fire.

Supply dumps were maintained in the rear positions. Only essential items of supply were brought forward in view of the plan to displace to INCHON.

RCT-7 on 5 October, 1950 continued occupation of same area. 21st Regiment of the 6th Republic of Korea Division passed through Regimental Combat Team -7 and continued to the northeast from ULJONGBU during the afternoon. The 16th Republic of Korea Regiment of 6th Republic of Korea Division moved into an assembly area to the rear of Regimental Combat Team -7. No enemy activity encountered.

RCT-7 on 6 October, 1950 continued occupation of same area. The 16th Republic of Korea Regiment passed through Regimental Combat Team -7 area early in the morning, moving north. 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, attached, was prepared to furnish fire in support of the Republic of Korea regiment. In the afternoon the relief of Regimental Combat Team -7 was completed and troops prepared to withdraw from the area.

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Withdrawal from the area began at 070530I. Troops were moved by truck along the road back to SEOUL and thence to INCHON. Withdrawal moved ahead of schedule and regiment closed in its assigned assembly area in INCHON by mid after noon.

8. A NARRATIVE OF ENEMY OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, PROBABLE ORDER OF BATTLE, AND EQUIPMENT IN THE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM - 7 ZONE FROM 22 SEPTEMBER TO 5 OCTOBER 1950.

Crossing of the HAN GANG River by Regimental Combat Team 7 in the vicinity of the Ferry (TA 0762), constituted a flanking threat to the enemy's defense of SEOUL, Korea. Consequently, during the period 21 - 22 September 1950, the enemy began to build up his strength to approximately 2 battalions in the general area 3000 yards north of the HAN GANG River Ferry Crossing. A captured enemy Operation Order indicated that the enemy intended to recapture the ferry and expel, eliminate or neutralize Regimental Combat Team - 7 from their positions north of the HAN GANG River. During the night of 23 - 24 September contact was first made with the enemy when he sent light patrols against I Company positions (TA 0567ABCDE).

Constant pressure in the expanding Regimental Combat Team - 7 zone of action, forced the enemy to revert to defensive tactics until the build up and reorganization of his forces could be effected. Subsequently on 25 September, it was discovered that the enemy on the eastern flank of Regimental Combat Team - 7, had mined the bridge and road leading northwest out of SEOUL commencing in the vicinity of (TA 1862), and several hundred enemy troops were digging in on the high ground vicinity HONGJEOE-RI (TA 1862). On the north central flank, approximately 100 enemy troops were reported digging in at (TA 0467 H4) while enemy troops on the left flank of Regimental Combat Team - 7 withdrew some 2500 yards out of contact. However during the night of 24 - 25 September a 9 man enemy patrol attempted to enter the Regimental Command Post, but were repulsed. An estimated 50 to 75 enemy infiltrated around our road block (TA 1263M) at 2100 but fired only sporadically and were likewise repulsed. No enemy dead were found. More were taken prisoner in these actions. On 25 September the enemy employed 14.5mm anti-tank rifles, of Russian design and manufacture, which failed to penetrate the armor of Regimental Combat Team - 7 tanks.

The following morning, 26 September, on the northeast front the enemy offered light to increasingly heavy resistance late in the afternoon as larger groups of well dug in troops were encountered. These troops were believed to be elements of the 2d Regiment, 17th North Korean Brigade opposing the advance of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines while elements of the 107th Security Regiment were believed to be opposite 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in the Regimental Combat Team - 7 northwest sector in the vicinity of the Ferry Crossing. There were 7 enemy mortar positions reported during the day although the enemy employed only light mortar fire on 3d Battalion, 7th Marines positions with 2 rounds falling in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post. By nightfall, 1000 enemy had been reported on the north east front (TA 1963M). Several hundred were reported in

the vicinity of TA 2063M and small enemy groups were reported in the vicinity of TA 1963M. Identifications of these groups could not be ascertained at that time. However, it was noted that the enemy fought in large compact groups as opposed to U. S. Marine Corps tactics of seizing and holding key terrain. The enemy made extensive use of mines, completely mining one large section of northern SEOUL (not in Regimental Combat Team 7 zone of action). The enemy strongly resisted Regimental Combat Team -7's evening attack in the northeast sector with small arms and machine gun fire. His force ranged from small unorganized groups to large well organized strong points. After positions were consolidated, occasional small fire fights took place throughout the night. At 260125 the enemy attacked 1st Battalion, 7th Marines positions with small arms, machine gun and mortar fire but did not enter our positions. Commencing with the jump off of 2nd Battalion and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in the northeast sector at 270630, the enemy offered from light to moderate resistance throughout the day. At 271715 approximately 1 enemy company (reinforced) launched an attack at the HAN GANG Ferry Crossing but was repulsed by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines with a loss of about 75 killed in action. During the night of 26 - 27 September the enemy increased his mining activities and mined roads in rear areas that had previously been cleared. The main road north in the vicinity of PONGILCHOW-NI (TA 0779) was reported mined as well as having trees felled across the roadway. While most anti-tank mines used by the enemy were of the wooden box type, some of which were booby-trapped, a new cast iron anti-personnel mine of Russian make was found. During the day the enemy employed a few mortars of undetermined caliber in his defense and local counterattacks. By night fall of the 27th various reports of enemy troops locations had been received; friendly guerrillas reported 250 North Korean troops at TA 1371I; native children reported 300-400 North Korean troops with 2 mortars and machine guns in the village north of TA 1961-1960 for rest and supplies and reported enemy troops massed at TA 2065K, using impressed civilians as camouflage. It was recognized that the many refugees gathering in the vicinity of Command Posts, dumps, etc, constituted a security hazard. The enemy RHD Company, 1st Battalion, 78 or 98 Regiment was tentatively identified. While enemy activity was negligible during the night of 27 September, several enemy infiltrated behind George Company, temporarily cutting it off. Enemy resistance remained light throughout the day of 28 September. The enemy continued road mining operations in the vicinity of TA 1962R to TA 1361C. Civilians reported 2000-3000 enemy at Ilson and 500-600 enemy at PONGILCHOW TA 7907 to the northwest of Regimental Combat Team - 7. The PONGILCHOW-Ilson area was believed to be the Headquarters of the troops defending the northwest sector and guarding the approaches to the North Korean Capital of PYONGYANG. To the west in the zone of action, the attached Korean Marine Corps Battalion was attacked by 150 enemy troops during the night of 27 September. On 28 September, a 36th Battalion and a 2d Company of unknown Regiments were identified. During the night of 28 September the enemy offered one small fire fight, some scattered small arms fire, and sniping. During daylight hours of 29 September, the enemy offered very light resistance with most enemy units withdrawing upon contact. However, Dog Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines encountered direct artillery fire and strong resistance in the vicinity of Hill 224 and later from 300-400 enemy troops. These withdrew from Hill 224 and later made an unsuccessful counterattack against the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. In the northwest sector Able

Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines received small arms fire from small enemy units at TA 1068D at 280200. In the north central front the enemy established a road block at TA 1409Y and continued extensive mining operation on roads and bridges throughout the area. An officer Prisoner of War stated that many thousands troops were moving north from SEOUL to UIJONGBU. The enemy 1st and 2d Battalions, 17th (Division - Regiment), containing 800 men each, were identified. Documents were found from the 4th Company, 3d Battalion of an unknown Regiment and from a Machine Gun Battalion, 5th Regiment although there had been no indication of their presence in the area. On 29 September, reports of 1200 enemy in the northeast sector on Hill 171 (TA 2464 and 500-600) digging in at TA 1670 in the north central sector were received while further reports indicated the enemy in the northwest sector TA 1169 withdrew northwest to ILSAN.

It is interesting to note that a 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines patrol found 30 bodies along the wall at TA 2162E, including some women and one child, whose hands had been bound behind them and who were then shot. A North Korean officer Prisoner of War stated these people were families of Republic of Korea soldiers, guerrillas and policeman and consequently had been dealt with in the same manner as soldiers.

In summary, the enemy forces in the northwest sector of the Ferry Crossing, though having the mission of recapturing the Ferry Crossing never fully committed their strength and appear to have been primarily a defense force protecting the approaches to PYONGYANG. The enemy forces protecting the northwest flank of SEOUL were never completely organized, and were under constant attack by air, artillery and ground units. Consequently, he remained off balance throughout the battle of SEOUL and was never able to effectively gain the initiative and accomplish his mission. After having been badly mauled in this campaign, the enemy withdrew his forces, hastily reorganized and began his defense of the SEOUL-UIJONGBU corridor.

Having completed their north flank missions in the 1st Marine Division's assault and liberation of SEOUL. The enemy withdrew to the high ground northeast of SEOUL and prepared to defend this gateway to eastern, northern and central Korea. The enemy's forces defending this vital corridor consisted of a heterogeneous force composed of remnants and elements of surviving units which had been reorganized and incorporated into the SEOUL or 16th Division.

The enemy's initial reaction to the advance of Regimental Combat Team - 7, (now making the main effort of the 1st Marine Division) during the night of 1 October, was relatively light and ineffective. However, during the daylight hours of 2 October resistance stiffened as the objective was approached and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines received heavy small arms, automatic, 120mm mortar and 57mm anti-tank fire throughout the depth of the battalion. One platoon of friendly tanks was stopped by a mine field in front of bridge TA 2874 which was covered by heavy fire. The enemy offered determined resistance during the day employing a BANZAI attack in the final defense of Hill 228. The enemy continued mining bridges and roads as he was driven northward. Elements of the 2d Medical Company,

[REDACTED]

2d Battalion, 17th Division were tentatively identified. The enemy continued stiff resistance to the Regimental Combat Team - 7 advance toward UIJONGBU suffering heavy losses, and by 3 October there were indications that he was breaking into small groups of 40-50 men and conducting a general withdrawal northward covered by mortar and flat trajectory fire, and abandoning weapons, ammunition and supplies in considerable quantity. It was noted that the enemy attempted jamming of friendly radio channels on 3 October 1950. Identifications made this day were the 4th Platoon, 2nd Company, Regiment unknown; 2d Company, 4th Battalion, 31st Regiment Seoul Division; 1st Company, 5th Battalion, 31st Regiment, Seoul Division; 31st Field Artillery and the signal Section, Headquarters, Seoul Division; 2d Company, Special Headquarters, Seoul Division (57mm anti-tank Company, 2 guns per Company). During the night of 4-5 October at UIJONGBU the enemy limited his operations to a few rounds of mortar fire which landed in the vicinity of the regimental command post. On 5 October two enemy tanks that had been pulled off the road and had been well camouflaged were destroyed by air. The enemy's operation for the day consisted chiefly of bypassing UIJONGBU and withdrawing to the north. It was on this day that 3d Battalion, 7th Marines discovered the bodies of 55 South Korean citizens in a ditch at TA 267SA2. Investigation revealed that persons included the officials of the village nearby as well as some policemen and their families.

In his defense of the UIJONGBU - SEOUL corridor the enemy suffered severe losses in personnel and equipment and was reduced to impotence as an effective fighting force. Identifications made on 5 October include: 632d Tank Battalion; 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 578th Regiment; 2d Company, 2d Battalion, 578th Regiment; Mortar Company, 5th Battalion, 31st Assault Infantry Regiment.

THE ENEMY'S SEOUL-UIJONGBU CORRIDOR DEFENSE CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

The enemy hastily organized surviving units and stragglers from the INCHON - SEOUL campaign. Consequently, he lacked the teamwork necessary in an efficient fighting force.

As his striking power was reduced, bit by bit, by the combined hammer-like blows of air, artillery, and ground troops, his defenses began to crumble and the final collapse near UIJONGBU came suddenly as his demoralized forces, abandoned weapons, ammunition, and supplies and withdrew in disorganized groups to the north.

His defensive tactics consisted of strong small arms and automatic weapons on commanding terrain, utilizing the counter-attack as the decisive element. He employed extensive mining of roads and bridges to cover his withdrawals. The enemy was masterful in employing camouflage, and his use of smokeless, flashless gun powder made his individual soldiers difficult for our ground forces to observe. Throughout the campaign, the enemy was often observed changing his uniform for the white clothes common to the native civilians. Many of them, when captured, were found to have a set of white clothing in their packs.

The typical weapons employed by the enemy were:

SMALL ARMS

7.62 mm rifle USSR M1891/30 (some with folding bayonets)

7.62 mm Carbine USSR

7.62 mm "SHPAGIN" PPSH, model 1941, SMG ("Burr Gun")

ARTILLERY

120 mm, M1938, Heavy mortar

82 mm, M1936 or M1937, Battalion Mortar

45 mm, AT gun, M1942

MOTORIZED and ARMORED

T-34 Tank

Truck, model GAZZ - 63 4x4

The following weapons were uncommon but were occasionally encountered:

12.7 mm DSHK M1938, dual purpose AAA gun

14.5 mm "SIMONOV" PTRS - 1941 AT Rifle

50 mm M1938 mortar

While many USSR F-1 defensive grenades and some USSR RA-42 offensive grenades and USSR RPG-43 HEAT grenades were found, none of the above were used to any extent. Generally the enemy's employment of mortars was ineffective, presumably due to poor communications. Several times he employed his flat trajectory, high velocity guns against scattered troops which was in all instances ineffective.

9. RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

The 7th Marines (Reinforced) landed at INCHON, Korea on 21 September, 1950. On October 3, 1950, the regiment had accomplished its final mission--the seizure of UIJONGBU. In these thirteen days the regiment had moved a total distance of nearly 46 Miles from INCHON to UIJONGBU, and had accomplished four vital tasks necessary to the seizure of the SEOUL area. They were: (1) the cutting of the northwest approaches to SEOUL along the PYONGYANG-SEOUL highway; (2) the outflanking and clearing of the defenses north of SEOUL; (3) cutting the northern approaches to SEOUL along the SEOUL-UIJONGBU highway; and (4) the seizure of UIJONGBU which established a blocking position north of SEOUL and cut enemy lateral communications in that area.

PERSONNEL DAILY SUMMARY

UNIT	STRENGTH			DAILY CASUALTIES					CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES					Days in Combat	GAINS		PRISONERS OF WAR		
	Actual Effective Strength	Authorized M/O Strength	South Korean Attached	BATTLE				Non-Battle	BATTLE				Non-Battle		Returned to Duty	Captured	Evacuated	On Hand	Total Taken
				Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total		Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total							
7th MAR																			
Oct2'50	3488	3902	11	13	31		44	46	54	184		238	122	11		10	87	87	201
Oct3'50	3400	3902	11	12	65		77	17	66	249		315	139	12		6	26	26	227
Oct4'50	3358	3902	11	4	25		29	29	70	274		344	168	13		16	20	20	247
Oct5'50	3315	3902	11	2	14		16	35	72	282		354	203	14		3	17	17	264
Oct6'50	3328	3902	11					12	72	282		354	215	15	4	24			264
Oct7'50	3364	3902	11		2		2		71	284		355	216	16	6	32			264

9. A. CASUALTIES

31-RR

PERSONNEL DAILY SUMMARY

UNIT	STRENGTH			DAILY CASUALTIES					CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES					GAINS		PRISONER OF WAR				
	Actual Effective Strength	Authorized T/O Strength	South Korean Attached	BATTLE				Non-Battle	BATTLE				Non-Battle	Days in Combat	Replacements Returned to Duty	Captured	Evacuated	Or Hand	Total Taken	
				Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total		Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total								
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)
7th MAR																				
Sept21'50	3673	3902												0						
Sept22'50	3673	3902						2					2	1						
Sept23'50	3660	3902	8		3		3	9		3		3	12	2			4	3	1	4
Sept24'50	3653	3902	9	2	7		9	4	2	10		12	14	3			3	4		7
Sept25'50	3652	3902	10	1			1	2	3	10		13	16	4		1	22	22		29
Sept26'50	3792	3902	11	2	3		3	6	5	13		16	22	5			13	10	3	42
Sept27'50	3761	3902	11	1	33		34	5	6	46		52	27	6			7	7		49
Sept28'50	3693	3902	11	13	41		54	19	19	87		106	46	7		1	15	15		64
Sept29'50	3674	3902	11	3	9	3	15	22	22	96	3	121	48	8		3	47	47		111
Sept30'50	3596	3902	11	15	37		52	16	37	133	3	173	64	9	3	1	3	3		114
Oct 1'50	3561	3902	11	4	20		24	12	41	153	3	197	76	10		1				114

9. A. CASUALTIES

32-RR

9. B. PRISONERS OF WAR

The majority of POW's taken were deserters and wounded. Interrogation revealed that many of their fellow soldiers would like to desert but were afraid to make the attempt since death was the penalty for those caught and they were closely watched by their officers.

Many of the PW's taken were dressed in white natives clothes. The uniform of the North Korean soldiers was a light weight khaki colored cloth. The shoes worn were rubber soled canvas sneakers. North Korean soldiers did not wear helmets.

The first PW taken was captured on 22 September 1950. Subsequently PW's were taken as follows:

22 September	1
23 "	2
24 "	2
25 "	23
26 "	5
27 "	29
28 "	26
29 "	80
30 "	9
2 October	6
3 "	10
4 "	30
5 "	32

GRAND TOTAL 255

Of the above total, one PW was an officer, who was captured the day following the fall of SEUL.

9. C. REPLACEMENTS

As indicated on 9. A.

9. D. STATUS OF SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

During the period 17 to 21 August 1950, the accountable officer for the regiment, reinforced, prepared requisitions on Marine Corps Supply Depot, Camp Pendleton of the following general categories:

- a. To fill the many shortages in "K" series (Peace) T/E and T/A for units already organized. These were shortages in equipment of the former Second Marine Division units whose designations had been changed in the formation of the 7th Marines, and which units had left Camp Lejeune only about a week previously with most of their "K" Series (Peace) T/E and T/A equipment -- less vehicles and engineer equipment.
- b. To provide routine barracks and accelerated training requirements.
- c. To make up the differences between War and Peace allowances of equipment and supplies for units already organized. Equipment and supply lists were prepared "in toto" for the below listed units by the Supply Officer, Representative, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and the Marine Corps Supply Depot, Camp Pendleton. These were automatically filled by the latter organization:

- 2 Inf Bns (K-W) (for 1/7 and 3/7)
- 1 Rifle Co (K-W) (for "F" Co, 2/7)
- 1 105 How Btry (K-W) ("I" Btry)
- 1 Platoon, Collecting and Clearing Co
- 1 Platoon, Engr Co
- 1 Platoon, Tank Co
- 1 Platoon, Shore Party Co
- 1 Anti-Tank Co, Inf Regiment
- 1 4.2 Mortar Co, Inf Regiment
- All vehicles authorized

Class I and Class III (30 days for reinf regiment); and Class IV - Cold weather clothing (for reinf regiment)

Class V supplies (5 U/F for entire ROT) were computed by Headquarters, Marine Corps, and requisitioned by the Regimental Ordnance Officer thru U. S. Naval Ammunition Depot, Fallbrook, California. Transportation during this period was procured on temporary loan from several local sources at Camp Pendleton; drivers were furnished by using units. Messing, medical service, and other routine functions were provided under the normal system for Fleet Marine Force units based at continental U. S. Posts.

On 21 August delivery of supplies and equipment requisitioned and/or furnished under the procedures outlined above commenced, and continued until after the main body of the Regiment (Reinf) had actually departed from the U. S.

Receipt, storage, issued, packing, manifesting, and marking of these supplies and equipment continued on a 24 hour a day basis throughout the period. A system for channeling the impedimenta to units concerned was set up and functioned in a highly satisfactory manner, under the circumstances of rapid organization and great dispersion of units, scattered from Tent Camp #2 to Camp Del Mar to Area #14 at Camp Pendleton. The vast amount of gear which was distributed (roughly the equivalent of 6,000 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T Truck loads) and the short period of time available for this distribution precluded detailed inventory upon receipt; but practically all major items necessary to sustain units in combat were

actually in the hands of troops and ready for use prior to sailing. An ordnance inspection team (provisional from personnel within the regiment), was set up which, augmented by details from units concerned, cleaned and inspected all weapons and other major items of ordnance prior to issue. This considerably reduced the incidence of initial issues of unserviceable weapons. After receipt and issue of motor transport equipment, borrowed vehicles were returned. Class I, III, and part of IV (cold weather clothing) supplies were delivered directly to the dockside at San Diego to eliminate the necessity of double handling. Class V was procured and delivered from many sources (via air, van, freight, and express) directly to Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, California, where it was received, staged, and loaded into ships by the Regimental Ordnance Officer in conjunction with local authorities. The 30 day Class II replenishment and Class IV engineer fortification supplies for the entire Regimental Combat Team were processed on the Camp Pendleton air strip by a detail from the Training Replacement center, Camp Pendleton, and sent directly to San Diego from that area.

Upon arrival at INCHON, Korea on 21 September 1950 all classes of supply, except Class II organic equipment and supplies, were landed, and turned over to the Engineer Special Brigade. Class II supplies and equipment were segregated by representatives of RCT-7 under the supervision of RSO, and stored or delivered to units as indicated. Vehicles were sent to units immediately upon landing. This segregation was continued for the duration of the operations ashore in the INCHON area; being necessary to assure the supply of many critical items to units, when these items were not available from other sources ashore.

During the period 21 to 23 September 1950 supply was via normal division channels. Elements of the RCT under Division control were administered directly by higher echelon. Traffic was hampered by poor, narrow, often tenuous roads and heavy dust. Attached service troops had reverted to parent control on landing and not been reattached.

On 23 September 1950 the first additional transportation was assigned: 13 trucks, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T, 6x6 from "D" Company, 1st Motor Transport Battalion. These trucks were distributed among the various units of the Regiment, and were used in the displacement of organizational equipment, as well as to supplement the partial unit distribution of supplies by Division. A regimental dump was activated near the Command Post on the west bank of the Han River to receive gear from INCHON as requested by units, as well as to function as the storage and distribution points for supplies and equipment for further operations. The Command Post and forward dump displaced across the Han River to TA 1264 X on the afternoon of 23 September 1950.

During the period 24 to 26 September, logistical support of the regiment was assigned to the Division Shore Party installation (at ferry) as elements crossed the Han River. Due to constantly changing priorities, however, certain trucks carrying 7th Marines equipment and supplies were forced to wait as long as 3 days on the west bank of the HAN River before being permitted to cross. Thus the 13 trucks

Assigned were not all available until the completion of this phase. Even these trucks however, were withdrawn piecemeal during the period; only 6 remained on the 26th.

Medical supplies, particularly blankets, stretchers, and routine aid station supplies, were obtainable but in insufficient quantities. Initial equipment was not delivered from INCHON until about 2 weeks after landing. Small Class I, III and V dumps were set up in the immediate vicinity of the Regimental Command Post; those units closer to the ferry than to the Command Post drew directly from the Shore Party. A combination of unit and supply point distribution prevailed, the latter predominating. The Shore Party maintained a dump of Class I, III, and V supplies (averaging about one day level) for all troops east in their zone of support. Few items were requested which were not available at that dump; exceptions were certain ordnance items such as anti-personnel mines, trip flares, etc. These were generally procurable on a few hours' notice. 5 in 1 rations were directed by Commanding General, 1st Marine Division to be used whenever possible in lieu of "G" rations, due to an acute shortage of the latter; but inasmuch as battalions were moving often rapidly, and considerable distances, substitution was not practicable for over 30% of our strength. BAKER rations were manifestly impracticable due to the fluidity of the situation.

On 25 September 1950 a 3 day post exchange ration was received from Division. It was distributed as expeditiously as practicable, although due to the tactical situation it was 5 days before the 2d Battalion could receive its portion. On 26 September 1950 Jeep #155895 was damaged beyond repair in a motor vehicle accident due to enemy fire. Jeep #109902 was destroyed by a land mine. The lunette assembly broke on 2 water trailers.

When the Regimental Command Post displaced to TA 1762 M, on 26 September, a small regimental forward dump (about 1 day supply) and motor park were established in the immediate vicinity.

Critical Class II shortages continued to be requested from the INCHON cargo sorting detail, and delivered either directly from the dockside or from the Regimental Rear Dump across the Han River. 5 additional trucks were sent to this regiment on loan from "C" Company, 1st Motor Transport Battalion. From 27 to 30 September 1950 all of the regimental Special Staff Officers with cognizance of logistical problems were at the Regimental Command Post. Supply was normal. As battalions spread over more distant and difficult terrain, supply problems increased considerably. On occasion trucks were used for tactical moves; this placed a greater burden on the supply system. One truck 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T was furnished by the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion to assist in the supply of that attached unit. Although arrangements were made for the 5th Korean Marine Corps Battalion to distribute rations to their component units in accordance with their actual strength, this was not always accomplished. As a result, on one occasion, certain small Korean Marine Corps units received a very late issue. The issue of steel helmets and entrenching tools to attached Korean Marines was expedited.

Jeep #155829 was destroyed by a land mine.

The Shore Party ferry installation previously used was farther distant than the other Shore Party ferry in SEOUL; accordingly, supplies were drawn from latter dumps, except for units operating well north of Regimental Command Post. These continued to draw directly from north ferry dumps. Combination of unit and supply point distribution prevailed.

The regiment received the first issue of fresh bread (2200 pounds) on 28 September. This item continued to be issued in that amount daily until the bakery was secured about 6 October. Distribution of 5 in 1 rations for relatively stationary units and "C" rations for fast moving units still prevailed.

On 27 September 1950, 10 trucks were assigned to the Regiment by order of Commanding General, 1st Marine Division for use as organic augmentation. They were assigned to subordinate units as follows: Two per battalion; one to the Anti-Tank Company; 3 to the Regimental Motor Pool. All trucks were in use at least 12 hours each day, many for 24 hours. The remaining trucks on loan from 1st Motor Transport Battalion were returned during the period 27-30 September.

On 30 September 1950 all dumps East of the HAN River were consolidated in the vicinity of the Command Post where the Regimental Dump remained until 7 October 1950.

Plans for displacement of the Regimental Dump West of HAN River were not carried out due to lack of transportation.

9. E. CAPTURED MATERIEL

Commencing with RCT-7's entry into combat on 22 September 1950, and continuing until the conclusion of the SEOUL-UIJONGBU campaign on 5 October 1950, enemy materiel of various kinds and in ever increasing quantities was overrun as the battle progressed. With the collapse of his UIJONGBU defenses, the enemy, now completely disorganized, left great quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment. Generally, however, RCT-7's advance up the corridor was so rapid that Battalion CP's spent more time moving forward during daylight hours than they did in stationary establishments. Consequently, assault infantry leaders and intelligence personnel did not have the time to thoroughly cover the ground overrun so as to make a complete or accurate tabulation of enemy dead and materiel. However, some of the enemy's losses were reported via the intelligence network and are herewith recorded as follows:

Captured 6 45mm guns
195 MG's (10 heavy)
9 57mm guns AT
2 AAA (light)
11 82mm Mortars
9 120mm Mortars

75 Tons commercial explosives

Several hundred Jap Bayonets

3 Large generators and stationary Radio Installations

7 14.5 PTRS AT Rifle

Numerous Rifles and SMG's

Large quantity of SA Ammo, hand grenades and artillery ammo

6 Enemy tanks destroyed (known)

9. F. KEY LOCATIONS TAKEN

Key locations taken by the 7th Marines during the operation are as follows:

DIVISION OBJECTIVE 11 (Hill 88 in TA 1167)

The capture of this objective cut the back road running to the east and west north of that hill, thus preventing further use of that road by the enemy for evacuation or reinforcement of SEOUL. This objective was taken simultaneously with the capture of Objective CHARLIE.

DIVISION OBJECTIVE CHARLIE (PYONGYANG-SEOUL highway in TA 1566)

The capture of this objective completely closed all northwest routes into SEOUL for use by the enemy.

DIVISION OBJECTIVE DOG (Hill 338 in TA 1960)

The capture of this objective closed the pass on the PYONGYANG-SEOUL highway at the outskirts of SEOUL, linking the 7th Marine with the 5th Marines and preventing possible enemy infiltration out of SEOUL into rear areas at that point.

DIVISION OBJECTIVE DAKER (Hill 171 in TA 2464)

The capture of this objective prevented further use of the UIJONGJU-SEOUL highway into SEOUL by the enemy.

UIJONGJU (TA 2898)

The capture of this town and occupation of the high ground around the town, established a blocking position on the road to SEOUL on the X Corps final phase line and prevented further use of the lateral roads in that area by the enemy.

9. G. ESTIMATED ENEMY LOSSES

Enemy losses in personnel are not known entirely as many resulted from air, artillery bombardment to such an extent as to often result in negligible resistance to the advance of ground troops. The enemy's counter action to air and artillery attacks was night maneuver and excellent employment of camouflage. Only by employing such measures was the enemy able to stave off complete annihilation.

There were no known personnel losses attributed to battlefield diseases or neuroses, nor was there any concrete evidence on which to base the relationship between KIA and WIA.

FOR Period 22 September 1950 to 5 October 1950, 2115 estimated KIA.

9. H. KNOWN ENEMY DEAD

As in the case of captured material, an accurate determined or a close estimated approximation of enemy dead was virtually impossible in the type of steep hills warfare peculiar to this campaign.

Quite often, as our attack was launched on a particular Objective, fire was received in varying degrees of intensity from nearby commanding terrain. Those positions would then be subjected to intense air and artillery attacks neutralizing or driving off the enemy located thereon. In many instances the enemy would move or bury his dead while in others, many enemy died in well concealed entrenchments that have never been discovered. Subsequently patrols would report negative, or, as a result of limited experience, would state in vacuous terms, i.e., many, few, some enemy dead. A paucity of this type intelligence resulted. The known enemy dead are tabulated as follows:

For period 22 September 1950 to 5 October 1950, 229 known dead.

9. I. STATUS OF MORALE

Excellent.

9. J. VARIATIONS IN COMBAT EFFICIENCY

The regiment entered in the battle for the SEOU Area untested in combat. The combat efficiency of the regiment prior to entry into combat was excellent from the standpoint of personnel strength and morale. Individual training was very good in view of the fact that the regiment was organized largely with regulars and active reserves. Little unit training was possible because of the short time between activation and entry into combat. This fact makes it difficult to evaluate combat efficiency of the regiment as related to the status of unit training.

Combat efficiency of the regiment was tested and improved by comparatively easy stages in the western defenses of the SEOU Area through patrol action and light skirmishes with the enemy. As contact with the enemy grew in strength and intensity, the fighting ability of the individual, the unit leader and the units as a whole at all echelons improved. The experience gained in practical application of tactical and logistical principles, enabled the units to be welded together into a combat team capable of exerting and maintaining the heavy pressure of combined arms.

Though casualties weakened units in personnel strength, the combat efficiency of the regiment increased proportionately with the experience gained in actual combat.

10. COMMENTS

During the period of 15 days from 17 August, when RCT-7 was activated at Camp Pendleton, until 1 September, when the unit sailed from San Diego, the following agencies performed services and rendered assistance and advice so valuable that they are deserving of special mention:

Representative, CG FMFPac, and Staff

CG, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego

Special Representative of the Quartermaster General
(Col HAWLEY C. WATERMAN, USMC)

CO, Marine Corps Supply Depot, Camp Pendleton
(Col RALPH B. DE WITT, USMC)

Officers in Charge at Naval Station, Navy Pier,

and Naval ammunition Depot, San Diego

Com Trans Div 21 and Staff

(Capt. S. B. KELLY, USN)

RCT-7 was composed of about 51% Reserves and 49% Regulars. The Reserves fitted into their duties and responsibilities quickly and their performance on such short notice has proved the value of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve.

The combined arms - air, artillery, engineers, infantry and tanks-worked well together in this initial operation. The methods of coordinating these arms, which have been developed by the Marine Corps since 1943, are considered sound. There is still room for improvement in communications, particularly radio sets.

The performance of KMC units attached was very satisfactory.

Pilfering and unnecessarily rough handling of cargo at INCHON seemed excessive and caused great loss to the government and to individuals.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

That helicopters be made available for troop movement, supply, evacuation, and wire-laying in hilly terrain.

That regiment and each battalion have two Forward Air Controllers.

That improved illuminating projectiles of all types be developed.

That field promotions to commissioned rank, as authorized in the last war, be readopted.

That in operations such as this, infantry regiments have attached a minimum of 15 $2\frac{1}{2}$ 6x6 trucks, to be allocated as follows:

[REDACTED]
3 to each battalion

2 to 4.2 Mortar Company

1 to AT Company

6 to be retained in Regimental Motor Pool

All 18 trucks could tow one water trailer (18 are authorized under present T/E but no prime movers are provided).

H. L. LITZENBERG, Jr.
H. L. LITZENBERG, Jr.

[REDACTED]
41-RR

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY
 7TH MARINES
 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINF) FMF,

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
Col	9902	Regimental Commander	LITZENBERG, Homer L.	Col	9906	03959	17Aug50 - 70ct50
LtCol	0302	Executive Officer	HARRISON, Charles W.	LtCol	0302	05187	17Aug50 - 11Sep50
Maj	0406	S-4	DOWSETT, Frederick R.	LtCol	0302	05234	12Sep50 - 70ct50
Capt	0170	S-1 Adjutant	NELL, David L.	Maj	0302	07900	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	5230	Special Services Off	GROVE, John R.	Capt	0301	013051	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0130	Asst S-1; PersClfn& Assgto	TROMBETTER, Robert E.	CWO	5230	040662	17Aug50 - 20ct50
Lt	0130	Asst S-1	SHEA, William E.	1stLt	0302	042316	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Liaison Officer	ESKELL, Lawrence W.	1stLt	0110	043498	17Aug50 - 70ct50
			BALZER, George T.	2dLt	0302	049608	17Aug50 - 70ct50
<u>INTELLIGENCE SECTION</u>							
Maj	0230	S-2	FRANCE, Donald R.	Capt	0302	013596	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0230	Asst S-2	ROE, Patrick C.	2dLt	0302	049785	17Aug50 - 70ct50
WO	0240	Photo Interpreter	HAUSSKE, Albert J.	1stLt	6272	026199	18Aug50 - 20ct50
<u>OPERATION SECTION</u>							
Maj	0306	S-3	FRIDRICH, Raymond	Maj	0302	08344	17Aug50 - 30Sep50
Capt	0306	Asst S-3	WOESSNER, Henry J.	Maj	0302	08588	10ct50 - 70ct50
			WARREN, Walter T.	Maj	0301	010313	17Aug50 - 70ct50
			HAMLIN, Hubert J.	Capt	0301	014260	17Aug50 - 70ct50

42-RR

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
<u>CHAPLAIN SECTION</u>							
LCDR	ChC	Regimental Chaplain	GRAVEN, John E.	LCDR	ChC	209299	9Sep50 - 7Oct50
Lt	ChC	Asst " "	HEARN, Kester M.	Lt	ChC	399282	22Aug50 - 7Oct50
Lt(jg)	ChC	Chaplain	GRIFFIN, Cornelius J.	Lt(jg)	ChC	522437	22Aug50 - 7Oct50
<u>DENTAL SECTION</u>							
LCDR	DC	Regimental Dental O	BREMER, George W.	Lt(jg)	DC	482210	9Sep50 - 7Oct50
<u>MEDICAL SECTION</u>							
LCDR	MC	Regimental Medical O	BYRNE, Edward G.	Lt(jg)	MC	490722	17Aug50 - 7Oct50
<u>PLATOON HEADQUARTERS</u>							
Capt	3010	Supply Officer	LAUBACH, Richard C.	2dLt	3010	019949	17Aug50 - 7Oct50
Lt	0430	Asst S-4; TQM	HAYES, James M.	1stLt	0302	047218	17Aug50 - 7Oct50
Lt	3020	OrdSup&MunitionO	DU CHARM, Roy H.	2dLt	3010	016038	18Aug50 - 7Oct50
<u>DISBURSING SECTION</u>							
Maj	3405	Disbursing O	BRAZKE, Herman A.	Capt	3405	09373	17Aug50 - 7Oct50
		AsstDisbO	BURRILL, Ray M.	Capt	3405	010120	10Sep50 - 7Oct50
WO	3410	AsstDisbO	THOMAS, Walter H.	CWO	3410	035374	17Aug50 - 7Oct50
WO	3410	Asst DisbO	MEZA, Michael	WO	3410	04279	27Aug50 - 7Oct50
<u>MAINTENANCE SECTION</u>							
Capt	3510	Asst S-4	WHITTEKER, William	1stLt	3520	09128	20Aug50 - 7Oct50
		Asst MT O	BEAN, Ernest T.	WO	0310	046331	17Aug50 - 7Oct50

43-RR

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
<u>SUPPLY SECTION</u>							
WO	3010	Asst Supply O	MEEK, Donald L.	CWO	3010	018692	20Aug50 - 70ct50
<u>PLATOON HEADQUARTERS</u>							
Maj	2502	Communication O	ZAWASKY, George E.	Capt	2502	016319	17Aug50 - 70ct50
WO	2520	Asst Com Officer	NOWAK, Stanley A.	WO	2520	019468	17Aug50 - 70ct50
<u>COMPANY HEADQUARTERS</u>							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	SMITH, Jefferson D. Jr.	Maj	0302	011185	17Aug50 - 10ct50
		Company Officer	SHIELDS, Nicholas L.	Capt	0302	017949	10ct50 - 70ct50
		Company Officer	KRIEG, Elmer A.	1stLt	0301	034376	17Aug50 - 70ct50
<u>ANGLICO DET</u>							
			DIVENY, John K.	1stLt	0301	033515	17Aug50 -
			CONNELL, Herschel G.	1stLt	7302	035524	17Aug50 -
			HAYS, Robert C.	Lt(jg)	USN	474413	17Aug50 -

44-RR

1st Battalion, 7th Marines
 1st Marine Division, (Reinforced), FME
 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SERNO	PERIOD
<u>HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY</u>							
<u>HEADQUARTERS PLATOON</u>							
LtCol	0302	Battalion Commander	DAVIS, Raymond G.	LtCol	0302	05831	31Aug50 - 70ct50
Maj	0302	Executive Officer	SAWYER, Webb D.	Maj	0302	07847	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	0406	S-4	EMILS, Arnold L.	Capt	0302	020680	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	0302	Company Commander	STARR, Elmer L.	Capt	0302	014276	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	5710	CmlWar&RadiologicalDe- fenseO	SKVARIL, Warren J.	2dLt	0302	048167	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	LiaisonO	WRIGHT, William W.	Capt	0302	08563	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Liaison O	GAUL, Wilbert R.	1stLt	0302	041203	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0130	S-1; Adjutant	RHODES, William C.	1stLt	0130	045446	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	5230	Special Services O	COLLINS, William H.	1stLt	5230	040390	18Aug50 - 70ct50
WO	0110	Asst Adj; Pers Clfn& AsgtO	ORR, James H.	CWO	0110	019305	17Aug50 - 70ct50

COMMUNICATION PLATOON

Capt	2502	Platoon Commander; Bn CommO	WORLEY, Kermit M.	1stLt	2502	048507	17Aug50 - 70ct50
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SERVICE PLATOON

Lt	3010	Platoon Comdr; Bn Q.M.	SMITH, Gordon N.	1stLt	3010	043273	17Aug50 - 70ct50
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T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
MEDICAL PLATOON							
Lt	MC	Battalion Medical O	WEDEMEYER, Robert G.	LtJG	MC	495693	21Aug50 - 70ct50
LtJG	MC	Asst Bn Medical O	CLARK, Daniel W.	LtJG	MC	497706	20Aug50 - 70ct50
WEAPONS COMPANY							
Maj	0302	Company Commander	VORHIES, William E.	Maj	0302	012718	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	0302	Executive Officer	POLSON, Robert J.	Capt	0302	017051	17Aug50 - 70ct50
MACHINE GUN PLATOON							
Lt	0302	Platoon Commander	SHEPPARD, Edward B.	1stLt	0302	046596	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltComdr AT Assault Plt	FLOYD, Donald S.	2dLt	0302	017956	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltComdr 81mm MortarSec	BLANDFORD, Richard P. Jr	1stLt	0302	044374	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	AsstPltComdr 81mm " "	DONOHUE, Francis I.	1stLt	0302	044691	17Aug50 - 70ct50
"A" COMPANY							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	BANKS, David W.	Capt	0302	017045	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	NOVATIER, Eugencus M.	1stLt	0302	037574	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	SecLdr 60mm MortarSec	DAVIS, William J.	1stLt	0302	049480	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr MG Plt	BOLES, Jack F.	1stLt	0302	048041	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	MITCHELL, Frank N.	1stLt	0302	048132	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	BRADLEY, Bobbie B.	2dLt	0302	011660	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	STEMPLE, James W.	2dLt	0302	049931	17Aug50 - 70ct50
"B" COMPANY							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	WILCOX, Myron E. Jr	Capt	0302	021866	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	KURCABA, Joseph R.	1stLt	0302	039091	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr MG Plt	LEE, Cheween	1stLt	0302	049826	17Aug50 - 70ct50

46-RR

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
Lt	0302	SocLdr 60mm MortarSec	OWEN, Joseph R.	2dLt	0302	049826	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	WILSON, John B.	1stLt	0302	041405	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	GRAEBER, William G. Jr	1stLt	0302	045523	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	KISER, Harrel	1stLt	0302	047874	17Aug50 - 70ct50
"C" COMPANY							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	DELANAR, Richard F. III	Capt	0302	012993	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	HILL, Twyman R.	1stLt	0302	045538	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr MG Plt	KLIEFORTH, George C.	1stLt	0302	049460	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	SocLdr 60mm MortarSec	PENNY, Chester C. Jr	1stLt	0302	044020	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	ELLIS, Grant R.	1stLt	0302	046107	17Aug50 -
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	NIETSCHMANN, William J.	1stLt	0302	047641	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	ADAIR, Hugh D. Jr.	2dLt	0302	049616	17Aug50 -

47-ER

2d Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division, (Reinforced) FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
LtCol	0302	Battalion Commander	HINKLE, Thornton M	LtCol	0302	05359	17Aug50 - 28Sep50
Maj	0302	Executive Officer	SAWYER, Webb D.	Maj	0302	07847	28Sep50 - 70Oct50
Capt	0406	S-4	CAREY, Roland E.	Maj	0302	08184	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Maj	0306	S-3	ANDERSON, Walter R. Jr	Capt	0301	013297	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	3010	Bn Supply O	LAWRENCE, James F Jr.	Maj	0302	07913	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0130	Bn S-1; Adj	WILSON, John E	Capt	3010	019626	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
		PersO	RYAN, Leo R.	1stLt	0302	041441	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Capt	2502	CommO	THORUP, Kent D.	1stLt	0302	047970	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0302	LiaisonO	DAVENPORT, Leslie L.	1stLt	2502	034222	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
			SIDOR, John L.	1stLt	0301	047098	17Aug50 - 70Oct50

