

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**SPECIAL ACTION REPORT INCHON-SEOUL
VOL III OF III FIRST MARINE DIVISION,
FMF [NOTE: FOLDER 1 OF 2]**

098-80

[REDACTED]

FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON-SEOUL *Part IA*
15 SEPT 50 - 7 OCT 50

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
FOR THE
INCHON - SEOUL OPERATION
15 SEPTEMBER - 7 OCTOBER 1950
VOLUME THREE

CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE

ANNEXES TO
1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - SEOUL

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| (1) QUEEN QUEEN | 5TH MARINES |
| (2) ROGER ROGER | 7TH MARINES |
| (3) SUGAR SUGAR | 11th Marines (Includes Btry "C",
1st 4.5 RktBn) |
| (4) TARE TARE * | 1ST AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION |
| (5) UNCLE UNCLE | 1ST COMBAT SERVICE GROUP (In-
cludes 1stair Delivery and
1st Fumigation and Bath
Platoons) |
| (6) VICTOR VICTOR * | 7TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION |
| (7) WILLIAM WILLIAM * | MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON 6 |

*Previously submitted to Distribution List by
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division ltr
serial 048-50 of 5 Dec 50.

3/clr
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines,
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force,
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

31 December 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF
Subj: Special Action Report, transmittal of
Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div General Order No 16
Encl: (1) 5th Marines Special Action Report 6 September 1950 to
7 October 1950

1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith as Annex ~~QUEEN QUEEN~~ to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report 6 September 1950 to 7 October 1950.

R. L. Murray
R. L. MURRAY

SPECIAL ACTION
REPORT

5TH MARINES-1ST MARINE DIVISION
PERIOD 6 SEPT - 7 OCT, 1950.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

I BASIC REPORT

a. Paragraph Contents

1. Introduction
2. Task Organization
3. Preliminary Planning
4. Training and Rehearsals
5. Loading and Embarkation
6. Movement to and arrival at Objective Area
7. Operation
 - a. Assault Phase
 - b. Exploitation Phase
8. Enemy
9. Estimated Results of Operations
10. Commanders' Comments and Recommendations

II ANNEXES

a. Staff Section and organic unit reports

1. ABLE - S-1
2. BAKER - S-2
3. CHARLIE - S-3
4. DOG - S-4
5. EASY - Supply
6. FOX - Motor Transport
7. GEORGE - Medical
8. HOW - Chaplain
9. ITEM - Ordnance
10. JIG - Communications
11. KING - Artillery Liaison
12. LOVE - Naval Gunfire
13. MIKE - TACP
14. NAN - 1stBn
15. OBOE - 2ndBn
16. PETER - 3rdBn
17. QUEEN - 4.2 Mortar Co
18. ROGER - AT Co

III STATION LIST

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5th Marines,
1st Marine Division, FMF
KOREA

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION.

a. General. The 5th Marines were relieved on the front lines west of YONGSAW in the NAKTONG bulge area at 2400 on a rain swept night 5 September. The regiment commenced the period of this report with a night foot march eight miles to an entrucking area where it moved by motor in echelon some 50 miles to PUSAN, closing late 6 September to prepare for and complete embarkation by 13 September for the INCHON invasion. Upon arrival in assembly area on the docks at PUSAN the regiment received unit augmentation and reorganized to war strength tables of organization. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, of which the regiment had been the infantry element, was disbanded on 13 September and the 5th Marines reverted to the 1st Marine Division as an organic unit. During the period of this report the regiment reorganized, rehabilitated, equipped, prepared plans for embarkation and an amphibious landing, landed in assault at INCHON and captured that city, advanced rapidly overland to capture KIMPO Airfield, made an assault river crossing, advanced and captured the western half of the Korean government seat of SEOUL and secured the western and northwestern approaches to that city.

b. Purpose. The purpose of this report is to provide an official record of the combat operations of the 5th Marines in KOREA from 6 September 1950 until 7 October 1950.

c. Mission. The mission assigned the 5th Marines was to land and seize the Korean port city of INCHON, prepared for further operations to the east to seize KIMPO airfield and the city of SEOUL.

d. Next Higher Unit.

1st Provisional Marine Brigade	6-13 September 1950
1st Marine Division	13 September-7 October 1950

2. a. TASK ORGANIZATION.

ROCT-5

LtCol MURRAY

H&S Co, 5th Mar
Co. "C", 1st Med Bn
Det ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn
Det Signal Co, 1st Sig Bn
Ln Section, Shore Party Group ABLE, 1st SP Bn
Hq Section, AT Company
4th Co, 1st Bn, ROK National Police (-3 Plat)
Arty Ln Team

a. BLT 1/5.

LtCol NEWTON

1st Bn, 5th Mar
Bn NGF Ln Team
Bn NGF Spot Team
Bn TAGP
FO Team, 4.2" Mort Co
Arty Ln Team
3 Arty FO Teams
3rd Plat, 4th Co, 1st Bn, Korean National Police

b. BLT 2/5

LtCol ROISE

2nd Bn, 5th Mar
Bn NGF Ln Team
Bn NGF Spot Team
Bn TAOP
FO Team 4.2" Mort Co
Arty Ln Team
3 Arty FO Teams
75mm Reco Gun Plat, AT Co
2nd Plat, Wharang Co, Korean National Police

c. Shore Party Group ABLE (-1 SP Team)

Major BACHELOR

Co "A", 1st SP Bn (-1 Plat)
Evac Section, 1st SP Bn
Det Ord Sup Plat, 1st CSG
Det Auto Sup Plat, 1st CSG
Det Engr Sup Plat, 1st CSG
Det CS Plat, 1st CSG
Det Sig Sup Plat, 1st CSG
SP Comm Section, 1st Sig Bn
SP Augmentation
Det Beachmaster Unit
1st Traffic Plat MP Co, 1st Mar Div

d. 4.2" Mort Co (-2 FO Teams)

1stLt LUCY

e. Co "A", 1st Tank Bn (- Dets)

Capt ENGLISH

f. Co "A", 1st Engr Bn (less Dets)

Capt KING

g. 3rd Bn, ROK Marines

LtCondr KIM

The following additional units were attached to the 5th Marines at various times throughout the period after the initial landing at INCHON:

1st Bn, 11th Marines
Co "A", 56th Amphib Trac Co USA
1st Bn, ROK Marines
2nd Bn, ROK Marines
Rcn Co, 1st Mar Div (Reinf)
Co B, 1st Tank Bn
Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Btry, 50th AAA Bn USA

LtCol WOOD
Capt O'DONNELL
LtCondr COE
LtCondr KIM
Capt HOUGHTON
Capt WILLIAMS
Capt BIBB

NOTE:

The 3rd Bn, 5th Marines (Reinf) under 1st Marine Division control for the landing and seizure of WOLMI-DO reverted to Regimental control upon the landing of the remainder of the Regiment at INCHON.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

a. Chronology.

30 August - 1300. 5th Marines received an initial warning order for the INCHON Landing including a tentative draft of the 1st Marine Division Operation Order, portions of several intelligence studies, and a verbal assignment to shipping. The Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade delivered these documents when his Chief of Staff, G-1 and G-4 returned from a staff visit to Commanding General, 1st Marine Division in TOKYO.

30 August - 2100. Data on embarkation group and shipping assignments were received from Commanding General 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

31 August - 1030. A conference was conducted to discuss certain features of a scheme of maneuver for the proposed landing.

31 August - 1930. A conference was conducted in which the Commanding Officers of 1st and 2nd Battalions were informed of the proposed amphibious operation. The Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 5th Marines had been designated as a direct subordinate of 1st Marine Division for the preliminary landing on WOLMI-DO.

1 September - 0905. A warning order was received by telephone from the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to be prepared for employment in an attack in the YONGSAN area of south KOREA. The planning for the INCHON landing was to be temporarily suspended.

1 September - 1115. Warning order received from Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to be prepared to move at 1200 to MIRYANG prepared for further operations.

1 September - 1310. Orders were received to move one battalion by motor and the remainder of the regiment less motor elements by train to MIRYANG.

1 September - 1420. Movement to MIRYANG commenced.

2 September. 5th Marines were in an assembly area in the vicinity of MIRYANG.

3 September. The regiment moved to a forward assembly area in the vicinity of YONGSAN.

4 September. 5th Marines relieved elements of the 9th Infantry and attacked to the west in the ILKOTONG bridge-head.

5 September. 5th Marines continued the attack during the day and were relieved on position at 2400 by elements of the 23rd Infantry. The regiment moved to the rear by foot about 8 miles and entrucked to commence movement by truck to PUSAN.

6 September. On this date the movement to PUSAN was completed. Troops were billeted in warehouses on the docks. The Regimental CP was established with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Command Post at PUSAN UNIVERSITY.

7 September. Unit augmentation was received and the regiment commenced reorganization to war strength. Concurrent planning for the INCHON landing recommended on Regimental and Battalion levels. A recommended landing diagram was completed and submitted to Brigade for transmittal to Division.

8 September. Concurrent planning continued. A conference of Battalion Commanders, Attached Unit Commanders, and Regimental Executive and Special Staff Officers was held concerning embarkation and planning for the INCHON landing.

9 September. A conference at the Brigade CP was held with a staff officer from the G-3 section, 1st Marine Division at which time the division landing plan was received. Regimental Operation Order Number 15-50 was published at 1930.

10 September. Regimental Administrative Order 3-50 was published at 1830. Embarkation commenced.

b. Planning.

Seven days were available to the 5th Marines to plan and embark for the major amphibious operation involving the seizure of the Korean port of INCHON. The first tentative instructions for the landing were received on 30 August but little was accomplished prior to 1 September, at which time the regiment was recommitted to action in South KOREA. Planning actually attained its first semblance of firmness on 7 September. By that time additional tentative data had been received from Division headquarters, which served as the basis for planning for the operation. On 9 September a copy of the division landing plan was received and on 10 September the regimental operation and administrative plans were completed, which meant that regimental plans were completed in three days.

Urgency was the keynote of planning. Estimates of the situation were hasty and mental. Great reliance had to be placed on past experience and training to piece together plans for such a complex amphibious landing as INCHON. There was no time to make detailed recommendations with regard to naval gunfire and air support for the destruction of precise targets in the regimental zone, and almost complete reliance had to be placed on plans prepared by higher authority. Concurrent planning was made difficult in this urgent situation because of Division headquarters being located in JAPAN and no aircraft available for constant liaison. Parallel planning was practically non-existent because all naval commanders concerned were either not available, or not available in time to plan for embarkation as well as the landing. Consequently, emphasis was initially placed on planning for embarkation, and later, on the landing plans. Emergency replacement plans, alternate landing plans and supporting fire plans received practically none of the detailed thought that should be given to such plans. In general summary, if there had not been a great store of experience amongst the officers conducting the planning on all echelons, and if the enemy had decisively defended, the lack of planning time might have proved costly.

The character of the landing beach assigned the regiment and the 31 foot tidal range, along with extensive mud flats, posed special planning problems. The beach was fronted by a sea wall. At the time the first waves were scheduled to hit the beach, it was estimated that this wall would be four feet above the tops of the ramps of the boats. The division headquarters had attempted to secure light aluminum scaling ladders with which to climb from the boat onto the sea wall, but had been unable to procure more than a small fraction of the ladders required. Additional wooden ladders were hastily fabricated by Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion and were allotted to the 1st and 2nd Battalions equally. It was realized enroute that the grasping hooks at the tops of the ladders were made too narrow to reach over the width of the top of the seawall but there was no material for their modification. While this defect was not serious, the ladders would have been more effective had the hooks at the top of the ladders been made to fit the seawall. Plans were also made and orders issued for boats of the 4th wave to carry cargo nets. These nets were to be staked to the top of the seawall to be used for the debarkation of the 4th wave, and to be left hanging in place for use by succeeding waves. In addition, each boat in the assault waves had four (4) pieces of pierced planking preloaded to be used to facilitate the debarkation of personnel and equipment across the prevailing mud flats in the event the boats grounded off shore.

The nature of the terrain inland from the beach plus the narrowness of the beach dictated the landing formation and initial scheme of maneuver. The beach was considered wide enough (650') to land the assault elements of only two (2) companies. On the

left of the beach and commanding it was Cemetery Hill, about 130 feet high, on which there was reported to be three dual purpose guns. To the right of the beach were a group of buildings which commanded the entire beach from that flank. Inland about 1000 yards and in the left of the Regimental zone was Observatory Hill, about 220 feet high and the key terrain feature in the city. This hill was relatively bare considering the density of buildings elsewhere in the city. Two other pieces of high ground in the city about 1200 yards from the beach commanded the division initial objective, the O-a line. This high ground lay in the right half of the Regimental zone of action.

After a consideration of the width of the beach and the initial terrain objectives inland, it was decided to land two battalions abreast in column of companies with the 1st Battalion on the left, the 2nd Battalion on the right. The 1st Battalion was assigned Cemetery Hill and Observatory Hill as objectives. The 2nd Battalion was assigned the buildings on the right of the beach and the two pieces of high ground in the right half of the Regimental zone of action overlooking the O-a line. A tentative H0W Hour of 1730 would allow only two hours of daylight to seize these objectives. It later proved necessary to secure these objectives after dark.

The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned a separate mission under 1st Marine Division control. The battalion was embarked in APD's and an LSD to land on WOLMI-DO Island at LOVE-Hour and seize that island, thereafter to revert to Regimental control at H0W-Hour, prepared to cross the causeway and rejoin the regiment on the mainland.

c. Enemy Situation: The enemy situation as determined from a study of aerial mosaics and the available Intelligence bulletins, summaries, reports and studies indicated only minor defensive positions in and around the city of INCHON. Estimates of strength in the area could not be considered as conclusive in the absence of confirmed reports from 'on the ground' sources. However, it was believed that the enemy had no more than 8,500 troops available in the INCHON-SEOUL area with only about one fourth this number in the landing area at INCHON.

Aerial photographic interpretation disclosed a continuing effort on the part of the enemy to strengthen the city's defenses as well as those on WOLMI-DO. Further, it showed that work was progressing on revetments and installations at KIMPO Airfield. The threat of enemy air action was also evident in the identification of several new aircraft at KIMPO.

Based primarily upon the available information obtained from higher echelons, an intelligence plan was prepared and issued to subordinate units. Maps and terrain studies were issued to organic and attached units in sufficient quantity to enable companies to brief all troops enroute to the objective area. The following publications were found to be the most valuable:

- (1) FIC GHQ Terrain Study #13.
- (2) GEC GHQ Terrain Handbook #65.
- (3) GEC GHQ Order of Battle Handbook on the North Korean Peoples Army.
- (4) 1st Marine Division Aerial Photographs, Enemy Situation Overlays, and Intelligence Bulletins.

c. A short briefing was given to troops in connection with the [redacted] plan for the landing at HUNSAN. It is believed this briefing would have been of more value had more time and information been available to prepare for it.

d. Logistical planning was considerably handicapped. Upon receipt of the warning order on 30 August for the INCHON landing, all equipment and material essential for combat were on hand, due to the fact the regiment had been in reserve for about a week and had had time to ready for further operations. Preparation for the operation was interrupted by three (3) days of combat in the NAKTONG area. Considerable individual and organizational equipment was damaged or lost and taxed resupply and rehabilitation efforts to again prepare for the INCHON landing. Basic logistical planning was performed on a higher level. The principal logistical planning performed on the regimental level was related to embarkation.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS.

Training was greatly restricted by the lack of time and facilities available between the final combat action under Brigade control and the mounting out for the INCHON landing. Lectures and blackboard illustrations on "Combat in Built-up Areas" were accomplished while in bivouac at PUSAN. Test firing of new and/or reconditioned weapons was accomplished by all units. Augmentation units recently joined were transported to Korean Military Advisor Group firing ranges for small unit tactics on Korean terrain. New elements were familiarized with the nature of Korean towns during trips to the ranges. Enroute, assault units practiced climbing out of boats by use of the scaling ladders. There was no opportunity to practice with these ladders against a wall similar to the one to be encountered at INCHON.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

a. Loading.

While assigned shipping was still arriving, temporary plans were drawn up for the organization for embarkation, the assignment of vehicles and supplies to the various ships, and the allocation of resupply to best conform with the tactical plan. It was soon found that a minimum amount of shipping space would be required for Class III equipment and that the majority of space could be set aside for vehicles preloaded to capacity. Loading plans could not be firmed up until the location of preloaded Class 6 and Class 7 (four units of fire) supplies were known. The latter was supposedly combat loaded on two ships although there was no information as to which ships; thus, loading plans were delayed.

After the arrival of shipping it was learned that the four units of fire were on the two ships previously assigned, but were not combat loaded. All small arms, 60mm and 81mm mortar ammunition were loaded on one ship while the other was loaded with only 105mm, 90mm and 3.5 rocket ammunition. Due to the time involved in the unloading, sorting, and reloading of 650 tons of ammunition it was decided that a compromise on combat loading would have to be made. The plans were therefore completed in modified combat loads and the loading of Class III supplies was started with three ships receiving the bulk of the gasoline. Vehicles and cargo were staged, marked, and loaded according to the combat priority established by units as adjusted by regiment.

b. Embarkation.