WEAPONS COMPANY

Maj	0302	Company Commander	LAWRENCE, James F. Jr.	Maj	0302	07913	17Aug50 - 26Sep
Capt	0302	Executive Officer	GIVENS, Harry L.	Capt	0301	016143	26Sep50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr 81mm MortarPlt	GIVENS, Harry L.	Capt	0301	016143	17Aug50 - 26Sep50
Lt	0302	PltCndr MG Plt	AUSTIN, Marshall S.	1stLt	0302	043429	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
			BOOTH, Joseph A.	1stLt	0301	028336	17Aug50 - 70Oct50

"D" COMPANY

Maj	0302	Company Commander	BREEN, Richard R.	Capt	0302	016320	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Capt	0302	Executive Officer	GOODMAN, William H. Jr.	1stLt	0302	028397	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0302	60mm Mortar Sec Ldr	HAMMOND, James D. Jr.	1stLt	0302	028412	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0302	MG PltCndr	GOGGIN, William F.	1stLt	0301	044716	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	SNEEBURGER, Edward H.	1stLt	0302	043059	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	MULLANEY, Paul V.	1stLt	0302	034396	17Aug50 - 70Oct50
Lt	0302	PltCndr Rifle Plt	THOMPSON, T. L. Jr.	1stLt	0302	031128	17Aug50 - 70Oct50

48-PR

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
"E" COMPANY							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	PHILLIPS, Walter D. Jr.	Capt	0302	031052	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	BALL, Raymond O.	1stLt	0302	047727	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	60mm Mortar Plt	SCHRIER, William J.	1stLt	0302	049221	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	MG Plt Ldr	WELLS, Richard P.	2ndLt	0302	049908	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	CLEMENTS, Leonard M.	1stLt	0302	037520	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	YANCEY, John	1stLt	0302	036570	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	SHROPSHIRE, Arthur H.	1stLt	0302	040244	17Aug50 -
"F" COMPANY							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	ZORN, Elmer J.	Capt	0301	032130	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	WRIGHT, Clark B.	1stLt	0302	044495	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	60mm Mortar Plt	SHARP, "J" "D"	1stLt	0302	043645	20Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	MG Plt Ldr	SCHMITT, Lawrence J.	1stLt	0302	044044	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	VAN CANTFORT, Rollin F.	1stLt	0302	047980	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	MC CANN, Joseph H. Jr.	1stLt	0108	029303	20Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	ABELL, Welton R.	1stLt	0302	043826	20Aug50 - 70ct50

49-RR

3d Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division, (Reinforced), FMF,
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
<u>HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY</u>							
LtCol	0302	Battalion Commander	ROACH, Maurice E.	Maj	0302	08492	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Maj	0302	Executive Officer	MORRIS, Warren	Maj	0302	08444	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0301	Bn S-1 & Adj	HILL, Robert E.	1stLt	0301	048356	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0130	BnPersCln&AsgtO	GALAZIEWSKI, Anthony J.	1stLt	0130	019748	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	0406	Bn S-4	WORTMAN, Harry D.	Capt	0301	018600	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Bn LiaisonO	COLD, Frank E.	1stLt	0802	039090	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	2502	CommO	STONE, Earnest H. Jr.	1stLt	2502	045147	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	CnlWar&RadDofO	FITZGEORGE, Harold J.	1stLt	0302	046119	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	0302	CO H&S Co	HARRS, Eric R.	Capt	0302	018094	17Aug50 - 70ct50
<u>WEAPONS COMPANY</u>							
Maj	0302	Company Commander	WOSSNER, Henry J. II	Maj	0302	08588	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Capt	0302	Executive Officer	PARKER, Austin S.	1stLt	0302	049026	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	MG Plt Ldr	DEPPE, John J.	1stLt	0302	040077	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	81mm Mortar Plt	GLASGOW, Joseph M.	1stLt	0302	049922	17Aug50 - 70ct50
<u>"G" COMPANY</u>							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	COONEY, Thomas E.	Capt	0301	032333	12Sep50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	HARRIS, Howard H.	1stLt	0302	048095	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	MG Plt Ldr	MORROW, Richard C.	2dLt	0302	049631	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	60mm Mortar SocLdr	JACKSON, John M.	2dLt	0302	049783	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	EARNEST, George R.	1stLt	0302	049337	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Rifle Plt Ldr	MOONEY, Arthur R.	2dLt	0302	049894	17Aug50 - 70ct50

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
"H" COMPANY							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	SHIELDS, Nicholas L.	Capt	0302	017949	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	FOOTE, William C.	1stLt	0302	046006	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	MG Plt Sndr	FRIESEN, Clarence W.	2ndLt	0302	049947	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	60mm Mortar Sec Ldr	DENNY, Paul E.	2ndLt	0302	049794	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Riflo Plt Ldr	NEWTON, Minard P.	2dLt	0302	049755	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Riflo Plt Ldr	REEM, Robert D.	2dLt	0302	049636	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Riflo Plt Ldr	SALVO, Victor A. Jr.	2dLt	0302	049844	17Aug50 - 70ct50
"I" COMPANY							
Capt	0302	Company Commander	SENGEWALD, Richard H.	Capt	0302	020190	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	JOHNSON, William E.	1stLt	0302	045050	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	MG Plt Ldr	THOMAS, Alfred I.	1stLt	0302	045440	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	60mm Mortar Plt	WERKOWSKI, John W. Jr.	2ndLt	0302	045890	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Riflo Plt Ldr	DAY, Lloyd R.	1stLt	0302	046742	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Riflo Plt Ldr	DONOVAN, Francis S.	2dLt	0301	049188	17Aug50 - 70ct50
Lt	0302	Riflo Plt Ldr	MORDEENTE, Joseph	2dLt	0302	049841	17Aug50 - 70ct50

51-RR

4.3 Mortar Company, 7th Marines
 1st Marine Division, (Reinforced), FMF
 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
Capt	0302	Company Commander	LOW, Stanley D.	Maj	0301	08150	17Aug50 - 7Oct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	VINCENT, Gordon	1stLt	0302	022911	17Aug50 - 7Oct50
Lt	0302	Platoon Commander	SEMINOFF, Nicholas M.	1stLt	0302	034429	17Aug50 - 7Oct50

52-RR

ANTI-TANK COMPANY
 7TH MARINES,
 1ST MARINE DIVISION, (REINFORCED), FMF
 c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

T/O RANK	T/O MOS	DUTIES	NAME	ACT RANK	ACT MOS	SER NO	PERIOD
Capt	0302	Company Commander	DELONG, Earl R.	1stLt	0302	048884	18Aug50 - 7Oct50
Lt	0302	Executive Officer	ELLEDGE, Raymond J.	1stLt	0302	048520	24Aug50 - 7Oct50
Lt	0302	Platoon Commander	TIEF, Francis W.	2dLt	0302	049935	18Aug50 - 7Oct50

ANNEX SS TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Hq, 11th Marines (Reinf)
 1st Marine Div, FMF,
 In the Field.

26 Nov 1950

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF
 Subj: Special Action Report for period 29 Aug-7 Oct 1950
 Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the reference, this report is submitted to report upon the actions of this organization for the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL area operation, from 29 August 1950 to 7 October, 1950. This Regiment was assigned its normal mission of providing artillery support to the 1st Marine Division, which is the next higher echelon.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

	Commanding Officer	Strength	
		Off	Enl
a. 11th Marines	Col. J.H. BROWER		
Headquarters Btry	Capt. A.H. WUNDERLY	30	208
Service Btry	Capt. G.B. MCKINSTERY	14	71
1st Battalion	LtCol. R. M. WOOD	43	621
2nd Battalion	LtCol. M. ADELMAN	42	620
3rd Battalion	Major F. F. PERRY	43	640
4th Battalion	Major W. MC REYNOLDS	32	602
b. Attached Units			
1st Amph Bk Co, FMF	Capt. J. BOOKHOUT	5	186
Btry 200, 1st 4.5" Rkt Bn, FMF	1stLt. E. A. BUSHE	4	73

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. Initial Information.

Upon arrival of this organization at Kobe, Japan, on 29 August, 1950, there was no information available pertinent to planning other than the fact that the unit was to be billeted in Japan for only a short time. This served as an indicator that planning time would be relatively limited.

A representative from the regiment, the assistant FSCC coordinator, had arrived in Tokyo on 18 August 1950, with advance elements of the Division staff and was familiar with the planning which had taken place while the unit was enroute from the United States. On 1 September 1950 this officer arrived at Kobe and was available for one (1) day to brief the unit commander as to the planning accomplished on the Division level. This officer provided the information as to the target location; approximate target date, based on the September tidal conditions in the target area; and furnished a limited number of aerial photographs of the landing beaches and the island of WOLMI-DO. Also available on this date were a rough draft of an artillery annex and a study of the feasibility of landing artillery on WOLMI-DO at H-Hour for initial support, both of which had been prepared by the assistant coordinator; the first tentative draft of Division Operation Order 2-50, with operations overlay; and the information that the 96th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) would be attached to the 11th Marines. Based upon the above information, planning was initiated on the regimental level on 2 September 1950.

Initial planning was hampered by lack of suitable maps; the only

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available map showing the target area being a peninsula map of Korea, scale 1:1,000,000. An assistant G-3 visited the unit on 2 September 1950 and made available, for a twelve hour period, one map of the target area, scale 1:50,000. As an additional aid to planning, this map was utilized to brief a reconnaissance officer of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, who was to leave for Pusan, Korea, immediately and land with the assault infantry battalion on WOLMI-DO about H-12 hours. The assistant G-3 also furnished the information that the Division staff would arrive in Kobe on 5 September 1950.

This unit completed the first tentative draft of the artillery annex (less Appendix 1, position areas, check concentrations and zones of fire) and a proposed landing plan on 5 September 1950 and delivered same to the Division on that date. Distribution was also made to the regiment and attached units for planning purposes.

Distribution of Division Operation Order 2-50 (less certain annexes) and military maps for the operation was made to this unit on 6 September 1950.

The landing plan as contained in Annex DOG to Division Operation Order 2-50, called for landing the regimental and battalion reconnaissance parties and the firing batteries of the light battalions by DUKWS in waves and columns on GREEN beach commencing at H-Hour. The COMPHIBGRU ONE landing plan giving the tractor area, rendezvous area, line of departure, location of control vessel, etc., was received by regimental headquarters just before sailing from KOBE; distribution to all artillery LST's could not be made before sailing. Based on the COMPHIBGRU plan, detailed landing instructions were formulated by regimental headquarters enroute to the target, and were distributed to all artillery LST's and the artillery logistical officer aboard the GREEN control vessel on 13 September. There existed considerable doubt that this plan could be executed without rehearsal, since it was an unusual plan as far as artillery was concerned, and the lack of compasses and radios in the DUKWS and a vague promise of guide boats provided no positive means of control.

b. Concurrent planning.

Due to the fact that this organization was enroute from the United States during the initial planning phase, the Division artillery officer had no opportunity to make recommendations, estimates, or proposed plans to the landing force commander. Consequently, concurrent planning was affected only in the minimum manner described in paragraph 3. a. above.

c. Alternate plans.

Lack of adequate planning time precluded the formulation of alternate plans in this organization as well as in higher echelons.

d. Knowledge of enemy situation.

During the planning phase, intelligence information was limited to vertical stereo pairs of aerial photographs of the immediate target area. Knowledge of the enemy strength and disposition in the target area was totally lacking. The enemy capability of firing on WOLMI-DO from the mainland influenced a decision to establish flash-ranging stations on the high ground of the island, slightly to the rear of gun position areas.

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e. Planning schedules.

The planning schedule was limited to a five day period from 1-5 September 1950, as dictated by the time and space factors described above.

f. Effect of inadequate planning time.

The accelerated planning schedule resulted in the following effects:

- (1) Final landing plans were not completed prior to embarkation, which necessitated distribution while enroute to the target area.
- (2) There was no opportunity to properly brief subordinate units as to the landing plan.
- (3) Coordination was not effected with Naval control groups, which resulted in the unit not landing according to plan.
- (4) Planning was not as thorough and detailed as prescribed by current doctrines.
- (5) Time and space factors precluded a thorough dissemination of planning information to subordinate units.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS.

a. Training.

No amphibious training was conducted by the unit prior to the embarkation. During the period 30 August to 8 September, 1950, the unit participated in basic individual training, fundamental artillery subjects, and physical conditioning. During the movement to the objective area, 9-15 September 1950, all elements conducted intelligence briefings, indoctrination in the handling of prisoners-of-war, and captured enemy documents and materiel.

b. Rehearsals.

No rehearsals were scheduled or executed for this operation.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

a. Organization.

Embarkation Group DOG was established by 1st Marine Division Embarkation Order 1-50. This group consisted of the following units:

	Officers	Enlisted
11th Marines (less 1stBn and Det)	104	1523
Det 1st Engineer Bn	1	50
1st AmTrkCo (less Det)	4	144
Det 2nd Engineer Special Brigade (USA)	4	100

Six SCAJAP LST's and one AKA (USS WASHBURN) were assigned Group DOG. The LST's were manned by Japanese crews. LST Q094 was assigned as the regimental command ship. LST's Q014, Q018, and Q019 were assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines was assigned Q059, Q071 and the USS WASHBURN (AKA-108). "M" Battery, 4/11 and the detachment of the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade were embarked on the USS WASHBURN.

b. Loading.

(1) Embarkation Group DOG.

Loading of the six LST's commenced on 7 September at KOBE, Japan. Approximately forty-eight hours was required to load one unit of fire of 105mm howitzer ammunition, understowed on the tank deck of

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each of three LST's: 6014, 6018, and 6019; and one unit of fire of 155 mm howitzer ammunition, understowed on the tank deck of each of three LST's: 6059, 6071, and 6094. The loading of this ammunition was a very slow process due to the fact that shortage of time prevented ammunition from being sorted by types when unloaded from other ships. Ammunition was unloaded into barges, then the barges were sent to the LST's for reloading. There were also numerous delays due to unavailability of barges and shortages of various types of ammunition. At approximately 2200 on 9 September 1950, the loading of ammunition ceased, and vehicles, 105mm Howitzers, 155mm Howitzers and DUKWS were loaded aboard. By 0500, 10 September 1950, all six (6) LST's were completely loaded, cargo, vehicles and personnel were aboard and ready for sea.

The USS WASHBURN (AKA-108) was scheduled to begin loading on 3 September 1950, at Kobe, Japan. This schedule was changed because a typhoon struck the KOBE-OSAKA area and caused great damage to equipment and the KOBE dock area, thus postponing the loading by two days. Further delays were caused by the lack of a complete loading plan prior to the commencement of loading. The equipment of "M" Battery filled only a portion of the ship. Division equipment and general cargo was then assigned to be loaded aboard the WASHBURN, but was not available for loading. This equipment and general cargo was in the process of being unloaded from other ships that had just arrived from the United States, with the result that loading was unduly slow. Only after the ship was fully loaded was it possible to complete the loading plans. The USS WASHBURN was completely loaded on 10 September 1950.

(2) 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.

The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, then a unit of the 1st Marine Brigade, loaded at Pusan, Korea, aboard three SOAJAP LST's: 6030, 6052, and 6012. Loading commenced on 9 September and was completed on 10 September 1950. This battalion was a unit of Embarkation Group Charlie I, with a platoon of the 1st Amphibian Truck Company (34 DUKWS) attached.

(3) "C" Battery, 1st 4.5" Rkt Bn, FMF.

"C" Battery, 1st 4.5" Rkt Battalion, FMF, an attached unit of the 11th Marine Regiment upon departure from the United States was detached and assigned to Embarkation Group Baker and attached to the 1st Marine Regiment. Loading commenced on 6 September 1950 at KOBE, Japan. The battery personnel and equipment were embarked on LST's 1138, 715, 6073, 1048 and 883. Two units of fire for the 4.5" rocket launchers was also loaded. Loading was completed on 8 September 1950.

(4) 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines.

The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, was loaded with RCT-7 in San Diego, California, on six different ships. This battalion arrived at the target area on 21 September 1950, six (6) days after the landing, and joined the 11th Marine Regiment.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

This phase was without incident and was completed on 15 September, 1950, for all units except the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion arrived at the objective area on 21 September, 1950. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinf, FMF was redesignated as the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF on 13 September, 1950.

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SCAJAP LST's did not meet normal standards in respect to cleanliness and messing facilities. "B" rations were consumed aboard these vessels enroute.

7. OPERATIONS.

Assault Phase, 15-16 September (inclusive).

15Sep50: At about 0630, an advance reconnaissance party of the 11th Marines landed on Green Beach, WOLMI-DO Island (TA 8849F1) with the assault waves of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. This advance reconnaissance party consisted of two (2) officers and seven (7) enlisted personnel from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, with a mission of reconnoitering beach exits and position areas. The mission was accomplished prior to H-Hour and was of great assistance to the artillery elements, especially in view of the tide conditions, the confusion on Green Beach, and limited artillery position areas existing on WOLMI-DO.

At about 1400, while enroute through the transport area, radio silence was broken aboard the headquarters LST and efforts were made to establish the artillery net afloat as planned. COMPHIB GRU ONE OpnO 14-50 called for breaking radio silence at H-3 hours and set D-Day and H-Hour as 15 Sept and 1700I respectively, unless otherwise directed; while Div OpnO 2-50 said that D-Day and H-Hour would be announced and radio silence would be "lifted for embarked troops only on order of the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of each element." In the absence of both the announcement and specific orders from OTC, it was concluded that the times indicated above were effective, since the disposition of ships and landing craft indicated that an amphibious assault was about to be executed. Communications afloat were established with Division and the 1st and 4th Battalions, but no contact could be made with the 2nd Battalion or with the Div Arty Officer aboard the AGC.

LSTs closed on the tractor area about 1430. About this time a message was intercepted on the LST control net giving H-Hour as 1730. Personnel were ordered to load in their respective DUKWS about 1530 and prepare for launching, when orders were received from the Commander of the LST flotilla to beach all LSTs on Green Beach. All LSTs weighed anchor and sailed up opposite Green Beach. Troops were recalled from the tank deck and the new plan was hastily explained. Upon arrival off the beach, orders were received rescinding beaching of LSTs and directing the launching of DUKWS. LSTs anchored where they were, some by the bow, some by the stern, and commenced launching DUKWS. The tractor area did not now resemble the anchor plan given in the COMPHIBGRU order, and the task of forming waves as previously planned proved impossible. Columns formed up as best as they could and proceeded to the beach regardless of time schedule or sequence. To add to the confusion, some LSTs proceeded to move about the narrow channel, thereby cutting across the approach route for light amphibious craft to the Green Beach control vessel. The Q094, upon which elements of the regimental headquarters were embarked, anchored by the bow,

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thus allowing the ship to head into the extremely fast current and making the launching of DUKWS very hazardous. When the third DUKW to go off was caught by the anchor chain and bow doors and almost lost, the troop commander ordered the skipper to come about and anchor by the stern. The remaining elements of the regimental reconnaissance party were launched without incident. The first regimental DUKW beached at 1800, but due to moving LSTs and confusion within the inner-channel, all elements of the reconnaissance party did not land on Green Beach until 1845.

At approximately 1845 firing batteries of the light battalions began to land across Green Beach. The 1st Battalion occupied a position in TA 8849F, the 2nd Battalion occupied a position in TA 8849LM, while the regimental CP was established in TA 87190. Communications were established within the regiment at 2045, at which time regiment assumed control. It was found that difficulties in radio communication were caused by sets being out of calibration, no opportunity being afforded for adjustment after leaving Camp Pendleton. After re-calibration, contact was established with the 2nd Battalion and the Artillery Officer on the AGC. Considerable difficulty was experienced in establishing and maintaining the regimental radio and wire nets because of the many communication personnel who were inexperienced in artillery field operations.

By 2150 both light battalions had registered and were in position prepared to support the assault regiments. Due to existing terrain, the great amount of smoke overhanging the city of INCHON, plus the light resistance being offered, little firing was conducted throughout the night. Artillery LSTs were beached and general unloading commenced at approximately 2330.

16Sep50: More artillery LSTs were beached throughout the night and early morning and general unloading continued.

Little opposition was offered the assault regiments and both light battalions displaced to the mainland. The 1st Battalion, after conducting a reconnaissance, commenced displacement at approximately 1100 to TA 9348G, and was in position by 1700.

The 2nd Battalion commenced displacement at 1200 to TA 9246N. This battalion had completed its registration and was prepared to mass fires in support of the 1st Marines by 1800.

Elements of the 4th Battalion landed on WOLMI-DO and on RED Beach and moved to their first position area at TA 9247G. Movement was commenced at approximately 1700 and occupation of position was not completed until after dark. About 0800 a helicopter landed at the regimental CP to provide airspot. A radio (SCR-619) and an observer were put aboard, but due to communication difficulties the first mission was not fired until about 1100.

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The regimental reconnaissance party went forward at 0830 to reconnoiter a new CP, returning about 1300. About 1715 the regimental commander landed on YELLOW beach, arriving at the CP about 1800.

At 2205 the 1st Battalion was attached to RCT-5.

Thus the assault phase was brought to a close. A minimum amount of firing had been conducted by the artillery battalions due to the light resistance met by the assault infantry units.

b. Exploitation phase, 17Sep-7Oct (inclusive).

17Sep50: The regiment displaced its CP to TA 9247C at 0800. Due to the before mentioned radio difficulties and the fact that the Division was attacking across a series of cross-compartments, the communications continued to be poor. A landing strip for OYs had been selected on a road near Division headquarters, but aerial observation was continued by helicopter during the day, while OYs were put in operating condition. The regimental survey officer conducted a forward reconnaissance by helicopter to assist him in formulating a survey plan.

The 1st Battalion displaced to TA 9950A. This battalion was in position, registered and prepared to mass fires by 1430. At 1700, due to the rapid moving situation the 1st Battalion again displaced to TA 0345L. A high burst registration had been completed and the complete battalion was again supporting the 5th Marines by 2230.

The 2nd Battalion displaced to TA 9647L. This displacement commenced at 1200. Due to the before mentioned rapidly moving situation "E" Battery, 2nd Battalion, was displaced forward to target area 9950K.

The 4th Battalion displaced to TA 9647C at 1400. Occupation of position was not completed prior to darkness. Communications were still difficult and lack of contact with the flash range OPs denied a HB registration. During the night of 17-18 Sep the 4th Battalion fired its first illumination mission. This was to become an every night request as the division moved further inland.

The 96th Field Artillery Battalion commenced unloading over Yellow Beach (TA 8949QL) and rendezvoused in TA 9148 NOST.

18Sep50: The regimental reconnaissance party moved forward at 0830. The CP was displaced to TA 0150R at 1615.

"C" Battery of the 1st 4.5" Rocket Battalion, FMF, was detached from the 1st Marines and attached to the 11th Marines at 1600 this date. The Rocket Battery selected, occupied and organized an assembly area in TA 0354W. Organization was completed by 1700.

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The 4th Battalion displaced to TA 0455Y. The battalion was in position, registered and was prepared to fire in support of the Division by 1500.

One battery of the 96th Field Artillery occupied a position in TA 9648X. This battery was registered by aerial observation at 1410. Liaison type planes were used for the first time for this registration.

19Sep50: Regimental Operation Order 1-50 changed organization for combat within the 11th Marines as follows:

1st Battalion: D/S 5th Marines
2nd Battalion: D/S 1st Marines
4th Battalion: G/S
"C" Battery, 1st 4.5" RktBn, FMF: G/S
96th Field Artillery Bn: G/S; reinforce 2/11

The 1st Battalion commenced displacement at 0600 to TA 0556-0. The battalion was in position supporting the 5th Marines in continuance of its attack by 1200.

"E" Battery, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, displaced to TA 0549L. The battery was in position and continuing its support of the attack of the 1st Marines by 1730.

The 1st Amphibian Truck Company was detached from the 11th Marines and attached to the 5th Marines at 0815.

The 96th Field Artillery Battalion closed on TA 9648X and displaced one battery forward to TA 0150R, occupying the old "E" Battery position after dark.

The regimental CP displaced forward to TA 0756X at 1400 this date.

"C" Battery displaced to TA 0756.

At 2230 organization for combat was changed to read as follows: 1st Battalion and Rocket Battery -- no change; 4th Battalion -- General Support, reinforce 1/11; 96th Field Artillery Battalion -- General Support, reinforce 48th Field Artillery Battalion (7th Army Division).

20Sep50: At approximately 0455 North Korean units defending in the 1st Marines sector launched a strong counter-attack. Scheduled illumination fired by the 4th Battalion uncovered the attack as it was approaching the MLR. Normal barrages were immediately fired by the direct support battalion. Due to the nature of the terrain, the reported formation of the attack, and the accuracy of existing maps, it was possible to select and assign unobserved missions to the 4th Battalion. Surveillance reports proved that the artillery fire introduced in halting this counter-attack accounted for two (2) tanks destroyed, and an estimated 100 enemy killed, and the prevention of "E" Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines from being overrun.

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At 0700 the 1st Battalion and the 4th Battalion fired a 15 minute preparation in the 5th Marines sector in support of the river crossing.

At 1330 the 1st Battalion commenced displacement to TA 0761P. This displacement was completed at 1610.

At 0950 the 2nd Battalion, minus "E" Battery, commenced displacement to TA 0755M. This displacement was completed at approximately 1300. "E" Battery closed on 2/11 prior to darkness.

The 96th FA Bn completed displacement to TA 0150R. Occupation of position was completed prior to darkness.

Harrassing and interdiction missions were assigned and fired by the medium battalions throughout the night.

21Sep50: The 1st Battalion displaced to TA 1157E at 0830. Occupation of position by the first firing battery to displace was conducted under counter-battery fire from across the HAN River.

The 2nd Battalion displaced, by echelon, to TA 1152L; displacement was completed by 1200.

VMO-6 commenced operations from Kimpo airfield this date.

The 4th Battalion displaced to TA 0857M. Displacement was completed and the battalion firing in support of the division prior to darkness.

The 96th FA Bn displaced to TA 0855W; displacement was completed about midnight, considerable difficulty being encountered in negotiating a poor road into position.

22Sep50: One (1) 155mm Howitzer from the 96th FA Bn was attached to the 2nd Battalion for illumination of the 1st Marines zone of action. This howitzer remained with the 2nd Battalion for illumination missions only until 29 Sep 1950.

23Sep50: The 4th Battalion (less "L" Battery) displaced to TA 1156H. Displacement was completed prior to darkness.

The 3rd Battalion joined the 11th Marines and was assigned a tactical mission of D/S of the 7th Marines. The 3rd Battalion displaced from its rendezvous area in TA 0354L to a firing position in TA 0760P. Occupation of position and registration was completed prior to darkness.

24Sep50: The 2nd Battalion commenced displacement, by echelon, to TA 1852X at 1430; displacement was completed and the battalion registered by 1800.

The 96th FA Bn displaced to TA 1752A at 1000. Displacement was completed by 1600 with the battalion registered and executing its mission.

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"L" Battery closed on the remainder of the 4th Battalion in TA 1156H at 1100.

25Sep50: In order to assure more effective artillery coordination between the assault regiments, direct communications between the artillery liaison officers at the infantry regimental level was established.

Reconnaissance across the HAN River was conducted by the 1st Battalion in preparation for their river crossing.

The 3rd Battalion (less "G" Battery) displaced by LVTs and ferry across the HAN River to TA 1661C. Displacement was completed with the battalion registered and prepared to support the 7th Marines by 1800.

The 4th Battalion and the 96th FA Bn were alerted to be prepared to answer calls for fire from the assault regiments during that period when the 1st and 2nd Battalions executed the river crossing.

26Sep50: At 0440, while the 2nd Battalion was making the final adjustment for a preparation for the 1st Marines attack, a strong enemy counter-attack was uncovered in the 1st Marines zone of action. Once again, due to the channelized nature of the enemy counter-attack and the accuracy of existing maps, it was possible to select and assign concentrations to both the medium battalions. Although unobserved, these fires together with the 2nd Battalion fires proved highly effective. The counter-attack was repulsed and surveillance reports credited artillery with destruction of six tanks destroyed and numerous enemy dead.

At 0700 the 1st Battalion commenced displacement across the HAN River by DUKWS. The battalion occupied a position area in TA 1661N and was prepared to support the 5th Marines in the continuance of its attack by 1100.

At 1400 the 2nd Battalion commenced displacement across the HAN River, using LVTs and ferry. Displacement to TA 1856A was completed by 2030, with all batteries in position and ready to fire.

A forward echelon of the regiment displaced across the HAN River at 1330. The forward CP was established at TA 1660A and control of the regiment assumed by the forward echelon at 2055.

The 4th Battalion conducted a reconnaissance across the HAN River throughout the day, selecting a position in the vicinity of TA 1559D.

27Sep50: The regimental rear echelon commenced displacement across the HAN River at 0900 and closed on the CP at 1300.

The 4th Battalion commenced displacement across the HAN River, by ferry, to TA 1559D. Displacement was completed

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prior to darkness with the battalion registered and firing in support of the division.

"C" Battery, 1st 4.5" Rkt Bn, FMF, received 3500 M48A-2 fuzes this date.

28Sep50: "C" Battery, 1st 4.5" Rkt Bn, FMF, executed their river crossing and established a rendezvous area in TA 1763I by 1400.

The 2nd Battalion commenced displacement, by echelon, to TA 2360H at 1300. Displacement was completed and the battalion registered and firing in support of the assault regiment by 1700.

The 3rd Battalion displaced to TA 2562G, by echelon, completing displacement prior to darkness.

One battery of the 96th FA was detached at 1200, reverting to control of X Corps Artillery.

29Sep50: The remainder of the 96th FA Bn was detached from the 11th Marines and reverted to control of X Corps Artillery at 0930.

One (1) 155mm howitzer from the 4th Battalion was attached to the 2nd Battalion for illumination of the 1st Marines zone of action.

30Sep50: At approximately 1215 the 2nd Battalion commenced displacement, by echelon, to TA 2861-I. Displacement was completed and the battalion registered by 1640.

At 1500, in compliance with Div OpnO 14-50, the following attachments were effected:

1st Battalion attached to 5th Marines
3rd Battalion attached to 7th Marines
50th AAA/AW (less "C" Btry) attached to 11th Marines

The 2nd Battalion was assigned the tactical mission of G/S at 1900 this date.

"I" Battery, 4/11, commenced displacement to TA 2662S at approximately 1800. Displacement was completed at approximately 2400.

10Oct50: The regimental reconnaissance party departed at 0845. The regimental forward CP was opened at TA 2761N at 1100 and control of the regiment was assumed at that time.

The 50th AAA/AW commenced closing on the 11th Marines area at 1100 this date. Tactical missions were assigned as follows:

"A" Battery attached 1/11
"B" Battery -- G/S
"D" Battery attached 3/11

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The remainder of the 4th Battalion closed on "L" Battery in TA 2662S at 1200.

"M" Battery displaced to TA 2667S at 1730 and was assigned mission of G/S reinforcing 3/11.

2-4Oct50: Little firing was conducted during these dates.

On 2 Oct, "C" Battery, 4.5" Rkt Bn, closed their rendezvous area in TA 1763I and moved to TA 2761G.

On 3 Oct at approximately 0730, "C" Battery, 4.5" Rkt Bn, was dispatched to CO, 3/11 as requested by CO 7th Marines for a fire mission. This mission was not executed until after dark on 3 Oct.

The 50th AAA/AW was detached at 0800, 4 Oct.

5-7Oct50: During this period elements of the regiment closed on the regimental assembly area. Displacements of the regiment (less attachments) were made at the following times:

Regimental headquarters and service batteries plus the Rkt Battery displaced at 1415, 5 Oct, arriving in the Inchon area (TA 8951SX) at 1950, 5 Oct.

The 4th Battalion commenced displacement to the Inchon regimental assembly area at 0430, 6 Oct, closing on the assembly area at 1500.

The 2nd Battalion commenced displacement to the regimental assembly area at 1300, 6 Oct. The Battalion closed on the Inchon area at 1700 the same date.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions had closed on the regimental assembly area by 1700, 6 Oct.

On 7 Oct the regiment continued establishing a temporary camp in the assembly area. Staging and planning for the Wonsan landing was commenced.

8. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, PROBABLE ORDER OF BATTLE, AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Tactics.

Observations of enemy tactics, due to the employment and location of this organization, were generally confined to enemy use of his artillery and his actions in our rear areas. Reports concerning other phases of enemy tactics were almost entirely second hand and will not be repeated in this report.

Enemy artillery fires against our rear areas, and our own artillery positions were extremely light considering the amount of artillery estimated as available to him. They were characterized by being sporadic in nature and consisting of only one or two pieces. In contrast, his use of artillery and mortars against our forward positions was fairly consistent and apparently delivered in considerably greater volume.

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Locations that the enemy shelled, as taken from shelling reports received by this headquarters, are shown on "Overlay of Areas Shelled", appendix VI to this annex. Duplications, as well as shelling reports that did not indicate area shelled, are not shown on this overlay.

A summation of areas shelled shows that 22 forward areas and 20 rear areas received mortar or artillery fire. None of them indicate that the enemy was able to mass the fires of more than a single battery - or else indicate that he did not choose to do so. The overlay, of course, shows only shellings reported. It is impossible to estimate how many shellings went unreported due either to communication difficulties or lack of appreciation of the importance of making shelling reports.

A general summary of enemy artillery and mortar fires against our infantry and forward positions as reported in Division Intelligence Summaries of enemy action follows:

- 151800-161800: Landing on Inchon effected against moderate small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire.
- 161800-171800: No artillery or mortar fire during period.
- 171800-181800: Our advance continued against scattered machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. A heavy mortar and artillery attack in the 1st Marines zone during the late afternoon closed the period.
- 181800-191800: Artillery fell in the vicinity of Kimpo airfield from 2048 to 2105, caliber unknown. Resistance on the right of the 5th Marines was moderate to heavy consisting of small arms, machine gun and mortar fire. Prior to jump off, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines received mortar fire in vicinity of CP. Consistent enemy mortar and artillery fire to the right and rear of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines throughout period.
- 191800-201800: 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines met moderate small arms and sporadic mortar fire at jump off. 1st Marines reported artillery fire received all morning.
- 201800-211800: Sporadic small arms and artillery fire in 5th Marines zone during the night. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received artillery and possibly heavy mortar fire at 1400. 15 rounds of artillery fell in 5th Marines CP as period closed.
- 211800-221800: Artillery and mortar fire fell sporadically throughout the night in 5th Marines zone of action. 5th Marines CP shelled, and several officers and enlisted personnel wounded. Light resistance consisting of small arms and mortars encountered by 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines on moving into position.
- 221800-231800: 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was hard hit by observed artillery fire as the period opened. Enemy activity continued during the night in 5th Marines zone, with sporadic small arms and artillery fire. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines received harrassing artillery and mortar fire during the night.

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- 231800-241800: Light small arms and mortar fire received in 5th Marines zone during the night. Entire regimental zone (5th Marines) subjected to mortar and artillery fire.
- 241800-251800: 5th Marines - Sporadic small arms, mortar, and artillery fire received during the night. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire received within the regimental zone throughout the morning and afternoon. 1st Marines - Determined resistance from strong enemy pockets supported by small arms, machine gun and mortar fire encountered throughout the 1st Marines zone during the morning and afternoon.
- 251800-261800: 5th Marines - No reports of enemy artillery fire during the period. 1st Marines - Light artillery and mortar fire with delayed fuze encountered during period.
- 261800-271800: 1st Marines - Light small arms, mortar and artillery fire throughout the 1st Marines zone during the night. 5th Marines - No mortar, artillery or AF fire received during the period.
- 271800-281800: Negative.
- 281800-291800: Intermittent mortar fire in 1st Marines zone throughout day.
- 291800-301800: Light enemy small arms, machine gun, and 120mm mortar fire fell in 7th Marines zone during night. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines received heavy enemy 120mm mortar fire at 301000 in TA 2465. By late afternoon mortar fire had practically ceased.
- 301800-011800: 7th Marines - The attack proceeded, over rugged terrain, against light small arms, machine gun and mortar fire.
- 011800-021800: 7th Marines - As period closed the enemy was resisting our advance with heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the high ground some 3,000 yards south of UIJONG-BO.
- 021800-031800: 7th Marines - Enemy resistance was made up of accurate small arms, machine gun, moderate artillery and mortar fires. For the first time in several days, he employed artillery, shelling both front lines and CP areas.
- 031800-041800: Negative.
- 041800-051800: Six to ten rounds of mortar fire fell during the night in the 7th Marines CP.

Conclusions regarding enemy tactical employment of his artillery and mortars drawn from locations shelled and artillery fires reported as listed above are as follows:

- (1) The enemy did not mass his fires. It is not known if this was through choice or inability.
- (2) The strength of his artillery effort was weak in contrast to the pieces he had available.
- (3) A preponderance of his artillery and mortar effect was directed against our forward positions, indicating that his tactical doctrine calls for use of artillery in the supporting role.
- (4) Though not clearly indicated by the reports above, it is believed that a majority of his fire was delivered without adjustment.

Miscellaneous tactical information concerning the enemyartil-

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lery effort indicates that the enemy used by-passed mortars, manned either by soldiers or communist elements of the civil population, to harrass our rear areas. Such fires were reported but twice, and were sporadic and ineffective. There was one report that the enemy used forward observers located behind our front lines, but this was not confirmed by actual apprehension or capture of such personnel. On another occasion the enemy was observed using a tank to fire into our rear areas; after firing two or three rounds, the tank would move along the road to a new position and repeat the fire. The enemy was also reported to be using the railroad tunnels west of Seoul as artillery positions, running the pieces back into the tunnel when under air or artillery attack.

Enemy ground action against our position areas was negligible. Though many enemy troops were by-passed, they were generally unarmed, leaderless, and only waiting for a chance to surrender safely. No raids or attempts at sabotage by the civil populace were reported.

b. Organization.

No positive information as to enemy artillery organization was gained by this organization. Probable organization based on enemy strength is covered in paragraph c. below.

c. Strength.

During the operation a total of 52 shelling reports and 99 location reports were processed. The source of the location reports were as follows:

API (Division or Corps)	33
API (11th Marines)	14
Flash Range (11th Marines)	23
Air Observers	10
Infantry	9
Forward Observers	10
TOTAL	99

No positions accurate enough to be useable were received from prisoners of war or from friendly civilians. Of the 99 positions obtained, 15 were confirmed and 84 remained unconfirmed.

By type, the positions referred to above were classified as follows:

AAA (Battery of 3 or more guns)	5
AAA (Single heavy gun)	2
FA (Self-propelled gun or howitzer)	4
FA (Towed-multiple gun position)	33
FA (Towed-single gun position)	36
Coast Defense or Dual purpose	7
Mortars (82mm or larger-multiple position)	12
TOTAL	99

And the total number of pieces so reported were:

AAA - Heavy	19
Medium	7
Light	1
	27

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CD - 45mm.....	5	
76mm.....	14	
120mm.....	<u>1</u>	20
SP - 76mm or 85mm.....	13	
120mm.....	<u>1</u>	14
FA - 76mm Gun.....	80	
90mm Gun.....	2	
105mm How.....	5	
122mm How.....	40	
152mm Gun or Gun-How.....	<u>1</u>	128
Mortars - 82mm.....	14	
120mm.....	<u>6</u>	20
		<u>209</u>
TOTAL....		209

In attempting to arrive at an estimate of enemy artillery strength based on the locations tabulated above, the following factors must be considered:

- (1) It must be assumed that the enemy was successful in employing and firing his artillery and mortars from positions never detected by any of our agencies.
- (2) The high ratio of suspected positions to confirmed positions. This was primarily due to an inadequate flow of shell reports, and the incomplete and inaccurate nature of many of the reports received.
- (3) A single piece or battery, as a result of displacements, might be reported several times.
- (4) Lack of any detection apparatus capable of successfully operating against mortars - as well as their mobility and position area requirements.

In view of these factors, and based on the locations reported, the following conclusions regarding enemy artillery strength are made:

- (1) The total number of artillery pieces shown above is probably inaccurate to the extent that the enemy was able to provide alternate gun positions and to displace his weapons.
- (2) It is believed that the list of anti-aircraft and mortar positions falls considerably short of the total available to the enemy. The nature of these weapons is such that shelling and location reports of their activity were usually fragmentary, or of such nature as to make confirmation of positions impossible.
- (3) In the matter of coast defense pieces, due consideration has been given to dual-purpose types. The type of emplacement was made the determining factor as to whether they were classed as AAA or as coast defense. It is probable that many light coast defense guns were not reported to this organization. It is believed, however, that the 15 medium pieces reported represents a fair estimate of the enemy's strength in this field.

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(4) No estimate of enemy self-propelled artillery strength can be made from these figures. Reports received usually could not distinguish between artillery, self-propelled artillery, or tank fires.

(5) It is believed that the number of field artillery pieces listed above represent an overestimate of enemy strength. It is observed that the enemy when retreating withdrew as much of his artillery to new locations as possible. The use of alternate positions by the enemy would also tend to increase the number of positions reported. In the light of these considerations enemy field artillery strength is estimated to have consisted of the following:

Approx. Six Batteries (36 pieces)	76mm Guns
Approx. Three Batteries (18 pieces)	122mm How
Approx. One Battery (4 pieces)	105mm How

(6) If this strength was organized according to best available information regarding North Korean order of battle, it indicates the presence of one artillery regiment in the area of operations and four to five artillery companies organic to infantry regiments, probably augmented by a few captured American or South Korean pieces.

d. Deployment.

Enemy deployment of his artillery is indicate on "Overlay of Hostile Battery/Mortar Positions", appendix VII to this annex. This overlay does not show positions original prior to 18 Sep 1950 since no shelling reports or location reports were received during the period 15-17 Sep 1950, and no positions were confirmed. Enemy deployment indicates that he based the bulk of his artillery defense of Seoul on positions in or near the city. The enemy positions may also indicate that the enemy experienced difficulty in moving his artillery across the Han River.

e. Probable order of battle.

Information as to enemy organization and probable order of battle is almost entirely negative. No translators or interrogators were attached to this organization, and locally procured interpreters were not linguistically able to conduct interrogations that might have revealed information as to enemy order of battle.

Information taken from Division Intelligence Summaries indicate the presence of the following artillery units:

4th and 6th Companies, 2nd Battalion, 918th Arty Regt.
4th Regiment, 18th Division.
Arty Bn, 17th Division.
AA Company, 17th Division.

f. Equipment.

Enemy artillery equipment examined by this organization showed fair workmanship and sound principles of construction. Many refinements were lacking; sighting equipment in particular would be considered sub-standard by U. S. Artillery. However, the enemy light artillery pieces seemed to be designed for a different method of employment than our own and it is probable that less stress was laid on sights and fire control equipment.