Upon completion of vehicle loading, the troops were ordered aboard the ships. This movement was orderly and conformed to the embarkation plan previously published. Both loading and embarkation of personnel were completed in 14 hours after these plans were finished. No unusual difficulties were encountered.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

At about 1300 on 12 September, 1950, the Regiment sailed from PUSAN in assigned shipping and arrived at INCHON, KOREA, at about 1300, on 15 September, 1950. During the period afloat debarkation drills were conducted. Briefings on the landing were held from the fire team to company level to include all individuals. Aerial photographs, mosaics, and maps were available and used extensively. Test firing of weapons was accomplished where necessary.

7. OPERATIONS.

a. Assault Phase.

15 September 1950

RCT-5 landed in assault at INCHON on Beach RED at 1732, 15 September with two (2) battalions abreast, battalions landing in a column of companies. The landing was made against moderate opposition and casualties were light. Seizure of the high ground immediately in rear of the beach was completed under the cover of darkness on a rainswept night by 2000. The assault units stopped for the night on this high ground. When reorganization was completed at about 2230 patrols were dispatched to the Division initial objective for the night, the OA line, which they reached without opposition. The OA line was outposted for the night. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines reverted to regimental control at H-Hour. The Regimental CP was established ashore at about 1830, and shortly thereafter the 3d Battalion was ordered into an assembly area in the vicinity thereof.

16 September 1950

At 0630, an attack was launched to capture the remainder of the city and other Division objectives. Formation was a column of battalions with the 2nd Battalion in the lead attacking east along the main east west roads through the city. The 1st Battalion followed the 2nd Battalion at 1000 yards, and the 3d Battalion moved forward by bounds. The Division O3 line was secured against light opposition at 1100. Contact was made with the 1st Marines on the right at 1005. The 3rd Battalion, ROK Marines under operational control of the 5th Marines, was directed to clear the city of enemy. This Battalion made a thorough sweep of the city capturing a large number of enemy soldiers and communist sympathizers who had been bypassed by the assault forces. At 1335 a coordinated attack was launched to seize the Division Beachhead Line. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were employed in the assault and moved out rapidly. The beachhead line was secured against scattered resistance just prior to darkness.

The operations in the assault landing phase resulted in the seizure of INCHON, and in conjunction with the 1st Marines, the beachhead line, thus securing INCHON Harbor as a base through which the 7th Infantry Division and remaining Corps elements and supplies could be landed. The landing had been accomplished in spite of the terrific natural and man made obstacles. The opposition, however, had not been strong and the casualties were relatively light.

b. Exploitation Phase.

17 September 1950

The night of 16-17 September was quiet. At 170600 six (6) enemy T-34 tanks accompanied by approximately 200 enemy infantry attacked the position of 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. The 1st Platoon "A" Company, 1st Tank Battalion assisted by 75mm Recoilless and 3.5 rocket launcher teams destroyed 5 enemy tanks and a 2.36 rocket launcher accounted for the 6th tank. All the enemy infantry were killed or wounded. This was a near perfect execution of the principles of establishment of a temporary defensive position in depth for

the night, and the execution of the defensive action against the enemy. Fire was held until the enemy tanks had bypassed front line elements and came into view of the preset tank and anti-tank positions. When friendly tanks opened fire, infantry elements closed the trap from 3 sides on the enemy infantry accompanying the tanks to complete the destruction. Only one minor casualty was reported by the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion, KMC, scheduled to attack at 0600, was delayed until 0700 at which time they passed through 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and attacked through the village at TA 9750-A-B-G-H continuing their attack to regimental objectives 1 (TA 9755-M-9756-N-9856-P-9855-A), 2 (TA 9857-T-9957-D-O-B), and 3 (TA 9958-M-9959-V-S-T). The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines scheduled to attack at 0700 was delayed one hour by the enemy counterattack mentioned above, and jumped off at 0800. Their direction of attack was northeast along the MSR to seize regimental objectives ABLE (TA 0452-D-M - 0453-X - 0553-B - 0554-P - 0454-X - 0453-V) and BAKER (TA 0653-Q-1 - 0654-B - 0554-D-Y - 0553-P) which were on the approaches to KIMPO Airfield. Initially, the battalion met moderate resistance in the built up areas in TA 9750 E-T, but once the village had been passed the 2nd Battalion advanced against little opposition seizing objective BAKER (TA 0653-Q-1 - 0654-B - 0554-D-Y - 0553-P) at 1650. The 3rd KMC Battalion continued to mop up scattered resistance in the village.

The 1st Battalion following in trace of the 2nd Battalion seized objective EASY (TA 0753-E to 0853-F to 0854-B to 0855-M-0755-Q-X) and attacked toward objective FOX (TA 0856-N to 0956-G to 0957-K to 0857-D-K).

At 1630 the Regimental CP displaced to TA 9951-O-3.

As soon as the 1st Battalion had passed objective BAKER the 2nd Battalion attacked to the north with two platoons of tanks attached, toward objective CHARLIE, KIMPO Airfield. Resistance was moderate and KIMPO Airfield was secured under the cover of darkness at 2020. The 2nd Battalion held positions around the airfield for the night. 1st Battalion's attack toward Objective FOX was halted along the line 0854-M-Y to 0755-G for the night and the 3rd Battalion moved into a reserve assembly area at TA 0354.

18 September 1950

At 0200, the 2nd Battalion, received a light probing counter-attack by a group of about 50 enemy. This counterattack was followed by a series of apparently uncoordinated counterattacks until 0500 when the enemy attacked with vigor with about 200 men. This attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy from well selected defensive positions and a well executed defense in depth. Small enemy pockets of isolated troops were found at dawn and were destroyed. KIMPO Airfield was cleared of all resistance by 0800.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines continued its attack at daylight and occupied objective FOX by 0930. Their positions overlooked the city of YONGDONG-PO. The 2nd Battalion seized objective DOG (TA 0561-P to 0560-O to 0660-M-B to 0661-V) at 1140, which positions overlooked the BAN River. The regimental CP displaced to KIMPO Airfield at TA 0558-H at 1245. At 1450, the 2nd Battalion occupied the following positions; one company on objective DOG, one company in the village at TA 0460 and one company in the village immediately north of KIMPO Airfield. The 1st Battalion occupied objectives EASY and FOX. The 3rd Battalion occupied an assembly area in TA 0557 - 0657 with detached outposts in TA 0659-T to 0754-P-O and 0858-G-M-S.

19 September 1950

At 0755, a platoon from the 3rd Battalion secured Hill 79 (TA 0960). At 0804, the 2nd Battalion extended its left flank and seized the high ground in TA 0563 overlooking the HAN River. The 1st Battalion attacked from objective FOX to seize Hills 80 and 85 in their zone of action to complete the capture of dominant terrain overlooking the HAN River in the 5th Marines zone of action. At 1230, one platoon of tanks was attached to the 1st Battalion to assist in the capture of its objectives. The 1st Battalion advanced against moderate resistance and captured its objectives by mid-afternoon. At 1554, the 3rd Battalion, ROK Marines reverted to Division control and the 2nd Battalion, ROK Marines was attached to the 5th Marines. Hurried preparations commenced for the crossing of the HAN river. The crossing was to be accomplished by the 5th Marines. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was to make the assault crossing. A preliminary reconnaissance by elements of the Division Reconnaissance Company was planned. Considerable difficulty was met in planning due to the large number of visitors who passed through the command post at KIMPO Airfield in a steady stream all day who desired briefings.

At 1700, all subordinate, attached and supporting units were briefed on the Regimental Commander's plan for the crossing of the HAN River. Execution of the plans was scheduled to commence with the crossing of the river by swimmers at 192000, followed by the remainder of the division reconnaissance company, for the purpose of determining enemy strength and locations on the far side of the river.

At 1900, a reconnaissance patrol made up of the Division Reconnaissance Company; departed the regimental CP and arrived at an assembly area on the near bank of the Han river at 1950. The swimming party, composed of two officers, ten enlisted men, one PIO USN, and one interpreter departed for the far side of the river at 2000 arriving on the opposite river bank at 2040. This patrol reconnoitered the village and the high ground to its right (objective ALE TA 0862) with no contact. If there was no enemy opposition it had been planned that the remainder of the reconnaissance company would cross in LVT's and continue the reconnaissance farther inland and occupy ground to cover the 3rd Battalion landing. Therefore, when no contact developed, the patrol returned to the river bank, and at 2110 gave the signal for the remainder of the Reconnaissance Company, assembled on the near bank, to cross the HAN River. The Reconnaissance Company embarked in 9 Amphibious tractors and departed for the north side of the river. About midway in crossing the enemy which had been hidden or asleep on the high ground suddenly opened fire with machine guns and mortars. The fire became so intense that the Reconnaissance Company in LVT's was ordered to return to the South bank of the HAN. While returning, 4 Amphibious tractors drifted about 1/2 mile downstream and got stuck in the mud. The swimmers were being fired upon and were directed to return to the near bank.