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No detailed examinations or test-firings of enemy artillery equipment were conducted by this organization.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS.

No comment.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Planning.

It is believed that current doctrines related to planning amphibious operations remain effective. Events which occurred during this operation serve to emphasize certain planning characteristics which are doctrine, but which were largely disregarded during the planning phase of this operation, thereby causing inadequacies in the final plan. That the plan was successfully executed despite its inadequacies may be attributed to the light defense of the beach by the enemy, and to the excellent on-the-spot decisions made and actions taken by the many Marine officers and Marine non-commissioned officers who were experienced in amphibious operations.

Current doctrine includes the following characteristics of landing force planning:

- (1) The necessity for concurrent planning in lower echelons.
- (2) The necessity for detailed planning.
- (3) The effect of time and space on planning.

Concurrent planning requires that preliminary planning be initiated by the artillery commander on the basis of advance information and tentative decisions concerning shipping, naval gunfire and air support plans, location of beaches, and the landing plan. In this operation the advance information was extremely limited and arrived only six (6) days prior to the loading date; a suitable map was made available only two (2) days prior to the loading date; and essential information concerning the naval landing plan was not available until the night before sailing. As a result, plans for the artillery were hurriedly made and disseminated; loading plans had to be issued verbally in fragmentary form; the advance reconnaissance party had to depart with incomplete and tentative information on the artillery plan; and the regiment sailed for the target area before a detailed landing plan could be drawn up.

There is a necessity for detailed planning because an amphibious assault is a complex operation in comparison with an operation on land. This operation was particularly complex for the artillery because of the extreme tidal conditions at the target, the fact that artillery was to be landed at H-Hour on an off-shore island which offered only very limited positions, and the assignment of Japanese-manned shipping. To insure success, a written plan covering all details was indicated, even for troops experienced in amphibious operations.

However, the planning method utilized precluded thorough coverage of all details, and important details concerning the ship to shore movement were disseminated only twenty-four (24) hours prior to H-Hour. As a result of the lack of timely details and other factors beyond the

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control of this headquarters, the ship to shore movement was a disorganized and haphazard affair, and the delivery of effective artillery support was thereby delayed. Had there been a rehearsal, the experience would have supplied many of the details unanswered in the landing plan, and communications failures would have been realized and would probably have been corrected.

Doctrine calls for increased time and space factors in planning an amphibious operation, to allow for the assembly of widely separated forces, special training, rehearsal, embarkation, and movement overseas. Under favorable conditions, an overall planning period of ninety (90) days is indicated. For this operation the planning period was reduced to about thirty (30) days, and this is the major factor which brought about variations from doctrine with the attendant results indicated above. It can not be determined from this experience whether or not the ninety (90) day period is too long a time; but it can definitely be stated that thirty (30) days is too short a time to allow for the formulation and dissemination of a detailed plan, the special training, and the rehearsal; elements which are still believed to be essential for assurance of success in assault of a defended beach.

Recommendation: That every attempt be made to follow existing planning doctrine in future operations.

b. Shipping.

The allocation of shipping as shown in paragraph 5 above resulted in the following undesirable features:

(1) One (1) 155mm howitzer battery was responsible for the loading and unloading of an entire AKA, although the battery materiel comprised only a small portion of the cargo embarked, and the battery had first priority of unloading. It appears unnecessary to assign such a logistical responsibility to a tactical unit.

(2) The heavy materiel of one medium battery had to be embarked in and landed from an AKA, when a more efficient method of handling this materiel is afforded by the LST.

(3) Regimental headquarters was established aboard a SCAJAP LST, therefore did not have access to the complete navy communications net, nor the orders and publications normally distributed to all navy vessels, and was deprived of the full use of small boats and the amphibious know-how normally found in a Navy crew.

(4) Up to 250 troops had to be embarked on each ship, whereas the rated capacity is only about 150.

Allowing for the personnel and vehicles normally embarked with the infantry regiments, division headquarters, and division rear echelon (pay and personnel), the artillery regiment has 2678 officers and enlisted men and the following vehicles for embarkation:

197	2½ Ton Trucks	44	300 Gal water Trailers
82	¼ Ton Trucks (cargo)	13	TD-14 Tractors
47	¼ Ton Trucks (radio)	18	TD-18 Tractors
183	1 Ton Trailers (cargo)	3	2½ Ton Wreckers
82	¼ Ton Trailers	54	105mm Howitzers
5	1 Ton Trailers (grease)	18	155mm Howitzers
5	1 Ton Trailers (HPCU)		

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Attachment of an amphibious truck company, as recommended in paragraph c. below, would add about 300 personnel, 110 DUKWS, 3 2½ Ton Trucks, 4 1-Ton Trailers, and 5 ½-Ton Trucks to the above figures.

In general, the most desirable means of shipping and landing artillery are considered to be as follows (in the order of preference):

Light Artillery

- (1) LST beached for landing, if LST can be beached early.
- (2) LST preloaded in DUKWS.
- (3) LST preloaded in LVT(5)s, where a coral reef is presented offshore.
- (4) APA's landed in LCM(6)'s or LSU.
- (5) AKA's landed in LCM(6)'s or LSU.

Medium Artillery

- (1) LST beached for landing.
- (2) LSD preloaded in LSU.
- (3) AKA landed in LSU.
- (4) APA landed in LSU.

Regimental Headquarters

- (1) LST, with 3 DUKWS preloaded for reconnaissance. Beach LST to land remainder.
- (2) APA, landed in LCVP's and LCM.

In all of the methods indicated above, except the APA, adequate bunk space is not available for artillery personnel. If the sailing time is short (say, up to 10 days) and the weather is mild, loading a maximum of 250 personnel on an LST is considered practicable, and no additional shipping for troops is necessary. Under more extreme sailing conditions, about 1200 troops should be embarked on other shipping, and be transhipped to the LST at the target area.

Recommendations:

(1) That 12 LST's be assigned to lift the artillery regiment when DUKWS (or LVT's) are to be used in the ship to shore movement. This will allow sufficient cargo space for the major items of materiel listed above, and will carry all the troops if weather and sailing conditions permit overloading each LST to 250 men.

(2) That when sufficient LST's are not available, an APA be substituted rather than an AKA. In accordance with the preferences listed above, it is believed that the medium battalion and the light battalions supporting the assault regiments should be LST-borne, while the regimental headquarters and possibly one (1) light battalion can be next best embarked in and landed from an APA. The APA would also offer a desirable solution to embarking those troops who could not be carried on the LST's.

(3) That when foreign-manned ships are utilized, at least one American ship capable of carrying the regimental headquarters be assigned the artillery embarkation group in order to assure positive communication and proper control.

c. Use of DUKWS.

The 1st Amphibian Truck Company, FMF, (85 DUKWS) was attached

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to this organization for the landing. Since the rated capacity of this amphibious vehicle is 5000 pounds and the 105mm howitzer (with accessories) weighs slightly more than this figure, then the howitzer must either be landed without a crew and ammunition, or the DUKW must be overloaded. Neither solution is desirable from the tactical viewpoint, and therefore the present DUKW is not an ideal vehicle for landing light artillery, as may be commonly believed. However, it does offer the best means now available, under most conditions, if a sufficient number of DUKWS are made available to permit a sound tactical landing without overloading. A company of 110 DUKWS, distributed as indicated below, is considered necessary to land the light battalion, and the reconnaissance elements of the medium battalion and regimental headquarters:

DUKW maintenance.....	5
Regimental Reconnaissance Party.....	3
Medium Battalion Reconnaissance Party.....	3
Each light battalion.....	33

Recommendation: That the DUKW be re-designed to carry at least 7500 pounds, or that the Amphibion Truck Company be reorganized as follows:

Co Hq - 8 DUKWS
 3 Plt - 34 DUKWS each

d. Supplies and equipment.

Upon moving out of Camp Pendleton, this unit carried with it almost 100% of the supplies and equipment authorized by the T/A and T/E. It was necessary to move all of this cargo from Camp Pendleton to the docks at San Diego, load it aboard ship, unload at KOBE, and reload it aboard assault shipping, prior to entry into combat. Since time was very limited, assault shipping was limited, and it was realized that transportation ashore would become a critical problem, an effort was made at KOBE to "lighten ship" by warehousing those supplies and items of equipment not considered essential to combat. The volume of cargo warehoused was large.

It is believed that the limiting time and space factors mentioned above will again occur in future Marine Corps operations.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the T/A and T/E list supplies and equipment under two separate accounts, garrison and combat.
- (2) That the garrison account include those additional items intended for use by an organization while in a garrison or training status, while the combat account list only those items essential to combat.
- (3) That all items in both accounts be crated and marked when a unit is ordered overseas, but that only the combat items accompany the unit when it is destined for immediate combat; and that the garrison items be shipped at a later date, when and where they are required.

It is believed that such an organization of supplies and equipment will allow for a more rapid and orderly transition from a garrison to a combat status.

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e. Motor Transport.

It is believed that the transportation provided the artillery regiment, with the exception of regimental headquarters and service batteries, is adequate to meet the requirements of an amphibious operation. It is extremely difficult for the regimental headquarters to maintain continuous and effective control during displacements and to provide efficient counter-battery intelligence with the number of vehicles now provided.

The amount of additional transportation required for extended land campaigns is dependent upon several variable factors:

- (1) The number of service elements supporting the operation. The lack of service elements may force the artillery to travel fifty (50) miles or more to an ASP.
- (2) The amount of ammunition and rations which the tactical situation dictates must be carried by a unit assigned to a particular mission.
- (3) The season of the year. Additional transportation is required to carry the impedimenta necessary for a winter operation.

In general, for successful operations in an extended land campaign, the artillery regiment should have much transportation as division artillery in the Army.

For the KOREAN campaign, the regiment utilized 100% T/E transportation excepting 1-Ton Trailers, which were taken generally on the basis on one (1) prime mover. Shortages were made up by (a) stripping down to the barest essentials of equipment and supplies; (b) making use of "liberated" motor transport; (c) overloading vehicles; and (d) making numerous shuttle trips. In one case in southern KOREA where the transportation shortage could not be overcome by any of these methods, galley equipment was sacrificed to the enemy.

Recommendations:

(1) That, in consonance with the armored force concept, two or more motor transport battalions be formed as part of force troops to provide the necessary augmentation in transportation required by a division or element thereof committed to a land campaign; assignment of additional transport should be based upon a consideration of the variable factors listed above as related to a particular campaign or mission.

(2) That regimental headquarters battery be authorized the following additional transportation:

One (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck and two (2) $1\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Trucks with 1-Ton trailers, to expedite wide reconnaissance and rapid displacement of the equipment and personnel required to establish from two to four flash ranging OP's across the division front.

One (1) $2\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck and one (1) $1\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck with 1-Ton trailers to enable the displacement and installation of the GR-8 sound ranging equipment soon to be delivered to the artillery regiment.

One (1) $1\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck with a 1-Ton Trailer for the displacement of the regimental FDC.

One (1) $\frac{3}{4}$ -Ton Ambulance to provide the regiment with one closed vehicle capable of evacuating casualties.

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(3) That regimental service battery be authorized the following additional transportation:

One (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck, one (1) $1\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck, and one (1) $2\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Truck with trailers to provide a means of moving the bulky but important equipment of the personnel and disbursing sections.

(4) That the 1-Ton Trailers in excess of the number for which prime movers are available be dropped from the T/E, since their presence appears to offer no particular advantage.

(5) That the present 300 gallon water trailers be replaced by the 250 gallon type used in the U. S. Army. The present water trailer does not stand up over rough roads, repeated failures occurring in the towing bar at the points where it joins the frame.

(6) That TD-18 tractors w/angle dozer replace the TD-14's presently authorized. The TD-14 is too light for much of the work required.

(7) That a welding unit be authorized for regimental service battery.

(8) That all $2\frac{1}{2}$ -Ton Trucks in the artillery regiment, except prime movers, be long wheel base trucks so as to provide additional cargo space.

f. Communications.

The communication personnel and equipment authorized for the regiment are, in general, considered adequate. Major deficiencies are noted below:

(1) The remote power relay in the mounting rack of the AN/MRC-5 and SCR-608 radio did not stand up to the long use over rough roads and it became necessary to remove this relay from the circuit.

(2) The BB-54 wet cell battery for the SCR-619 portable radio proved to be an inadequate power supply. It was impossible to re-charge these batteries with sufficient speed and in sufficient numbers to keep forward observers and liaison officers supplied, and the battery itself is not strong enough to withstand the rough handling of normal usage.

(3) Present AM radio equipment does not have enough range for extended land campaigns.

(4) Present FM equipment used by forward observers (SCR-619 or SCR-610) does not have enough range to offer reliable, direct contact with the FDC.

(5) No equipment is now available in the regiment to net with the VHF radios in high-performance airplanes.

(6) Battalion T/O's do not authorize sufficient radio technicians.

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Recommendations:

- (1) That a better remote system be developed for the AN/MRC-5.
- (2) That the SCR-619 be immediately replaced by the SCR-610 (or later development), and that automatic relay stations be procured for "boosting" forward observer's transmission back to the EDC.
- (3) That regimental headquarters and each battalion be authorized one (1) AN/VRC-1. The VHF portion of this set could be used for communication with high-performance aircraft, while the MHF portion (SCR-193) would provide a more powerful AM radio.
- (4) That each battalion be authorized another radio technician in the regimental liaison section.
- (5) That one additional AN/MRC-5 be authorized regimental headquarters battery for assignment to the flash range section.

g. Aerial observation.

Observers provided by the T/O were adequate. However, the number of liaison-type planes in VM0-6 was so limited that only one air observer could be kept airborne for the entire division during the greater part of the operation. This observer had to act as both tactical and gunnery observer, and since a new major tactical mission is to lead in air strikes, an important and rather frequent task, the single observer could not possibly satisfy both the tactical and gunnery requirements. For satisfactory service, the artillery alone must have three (3) planes available for simultaneous missions.

Helicopters are valuable for artillery spot in special situations, such as early in an operation when airstrips are not available, but in general the OV is considered a better spotting plane, because it is more maneuverable and less vulnerable to enemy air attack and AA fire. Based on recommendations of observers, it is believed that the VM0 should include six (6) helicopters for those special missions which the unique capabilities of this craft enable it to accomplish.

Recommendations:

- (1) That VM0 be provided with sixteen (16) liaison type planes in order to be capable of maintaining one tactical and three gunnery observers on station.
- (2) That helicopters be made available to operate from the deck of an LST for artillery spot during the initial stages of an amphibious operation.

h. Use of VT fuze.

VT fuze was used on only a few missions during this operation because of the warning restrictions and attendant delays imposed by higher echelon, and the mountainous terrain. X Corps SOP relative to firing VT fuze is quoted in part:

- "b. Notification of the mission will be transmitted as follows: "HELLFIRE ON (LOCATION); AZIMUTH _____ FOR _____ MINUTES AT (TIME) (Location and azimuth will be sent in shackle code).
- "c. Corps Artillery Fire Direction Center will notify all artillery units with the Corps on the Corps artillery command net (SCR-193) of the mission. Corps artillery light aviation will be notified by Corps Artillery Fire Direction Center on the Corps Artillery AIR SPOT

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NET (SCR-608/619). Division Artillery will be responsible for notifying all light aircraft under division control.

- "d. Each artillery unit will direct its own light aviation to clear danger areas.
- "e. Units initiating VT missions must allow a reasonable time for the dissemination of the warning message. Unit will not proceed with the mission until 10 minutes after Corps Artillery warning broadcast. In periods of emergency, the Corps Artillery Commander may authorize the firing of VT fuzes without delay or warning. In such cases, ground observation posts can be utilized by units firing, so as to delay fire when planes are near the trajectory."

The notification system set down in this SOP depends upon many different communications nets, and is entirely too slow and ponderous to permit the effective use of VT fuze. It is a peace-time system and is considered over-cautious for war, which is in effect a continuous state of emergency.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the warning system for VT fuze allow direct support battalions to fire this fuze after clearance with the supporting arms center of the supported infantry regiment, to insure that aircraft are not striking in the vicinity of the proposed target.
- (2) That clearance for division general support units be obtained through the division FSCC.
- (3) That clearance for corps general support units be obtained through the division FSCC which coordinates supporting arms in the proposed target area.
- (4) That dependence for clearance of miscellaneous aircraft be placed upon air sentries.

i. Self-propelled artillery.

In the fast-moving situation over a wide front encountered in this operation, self-propelled artillery would have been desirable from the tactical viewpoint. However, considering the problem of the ship-to-shore movement, the limited road net with many light bridges, and the extensive rice paddies alongside the roads, it is believed that towed light artillery was the better weapon for direct support. As far as medium artillery is concerned, the self-propelled 155mm howitzer should offer no greater problems in landing or negotiating the type of terrain encountered than the present M1 howitzer with TD-18 prime mover. It could be emplaced and displaced more rapidly, and would afford greater flexibility in covering a wide zone of fire. It is noted that the self-propelled 155mm howitzer, M41, is not capable of high angle fire. High angle fire is considered a necessary characteristic in the terrain encountered in KOREA.

Recommendations:

That the Marine Corps adopt self-propelled 155's in lieu of the present towed weapons as soon as a weapon capable of high angle fire becomes available, and that a limited number of self-propelled 105's of the latest design be procured for experimental purposes.

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j. Illuminating projectiles.

Illuminating projectiles were very effective, but have a range limitation imposed by the 25 second fuze (M54). To avoid this limitation, a 155mm howitzer was frequently assigned to each D/S Battalion for illumination purposes. As one experiment to obtain greater range, M67 fuzes (75 sec.) were modified by removal of the booster and fired with illuminating shell. A range of 10,000 yards was fired and the fuze appeared satisfactory, but further use was suspended pending further experiment and ordnance approval.

Recommendations:

- (1) That ordnance experts examine the possibility of increasing the range of the present illuminating shell.
- (2) That the amount of illuminating shell in the unit of fire be doubled. The present allowance of 7 rounds per gun is not enough to supply infantry demands for illumination.

k. 4.5" rockets.

Battery "C", 1st 4.5" Rocket Battalion, FMF, consisting of six T66P rocket launchers, was attached to the Division throughout this operation. During the assault phase and part of the exploitation phase the battery was operated similarly to the rail-type, truck-mounted launchers of World War II, being attached to RCT-1, while during the remainder of the operation it was attached to this Regiment and operated as general support artillery. Prior to sailing from KOBE, the battery was provided with M51A4 fuzes as a substitute for the standard M48A2, since the latter were not then available and the two fuzes are normally considered interchangeable. After firing missions for RCT-1, it became apparent that the M51A4 fuzes were not functioning properly, since almost all of the rounds failed to burst on impact; subsequent tests indicated that a design feature of this fuze prevents it from arming when fired with the 4.5" rocket. As a result, the battery was out of action until about 27 September when M48A2 fuzes were received. One mission was fired with this fuze and was considered very successful. This mission emphasized the principle of rapid displacement immediately after firing, since an enemy mortar concentration was brought down on the firing position within five minutes after the rounds were complete.

Recommendations:

- (1) That ordnance agencies conduct experiments with the various fuzes which will fit the 4.5" rocket and publish definite instructions as to which, if any, will function satisfactorily as a substitute for the M48A2.
- (2) That since the 4.5" rocket launchers are organized as rocket artillery, they be habitually employed by attachment to field artillery rather than infantry units.

l. Counter-battery/Counter-mortar Intelligence.

A counter-battery/counter-mortar intelligence section was set up within the S-2 section, headed by the assistant S-2, and functioned throughout the operation. Procedures and techniques as prescribed in current Army Field Manuals were employed and found to be sound. During the operation, ninety-nine (99) suspect enemy artillery or mortar positions were acquired, and of those positions, fifteen (15) were confirmed.

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The necessity of maintaining a counter-battery chart and performing other counter-battery work on a twenty-four basis, as well as performing all the normal duties of an S-2 section placed an undue strain on members of the section.

Recommendation. That the current T/O (K-1226 w/change 3) for the artillery S-2 section be increased by the following additions:

1	SSgt	Intelligence Man	MOS 0231
1	SSgt	Fa Operations Assistant	MOS 0848

n. Flash Ranging.

The Flash Ranging Section, reinforced by the Sound Ranging Section, was operative throughout the campaign. Good flash ranging positions were available and excellent results were obtained. The following problems in the employment of the Flash Ranging Section were encountered:

- (1) Insufficient personnel for twenty-four hour operation and provision for local security. This was solved by attachment of sound ranging personnel to the Flash Ranging Section.
- (2) Inadequate transportation. Two DUKWS were attached to the section during 15-19 September, providing sufficient transportation during this period. After 19 September, only one jeep and one 2½-T truck were available. With this amount of transportation, three to four round trips were necessary upon displacement, preventing the section from staying in action during fast moving situations. This problem was partially but unsatisfactorily solved by stripping the section to the bare minimum of personnel and equipment necessary for limited operations, and carrying the remaining personnel and gear with battery headquarters, to rejoin the section when the situation permitted.
- (3) Inadequate radio communications. Considering the distance involved, wire communications were excellent throughout the campaign. During the fast moving phases of the operation, the flash ranging section, following behind the infantry, was not able to go into position until late afternoon. Under these conditions wire could not be installed until late at night, or the following day; and the SCR-610 radio assigned the section usually could not reach the FDC. No solution to this problem was found.
- (4) Lack of survey control. Insufficient personnel are provided in the current T/O to perform interior survey, except at the expense of other functions. The regimental survey section is not so constituted as to be able to regularly perform this additional mission. As a result, the majority of positions occupied by the Flash Range Section were located by inspection.

Recommendations:

- (1) That the current T/O for the Flash Ranging Section (K-1226-W) be cancelled and the following T/O substituted:

"FLASH RANGING SECTION"

Lt	Flash Ranging Officer	0802	1c
MSgt	Flash Ranging Chief	0848	1c
TSgt	Chief Observer	0848	1c
SSgt	Flash Ranging Assistant	0848	2c

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SSgt	Flash Ranging Ass't (Plotter)	0848	1c
Sgt	Wire Team Chief	2511	1c
Sgt	Switchboard Operator	2511	1c
Sgt	Flash Ranging Assistant	0841	2c
Cpl	Flash Ranging Assistant	0841	4c
Cpl	Radio Operator, Low Speed	2531	1p
Cpl	Draftsman	0844	1c
Cpl	Computer	0841	2c
Cpl	Truck Driver	3531	3c
Cpl	Wireman	2511	3c
Pvt	Flash Range Observer	0800	4b
Pvt	Flash Range Observer	0800	6c
Pvt	Wireman	2500	6c
Pvt	Draftsman	0800	1c
Pvt	Computer	0800	2c

The total number of personnel required to fill recommended T/O's: 1 officer, 44 enlisted. Total number of personnel carried on current T/O: 1 officer, 36 enlisted.

(2) That the problem of providing interior survey for the Flash Ranging Section be solved by creating a survey section within the Intelligence and Counter-Battery Platoon to perform this mission. This section could also be employed to perform the same mission for the Squad Ranging Section, thus making for an overall economy in the use of personnel. Recommended T/O for a proposed counter-battery survey section:

"SURVEY SECTION"

TSgt	Survey Chief	0848	1c
SSgt	FA Operations Assistant	0848	1c
Sgt	FA Fire Control Man	0844	2c
Cpl	FA Fire Control Man	0844	2c
Pvt	Fire Control Assistant	0800	6c

Total strength of recommended T/O: 12 enlisted. No equivalent section exists within current T/O's.

(3) That the following major items of equipment be added to the Tables of Equipment for use of the Flash Ranging Section:

2 Flash Ranging Sets AN/GTC-1 (SB-4 switchboard)

n. Sound Ranging.

The Sound Ranging Section was not employed during the operation. Initially, it was not committed because no suitable positions existed on the island of WOLMI-DO (insufficient length for required base). During the exploitation phase it was not committed for the following reasons:

(1) It would have required detachment of sound ranging personnel from the flash ranging section to such a degree that the future success of that section would be imperiled.

(2) No transportation was available for assignment to the section. The speed of the infantry's advance was such as to preclude any other method of displacement.

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Recommendations:

(1) That the sergeant major be carried in service battery with the personnel section, since all of the personnel he supervises, and the executive staff officer to whom he reports (S-1) are now in this section.

(2) That the Captain (Special Services Officer) be designated battery commander of service battery instead of the S-4. It is believed that a member of the regimental executive staff should not be regularly assigned command responsibilities as additional duties.

(3) That the following logistics section be added to service battery:

Capt (0802) - S-4
Lt (0430) - Embarkation Officer
TSgt (0439) - Loading assistant
Sgt (0431) - Loading assistant

(4) That the athletic and recreation officer be deleted from the T/O.

(5) That the TSgt (Ass't Wpns Repair Chief), SSgt (FA Wpns Armorer) and Sgt (FA Wpns Armorer) be deleted from the ordnance maintenance section of service battery, and the following be added:

TSgt (Ammunition Chief) - 2316
Sgt (Ammunition Ass't) - 2311

Since no tools are provided at this echelon for the repair of field artillery ordnance, it is believed that the function of this section is advisory and administrative in nature, and therefore the FA Armorers listed above are not required. However, experience has shown a definite need for ammunition specialists in this section to keep the staff and the commander constantly advised of the status of supply and rate of expenditure of ammunition throughout the regiment.

s. Personnel.

Special consideration should be given to qualified artillery lieutenants as replacements in the early phases of operations and continuously thereafter. Experience has shown that forward observers suffer a high percentage of casualties, with no replacements available within the artillery regiment unless other essential T/O billets are left vacant. Junior officer replacements should receive instruction in the U. S. prior to being sent out, since "on-the-job training" is not practicable in combat. Such on the job training is necessarily restricted to the billet assigned, whereas artillery officers should have a working knowledge of all phases of artillery gunnery, materiel, and tactics in order to properly discharge the duties of the billet to which assigned, and to permit job rotation necessitated by normal combat attrition. For example, suppose a battalion has three officer casualties during an attack - two observers and one battery executive. An immediate rotation of jobs is necessary in order to fill these three key spots for tomorrow's attack; in order to effect this rotation, there must be assistant executives qualified as forward observers, and assistant staff officers qualified as battery executives. If several of these jobs are held by officers undergoing on-the-job training, then immediate replacement may not be feasible because all they have been able to learn so far is the duties of their assigned billet. Such a situation can lead to serious reduction in the effectiveness of artillery support delivered during the

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the time it takes to train partially experienced officers in new duties.

C. A. YOUNGDALE

APPENDIX ONE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1st Battalion, 11th Marines,
In the Field,
24 November 1950

1. INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted in compliance with Division General Order No. 16-50, and in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 11, Paragraph 11401, MCM, 1949. The period covered, from 6 September to 7 October 1950, begins with the close of the South Korean campaign and includes the entire INCHON-SEOUL invasion phase.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

On 6 September 1950, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced), FMF, consisted of thirty-nine (39) officers and four hundred and seventy-four (474) enlisted men. This figure included three (3) officers and eleven (11) enlisted U.S. Navy. Forty-nine (49) South Korean Policemen and one (1) ROK Army officer were attached. During 6 and 7 September, the battalion joined one hundred and seventy-four (174) enlisted and three (3) officers. The battalion was constituted as follows:

Headquarters Battery:	15 officers; 152 enlisted
Service Battery:	8 officers; 105 enlisted
Battery "A":	6 officers; 127 enlisted
Battery "B":	5 officers; 129 enlisted
Battery "C":	7 officers; 129 enlisted
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>41 officers; 642 enlisted</u>

The battalion was in bivouac at Pier No. 1, Pusan, Korea, from 6 to 10 September, 1950. On 9 September, 1950, the 1st Amphibian Truck Company, consisting of two (2) officers and ninety-five (95) enlisted were temporarily attached to the battalion.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

The planning for an assault landing, as indicated by the limited intelligence received by this battalion, was necessarily restricted to logistics and re-supply. The operations of the battalion in Southern Korea, from 3 August to 6 September 1950, had taken a severe toll of equipment. This was particularly true in connection with motor transportation, communications materiel, and galley equipment. Reorganization of the firing batteries was necessary in order to convert from four (4) to six (6) guns per battery and to assign new personnel to appropriate functions within their occupational fields as far as practicable. The battalion prepared to combat load aboard three (3) LST's; the QO-30, QO-52, and the QO-12. Six (6) new 105mm howitzers were received, but sights, aiming posts, and accessories did not accompany the guns and were impossible to obtain until 19 September, 1950. The following table indicates motor transportation vehicles and equipment on hand and the totals after re-supply on 8 September, 1950:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>REC'D</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6	28	15	43
Truck, ½ ton, 4x4	15	3	18
Truck, ¼ ton, radio	13	2	15
Truck, ¼ ton, ambulance	1	0	1
Trailer, 1 ton, cargo	9	20	29
Trailer, ½ ton, cargo	10	3	13
Trailer, grease	1	0	1
Trailer, HPCU	0	1	1
TD-14	3	1	4
Trailer, water, 300 gal.	1	0	1

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Communications equipment requisitioned was not made available. Four (4) field ranges and three (3) immersion heaters were supplied to supplement galley equipment on hand.

In accordance with Brigade planning and 1st Marine Division directives, a personnel section of three (3) enlisted was detached and readied to join the division personnel section in KOBE, Japan. All diaries, personnel reports and correspondence were brought up to date. Publications, files and forms were so segregated as to furnish a field working unit after the personnel section was separated in possession of the service records and the bulk of the administrative paraphernalia. The rear personnel section was left in PUSAN under supervision of Brigade upon loading out by the battalion.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No formal training or rehearsals were conducted prior to departure from PUSAN. Newly joined men were indoctrinated, where necessary, into their assignments by "on the job" training incidental to reorganization and routine activities while loading out.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Loading of the three (3) LST's started at about 1400, 9 September, 1950, and was completed at 1200, 10 September, 1950. Embarkation of personnel was completed immediately after loading. Personnel embarked in the following manner:

LST 60-30: "C" Battery (less LNO and FO teams); Headquarters Battery (less Reconnaissance Party elements); Service Battery (less reconnaissance personnel); plus one (1) platoon of 1st Amphibian Truck Company.

LST 60-52: "A" Battery and "B" Battery (less LNO and FO teams); Reconnaissance personnel from Headquarters and Service Batteries; plus one (1) platoon of 1st Amphibian Truck Company.

LST 60-12: One (1) officer and twenty-two (22) motor transport operators. This vessel carried the overflow of twenty-two (22) vehicles which could not be loaded on the other LST's.

At 1900, 10 September 1950, the LST's got underway and pulled out into the stream. They lay at anchorage until 0100, 11 September 1950, and then again got underway to make rendezvous with the convoy. LST's 60-30 and 60-52, transporting the main body of the battalion personnel, were Japanese-manned and under Japanese officers. The battalion mess personnel and equipment was distributed and food stocks divided, in order to set up messes aboard. "Baker" rations were served while underway. The two (2) LST's were overloaded for most troop transportation purposes. Battalion personnel, after a month in combat, did not consider the somewhat crowded conditions a hardship.

6. MOVEMENT TO, AND ARRIVAL AT, OBJECTIVE AREA

The period from 11 September to 15 September 1950, was spent en-route and was uneventful. The convoy arrived at the objective area, WOLMI-DO Island, adjacent to INCHON, Korea, the morning of 15 September 1950. On 13 September 1950, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinforced, FME, was redesignated as the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division, Reinforced, FME, by authority CG 1stMarDiv Msg 10080Z.

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1st Battalion, 11th Marines,
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7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase

On 15 September 1950, an advance party from the battalion, consisting of two (2) officers and three (3) enlisted men, landed with waves of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on Green Beach, located at (8849F4) (Map of Korea 1:25,000 metric U.S. Army), on WOIMI-DO Island. This landing was made at 0637. Battalion positions were selected by this advance party. The first elements of the battalion landed were the reconnaissance group, closely followed by the firing batteries. The landing started at 1530, and was accomplished in ship-to-shore movement by DUKW's manned by the 1st Amphibian Truck Company, attached. Some delay was encountered by the small beach space and crowded, narrow roadways. Registration, by high burst adjustment, was completed at 2250. The CP and FDC were located at (8849F4). During the night the battalion fired a total of nine (9) concentrations from this position in direct support of the 5th Marines. Results were generally unknown due to poor observation due to rainfall and resultant poor visibility. During 16 September 1950 the LST's were successfully beached and a full unit of fire off-loaded to augment the basic load landed with the firing batteries. The battalion, continuing in its mission of direct support of the 5th Marines, displaced by echelon to a new position in the vicinity of TOHWA-RI, CP location (9348G3). Base point registration was completed by 1700. This area had been passed through by fast moving infantry units of the 5th Marines, and many scattered enemy troops remained in the area. Ten (10) enemy were killed by our security elements and twenty-four (24) prisoners were taken. Fourteen (14) concentrations were fired with good results reported.

b. Exploitation Phase

At 0630, 17 September 1950, a battalion reconnaissance party proceeded in rear of the advancing infantry column. This party was held up for several hours by a tank-infantry battle in selected positions for the battalion. Advance elements, including one (1) firing battery were in position by 1430 and the remainder of the battalion at 1730. CP location coordinates (995GA4). Registration was completed by all firing batteries at 1620, but no other missions were fired due to the rapid advance of the infantry. The battalion again displaced at 1740 to previously selected positions. CP location (G354L). Registration was completed by high burst adjustment at 2250. A total of twenty (20) concentrations were fired during the night. Eighteen (18) enemy prisoners were taken in the immediate area. Reports indicated results of our artillery fire as excellent. On 18 September in anticipation of an early displacement the reconnaissance party moved out and selected positions in the vicinity of KIMPO Airfield, which had been secured the previous night. In order to continue close support missions, one (1) gun from Battery "A" was moved forward to complete Base Point Registration prior to movement of the entire battalion. Wire was laid to gun positions selected and to the FDC and CP. Dozers were moved up and dug in all emplacements in preparation for battalion occupation. The batteries were not displaced until 0600, 19 September. A total of thirty-nine (39) concentrations were fired. Three (3) prisoners were taken. The CP was located at coordinates (C55602). On the night of 19 September Second Lieutenant Kenneth R. STEWART, USMC, with Battery "A" FO Team accompanied Division Reconnaissance Company in the crossing of the HAN River. Heavy fire missions were called by FO in order to cover forced withdrawal after initial crossing.

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On 20 September 1950 advance reconnaissance chose new positions in the vicinity of PONGHWA-RI. Regular reconnaissance group, with Battery "C", moved into position at 1330. An infantry fire fight delayed planned earlier displacement. All firing batteries moved up and completed Base Point Registration by 1610. Nine (9) enemy prisoners were taken in the area. CP location coordinates (6761P3). The battalion received the following motor transport vehicles:

4 Trucks, 2½ ton 6x6

3 Trucks, ½ ton 4x4

2 Trailers, ¼ ton

1 Trailer, water, 300 gal

On 21 September 1950 the battalion started displacement to coordinates (Tall57E) at about 0830. Heavy enemy counterbattery fire was received, and continued intermittently for several hours. Nine (9) enemy prisoners were taken and two (2) killed. Sixty-four (64) concentrations were fired. On 22 September the battalion received heavy counterbattery fire at about 0430. Four (4) men were wounded in action. At 0630, a twenty (20) minute preparation was fired in support of the infantry advance toward SEOUL. At 0930 a patrol found a quantity of arms and ammunition and took four (4) enemy prisoners. Fifty-two (52) concentrations were fired.

From 23 through 25 September 1950 the battalion did not displace, but continued to fire support for the 5th Marines moving on SEOUL across the river from the battalion position. Movement of infantry was lateral to river, so support continued to be possible and effective. One hundred and twenty-four (124) concentrations were fired during the period. On 25 September an advance party crossed the HAN river to locate new positions. These were chosen in the vicinity of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines CP area, located at coordinates (1661N3). The advance party crossed at the initial river crossing. On 26 September when directed to utilize the new crossing the reconnaissance party encountered considerable difficulty getting to position due to the inability of DUKW's used for transport to negotiate the narrow thoroughfares on the outskirts of SEOUL. Forward elements of battalion, including Battery "C", occupied positions at 1100, and registration of Battery "C" was completed at 1700. Thirteen (13) concentrations were fired.

During 27 and 28 September the battalion did not fire due to action within the city proper and mopping-up operations unrelated to support by artillery.

29 September 1950 the situation remained uneventful. CP location unchanged. Infantry mopping-up operations continued.

On 30 September Battery "C" was detached for operational purposes to the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. On 1 October "A" Battery, 50th AAA (AW) Battalion, U.S. Army, was attached to the battalion for operational control. On 2 October one (1) platoon of this battery was attached to Battery "C".

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During the night of 2 October 1950 Battery "C" was attacked by twenty (20) to thirty (30) enemy troops, and was brought under enemy mortar fire. One (1) security outpost was surrounded by the enemy but successfully defended its position. The attack was repulsed. Battery "C" took forty-two (42) prisoners the following day, 3 October 1950.

On 4 October 1950 the U.S. Army AAA Battery was detached. On 5 October Battery "C" rejoined the battalion. At 1400, 5 October the battalion commenced displacement to the 1st Marine Division assembly area in INCHON, Korea.

6 and 7 October 1950 the battalion remained in bivouac at the Division Assembly Area in INCHON.

8. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, PROBABLE ORDER OF BATTLE, AND EQUIPMENT

Generally unknown; information obtained from infantry S-2 reports would be of greater value.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Missions and ammunition expended:

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>
Area missions	346	14,974	1,707
Precision missions	29	1,812	185
Harassing missions	147	2,250	131
Defensive missions	20	167	13
assault missions	1	15	
TOTALS	543	19,218	2,036

Total expenditure of ammunition: 21,254 rounds

Results of firing:

Enemy killed:	3,155
Enemy wounded:	3,309
Machine guns destroyed:	61
AT guns destroyed:	17
Automatic weapons destroyed:	78
Mortars destroyed:	28
OP's neutralized:	10
Tanks destroyed:	1
Vehicles destroyed:	2
FA pieces destroyed:	13

Additional pertinent statistics:

One hundred and fifty-six (156) enemy personnel were captured by members of the battalion. Thirteen (13) enemy were killed by battalion security elements. Two (2) 105mm howitzers were recaptured from the enemy. Four (4) tons of assorted munitions and demolitions were also captured.

Battalion casualties during the campaign were as follows:

KIA:	1
WIA:	30
SKE:	13 (Sick and Injured) (Non-battle)

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10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMANDER

It is the opinion of this command that the 105mm howitzer has proved an extremely effective weapon during the course of the Korean campaign. There are, however, certain factors governing the use of this weapon which should be taken into consideration in an effort to increase its effectiveness.

During operations in which this command was a part of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, it was found that a six (6) gun battery was not a practical solution to the problem of artillery support. The nature of the terrain available for use as artillery position areas precluded the use of a battery containing in excess of four (4) pieces. The tactics of the enemy, who were adapt at infiltration and guerilla tactics, necessitated an all around perimeter of local security defense by artillery units. There proved to be insufficient local security personnel included in current Tables of Organization for artillery units. It was, therefore, necessary to compress the battalion position into a compact area in order to achieve the necessary security.

It is recommended that, whenever possible, the above-mentioned factors be taken into consideration in determining the number of artillery pieces to be included in a battery of artillery for a specific campaign.

It was also found that twelve (12) artillery pieces per battalion, as opposed to the eighteen (18) pieces provided by the T/O (War Strength) gave ample fire support to an infantry regiment in the type of campaign which was fought by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. This opinion is based on the fact that over 95% of the artillery concentrations fired were battery concentrations. A battalion concentration was an exception rather than the rule.

The value of white phosphorous cannot be overemphasized. It was learned, both from observation and prisoner interrogation, that while white phosphorous shells were very effective against the enemy. Due to the mountainous terrain, WP shells were used extensively for registration purposes, thereby saving many HE shells, which would otherwise become lost rounds. It is believed that artillery effectiveness would be improved by increasing the amount of WP projectiles contained in a unit of fire. It is also believed that the percentage of HEAT shells contained in a unit of fire should be substantially increased, and that at least two (2) rounds of cannister shells should be included in a unit of fire.

Both fuze time and fuze VT were found to be particularly effective. It is to be noted, however, that very little fuze VT was used due to the unreliability of the vertical control of the firing charts available. Since the use of fuze, time, was easily controlled by direct observation, this problem was not present in using this type of fuze.

There is a very pressing need for an illuminating shell for use with the 105mm howitzer. It is unfortunate that an accurate count of the number of requests for illumination received by this unit was not kept to lend support to the argument that 105mm howitzer illuminating shells are an absolute necessity.

It is also believed that some serious thought should be given to the advisability of including self-propelled artillery in the T/O's. The extreme narrowness of most Korean roads makes it virtually impossible to turn a towed load around. The continued possibility of ambush in this type of campaign increases the need for extremely rapid employment of artillery. These factors, combined with soil conditions which necessitate the use of tracked vehicles, are strong arguments in favor of the use of self-propelled artillery pieces.

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The use of liaison type aircraft in this type of warfare has proved invaluable. However, it is believed that the effectiveness of their employment would be greatly enhanced if they were placed under the operational control of the battalion commander. This opinion is based on practical experience since, in the campaign at CHINDONG-NI, the artillery spotting planes operated from a landing strip adjacent to battalion headquarters. It was found that the planes could be more effectively employed when operating in this manner. Their increase in effectiveness was due mainly to the fact that they were more easily available for assignment, they would be directed to effective spotting positions much more quickly, plus the fact that the pilots, observers, and the battalion operations officer could establish personal liaison, which is of great value to all concerned.

It is further the opinion of this command that the following materiel improvements would greatly increase the effectiveness of artillery fire:

- a. Night lighting devices for aiming posts should be supplied by a common electrical source and should be centrally controlled from the battery executive officer's position.
- b. The left shield of the howitzer should be lowered at least four (4) inches to allow greater sight visibility.
- c. A radio, which can be easily transported by a single individual, should be provided for use by forward observers. This set should be similar in design to the present 300 series used by the infantry, but must have greater range capabilities.
- d. Target grids must be made of more durable material. Possibly one made of plastic or some form of parchment may be the answer.

R. M. WOOD,
Lt Col., USMC,
Commanding 1st Bn 11th Marines

APPENDIX TWO TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

2d Battalion, 11th Marines
In the Field
10 November 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 11th Marines
Subj: Special Action Report for period 2 September 1950 to 7 October 1950
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

The following report sets forth in some detail the activities of this unit immediately prior to and during the INCHON-SEOUL campaign in Korea from 2 September, 1950 to 7 October, 1950. An attempt has been made to set forth the problems which confronted this unit and the methods used in solving these problems in clear, concise terms. It is believed that anyone with a knowledge of artillery can derive useful information and profit by the experiences of this unit by analyzing the contents of this report.