At 2140, six men of the Reconnaissance Company patrol reached the near bank by swimming. At 2200, the remainder of the patrol commenced returning. The swimmers became separated. The Company Commander suffered concussion from a near miss by a mortar shell and drifted downstream. The patrol returned to the Regimental CP by 0445 with a total of 3 casualties. The Reconnaissance patrol determined that an estimated enemy battalion was in position to oppose the river crossing and that the majority of their defenses were located on the high ground of Objective ALE. The beach condition on the far bank at the old ferry site was determined suitable for the landing of LVT's. Planning immediately turned to preparation for an assault landing, rather than a crossing under cover of the Reconnaissance Company prior to daylight as originally planned.

20 September 1950

In accordance with the revised Regimental Operation Plan, the 3rd Battalion, at 0645, following an artillery preparation, commenced the assault crossing of the HAN River. The 1st wave landed at 0650 and by 0850 the high ground on the right of the landing area was taken. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was received but there were few casualties during the crossing. The remainder of the 3rd Battalion was embarked in amphibious tractors, crossed the river successfully, and sent one company remaining in LVT's straight on inland about 1500 yards to the high ground covering the SEOUL-KAISONG road, ignoring the fact that high ground at the beach had not yet been taken. Enemy opposition estimated at 300 men defended the high ground at the beach. Objective BAKER (TA 0864-D-S-O to 0865-Y-H-V) was taken with no enemy opposition at 0940. The scheme of maneuver called for a sharp change of direction to the right to fix the direction of attack toward SEOUL with the north (left) flank and rear open. The 2nd Battalion was to pass through the 3rd Battalion and continue to attack toward SEOUL.

At 0900, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, was ordered to cross the HAN River in amphibian tractors and at 1000 the 1st LVT commenced crossing. The 2nd Battalion was to remain in LVT's and pass through the 3rd Battalion and continue the attack. "A" Company, 56th Amphibious Tractor Battalion, US Army, followed the 2nd Battalion and the 2nd Battalion, Korean Marine Corps in LUKWS followed "A" Companies LVT's. The KMC Battalion was to provide security for the rear of the Regiment. By 0940, Objectives AILE, BAKER and CHARLIE, were secured (Objective CHARLIE TA 1064-D-M-W to 1164-P-B to 1165-P to 1065-X). At 1330, the 1st Battalion was ordered to cross the river and move to an assembly area in the vicinity of Hill 95 prepared to continue the attack toward SEOUL. At 1400, the Regimental CP displaced to TA 1054-E. At 1415, the 2nd Battalion reported that they had secured Objective DOG (TA 1161-D-X-V-1 to 1261-C to 1262-L to 1162-V) and objective EASY (TA 1262-E-O to 1362-Q-N to 1363-J-C-U). By 1520, the 2nd Battalion, IMC had relieved the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on objectives BAKER and CHARLIE and the 3rd Battalion moved to an assembly area in TA 1064-H to 1065-S. At 1830, the 1st Battalion moved one company to objective AILE for security of the landing area for the night.

21 September 1950

At 0925, the 3rd Battalion launched an attack on Hill 165 (TA 1461) followed in trace by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Hill 165 was seized at 1130 and the attack continued on Hill 125 (TA 0862) at 1215. At 0910 the 1st Battalion, Korean Marine Corps was attached to the 5th Marines for operational control for use in fighting in the built up area of SEOUL.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to attack and seize Hill 96. This mission was accomplished at 1310.

The Regimental CP displaced at 1425 to TA 1361-H.

At 1615, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to seize and hold, for the night, the high ground along the line from TA 1558-G to TA 1558-P-U. The 1st Battalion, KMC was ordered to seize the high ground along Hill 104 (TA 1659) and hold for the night; the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to seize Hill 216 (TA 1761) and hold for the night; the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was to move to a position along the high ground in TA 1461-D to 1460-O, and occupy the hill in TA 1460 to block the road in the vicinity of TA 1560-B and hold these positions for the night.

22 September 1950

The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 5th Marines commenced the attack at 0700. The 1st Battalion, KMC received heavy mortar, artillery, and automatic weapons fire and reported that it could not move for-

forward. The 3rd Battalion reported that it had advanced and had taken Hill 296 (Div Obj 4) at 1012 and was receiving heavy fire from Hill 338 (TA 1960). The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines in its attack on Hill 105 (TA 1757-Q) was slowed down by heavy mortar, artillery, and machine gun fire. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to hold Hill 68 (TA 1558-O) with one company and Hill 105 with the Battalion minus one company. The 1st Battalion, KMC attacked late in the afternoon and reached the line TA 1759-O to TA 1759-V. Although it was planned to hold this line, the Battalion withdrew in the face of intense fire to its original lines on hill 104. The Regimental Headquarters was not notified of this withdrawal until the USMC Liaison Officer was able to report the situation in person just prior to darkness. This withdrawal found the center of the line about one thousand yards in rear of the front line elements of the 1st Battalion and 3rd Battalion on the right and left respectively.

23 September 1950

At 0700, the 1st Battalion, KMC was directed to attack and seize the enemy positions to its front in order to straighten out the lines while the 1st and 3d Battalions held their positions, and assisted the advance by fire. The 1st Battalion, KMC made only slight gains forward of hill 104 and was unable to seize its objectives while receiving heavy casualties from artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons fire from a heavily fortified enemy position located to their front. When the advance of the 1st Battalion, KMC stalled, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to pass through and relieve the 1st Battalion, KMC at 1500 and continue the attack. When passed through, the 1st Battalion, KMC moved to an assembly area at TA 9560-H-O to 1660-L. The 2nd Battalion continued the attack against fierce resistance and at 1800 reported heavy casualties. It was ordered to consolidate its minor gains and hold the line TA 1759-W to 1759-V. In the meantime, the 1st and 3rd Battalions held their positions throughout the day and the entire attack awaited the reduction of the organized position in front of the 2nd Battalion.

The 2nd Battalion, KMC was relieved by elements of the 7th Marines which had crossed the river and assumed responsibility for the security of the rear area. This battalion then moved to an assembly area at TA 1760 to 1860.

24 September 1950

At 0640, the 2nd Battalion resumed the attack against heavy resistance after a 20 minute artillery and air preparation. By 0700, the 1st Battalion commenced moving out slowly toward Regimental Objective 2 (TA 1959-L to 2058-G). At 0810, the 3rd Battalion commenced moving down the east spur of Hill 296 overlooking SEUL to attempt to outflank the heavy resistance in front of the 2nd Battalion to gain better observation to support the 2nd Battalion by fire. At about 0720, the lead tank of the 1st Platoon, A Company, 1st Tank Battalion moving up the road in the 2nd Battalion zone of action was disabled by a mine. A second tank was hit on the motor hatch by a mortar shell damaging it sufficiently to make it inoperative.

The 2nd Battalion advanced toward Hill 105 (TA 1958) against heavy resistance and received heavy casualties. Concentrated, accurate, mortar, artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire was encountered. At 1000, the 1st Battalion was directed to move their reserve company around from the right to the left flank to relieve elements of the 3rd Battalion on Hill 216 (TA 1761) and hold that Division Objective in order that the 3rd Battalion could continue its attack in support of the 2nd Battalion. By 1430, the 2nd Battalion had seized its objective (Hill 105), suffering its

heaviest casualties of the Korean War, but capturing the vital positions leading to SEOUL. The 2nd Battalion, KMC was moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of TA 1760-1860 to protect a corridor into the regimental left (north) flank. By 1300, the 3rd Battalion front line positions were located along line TA 1959-L-3 to 1859-M. By nightfall the lines of the 2nd Battalion extended from TA 1758 W-M-J to 1759-M and at 1845 the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had made contact and tied in for the night. During the night, limited counterattacks were received by the 1st Battalion on the right which were supported by artillery fire believed to be coming from the left flank on Hill 338. The 3rd Battalion also received heavy artillery and mortar fire from the left (north) flank.

25 September 1950

At 0700, the 3rd and 2nd Battalions jumped off in the attack to seize that portion of SEOUL in the Regimental zone. Resistance was light in front of both battalions. The 3rd Battalion supported by the 2nd Battalion by fire in its advance on Hill 105 (TA 1958-P). At 0840, HOW Company was momentarily held up by fire from enemy located on the east slope of Hill 338 to the left (north) flank of the regiment. By 1145, front lines of the 3rd Battalion were located at TA 1959-G-1 to 1959-H-3 and 1959-F-2 to 1859-T-5. At 1335, the 2nd Battalion seized Hill 72 and continued to attack to seize Hill 105. At 1450, the Division Reconnaissance Company was attached to the 5th Marines and occupied Hill 216 and 296 (TA 1860) relieving elements of the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion moved to an assembly area in the rear of the 3rd Battalion preparatory to the final attack for the capture of SEOUL in the regimental zone. At 1745, the 3rd Battalion received a counterattack by about 200 enemy. The attack was repulsed with considerable casualties to the enemy. The attack the following day was to be a ninety degree change of direction to the left (north) with the 3rd Battalion leading the attack and gaining contact with the 1st Marines on the right. The 1st Battalion was to follow the 3rd Battalion in trace and make another sharp change of direction to the west and capture Hill 338 (TA 1960). The 2nd Battalion was to clean out a final pocket of resistance in the regimental zone in rear of the 3rd Battalion and go into a reserve assembly area.