The assigned tactical mission of this battalion was direct support of the 1st Marine Regiment.

The next higher echelon was the 11th Marine Regiment.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

(A) UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER
2d Battalion, 11th Marines Lt Col. MERRITT ADELMAN, USMC

<u>(B) ORGANIC UNITS</u>	<u>COMMANDING OFFICER</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	
		<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Headquarters Btry	Capt. G.J. BATSON USMC	12	163
Service Btry	Capt. H.R. MERRICK USMC	7	100
Dcg Btry	Capt. A.H. STROHMENGER USMC	8	117
Easy Btry	Capt. J.C. MC CLELLAND USMC	8	123
Fox Btry (2-27Sep)	Capt. C.M. CABLE USMC		
(28Sep-7Oct)	Capt. G.J. KOVICH USMC	8	117
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>620</u>

(C) ATTACHED UNITS NONE

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Planning schedules formulated by this unit were minor in scope and content. Upon our arrival in Camp Sakai, Japan, the 11th Marines furnished preliminary planning information to this unit for the purposes of loading aboard assault shipping, movement to the INCHON area, and initial operation on WOLMI-DO. A planning room was established by the 11th Marines at Camp Sakai and made available to the following officers: CO, ExecO, S-2, S-3, Asst S-3, and S-4. Detailed loading plans were formulated and executed prior to our departure from KOBE, Japan. Operational planning was routine in nature since the employment of artillery for the INCHON landing was generally in accordance with procedures outlined in landing force manuals. The formulation of a detailed landing plan and DUKW loading plan was necessary however, because of the extremely unusual tidal conditions at INCHON.

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2d Battalion, 11th Marines
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It was imperative that only the most essential personnel and equipment be in the initial landing of DUKW's since the tide effect prevented additional landing of personnel or equipment for a period of twelve hours. Considerations were also made of the weight limit of 6000 lbs/DUKW imposed by the DUKW Company. Accordingly, the problem of justifying the allocation of personnel and equipment against the weight restriction imposed was solved during this planning phase. The detailed loading plan of DUKW's and the methods used to solve these problems are included in paragraph 5 of this report.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

The period covered by this report was not suitable for the conduct of a training program prior to our entry into combat. Training facilities at Camp Sakai, Japan and aboard assault shipping were inadequate and used little by this unit.

No rehearsals for the INCHON-SEOUL operations were conducted by this unit.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Three (3) SCAJAF LST's were assigned this battalion on 3 September. Loading plans were immediately commenced and were completed prior to 0800 4 September. One firing battery was assigned to each LST with Headquarters Battery and Service Battery evenly split on all three ships. Directives from higher authority specified that each LST would carry one battalion U/F understowed on the tank deck. The assignment of personnel was as below indicated:

<u>CO 14</u>		<u>CO 18</u>		<u>CO 19</u>	
"D" Btry	3-100	"E" Btry	2-95	"F" Btry	2-95
HqBtry	7-56	HcBtry	1-64	ServBtry	2-45
Navy	1-13	ServBtry	2-45	ServBtry, 11thMar	7-70
ServBtry	2-0	Det Eng Bn	1-30	1st AmphTrkCo	0-29
"E" Btry	2-5	1st AmphTrkCo	1-30		
"F" Btry	2-5				
1st Amph					
TrkCo	1-30				

Loading was started at 1600 on 7 September. The next 48 hours were consumed in understowing the 105mm ammunition. This was a slow and tedious process in that the ammunition had to be off loaded from ships to barges, the barges were towed to docks and the ammunition unloaded onto the LST. Considerable loading time would have been saved if any of the above handling could have been eliminated.

Equipment for this battalion was loaded aboard the Green Bay Victory enroute from the United States at the time that assault shipping was assigned. This ship arrived at KOBE, Japan on 4 September. As the equipment was unloaded from the Green Bay Victory it was immediately processed in preparation for loading out on the LST's.

Loading of vehicles commenced on the LST's at 2000 9 September and was completed and personnel embarked by 0200 10 September.

This unit was assigned 33 DUKW's for use on the INCHON-SEOUL landing. Allocation of the DUKW's was made as follows:
 9 DUKW's /firing battery (6 gun DUKW's, 2 ammo, and 1 personnel)
 6 DUKW's for Hqrs and Service Batteries
 (3 Reconnaissance Party, 1 ammo, and 2 personnel)

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Each firing battery was loaded as shown below:

- 6-Howitzer DUKW's: loading for 1 DUKW
 - Driver and Assistant Driver
 - 5 man Gun crew
 - 1 Howitzer, 105mm
 - 10 Rounds of 105mm ammunition
 - 2 Days rations (Type C)
 - 5 Gallons of water
 - Section chest
- 2-Ammunition DUKW's: loading for 1 DUKW
 - Driver and Assistant Driver
 - 109 Rounds of 105mm ammunition
 - 15 gallons of water
- 1-Personnel DUKW
 - Driver and Assistant Driver
 - Battery Executive Officer
 - Firing Battery Headquarters and Local Security personnel (20)

Total Firing battery personnel - 50/Battery - 150/Battalion

Headquarters and Service Battery DUKW's were loaded as shown below:

3 - Reconnaissance DUKW's

<u>No. 1 DUKW</u>	<u>No. 2 DUKW</u>	<u>No. 3 DUKW</u>
Bn CO	"D" Btry CO	"F" Btry CO
CommO	"E" Btry CO	Hq Btry CO
Asst-3	"F" Btry ExecO	"D" Btry ExecO
EngineerO	Bn SurveyO	"E" Btry ExecO
3-Radio Opr.	3-Mbrs Survey Sec.	3-Mbrs Survey Sec.
3-Wiremen	2-Radio Opr	2-Radio Opr.
1-AN/MRC5	3-Wiremen	3-Wiremen
2-619's	3-FDC men	2-FDC men
500#Comm Equip	6-Btry Recon men	6-Btry Recon men
	2-619's	1-Demolition man
	500#Comm Equip	2-619's
		500#Comm Equip

3 - Rear Element Hdqrs and Service Batteries DUKW's

<u>No. 4 DUKW</u>	<u>No. 5 DUKW</u>	<u>No. 6 DUKW</u>
Bn ExecO	20-Local Security	109-Rds, Ammunition
Bn S-4	personnel w/dual	15-Gallons of water
1-Radio Opr	jobs. i.e. Rad Opr	
7-Demolitions men	Wire, FDC, Etc	
15-EE-8's		
1-AN/MRC5		
2-Mi W-110 Wire		

Total Hdqrs and Service Battery personnel - 75
 Total Battalion personnel in DUKW's - 225
 Total 105mm Howitzer ammunition - 943 rounds

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The LST's Q014, Q018, and Q019 with personnel and equipment of this battalion embarked and sailed from KOBE, Japan at 0600, 10 September. The ships were enroute to the objective area for six days and arrived at H-2 hours on 15 September. Considerable unpleasantness resulted from using the SCAJAP LST's in that they were

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not up to the normal expected standard of cleanliness and in that "B" rations were consumed aboard when it was believed that "A" rations could have been provided.

At the objective area during the launching of the DUKW's one DUKW was lost from the L018. This ship got underway during the launching and did not notify the tank deck. As the DUKW was being launched the ramp dropped and the DUKW immediately sank. Three demolition men from "B" Company, 1st Engineer Battalion were drowned and one 608 radio jeep lost. The remainder of the artillery DUKW's were landed on Green Beach at H hour.

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase

15 September, 1950. 0640- A reconnaissance party consisting of the S-3, assistant S-2, and four (4) enlisted personnel landed on WOLMI-DO with BLT 3/5 to locate and establish a position area for the battalion. Position area selected and occupied in TA 8849 L-M. 1745 - Elements of battalion began landing at Green Beach. 1930-Elements of all batteries ashore and establishment of position areas underway. 2150 - All battery positions established and the battalion ready to fire. No fire missions completed this date.

16 September, 1950. 0140 - Commenced high burst registration using Easy Battery as registering battery. 0200 - Completed registration with the following corrections computed: Deflection Correction 18 m left, Range Correction + 100/1000. 0735 - Commenced Basepoint registration using an observed firing chart. 0755 - completed registration. 1010 - Battalion Commander and reconnaissance party departed from old position area to reconnoiter for a new position area. 1200 - Firing elements of battalion displaced forward to new battalion position located in TA 9244 J. 1815 - All elements of battalion in position and ready to fire. 1915 - Attempted Basepoint registration without success due to darkness. Several attempts were made to establish a short base from which a high burst registration could be conducted, however, considerable firing of small arms in the position area prevented this. Six (6) missions completed this date. 90 rounds expended.

b. Exploitation Phase

17 September, 1950. 0720 - Battalion Commander and reconnaissance party departed to reconnoiter for new position area. 1000 - Advance FDC and Survey Section displaced forward with one registering howitzer to rendezvous forward with the battalion commander. 1230 - New position area established in TA 9647 L. 1300 - Dog and Fox batteries ordered to displace forward. 1400 - Registrations conducted with registering howitzer from Dog battery and using services of the Air Observer. 1520 - Headquarters battery and Easy battery were ordered to displace to position area located in TA 9647 L however RCT 1 moved forward at such a rapid rate it became obvious to the battalion commander that to maintain proper support of RCT 1 he must leap frog the battalion. Accordingly, Easy battery and one section of the Fire Direction Center continued displacement forward to a position area in TA 9950 K. 2010 - Easy battery fired its normal barrage against a small counter attack in RCT 1 zone of action. Attack was repulsed and artillery fire was reported to be very effective. 21 missions plus 5 H&I missions completed this date. 870 rounds expended.

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18 September, 1950. 0545 - Battalion began firing preparatory fires prior to jump off of RCT 1. 0755 - Easy battery registered on a check point using normal ground observer procedures. Registration corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Left 10 μ , Range Correction \neq 5.6/1000. 0930 - Dog and Fox plus elements of Headquarters and Service Batteries began displacement forward to new position area located in TA 0150 E-I. 1535 - Easy battery displaced forward to the battalion position area. 1615 - All batteries in position and ready to fire. Registration conducted with corrections computed as follows: Deflection Correction right 71 μ , Range Correction \neq 21.8/1000. 25 missions plus 3 H&I missions completed this date. 456 rounds expended.

19 September, 1950. 1028 - Conducted Basepoint registration by Air Observer with corrections computed as follows: Deflection Correction Left 21 μ , Range Correction \neq 69/1000. 1500 - 96th Field Artillery Battalion assigned the mission of reinforcing 2/11. Liaison Officer reported to Commanding Officer 2/11 for instructions. 1730 - Easy battery plus one section of the Fire Direction Center were displaced forward approximately 2500 meters to a new battery position in TA 0549 L. This displacement was necessitated due to the fact that one BLT of RCT 1 would be beyond the maximum range of the battalion by daylight of the next day. 2035 - Several attempts were made to register Easy battery, however, registration corrections were never obtained due to extreme ranges encountered and poor observation of the target area experienced by the forward observers. 26 missions plus 8 H&I missions were completed this date. 409 rounds were expended.

20 September, 1950. 0455 - Battalion began firing Dog and Fox normal barrages against a counter attack in RCT 1 zone of action. 0506 - Easy battery began firing their normal barrage on the same counter attack. 0555 - 96th Field Artillery Battalion reinforced 2/11 against the counter attack now reported in TA 1454 E and 1051 R-S-T. 0655 - Commanding Officer, Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines sent the following surveillance report to 2/11. "one truck, two tanks and approximately 100 infantry troops destroyed by your artillery fire. Without artillery fire this Company would have been wiped out." 0720 - Battalion reconnaissance party plus Dog and Fox batteries began displacement forward. 0950 - New position area established in TA 0755 M. 1145 - Conducted a Basepoint registration utilizing the Air Observer. Corrections computed from registration were as follows: Deflection Correction Left 7 μ , Range Correction \neq 17/1000. 1210 - Battalion received three rounds of enemy mortar fire. Upon completion of the firing, a crater analysis was conducted and it was determined that the enemy fire was from an enemy 82mm mortar. 21 missions plus 10 H&I missions completed this date. 1656 rounds expended.

21 September, 1950. 0700 - Battalion Commander and reconnaissance party departed to reconnoiter for a new battalion position. 0730 Advance FDC and survey section plus one registering howitzer from Fox Battery departed for the new battalion position. 1200 - New battalion position established in TA 1152 L. 1245 - Easy and Dog batteries fired a two hour concentration from the rear position (TA 0755 M) on mortars, infantry, and artillery.

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Surveillance report received "Excellent" results, area well neutralized. 1335 - Conducted Basepoint registration. Mission prolonged for over two hours due to poor communications. 1500 - Battalion OP was established by the S-3 section. Visibility was poor due to smoke and haze arising from Yong Dong Po. 1505 - Enemy mortar fire received in position area. 1955 - Easy and Dog batteries plus service elements of Headquarters battery arrived in new position area. 38 missions complete this date. 2682 rounds expended.

22 September 1950. 0630 - Battalion fired preparatory fires prior to jump off of RCT 1. 1245 - Battalion conducted a Basepoint registration utilizing Air Observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Right 50 μ Range Correction $-1.4/1000$. 1825 - Fired Fox normal barrage on a large enemy troop concentration. No surveillance report received. 18 missions plus 7 H&I missions completed this date. 459 rounds expended.

23 September 1950. 0010 - One (1) 155mm Howitzer from 96th Field Artillery Battalion was placed well forward in RCT 1 zone of action to be used as an illumination howitzer. This howitzer remained with the Battalion until 29 September 1950. 0900 - Conducted a Basepoint registration utilizing the Air Observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Right 46 μ Range Correction $+3.2/1000$. 2305 - 2/11 reinforced by 48th Field Artillery Battalion. 27 missions plus 10 H&I missions completed this date. 954 rounds expended.

24 September 1950. 0705 - Conducted Basepoint registration utilizing Air Observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Left 14 μ , Range Correction $-1.7/1000$. 0735 - Conducted Basepoint registration for Baker battery 96th FA Battalion. 0950 - Battalion Commander and reconnaissance party departed to reconnoiter for new position area. 1430 - new position area established in TA 1852 X. 1645 - Conducted a Basepoint registration using the Air Observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction $-19/1000$. 1900 - Rear elements of battalion arrived in new position area. 17 missions plus 5 H&I missions completed this date. 487 rounds expended.

25 September 1950. 0700 - Conducted a Basepoint registration using the services of the Air Observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Left 13 μ , Range Correction $-4/1000$. 1045 - Following message received by battalion in conjunction with a fire request, "Infantry cannot wait for artillery. Infantry will advance and take the consequences. Henry 3 sends 'Thanks a lot for your artillery support'. (This target plotted behind front line positions of adjacent unit that were reported 2 hours prior. S-3 attempted to check for safety and received the above message in reply.). In connection with this mission and the general situation for the day it will be of interest to explain the difficult maneuver involved. This unit continued its assigned mission of direct support of RCT-1. The battalion was in position on the South banks of the HAN RIVER. 2-1 crossed the river, to the northern banks, at daybreak to a point approximately 2000 yards behind the front line elements of RCT 5 which had been across the river for

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three days. From the position area of 2/11 the angle T, to the front line units of 2-1 was 2000 mils. During the planning stages of this maneuver it became obvious to the artillery that any "overs" or "ricochets" landing to the front of 2-1 would fall directly into units of RCT 5. Accordingly this unit sent a liaison officer to 1/11, who were in a favorable position area to support both RCT 1 and RCT 5. "No fire" restrictions were imposed on this unit by mutual agreement of RCT 1 and RCT 5 until front line elements moved East of a # 20 north-south grid line. As the units passed the 20 grid line the angle T from this unit to RCT 1 zone of action was approximately 1300 mils. Artillery support for this intricate maneuver was not up to its normal standard, however, this unit was prevented from moving to favorable position areas due to the time and space factors involved, and Division priority in crossing the HAN RIVER. The Division Operation Order was received and discussed at an RCT 1 staff meeting at 0230 the morning of the 25th and called for its execution at daybreak. To move to a favorable position area this unit would have had to displace over a distance of 15 miles in the middle of the night and be prepared to fire at daybreak. Difficult operations of this nature must be disseminated to all echelons early so that proper planning procedures can be made and sufficient time allowed for their successful execution. 15 missions plus 10 H&I missions completed this date. 385 rounds expended.

26 September 1950. 0440 - Battalion began firing on large enemy concentrations at a rapid rate. (Battalion expended 3776 rounds on this mission). Troops and tanks reported in TA 2157 U. Estimated 1000-2000 troops with tanks moving into RCT 1 zone of action. 4th FA Battalion and 96th FA Battalion reinforced 2/11 on this mission. Area well neutralized and artillery credited with destruction of six (6) out of twelve (12) tanks. 0600 - Battalion Commander and reconnaissance party departed to reconnoiter for a new position area across the HAN RIVER. 1400 - Battalion commenced displacement across HAN RIVER to a new position area in TA 1856 A. Battalion used LVT's and the ferry to cross the river. 2030 - Displacement across HAN RIVER completed. All batteries in position and ready to fire. 6 missions plus 8 H&I missions completed this date. 5814 rounds expended.

27 September 1950. 0600 - Battalion fired preparatory fires in RCT 1 zone of action prior to infantry jump off. Numerous missions were fired throughout the day in support of RCT 1 attack through SEOUL. 43 missions plus 4 H&I missions completed this date. 1467 rounds expended.

28 September 1950. 0615 - Battalion fired preparatory fires in RCT 1 zone of action prior to infantry jump off. 0700 - Battalion Commander and reconnaissance party departed to reconnoiter for a new position area. 1200 - Dog and Easy batteries displaced forward to the new position area located in the Royal Palace Grounds, TA 2360 G-H-L-M. 1600 - Forward echelon of battalion in position and ready to fire. 1730 - Entire battalion completed displacement. 1815 - Conducted Basepoint registration utilizing the Air Observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Right 6 μ , Range Correction - 12/1000. 22 missions plus 8 H&I missions completed this date. 821 rounds expended.

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29 September 1950. 0800 - Battalion conducted a Basepoint registration using a ground observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Left 27 μ , Range Correction $+ 33/1000$. 1200 - 96th FA Battalion received a new tactical mission cancelling their reinforcing mission of 2/11. 1920 - One howitzer from 4/11 was emplaced in our position area to be used as an illumination howitzer. Numerous missions were fired throughout the day in support of RCT 1's mopping up activities, through SEOUL. 26 missions plus 3 H&I missions completed this date. 525 rounds expended.

30 September 1950. 0635 - Battalion fired preparatory fires in RCT 1 zone of action. 0735 - Basepoint registration conducted by an Air Observer. Corrections computed were as follows: Deflection Correction Right 18 μ , Range Correction $+ 13/1000$. 0920 - Battalion S-3 departed on reconnaissance for a new position area. 1215 - Firing elements displaced forward to the new position area located in TA 2861 I. 1620 - Basepoint registration conducted by an Air Observer. Corrections were computed as follows: Deflection Correction Right 29 μ , Range Correction $- 7/1000$. 1815 - Displacement completed, all batteries established in the new position area. 1900 - Assigned the new tactical mission of General Support. Liaison officers and forward observers remained with RCT 1, however, 2/11 was required to clear all fire requests through the 11th Marines due to our assigned mission. This situation was extremely awkward because RCT 1 had become accustomed to immediate replies to their fire requests. 28 missions plus 11 H&I missions completed this date. 925 rounds expended.

1 October 1950. 0700 - Battalion was assigned a sector of fire 3000 μ wide therefore the Battalion Commander had each firing battery lay on a different compass to adequately cover the area. Dog Battery was laid on CA 1050, Easy Battery laid on CA 5800, and Fox Battery laid CA 1600. 16 missions completed this date. 99 rounds expended.

2 October 1950. Battalion remained in position with mission of General Support. Extremely quiet day for artillery. 4 missions completed this date. 398 rounds expended.

3 October 1950. Battalion remained in present position area with mission of General Support. Very little activity throughout the day. 2 missions completed this date. 79 rounds expended.

4 October 1950. Battalion remained in present position area with mission of General Support. 2 missions completed this date. 24 rounds expended.

5 October 1950. Battalion remained in present area with mission of General Support. No artillery missions fired this date.

6 October 1950. 1300 - Battalion departed from position area via battalion motor convoy enroute to assembly area in INCHON. 1700 - Battalion arrived in assembly area and began to establish camp site.

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7 October 1950. Battalion remained in assembly area, improvement of camp site and maintenance of materiel were the primary functions of personnel throughout the day. Battalion Commander established command liaison with RGT 1 for planning purposes on WONSAN operation.

8. ENEMY

During the period from 15 September, 1950 to 7 October 1950 the intelligence section of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines was actively engaged in operations against the enemy.

Information directly concerning the enemy such as his tactics, organization, deployment, etc., was reported to the S-3 section by those units in physical contact with the enemy, Division Periodic Intelligence report, adjacent and attached units, and from higher echelon. Therefore our main source of information came to us second-hand. Intelligence data extracted from prisoners of war was negligible.

The S-2 section took a total of nineteen (19) prisoners throughout the period none of whom were armed at the time of capture. All had either lost or discarded their weapons. Initially this section had no interpreter; however, when they were able to procure one much progress was made in determining the status of prisoners. The S-2 section made proper disposition of prisoners as outlined in Division Operation Plan No. 2. The facilities of this unit did not permit us to carry on extensive interrogation.

On WOLMI-DO, at our first firing position, several rifles of type MASSIN-MAGANI, one heavy machine gun MAXIM 1910, several boxes of hand grenades and much small arms ammunition were recovered. All arms were forwarded to Regiment and later returned to us for destruction or distribution as souvenirs to original finder. During the INCHON-SEOUL campaign, our Battalion recovered or found in our Battalion areas the following equipment: four (4) trucks and two (2) civilian cars, 15 SHPAGIN "Bump Guns", four (4) SIMONOV AT Rifles, and several tons of ammunition. The disposition of recovered material varied. Ammunition was buried or dispersed, small arms either taken as souvenirs, forwarded to higher echelon or disabled. In several instances the Battalion by passed several caches of ammunition which were reported to Regiment.

Morale of the enemy observed from prisoners of war, was low in all phases of the campaign. In latter stages of the operation prisoners were more inclined to surrender than in the earlier stages of the operation. Fewer prisoners were found hiding in fields and abandoned houses. It is felt that the enemy began realizing the futility of the situation, thus more readily surrendering themselves at the close of the campaign.

It is also felt that the enemy was definitely weak in artillery. The enemy consistently failed to shell the battalion position or engage our guns in counter battery fire at any time. Only on two occasions did the battalion receive counter battery mortar fire. The first time was on 20 September, 1950, when three (3) rounds of 82mm mortar landed in the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters. Had the enemy continued his fire it is believed that the battalion would have suffered considerable damage and casualties. On the 21st of September, 1950, five (5) rounds of 82mm mortar landed in the vicinity of the Battalion FDC narrowly missing our installations. Here again the enemy failed to follow up his obvious advantage. It may be assumed that the enemy was low on

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ammunition and intended only to harrass our troops or he may not have realized the effectiveness of his shooting. On both occasions when the Battalion received counter mortar fire, crater analysis were made and reports were forwarded to regiment. Forward Observers with rifle companies normally were unable to make crater analysis for several reasons mainly; inadequate knowledge or "know how" in the proper methods of performing a crater analysis, the rapidity of advance, and because of areas exposed to intense small arms fire. The regimental liaison officers did, when possible, send in shell reports which were recorded by this section and forwarded on to regiment. Due to lack of shell reports, this unit did not attempt to engage the enemy with counter battery fire. The battalion did however conduct H&I fires on suspected enemy troop concentrations and targets based on recommendation of the Battalion S-2 when practical. The Battalion S-2 consolidated information obtained from periodic intelligence reports and turned it over to the Battalion S-3 for recommended nightly H&I fires.

The battalion reconnaissance parties encountered several marked mine fields. In view of the fact that infantry and engineers had preceded the artillery, in most cases, it is understandable that few mines were encountered. On one occasion a battery vehicle of this battalion was completely destroyed by a mine killing one marine and severely wounding three (3) others. In this instance the mine proved to be completely effective.

The battalion did not encounter any deliberate road blocks or obstacles other than mines and blown bridges. Here again it can safely be assumed that the engineers either repaired or removed obstacles which may have impaired our movements.

Several areas occupied by this battalion, which had been previously utilized by the enemy, indicated that camouflage was used extensively and to good effect. During the initial stages of this campaign the firing batteries camouflaged their respective positions. Later on, due to lack of enemy air activity, the battalion dispensed with extensive camouflage procedures.

The S-2 section established battalion observation posts on two occasions. Because of haze and smoke in the air, the OP's were not completely effective.

This battalion did not knowingly experience any night infiltration or sabotage. Personnel in this battalion did not encounter any booby-traps. The battery positions were never raided or attacked by any organized or unorganized enemy troops. Enemy aviation did not at any time attack or bomb the battalion positions.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

The estimated amount of damage inflicted upon the enemy by this unit during the INCHON-SEOUL campaign from 15 September 1950 - 7 October 1950.

Approximately two thousand (2000) enemy were killed, eight (8) tanks destroyed, one (1) ammunition dump containing a considerable amount of high explosives destroyed, thirty-five (35) trucks destroyed and six (6) mortars destroyed. In addition, an undetermined amount of

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small arms, machine guns, and light anti-tank weapons were neutralized over the entire period.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. COMMENTS

(1) COMMUNICATIONS

The early fire missions received from forward observers were lacking essential elements. These elements were either left out by observers or lost in the limited communication facilities. The rapid advancement of troops and the limited range of the 619 radio, immediately introduced the necessity of using both battalion and regimental liaison officers as relay stations. The majority of fire missions were conducted over one battalion common fire direction channel. Radio remotes did not operate satisfactorily. A telephone line was run from the radio jeep to the FDC with a talker on each end of the line. By the time a mission reached the FDC it had been sent through four radios and two telephones.

The rapid movement of the infantry dictated that relay stations be maintained. The artillery would displace to within a thousand yards of the front lines. And on occasion became part of the front lines, only to find that the infantry was out of their supporting range by night fall. By making almost daily displacements this battalion did furnish continuous support. However, maintaining constant communications remained a challenge in all situations.

To increase communications, forward observers were instructed to leave out the words "forward observer" in their fire request; to identify themselves by battery and number; i.e. "Dog One or Easy Two". Relay stations discontinued "reading back for possible correction". They questioned only that part of the fire request which was not understood. Remotes were repaired or replaced and remoted directly to the FDC, all stations were notified that the traffic load and not a fire mission tied up a net. The phrase "Get off the air, I have a fire mission" was discontinued. The words 'fire mission' denoted only priority. As many as three missions can be conducted simultaneously over the one common channel.

A forward observer with a fire mission listened to the net until he was sure he could get his mission started during a transmission break. He would then send his mission to the FDC. With two or more missions on the air each observer must identify his subsequent corrections, i.e. "Dog One, Right 200 Add 400". The FDC must notify the observer that his rounds are on the way by identifying the observer; i.e. "Dog One on the way". The S-3 maintains close supervision of this channel. He keeps missions segregated and unnecessary traffic off the air.

The statement "no communications; no artillery" has proven itself many times in the Korean campaign. In this fast moving situation, wire communications were seldom established forward of the Battalion Liaison Officer. Often wire did not get further than the Regimental Liaison Officer. Wire was usually in to the Regimental Liaison Officer by nightfall. It was always a problem to keep in. Wiremen would lay a line only to turn around and trouble shoot it.

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The majority of communications were dependent upon radio. The 619 radio proved inadequate. The 610 was considerably better with its dry batteries. However, the 610 demands delicate treatment. This treatment could not be given particularly due to insufficiently trained personnel and the fact that only one radio technician was available. Frequently a radio operator needed both of his hands to climb a hill. The 610 was especially hard to carry in an operative position. For this reason, liaison officers were not in communications with their observers while they were on the move. Communications must be maintained in a rapidly changing situation. A more efficient and adeptable radio is required for the forward observer.

Due to the great number of outposts manned around our position area and the necessity for maintaining a "hot loop" of communications it was found that the number of telephones allotted on the present T/E's was grossly inadequate.

It was found that the common malfunction of mike buttons could be eliminated by making a straight connection in the mike. This produces a mike which is always "alive". The operator plugs the mike in only when he desires to use it.

(2) TACTICS

The forward observers had many problems arise because, infantry officers were not aware of the limitations and capabilities of their supporting arms. Observers received such impossible requests as; "I want fire (with a wide sweep of the arm) here, here, and here; I want to keep this fire in front of us as we move out. We move out in twenty minutes". The observers vainly tried to meet each request, however, it was impossible to provide such a general preparation in the time specified. The observers eventually worked out a system that was satisfactory to the infantry. They would call for a battery concentration and inform the FDC that this was a preparation concentration. They would then shift the fire for effect to the area pointed out by the supported unit and advance the fire during the initial assault. This method of preparatory fires was applied in support of units of battalion strength or less. Preparations in support of a coordinated RCT attack were conducted in the normal manner. Liaison Officers were charged with the responsibility of frequent time checks between the attacking and supporting unit. Prompt reports were made of any changes in the original plan.

Many times the forward observers were not informed that preparatory fire was to fall in their zone of observation. This occurred when the infantry failed to keep the observers informed of their plan of action. The operation plan would be received so late at night by the infantry regiment that it was impossible to disseminate it through normal channels prior to the jump off time. In these instances preparatory fires would be planned by the Regimental Liaison Officer and he would submit them directly to the FDC after obtaining approval from the infantry regiment. If time allowed these fires were changed to conform with infantry battalion commander's requests upon which the regimental commander had concurred. In the short time available for planning an attack, infantry unit commanders sometimes failed to call in their artillery liaison officer during the planning phase. Liaison officers had to be aggressive in obtaining information, to avoid last minute requests being imposed on the artillery.

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The problem of clearly defined boundaries as expected, arose in Korea. They did not always follow terrain features nor prominent land marks. In one instance, on the outskirts of SEOUL, the artillery was furnished one set of boundaries and the infantry another. A change was made in the boundaries and the artillery was not informed. Permission to fire into adjacent sectors was always hard to obtain. The Regimental Liaison Officer did not have direct contact with the FSGC nor the adjacent liaison officers.

Hand in hand with the problem of boundaries were the problems of front lines. Due to the rapid moving situation and the limitations of the 619 and 610 radios, it was impossible for the forward observers to keep the FDC informed of the disposition of their front lines. However, a general knowledge of the front lines can be obtained if the observer gives frequent coordinates of his position. When doing this the observer must state whether he is observing from an OP or is physically with the front lines. Unless stated it is always assumed that he is with his unit. The observer has very little difficulty in giving his location by grid coordinates provided that he is equipped with a fairly accurate map. The majority of all fire mission requests located the target by grid coordinates rather than by reference to a known point or concentration. The maps used in the INCHON-SEOUL operation were sufficiently accurate, but were lacking in detail. The forward observers used the 1/50,000 map as a tactical map and the FDC used the 1/25,000 as a firing chart.

Illumination was a big problem. The 155mm howitzer was used exclusively due to its limiting range of seven thousand yards and the rapid advancement of the front lines, the 155mm battalion could seldom furnish illumination from its position. One medium howitzer was attached to this battalion and overcame the range limitations in most situations. On occasion this howitzer was emplaced in front of the 2/11 position area in order to fulfill its illumination mission.

(3) GUNNERY

The Korean campaign furnished the Marine Corps with its first opportunity to use the Target Grid System of fire direction under combat conditions. The system proved to be far superior to the old system in that it eliminated much of the long technical training required of observers and fire direction personnel.

The Battalion Survey Section has had little difficulty in accomplishing its mission. Due to the numerous displacements by the battalion, it was impossible to shift to regimental survey control. Only on two occasions during the INCHON-SEOUL campaign was regimental control carried to battalion in time to be of value and then only for a short period of time.

With the 1/25,000 map as a firing chart and combined with a position area survey the battalion was able to utilize vertical control and mass fires satisfactorily. High angle fire was used frequently during the later stages of the operation with good results. Some normal barrages were fired as high angle missions.

Normal barrages were fired in as concentrations and numbered as such. The assignment of a specific concentration as a normal barrage was not done until all the defensive fires had been fired in for the

APPENDIX TWO TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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night. The battalion liaison officers would make recommendations to the Regimental Liaison Officer as to which concentration they desired for their normal barrage. The Regimental Liaison Officer would confer with the Regimental Commander and make the final decision as to which concentrations would be the normal barrages for the night. The FDC would be notified and batteries would be assigned their barrages. All computers would compute data for their battery to fire on all defensive concentrations. This data would be placed on one sheet with the particular battery's normal barrage at the top of the page. This page would then be labeled "Emergency Data" and the battalion would be massed on any concentration immediately.

The terrain encountered in Korea was well suited for the use of White Phosphorus. Observers often requested the use of WP rather than HE. It was especially useful in firing in night defensive fires which frequently was done after dark since the infantry did not stop until darkness. The large demand for WP made it necessary to fire shell mixed to conserve WP. When this was done the FDC had to compensate for the difference in the weight of the two projectiles. In the early stages of the operation there were instances of short rounds of WP. This was caused by the difference in the weight of the two projectiles and the fact that the WP had solidified unequally within the projectile. Instructions were given to the battery executive officers to store WP in the upright position with the projectile resting on its base. This procedure improved firing results. However, the age of the projectile still caused erratic rounds. The proper handling given the projectile in the battery position was not sufficient to overcome the long period of improper stowage. By melting or softening up WP will shift within the projectile and cause erratic rounds whenever the projectile has been exposed to high temperatures and improper stowage.

(4) ORDNANCE

Rugged terrain and poor roads were very hard on howitzer tires. It was necessary for the Battalion to replace four (4) howitzer tires for which there was no replacements. Neither the standard 7.50-24 howitzer tire nor the combat 9.00-20 tire were immediately available. The standard 6x6 truck tire 8.25-20 and wheel were used as replacements. The M2A1 howitzer carriages were modified to take the 8.25-20 tire by cutting the shield, moving the lower shield bracket, modifying the brake handle, and utilizing the M2A2 brake backing plate. If the modification had not been made on the M2A1 carriages the wheel hubs would have been too widely spaced to fit in the DUKW.

Ammunition resupply was generally very good during the entire operation. However, it is felt that ammunition trucks wasted unnecessary time in going from one ASP to another until they found the type ammunition needed. They could not go directly to the ASP which had the proper type ammunition, but had to follow the routine of picking up statements from each ASP certifying that it did not have the type ammunition desired.

(5) ORGANIZATION

The INCHON-SEOUL campaign was characterized by rapid, continual, and extremely mobile operations. This situation made the duties of the Regimental Liaison Officer unduly difficult. His duties required continuous attention both day and night. During the daylight

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hours he monitor fire missions, supervises the preparation of preparatory fires within the regiment, and keeps the Infantry Regimental Commander abreast of the artillery situation. During the hours of darkness he again monitors all fire missions, supervises the establishment of night defensive fires, participates in staff conferences for the next days operations, and plans the following mornings preparation. The proper accomplishment of these varied and tedious duties are felt to be too much of a work load for one officer. Accordingly, this unit assigned an additional officer as assistant liaison officer with the infantry Regiment.

It might be of interest to the reader of this report to know the composition of the Regimental Liaison Team, as set up by this unit. The team was organized with 2 commissioned officers and 27 enlisted. The detailed breakdown of this team is as shown below:

- 1 - Major, Liaison Officer
- 1 - Captain, Assistant Liaison Officer
- 1 - Sergeant, Liaison
- 3 - Drivers (2 - $\frac{1}{2}$ ton and 1-2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton)
- 15 - Wiremen (3 - Wire teams and 1 - Switchboard team)
Two of the wire teams would lay the lines to the assault battalions and the third team would establish communications with the reserve battalion, artillery FDC, and trouble shoot all lines.
During active operations these wire teams laid approximately 20 miles of wire per day.
- 7 - Radio Operators
- 1 - Communication Chief

(6) MISCELLANEOUS

The handling and safe-keeping of classified documents became increasingly difficult as the campaign progressed. The battalion safe was a constant nuisance and soon became overloaded with non-essential classified material. The assistant S-2 is custodian of classified publications. This unit has on receipt to the Chief of Naval Operations 36 publications of which, at most, 5 were utilized during the operation. It is recommended that all non-essential publications, for battalion level, be maintained at Regimental or higher echelon only.

On the whole medical facilities, including both personnel and supplies, have been adequate to meet the needs of this battalion during the period covered by this report. Casualties due to disease as well as enemy action have been negligible, within the various position areas. Considering the obstacles met, and geographical area of operations, sanitation has been very good. There have been no epidemics of any nature. Gastroenteritis has been the most common complaint with approximately fifty (50) cases occurring during the entire operation. Only two (2) cases required hospitalization. The quantity and quality of rations has been adequate. Transportation for medical supplies and medical personnel has been inadequate, necessitating an absolute minimum of supplies be carried. Much of the full 30 days initial supply was left in a dump in the rear area.

(B) RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) A light, durable, and highly mobile radio similar to an SCR 300, with increased range, should be developed and provided for forward observers.

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- (2) The Regimental Liaison Officer should be furnished with a TCS radio over which lateral communications can be maintained, between adjacent regiments, and monitored by the artillery regiment. This would facilitate the obtaining of clearance to fire missions in adjacent sectors.
- (3) The present T/E should be increased by two (2) ED-7c switchboards, twenty-six (26) EE-8 telephones, and twenty-six (26) head and chest sets. (See comment under communications).
- (4) The present T/O should be augmented to provide a radio technician in the Regimental Liaison Team and two (2) technicians in Battalion Headquarters.
- (5) The Regimental Liaison Section should be increased in the present T/O to include a Technical Sergeant Liaison Section Chief and Captain, Assistant Liaison Officer.
- (6) The present wartime T/O for each (3) Battalion Liaison Sections should be increased to include one complete wire team and a relief for the present radio operator. A suggested composition of the section is as follows:
 - Lt -- Battalion Liaison Officer
 - Sgt -- Liaison
 - 2 -- Radio Operators
 - 4 -- Wiremen
- (7) The Headquarters and Service Batteries should be organized into one battery in place of the present organization of two separate batteries. On Battalion level the functions, problems, and activities are so closely related that they are invariably employed as one.
- (8) The present wartime T/O's should be augmented to provide a local security section in the Headquarters and Service Batteries composed of at least twenty men. (One (1) sergeant, four (4) corporals, and fifteen (15) privates first class or privates). Local security of an artillery battalion is a must and yet there are at the present time insufficient personnel of the proper classification to adequately perform the job.
- (9) A 155mm Howitzer should be attached to each direct support battalion during a fast moving situation as an illumination gun, or a 105mm illumination shell be developed.
- (10) The M2 and M2A1 carriage of the 105mm howitzer should be modified so that the wheels of the prime mover are interchangeable with the howitzer wheels. (See comment under ORDNANCE).
- (11) A 60mm or 81mm Mortar should be included in the wartime T/E for each artillery battalion to be used as an illuminating weapon for local security. Trip flares and illuminating grenades are inadequate.

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2d Battalion, 11th Marines
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- (12) A 1-ton, trailer w/5kw generator unit should be included in the T/E for an artillery battalion to provide the source of electricity used in the fire direction center.
- (13) To facilitate carrying maximum cubic capacity all service battery vehicles should be 5 ton capacity, particularly for ammunition. $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles have proven inadequate where long hauls were involved.
- (14) The present wartime T/E should be augmented to include the addition of five (5) $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton, or 1 ton trucks, one per battery executive officer section, battalion wire section, and battalion survey section.
- (15) Each prime mover should have a pintle hook attached to the front bumper to facilitate emplacing the howitzer in difficult positions as was frequently encountered by this unit during this operation.

FINAL CONCLUSION

Since the T/O's, T/E's and T/A's are based on an assumed employment (as taught in the Marine Corps Schools) of the Marine Corps, viz; the establishment of a beachhead no deeper than 12 (approximate) miles it is recommended that the employment of the Marine Corps be approached realistically and be modified to include land warfare. This would require a restudy of all T/O's, T/E's and T/A's to provide for such type warfare. Generally speaking it is believed that the logistic support of FEF units need a change to cope with land warfare. It is felt that the Korean War is probably one in a series of incidents in which the Marine Corps will be thusly employed.

MERRITT ADELMAN

APPENDIX THREE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

3d Battalion, 11th Marines
In the Field
15 November 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 11th Marines

Subj: Special Action Report for the period 15 September 1950 to
7 October 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order Number 16

1. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with instructions contained in reference (a), this report is submitted, covering the operation of this battalion in the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL campaign. As a part of the Eleventh Marines, it's mission was to support infantry units, as directed.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines - Major Francis F. PARRY, USMC
Headquarters Battery, Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines - First Lieutenant Michael B. WEIR, USMCR
Service Battery, Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines - Captain Robert A. THOMPSON, USMC
Battery "G", Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines, Captain Samuel A. HANNAH, USMC
Battery "H", Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines - Captain Benjamin S. READ, USMC
Battery "I", Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines - Captain John M. MC LAURIN, USMC
Battery "D", 50th AAA AWBn, USA - Captain FINK, CAC, USA (2 to 5 October, 1950).

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Very little formal preliminary planning was done by this unit due to the fact it was enroute from the continental United States during planning phase, and did not arrive in the objective area until D plus six (6). Some planning was done, based upon official, semi-official and other reports from the objective area.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

This battalion trained for approximately twelve (12) days during the expansion phase at Camp Pendleton. Approximately one-third of its enlisted personnel were joined in the three (3) days prior to sailing. All possible training was conducted aboard ship enroute to the objective area. No rehearsals were held.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

This battalion was commercially loaded with Regimental Combat Team 7, from San Diego, California, in six (6) different vessels.

6. MOVEMENT TO, AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

This phase was without incident; arrived at objective area on 21 September, 1950.

APPENDIX THREE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

3d Battalion, 11th Marines
In the Field
15 November 1950

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase:

This battalion did not participate in the assault phase.

b. Exploitation phase:

This battalion was landed during the night of 21 September, 1950, at INCHON, Korea. On 22 September, 1950 it proceeded to an assembly area south of KIMPO Airfield. On 23 September, 1950, it occupied firing positions near the HAN River, North of KIMPO, in direct support of the Seventh Marines. On 25 September, 1950, the battalion, less Battery "G", crossed the HAN River via LVT and ferry, and occupied firing positions Northwest of SEOUL. This battalion was the first artillery battalion to cross the HAN River. On 29 September, 1950, the battalion displaced to positions North of SEOUL, along the Uijongbu Road, still in direct support of the Seventh Marines. On 30 September, 1950, this battalion was attached to Regimental Combat Team 7 for the advance on Uijongbu, and remained so until the end of the operation, 7 October, 1950. During the operation this battalion fired about 280 missions and 8,134 rounds.

8. ENEMY

Enemy artillery was in little evidence during this campaign. It is estimated that not more than one battery of light artillery opposed our forces, identified as the artillery of the 17th Division. Artillery activity was light and sporadic, generally very ineffective. The enemy usually employed his artillery in single pieces. It is believed that the enemy was cognizant of our artillery strength and positions, but was not capable of effective counter-battery fire.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Missions fired during this campaign included enemy troops, mortars, machine guns, anti-tank guns, automatic weapons, AA guns and vehicles. Many of their installations and equipment were destroyed. It is estimated that 250 to 300 enemy were killed by artillery fire during this campaign.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. After careful study of the campaign covered by this report, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the deficiencies most responsible for hampering operations of this battalion are as follows:

(1) Communications

Good reliable communications are absolutely essential to the effective operation of field artillery. Upon entry into combat, the communications section of this battalion was poorly organized, poorly trained and poorly equipped; this was due to the fact that the Communications Officer was joined one (1) day prior to sailing from the Continental United States. About 50% of the communication personnel were joined within three (3) days prior to sailing. These were for the most part very inexperienced personnel. The only training they received was given aboard ship enroute to the objective area. In addition, much of the communication equipment was received just prior to sailing, with no opportunity to check, test and repack it. Many items were later found to be in poor repair. This battalion was commercially loaded in

APPENDIX THREE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

3d Battalion, 11th Marines
In the Field
15 November 1950

six ships, and some of this equipment was never recovered upon landing, in spite of the most diligent efforts to spot and recover it. Great difficulty has been experienced in maintaining both SCR 619 and SCR 608 radios; SCR 608 troubles were mostly due to mechanical failures of vehicles and also extremely poor performance of the remote units. These remote units are definitely not satisfactory. The SCR 619 was found to give excellent service so long as freshly charged batteries could be kept up to forward observer parties; this problem was partially solved by placing battery chargers on the liaison officer's cargo jeeps, and further by keeping charged batteries on battery commander's vehicles so that batteries could be exchanged every time the battery commander went forward to visit his liaison and forward observer teams. The SCR 619 has proven far superior to the SCR 610. This campaign has proved again that artillery cannot shoot without communications.

(2) Liaison

Liaison and relations in general with infantry units has been good. In the matter of clearance of fires, considerable difficulty has been experienced in maintaining current front line information. This has been due mostly to poor communications, both artillery and infantry. This situation improved throughout the campaign, however, artillery must know friendly troop locations, particularly in this type of terrain, where one forward observer does not know and cannot see adjacent units.

(3) Equipment

Equipment has generally been satisfactory, except that there were many shortages existent in the battalion, and on some critical items, no resupply was available.

F. F. PARRY

APPENDIX FOUR TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

WMCr:AJC:wm
2295
Ser 72-50

4th Battalion, 11th Marines,
In the Field
15 November 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FIF

Subj: Special Action Report for period 31 August - 7 October 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The purpose of this report is to summarize all occurrences incident to combat participated in by this organization during the Inchon-Seoul-Kimpo area operation including planning involved during subject period.

b. The mission assigned this organization was that of general support artillery of the 11th Marines Reinforced in the zone of action of the 1st Marine Division.

c. The designation of the next higher echelon is Headquarters, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division, FIF.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

4th Battalion, 11th Marines	Major William MC REYNOLDS (07189)	USMC

Headquarters Battery	Captain Charles S. CUMINGS (09222)	USMC
Strength	USMC	USMC
Officers	Enlisted	Officer
11	133	1
11	133	1

Service Battery	Captain Armand G. DADDAZIO (012981)	USMC
Strength	USMC	USMC
Officers	Enlisted	
8	119	
8	119	

King Battery	First Lieutenant Robert C. NESSMAN (039208)	USMC
Strength	USMC	USMC
Officers	Enlisted	
4	112	
4	112	

Love Battery	Captain Lawrence R. CLOERN (014589)	USMC
Strength	USMC	USMC
Officers	Enlisted	
4	115	
4	115	

Hike Battery	Captain Vernon W. SHAPIRO (017363)	USMC
Strength	USMC	USMC
Officers	Enlisted	
4	117	
4	117	

Battalion Strength

USMC

USN

Officers

Enlisted

Officers

Enlisted

31

596

1

11

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. From the date the battalion arrived at Camp Pendleton and commenced reorganizing to the war M/O, the efforts of all hands were directed to forming and equipping a medium howitzer battalion capable of performing a typical amphibious role to be expected within a Marine Division. Reorganization was completed prior to embarkation for overseas but assignment of equipment to subordinate units was not, and was further pursued during the period spent by the Division in Japan.

b. Upon receipt of Division Planning Order Number 2, and while still unloading at Kobe, work began on separating equipment to be taken on the operation and equipment to follow at a later date. Most of the landing plans concerning this battalion were accomplished on higher levels. Planning information was received at the Regimental planning room and passed on in fragmentary form to personnel as needed, or in battalion conferences. Prospective battalion position areas were selected in the objective area from stereo-pairs furnished by intelligence. Upon assignment of shipping, it was planned to split the Headquarters and Service Batteries into only two sections as only two assault ships were assigned to the battalion. Other planning peculiar to the loading and landing of the organization not covered by instructions from higher authority, were executed by issuance of fragmentary orders and personal supervision by experienced officers assigned from within the battalion.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

a. Upon arrival at Kobe, Japan, on 28 August 1950, and prior to receipt of any directive concerning future operations, the following had been accomplished:

1. Ship-board training enroute had been executed to cover basic subjects as well as artillery section training within the limitations imposed.

2. Plans had been tentatively made to conduct test firing of machine guns and rocket launchers, and to calibrate the battalion howitzers.

3. It was also planned to conduct artillery training to include at least one Reconnaissance, Selection, and Organization of Position, as the first time that the battalion had been assembled in one location occurred upon embarkation on the USNS GENERAL WEIGEL for overseas. However, the same situation applied in the Far East and upon debarkation, the battalion was not assembled in a single location again until landed from assault shipping at Inchon, Korea. Training proceeded however, on a battery and section level, using available personnel during the period from 31 August to 15 September 1950. No rehearsals were made. Most machine guns and all individual table of organization weapons had been fired during the period that the battalion was forming on the West Coast.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. This battalion, a part of Embarkation Group Dog, had as its assigned shipping for the movement from Kobe, Japan to Inchon, Korea, LST 00 59, LST 00 74, and KA-108 (USS WASHBURN). In addition, the

4th Battalion, 11th Marines, was charged with the responsibility of understowing one unit of fire of 155mm ammunition on LST 00 94.

Embarked in the above shipping were the following:

LST 00 59: King Battery, elements of Headquarters Battery, elements of Service Battery (all 4-11 units) and one U/F on organic transportation and understowed. This ship was the Battalion CP afloat.

LST 00 74: Love Battery, elements of Headquarters Battery, elements of Service Battery (all 4-11 units) and one U/F on organic transportation and understowed.

KA-108: Mike Battery, elements of Headquarters Battery, elements of Service Battery (all 4-11 units), and one U/F on organic transportation as general cargo. In addition, equipment of Division units and Division general cargo were loaded.

Mike Battery boarded the KA-108 on 4 September 1950. No plan was formulated for loading Division equipment and general cargo, with the result that loading was unduly slow. Only after the ship was fully loaded was it possible to complete the loading plan. The loading of this ship was completed on 10 September 1950.

Loading of ISFs was initially hampered by lack of ammunition for understowage. Fuzes for shell, illuminating, were not unloaded from the Moonday Victory in sufficient time to be reloaded in assault shipping, necessitating airlifting same to Korea. Each barge delivering ammunition to ship-side generally contained only one type, i.e. H.E. shell, etc., necessitating respotting of ammunition barges until a complete unit of fire was selected.

During the re-embarkation at Kobe, Japan, a disastrous typhoon struck, holding up work for one day and setting back the schedule for one more. Little combat equipment was lost, but much of the servicing and conditioning had to be done over. Electronic and communication equipment was damaged the most, and caused some hardships in that field after the landings.

Space for rear echelon equipment of this battalion was allotted in Warehouse Peter at Kobe. This proved inadequate, and a reassignment of space to Warehouse X-ray was made. The re-movement of this equipment simultaneously with the combat loading of assigned shipping, added to the problems of mounting out.

Communications between the Battalion CP at Camp Sakai and the Kobe Base were grossly inadequate. Due to this, the fragmentary administrative and embarkation orders which were issued, in several instances, did not reach the lower echelons in sufficient time to be accomplished.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

a. Personnel embarked at Kobe, Japan, for the landing at Inchon as follows:

1. On 8 September 1950, the Battalion Commander, with elements of Headquarters Battery, Service Battery, and all of King Battery, embarked aboard LST 00 59. Total personnel embarked amounted to 15 officers and 238 enlisted.

2. On 8 September 1950, the Battalion Executive Officer, with elements of Headquarters Battery, Service Battery, and all of Love Battery, embarked aboard LST # 14. Total personnel embarked amounted to 13 officers and 239 enlisted.

3. On 11 September 1950, Mike Battery embarked aboard the USS WASHBURN (KA-106). Total personnel embarked amounted to 4 officers and 150 enlisted.

b. The ships arrived at Incheon on 15 September 1950, and reconnaissance parties went ashore at 1340 on this date at Wolmi-do Island, Korea. The entire organization disembarked at Wolmi-do Island on 16 September 1950.

7. OPERATIONS

a. ASSAULT PHASE 15-16 September 1950

The Battalion Reconnaissance party landed at Green Beach at 1830, 15 September 1950, via amphibious truck. Wolmi-do disclosed only one battalion position and this area was then occupied by the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. At 0530, 16 September 1950, this position area was more fully scouted and routes thereto from Opal Beach were developed for reception of Mike Battery due to arrive at 0730. At 1400, a reconnaissance was made in northwestern Incheon in rear of Red Beach and positions were selected for the battalion. However at 1700, an additional reconnaissance was made on the eastern outskirts of the city upon receipt of front lines. The battalion's initial position was in this area. Guides were sent out to the beaches for the remainder of the battalion which was due to land on the evening tide. The LSTs plus the elements of Mike Battery expected in the morning were able to land on this tide. Batteries occupied positions after dark in rice paddies. Registration was planned by high burst, but was not made owing to the difficulty of establishing observer stations after dark. Lack of accurate front line information and lack of contact with observers attached to the Light battalions. Wire communication with regiment was not reliable during the evening and control was maintained via radio.

b. EXPLOITATION PHASE 17 September -- 7 October 1950

At 0830, 17 September 1950, reconnaissance was made at TA 97480 where elements of the 5th Marines reserves were then located. The battalion was brought forward in echelon, King Battery being last and occupying its position after dark. Registration was not made at this position, available observers being occupied with targets for direct support battalions. Arrangements for high burst registration fell through when contact with Flash OPS could not be maintained. The 1st Marines called for illumination to its front. Adjustment of the illumination was made by 2-11 observers and the illumination was fired at one hour intervals during the night. 1st Marines then called for harassing and interdiction fires on the forward slope of Hill 123 TA 05506 to their front and road nets in rear thereof. Map coordinates were selected for fourteen separate points and fired through the night. Observation was not obtainable on these and surveillance has not been received.

Registration was made by VF aircraft at 0930, 18 September on trucks and troops at TA 07501Z. Four additional concentrations were fired on similar targets along the road to Seoul during the morning.

Reconnaissance was made; King and Mike Batteries moved forward to TA 0455V and were followed by Love Battery at 1500. Mike registered by AO. During the evening, two illuminating missions were fired in Z/A of 5th Marines. Mike fired three observed illuminating missions in Z/A of 1st Marines. The 1st Marines missions were delayed as a result of the following:

1. Pieces to fire had to be reloaded after dark, which required one hour and a half.

2. Mike, on the right, was best situated to deliver the fire without endangering the position. Mike, formed on the West Coast, received its equipment with only sufficient time to enable it to be marked and boxed and shipped via Combat Service Group shipping on the Green Bay Victory. Much of its equipment was not located when the Green Bay Victory unloaded. Flashlights on hand were substituted for night lighting devices, as an example.

3. A night counter battery mission against two medium artillery pieces was fired on an early morning mission against a train on the north side of the Han River, with good results. Five H and I missions were fired on targets in Z/A of 5th Marines across the Han River. During daylight hours on 18 September, two missions were fired on troop concentrations in Z/A of 5th Marines and two missions in Z/A of 1st Marines west of Yong Dung Po Ri.

4. During the night of 14-19 September, two counter battery missions were fired in Z/A of 5th Marines. In the 1st Marines sector, four H concentrations and one illuminating mission were fired on enemy assembling south of Yong Dung Po Ri. Early in the morning of 20 September, four additional concentrations were fired in concert with 2-11 in order to repel an enemy counter-attack. CO of Company E, 1st Marines, reported excellent effect and in the nick of time. During the morning of 20 September, three exploratory concentrations were fired on Objective Alpha via 1-11 on request of assault battalion commander. At 1500, 18 concentrations were fired on Yong Dung Po Ri, and 15 H and I concentrations were fired on this city during the evening. At 2240, a concentration was fired on 12 enemy tanks, Z/A of 1st Marines. Also 2 H and I concentrations were fired Z/A of 5th Marines across the Han River during the night of 20-21 September. Battalion fired 25 preparatory concentrations in support of attack of 5th Marines early on 21 September and three concentrations were later fired on troops, AA guns, and artillery opposing assault elements of 5th Marines. One concentration was fired on enemy troops in the area south of Yong Dung Po Ri via AO. 190 rounds were fired by one battery on this concentration, the observer jumping the impact all over an area about 2000 meters square. Results were reported excellent. The battalion displaced to TA 0857H during the day and fired only seven H and I fires during the night of 21-22 September. On 22 September, two concentrations of enemy troops and one on enemy artillery in Z/A of 5th Marines were fired. Early on 23 September, preparatory concentrations were fired in Z/A of 5th Marines and later 3 concentrations on enemy artillery were fired. During the afternoon, the battalion, less Love Battery, displaced to TA 1156H. During the evening of 23-24 September, experiments for high burst registration were made using shell, illuminating, and fuze 1E67 modified by removal of booster charge so as to be accommodated by fuze cavity of shell, illuminating. The purpose of this experiment was to seek to gain more range from shell illuminating than is provided by the 25 second fuze 1E54. Flash observers reported good observation. Corrections were obtained as follows and applied to the shell HE GFT; Range 8500, altitude of burst 590, fuze time 37.1 seconds.

On 4 October, Mike fired four concentrations on enemy installations and that evening Mike fired 7 H&I fires. At 1425, 5 October, Mike rejoined the battalion at 2063. At 1430, 5 October, the battalion displaced to an assembly area North of Red Beach, Incheon, EA 89544.

8. ENEMY

Enemy activity against this battalion during the period covered by this special report consisted of harassing fires. This was carried out by 75mm and 122mm howitzers and 82mm mortars. No enemy air activity was reported in the battalion area. Although there were threats of enemy infiltrations this battalion had no such activity due to the all around security of this battalion area.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

During the assault phase of the operation no firing was done by this battalion. Although the battalion had landed and was in a position to deliver fire at the end of the assault phase.

During the exploitation phase high angle fire was utilized for H&I fire on one occasion. No proximity fuze was used during the operation owing to the difficulty of clearances with higher echelons. Time fuze was used only for illumination as difficulty was experienced in obtaining observation long enough to obtain a time registration. It is believed that air burst would have inflicted a much larger proportion of personnel casualties than occurred. Prior to the capture of Seoul the road from Pusan carried a large number of troops North through the city of Seoul. Also the demoralizing effect of air bursts is believed to be much superior to impact fuzes in flushing an entrenched enemy and in the conduct of an assault.

Surveillance of enemy artillery fire has been difficult to obtain as a result of no battalion personnel assigned for observation posts and no fire line restrictions in target areas. Actual confirmed results amount to 18 tanks, 1 artillery battery, 2 artillery pieces, 2 locomotives, 3 trucks destroyed and an indeterminate number of personnel casualties. The battalion assisted in repelling 4 counter attacks supported by tanks, silenced artillery fires coming from 4 battery positions, dispersed nine sizeable troop concentrations, silenced 5 anti-tank guns, stopped two trains, participated in preparations prior to the assault, fired numerous harassing and interdiction missions and furnished adequate illumination within the range limitations of the shell and fuze combination provided. Opportunity was not available for battalion personnel to make its own surveillance and in many cases observer personnel were hampered by dusk or darkness, or more pressing local matters to provide surveillance on all missions fired.

In spite of lack of opportunity to calibrate other than watching Initial Velocity from the gun bocks, the accuracy of the 155mm howitzer was demonstrated on more than one occasion. Close support 155mm fire was called down by observers on the night of 25-26 September when a salient had been made between regimental boundaries to a depth of about 600 map yards according to situation overlay that evening. The observer walked the fire down into the salient and supported troops were well satisfied with the results. The battalion was in position to fire throughout the division sector during the exploitation and most of the time was actually laid to cover the entire sector except on occasions when the front exceeded 2400 miles in azimuth from the position area.

This spreading of the battalion fires prohibits massed fire, however few targets appeared requiring the massed fires of 18 155mm howitzers during the operation. Illumination was supplied to distant sectors by sending howitzer sections forward in the sector involved at night fall. This illumination was controlled directly from the D/S Battalion HQ.

In the terrain provided, positions which provided adequate "going" for the howitzers were difficult to find. Rice paddies proved too muddy, even when dry on the surface. The areas in which dry crops were located proved adequate. Another solution was to place the howitzers on small knolls, minor to larger mask to the front. In any case adequate dispersal area for vehicles was difficult to find within the positions available.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It was found that at least one hour is required to shift trails and relay a battery on a new azimuth. Conditions of darkness, uneven ground and the condition of the soil aggravate the difficulties involved in digging new trail pits and relaying the howitzers. In most positions occupied during the operation the soil had a hard crust for 14 inches with a powdery base, which broke down upon firing. Preparation of trail pits under such a condition requires additional reinforcement in order to insure that howitzers will not shift unduly on firing. Because of the fast moving situation and frequent displacements, primary positions and primary sectors only were prepared. Most trail shifts occurred after dark. With any information available during daylight as to alternate areas of expected enemy concentrations, some advance preparations could have been made in some instances, which would have cut down the interval required to shift.

2. The target area grid system of spotting produced very good results even being used by infantry officers on occasions. This suggests wide dissemination of spotting procedure throughout infantry commands to include fundamentals. In reference to regular artillery observer personnel the following factors were noted:

a. Variance from established fire control procedure although not affecting accuracy does inject additional delay in the delivery of prompt support.

b. Inaccurate map reading likewise introduces delay in close situations, as well as danger to own troops.

c. Inaccurate initial azimuths introduce an error which can be corrected at the fire direction center upon firing, however delay ensues and in close support missions danger to own troops is serious.

d. Aerial observers were not careful to determine the GT line and battalion positions which introduced the same type error as not in (c) above.

e. Ground observers when firing against hilly terrain could have gotten on target easily by use of altitude spots rather than range corrections on many occasions. However, this was only done on one occasion when communications were good and a suggestion from the fire direction center got through to the observer.

As a result of the presence of the five factors just noted enemy targets were able to disperse to the extent that fire for effect produced less than optimum results and in some cases adjustment was not even completed. A contributing factor to the non-completion of adjust missions is the reliance upon radio in fluid situations which again points up the necessity of adhering to proper procedure.

It is recommended that training of observer personnel continue to stress procedure and map reading, and that all Marines be encouraged to familiarize themselves with observer procedure fundamentals.

3. It is recommended that further progress be made in development of a shell, illuminating, combination to produce illumination ranges in excess of 7200 yards and that CRT's for the combination be issued to the using arms. It is suggested that a parachute which can remain intact at higher initial velocities than those produced by charge 5 in conjunction with the use of the Mechanical Time fuze.

4. It is recommended that the target area grid be reproduced on clear acetate to facilitate determination of target altitude as well as to assist the operations officer in checking the pin for accuracy of location and safety.

5. The present issue CP tent does not provide sufficient room for inclusion of necessary equipment and personnel in the fire direction center and night operations is hampered thereby. Recommend the design and issue of a blackout CP tent with at least 250 square feet floor space.

6. It is recommended that the 155mm howitzer battalion be equipped with self propelled howitzers in the Marine Division. The chief advantage of the self-propelled howitzer lies in its ability to be placed in action in a short time which advantage is very real in moving situations. The M howitzer requires 1 1/2 hours to shift sector. A displacement in echelon usually requires the best part of a day with the M. In addition the rapid movement of fire-power as required within the sector is greatly improved. As an example, howitzers sent forward for night illumination left the position area at least 3 hours before sundown and were not back in position to fire with the battalion until 0900 to 0930 the next morning. The distances involved were only about two miles and routes were usually good. The amount of transportation required in the battalion would likewise be decreased. Present T/E gives each howitzer section an M5 1 HC 2 1/2 T trucks, a TD-18 tractor, a 1 ton trailer and the howitzer. Recommended T/E would give the section it's SP howitzer and a heavy duty ammunition trailer.

7. It is recommended that steps be taken to shorten the time necessary to clear a proposed proximity fuze mission. A typical VT fuze target, i.e. personnel, would have an opportunity to travel 2 1/2 miles at quick time during the time that one of these missions is being cleared by the "Hellfire" procedure.

8. There are four components to a complete round of 155mm howitzer ammunition and the lack of any one prevents the use of the other three. In addition the unit of fire for the howitzer contains 12 different components normally. Attention should be directed in loading to loading complete components on a proportionate basis on each carrier (ship or vehicle). Initially during loading at Kobe only White bag powder charge and shell HE were available for loading. All other components had been loaded on a second ship. Fuzes, M54 time for illuminating was not unloaded from this ship in time to be loaded in assault shipping and if ship #2 had been sunk enroute to Kobe there would have been no effective 155 howitzer ammunition in the assault shipping.

9. While staging at Kobe as well as at San Diego, California, Battalion Headquarters was located two hours distant from staging areas and dockside. Communications nets were not established below the division level and this seriously hampered control of operations. The only method of keeping a finger on the situation was by constant travel, which was done but which put a great strain on all personnel as work was around the clock in both cases.

10. The loading of the Washburn was made a responsibility of Mike Battery as it had top priority in unloading. The Washburn cargo included one U/F for 155mm Howitzer, 2 U/F for 105mm Howitzer, 3 days C ration for 11th Marines, supply of B rations, trucks for the 7th Motor transport battalion, assorted organizational equipment for the Combat Service Group, water in 55 gallon drums for the Service Battalion and elements of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, USA. In keeping with the spirit of the Division Commander's letter of loading by eye if necessary in order to meet sailing dates, all efforts were bent to the task and the objective date was met. Mike Battery being first off had to be assigned the top hold space, which prohibited loading its gear until lower level loads were loaded. A field officer from the battalion was assigned to coordinate the work on the ground. 7th Motor Transport trucks to be loaded were just being unloaded from other shipping. They had to be utilized by division in moving infantry units whose transportation had already been loaded. Ammunition which could only be loaded in No. 2 hold deep tanks, was not even unloaded and when unloaded, Washburn had last priority over assault ships scheduled for loads of this type ammunition. Liaison was difficult to effect and when effected ran into problems beyond its capabilities. It is recommended that an officer from the highest echelon involved, in this case, division, be assigned to coordinate and supervise loading of ships with this type load, particularly in situations where insufficient time is available to completely plan loading in advance. The Woonday Victory, as another example, was assigned an assorted load out of San Diego including a large portion of the division ammunition. The tank battalion had priority in unloading and a tank officer was made unloading officer. Loading plans were not in his hand and although he knew ammunition aboard, he was not acquainted with how much and what types were aboard. Assault shipping waited for loads of ammunition to be understowed and the Washburn having last priority had to close #2 tanks before arrival of all its assigned load in order to load upper levels and meet sailing date.

11. It was found that even with good position areas available it was difficult to disperse battalion motor transport sufficiently. As a result during periods when infiltrations posed no serious threat, Service Battery except for the Adjutants' section, occupied positions in the vicinity of the Main Supply Route between supply points and the battalion. This procedure allowed the battery to remain in position when the remainder of the battalion moved forward with no disruption of maintenance work in progress and good results from the supply point of view.

12. The medium artillery fired relatively little during daylight hours as a result of the following:

a. Due to a shortage of L-5 and HO35 Planes, TAO and GAO functions were combined in the same plane using one frequency.

b. Assignment of observers when available to artillery was usually made to one of the direct support battalions.

c. Observers with the direct support battalions located few targets for direct artillery with the exception of the latter stages of the operation.

d. VF aircraft were usually assigned for artillery observations on targets of importance not feasible for HO35&45 observers to observe and the only method for locating targets within the division other than those enumerated above was the regimental flash range section for location of enemy artillery. It is recommended that sufficient L-5 & HO35 aircraft be supplied to the division to enable the observers to be aloft continuously during daylight hours when the situation warrants.

13. In view of the rapid formation of the division, complexity of staff work involved in mounting an amphibious operation, the short time involved in planning and executing of preparations for the assault and the nature of the beach over which the assault force had to move its equipment, the whole operation is remarkable for absence of any serious miscalculations. Personnel joining this battalion, both regular and reserve, proved readily adaptable to rapid assimilation and approached all tasks with an enthusiasm remarkable in view of the fact that much of the work involved was back-breaking around the clock and most of the reserves involved were, a short time before, pursuing long range objectives incident to a civilian career.

WILLIAM MC REYNOLDS

APPENDIX FOUR TO 1ST MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

APPENDIX FIVE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

UNIT: Btry "C", 1st 4.5" RktBn, FMF
Location: Hamhung, Korea
Date: 12 November 1950

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commanding Officer, Eleventh Marines
Subj: Special Action Report for period 28 August 1950 -
7 October 1950
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

This report is a special action report covering the assault and exploitation phase of the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul operation including the arrival of the unit into the FEC and operations subsequent to that arrival. "C" Battery, First 4.5" Rocket Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, was attached to the Eleventh Marines for operational and administrative control on 4 August 1950 and assigned as a general support unit.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Table of organization strength of the battery is: Officers 4, Enlisted 86; actual strength at beginning of the operation: Officers 4, Enlisted 73, under the command of First Lieutenant Eugene A. BUSHE, U. S. Marine Corps. There are no attached units. Two hospital Corpsmen are detailed from the Eleventh Marines.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

The 4.5" Rocket Battery was attached to the First Marine Regiment and assigned to Embarkation Group Baker under First Marine Regimental Command with the mission of supporting that unit for the assault and seizure of Inchon. The battery was to land with rocket launchers and firing battery personnel embarked in LVT's and LVT's were to be utilized as prime movers until such time as organic prime movers and other vehicles could land from LST's. In addition to the six LVT's required to move the rocket launchers and firing battery, three LVT's were to be loaded with 4.5" rocket ammunition and utilized as a floating dump on call. Plans called for six LVT's to land the battery, each LVT loaded with one 4.5" rocket launcher, forty-eight fuze rounds (to be fuze on the way into the beach) of 4.5" rocket ammunition, and section crew. Each of the three LVT's in the floating dump were to be loaded with one-hundred rounds of 4.5" rocket ammunition with fuze, giving a total of five-hundred and eighty-eight rounds and fuzes to be landed

APPENDIX FIVE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

in the assault phase. In addition, the prime movers and ammunition trucks were to be combat loaded with seven-hundred and twenty rounds of fuzes and 4.5" rocket ammunition (one unit of fire) and one unit of fire for small arms. Personnel were to be issued one unit of fire of small arms ammunition. The rocket battery carried out planning directives of the Eleventh Marines prior to attachment to First Marines and thereafter carried out First Marine plans and directives. At all times the battery received enemy situation and intelligence reports from the Eleventh Marines and First Marines. In addition to Eleventh Marine plans and directives for operations and logistics the battery received those of the First Marines and the First Amphibious Tractor Battalion.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

There were no rehearsals. Upon arrival into the FEC the battery continued training, emphasizing rocket battery tactics and techniques, and also training with automatic weapons and bazookas. Small arms, ammunition, map reading, field sanitation, and individual combat training was carried out according to battery training schedules. In addition, pertinent instruction data on the enemy such as tactics, uniforms, capabilities and limitations of his weapons and equipment, situation, treatment, etc, was given. Division and regimental SOP's were read and battery instructed as to how to carry out same. Personnel assigned to the battery on the West Coast to bring the battery to wartime strength were integrated as to duties and methods of operations mainly through the medium of map problems.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Combat loading commenced on 6 September 1950, at the docks at Kobe, Japan, and plans were carried out as discussed in paragraph three. The battery was embarked on LST's 1138, 715, JO 73, 1048, and 883 as follows: CP, LST 715; firing battery personnel, LST 1138; prime movers and vehicles, LST's 883, 1048 and JO 73. The battery drew two units of fire for all small arms weapons and 1,308 4.5" rockets and fuzes from the First Marine Regiment. 588 fuzes and rounds were combat loaded on LVT's in LST 1138 and 720 fuzes and rounds were combat loaded on prime movers and ammunition trucks on LST 883. One unit of fire of small arms was issued to personnel, and one unit of fire of small arms was combat loaded on vehicles. Loading was completed on 8 September 1950 and personnel embarked on assigned vessels.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Battery sailed as part of convoy for Inchon, Korea on 10 September 1950. Enroute to objective, personnel were briefed on mission of battery, missions of the various

APPENDIX FIVE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

infantry regiments, the artillery regiment, and other arms of the division. In addition, the battery was instructed on all available information of the enemy, including his positions, capabilities, tactics, strength, probable course of action, etc.

7. OPERATIONS

(a) Assault phase.

15 September 1950 (D-Day)

The Battery Commander with reconnaissance sergeant and radio operator landed on Beach Blue at H plus 25 in the seventh wave. The firing battery, embarked on LVT's, landed at 1845 on Blue Beach 3, TA9146X4, with no casualties. Battery assumed the mission of supporting the First Marines and occupied a firing position on the beach. Battery landed with 588 fuze rockets combat loaded on nine LVT's. Six LVT's were loaded with 48 rockets, section crew and launcher. Three LVT's landed loaded with 100 rounds of rocket ammunition and fuzes. Sporadic mortar or 76 millimeter fire was directed at tractors while approaching the beach, but no hits were affected.

16 September 1950

At 0830 the battery commenced displacing following the First Marines by bounds using LVT's as prime movers. Part of the battery prime movers and other vehicles were met during the morning at 1000. LVT's were utilized as prime movers until all vehicles rejoined the battery at TA9547J3. With the arrival of battery vehicles a total of 1,308 rounds of rocket ammunition and fuzes were on hand. The battery arrived at this position at 1700, and took up a firing position in support of the First Marines. One wounded prisoner was captured at 1000 and turned over to Shore Party on the beach. Three civilian prisoners were apprehended at TA9547J3 at 1730 and turned over to the First Marines. The Battery Commander went forward on the Inchon-Seoul highway at 2115 on reconnaissance for firing position areas. A position was found and the battery was alerted for night fire missions.

(b) Exploitation Phase.

17 September 1950

At 1005 a fire mission of 180 rounds was fired at coordinates (99.590-49.090) from TA9547J3 on enemy gun positions and a concentration of troops. There was no surveillance report on this mission. The battery immediately displaced to a firing position at TA9647D1. At 1200 the battery displaced to a firing position at TA9646I2. At 1320 the battery returned to a rendezvous area at TA9547J3, and at 1800 again displaced to a rendezvous area at TA9849K4, in the vicinity of the First Marines CP.

18 September 1950

At 0900 the battery displaced to a firing position at TA0250Y5. A North Korean soldier was captured in this area and turned over to the Second Battalion, Eleventh

APPENDIX FIVE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Marines. The battery fired 144 rounds from this position at enemy mortar emplacements at coordinates (06.500-51.590) at 1500. At 1515 the battery fired 144 rounds at enemy mortar positions at coordinates (06.300-51.590) from the same position. These were both unobserved fire missions and no surveillance reports were obtained. At 1600 the battery was detached from the First Marines, attached to the Eleventh Marines, and assigned a mission of general support. At this time the battery displaced to a rendezvous area at TA0454E4 in the vicinity of the Eleventh Marines CP.

19 September 1950

At 1600 the battery displaced to a rendezvous area at TA0756Y near Kimpo airfield.

20 September 1950

At 1000 the battery moved to a rendezvous area at TA0756U. At 1535 a test mission of 12 rounds was fired at Yong Dung Po in TA1354STXY from a firing position at TA0950H5. The Battery Commander on an OP confirmed suspicions that M4A4 fuzes were not exploding the rockets. Ceased fire at 1540 and returned to rendezvous area at TA0756U.

21-27 September 1950

The battery remained at this rendezvous area awaiting arrival of M48A2 fuzes, and maintained local security with no enemy activity other than sporadic and inaccurate mortar fire.

28 September 1950

The Battery Commander and Battery Headquarters displaced across the Han river at 0820 with the remainder of the battery bivouacing on the Seoul airport in the vicinity of the pontoon bridge at Seoul. During the evening M48A2 fuzes were located.

29 September 1950

The remainder of the battery crossed the Han river via DUKWS and amphibious tractors displacing to TA1762E2.

30 September 1950

Routine security measures. Several night positions were located and preparations completed for night occupation in TA1763N1 and TA1664C2.

1 October 1950

At 0700 the battery displaced to TA2661N3, utilizing this area as a rendezvous area.

2 October 1950

No activity.

3 October 1950

At 0730 the battery displaced to firing position at TA2874U5 and was in position at 0815 in support of the

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX FIVE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Seventh Marines. A mission was not fired as anticipated due to the lack of observation. Returned to rendezvous area at 1600. By 1915 the battery had moved again into firing position at TA2876P2, and 144 rounds were fired at 1930 at troops and artillery dug in on hills at TA2879FGHIJ. Surveillance reports of the Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines observer said the mission was excellent. The Seventh Marines reported there was no further activity from the target area. At completion of the mission, the firing battery displaced to a rendezvous area in the Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines firing area.

4 October 1950

Returned to rendezvous area at 0800. No further activity during the day.

5 October 1950

The Eleventh Marines displaced by motor march to its staging area at Inchon, Korea at 1630.

6-7 October 1950

The battery remained in the staging area refitting equipment and making preparations for further operations.

8. ENEMY

No organized enemy were sighted. Upon completion of the fire mission at 1930, 3 October 1950, enemy fire destroyed the previously occupied battery position and interdicted the road approximately 1,000 yards south of position.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

This battery operated for three days firing unobserved fires with the Mola4 fuze, as fuze M48A2 were not available for issue at the embarkation point for the target area. Upon being assigned the fire mission on Yong Dung Po, observation was accomplished and the registering rounds were considered lost, as no rocket bursts were seen in the target area, therefore it is considered that the battery expended 480 rockets that failed to detonate due to improper fuzes. At no time during this period was air observation or artillery observation available. Upon receipt of correct fuzes the mission fired in support of the Seventh Marines was considered excellent as evidenced by the surveillance report. Based upon the results obtained from this mission, it is believed that similar excellent effect would have been reported for the missions fired earlier in support of the First Marines, had proper fuzes been available at that time.

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX FIVE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. The plan of landing the rocket battery in LVT's is considered excellent.
- b. The principles and tactics as taught at the Field Artillery School, MCS, and in previous training with the Tenth Marines are considered sound.
- c. The M51A4 fuze apparently failed to arm when fixed with the rockets.
- d. It is recommended that:
 - (1) Rounds come fixed with fuzes.
 - (2) That an artillery reconnaissance sergeant, MOS (0846), be included in the battery T/O.
 - (3) That a TCS radio be assigned for use when operating as a direct supporting unit to an infantry regiment and for air observer control.
 - (4) That the rocket launcher be a selfpropelled weapon capable of towing an ammunition trailer.
 - (5) That a more reliable radio be substituted for the SCR 619.
 - (6) The M51A4 fuze not be used with rockets.

E. A. Bushe
E. A. BUSHE

ANNEX

**THIS
SECTION
CONTAINS
OVERLAYS
REFER TO
ORIGINAL
FOLDER**

ANNEX TARE TARE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Wonsan, Korea
26 November 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Subj: Special Action Report for period 1 September 1950 to 7 October 1950.
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16.
Encl: (1) Copy of CG, 7th Army InfDiv Ltr to CG, 1stAmTracBn dtd 5Oct50.

1. INTRODUCTION

a. General

(1) The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion less Company "A" and Company "D" arrived at Kobe, Japan in the Far Eastern Area on 1 September 1950. Personnel were on board the USNS GEN M. C. MEIGS. Vehicles and equipment were on board the S. S. TWIN FALLS, S. S. BELGIUM VICTORY, GREENBAY VICTORY, AFRICAN PATRIOT, AMERICAN PRESS, ALMA VICTORY and S. S. NOONDAY. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Company had departed U. S. in July with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade for Pusan, Korea. On 25 July 1950, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Company was directed by Brigade Headquarters to proceed with other amphibious equipment and personnel to Kobe, Japan. On 1 September 1950, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Company was redesignated Company "A", 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF, per authentic Provisional Marine Brigade General Order No. 7-50. Company "D" was not activated at this time.

b. Purpose of report.

(1) The purpose of this report is to set forth in detail the employment of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF, during the period 1 September 1950 to 7 October 1950.

c. Next higher echelon.

(1) 1-25 Sept 50	1stMarDiv
26 Sept 50-1 Oct 50	7thInfDiv
1stAmTracBn, less "B" Company	
26 Sept 50-1 Oct 50	1stMarDiv
"E" Company, 1stAmTracBn	
2-7 Oct 50	1stMarDiv

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

1stAmTracBn	USMC 37-819	LtCol. E.F. WANN Jr.
	USN 2-10	
H&S Company	USMC 16-198	Capt. F.E. GRANUCCI
	USN 2-10	
"A" Company	USMC 7-214	Maj. J.P. TREADWELL
"B" Company	USMC 7-202	Capt. R. HAMLET
"C" Company	USMC 7-205	Maj. A.J. NOONAN

ANNEX TARE TARE TO 1STMARDIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. The early employment of this division prevented having completed directives from higher echelons available at the time planning had to be initiated. Planning, then, depended on fragmentary instructions and proceeded on a concurrent basis in all units. Logistic planning was, for the most part, accomplished by division, since the staging and embarkation for Korea had to be started immediately upon arrival at Kobe.

b. This battalion was aided in its preliminary planning by sending the executive officer as liaison officer with the Commanding General and the division staff. This advance planning group arrived in Tokyo on 21 August and had tentative drafts of all orders completed by 29 August. On 30 August the executive officer arrived at Kobe, briefed the 1st Amphibious Company ("A" Company) on necessary preparations, and met the battalion on arrival on 1 September. Thus a "Warning Order" on the planned operation together with the Commanding General's concept of the plan was received orally, along with written administrative directives from division immediately on arrival of the battalion.

c. Since this battalion was activated and equipped during the embarkation period in San Diego, the first planning and preparation that had to be accomplished at Kobe was distribution and preparation of organic equipment. Upon arrival of Commanding Officer and staff of 1st Marines, which the battalion was to land on BLUE BEACH at Inchon, close liaison was established and plans for the operation were made. When the Landing Diagram for the 1st Marines was finally completed it was possible to complete the battalion operation orders and the plans for loading of LVTs on LSTs which had to be based on the plan for landing.

d. In general, the order called for a "one-trip" Ship-to-Shore movement of the 172 LVTs in the battalion, landing the assault battalions of the 1st Marines on BLUE BEACHES ONE and TWO, and transporting the troops inland to their objectives. In addition, a battalion administrative order was prepared to support the landing, providing that sufficient supplies and equipment would be carried in the assault LVTs to support this battalion ashore until general unloading was in effect on other beaches. No logistic build-up of BLUE BEACH was planned. The 1st Marines were advised of the capabilities of LVTs for transporting pre-loads as mobile dumps and to take full advantage of this support.

e. Adequate aerial photos were not available to brief wave commanders on Beach exits. Such briefing on the plan was possible only on maps and half-tone photos.

ANNEX TARE TARE TO 1STMARDIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

NONE

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. Since this unit's organic equipment was on eight vessels and unloading was interrupted by a severe typhoon, loading and embarkation actually took place while some equipment was still being unloaded.

b. Because most of the battalion's LVTs, except those already in Kobe with "A" Company, were shipped directly from Barstow to the dock staging area in San Diego and thence to Kobe, thorough inspection and maintenance was necessary to ready them for the coming operation. In this phase of the operation this unit was fortunate in having "A" Company less 1 platoon already set up in Kobe and ready for operation. Immediately upon arrival of the battalion an LVT park was established near the foot of pier six. All LVTs being unloaded were transported by water to this area, processed briefly by battalion maintenance section, distributed to companies and at company level were made ready for operation. "A" Company was placed in charge of unloading LVTs and other companies were assigned to readying their own vehicles as they arrived in LVT park. This work was hindered by many things including insufficient room and facilities at LVT park and lack of equipment, spare parts etc, some of which had not been unloaded by the time the battalion sailed. "A" Company lived at Camp Carver while the remainder of battalion was housed aboard USNS MEIGS at pier four. Lack of lighting facilities at LVT park limited working hours to daylight. The typhoon of 3 September made it impossible to do any work that day. Near the end of this period "A" Company was brought up to a strength of 52 LVTs with the formation of one platoon. On 6 September the final landing plan was received from 1st Marines and the landing diagram, assignment of LVTs to waves was accomplished. Until these plans were completed the loading plan was necessarily delayed until the last minute. On 7 and 8 September loading of LVTs on LSTs was accomplished at pier six. At 1130 8 September at a conference with the S-3 of the 1st Marines on board USS NOBLE it was found necessary to change wave 8 on BLUE BEACH TWO to wave 9 on BLUE BEACH TWO. Embarkation of personnel on LST was completed at 1200 on 9 September. On 9 September at 1500 it was found that troops on LSTs 611 and 1123 were reversed in relation to landing plan. It was therefore necessary to change wave commanders between these ships. On 10 September this unit sailed from Kobe for the target area aboard following ships:

LST 611	LST 715
742	802
745	1048
1123	1134
1138	Q036
Q058	Q073
KA 106	

ANNEX TARE TARE TO 1ST MAR DIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

a. Routine

7. OPERATION

a. Assault Phase

(1) LSTs in which this battalion was embarked launched all LVTs at 1530 on D-day, 15 September, to proceed to the control vessel at the Line of Departure which was 5500 yards from BLUE BEACH. All phases of Ship-to-Shore movement were extremely confused. Lack of sufficient guide boats nearly caused complete failure of Ship-to-Shore movement. Four (4) guide boats were provided where doctrine in U. S. F.s called for 2 per wave or 32. (For comments on communications see appendix). The strong tide in the rendezvous area resulted in considerable mixing of waves in position while waiting to be dispatched to the beach. Actually, the control or dispatching of on-call waves degenerated to such a state that it was necessary for LVT personnel to board Landing Craft to rally waves and give orders from aboard the control vessel to dispatch them to beach. Visibility from the Line of Departure to approximately 800 yards from the landing beach between H plus 20 and H plus 1 50 ranged from a maximum of 400 yards to a minimum of 10 yards, consequently the absence of guide boats and the absence of compasses in the LVTs made the landing on the proper beach a remarkable feat. The four Navy guide boats after leading the first two waves to the beaches, took positions on the flanks of the boat lanes about 2/3 of the way in from the Line of Departure did their best to assist remaining waves to the beach. However, due to the poor visibility, their usefulness was limited. In fact, the success of the Ship-to-Shore movement was due in a large degree to the timely decisions made by the wave commanders and the outstanding initiative displayed by the small unit commanders of this battalion. Upon the arrival of assault waves at the sea wall on BLUE BEACH it was discovered that debarking of assault troops over this obstacle was hazardous and slow since LVTs were required to come alongside the wall and troops were to secure scaling ladders to wall and scramble over. Few LVTs in early waves debarked troops in this manner. Some enemy mortar and small arms fire was encountered by the LVTs near the sea wall but it was ineffectual and did not hamper the safe arrival of the LVTs at the beach. LVTs that landed on BLUE BEACH ONE attempted to exit from the beach through a drainage ditch, but after 5 LVTs of second wave got through, the rest bogged down and this route was abandoned. In the meantime LVTs were piling up in the vicinity of sea wall and darkness was rapidly falling. The fifth wave of LVTs found a narrow but satisfactory exit by going around the south end of sea wall and landing on BLUE BEACH THREE. As soon as this was discovered it was quickly exploited by wave commanders of following waves.