At 2230, a message was received from the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division that, based on late intelligence, the Corps was to initiate pursuit of the enemy immediately, as he was withdrawing rapidly to the north.

At the time this order was received, the enemy was counter-attacking the 3rd Battalion positions on the slopes of Hill 296, and the initiation of the pursuit was delayed until the counter-attack was beaten off.

26 September 1950

By 0445 the counterattack had been repulsed and a patrol from 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was sent to the east to contact the 1st Marines in order that the pursuit might be coordinated. This patrol was unable to contact the 1st Marines which had not advanced to the prearranged point of contact because of heavy enemy pressure, and because the patrol found the enemy in strength on the high ground around a railroad tunnel in TA 1958-P-Q.

About 0900, the 5th Marines received a message from the 1st Marine Division that the 7th Marines were prepared to attack from southwest to northwest across the present 5th Marines zone of action.

The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, after contacting the 1st Marines launched an attack at 1140 coordinated with elements of that regiment. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was able to advance 500 to 600 yards against light resistance by 1245.

A patrol from DQG Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines reported as having moved into the 5th Marines zone of action from the northwest and was halted and unable to move from a position located at 1960-S.

By 1800, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, had gained positions (TA 1958-D-1 to TA 2058-M-5) after encountering bitter resistance from the enemy dug in on a hill (TA 2058-P-3) on the right of the battalion zone of action. The first company of the 1st Battalion, KIC was moved into position (TA 1958-D-1 - TA 1959-A-5) on the left flank of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines filling the gap between the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines' left flank to the position of the Reconnaissance Company on Hill 296.

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines nopped-up in its zone and the 1st Battalion, KIC, nopped-up in areas behind Regimental front lines in the city of SEOUL capturing 42 POW's and eliminating most of the bypassed pockets of resistance.

A warning order was received about 1205 from 1st Marine Division that elements of the 8th Army may appear at any time in the Corps Area from the south to create a junction of the two forces.

The 5th Marines zone of action was generally quiet throughout the night except for occasional enemy mortar fire.

27 September 1950

The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines continued the attack at 0630. No resistance was reported by 0950 and the 3rd Battalion, front lines were approximately 200 yards ahead of phase line 3 (PYONGYANG-SEOUL HIGHWAY) (TA 2959-K-4 to 2058-O-1). Subsequently, the Battalion encountered light resistance to their advance from sand bag emplacements which blocked the main streets. The advance was hampered somewhat by the necessity for clearing many AT mines from the streets to make way for the tanks. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines following in the trace of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, at 1030 passed to the left rear of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and attacked to seize hill 338 (TA 1960). While the 3rd Battalion continued its advance against light resistance, the 1st Battalion, KIC, moved two companies through the city in rear of the assault elements of the Regiment nopping-up isolated pockets of resistance; one company remained in position along ridge (TA 1959 L-R-X).

EASY Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines reinforced with a section of tanks patrolled northwest along the PYONGYANG-SEOUL Road (Phase Line 3) to gain contact with and assist the company of the 7th Marines under attack along that road. The enemy had withdrawn and the company was relieved with no resistance encountered enroute, and upon search of the prison at TA 1959-D the patrol was informed by a civilian on the premises that approximately 400 American prisoners were removed to the north about five days previously. EASY Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, made contact with EASY Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines at 1500 at TA 1960-R-5 and was ordered to return to its previous area.

At 1500, George Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines had captured the capitol building and struck the Red Flag flying in the Government Grounds and raised the United States Flag.

By 1840, the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines were established along a line TA 2060-K-1 to TA 2161 and by 1900 Hill 338 (TA 1960) was secured. At 1900, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines' front lines extended along a line TA 2160-G-3-E-5-T-5 to 2159-E-2. All regimental objectives had been secured. The 3rd Battalion sent a patrol which proceeded 700 yards SSE from RJ TA 2295-A-1 but was unable to contact the 1st Marines advancing on the right and re

28 September 1950

The 5th Marines having captured its assigned objectives and was pinched out by the 1st Marines on right and 7th Marines on left as planned. At 0630, the regiment commenced patrols throughout the Regimental area. No enemy resistance was encountered by any of the patrols and all returned by 1630.

The 3rd Battalion, commencing at first light, provided security in the vicinity of the Government Building, SEOUL, for a ceremony wherein the Government of South Korea was returned to the President and Government officials of South Korea. About 1435 the 3rd Battalion was relieved of this duty and proceeded to the Regimental assembly area established at EWHI Women's University TA 1358-0.

Mopping-up was continued throughout the day with no enemy resistance encountered. A patrol from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines returned with 45 POW's. Division was informed at 2050 that mopping up operations in 5th Marines zone of action were completed.

29 September 1950

The 2nd Battalion commencing at 1300 proceeded to the west and relieved elements of the 7th Marines by 1730 at positions in vicinity of the original river crossing around the towns SAM-SABUDONG (TA 0665) and RYOKOKU (TA 0765) and on ridges astride highway from TA 1566-D to TA 1767-Q and TA 1867-U. The Battalion was directed to provide outposts and security to protect the Division left flank.

About 1815, a patrol of the KMC engaged a detachment of enemy in a fire fight to the west of the 2nd Battalion on high ground from 1867-I to 1868-R. By darkness the patrol withdrew through the outposts established in area by 2nd Battalion. No further enemy encountered throughout the night.

30 September 1950

One Company of the 1st Battalion and a platoon of the 4.2 Mortar Company were attached to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines for operational control to provide a reserve for the battalion in its extensive area on the west flank. Vigorous patrolling was conducted by all companies of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines remained in bivouac in the Middle School area (TA 2059) to provide security in the city of SEOUL and to reorganize. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to move to the Regimental assembly area at TA 1664-I to 1765-Q. The 2nd Battalion patrols reported no contact with enemy.

1 October 1950

At 0600, the 3rd Battalion reinforced with a battery of artillery, platoon of tanks and engineers, operating as a reconnaissance patrol in force, crossed the IP located at TA 1666-H enroute by motor to the town of SUYUHYON TA 0481. CHARLIE Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, then attached to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, followed in trace to protect the battalion rear as if moved forward and to provide security for returning motor transport. By 0925, the advance elements of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines had advanced to a position located $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the IP northwest along the SEOUL-SUYUHAN HIGHWAY. No contact with the enemy had been made.

About 1030 a patrol of 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines patrolling in its assigned area made contact with an enemy force of between 150 and 200. Air and Mortar fire drove the enemy from the

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position leaving thirty dead and considerable arms and ammunition. By 1130, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, struck a road block of AT and AP mines located at 1076-X-4. This road block was not covered by fire and immediately cleared by attached engineer units. Later, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, overcame a road block of an estimated three machine guns and reached a position suitable for defense that night just short of its final objective on high ground near RJ at TA 0778-A. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines reported that many weapons still in cosmoline were captured aboard three excarts being delivered to enemy troops.

CHARLIE Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reverted to 1st Battalion control after it had completed its mission of providing security to the rear of the 3rd Battalion and returned to 1st Battalion assembly area. 1st Battalion, in the meantime, had been moved to a new assembly area in TA 1764 by 1905.

2 October 1950

A vigorous patrol plan was initiated along the Regimental front. A series of daylight patrols were planned to penetrate 4000 to 8000 yards in front of the battalion position with particular attention to valleys or other routes of enemy withdrawal to the north. These patrols were supplemented by day and night local patrols. Throughout the day, though numerous small groups of enemy were sighted, little or no resistance was encountered by patrols of the 1st or 2nd Battalion. About 0200 the 3rd Battalion CP received a counterattack by an estimated 100 enemy. By 0430, this force had been driven off leaving 67 enemy dead. At 0700, the 3rd Battalion continued its mission and by 1100 had reached its objective and set up positions to block the road to the southwest of SUYUOHN.

3 October 1950

All Battalions of Regiment conducted patrolling action in assigned areas. Patrols of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reported sighting many small groups which were driven off without resistance. A total of 4 enemy were killed and 6 captured by the 1st Battalion. Patrols from 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, made no enemy contact, though one patrol returned with 6 civilians reported to be Communist sympathizers. No enemy contact was made by patrols of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines; however, quantities of enemy small arms and ammunition were discovered and destroyed. No enemy activity was noted throughout the Regimental zone during the night.

4 October 1950

The Battalions of 5th Marines conducted extensive patrolling with no resistance encountered. The small groups of enemy encountered fled upon approach of the patrols, often time leaving small arms and ammunition behind which were destroyed. From 1000 to 1800 elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment passed through the Regimental area moving north of position occupied by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. About 2240, the Regiment received an order from 1st Marine Division to move to a staging area at INCHON prepared for embarkation for further operations.

5 October 1950

Movement to the assigned staging area in INCHON commenced. The first serial cleared 2nd Battalion area at 0925. By 1845 all units of 5th Marines closed in the assembly area.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 October 1950

Units of Regiment conducted reorganization, care and cleaning of weapons, equipment repair, and rehabilitation of personnel. Plans for embarkation commenced.

7 October 1950

Continued planning and rehabilitation of personnel and equipment.

8. a. ENEMY TACTICS.

(1) Infantry:

(a) General: In the past, studies of enemy infantry small unit tactics have indicated that, though Russian trained, a great deal of Imperial Japanese Army influence is apparent in enemy operations. There is doubt, however, that any particular school of military thought is adhered to by the enemy in training or in field operations. During the period of this report, tenacious and well organized forces were generally lacking except on the outskirts of SEGUL, as was the use of massed troops together with coordinated supporting fires in the Russian type counterattack or defense. The lesser details of operational planning such as initial individual supply of weapons, food, and ammunition were meticulously carried out while the broader, more inclusive phases of planning were neglected, resulting in a lack of general coordination. For example, individual troops were well camouflaged with native growths and supplied with an initial unit of fire, but the reserve forces appeared not to have been alerted, no provisions were apparently made for resupply, and machine guns, high velocity weapons, tanks, and artillery acted independently and without coordination except on rare occasions.

(b) Attack: The enemy, though aggressive in the attack, did not coordinate its various attacking elements and thus consistently launched a weak assault which failed to gain the initiative. This lack of coordination and depth usually resulted in a "Banzai" frontal assault of the Japanese type. The enemy assaults took the form of counterattacks on limited objectives and the majority were conducted between the hours of 2300 and 0500. Flares were normally used as signals for the commencement and cessation of the attacks. There was no evidence of long range planning and the attacking troops, once halted, rapidly dispersed and retreated in disorganization.

The enemy did not attempt any enveloping or flanking attacks. All attacks were generally frontal along roads or natural avenues of approach and directed at critical terrain features. It appears that no main or secondary efforts were made but that each attack was independent in itself resulting in a series of scattered infantry movements. These attacks were normally preceded by flares, whistle or bugle signals and in many instances by a combination of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire some five to ten minutes in advance of the attack itself.

(c) Defense: The enemy occupies the high ground in force when establishing his defensive positions leaving small groups of 15 to 20 men armed with automatic weapons and small arms to delay and hold at the critical points along the low ground in front of the main defensive positions. There has been no evidence of defenses in depth, but rather of a series of independent positions. Positions defended have prepared emplacements on the very top of the hills with reverse slope positions behind these. Three types of enemy defenses have been encountered by this regiment during the period, namely: prepared, hasty, and a form of combat outpost defense. It is notable that though each type of defense was organized, the

enemy did not generally hold his positions at all cost, thus nullifying much of the advantage gained by commanding terrain. When the center of the defensive position was breached, its flanks consistently fell back rapidly. At times the enemy was found to organize defensive positions along roads even when there was higher ground adjacent thereto. He has consistently attempted to oppose our strength with his major efforts. The vital defenses on and in front of the ridge line (TA 1858-K-G-B, TA 1859-Y-R-N) straddling the railroad on the last high ground overlooking SEOU from the west were prepared with great care. Weapons were emplaced in mutually supporting positions with both the military and topographical crest heavily defended. The reverse slope was defended to a depth of approximately sixty-five (65) yards with nine (9) 7.62mm Maxim Heavy Machine Guns and approximately twenty-seven (27) 7.62mm DP Light Machine Guns as well as numerous personnel armed with 7.62mm PPSH sub-machine guns and rifles. Five (5) 37mm and three (3) 76mm guns were sighted in on the ridge line and roads passing through the low ground to the rear. Groups of emplacements on the crests and forward slopes of the ridge were formed around the heavy machine guns, each group having one (1) heavy machine gun, two (2) light machine guns, and approximately twelve (12) men armed with sub-machine guns, grenades, and rifles. This ground was defended by elements of the 25th NK Brigade. The Brigade Command Post was located in an enormous tunnel running through the ridge. It is estimated that one (1) Infantry Battalion, two (2) Heavy Weapons Battalions, an Engineer Battalion, and one (1) 76mm Artillery Battalion, totaling some 2,310 men, actually occupied the ground with a 120mm Mortar Battalion and an Artillery Battalion supporting from positions on Hill 105, the next high ground to the east. All of the senior officers and many of the junior and non-commissioned officers of the 25th Brigade, according to captured documents and Prisoner of War interrogation, were veterans of the Chinese Communist Army, which may explain in part why the defending troops remained in position until killed. Two concrete reinforced caves were dug into the flanks of the ridge line and used as storage space for large quantities of ammunition and food. These caves may have provided refuge for additional reinforcements brought in from other sectors until they could be committed to action on the ridge as replacements. Each personnel emplacement was dug by undercutting the ground in order to afford the individual occupant added protection from air and artillery attack. Individual emplacements were prepared very close together, about 2 yards apart, and deep enough to serve as an individual fire trench.

Another type of prepared defense encountered was enemy observation posts. These were prepared and camouflaged by cutting the top off the high ground, preparing a position with logs, then replacing earth and growth resulting in a completely natural camouflaged position. This type of position was normally defended with approximately fifteen (15) men armed with hand grenades, automatic 7.69 sub-machine guns, 7.62 DP light machine guns and rifles.

Hasty Defenses: The only preparations made by the enemy for hasty defense were the construction of individual prone-type fox-holes usually on reverse slopes. These holes are normally so shallow that a man lying face down has his shoulders and approximately one-fourth ($\frac{1}{4}$) of his body above the ground. No evidence has been observed of a Command Post being emplaced at a hasty defensive position.

Combat Outpost Defenses: This type of defense is characterized by the ease with which the enemy is dislodged and the rapidity of his disappearance. Five (5) to ten (10) men with one or two light machine guns are usually placed at a turn in the road, a village, or a road cut. Firing initially on the advanced elements of the attacking unit, the enemy maintains

its fire until a heavy volume of fire is returned at which time the enemy withdraws to a new position.

Troop Action in the Defense: The average infantryman of the lower ranks shows no desire to hold at all cost in the face of an assault. Under artillery, air and mortar attack, the officers attempt to keep their men in their positions, often apparently by coercion. However, Prisoners of War report that when the attack commences, some of the officers withdraw, leaving the troops to fall back in groups of two and three. Interrogation reveals that the men, on the whole, were newly inducted in this area and lacked the will to resist strongly, except on the prepared position mentioned in paragraph 5 (c) (II) where officers and men alike remained in their battle position to the last man throughout our attack. The hundreds of dead on the position give credence to this fact.

(2) Camouflage and Concealment.

(a) Maximum use of natural camouflage is employed by the enemy. Troops often fasten grass, branches and other growth to their uniforms and weapons. No use of large camouflage netting for guns or vehicles was discovered. At KIMPO Airfield the enemy moved two (2) fighter aircraft into a wrecked hanger and covered them with burned timbers and rusty corrugated sheeting in apparently effective camouflage from our aircraft.

Enemy troops often conceal themselves by dressing in the traditional white Korean civilian clothing. Entire platoons have been known to don civilian clothing and continue to operate as a tactical unit. The terrain in this Regiment's zone of action was readily adaptable to concealment. The enemy skillfully exploited this advantage and, as in past operations, moved many troops and supplies during the hours of darkness.

The enemy further concealed his positions and weapons by disposing them in burned, or otherwise devastated areas in order to hide gun flashes and create the impression that the weapons had already been damaged or destroyed.

(3) Utilization of Armor.

(a) The enemy utilized its tanks without infantry support except on one occasion just west of KIMPO Airfield. On no occasion did the enemy utilize tanks in conjunction with both infantry and artillery during a counter-attack. Twelve (12) to fifteen (15) T-34 tanks were destroyed during the period of this Report. The T-34 was the only tank encountered during this operation.

(4) Artillery:

Massed fires were not employed by the enemy. Artillery units apparently were broken down as far as gun sections and assigned to infantry units. Extremely accurate fire on several occasions indicated a high degree of training of crews and the possibility of artillery spotters located behind friendly lines. The use of artillery spotters was confirmed when an enemy forward observer with a combination radio-telephone set was captured behind Hill 104 in EA 1659-B. Enemy mortar fire was by far the most accurate and effective on the outskirts of SEOUL than during any other action encountered by this regiment in Korea. Targets of opportunity were engaged rapidly and effectively.