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Nearly all of the 172 LVTs of this unit landed on BLUE BEACH THREE. In spite of the congestion, in all cases where waves landed intact on BLUE BEACH THREE the assault troops were transported in LVTs either to their initial objectives or other selected locations depending on the decisions made by infantry unit commanders. By 2015 15 September all LVTs except six were ashore. Of these six, two sank in deep water after engine failures, two swamped in mud flats far to the left of BLUE BEACH ONE and two swamped off BLUE BEACH TWO. One of the LVTs sunk in deep water contained all of the battalion's small stock of LVT spare parts, the other contained all communications repair equipment and spare parts. The battalion CP was established 100 yards inland at center of BLUE BEACH. Security measures were taken but nothing of note occurred during the night. Congestion of vehicles on the beach was extreme and it was necessary to move all vehicles out just before dawn in order to disperse them in anticipation of enemy artillery fire. This was accomplished successfully though it was difficult and dangerous because of the congestion of troops in the area.

(2) Throughout the day of 16 September this battalion continued in direct support of 1st Marines. Most LVTs stayed with the units they transported ashore and assisted in displacing them forward, evacuating casualties and transporting ammunition and supplies directly to the units requesting them. Examples of types and character of support furnished:

(a) TSgt Palmer H. DARROW, NCO in charge "B" Company LVTs 23, 24, 46, 48, 49, "moved out from BLUE BEACH THREE with "C" Battery 4.5 rockets and took up positions at crossroads TA 9347 Obce 3 and dug in for the night".

(b) 2ndLt. Gerald G. TIDWELL, Commander 3rd platoon "B" Company, "At approximately 2000 we joined other elements of "B" Company, 1stAmTracBn and took "B" Company 1st Marines aboard for transportation to their objective area.

The night was spent uneventfully on a mound behind the objective of "D" Company, 1st Marines.

At dawn my wave with 3 additional tractors proceeded to the objective of "B" Company 1st Marines and assisted by fire in the capture of their objective. The conduct and fire discipline of the men on these tractors was exceptional and in my opinion materially assisted "B" Company in the capture of their objective.

While engaged in the fire fight we captured four NK troops. These POWs with 13 others captured by the infantry were returned to the stockade on BLUE BEACH TWO and the LVTs were returned to the battalion area for servicing and refueling".

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[REDACTED]

(c) Lt. Robert B. ETTEBOROUGH, "C" Company. 16 September, "M" moved forward with assault troops of 3rd Bn, 1st Marines carrying Mortar Platoon. Came under very inaccurate mortar and sniper fire, no casualties".

H&S Company set up temporary camp in vicinity of battalion CP and the maintenance section gave assistance to letter companies in maintaining LVTs and salvaging those that were swamped in mud flats during landing.

b. Exploitation Phase.

On 17 September this battalion supported elements of 1st Marines on call to displace ammunition and supplies forward. In many instances amphibian tractors were employed as armored personnel carriers and troops of 1st Marines were transported overland in LVTs from one position to another. 32 LVTs from "G" Company were being used as mobile dumps by 1st Bn, 1st Marines and the Regimental S-4. Other LVTs from "A" and "B" Companies were transporting supplies of other battalions of the 1st Marines. To simplify support "C" Company was placed in direct support of 1st Marines and all LVTs of other companies were called back to the battalion area so they could be serviced and prepared for either relief of "C" Company when necessary, or further operations on order. 18 September, "C" Company displaced command post to TA 9850-S in order to facilitate support of 1st Marines. All other companies conducted organizational maintenance of vehicles and attempted to get LVTs still with the 1st Marines relieved by "C" Company vehicles and returned to battalion area. However, due to wide area over which LVTs were dispersed and reluctance of infantry units to release them, 36 hours were required to get all LVTs except those of "C" Company back to the battalion area. On 19 September this battalion was relieved of support of 1st Marines and assigned to support the 5th Marines. All LVTs were withdrawn from the 1st Marines and the battalion displaced by motor march to the vicinity of Kimpé airfield, a road distance of 18 miles. Battalion CP was established at 1430 at TA 0659-X.

Conferences with the 5th Marines revealed that an assault crossing of the Han River was to be made on 20 September. The area in which the crossing was to be made had been selected and before darkness routes of approach to the crossing were selected and a visual reconnaissance of the crossing area was made by officers of the battalion.

The plan called for one platoon of LVTs to transport the bulk of the Reconnaissance Company across that night to seize high ground and cover the landing the following morning. This was attempted at 2030. However, due to enemy resistance, and lack of time to make proper plans, the night crossing and

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[REDACTED]

reconnaissance was unsuccessful and the forces withdrew. Four LVTs which were mired in the river mud were abandoned but were recovered by their platoon leader during the assault crossing the following morning.

Although tentative plans for the formation, time of departure and assignment of troops to LVTs had been made earlier, the first indications that the reconnaissance had been unsuccessful necessitated a review of planning. Consequently, representatives of this battalion conferred continuously at 5th Marines CP from about 2230 to 0430 20 September, at which time it was decided to cross at a native ferry point, in waves of from two (2) to six (6) LVTs. All LVT waves boating the 3rdBn, 5th Marines formed in wave formation at the Line of Departure on the friendly bank of the river and remained in place for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes - possibly a dangerous extension of standard Ship-to-Shore tactics. During this period naval gunfire concentrations planned as preliminary bombardment 2000 yards inland, in the final salvos fell uncomfortably close to the assembled waves at the Line of Departure. The 1st wave left the Line of Departure at 0645 at TA 0762-G with "A" Company, 1st AmTracBn transporting 3rdBn, 5th Marines. Aggressive action of the LVT(A)s of the 56th AmTracBn., U.S.A., which were in support, could have provided very effective direct fire support from positions near the Line of Departure. Although LVTs were under fire from rifles, anti-tank rifles and heavy machine guns during the crossing, and received no less than two hundred hits including a few 14.5 mm AT and some type of small explosive projectiles, the armor plate and covers on the LVTs, (LVT(3) c), prevented any casualties to the infantry, while this unit sustained only 1 KIA and 3 WIA. This was fortunate since LVTs were forced to stop at the opposite shore and form into column due to the narrow beach exit. As was attempted in the Inchon landing, LVTs transported the infantry directly to their objectives and assembly areas as far as 2000 yards inland.

Amphibious Trucks (DUKW's) were scheduled to carry Korean Marines across the river after the 5th Marines, but the first DUKW's loaded with troops found that once in the river they could not exit on either bank, so the LVTs also transported the KMC battalion across.

From 21 to 23 September this unit supported 1st Shore Party Battalion in establishing and operating a river ferry at TA 0762 and by hauling supplies and equipment to forward elements of 5th Marines. At the river ferry LVTs transported jeeps, KMC and ROK troops, ammunition, supplies and equipment across river. On return trips they carried wounded and POWs.

At 2030 on 23 September this battalion received orders at Division CP to transport the 2ndBn, 1st Marines across the Han river in the vicinity of TA 1536-M. Again plans were made hastily and a route for LVTs was reconnoitered from the AmTracBn area to the prospective crossing site. LVTs departed the CP area at 2400 and traveled to the infantry assembly area over the previously reconnoitered route

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avoiding the M&B whenever possible. At dawn on 24 September, in spite of the short time for preparation, one company and one platoon of LVTs were ready, in the assembly area in Yongdong-Po, to cross the river. The crossing was successfully accomplished at 0800 with "A" Company and one platoon of "G" Company while "E" Company continued to operate ferry service at TA 0762-G. "B" Company was left at river crossing at TA 1556-M to support river ferry being established there by 1st Shore Party Battalion.

Upon returning to the battalion office, a message was received attaching the battalion to the 7th Infantry Division, USA. Representative of this unit met officers from the 7th Infantry Division and X Corps Staff at 1200 on 24 September at TA 1552-E and made a reconnaissance to select a river crossing site. The Battalion staff, Company "A" and Company "C" moved overland a distance of 6 miles to an assembly area in Yongdong-Po near TA 1552-E. "B" Company remained in the 1st Marine Division Zone of Action to operate ferries at TA 0762-G and TA 1556-M.

After selection of the crossing site, the battalion was informed it was to support the 32nd Infantry in the assault crossing. The Battalion Commander and staff visited the 32nd Infantry CP and initiated detailed planning at 1600. The crossing selected was at TA 2154-M and was to be made at 0630 on 25 September.

Since the most direct route from the LVT assembly area to the 32nd Infantry embarkation area was open to view by the enemy in Seoul, and exposed to enemy fire, an indirect route was decided upon. This route entailed overland travel for a distance of 28 miles from Yongdong-Po to vicinity TA 2148-E via Anyang-NI. The LVTs were immediately refueled, serviced and prepared for river crossing.

Planning continued until 2200 with the Battalion staff assisting the army in preparing the amphibious portions of their orders. A final conference was held at the 32nd Infantry CP at 0130 with the Regimental staff and infantry battalion commanders. Following this the LVT wave commanders and crews were briefed. The infantry embarked into LVTs at 0430. At 0545 the first wave left the assembly area, moving over roads in column, and arrived at the crossing site at 0635. The first wave crossed the Line of Departure at 0630. Waves of 8 LVTs were used and due to the terrain on the far shore, LVTs discharged troops on the river banks and returned at once. While crossing the river, troops encountered small arms fire and some direct fire from a 76mm anti-tank gun, firing 85 shells. However, due to armor protection and covers over landing, LVTs incurred no casualties. As soon as LVTs were unloaded on far shore they returned to infantry assembly areas and embarked remaining troops, and jeeps with trailers, of the 32nd Infantry Regiment.

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At about 1300 the Corps Commander visited the crossing site, directed a demonstration firing by LVT(A)'s of the 56th AmTracBn, USA., which had been ordered to cross the river, and rode across the river in his jeep aboard an LVT. During this period the complete lack of anything similar to a Shore Party on the friendly bank was noted, which resulted in the officers of this battalion assuming that role. They directed the return of casualties from the far bank, evacuation from the friendly side, priorities of later vehicles and supplies for crossing, and traffic in the beach area.

By 1600 25 September the 32nd Infantry Regiment, except for a few vehicles, was completely across Han river. As soon as this was accomplished, LVTs assembled near the crossroads in vicinity of Sinsa-Ri and embarked a ROK regiment for transportation across the river to the right of 7th Division troops. Again, as earlier in the same day, enemy opposition was encountered in the form of 76mm anti-tank gun and mortar fire on landing beach. However no serious casualties to personnel or vehicles were received. In this landing due to lack of exits from the beach, troops were debarked on the levee.

Upon completion of the assault phase of this crossing, the battalion departed for its CP area near Kimpo airfield leaving "C" Company near Sinsa-Ri to support the 7th Infantry Division river crossing. "C" Company continued in direct support until released on 1 October.

During the period 25 to 29 September this unit continued to support Shore Party Battalion river ferries at TA 0862-S and TA 1556-M.

At all three of these crossings LVTs transported a wide variety of cargo both ways across the river.

On 29-30 September battalion CP displaced up river to Seoul and established the CP at TA 2054-R. Men were billeted in a building near the Han River with LVTs parked on the sand in the immediate vicinity of the highway bridge over Han River.

"C" Company was released from the 7th Infantry Division, USA on 1 October and returned to the battalion area via the Han River. During the period 25 September to 1 October at least 76 LVTs were in ferry work and were operating an average of 10 hours per day. Those that were not involved in ferry operation were undergoing repairs or preventive maintenance.

October 2nd and 3rd were spent in moving the battalion from Seoul to a new location in Inchon at TA 9246-C. This was done in serials to avoid congesting roads. LVTs proceeded down river about 3 miles, thence by little used roads to the MSR near

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Ascom City, thereby avoiding the use of MSR as much as possible.

The battalion experienced little difficulty in these long overland motor marches. In all, LVTs of this battalion operated over roads a distance of approximately 125 miles. This figure includes only major movements overland of the battalion as a whole, and does not include miles traveled by subordinate units or individual LVTs in carrying out their support mission.

During period 3-7 October the battalion loss one platoon "E" Company was intact in the Inchon area. One platoon of "B" Company was operating the river ferry at TA 1556-0 and continued to do so until just before the battalion departed the Inchon area. During this period the battalion was busy making preparations for the Wansan operation. Preventive maintenance and all repairs necessary were made except those requiring parts that were not available.

8. ENEMY

a. This battalion was in contact with the enemy only as a supporting element for the infantry. Comment on the enemy made by the 1st and 5th Marines obviates the need for remarks on the subject in this report.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

a. The operations of this battalion were successful in every mission since the supported infantry was aided in successfully attaining its objectives. In the case of support furnished the 7th Infantry Division, USA, enclosure (1), letter of commendation from Commanding General is of interest.

Actual number of casualties inflicted on the enemy are not known, although some undoubtedly were inflicted. In its dispersed role as a supporting unit, elements of this battalion turned over prisoners of war to adjacent units. During the period four own casualties were 3 KIA, 30 WIA, and 1 Died of Wounds.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Planning

(1) Intelligence

An amphibian tractor organization has the mission of transporting and landing assault troops on designated beaches. In the Inchon landing the plan called for continuing inland and discharging troops at their objectives. To accomplish this, the wave commanders and crew chiefs of each LVT wave must be thoroughly briefed. Due to security considerations these personnel can be briefed only after sailing for

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the target. For the movement to Inchon, personnel of this battalion were aboard 12 LSTs.

During the planning phase an amphibian tractor battalion should be provided with good aerial photos, beach obliques and stereo-pairs, in order to study beaches and beach exits thoroughly. These should be provided in quantity sufficient to give one set to each LST on which LVTs are to be embarked.

(2) Operations

Infantry units to be landed by amphibian tractors must bear in mind that their landing plan has to be complete before the amphibian tractor battalion can divide its organization, assign LVTs to waves, assign wave commanders to waves, brief wave commanders and crews, develop its plan for communications and control, and plan the loading of LVTs and LVT personnel on LSTs to support the landing plan of the infantry. All plans made by an amphibian tractor battalion have one purpose -- to give the infantry the best support possible. S-3s of infantry regiments and battalions must schedule their planning to allow time for the supporting amphibian tractor battalion to make its plans. And they should realize that even minor adjustments of their plans thereafter affect many other factors. The tractor battalion should be notified of such changes.

The Attack Force Operation Order (1 copy) was received at the CP of this battalion aboard the LST 715. This was too late to be of value to wave commanders on all other LSTs. The Ship-to-Shore Annex of the Attack Force Order should be distributed to an amphibian tractor battalion as early as possible.

b. Execution

Unless wave guides are to be provided and control exercised in accordance with doctrine, the Landing Force should have complete control of the Ship-to-Shore movement. As has been demonstrated repeatedly in the past, amphibian tractor command elements must in any case have high speed craft in order to properly "assist" in control of the Ship-to-Shore movement. A specialized high speed amphibious command craft would be of inestimable value in this phase, as well as in later operations ashore.

In order to land the infantry in accordance with their landing diagram, the tactical integrity of an amphibian tractor battalion, its companies, platoons and sections, is disrupted. When AmTracs transport troops inland from the beach they should be released to their parent organization at the initial objectives so that the amphibian tractor organization can be restored. The tractors released would be replaced at once if needed, and more efficient support could be furnished by the AmTracs due to better control, maintenance and supply.

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A very high degree of mobility was achieved by this battalion during the operation due to the fact that the initial battalion administrative plan provided for balanced combat loads of ammunition, water, rations, oil and grease on each LVT and the remainder of the equipment and supplies of the battalion loaded on organic headquarters LVTs and motor transport. Thus the battalion could put all its supplies and equipment "on wheels", sustain itself for about 3 days, and still have full space available to embarked units in the operating platoons 144 LVTs.

During three river crossings conducted by this battalion, AmTrac officers performed duties similar to those of Navy Control Officers. Difficulty was experienced in control of vehicles that cannot be solved completely by radio or visual means. A portable public address system should be added to the T/E for an amphibian tractor battalion. This would be of great assistance in LVT control on any beach.

Prior to each displacement of the battalion and before each river crossing, a reconnaissance of routes was conducted by LVT and/or jeeps. Two (2) M29Cs (Weasels) could well be added to the T/E of an amphibian tractor battalion for reconnaissance vehicles. An LVT is too large to be handy for this type of reconnaissance, while a jeep is not capable of traversing the same terrain as an LVT. It is felt that an M29-C could more effectively fill this reconnaissance role.

c. Amphibious Technique

At BLUE BEACH an attempt was made, with limited success, to transport infantry in LVTs directly from the ships to their objectives ashore. During subsequent movements some small units of the 1st Marines utilized LVTs as armored personnel carriers ashore, moving in them from one objective to the next.

In the first crossing of the Han River, the 5th Marines were transported directly to their objectives and assembly areas inland.

When the terrain, beach exits and the type of enemy resistance permit, the plan for landing should include movement in LVTs through the beach and on inland to disembark intact units on their objectives.

Under suitable conditions, normal wave formations might well be abandoned in favor of boating tactical units together in single or multiple columns, or vee formation with, for example all elements of an assault company boated in a single column or vee or other formation, moving as a unit from the Line of Departure into the beach and then on inland to their objective area. An assault battalion might thus be boated as four or five unit formations rather than several waves with portions of units in each wave. This method

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would have certain obvious advantages in rapid seizure of objectives, securing better control, reducing danger from beach mining, and in reducing congestion of both troops and vehicles on beach.

It is recommended that a study be made of this type of landing and amphibious exercises be conducted to test its suitability. It is noted that essentially this type of maneuver was forced on the 5th Marines in the first river crossing of the Han, by the nature of the beach exits where all vehicles proceeded inland via no restricted exit. Here the primary danger lay in the congestion of waves as they formed into columns on the enemy shore before proceeding inland. In this case a formation which was from the beginning a column evolution would have been preferable and would have considerably reduced the congestion at the beach exit.

d. Communications

(1) For a complete report on communications during the period, with comments and recommendations, see appendix (1).

(2) In general it may be said that an amphibian tractor battalion has too many radios which are too specialized and too limited in utility. The radio equipment for amphibian tractor communications should be re-examined with a view toward providing more flexible communications over longer ranges with simpler sets. Present equipment will not net with infantry tactical nets and apparently was designed for the Ship-to-Shore movement only. Presently authorized radio equipment in this amphibian tractor battalion, (less one company) has a value of \$257,893.00 and it is not felt that an equal value in communications is received.

e. Amphibian Tractors

(1) General

This battalion was equipped with both the LVT(3) and modified version, the LVT(3)(c). Both models performed under the conditions encountered, in a manner which far exceeded expectations based on the only previous combat employment, i.e., Okinawa. Their life was shown to be longer than previous estimates, with a minimum of maintenance and with almost no spare parts available. The extent of overland employment is to be particularly noted. The tractors averaged about 175 hours of operation during the period while some tractors entered the operation with estimated 200-400 hours as a result of previous use. At no time did deadlined vehicles exceed 5% and at the end of the period all LVTs were operating except six (6) sunk on D-Day and one (1) destroyed by a land mine. No one component consistently failed and it is felt that there are no serious defects in the design of mechanical parts.

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In this connection only five (5) LVT repair pallets were carried by this battalion, i.e., one (1) retriever pallet per company, one (1) hull repair and one (1) consumables in 448.

(2) Recommendations

Lead storage batteries continue to be a source of major despair in LVTs. Almost all batteries in the tractors were dead when unloaded at Kabe and would not take a charge. This was overcome by improvisation using 4-H motor transport batteries and modifying the terminals. A battery with longer service life than the present lead-acid battery is needed.

Spare parts for LVTs should be reorganized and catalogued so that the parts listed for issue and use by an amphibian tractor battalion will support the present definition of organizational maintenance. Quantities of such items as spark plugs are much too low, and in other items seldom used quantities are excessive. It is felt that no spare parts should be used in rebuilding LVTs in any repair echelon above the using organization until, and unless, LVT(3) spare parts are again in production. Existing stocks of spare parts in the United States are in many categories insufficient to support organizational maintenance requirements. If parts are expended in rebuilding tractors following extensive use, this condition would be further aggravated.

A requirement was noted in the landing at Inchon, and particularly in the river ferry operations, for a large LVT capable of carrying a 2 1/2 ton 6X6 truck.

(3) The LVT(3)(c)

The lack of casualties to the 5th Marines during the first crossing of the Han River can be attributed largely to those covered tractors, with their increased personnel protection.

The LVT should be equipped with fixed headlights for use in night movements when the situation permits and especially in beach unloading operations which normally proceed around the clock.

An improved seal is needed on the ramp. The life of the present seal is not adequate, although old rubber in these seals may be the reasons for their short life.

It was noted on tractors used extensively in river ferry operations that in a period of less than two weeks during which the ramp was probably raised and lowered 700-1000 times, the ramp cable wore completely through the ramp cable guide sleeve on the ramp proper, slicing it for a distance of several inches. Field fix consisted of welding back up, but the rough weld causes rapid wear on cables subsequently.

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This sleeve should be strengthened at the point of emergence of the cable on both sides.

The switchbox for the intercommunication system in the LVT(3)(c) should be re-located, to be accessible to the crew chief when standing in one of the hatches on either side of the machine gun mounts.

It is felt that TCS radio installations in LVTs should be discontinued. They are seldom used by embarked infantry and an AN/MRC-6 carried in an LVT could substitute when needed. The TCS installations limit the usefulness of the LVT. An excess of command LVTs was found in Kobe and in subsequent resupply and it was necessary to remove some TCS installations to convert to cargo vehicles to meet the requirements for the battalion.

During this operation, as in all previous LVT experience, the track and suspension system was found to be the least durable major component of the LVT. A more efficient and durable track is still required. It is felt that an improved track on the LVT(3)(c) could raise the serviceable life of the tractor to upwards of 600 hours, which appears to be a fair life expectancy for the majority of the other major assemblies, including the engine.

f. Recommended Changes in Tables of Equipment and Allowances.

Delete the one (1) truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6X6, wrecking, per battalion. This item does not have sufficient capacity for general use in this battalion.

Delete the one (1) tractor, heavy, TD-18 w/anglelozer, double drum power control unit, and night lighting equipment, per amphibian tractor company and add one (1) of that item to H&S Company, making a total of two (2) per battalion.

Add one (1) two wheel crane (15-20) ton to T/E 4667 for use with present tractor heavy, TD-18 w/anglelozer.

Add four (4) trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6X6, tank, gasoline, 750 gal to T/E 4667. These are a necessity due to the very high fuel consumption rate of LVTs, the number of LVTs in a battalion, and the distances that gasoline must be hauled to fuel them. If these items are not added, an increased number of trucks, 2 1/2 ton, 6X6, cargo is required.

Reduce the allowance of jacks, hydraulic, 10 ton, roller car type from ten (10) per amphibian tractor company to two (2) per company. T/E 4663. A limited use exists for this item and then only on hard surfaces.

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
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Glasses, field, 7 X 50, authorized by Vol. II, T/A on the basis of one (1) per line officer and one (1) per LVT should be authorized only on a basis of one (1) per line officer.

Reduce the allowance in Vol. II T/A of cans, expeditionary, gas or oil, 5 gallon, from fifty (50) per LVT to five (5) per LVT. This would reduce the presently authorized total from 9470 to 1730 for this battalion. For the reasons stated in connection with the comment on tank trucks, it is not practicable to refuel LVTs from these cans, and when necessary to carry additional gasoline this is more efficiently done in 55 gallon drums. With a unit price of \$4.50 this reduction in expeditionary cans would save \$34,830.00, which should purchase several tank trucks.

The present allowance of individual weapons arms each LVT crewman with a pistol. This should be changed to provide one (1) pistol and two (2) carbines for each three (3) man amphibian tractor crew. For all duties other than actually driving the LVT the present arms are inadequate. Should the recommended change in individual weapons be effected, two (2) brackets, rifle, universal should be authorized per LVT.

Cans, meat with cover, and trays, mess, are both authorized by Vol. II, T/A one (1) per individual. It is recommended that issue of cans, meat with cover be discontinued. When rations and equipment for serving "B" rations are carried, mess trays could be carried with little additional space and weight. Present "C" rations should be eaten from cans. Abolishing individual mess gear would prevent cooking and eating unauthorized food and insure that mess gear is used only when it can be cleaned properly, i.e., when a galley is operating. Further, the space occupied by mess gear in individual packs could be used to better advantage.


ERWIN F. WANN Jr.

APPENDIX 1 (Communications)

ANNEX TARE TARE TO 1ST MARDIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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HEADQUARTERS 7th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 7

5 October 1950

SUBJECT: Commendation

THRU: Commanding General
X Corps
APO 909

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (LVT 3)
Fleet Marine Force

I wish to commend the officers and men of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (LVT 3) who performed so outstandingly in connection with the support of the 7th Infantry Division during the period 24 September 1950 through 1 October 1950.

During this period elements of the 7th Division were engaged in crossing the Han River with the mission of securing that part of Seoul, Korea, and the high ground in their zone. One important factor which enabled the Division to accomplish its mission was the splendid support rendered by your unit.

The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion transported the assault troops of the 32nd Infantry across the river and over beaches that had not been cleared of mines. So effectively did the unit function that our troops were able to reach the far shore with minimum casualties. From the time of the assault until the end of the period elements of your command, particularly Company "C", continued this fine support by ferrying troops, supplies and vehicles across the river. In addition to the support of the division all of the supplies of the 17th Republic of Korea Regiment were transported by Amtrac from the vicinity of Sinsari to a beach dump at Chongsu-dong a distance of three miles.

Despite long hours, loss of sleep, maintenance difficulties and exposure to fire the personnel of your battalion performed so magnificently that I have nothing but praise to offer.

If at any time in the future elements of this division are called upon to cross a river it is my sincere wish that they may be supported by the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

DAVID G. BARR
Major General, United States Army
Commanding

AG (5 Oct 50) 1st Indorsement

HEADQUARTERS, X CORPS, APO 909, U.S. Army, 5 November 1950

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

TO: Commanding Officer,
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (LVT 3)
Fleet Marine Force

It gives me great pleasure to express my appreciation for a job well done.

EDWARD M. ALMOND,
Major General, United States Army,
Commanding

1355
l/wdg
Ser 41135
8 Nov 1950

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG, 7thInfDiv, USA, ltr of 5 Oct 1950

From: The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
To: The Commanding Officer, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Subj: Letter of appreciation

1. Forwarded. The Commanding General notes with pleasure the outstanding manner in which the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion performed its assigned duties during the Inchon-Seoul operation.

OLIVER P. SMITH

ENCLOSURE (1)

1stAmTracBn, FMF
Wonsan, Korea
22 November 1950

Appendix 1 to Annex TARE TARE to 1stDiv Special Action Report.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. PLANNING.

All communication personnel of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion were utilized to the utmost during the ten day period the organization staged at Kobe, Japan. Proper frequencies were set up on the ten channels and the radio equipment of the 172 LVT's of this battalion was checked. All transmitters and receivers of the SCR-508, SCR-528 and the AN/MRC-7 Radio Sets were set up identically to facilitate the interchangeability of any unit within the battalion.

There were six frequencies that were required to be set up on each transmitter and receiver. These assigned frequencies were the Battalion Command Net, ABLE Company command net, BAKER Company command net, CHARLIE Company command net, Tank-Infantry-Artillery-LVT Common and the LVT Common. The additional frequencies set up for possible future use were the Division Tactical, Shore Party Auxillary Lateral, Division Intelligence, and the Joint Emergency Combat Common.

The Communication Plan for the assault landing at Inchon was prepared to fit the special type landing plan. All amphibian tractors landing the infantry BLT on BLUE BEACH ONE would be on the same frequency regardless of the company to which assigned. These tractors would be under the control of the company commander with whom the BLT commander was riding. The same was true for BLUE BEACH TWO. As soon as the initial mission had been completed and the embarked troops discharged, the tractors would return to their parent companies' frequency and check in with their own Company Commander for future instructions.

The displacement of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion Command Post ashore called for the Amphibian Tractor Battalion Commander to accompany the RCT Commander ashore in the Battalion Commander's command tractor. This would insure close liaison between the infantry and the Amphibian Tractor Battalion. The AmTrac Battalion Executive Officer would come ashore in his command tractor. 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion Commander and Executive Officer, all company commanders, and all tractors of Headquarters and Service Company would guard the Battalion Command Net for control and information. The Division Command Net was to be guarded by the TCS in the executive officer's LVT. The TCS in the battalion commander's LVT was made available for use by the embarked RCT headquarters. Four telephones

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and one mile of wire. WD-1/TT was preloaded into the executives tractor. In case the need arose for the installation of a telephone line immediately upon arrival ashore. The remainder of the communication equipment desired ashore, as soon as possible after the initial landing, was preloaded in an LVT assigned to the communication section. This equipment included an AN/MRC-7, TBX-8, BD-72 Switchboard, Two SCR-510 Radio Sets, Telephones and wire, spare transmitters and receivers for the SCR-528 and sufficient maintenance equipment to establish adequate maintenance shop. The assigned LVT was to be transformed into a mobile repair shop once ashore. All signal maintenance to be performed by this organization would be carried out at battalion level. The companies would bring their unserviceable radio equipment to the battalion command post and receive in exchange a serviceable like item. Communication personnel were echeloned among the commanders, the executive officers and the communication LVT.

Provisions were also included in the plan for tractors in distress to enter the battalion command net when out of contact with their parent organization. The use of the signal flag, M-113, carried by all tractors, as a distress signal, and the use of a blinking light for the same reason after dark was also included in the plan.

The only training that could be accomplished at this time was very elementary instructions to tractor crews on the operation of the radio set in their tractor and attempting to teach everyone concerned proper radio procedure and the appropriate call signs to be used.

Arrangements were made between the S-1 and the Communication Officer for the establishment and operation of the battalion message center using S-1 personnel. The message center was to function entirely under the control of the S-1. The communication officer prescribed operating procedure and assumed the responsibility for the proper training of the assigned S-1 personnel in message center operation and technique.

2. CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS.

The test of all communication planning and preparation began with the lifting of radio silence at H-3 hours. This organization checked into the 1st Marine Division Command Net by use of the AN/MRC-6 radio set loaded on the main deck of the LST. A slight delay was encountered due to this organization's not knowing if this net was going to be a CW or voice net. When the net was established as a CW net, there was no JANAP 131 available. The proper Z-signals were finally obtained from the station of the 1st Marines aboard the same LST.

Radio communications on all battalion and company nets were very poor during the ship-to-shore movement caused by unnecessary transmissions, improper radio procedure, and poor net discipline.

The battalion command net was maintained by the SCR-508 in the command LVT of the battalion commander. According to plan, the RCT commander also rode this command LVT of the battalion commander. The embarked infantry regimental headquarters did not use the TCS in the LVT during the ship-to-shore movement. The battalion command net was guarded by the battalion executive officer in his command LVT, all company commanders, the LVTs of Headquarters and Service Company, and many LVT's of the companies who inadvertently ended up on this frequency.

Once ashore, order was quickly restored to the net. A continuous watch was kept on the SCR-508 in the commander's LVT during the night of D-day. The battalion command net proved quite effective in the controlling of LVT's on the way to the beach during the hours of darkness, as well as those LVT's out of contact with their parent company. The location of LVT's inland at their objective, those on the beach, and those stranded off shore were noted by the radio operator to aid in the rapid reorganization the following morning.

During the night of D-day, the infantry regimental Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer used the TCS in the command tractor twice to establish communications with the fire support ships and to conduct fire missions. This was the only time the TCS's of battalion Headquarters command LVT's were used by the infantry during the entire period covered by this report.

Early in the morning of D plus 1 a command post was established just off BLUE BEACH TWO at Inchon. The communication section LVT had not come ashore as yet. The TCS in the LVT was used to reestablish contact with division on their command net. The SCR-508 was used to establish the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion Command Net. Company LVT's still on the battalion command net were instructed to return to their assigned company frequency. A message center was established in accordance with previous plans. Four telephones and one mile of wire WD-1/TT were available having been carried ashore in the command tractor of the battalion executive officer. No telephones or lines were installed in anticipation of the arrival of the switchboard and other telephone equipment in the communication LVT.

It was noon on D plus 1 that word was received that the LVT loaded with the communication equipment had sunk. The AN/MRC-7, the switchboard, and the TBX-8 had been saved and landed on Wolmi-Do along with the communication personnel embarked. It was D plus 2 before the switchboard could be repaired,

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additional wire, phones, batteries, drawn from Division Signal Supply. The four AN/MRC-7 and one AN/MRC-6 Radio Sets of the battalion left aboard the LSTs were landed on RED BEACH. They arrived at the command post on D plus 2 and D plus 3. The Division Command Net was transferred to the AN/MRC-6 and the Amphibian Tractor Battalion Command Net was transferred to the AN/MRC-7 as soon as these sets were available. A telephone line was installed from Shore Party. Locals were established with long locals to the headquarters of the companies. Radio communications with the companies which moved up in support of the infantry were poor due to the increased distances and the rugged terrain. All communications with companies operating outside the immediate area of the battalion command post had to be conducted by messenger.

An LVT was sent to the command post of the 1st Marines to provide facilities for communications between the infantry and the supporting tanks. This use of an LVT as a mobile relay station utilizing the pre-set Tank-Infantry-LVT-Arty Common frequency was never tested.

No communications between the infantry and their supporting amphibian tractors were established. Infantry units below regimental level were not equipped to enter any frequency guarded by the tractors. The need for this type of communications was apparent for control of the assigned LVT's in logistical and tactical support.

On 19 September, the complete battalion moved from Inchon to Kimpo. Once again all communications between the battalion headquarters and the companies was broken. The movement of the long column through the mountainous terrain precluded the effective operation of the SCR-508's and SCR-528's mounted in the tractors.

The battalion command post was established with normal communications. Additional radio communications were established with the Fifth Marines on the Tank-Infantry-Arty-LVT Common and the Fifth Marines Command Net. The Battalion Command Net and the Tank-Infantry-Arty-LVT Common were both guarded by an AN/MRC-7. The AN/MRC-6 retained the division command. A TCS stopped a command tractor was used to enter the regimental command net.

During the river crossing by the Reconnaissance Company using LVT's of CHARLIE Company on the night of 19 September, an AN/MRC-7 station was established at the Fifth Marines command post guarding the CHARLIE Company frequency. Information given on this act was passed on to the regimental commander and orders from the commander were passed directly to the tractors.

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During the river crossing by the Fifth Marines by means of amphibian tractors, a radio set, AN/MRC-7, was established on hill 131, TA 0661-V, the battalion commander's OP overlooking the crossing site. This station was used to monitor the Command net of the companies making the crossing and enabled the battalion commander to exercise control from his OP on any company or battalion command net.

On 24 September the executive officer proceeded with ABLE Company for the 1st Marines river crossing. A radio operator with AN/MRC-7 accompanied the executive officer. This station proved effective in control of tractors during the crossing and the relaying of information back to the battalion command post. Due to the distance and the intervening high ground between the crossing site and the command post, an AN/MRC-7 was established on hill 131 as a relay station between the two. An SCR-510 was established at the battalion command post on this net.

The crossing of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division, USA, of the Han River east of Seoul was also conducted by amphibian tractors. The crossing was coordinated by the battalion commander by use of an SCR-510 from the 7th Division's OP on hill at TA 2350-M. From this vantage point, it was possible to maintain communications with tractors on both sides of the river and the assembly area. All tractors of ABLE and CHARLIE Companies involved in the crossing were operating on the same frequency as planned. Net discipline was excellent. The battalion commander was able to maintain control, regulate movement, advise and instruct all tractors in the area. This station proved invaluable in the direction of tractors to beach exits, expediting the return to and from the assembly area, relaying important information from the crossing site to the assembly area, and the direction of tractors returning from the enemy side of the river with wounded to the well hidden aid station of the Army on the friendly beach.

The Amphibian Tractor Battalion command post was displaced from Kimpo to Seoul 29 September. Radio contact was maintained with 1st Marine Division during displacement by the AN/MRC-6. This net was transferred to the TBX-8 upon the establishment of the command post. Normal communications were established with the addition of a telephone line from Division. No battalion command net was established. ABLE and CHARLIE Companies were in nearby assembly areas. BAKER Company was operating as a ferry at the second crossing site west of Yongdongpo. The distance separating the battalion and BAKER Company was too great for the operation of the SCR-508-AN/MRC-7 equipment.

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On October 3rd, the battalion moved back to Inchon. Normal local wire nets were established. A trunk line was laid to the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, to give the battalion wire communications with division via 1st Armored, Combat Service Group, and the X Corps. This system was poor due to the number of switchboards involved and the time consumed in getting a call through. Radio communications with division were equally unreliable due to the distance and terrain involved. Radio communications with division improved greatly with their displacement to Ascom City.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

There has been much pro and con discussion on the merits of the command LVT's. The largest complaint is the space taken up by the auxiliary generator to power the TCS's. The TCS Radio Sets have been installed for the use by the embarked infantry. The use of the TCS by the infantry was very limited, but any use by the infantry of the TCS in time of need may be sufficient reason to maintain the command tractor as such, although use of their own AN/VRC-3 in a separate tractor would do as well.

The assignment of a frequency to the amphibian tractor battalion within the TCS range would be highly desirable. The movement of the companies inland in support of the infantry as in the Inchon-Seoul Campaign demonstrated time and time again the need for a higher powered, lower frequency command net between the companies and the headquarters of the amphibian Tractor Battalion. An AN/GRC-9 on TBX-8 Radio Set included in the T/E of each company would greatly augment the LVT mounted TCS.

The requirement was noted for communications between the company and their platoons operating some distance away with the infantry on something other than the tractor-mounted SCR-528. The allotment of one SCR-510 per tractor platoon would save the tractor batteries through continuous operation of the SCR-528.

Communications between the amphibian tractor company and the supported infantry battalion would be greatly improved with the installation of an AN/VRC-3 in the command tractor of the company. This set would enable the tractor company commander to enter the infantry battalion command net when required or directed.

Message center operation by S-1 personnel proved quite satisfactory during the entire period.

The installation and maintenance of the wire system was satisfactory but much efficiency was lacking due to the absence of telephone personnel from the T/O of this organization. S-1 personnel had to

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be trained in the field as switchboard operators to augment the communication personnel organic to the battalion headquarters.

The above uses of S-1 personnel for communication work proved satisfactory during this operation, but can not be considered a reliable system under all circumstances. It is felt that the addition of telephone and message center personnel to the T/O of this organization would be highly desirable. The continued tactical employment of the Amphibian Tractor Battalion on an inland operation necessitates the establishment of a complete well organized communication section. The utilization of whatever people that might be available is not conducive to the high degree of efficiency required in communications.

Space and time limitations prevented the accomplishment of any radio maintenance on the amphibian tractors of this battalion until the staging area had been reached. At this time several problems confronted the communication maintenance section.

1. A serious lack of qualified technicians existed in the entire battalion. Of the few technicians available, few had had previous experience with the SCR-528 type radios in the tractors.
2. Small hand tools, notably screwdrivers for presetting the radio equipment, were not adequately provided for in the T/E and were not available locally.
3. The supply of replacement and spare parts was non-existent.
4. The radio equipment installed in the tractors were in conditions which ranged from new to extremely poor. A few tractors were received incomplete and in some cases, the radio installation was missing completely.
5. The time available to bring the equipment to a condition of combat readiness was extremely short. In spite of the fact that many of the tractors were not made available until shortly before embarkation, a fairly high state of readiness was attained. The tractors of the lettered companies and the command tractors of Headquarters and Service Company were stressed and upon embarkation they were ready for their prescribed assignments.

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Subsequent maintenance at the target area was routine. Tractor companies submitted equipment they were unable to repair to the Headquarters and Service Company Communication Section. In the few cases where H&S could not effect repair, the unserviceable sets were sent to Division Signal Repair for more technical adjustment or for survey.


The table of equipment for an amphibian tractor battalion or for a company operating alone should include:

- 1 Power Unit, PE-75
- 1 Tool Set, TE-11
- 1 Vacuum Cleaner, HD-44A/U
- 1 Test Set, CEQ
- 1 Tool Equipment, TE-41

An allowance of one Tool Kit, 10225, per technician or repairman would be extremely desirable. Lacking this, a special allowance of screwdrivers (3/16" blade and 4 1/2" shank) and a 12 volt soldering irons would, to some extent, remedy small tool requirements. Whenever installation or reinstallation problems occur, heavier tools are required. The Tool Set, TE-11 or a similar set would materially reduce time involved and misuse of smaller tools.

A precision test equipment of the CEQ type would speed up considerably test bench checking of radios.

The radio installations of amphibian tractors are subjected to high humidity conditions afloat and the collection of dirt and dust when ashore. Periodic cleaning and drying with a Vacuum Cleaner, HD-44A/U would alleviate many maintenance problems.