(5) Road blocks:

Road blocks were encountered at road junctions or crossings in and near the city of SEOUL. The road blocks were con-

structured of rice bags filled with sand and surrounded by AT and AP mines. Road blocks within SEOUL were habitually covered by fire while those encountered between SEOUL and SUYUHOH were not.

(6) Mines:

The enemy has mined road nets extensively with both AT and AP mines, scattering additional AP mines in the fields bordering the roads. Three separate mine fields were encountered wherein each mine was booby trapped by placing a hand grenade with a pull-type firing mechanism under the buried mine.

(7) Village Raiding:

Small enemy units by-passed by our forces conducted raiding patrols into villages situated away from the main supply routes. These patrols normally entered the villages in the early morning hours covered by small outposts situated on the outskirts of the villages. They confiscated food and committed a number of atrocities upon the local populace. Raiding parties normally withdrew upon the approach of our patrols after a short exchange of fire.

(8) Enemy Organization:

(a) The standard Infantry Division is composed of three (3) Infantry Regiments and an organic Artillery Regiment. Other units normally attached are: A Transportation Unit, an Anti-Tank Battalion, a self-propelled Artillery Battalion, an Engineer Battalion, a Signal Battalion, and a Medical Battalion. No enemy Divisions were contacted wherein a major deviation existed from the standard table of organization of a North Korean Peoples' Army Rifle Division.

(b) Two (2) enemy Brigades were encountered, the 25th and 27th, neither of which appeared to have a standard table of organization but were formed by the consolidation of existing independent Battalions and Security Forces.

(9) Probable OOD opposing our forces:

15th NK Rifle Division	Original Strength
	10,000
1st Regiment	
2nd Regiment	
22nd Regiment	
1 Artillery Regiment	
25th Brigade:	
4 Heavy Weapons Battalion	4500
1 Independent Infantry Battalion	
1 120mm Mortar Battalion	
1 Engineer Battalion	
1 76mm Artillery Battalion	
1 Brigade Artillery Battalion	
27th Brigade:	5000
4 Independent Infantry Battalions	
1 Heavy Weapons Battalion	
1 Engineer Battalion	
1 Artillery Battalion	
226th Regiment	900
2nd Regiment (Seoul Regiment)	1100
78th Regiment	1100
TOTAL	22600

The NKPA units listed above opposed this Regiment, however, small detachments trapped in the SEOUL area while enroute to join their parent organizations were also engaged and have been made the subject of a special order of battle report (See App 1 to Annex Baker this report). On 22 September, 1950, local civilians and Prisoners of War reported that the organization of various units defending in SEOUL and the vicinity had been dissolved and a central defense command created. No documents or other substantiating information was received concerning this report, but it is known that the various Volunteer Units were armed and pressed into action with little training under the command of some unidentified headquarters.

(10) Equipment:

(a) General: Individual equipment and supplies normally issued consisted of one (1) uniform, one (1) set of white underwear, food, a weapon, and 80 to 100 rounds of ammunition. There appeared to be no shortage of ammunition, great quantities having been abandoned wherever the enemy withdrew. Rations usually consisted of dry rice and a form of biscuit issued on a three day basis.

(b) Uniforms: Several variations of the standard khaki cotton uniform have been found. The uniform consists of a close fitting jacket of Russian design and the typical baggy trousers. Head gear is a single carton visor cap with ear flaps. Sewn on the chest and back portions of the coat and on the cap is a net of string intended to be used to fasten vegetation or other material. Colored piping along the trouser seams, on the cap and around the coat sleeves indicates the branch or arm of service. Shoulder board insignia of rank, although not worn in battle, can usually be found on the person or in the effects of the enemy.

A few enemy dead were discovered in a slate blue uniform on Hill 104 just west of SEOUL. They were tentatively identified as Security Forces personnel.

A number of personnel of the volunteer units not issued complete uniforms were found to be partially or completely dressed in civilian clothing.

(c) Weapons: Individual weapons used are primarily of two types; the USSR M1891/30 rifle and the 7.62mm PPSH sub-machine gun. Listed below are the weapons known to have been employed by the enemy in our zone of action:

- Soviet 7.62mm TT-1933 (Tokarev Pistol)
- Soviet 7.62mm PPSH-1941 Submachine Gun
- Soviet 7.62mm PPSH-1943 Submachine Gun
- Soviet 7.62mm M1891/30 Rifle
- Soviet 7.62mm DP (DEGTJAREV) Light Machine Gun
- Soviet 7.62mm 1938 Carbine and 1904, folding bayonet
- Soviet 7.62mm Maxim MG
- Soviet 14.5mm PTRS-1941
- Soviet 14.5mm PTRD-1941
- Soviet 82mm M1941 Battalion Mortar
- Soviet F-1 Defensive Hand Grenade
- Soviet RG-42 Offensive Hand Grenade
- Soviet 76mm Field Gun, M1902/30
- Soviet 76mm Field Gun, M1942
- Soviet 122mm Field Howitzer, M1938
- Soviet 45mm Anti-Tank Gun, M1942
- Soviet 120mm Mortar, M1938

The enemy employed U.S. manufactured rifles, carbines, anti-tank guns and artillery presumably captured from the UN Forces. These weapons were used mainly by newly formed units and were probably issued in the SEOUL area.

One unidentified water-cooled heavy machine gun was captured bearing a swastika and Japanese characters. This weapon was captured in the SUYUHON area and was forwarded to the Division Ordnance Battalion for identification and inspection.

(11) Training and Morale:

The lower ranking enlisted men and the Lieutenants, were, on the whole, inadequately trained. Training included field exercises, night fighting and political indoctrination but it was not standardized throughout the units. One result of the training appeared to be obedience through fear of their officers. Individuals appeared to be lacking in initiative and poorly informed. Their political ideology is so minute as to be practically non-existent. The average Prisoner of War was found to be susceptible to any line of thought presented if given sufficient time to think about the subject.

The morale of the lower ranking men appeared to decline as combat became imminent, and, under air strikes, artillery fire or infantry assault it decreased rapidly.

Surrender leaflets dropped by our aircraft and surrender broadcasts made in the front lines by a portable public address system were exceedingly effective in every instance used. Many prisoners surrendered solely as a result of this medium.

NOTE: Target areas referred to in the above report are taken from the AMS L751, KOREA, 1:50,000 Map.

9. ESTIMATED RESULT OF THE OPERATION.

a. As a result of operations between 15 September and 6 October, 1950, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division successfully accomplished all assigned missions. On 15 September, 1950, as an assault regiment of the 1st Marine Division, the 5th Marines conducted an opposed landing at INCHON, KOREA. This landing was characterized by:

(1) An urgent planning phase interrupted for a three day attack by this regiment against enemy forces in the YONGSAN area in southern KOREA and the subsequent movement to and reorganization to war strength at PUSAN, KOREA.

(2) An embarkation phase in which the embarkation plan was completed before the operation and administrative plans, and all were completed for this major landing in 3 days.

(3) A landing conducted over a vertical sea wall in a harbor restricted by treacherous mud flats, on the crest of a tide that ranged about thirty (30) feet twice daily.

(4) An assault over a seawall beach backed by the major harbor city of INCHON.

b. The Regimental Commander decided upon a scheme of maneuver which facilitated the rapid seizure of initial objectives upon landing and the rapid movement of elements through the main streets of the southern portion of INCHON followed by elements of the Korean Marine Corps to mop-up isolated resistance in the major portion of the city. The successful landing and seizure of initial objectives after darkness paved the way for a rapid advance the following morning to capture INCHON, to gain contact with the 1st Marines and for capture of the INCHON peninsula which allowed the unimpeded landing of the remaining elements of the Corps. Bold aggressive pursuit from the city of INCHON kept the opposing forces off balance to the point that little organized resistance was encountered short of KIMPO Airfield which vital objective was captured after darkness on the third day after landing. After the capture of KIMPO, reorganization

took place and the regiment made an assault river crossing of the HAN River against moderate resistance. A sharp change of direction to the right ensued to attack to capture the city of SEOUL. Resistance was exceedingly strong on the outskirts of SEOUL, but upon overcoming bitter resistance, the enemy's main line of resistance crumbled and entrance of the city was made against moderate resistance. At 1500, 27 September, 1950, the Red Flag was struck and the American Flag raised over the South Korean Government Building. The following day, in a ceremony conducted by General MacArthur, this regiment provided security while the government site was turned back to Korean President Syngman Rhee and the civil officials of the Republic of Korea. With the capture of SEOUL the main supply and communications route to the North Korean forces to the south was severed. Consolidation of gains attained continued until this regiment was withdrawn on 6 October to JINCHON for embarkation for further operations.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Tactics.