ERWIN F. WANN Jr.
LtCol., U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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Serial: 03

Annex UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division Special
Action Report

1st Combat Service Group,
Service Command, FMF,
In the Field, Masan, Korea
28 Dec 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF.
Subj: Special Action Report for period 28Aug - 7
Oct, 1950
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16
Encl: (A) Sketch Map of Combat Service Group Area
in Inchon, Korea

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this report to describe the logistical support provided by the 1st Combat Service Group to elements of the X Corps, U.S.A., in the INCHON-SEOUL Operation during the period from 27 August to 7 October, 1950.

The location of the Group during this period was as follows:

27Aug - 10Sept. Kobe, Japan
11Sept- 14Sept. Aboard ship, enroute to Inchon,
Korea.
15Sept- 7Oct. Inchon, Korea

The 1st Combat Service Group at the beginning of the period was attached to the 1st Marine Division with the mission of providing logistical support to the Division within the limits of its capabilities. During this period the Group was subsequently attached for operational control to the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, U.S.A., and to the Inchon Base Command (redesignated 3rd Logistical Command)

II. TASK ORGANIZATION

1st Combat Service Group, Service Command, FMF
(109-1522) Col. John H. COOK, Jr.
Headquarters Company (36-284) Capt. J.C. MUSGROVE
Maintenance Company (21-425) Maj. E.H. VOORHEES
Supply Company (42-406) Maj. R.W. HENGESBAC
Support Company (5-170) Maj. D.B. COOLEY
Truck Company (3-86) Capt. J.A. PEARSON

Attached:

Air Delivery Platoon (1-66) Capt. H.D.C.
BLASINGAME

27Aug-19Sept. Fumigation and Bath Platoon, (1-31)
1stLt. J.L. DUMAS

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1stCSG Rear Echelon, Kobe, Japan (4-41) Capt. A.F.
WILSON, Jr.
Joined: From Combat Service Group Detachment, First
Provisional Marine Brigade, 13 Sept 1950,
(4-104) Maj. T.J. O'MAHONEY. (These per-
sonnel joined physically at various dates
from 16 Sept to the end of the reported
period.

Notes:

- a.) Total for the Group includes organic Companies, Air Delivery Platoon, and Fumigation and Bath Platoon as of 13 September, prior to joining the personnel from the C.S.G. Detachment, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. No Army personnel are included in this total
- b.) The Headquarters Company and Total figures include 4 Officers and 24 enlisted U.S. Navy (Medical and Dental personnel)
- c.) The CSG Detachment, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, includes 4 Navy enlisted medical personnel

III. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

The planning phase of this operation for the 1st Combat Service Group was based on the following Orders and directives received:

- (a) X Corps Administrative Order 1-50, dtd 27Aug50
- (b) 1st MarDiv, 1st Draft of OpnPlan 2-50, dtd 28Aug50
- (c) 1st MarDiv AdmO. 2-50, dtd 4Sept50
- (d) 2nd Engineer Special Brigade Field Order 1-50, dtd 2Sept50

The planning phase of this operation was short (two weeks) and coincided with the period of intense activity involved in unloading, segregating, and re-loading the entire Division at Kobe, Japan. Important problems which required planning were as follows:

1.) Detailing of detachments to augment 1st Shore Party Battalion and to provide ship's platoons during the assault phase, in accordance with missions assigned in (b), (c) and (d) above.

2.) Planning the space, personnel, and equipment requirements for operating segregated and consolidated dumps of all classes for the 1st Marine Division and subsequently the X Corps. In accordance with (a), (b), and (c) above, the 1st CSG was attached for operational control to the 2nd E.S.B., and that command was assigned as the logistical agency for support of the 1st Marine Division and the X Corps. As the only major supply and maintenance agency attached to the 2nd ESB, the 1st CSG assumed responsibility for those missions.

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3.) Detailing of personnel and planning for the rear echelon warehousing in Kobe, Japan of all supplies and equipment of the 1st Marine Division not accompanying the assault shipping, in accordance with 1stMarDiv AdmPlan 1-50, dtd 27 August, 1950.

d.) Planning requirements of Fourth Resupply for the 1st Marine Division on items peculiar to the Marine Corps, in accordance with the assignment of this mission in (c) above

These necessary plans were completed prior to 8 September and the 1st Combat Service Group Adm O 2-50 was issued on 5 September covering the detailed administrative plans for the command.

IV TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No rehearsals were conducted.

Training consisted of lectures on the SOP and mission of the various sections and platoons, held aboard ship enroute from the United States. Due to the very considerable and hurried increase of personnel prior to departure from the United States, serious shortages of skilled personnel were evident. No adequate training of these new personnel was possible until after the commencement of the operation.

V LOADING AND EMBARKATION

When the 1st Marine Division arrived in Kobe, Japan it was necessary to unload the Division from transport shipping and combat load into the assault shipping. The directives covering this reloading were

- (a) 1stMarDiv AdmPlan 1-50, dtd 27Aug50.
- (b) 1stMarDiv EmbOrder 1-50, dtd 31Aug50.

The Administrative Plan 1-50 established the overall plan for billeting Division troops in the Kobe area, and for the unloading, segregation, and reloading of the Division's supplies and equipment. The Embarkation Order 1-50 gave the specific detailed instructions for the Combat loading of the 1st Marine Division. The Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group, augmented by the 1st Shore Party Battalion, was assigned the responsibility for supervising and coordinating the entire Division unloading and reloading.

The Commanding Officers of the 1st Combat Service Group and the Shore Party Battalion with a clerical force of 6 enlisted personnel and 6 dock supervisory officers carried out the mission of coordinating and supervising the unloading and embarkation of the Division. The Combat Service Group supplied trucks, truck drivers and material handling equipment to aid in this operation. Preparation of loading plans for the Division were made during this period under the direction of the 1st Combat Service Group Embarkation Officer.

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During this period of staging, a typhoon struck Kobe harbor on 4 September from 1130 to 1530. Approximately two days time were lost due to the work involved in securing gear prior to the storm, the time lost during the storm, and the time lost in clearing debris and repairing storm damage. Additional delays were caused by the disruption of communications and power lines. Only very minor damage to supplies resulted due to water soakage.

One point of interest in this unloading was the handling of ammunition and P.O.L. supplies. Ammunition and P.O.L. were unloaded into Japanese lighters and kept aboard the lighters until reloaded for embarkation. Ammunition was loaded out of San Diego with each Embarkation Group carrying five Units of Fire. Upon unloading the ammunition in Kobe it was found to be ~~so~~ mixed that it was necessary to land ammunition and segregate it in order to comply with the Embarkation Order.

Despite the originally tight schedule and the time lost due to the typhoon, all loading deadlines were met.


The Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group was assigned as Commander, Embarkation Group ABLE consisting of the following commands:

- 1stCSG (Less Dets) 75-1019
- Fun&Bath Plt. 1-29
- AirDelPlat 1-62
- HqBn (Less Dets) 99-631
- 1stServBn (Less Dets) 28-616
- 1stSigBn (Less Dets) 43-712
- Carrier Plt. 2-84
- 1stMTBn (Less "A"&"C") 33-460
- 1stOrdBn (Less Dets) 21-371
- 1stMedBn (Less Dets) 43-279
- Det HqCo., 1stTankBn 4-50
- 1st S.P. Bn. (Less Dets) 19-149
- 1stEngrBn (Less Dets) 34-590
- 7thMTBn 32-399
- UK Volunteer Det 19
- RM Commandos 210
- Spec. Opns Co. 137
- Marine Air Control Group 500
- Team 3, SF Gp Baker 12-200
- Det., 1st TkbN 1-10
- Det., 1st Amph. TracBn 1-10

The 1st Combat Service Group was embarked aboard the following ships:

HqCo	USS CLYMER (APA 27) (29-183)
Supply Co.	LST 859 (6-121)
	LST 973 (6-116)
	LST 898 (6-57)
Maintenance Co.	USS WHITESIDE (AKA-90) (21-425)
Support Co.	LST 802 (0-6) LST 742 (0-6)
	LST 973 (3-27) LST 1160(0-2)
	LST 898 (1-30) LST 1125(0-2)
	LST 859 (2-25) Q036 (0-6)
	LST 883 (1-16) Q037 (0-7)
	LST 1048 (0-6)

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VI. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

This command sailed from Kobe, Japan on 11 September 1950, and arrived at Inchon, Korea on D-Day, 15 September. The time aboard ship was spent in thoroughly briefing all hands on the geography and known enemy situation in the target area, and regarding the operational mission and plans of the 1st Combat Service Group and each organization therein. Final checks were made to insure that all organizational equipment was in proper working order.

VII. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase, 15-16 September

15Sept At 1800, LST's 859, 973 and 898 landed on Red beach, with a total of 28 officers and 449 enlisted of the 1st Combat Service Group to augment the 1st Shore Party Battalion. These personnel landed under sporadic sniper and mortar fire, commenced unloading priority vehicles and cargo, and during the night built up beach dumps, operating under the 1st Marine Division Shore Party Commander.

16Sept Headquarters, 1st Combat Service Group, landed at 0630 on green beach, Wolmi-do Island and commenced reconnaissance for sites suitable for the establishment of consolidated dumps. The areas selected were located in the southeastern part of Inchon as indicated on the attached sketch adapted from the 1:12,500 map of Inchon (enclosure (A)).

This area was chosen primarily because it was adjacent to the Tidal Basin, and it was contemplated that the basin would be used as the primary center of general unloading for all craft smaller than LST's. The selection was also influenced by the presence in the area of fairly adequate warehousing for class I, II, & IV supplies.

1st Combat Service Group commenced the consolidation of dumps, receiving supplies by truck from the beach dumps. This work was rendered most difficult by the fact that most of the Group's manpower, including many technical supply personnel, were absent, either augmenting the Shore Party Battalion or working as ship platoons. Concurrently with the establishment of the dumps, Marine Corps and Army units were drawing large quantities of supplies from these installations. The large number of receipts and issues initially retarded the efficient operation of the consolidated dumps, but as stocks accumulated, dump operations increased in efficiency.

b. EXPERIMENTAL PHASE

17Sept Normal work of unloading ships and establishing dumps continued on a 24 hour basis. Commencing in the morning, the Tidal Basin was in use as a center of general unloading of small craft. Naval Craft, up to the size of LSU's, and Japanese Haru-Tai class ships were unloaded in the Tidal Basin.

On order of the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Dispatch 171520I), the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade assumed operations, relieving Division Shore Party. The 1st Shore Party Battalion and the 1st Combat Service Group were attached to the 2nd ESB for operational control.

18Sept Began to regain control of personnel who had been augmenting Shore Party, continued unloading ships and operating dumps, and supplying all elements of the X Corps ashore. A Group labor office was established for the procurement of indigenous labor in large numbers. Maintenance Section, Headquarters Company, established a water point which supplied 9,000 gallons of purified water per day to Inchon area units.

19-20 Sept Unchanged

21Sept In accordance with X Corps Administrative Order 2-50, dated 21 September, the Inchon Base Command, as an agency of the X Corps, assumed responsibility for providing logistical support to all units ashore. The 2nd ESB, with 1st Combat Service Group still attached, was attached to the Inchon Base Command, with the mission of operating the beach and port, developing port facilities, and providing beach defense. The mission and operations of the 1st Combat Service Group remained unchanged.

The Air Delivery Platoon moved to Kimpo Air Field and commenced air drop operation. Truck Company, 1st Combat Service Group, was assigned to a hauling mission for the 7th Army Division. Twenty-three (23) trucks were used on a 24 hour basis, hauling rations, fuel and ammunition to Suwon for a two day period.

22Sept At approximately this date the 65th Ordnance Ammunition Company, U.S.A., set up and commenced operating a Class V dump.

23Sept Unchanged

24Sept In accordance with Inchon Base Command Special Order #1-24, dated 24 September, the 1st Combat Service Group was detached from the 2nd ESB and attached for operational control to the Inchon Base Command (Subsequently redesignated as the 3rd Logistical Command). The mission assigned to the 1st Combat Service Group was that of continuing to operate supply dumps in the Inchon Port area, and to furnish cadre for establishing a general depot in the Ascom City area (Target Area 9851 on section 6526-III, 1:50,000 map of Korea).

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Elements of Maintenance Company moved to Ascom City and commenced setting up facilities for a general depot. By this date the Groups Labor Office was supplying approximately 1800 indigenous workers to the Group daily, and as many more to various Army organizations in the Inchon Area.

25-30Sept Continued operating supply dumps and limited maintenance facilities. Elements of Supply Company moved to Ascom City on the 27th.

During this period galley's were set up and serving of hot meals commenced. Bakery and Laundry platoons provided bread and laundry service to the Group.

During this period the 506th QM Petroleum Supply Company, U.S.A. and a detachment of the 20th Subsistence Company began dump operations to supplement the Combat Service Group Class I and III dumps.

10Oct Received 3rd Logistical Command Op O #2, dated 1 October, which directed the 1st Combat Service Group to continue operating dumps and supply points as directed.

Ration and P.O.L. personnel of Supply Company moved to Ascom City, as dumps of all classes in the Inchon Port area were expended.

2-6Oct Continued routine operation of dumps and maintenance facilities in the Ascom City area.

7Oct Received preliminary orders on reembarkation and commenced preparations for securing operations and unloading.

VIII ENEMY (Not Applicable)

IX ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

1. Supervised the successful reloading of the 1st Marine Division at Kobe, though working against a tight time schedule and delayed by a typhoon.
2. Augmented the 1st Marine Division Shore Party Battalion with approximately 500 officers and men, as well as trucks and material handling equipment, during the assault phase of the operation.
3. Operated supply dumps which supported the entire X Corps during the early phases of the operation. (Until after D+ 10)
4. Established and built up permanent depots for the Inchon Base Command.
5. Provided a number of miscellaneous services to various Marine and Army Organization, such as Maintenance, transportation, baking, laundry and water supply.
6. Through the Air Delivery Platoon, provided air drops of all classes of supplies for isolated units of the X Corps.

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X. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Organization and Personnel

a.) Maintenance and Supply. The present Organization of Maintenance Company and Supply Company, as such, is not workable. The very nature of their duties and the availability of storage and work space require these Companies to be widely scattered, making it difficult for the Company Commanders to exercise administrative control. Operational control of the platoons of these companies was of necessity invested in the respective special staff officers, and, whenever possible, maintenance and supply platoons were located in the same areas. In order for the staff officers to keep control of their respective Supply and Maintenance platoons it was necessary to maintain close liaison with the Company Commanders. In order for the Company commanders to detail men for housekeeping duties (mess, police, guard, etc,) it was necessary for them to coordinate with five different staff officers.

The organization of the Maintenance and Supply Companies, as it now exists, imposes an additional chain of command which is undesirable. It is recommended that the companies be organized in accordance with their technical category (i.e., Ordnance, Engineer, Automotive, Signal and General Supply), combining supply, maintenance, and administrative control under one Commander, and that that Commander be assigned additional duties as Special Staff Officer for his cognizant technical category.

b.) Ordnance Personnel - During this operation the services of the small arms, field artillery, and fire control instrument maintenance section of the Ordnance Maintenance Platoon were not required by the Division. It is believed that the Division has ample personnel in these categories within the Ordnance Battalion and the Artillery Regiment to take care of their own needs. It is further believed that any small arms, artillery, fire control instruments, and watches requiring repairs beyond the capabilities of the Division should be turned in to the Combat Service Group for shipment to Base Depot for repair. It is recommended that these sections be eliminated from the T/O of the Combat Service Group.

The personnel of the LVT repair section of the Combat Service Group were assigned duty with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. During the operations of that Brigade, the AmTracks were not employed, and the above personnel were attached to the AmTrac Battalion and remained in Kobe. Division did not return these personnel until after the Wonsan landing.

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The Ammunition Section of the Ordnance Platoon, consisting of 22 men is not even large enough to supervise the labor required in the ammunition dump on a 24 hour basis. An Ammunition Company of 3 officers and 152 men is the smallest unit that can effectively support a division or larger unit.

c.) General Supply - It is considered that both the Ration and Fuel Handling Sections of the General Supply Platoon are too small to adequately operate Class I and III dumps on a 24 hour basis. It is recommended that the T/O be increased to a minimum of 2 officers and 51 enlisted in a Ration Platoon and 2 officers and 55 enlisted in a Fuel Platoon.

d.) Truck Battalion - It is considered in the light of experience in this operation that the Truck Company organic to the Combat Service Group is inadequate to meet the transportation requirements of the Group in the field. To meet these requirements it is recommended that the Combat Service Group T/O provide for an organic Truck Battalion to be organized as follows:

- 2 - Standard 2½ Ton 6x6 Truck Companies.
- 1 - Cargo Company -- On a displacement of the Group this Company would furnish prime movers for Group Machinery trailers.
- 1 - Light Truck Company -- to be equipped with 30 trucks of approximately 1 ton capacity, and 4 personnel carriers of ½ - ¾ ton capacity. This Company would be used to accommodate the house-keeping needs of the Group and to provide transportation for contact parties to supported units in the group as a whole a number of automotive mechanics as well as vehicles scattered about the Companies. Better maintenance of automotive equipment and more efficient use of all vehicles would result from having all organic vehicles maintained and dispatched by a Group Motor Pool operated by this Light Truck Company.

e.) Guard and Security - The Guard Platoon of the Combat Service Group consists of 1 officer and 24 enlisted, of which 11 men are assigned fire-fighting duties. The personnel available from this platoon for security of supplies between ship and dumps, and within the dumps, are negligible in number.

The security of supplies within the dumps was an additional duty imposed upon supply personnel who were already overworked segregating, warehousing, and issuing supplies. The security of supplies between dock area and dumps was left to the honesty of the truck drivers. The security of supplies on the dock was provided by a small detachment of men from the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. Security of supplies in transit from ships was dependent on the honesty of the boat crews.

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No organized and trained M.P. unit was provided for security of supplies during the operation. Since organic equipment of Division units was being handled along with supply items, and it therefore was necessary to allow units access to the port and dump areas to recover their equipment, the proper security of both organic equipment and supplies was impossible with the small force available. Pilfering was prevalent by personnel of all services and all ranks, some pilfering even being organized by unit commanders, until all unauthorized units were excluded from deck and dump areas.

A strong security unit organic to the Combat Service Group is considered necessary for proper safeguarding of supplies and for traffic control within the port area.

f.) Miscellaneous - It is considered that there is no need for the Photographic Repair Section of the Engineer Maintenance Platoon, because there is so little photographic equipment in the Division. It is recommended that such repair be done in depots.

2. Equipment

a.) Machine Shop Trailers and Vans - At present the machine shop trailers and vans are of such height and weight that they can only be loaded in one hold of normal available shipping. This resulted in leaving behind equipment because of lack of shipping space. It is recommended that all machine shop trailers and vans be redesigned with the purpose of reducing their height to approximately 7 feet and weight to approximately 5 tons.

b.) TD-14 With Hughes-Keenan Crane - This item of equipment proved too slow in operation and the boom proved too short to be of much value in dump operations. It is recommended that this equipment be replaced with high speed crawler cranes with booms 40 feet in length and a minimum capacity of 1 ton.

c.) Roller Conveyor - Skate wheel roller conveyors were used by this organization to segregate and store rations. It was found that these conveyors are not strong enough to stand up under the usage to which they must be put. Of 1200 feet of roller conveyor brought out by this organization only 700 feet are now in usable condition. The following defects were noted:

- I) The aluminum axles bend easily.
- II) 75% of the end couplings broke off
- III) The aluminum frame bends and sags under heavier boxes.
- IV) Conveyors are too narrow.

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It is recommended that the wheels, axles, and frame should be capable of withstanding the dropping of a 70 pound box from a height of 18 inches. Frames should be strong enough to support a distributed 400# load without noticeable sag. The conveyor should be 50% wider to accommodate larger sizes of boxes.

No roller conveyors were available to this organization for the segregation of ammunition.

It is further recommended that the feasibility of powered conveyors for use in ration and ammunition dumps, and in shore to dump operations, be investigated.

d.) Fork Lifts - Clarke and Ross fork lifts performed satisfactorily on hard ground. The Clarke fork lift was particularly useful in the P.O.L. dump for loading trucks. Both fork lifts were too large to be used efficiently in the warehousing space available. A 3000 pound capacity warehousing fork lift should be carried as a Class IV item of equipment available to Combat Service Group.

e.) Additional Material Handling Equipment - During this operation it was necessary to dump all supplies in a large segregating yard. Supplies were then segregated, reloaded on 2½ ton trucks, and transported to warehouses. This created double requirements for 2½ ton trucks. A great saving of material handling time, equipment and manpower could have been effected had warehousing tractors and dollies been available.

It is recommended that large capacity pneumatic tired tractors and 1-2 ton capacity pneumatic tired dollies be carried as Class IV equipment, to be made available to Combat Service Group when operations in a developed port area are contemplated.

f.) TD-18 Tractors - These tractors were employed by this organization as the power unit for the Le Tourneau Crane, Angle dozer, and scraper. The operation of these tracked vehicles caused considerable damage to the roads and railways in the port areas, which damage seriously limited the usefulness of this equipment. In the particular case of hauling fill dirt for the port area, the distance involved made the present tractor and scraper inefficient. It is recommended that this tracked equipment be replaced with pneumatic tired prime movers similar to the Le Tourneau pneumatic tired vehicles, such as the Tournapull, Tournadozer, and tournacrane.

g.) Floodlight Trailers - During the whole of this operation, dump operations at night were seriously impaired by a lack of floodlight trailers for illuminating purposes. It is recommended that an additional 12 floodlight trailers be made organic to the Materials Handling Platoon.

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3. EMPLOYMENT

The mission and assignment of this Group in logistical support of a Corps was appropriate and in line with accepted doctrine. During the early phases of this operation the 1st Combat Service Group was the only logistical operating agency supporting the X Corps. During the period from 25 September to 1 October the Group was supplemented by three Army units:

65th Ordnance Ammunition Company, USA.

Det. 20th QM Subsistence Co., USA.

506th QM Petroleum Supply Co., USA.

Other 3rd Logistical Command Depot Companies and Battalions were not in operation until the 1st Marine Division commenced unloading, on about 10 October.

In joint operations with the Army where there is only one Marine Division in an Army Corps it is considered that the Combat Service Group, augmented by the Division Shore Party Battalion, and Army equivalents of Shore Party Battalion, should operate beach and port installations and facilities and provide logistical support for the Corps. In joint operations where Army Corps Service troops are provided it is considered that the Marine Division service elements should be responsible for Class II and IV supplies peculiar to the Marine Corps, and that the Combat Service Group not be employed in this fashion.

It is believed that the use of Combat Service Group personnel to augment Division Shore Party during the initial phases of an operation is an error. During this period the Combat Service Group should be reconnoitering and developing dump areas to handle cargo efficiently upon general unloading. Further, the Division Service Battalion was not employed during this phase of operation, being held back to be available to go forward and establish dumps behind Division. However they could not draw supplies to support the Division until after Combat Service Group dumps were in operation.

The 1st Air Delivery Platoon was not in a position to accomplish its mission of air supplying isolated units until D/7, 22 September. It is recommended that in future operations provisions be made for the Air Delivery Platoon to operate from aircraft carriers until such time as land based facilities are available. In this manner the capabilities of this platoon would not be lost during the early, critical phase of the amphibious landing.

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The experiences of this operation clearly demonstrated that a balance of material handling equipment, personnel, and transportation must be maintained at ships, beach unloading points, beach reloading points, and dumps in order to obtain an orderly flow of supplies. Supplies are useful to the supported units only after they have been segregated within the dump. During this operation stress was placed on maximum tonnage unloaded at the port, to such an extent that the condition of supplies after unloading and transportation to the dumps was of secondary importance. This resulted in dumping of cargo nets in dock areas and stacking and mixing supplies in dock areas. Consequently many boxes were broken, much equipment was lost, and excessive work was required in segregating at the dumps.

4. MISCELLANEOUS

a.) Ammunition Loading - In this operation ammunition was loaded so that each unit carried its basic load and each ship was unit loaded. Because of this, ammunition arrived at the dumps with each truckload containing numerous types of ammunition, resulting in great expenditure of manpower to segregate ammunition for issue. It is recommended that in future operations ammunition, other than basic load, be block loaded so that, on unloading, ammunition would arrive at dumps in a segregated condition. Ammunition could be dispersed within the convoy in such a fashion that supplies of particular types would not be jeopardized by possible losses.

b.) Organic Property of Supporting Units.

According to Division Embarkation Order 1-50, units were ordered to carry only those supplies essential to the operation. At Inchon the 1st Combat Service Group received, segregated, and stored approximately 100,000 cu. feet of organizational property landed in assault shipping, including athletic and other special services equipment. 75% of this equipment was not called for during the Inchon campaign, in spite of the fact that many of the organizational boxes contained items of equipment that were listed in Division logistic Reports as being in critical shortage.

It is recommended that in future operations that units load in assault shipping only those items of organic equipment which can be transported in organic transport. It is further recommended that all other necessary items should be carried by Combat Service Group as items of supply for supported units.

During the assault phase of this operation the Combat Service Group picked up and stored approximately twenty three truckloads of combat packs and bedding rolls dropped by troops on the beaches.

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Great difficulties were experienced in returning these packs to the proper organization. In addition there were approximately 200 men of Combat units of the Division detailed to guard unit equipment in the port area. Had such items of equipment been carried in Combat Service Group supply, these men would have been available to their units for combat duty.

c.) At no time during this operation did this unit receive any items of equipment or materials for salvage, until just prior to outloading from Inchon, at which time numerous weapons and other items of equipment were turned in by Division units. All weapons were turned over to the Ordnance battalion of the 3rd Logistical Command for salvage.

In view of the above, it is believed that all units and ranks in the Division showed a lack of appreciation of the value of salvagable material to the war effort. It is believed that the maintenance units of the Combat Service Group furnish their greatest service in the proper repair and disposition of unserviceable material. It is recommended that all personnel of the Marine Corps be indoctrinated in the necessity of the continuous shipping of salvage equipment and materials to responsible agencies.

John H. Cook, Jr.
JOHN H. COOK, Jr.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE TO 1st Marine Division
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT.

Engineer Company, (Operational)
1st Combat Service Group
Service Command, FMF
% FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

NJD:ath
27Nov1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group
Subj: Special Action Report for period 27 August to 7
October 1950
Ref: (a) DivGo, #16

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. This special action report is submitted in compliance with reference (a) by the Engineer Special Staff Officer, for the Engineer Supply Platoon and for the Engineer Maintenance Platoon, 1st Combat Service Group.

b. The Engineer Supply and Engineer Maintenance Platoon under the operational control of the Engineer Staff Officer were assigned the respective missions of supply and maintenance of engineer materiel.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

Engineer Social Staff Section (HqCo)
1-Officer 4-Enlisted Captain N. J. DENNIS

Engineer Supply Platoon (Supply Co)
3-Officers 23-Enlisted 1stLt. J. H. AFFLICK

Engineer Maintenance Platoon (Maintenance Co)
3-Officers 62-Enlisted CWO M. O HOGUE

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING:

Coincident with the arrival at Kobe, Japan, on 27 August, 1950, the hastily organized elements of the engineer activity were regrouped by platoon and sector according to the Combat Service Group T/O, and necessary plans were formulated for the accomplishment of the missions assigned in the SOP.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS:

a. Although all units were operating and were billeted under adverse conditions brought on by the highly intensified activity of the pre-embarkation period at Kobe, Japan, 27 August to 10 September 1950, limited nontechnical training of personnel of the Engineer units, of the Combat Service Group, was accomplished. The command was familiarized with the objective while aboard ship. No training other than on-the-job application was conducted from 15 September to 7 October, 1950.

b. No rehearsals were conducted.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION:

a. Out-loading for the objective, Inchon, Korea, was accomplished practically simultaneously with the unloading of ships arriving at Kobe, Japan. All organic property and equipment, was assembled into staging areas, segregated, processed, re-boxed, repaired, and serviced. Elements of the Supply and Maintenance Platoons were utilized as ship-loading details. The unusual requirement and loading facilities were overcome by sheer determination and will of all involved. Due to the intensity of the loading activities, initiative and improvisations greatly reduced problems which could easily have become magnified and hampered the overall effort.

b. The Engineer Maintenance Platoon (3-Officers 62-Enlisted) embarked aboard the USS WHITESIDE (APA-90) on 9-10 September, 1950, with Maintenance Company.

All elements of the Engineer Supply Platoon were assigned the support mission of augmentation troops for 1st Shore Party Battalion, and embarked on 8-9 September 1950 as follows:

LST 898	1 Officer.	5 Enlisted
LST 859		9 Enlisted
LST 973		9 Enlisted

The Engineer Staff Section embarked aboard the USS GEORGE CLYMER (APA-27).

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA:

a. Engineer Supply Platoon, embarked aboard the Tractor Groups, departed from Japan on 10 September, 1950 and proceeded as directed to the objective area. The outer LST Transport Area was reached on the morning of 15 September, 1950. Movement across the line of departure and to the beach was accomplished without incident.

b. The Maintenance Platoon aboard the USS WHITESIDE departed from Kobe on 11 September, and arrived at the objective area on 15 September, without incident. Normal shipboard life was effective throughout.

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase (15-16 September)
15 September, the Engineer Supply Platoon arrived at the objective area approximately 1000 aboard the assault LST'S. During the interval between the assault of Wolmi-Do and the actual landing on Red Beach, members of the Supply Platoon manned the 20mm and 40mm guns of the respective LST'S. The line of departure was crossed at approximately 1700 and the landing on Red Beach was effected on schedule. This Platoon, previously briefed on its mission in the overall landing plan, was employed in off-loading the bulk cargo (Classes I, III, V) from LST 973 and also performed the mission of beach security as dictated by the tactical situation.

16 September, after all ships were unloaded, the elements of the Supply Platoon were assembled by the Platoon Leader, and continued working in the Class III Dump. At 2400, this Platoon intact reverted to CSG, which was under the operational control of the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade. The elements of the Staff Section landed from the USS GEORGE CLYMER (APA-27) and were integrated into the operation.

b. Exploitation Phase (17 September to 7 October 1950). 17 September the Supply Platoon, displaced to a previously designated site on west side of the Tidal Basin and established a Class II and Class IV dump, covered and open storage, where supplies were received and issued on a twenty-four (24) hour basis. The Maintenance Platoon landed and was billeted in CSG dump area.

18 September, the Maintenance Platoon began to recover equipment and supplies from the beach area; the supply Platoon continued to receive issue and warehouse supplies. All items of Engineer Equipment both U.S.A. and USMC supplies, including bridging, were directed to the Supply dump. Twenty-two (22) truck loads of M4A2 floating bridge were loaded and delivered to the 1st Engineer Battalion Command Post at Kimpo Airfield during the hours of darkness. The Platoon Leader supply Platoon personally directed and led the convoy under the most adverse conditions to the destination.

19-21, September, the Supply Platoon collected rapid laying beach matting and cyclone wire from all sources delivering it to the 62nd Engineer Battalion, U.S.A., constructing the approach to the Han River.

Gross tonnage of the mat involved amounted to 200 tons. The Maintenance Platoon activated repair facilities.

22-23, September, supply operations continued on at a twenty four hour basis. The Maintenance Platoon prepared all organic equipment for displacement to Ascom City.

23, September, the Maintenance Platoon displaced to Ascom City without incident.

24-30, September, Maintenance Platoon established shops at Ascom City and began operation. Supply activity in regards to field fortification equipment increased.

1-6, October, Operations continued as usual with both the Supply and Maintenance Platoons carrying out the assigned missions.

7, October, Maintenance Platoon displaced to CSG area, Inchon, Korea, to make preparations for embarkation for Wonsan, Korea. The Supply Platoon started reboxing, remarking and other necessary preparations for outloading.

8. ENEMY

No enemy encountered.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

The Engineer Supply and Maintenance Platoons provided the requested supply and maintenance of engineers material in the support of the 1st

Marine Division and X Corps. Both platoons have proven their practicability, under most adverse conditions, by the overall services rendered the supported units, and it is believed that the proficiency of operation has been greatly increased.

10 COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Maintenance Platoon. The experience of this operation indicated the desirability of certain revisions in T/O. Two of the Electric Motor Repairmen (1144) are considered to be in excess of requirements. Practically no use was required of the six (6) Camera Repairmen as such. The need for an additional Diesel Mechanic (3511) was also indicated.

Certain deficiencies in allowances for tool kits were also noted. One kit, tool, motor repair was needed. The electric motor repairmen found a definite need for a standard field kit of tools, jigs and special materials for the repair of motors and generators. The Army has such a kit as a standard item, which would meet this requirement adequately. It is also recommended that the number of kits provided for refrigerator mechanics should be increased to four, to allow one kit for each mechanic. The distance between this unit and the supported Engineer Battalion was usually 15 miles throughout the period of this operation. This distance proved to be a serious obstacle to the adequate accomplishment of the Maintenance mission. It was apparent that either the Maintenance Platoon should operate nearer to the supported unit, or retriever equipment should be provided. It is recommended that 1 Truck, Tractor M26A1 and 1 Trailer, low bed, Machinery 25 Ton be provided as organic equipment.

b. Supply Platoon. The supply platoon lacked the necessary personnel to operate Class II and IV and Bridging dumps on a twenty-four (24) hour basis. In an attempt to overcome this manpower shortage indigenous labor was employed, but this solution did not prove to be satisfactory. Dump operations were also seriously curtailed by the lack of organic illumination and material handling equipment.

Spare parts supply was disrupted because of a lack of adequate packing slips on boxes. This pertained to both boxes received in the first resupply and to those received from the 1st Engineer Battalion. Each box had to be opened and the contents identified and inventoried before stock records could be set up or issues could be made.

No standard replenishment tables are available for Engineers parts resupply, as it is expected that experience factors will be employed. It is considered that material benefits would accrue from the introduction of more systematic tables.

Another difficulty noticed was that arising from the breaking of sets of Engineer tool and equipment sets, either by issue or loss. Once a single box of a set is missing, the entire set loses its identity. It is suggested that consideration be given to boxing such sets in standardized and distinctive boxes.

N. J. DENNIS

APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE TO 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

Ordnance, In the Field, Korea
18 November, 1950

From: Group Ordnance Officer
To: Commanding Officer

Subj: Special Action Report for period 27
August - 7 October, 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order Number 16.

1. INTRODUCTION

This special action report will cover the activities of the Group Ordnance Special Staff Officer, Major Segal, and the activities of the units directly under the Ordnance Special Staff Office, Ordnance Section, Headquarters Company; Ordnance Supply Platoon, Supply Company; Ordnance Maintenance Platoon, Maintenance Company.

The mission assigned this Group was to provide Ordnance Logistical Support to the 1st Marine Division, (Reinforced), and units of the X Corps.

The next higher echelon for this Group was the 60th Ordnance Group X Corps, U.S. Army.

2. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Arrived Kobe, Japan aboard U.S.S. Butner, 28 August, 1950. General unloading commenced at 1900. 4-11 September, 1950, ships were combat loaded. Various ships were assigned to each section or platoon.

3. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

11-15 September, 1950, enroute to objective area.

4. OPERATION

15 September, 1950. The Ordnance Supply Platoon was attached to the 1st Shore Party Battalion and with that organization landed at Red Beach, Inchon, Korea, at 1800. This Platoon was distributed to assist in the unloading of Class I, II, III, and V supplies. Ordnance Detachment, Headquarters Company landed at Wolmi-Do Island at about 0600, 16 September, 1950, and proceeded to Inchon, arriving there at about 0730. On or about 1400 the Commanding Officer and Special Staff reconnoitered the area assigned 1st Combat Service Group. The area was established, warehousing and shop areas assigned to each supply and maintenance platoons of this Group. Elements of Ordnance Maintenance Platoon began disembarking at Inchon.

About 1530, the Commanding Officer assigned the area at Yellow Beach where Class V dump was to

APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE TO 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

be established and maintained. The Ordnance Officer immediately assembled eight men from the ammunition section, Ordnance Supply Platoon, two men from Ordnance Section, Headquarters Company and about thirty native laborers to handle the Class V dump. Vehicles loaded with ammunition, arriving at the designated area at 1630 and unloading of the vehicles commenced immediately. The area assigned for ammunition dump was staked out to receive the segregated ammunition by the ammunition identification code (AIC). Checkers were assigned in which to supervise the native labor and submit their reports of the ammunition received, to the ammunition office. The total number of men working at the dump were considered sufficient until about 2100, when trucks started to line up to await unloading. Steps were taken immediately to withdraw the remainder of the ammunition section from Red Beach and an additional 50 native laborers were requested and received. At 2300 this added force was able to cope with the situation. The trucks arriving at the dump were unloaded without delay. By 0400, 17 September, 1950, due to the short distance from the Tidal Basin to the dump and by the addition of trucks in which to haul the ammunition made it necessary that more supervisors and native labor be added to the force which were already at work, also necessitated the establishing of an additional shift. About 20 noncommissioned officers from the Ordnance Maintenance Platoon were detailed and the native labor increased to 150 men per shift. At 0800 work shifts were changed and unloading was very satisfactory. Ammunition report was submitted to X Corps about 0600, the following day. At 0900 issuing of ammunition commenced to various units of the X Corps. Due to the limited size of the area, difficulty was experienced in routing of incoming and outgoing vehicles loaded with ammunition. This situation was remedied by establishing two traffic posts at the entrance to the dump. The above schedule was maintained during the 18th, 19th and 20th of September, 1950, receiving of ammunition ceased at this dump. The approximate tonnage of 900-1000 short tons were handled during each 24 hour period. Issue of ammunition continued until 25 September, 1950, and the remaining ammunition was evacuated to Ascom City dump by an Army Ammunition Company.

On or about 17 September, 1950, the exploitation phase began. The remainder of the Ordnance Supply Platoon started to assemble its supplies from the Class II and miscellaneous dumps. All items were inventoried and new Stock Record Card system established on items peculiar to the Marine Corps. Requisitions were submitted to the 330th Ordnance Depot Company. The second resupply shipment of items peculiar to the Marine Corps arrived from Kobe, Japan. This resupply constituted only about 25 per cent as that shown on

APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE TO 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

SOLR. The Ordnance Maintenance Platoon moved to Ascom City and was engaged with the Army 82nd Heavy Maintenance Ordnance Company to prepare and establish its assigned shop facilities. During this period the Tracked Vehicle Section of the Ordnance Maintenance Platoon was at reduced strength due to having 14 technicians assigned to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The remainder of the Tracked Vehicle Section were utilized in the recovery of tracked vehicles from the forward areas, also the removal and servicing of resupply tracked vehicles arriving at the port of Inchon. On or about 6 October, 1950, orders were received to prepare outloading of ships for further amphibious operations.

5. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Due to the short period of the operation, ordnance maintenance shops could not be properly established for the performance of proper field maintenance, however, the Ordnance Supply Platoon was able to accomplish its mission of supplying the units of the X Corps with ammunition and of supplying the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), with items peculiar to the Marine Corps.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This operation has shown the necessity of having all ordnance personnel in one company and the special staff officer assigned the additional duty of company commander. This company to include a company headquarters, ordnance supply platoon, ordnance maintenance platoon and a ammunition platoon. The strength of these platoons to vary in accordance with the size of the force to be logistically supported.

NATHAN SEGAL
Major, USMC

APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

Signal Section
Hungnam, Korea
27 Nov 1950

From: Group Signal Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group
Subj: Special Action Report for period 27 Aug 1950
to 7 Oct 1950
Ref: (a) Division General Order Number 16

1. INTRODUCTION

The following report covers the period 27 August 1950 to 7 October 1950 for Signal Supply Platoon, and Signal Maintenance Platoon, First Combat Service Group, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force. The mission assigned was to furnish the First Marine Division with signal equipment and to perform maintenance and repair on all signal as assigned by the Division Signal Officer.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Does not apply.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Preliminary planning was for Signal Supply Platoon to absorb all signal supplies (less 5 days) carried by the Division Signal Quartermaster; set up a signal dump and make issues therefrom. Test and repair facilities were to be furnished by Signal Maintenance Platoon.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Training specifically for the period being covered by this report was not accomplished nor were any rehearsals made. Training of specialists was accomplished through appropriate schools of the Marine Corps.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The Signal Supply Platoon embarked aboard LST 973 and LST 859 on 10 September 1950. Beginning 28 August 1950, maintenance equipment was unloaded, separated into priority groups and loaded aboard the USS Whiteside, KA-90. Loading was accomplished by 9 September 1950, and the Signal Maintenance Platoon was embarked aboard the USS Whiteside on 9 September 1950.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The Signal Supply Platoon disembarked on 15 September 1950. The Signal Maintenance Platoon arrived at Inchon, Korea on 15 September 1950 and disembarked 17 September 1950.

APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase. During the assault phase 15-16 September 1950, the Signal Supply Platoon augmented the Fuel Section, Supply Company, First Combat Service Group, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force. During the assault phase the Signal Maintenance Platoon remained aboard ship.

b. Exploitation. During the exploitation phase from 17 September 1950 through 26 September 1950, the Signal Supply Platoon set up a signal dump and made issues to all units (both USMC and Army) as supplies became available. From 27 September 1950 through 30 September 1950 the Signal Supply Platoon turned over to the 181st Signal Depot, U.S. Army all signal supplies and from 30 September 1950 to 7 October 1950 the Signal Supply Platoon augmented the 181st Signal Depot, U.S. Army. Upon disembarkation, the Signal Maintenance Platoon proceeded to Combat Service Group area. Shop facilities were set up 18 September 1950 and work on equipment began. Repair of abandoned radios and check on supplies for possible damage by water during the typhoon at Kobe, Japan was instituted. From 27 September through 7 October, 1950, the Signal Maintenance Platoon augmented the 181st Signal Depot, U.S. Army.

8. ENEMY

Does not apply

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Does not apply

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the Signal Supply Platoon carry in bulk all signal supplies necessary to maintain a 30 day replenishment for the First Marine Division. Handling of materials arriving at beach was inadequate. There was a lack of proper supervision to prevent pilfering and misdirection. Further losses of valuable equipment were encountered when preloaded trucks sent by LST were commandeered and unloaded on the beach to facilitate movement of other organizations. This was possible because no Combat Service Group officer was present to prevent such misdirection of vehicles.

It is also recommended that the status and mission of Signal Maintenance Platoon in relation maintenance and repair of First Marine Division Signal equipment be more clearly defined.

F. L. Oglesey
F. L. OGLESBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Group Signal Officer

APPENDIX 4 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

Support Company
1st Combat Service Group
Service Command, FMF,
% FPO, San Francisco, California.

DBC/jhw
28 Nov 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, First Combat Service Group
Service Command, FMF.

Subj: Special Action Report for period 27 Aug 1950
to 7 Oct 1950

Ref: (a) Group General Order No. 151 of 3 Nov 1950

1. INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted for the purpose of providing higher echelons and other interested parties with pertinent information concerning the operation of the various elements of Support Company during the period covered, including situations encountered, problems faced, suitability of the existing organization for the performance of assigned missions, and capabilities and limitations of equipment provided. Missions of the company are the maintenance and operation of Materials Handling equipment, the provision of organized depot labor details, Laundry service for the Combat Service Group and other organizations as directed by higher authority, and the supplying of fresh bread at the rate of eight (8) ounces per man per day for the Combat Service Group and other units as directed. The next higher echelon of this organization is the First Combat Service Group, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

- a. Company Headquarters; strength, one (1) officer, thirty (30) enlisted; Captain N. J. DENNIS, Section Commander.
- b. Materials Handling Platoon; strength two (2) officers, forty-eight (48) enlisted; First Lieutenant D. J. HILLMER, Platoon Commander.
- c. Depot Platoon; strength, one (1) officer, thirty-four (34) enlisted; First Lieutenant G. D. MOORE, Platoon Commander.
- d. Laundry Platoon; strength two (2) officers, eighteen (18) enlisted; First Lieutenant T. R. RHYMES, Platoon Commander.
- e. Bakery Section; strength, no officers, nine (9) enlisted; Staff Sergeant J. W. CAIN, Section Commander.

APPENDIX 4 to Annex UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

All units of the Support Company functioned under existing pertinent plans and orders issued from Headquarters, First Combat Service Group, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No opportunity for training and rehearsals was afforded, other than on the job training for all units.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

These functions were effected in accordance with loading and embarkation plans prepared and issued by Headquarters, First Combat Service Group, Service Command, FMF.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The entire Company, embarked in eleven (11) landing ships, tanks, less four (4) Bay City Cranes operators aboard two landing ships, utility, arrived at Red Beach, Inchon, Korea at approximately 1830 on D Day, 15 Sep 1950. Bay City Crane operators and their equipment arrived at Blue Beach on D Day, 15 Sep 1950.

7. OPERATIONS

- a. Assault Phase (15-16 Sep 1950) - Entire Company employed in unloading LST's and LSU's in which embarked, under enemy fire, in augmentation of the First Shore Party Battalion.
- b. Exploitation Phase (17 Sep - 7 Oct 1950) - Units of Support Company reverted to control of Combat Service Group and established facilities for the performance of assigned missions, (see paragraph #1, above). The performance of these missions was continued throughout the period covered by this report.

8. ENEMY

Landing at Inchon, Korea was effected under fire from enemy weapons of various calibers. No other information of the enemy available to this organization.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Not applicable

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Material Handling Platoon

EMPLOYMENT

The capabilities of this section were not properly utilized throughout the operation due to the fact that the requesting units did not adhere to the SOP and channel their requests through the S-4. It is recommended that the Materials Handling Platoon have an NCO attached to the S-4 for liaison purposes so that when a call is received for materials handling equipment, he can determine the type of equipment that should be sent out to perform the job. It was found that many sections requesting lifts had no conception as to the capabilities and limitations of the equipment organic to this platoon; thus when a piece of equipment was sent out it was found that it was often impractical for it to perform the job. This could be rectified by having the requesting unit give the type and weight of the material to be lifted to the liaison NCO attached to the S-4. The liaison NCO could then determine the type of equipment that should be used to best handle the job and forward that information to the materials handling dispatcher, who could then dispatch the proper equipment out to the job requested.

ORGANIZATION

The present tables of organization for this section could be improved. Certain other Companies in the Combat Service Group now have materials handling operators and equipment. It would be more feasible to pool all operators and equipment into the materials handling platoon. This would do away with a duplication of effort by other companies, and it would be easier to carry out maintenance of the equipment.

Personnel now allotted to this section by the T/O is not sufficient to carry out the platoon's mission. Due to the heavy influx of supplies and equipment needed on an operation, equipment must be operated on a twenty-four (24) hour basis. It was only through the assistance received from the Shore Party and the Army Materials Handling Section that this platoon was able to carry out its mission. If this platoon is to carry out its mission on its own it will need a substantial increase in personnel and equipment.

APPENDIX 4 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report

SUPPLY PROCEDURES

This platoon did not operate at its maximum efficiency due to its inability to obtain spare parts for the forklifts. No spare parts were available and although repeated requests were made, no spare parts were received. This necessitated stripping forklifts so that spare parts could be obtained. This far it has been necessary to strip two (2) 3500 lb. forklifts and one (1) 6000 lb. forklift so that all the remaining lifts could be kept in operation. Investigation revealed that no spare parts are stocked by the Marine Corps; hence they have to be bought on open purchase. If such is the case, recommendations should be made for the stocking of these parts so that they can be made available when needed. An initial supply of spare parts should be issued to Materials Handling Platoon when they load out on an operation so that breakdowns can be quickly repaired.

MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

According to the SOP, Maintenance Company is responsible for the repair and maintenance of all Combat Service Group Vehicles. This proved to be impractical due to location and the heavy influx of repair work that had to be done on trucks and jeeps. This necessitated the platoons doing its own repair and maintenance work because it could not wait for the Auto Maintenance Platoon to do its work. A small maintenance section should be included within this platoon's T/O.

MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

It was found that the additional Bay City Mobile Cranes could have been used to expedite the moving of supplies. The TD-14 Keenan Cranes were found to be of little value due to the limitation of the length of their booms. It is recommended that the TD-14 Keenan Cranes be replaced by Northwest 3/8 cu. yd. Crawler Cranes to eliminate limitations on loads to be lifted. Many breakdowns occurred with the forklifts because of the fact that they were operating on terrain for which they are not adapted. Tracked forklifts should be made organic to this platoon to operate in beach and dump areas and pneumatic mounted forklifts should be used in warehouse areas only.

b. Depot Platoon

APPENDIX 4 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

EMPLOYMENT

(1) Except initially, the Depot Platoon was not employed for its mission. The presence of sufficient indigenous labor largely eliminated the need for manpower. The employment of individuals of the platoon as supervisors or foremen over small groups of indigenous labors was the most practical approach to the problem. This was done in the ammunition dumps, miscellaneous dumps, Class II & IV, and ration warehouses at Ascom City. The later use of thirty (30) men at Ascom City as guerillas was very much needed and was considered in line with the situation.

(2) It is believed therefore, that, although its stevedoring mission was not performed fully, having a pool of men available to handle other tasks as they came up was advantageous.

(3) Had there been no indigenous labor available it is believed that the Depot Platoon would have been very useful but not nearly sufficient in numbers to meet the manpower requirements.

ORGANIZATION

(1) The organization of the platoon in two (2) fifteen (15) man sections is considered satisfactory. Good control and employment are possible under this plan.

(2) It is recommended that the Depot Platoon be increased to a company size with the following needs of the Group as a guide:

- a. A trained ammunition handling section.
- b. Additional trained personnel in warehousing and the segregation of supplies and organic property.
- c. Man power for stevedoring.
- d. The need for trained assistants for the operation of such equipment as cranes and forklifts.
- e. Personnel for various unforeseen tasks.

c. Laundry Platoon

EMPLOYMENT

One remaining Laundry Unit was utilized at less than 50% of its maximum capacity in this particular area. This fact is believed to be due to lack of liaison between companies and the Laundry Section, and the fact that clothes were washed by native civilians within the immediate area. One laundry unit in good working condition can furnish two (2) changes of utility clothing, underwear and socks per man, rough dry, each week by working twenty-four (24) hours per day where an adequate water supply is available and favorable conditions prevail, for approximately 1500 men.

APPENDIX 4 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report

ORGANIZATION

Present organization is considered satisfactory

SUPPLY PROCEDURE

No replacement parts are available in the field for equipment being used.

MAINTENANCE

All necessary maintenance during period covered performed by personnel of the Laundry platoon.

MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

- (1) Certain spare parts are urgently needed.
- (2) Electric water pumps proved unsatisfactory under field conditions.

d. Bakery Section

No recommendations are submitted for the Bakery Section for this period. The operation of the section under conditions encountered at Inchon was considered highly satisfactory.

D. B. Cooley, Jr.
D. B. COOLEY, JR.

APPENDIX 5 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE TO 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

1st Air Delivery Platoon
Service Command, FMF
Inchon, Korea
13 Nov 1950

From: Commanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery
Platoon, Service Command, FMF
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service
Group, Service Command, FMF
Subj: Special Action Report for period 27 August
1950 to 7 October 1950, Inclusive.
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Purpose of report

(1) The general overall purpose of this report is to give a comprehensive summary of the 1st Air Delivery Platoon's operations during the Inchon-Kinpo and Seoul operations covering the period 27 August 1950 to 7 October 1950, inclusive.

b. Mission assigned

(1) The mission assigned to 1st Air Delivery Platoon by the Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group was the assembly and preparation of supplies and equipment requiring air delivery, the development and perfection of air delivery techniques and equipment, and assisting in the delivery, by air freight or air drop supplies and equipment required by supported units.

c. Designation of next higher echelon

(1) The next higher echelon to this organization is the 1st Combat Service Group, Service Command, FMF.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. Organic Unit

(1) The 1st Air Delivery Platoon is composed of two operating sections and one headquarters section. Platoon headquarters consisting of one Officer and ten enlisted men performs command and administrative duties for the platoon. Two operating sections of twenty-six men each with a Technical Sergeant (Air Delivery Chief) in charge performs the packaging of supplies and equipment and the packing of parachutes.

APPENDIX 5 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report

b. Attached units

(1) There are no attached units to the 1st Air Delivery Platoon.

c. Strength and unit commander

(1) The strength of the 1st Air Delivery Platoon during the period of this report was 1 officer and 66 enlisted men. Platoon Commander. Captain Hersel D.C. BLASINGAME, U. S. Marine Corps.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. Planning Schedules, preferred

(1) 1st Air Delivery Platoon was prepared to effect the aerial delivery of supplies and equipment by parachute from the nearest friendly airbase to units in isolated areas or in areas cut off from main forces and when speed was a vital factor and critical items were not otherwise available.

b. Planning schedule, alternate

(1) Operating sections consisting of approximately ten men each would operate from aircraft carriers, utilizing carrier based aircraft until such time as land based transport aircraft and airfields became available.

c. Directives under which operating

(1) The 1st Air Delivery Platoon operated under directives issued by Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group. During the period 19 September 1950 to 7 October 1950, operational directives were issued by G-4, 1st Marine Division.

d. Enemy

(1) Not known

e. Estimate of situation formulated in planning

(1) None

f. Logistic Planning

(1) The logistical planning for 1st Air Delivery Platoon was performed by Organic Supply, 1st Combat Service Group

APPENDIX 5 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

g. Accumulation of Intelligence

(1) The inflow of pertinent information and intelligence during the planning phase was excellent, and this organization was kept abreast of developments at all times.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

(1) Prior to and during the period of this report training was given to new personnel who had joined the organization prior to leaving the West Coast. This training consisted primarily of instructions in packing of cargo parachutes, supplies and equipment and familiarization of aerial delivery containers. New personnel worked with established flight crews. By this method it was found that the efficiency of the organization was not impaired because of men having to leave their duties to conduct training or rehearsal periods. In addition to training in the concept of aerial replenishment, an intensive training program was carried out to familiarize all personnel with the general mission of an Air Delivery Platoon. Physical conditioning, familiarization with amphibious operations and the functioning and operation of organic crew served weapons.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

(1) During the period 4 September 1950 to 9 September 1950, all organic equipment was loaded aboard the USS General George Clymer (APA-27) at Kobe, Japan. On 10 September 1950 all personnel of 1st Air Delivery Platoon embarked aboard the same ship.

6. MOVEMENT AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

(1) All personnel of the 1st Air Delivery Platoon sailed from Kobe, Japan aboard the USS General George Clymer (APA-27), with elements of the 1st Marine Division on 11 September 1950. The convoy of which the Clymer was a part of arrived and anchored at Inchon, Korea, about 1400 on 15 September 1950.

(2) 40 Air Delivery Personnel were assigned to the ships unloading detail upon arrival at Inchon and remained aboard ship until the night of 21 September 1950 at which time they disembarked. 1 Officer and 26 enlisted men disembarked at 2200 hours on 17 September 1950. These personnel were billeted with 1st Combat Service Group at the Flour Mills in Inchon during the period 18-21 September 1950 while assembling supplies and equipment.

APPENDIX 5 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report

On the night of 21 September 1950 orders were received from the 1st Marine Division for 1st Air Delivery Platoon to move all personnel and equipment from Inchon to Kimpo Airfield. This move was accomplished immediately.

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase

(1) The 1st Air Delivery Platoon did not participate in the assault of the Inchon operation other than unloading supplies and equipment from ships.

b. Exploitation Phase

(1) At 1400 on 26 September, 1950, 1st Air Delivery Platoon was requested by G-4, 1st Marine Division to perform an aerial replenishment mission. This mission consisted of two C-47 transport aircraft loaded with ammunition and blood plasma. These supplies were dropped by parachute over designated target in the Seoul area at 1600 hours. While dropping these supplies intense enemy small arms fire was received by both aircraft. One air delivery man was wounded in the right thigh by small arms fire. The hydraulic system was damaged on one of the aircraft forcing it to make a crash landing; no personnel suffered any injuries due to the landing but the plane was destroyed.

On 28 September 1950 the delivery of ammunition and rations was effected to a unit which had pushed well out from the normal source of supplies. This delivery was effected without incident.

Orders was received from the X Army Corps at 1800 on 6 October 1950 to prepare for an air drop of food and water to a group of men believed to be American prisoners of war about 50 miles southeast of Pycnyan, Korea. 36 cases of "C" rations and 20 gallons of water were packed and loaded aboard a U.S. Air Force aircraft, which took off from Kimpo Airfield at 0700 hours, 7 October 1950. This plane with an air delivery crew of 1 officer and 6 enlisted men proceeded to the area designated and effected the drops. There appeared to be about 300 of the prisoners slowly working their way south towards the 38th parallel when they were sighted they had spelled out the word FOOD with formations of men.

8. ENEMY

(1) Due to the nature of duties performed by this organization there was no known information concerning the enemy during the period of this report.

APPENDIX 5 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

(1) Even though only two aerial replenishment missions were accomplished by this organization in support of troops during the Inchon-Kimpo and Seoul operation, here again the Air Delivery Platoon has indicated it's value in amphibious operations.

The units needing the ammunition, rations and blood plasma which were dropped on these two missions were separated from the supply by a considerable expanse of terrain impassable to vehicles. Routes around the terrain were not secured and their existence were not known definite. Therefore, it appeared that air supply was the only means of providing the critical supplies to the units in time. The delivery of critical needed supplies in these two instances proved to be an important factor in the support of the receiving units.

(2) Even though the 1st Air Delivery Platoon had few requests for delivery of supplies to supported units by parachute, invaluable experience was gained in the support of an amphibious operation from an air delivery standpoint.

It proved that the aerial delivery of supplies accurately and rapidly was an important factor in logistical support of an aggressive hard hitting force; that air delivery of supplies and equipment can be accomplished with good results by an air delivery unit.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Comments

(1) Although the landing of troops at Inchon was made at 1600 on 15 September 1950, it was not until 22 September 1950 that the Air Delivery Platoon was moved into an area where it could render effective and sustained air delivery of supplies. Should an operating section of 10 men have been stationed aboard an aircraft carrier prior to arrival at Inchon, they could have been able to furnish critical supplies starting at "H" hour on "D day", utilizing only one bomb rack of a fighter type aircraft flying a mission of 200 to 400 pounds of supplies could have been delivered and the aircraft continued on its mission. Considerable training has been spent on this phase of air delivery by detachments of the 1st Air Delivery Platoon with the Sixth Fleet over the past two years.

APPENDIX 5 to MANNED UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

b. Recommendations

(1) It is recommended that the T. E. for vehicles for an Air Delivery Platoon be changed from four $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with trailers and one 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6X6 truck to four 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6X6 trucks and one $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck with trailer. The operations covered by this report has proved that $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks with trailers are limited in utility and capacity in hauling air delivery containers from the packaging area to the aircraft. The $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck and trailer is useful only for camp maintenance and hauling packed parachutes.

(2) It is further recommended that all personnel in an Air Delivery Platoon be armed with a .45 Caliber pistol with shoulder holsters. Considerable difficulty has been encountered with attempting to keep a shoulder weapon at hand as required by the enemy situation and performing duties as members of air delivery crews. The altitude at which air delivery is normally accomplished precludes the possibility of a cargo crewman being able to avail himself of a shoulder weapon prior to abandoning a disabled aircraft.

(3) It is further recommended that four drying lockers, parachute, plywood, portable, be deleted from the T. E. and four drying lockers, parachute, jointed pipe, canvas covered be substituted. The plywood dry lockers has proven to be of such great weight and bulk and suffered such damage in on and off loading that they are unserviceable when needed.

H. D. C. Blasina
H. D. C. BLASINGAME

APPENDIX 6 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

1st Fumigation and Bath
Platoon, SC, FMF
In the Field, Korea
20 November, 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service
Group, Service Command, FMF.

Subj: Special Action Report for period 27 August
7 October 1950.

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16 of 20Oct50

1. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), the subject named report is submitted. This unit was assigned the mission of bathing and issuing clean clothes to front line troops. The next higher echelon is the 1st Combat Service Group, Service Command, FMF.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

This unit is comprised of the following:

(a) OFFICERS ENLISTED

1 31

(b) Commander: First Lieutenant James L. DUMAS
037216/1202, U. S. Marine Corps

3. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

(a) Loaded ship on 7-8Sep50 and embarked 9Sep50 at Kobe, Japan.

(b) Loading ship 12-13Oct50 and embarked 14Oct50 at Inchon, Korea.

4. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

(a) Sailed from Kobe, Japan on 10Sep50. Arrived at Inchon, Korea on 15Sep50

(b) Sailed from Inchon, Korea on 17Oct50. Arrived at Wonsan, Korea on 25Oct50

5. OPERATIONS

Furnished bathing facilities and clean clothes to personnel during the period 17Sep-7Oct50.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Insofar as can be observed the equipment and supplies have been adequate for the mission assigned, however it is impracticable for the undersigned to make any recommendations at this time in reference to equipment or supplies necessary in the event this Unit should be assigned the mission of decontamination.

JAMES L. DUMAS

APPENDIX 7 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report

Truck Company, 1st Combat
Service Group, Service Command,
Fleet Marine Force,
% FPO, San Francisco, Calif
14 November, 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group
Service Command, FMF
Subj: Special Action Report for period 27 August 1950
to 7 October 1950.

Ref: (a) Division General Order Number 16.

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to set forth in a chronological and narrative form the performance of this company during the preparation, assault and exploitation of the Inchon-Kimpo, Seoul operations. The mission of Truck Company was to perform hauling as assigned by the Commanding Officer, First Combat Service Group.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

The Truck Company had no attached units. The strength of the company during this period was five (5) officers and eighty-four (84) enlisted and Captain J. A. PEARSON was the commanding officer.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Truck Company being an organic unit of the First Combat Service Group used the Group Operation Order 1-50 and Administrative Order 2-50. It was not found necessary to augment these orders with company directives to accomplish assigned missions.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Daily routine provided the training necessary to carry out our mission. No rehearsals were conducted.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. Twenty (20) of thirty-one (31) trucks of this company were loaded with organic property, water and gasoline in five (5) gallon expeditionary cans. Two (2) of the twenty (20) trucks were loaded with miscellaneous fuels in five (5) gallon expeditionary cans. The remaining trucks were unloaded empty for immediate use upon landing.

b. The company embarked aboard four (4) L.S.T.'s to support the Shore Party Battalion during the assault phase of the landing at Inchon, Korea.

6. MOVEMENT TOWARD ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

During the movement to the objective area the personnel of Truck Company were used to exercise all vehicles and for the inspection of securing devices on assigned shipping. We arrived at the objective area on 15 September 1950.

APPENDIX 7 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine Division
Special Action Report

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase

- 15 Sept All the company landed at about 1830, offloaded the trucks and immediately began hauling operations as directed by the Shore Party Commander. All vehicles were offloaded and placed in hauling operations during the night 15-16 Sept 1950.
- 16-17 Sept All trucks were used by Shore Party Battalion in the beach area hauling from L.S.T.'s to dumps in vicinity of beach area.
- 18 Sept Truck Company reverted to control of the Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service Group. We started hauling between the beach dumps and the new dump areas of the Combat Service Group.
- 19-21 Sept Truck Company was used by the Combat Service Group for internal hauling and to the to the Service Battalion dumps.
- 22-23 Sept Twenty-five (25) trucks were used by the 7th Army Division to haul rations, water, and fuel to Suwon, approximately thirty-five (35) miles south of Inchon, Korea.
- 24Sept - 7Oct Truck Company continued to perform internal hauling missions for the Group, the mission for which it is designed. During the period 15 September to 7 October this company was able to keep twenty-five (25) trucks of the thirty-one (31) on the road twenty-four (24) hours a day.

8. ENEMY

No comments. This company never came in contact with the enemy.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

It was found that the G.M.C. 2½ ton, 6X6, stood up well on "round the clock" operations with little mechanical attention. The TFO for the Truck Company is not adequate to provide for prolonged twenty-four (24) hour operation of its vehicles.

APPENDIX 7 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Marine
Division Special Action Report

(See paragraph 10). That the tops of all cabs and fifty per cent (50%) of the truck tarpoulins had rotted in storage. The need for a sectional bar that is permanently attached to the body of the truck that would eliminate the loss due to breakage of the wooden bows through constant removal to make maximum efficiency for hauling. The need for use of .50 Caliber machine gun mounts did not arise in either phase of the operation, however they are a critical shortage in this unit.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the war time Table of Organization for this unit be increased as follows:

a. That each truck authorized in the T/E be manned by two (2) drivers.

b. That the automotive serviceman assigned to each truck platoon be eliminated and replaced by drivers as noted in (a) above.

c. That five (5) automotive servicemen from the Company Headquarters be deleted as such and assigned to platoons as in (a) above.

Accomplishment of the above would effect an overall increase of four (4) men (5-92). It is felt that the number of servicemen in the T/O is excessive for the equipment available and that proper supervision of driver's maintenance will accomplish the same results.

It was noted during the period 15 September to 7 October that many cases of improper usage and disposition of Combat Service Group vehicles occurred. It is recommended that a closer liaison between the using agency and the dispatching agency be inaugurated. In far too many cases, the vehicle dispatcher was not informed as to what loads in weight, cube, and numbers were to be hauled and the Truck Company officers were rarely consulted in an attempt to make best use of available transportation.

A. G. COPP

ANNEX VV to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report.

7thMTBn, SC, FMF,
In the field,
30 Nov 1950.

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF
Subj: Special Action Report for period 1 Sep - 7 Oct 1950
Ref: (a) Division General Order 16

1. The purpose of this report is to enable higher authority to obtain a picture of the operations, planning, and training of this battalion during this period. The initial mission assigned the 7th Motor Transport Battalion was to support the 1st Marine Division. The battalion landed at Inchon, Korea, on 15 September 1950, and went under the operational control of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, U. S. Army on 17 September 1950, and was assigned the mission of port and beach clearance. In addition, the battalion was called on to haul supplies and troops directly to the forward areas. The operational control of the battalion changed several times during the period covered, but the administrative control remained with the 1st Marine Division.

2. The 7th Motor Transport Battalion consists of a Headquarters and Service Company and four truck companies. The task organization is as follows:

UNIT	USMC		USN		USMC TOTAL	USN TOTAL	UNIT COMMANDER
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl			
7thMTBn	31	393	0	6	424	6	Maj J. F. STEPKA
H&SCo	11	57		6	68	6	1stLt R. T. KING
"A"Co	5	84	0	0	89		Capt I. N. HAYES
"B"Co	5	84	0	0	89		Capt C. M. JONES
"C"Co	5	84	0	0	89		Capt F. B. ROGERS
"D"Co	5	84	0	0	89		Capt J. L. BUNKER

3. Due to the dispersion of units of the battalion, additional planning prior to arrival at the objective area was limited. Division Operation Order No. 2-50 was received on 4 September 1950 while the battalion was at Kobe, Japan, and conferences were held by the Battalion Commander to determine the action to be taken upon landing. The decision was that upon landing all vehicles and personnel would report to a designated assembly area for further orders. It was estimated that upon landing the enemy situation would be such that all preloaded equipment could be unloaded and vehicles made readily available for further assignment.

4. The training for this operation consisted only of such training as could be accomplished aboard ship. This training consisted mostly of small arms training, dissemination of available weapons, and indoctrination of all personnel in the operations and procedure of the battalion. There was no rehearsal for the operation.

5. In preparation for the assault landing this battalion was loaded aboard fourteen ships. Loading commenced on 5 September 1950 and was completed on 9 September 1950.

6. The battalion sailed from Kobe, Japan on 10 September 1950 and arrived at the objective area on 15 September 1950.

7. a. 15 September 1950: Arrived at Inchon, Korea. 16 September 1950 units of this battalion commenced unloading and general reorganization began at the assembly area.

b. 17 September 1950: Reorganization completed and battalion command post established at 9043L, map Korea 1:50,000, Kimpo Sheet. All available vehicles commenced operations in port and beach clearance, under the operational control of the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, U. S. Army.

18-19 September 1950: Continued port and beach clearance with individual short hauls from rear to forward dumps. Visibility was poor due to extremely dusty roads. This situation caused several minor accidents.

20 September 1950: Continued port and beach clearance with individual short hauls to forward dumps. Eleven trucks, twenty-two men, and one officer from "B" Company were assigned to work for the 1st Marines for the purpose of transporting troops and supplies in the forward area. Sixteen TD14 tractors with at they trailers were being utilized in port and beach clearance. There were six 2 1/2 ton 6x6 cargo trucks involved in accidents, two of which required extensive repairs. All repairs were accomplished by this battalion. Difficulty was encountered in obtaining parts for minor repairs. Tire repair was a serious problem, due to the lack of tire repair kits and replacements.

21 September 1950: The battalion continued port and beach clearance and individual dispatches to forward areas. One truck ran off the side of a bridge into a stream approximately fifteen feet below, and was wrecked beyond economical repair. In order to salvage this truck it would have meant blocking the main road for an indefinite period; consequently it was cannibalized and surveyed.

22 September 1950: Continued port and beach clearance. Full operational quota of one hundred vehicles were maintained; this included sixteen TD14 tractors with at they trailers. Fifty-three vehicles were dispatched for an indefinite period to the 7th Division, U. S. Army, for transportation of troops and supplies. The eleven trucks previously assigned to the 1st Marines returned. The Administrative Section, previously attached to the Division Administrative Center, arrived from Keese, Japan, and reverted to battalion control. While returning from a short haul from the forward dump area, one truck was attacked by six north Korean soldiers. With the aid of two army military police stationed nearby, two army military police passengers, and one guard riding with the driver, this attack was repulsed, and the six north Koreans were killed. The guard was killed and the passengers were wounded. The driver was not injured.

23 September 1950: Port and beach clearance and short hauls to forward dumps continued. Fifty-two of the fifty-three trucks previously assigned to the 7th Division, U. S. Army, returned. One truck from this assignment was abandoned after having run off the road into a rice paddy. Upon the arrival of a wrecker dispatched to recover this truck it could not be located. This truck was never recovered. Fifteen North Koreans dressed in civilian clothes, three of whom were armed, surrendered themselves to one of the truck drivers from this battalion while he was returning from a forward dump area. These prisoners were turned over to the Army military police.

24 September 1950: Port and beach clearance continued. A convoy of thirty vehicles loaded with ammunition was dispatched to the 7th Division, U. S. Army dump. A convoy of twenty-five vehicles loaded with rations was dispatched to the 7th Division, U. S. Army, to be unloaded and used in displacement of 7th Division troops and supplies forward.

[REDACTED]

25 September 1950: Port and beach clearance continued. The convoy of thirty vehicles returned from the 7th Division, U. S. Army. A convoy of eighteen vehicles loaded with bridge parts was dispatched to work with the army engineers in the installation of the Han River bridge.

26 September 1950: The convoy of thirty-five vehicles returned from the 7th Army Division.

27-29 September 1950: Port and beach cleared, individual dispatches continued.

30 September 1950: The eighteen truck convoy assigned to the army engineers returned.

1 October 1950: The battalion received orders to move to Seoul. These orders were received at 0200. By 0900 the battalion had broken camp and moved out. One officer and thirteen men were left in Inchon, with most of the organic equipment. The battalion was released from the operational control of the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, U. S. Army, and went under the operational control of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion. The forward elements arrived at Seoul at 0700, and the remainder of the battalion arrived at 1200.

2 October 1950: "C" Company dispatched twenty trucks, forty-four men and one officer to the 1st Service Battalion, and "A" Company dispatched twenty-five trucks, fifty-five men and two officers to the 1st Ordnance Battalion for an indefinite period. Two ten truck convoys were dispatched to Division Headquarters, the remainder of the battalion was engaged in short hauls and small convoys.

3 October 1950: A twenty-five truck convoy was dispatched from "D" Company to haul ROK troops to the front lines near the 38th parallel. This convoy returned the same day. Individual dispatches were carried out throughout the day.

4 October 1950: Five trucks were dispatched to haul truck parts from ASCOM city for maintenance company, 1st Motor Transport Battalion. No other hauls were made. The five trucks returned to this battalion after one trip.

5 October 1950: The trucks and personnel previously assigned to the 1st Service Battalion and the 1st Ordnance Battalion were called in. Orders were received that the battalion would move to an assembly area at Red Beach in Inchon the following day. Headquarters and Service Company was to move down and set up camp. The truck companies were to remain at Seoul and haul troops and equipment from the front lines to Inchon.

6 October 1950: The advance echelon from Headquarters and Service Company departed Seoul at approximately 1000 aboard DUKW's, with the office equipment and galley gear. The remainder of Headquarters and Service Company departed at approximately 1800 by truck and jeep convoy, arriving at Red Beach, Inchon, at 2145. Ninety-six trucks were engaged in hauling the 5th and 11th Marines from the front lines to an assembly area at Inchon.

8. Not applicable.

9. As a result of this operation the 7th Motor Transport Battalion made 3,400 trips, traveled 56,000 miles, hauled 11,950 tons of supplies and equipment, and 8,200 troops.

10. It is recommended that in future operations this battalion be allowed to stock a reasonable supply of spare parts such as spark plugs, distributors, tire repair kits, brake fluid, breaker points fan belts, and hydraulic brake hoses. There were several instances where the battalion was operating out of reach of the normal supply lines. This problem could probably be eliminated by allotting one two wheel spare parts trailer to the battalion. It is further recommended that additional personnel be assigned to the battalion to operate and maintain the twenty TD14 tractors assigned. This would require an increase in the present T/O of three officers and 55 enlisted men. If the T/O can not be increased, it is recommended that these tractors be taken off the present T/E.

Due to the negligible maintenance facilities of this battalion, it is recommended that it not be committed to support front line units for periods in excess of seven days duration.

It is recommended that in the Motor Transport School curriculum, that personnel be given training in the defense of a convoy when attacked.

CARL J. CAGLE

ANNEX WILLIAM WILLIAM TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION, SPECIAL ACTION
REPORT

GWM:jjh
A9-4
Ser 049

VMO-6
Yonp'o Air Base, Korea
27 Nov 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Sub: Special Action Report for period 6 September 1950 to
7 October 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. This report is made to cover the activities of VMO-6 in its assigned mission of rendering aerial support and observation to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and later to the 1st Marine Division, during the period 6 September 1950 to 7 October 1950. Administrative and logistical control was maintained by MAG-33, 1st Marine Air Wing, the operational control was maintained by the 1st Marine Division for the period covered.
2. VMO-6, Commanded by Major V. J. GOTTSCHALK, USMC, had a strength of fifteen (15) officers and ninety-five (95) enlisted men. In addition eight (8) aerial observers were attached from the 1st Marine Division, with Major M. F. WOJICK, USMC, as chief air observer.
3. Earliest use of helicopters and OY's became the prime consideration in planning for the coming operation. This was to be accomplished by transporting the helicopters on an LST, from which they could operate for a limited time, and by placing one OY on the USS SICILY (CVE-118) and one OY on the USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) in a flyable condition for flight to the beach upon call.
4. Due to the lack of sufficient shipping space available, it was necessary to divide the squadron into a forward and a rear echelon. The forward echelon consisted of ten (10) officers, forty-eight (48) enlisted men, four (4) HO3S-1's and six (6) OY aircraft embarked aboard LST Q079, USS SICILY, and USS BADOENG STRAIT. The rear echelon consisted of four (4) officers and forty-three (43) enlisted men, four (4) HO3S-1's, two (2) OY's and a large portion of the squadron property.
4. Due to the lack of time no training was performed nor were any rehearsals held.
5. The main body of the forward echelon loaded aboard LST Q079 at Chinhae, Korea on 9 September 1950 and got underway for, and arrived at Pusan Harbor on 10 September 1950. At Pusan two (2) OY's were loaded aboard, bringing the total of OY's aboard to six (6). LST Q079 got underway for Inchon, Korea on the night of 10 September 1950.

The two (2) OY's embarked aboard the USS SICILY and USS BADOENG STRAIT and were loaded on 11 September 1950 and sailed from Sasebo, Japan on 12 September 1950 for Inchon, Korea.

The rear echelon loaded aboard LST 0002 at Chinhae, Korea on 20-21 September 1950 and sailed for Pusan Harbor on 22 September 1950, arriving there at 2000 the same date. LST 0002 sailed from Pusan for Inchon, Korea at 0130, 23 September 1950.

6. LST 0079 sailed from Pusan Harbor on the night of 10 September 1950 and arrived at Inchon Harbor, Korea at 1436, 15 September 1950. All personnel aboard were briefed for the landing on 13 September 1950.

The rear echelon sailed from Pusan Harbor on 23 September 1950 and arrived at Inchon Harbor at 0700, 25 September 1950.

7. 15 September 1950

With the late H-hour of 1730 no flights were required of VMO-6.

16 September 1950

At 0640 the first reconnaissance flights were made by helicopter over Wolmi-do Island, Inchon Harbor, and at 1030 an artillery observer aboard a helicopter conducted the first artillery spot mission for the 11th Marines. A successful rescue of a downed Navy corsair pilot was also made in Inchon Harbor by helicopter. All aerial flights this date were made from LST 0079 by squadron helicopters. Flights conducted were 3 reconnaissance, 2 artillery spot, 1 utility, 1 rescue and 3 beach reconnaissance.

18 September 1950

Aerial observation missions commenced on a daily dawn to dusk schedule. Routine observation and artillery spot missions were performed by OY's and evacuation, liaison, and reconnaissance missions being performed by helicopters. The first landing at Kimpo airfield was made by Captain V. H. ARMSTRONG in a VMO-6 helicopter at 1000. Lieutenant General SHEPHERD was a passenger. Flights conducted were 8 reconnaissance, 6 artillery spot, 14 utility and 5 evacuation.

19 September 1950

Routine operations were continued with the following flights conducted: 6 reconnaissance, 4 artillery spot, 11 utility and 7 evacuation.

20 September 1950

The 1st Marine Divisions rapid advance resulted in the seizure of Kimpo airfield. On this day VMO-6 was directed to move to Kimpo airfield and to continue operations from that point. This move was made with no loss to operations. Flights conducted were 9 reconnaissance, 7 artillery spot, 29 utility, and 6 evacuation.

21 Sep 1950

Increasing enemy small arms fire resulted in the abandonment of one OY aircraft when it was hit near the town of Yong Dong Po-re. Both the pilot, 2dLt E. F. GAUBETTE JR., USMC, and observer Capt R. E. MC CLEAN, USMC, parachuted to safety behind friendly lines suffering minor injuries. One HO3S-1 helicopter piloted by 1stLt A. R. BANCROFT, USMC, was destroyed on the ground while attempting a rescue behind enemy lines. Another squadron helicopter piloted by 1stLt R. A. LONGSTAFF, USMC, rescued 1stLt BANCROFT and the downed fighter pilot. Flights conducted were 8 recon, 7 arty spot, 9 utility, 3 rescue and 13 evac.

22 Sep 1950

Because of increasingly heavy AA fire encountered in the Seoul area, arrangements were made with VMF(N) 542 to use high performance F7F type aircraft for missions over that area. Two such flights were made with fair results, however this type of aircraft does not provide the necessary visibility for proper aerial observation. Flights conducted were 3 recon, 9 arty spot, 9 utility, 14 evac and 2 arty spot in F7F type aircraft.

23 Sep 1950

Normal Squadron operations continued, however a noteworthy rescue was made by Capt V. A. ARMSTRONG who flew an HO3S-1 helicopter behind enemy lines and north of the 39th parallel to pick up a downed fighter pilot. Flights conducted were 10 recon, 5 arty spot, 1 utility, 6 evac, and 3 rescue.

24 Sep 1950

One OY aircraft was damaged in landing at Kimpo airfield, which necessitated a wing change. No injury resulted. Flights conducted were 1 recon, 5 arty spot, 7 utility, 19 evac and 1 aerial re-supply.

25 Sep 1950

Although routine missions were continued, a record was believed to have been made when a Marine pilot and aircrew man were rescued by a VM3-6 helicopter in an elapsed time of six minutes from time of notification to rescue. Flights conducted were 8 recon, 2 rescue, 14 evac and 2 utility.

26 Sep 1950

The rear echelon arrived at Kimpo airfield from Inchon Harbor uniting the squadron once again. Flights conducted were 6 recon, 4 arty spot, 26 utility and 9 evac.

27 Sep 1950

Normal operations continued. Flights conducted were 9 recon, 6 arty spot, 6 utility, 9 evac and 1 rescue.

28 Sep 1950

Normal operations continued. Flights conducted were 7 recon, 7 arty spot, 21 utility, 11 evac and 1 rescue.

29 Sep 1950

Normal flights were continued, however the hard pressed enemy stiffened his air defense with the use of heavier AA which resulted in the destruction of one OY and one HO3S-1 aircraft of this squadron. The OY was shot down five miles north of Seoul bringing death to the aerial observer Capt E. E. RIVES, USMS, and the taking as a POW of the pilot 2dLt T. D. ODENBURGH, USMC, who had safely parachuted to earth. A helicopter piloted by 1stLt A. H. BANCROFT, USMC, was dispatched as the rescue plane but was destroyed in the air by AA fire, causing the death of the pilot.

On this tragic day, General McARTHUR had entered the city of Seoul by motorized convoy led by a VMO-6 OY which acted as an air point to observe for any possible enemy snipers or road blocks. Flights conducted were 6 recon, 2 arty spot, 17 utility, 5 evacuation and 2 rescue.

30 Sep 1950

One OY aircraft was forced to land behind friendly lines due to engine failure. No injuries were suffered by the pilot, Major V. J. GOITSCHALK, or observer, Capt H. F. DYER, and no damage was sustained by the aircraft. Other operations were normal. Flights conducted were 2 recon, 6 arty spot, 25 utility, 1 evac and 1 rescue.

1 Oct 1950

Due to the lessening need for observers on station, aerial observation operations shifted from the dawn to dusk flight schedule to an on-call stand-by status at Kimpo airfield. Flights conducted were 2 recon, 2 arty spot, 19 utility and 2 resupply.

2 Oct 1950

Operations were becoming increasingly light for the OY aircraft, however the helicopters continued to be used quite extensively. Flights conducted were 2 recon, 1 arty spot, 14 utility and 4 evac.

3 Oct 1950

In addition to continued support of the division, one rescue of a downed pilot was made in the vicinity of Chunchon by 1stLt L. J. ENGELHARDT. General C. B. CATES, CMC, was flown on an inspection tour of the area by Capt V. A. ARMSTRONG in an HO3S-1. Flights conducted were 1 recon, 1 arty spot, 29 utility, 1 evac and 1 rescue.

4 Oct 1950

General C. B. CATES, CMC, was again flown on a tour of the area in an HO3S-1, piloted by 1stLt L. J. ENGELHEDT. Flights conducted were 3 recon, 30 utility, 1 evac and 1 resupply.

5 Oct 1950

1stLt L. J. ENGELHEDT made a successful rescue of a downed pilot near Sibyon-ni. Other flight operations continued to be light. Flights conducted were 1 recon, 25 utility, 1 arty spot, and 1 rescue.

6 Oct 1950

The squadron began to assist elements of the Division in their move back to Inchon. Plans and preparation were also started for embarkation of a surface echelon of VMO-6 to accompany the Division on its next operation. Flights conducted were 2 recon and 28 utility.

7 Oct 1950

Assistance rendered to the Division in its move back to Inchon continued. Flights conducted were 1 rescue, 2 recon and 24 utility.

8. Enemy not applicable.

9. Estimated results of operations.

Total flights flown by VMO-6 from 16 Sept to 7 Oct 1950.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>FLIGHTS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
Reconnaissance	98	129.1
Arty Spot	85	158.5
Utility	319	132.2
Evac	127	72.0
Rescue	16	14.9
Resupply	4	2.0
Beach recon	3	1.2

Results of operations for this period

Registrations	69
Fire Missions	27
Pilots rescued	12
Casualties evac	139
Directed air strikes	28
Message drops	4

led in ground

By conducting the above 27 fire missions and 28 directed air strikes the following damage was inflicted:

Enemy troops killed	1665
Machine guns destroyed	5
40 MM AA gun destroyed	1
76 MM field arty pieces destroyed	20
Mortars destroyed	3
anti-tank guns destroyed	1
Tanks (T-34) destroyed	2
Trucks destroyed	42
Buses destroyed	2
Jeeps destroyed	7
Fuel dumps destroyed	2
Staff cars destroyed	2
ammunition dumps destroyed	2
Road block destroyed	1
Barracks damaged	6
76 MM field arty piece damaged	1
Tanks (T-34) damaged	1
Trucks damaged	4
Jeeps damaged	1
Factories damaged	1

10. Comments and Recommendations

a. Comments

1. The composite VMO squadron has during this period proved its worth over and over. Such factors as the improved morale of front line troops, who know that routes of supply and evacuation are assured with VMO helicopters available cannot be overlooked. Close air support pilots are aware that chances of rescue are increased in the event of an emergency behind enemy lines. Commanders have found that a personal survey of an existing situation is now rapidly possible by using a helicopter as the means of transportation and aerial observation.

It is necessary to point out, however, that although mention is made of the helicopter and its uses, it cannot replace OY type aircraft in a VMO squadron.

b. Recommendations

1. VMO composite squadrons should include 8 liaison helicopter, 10 OY type aircraft, 100 men, and 25 officers, 3 of which should be ground officers in the specialties of engineering, materiel and intelligence.

2. It is considered desirable to have VHF radio gear installed in OY type aircraft. This would greatly facilitate the direct strikes. Conversely, MF equipment on helicopters would assist in communicating with units so equipped.