(1) The operations of this command during the period were characterized by speed of movement and the necessity of attacking over wide frontages. These factors combined to give rise to a problem that was never adequately solved. This was the problem of timeliness of orders. The nature of the terrain was such that it was extremely difficult to find an OP from which the entire zone of action could be seen at once; and because of the distances involved, the selection of and trips to several OP's in order to get a complete picture of the ground was too time consuming. This, coupled with the fact that movement of the troops was generally very rapid, made it necessary in most cases to wait until late in the afternoon to issue orders and then to base these orders primarily on a map reconnaissance. As a result, junior officers seldom had adequate opportunity for reconnaissance prior to launching their attacks the following day.

RECOMMENDATION: That all unit training problems stress rapid movement and that a major objective of every problem be the training of officers in the employment of time saving devices in order to reduce to the minimum the time between reconnaissance, decision, and orders.

(2) During the operation it became apparent that the art of reconnaissance patrolling was largely a lost art. Patrols, whether dispatched on reconnaissance or combat missions almost invariably became involved in combat with the result that complete information of the enemy to the front and flanks was seldom forthcoming.

RECOMMENDING: That more stress be placed on the techniques of reconnaissance patrolling in recruit depots and Basic School.

(3) When units assumed defensive positions for the night, and, towards the close of the active fighting around SEOUL, when units occupied defensive positions, it was noted that there was a general failure to properly outpost positions. The common practice was to establish a perimeter-like defense, with outposts, if any, established at distances from the front lines of only 150-200 yards.

RECOMMENDATION: That our schools stress the importance of proper outposting, and make a special effort to dispel the idea that the perimeter defense is the proper defense in all types of terrain and under all circumstances.

b. Air Support.

Due to the complex nature of the terrain it was found desirable to have two forward air controllers in each battalion, one to act as a liaison officer and the other to spot targets and direct the aircraft. Naval gunfire spotters were used for this purpose after the unit was out of range of naval gunfire and they were found to be very successful.

RECOMMENDATION: That a TACP for battalions consist, of two teams; one team to perform the duties of liaison with spotting a secondary mission, and the other team to be a spotting team which stays well forward and locates and designates targets for the aircraft.

c. Equipment.

(1) In land warfare, to which the Marine Corps appears committed, it will be necessary either to cut down on the bulkiness of our equipment, or to increase greatly the amount of organic transport in all units. Such things as typewriters, with their chests, mimeograph machines, CP tents, galley equipment, are all too heavy and bulky in their present form for combat which involves rapid movement. It is a paradox that the armies we fight consist of personnel who are used to bearing heavy burdens, yet are more lightly equipped than we.

RECOMMENDATION: That studies be initiated with the view to reducing the size and weight of all military equipage. Especially important is the necessity for lighter, more durable office equipment and galleys.

(2) The reproduction equipment presently organic to battalions and regiments is unsatisfactory. A more efficient means than the jelly roll of reproducing orders and overlays is urgently required.

RECOMMENDATION: That a study be initiated immediately with the view to discovering a lightweight, durable machine capable of rapid reproduction of orders and overlays.

(3) Transportation.

(a) It was necessary, throughout the period, for this command to be assigned, on a permanent basis, additional 2½ ton trucks. It is felt that in any land warfare situation the present allowance of vehicles in an infantry regiment is wholly inadequate. For the more standard amphibious operation additional transportation is also required for the heavier weapons in the regiment.

RECOMMENDATION: 1. That an auxiliary T/E be established for each unit which will include the extra transportation required by that unit for extensive land warfare.

2. It is further recommended that the present allowance of motor vehicles for infantry battalion and regimental headquarters be changed as follows:

<u>WE K1099</u>	<u>Present Allowance</u>	<u>Recommended Allowance</u>
Amb. ¼ T		
H&S	5	3
Inf. Bn	1	3
Trl ¼ T		
H&S	17	13
Inf. Bn	20	14
4.2 ammunition	4	1
AT Co	5	2

Trl 1 T			9
H&S			7
Inf. Bn			4
4.2	1		4
AT Co			4
Trl water 300 gal			
H&S	18		3
Inf. Bn			2
4.2			1
AT Co			1
Truck $\frac{1}{2}$ T			
H&S	12		13
Inf. Bn	19		14
4.2	4		1
AT Co	5		2
Truck $\frac{3}{4}$ T PG			
H&S			4
Inf. Bn			6
4.2			4
AT Co			2
Truck $2\frac{1}{2}$ T 6x6			
H&S			10
Inf. Bn			3
4.2	2		1
AT Co	2		3

(b) During this operation it was necessary for infantry regiments to perform a considerable amount of field maintenance on their vehicles because of the rapid movement overland and the fact that the Motor Transport Battalion did not have like vehicles to replace those turned in for repair.

RECOMMENDATION: That infantry regiments be provided with an adequate number of mechanics and spare parts to perform the more common repairs encountered in field maintenance.

d. Administration.

(1) Considerable difficulty was experienced in maintaining proper administrative records due to the bulk of the equipment required for administration and to the rapidity of movement which necessitated frequent displacement of the administrative group.

RECOMMENDATION: That a special trailer be constructed for issue on the basis of one per battalion and one per H&S Company, Regiment. This trailer should have the following characteristics: Afford working space for eight (8) persons and with built-in equipment including 7 typewriters and 1 mimeograph machine. Above 5 of the 7 typewriters should be placed a set of cardex files for IRC's (400 card capacity above each typewriter) which fold flush into the bulkhead when not in use. On each side of each of the 7 typewriters should be placed 3 filing drawers which in fact makes 6 drawers available for each company and 18 drawers available for battalion headquarters and any records of attached units. This would give each company clerk space enough for his SR's plus 25% additional space over War T/O for receiving replacements before casualties are transferred. He would also have space enough for his company files and a small working stock of forms. At the forward end should be a built-in mimeograph machine under which should be at least 6 drawers for blank forms storage such as service record pages, fitness report blanks, etc. The forward corners should have doors opening from the outside of the trailer, and on one side should be a generator to provide lighting and on the other side should be shelves for storage of mimeograph papers.

[REDACTED]

(2) A great amount of time has been consumed within this command in the preparation of historical records, most of which duplicate each other in one respect or another.

RECOMMENDATION: That the daily unit report be made the basic historical document for each unit. Periodically, at the conclusion of each phase of the operations a summary of lessons learned, comments, and recommendations could be prepared and bound with the daily unit report to form the history of the unit for the period. This report could then be reproduced in adequate quantities for distribution to all interested officers.

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1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

23 December 1950

ANNEX A TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

S-1 SECTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The S-1 Section performed the normal functions of the S-1 and Adjutant Section as prescribed by the Marine Corps Staff Manual 1948 and current directives from higher authority during the period. Specifically, the S-1 Section performed functions the highlights of which are contained in subsequent paragraphs.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. Composition

The S-1 Section operated under T/O K-1097 (Peace) at the beginning of the period. The T/O allowed for three (3) officers and eight (8) enlisted personnel. The actual strength of the section was two (2) officers and 14 enlisted personnel. On 7 September, 1950, the section shifted to T/O K-1097 (War). This authorized the section three (3) officers and nine (9) enlisted personnel. On 10 September the section was increased by one officer. For the remainder of the period the section consisted of three (3) officers and thirteen (13) enlisted personnel. The section was broken down into three operating sections which were echeloned in depth and organized as follows:

(1) Command Post Personnel (Regimental CP)

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	
S-1 - 1stLt	SgtMaj	MSgt
	Pers SgtMaj	MSgt
	Chief Clerk	TSgt
	(Graves Registration)	
	Clerk	SSgt
	(NCOinC IOW's)	
	Clerk	SSgt
	(Casualty Clerk)	
	Clerk typist	Sgt
	Clerk typist	Cpl
	(Steno & Gen Clerk)	
	Mail Orderly	Cpl
	Clerk typist	Cpl
(Driver)		
Clerk typist	Ifc	
(Runner)		

(2) Regimental Administrative Center (To accompany Regimental train).

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	
Pers & ClfnO CWO	Clfn Chief	TSgt
	Clerk typist	Cpl
	Clerk typist	Ifc

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1975

ANNEX ABL E TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(3) Rear Administrative Center (Attached to the Division Administrative Center)

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Asst S-1 - 1stLt	None

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

The Section transferred old records to the permanent files. Casualty Cards were prepared for replacements and new cards were prepared to replace those that had become damaged due to handling. Efforts were made to procure Identification Tags. The section supervised the receipt and assignment of replacements; replenished chests with necessary equipment, and assisted in the preparation and distribution of orders.

4. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The S-1 Section embarked the equipment and personnel of the Command Post Echelon and the Regimental Administrative Echelon in the USS HENRICO on 11 September 1950. The Rear Administrative Center Echelon embarked in the SS KOAN MARU on 16 September 1950. The latter echelon was directed to report to the Division Administrative Center at KOBE, JAPAN for duty and to accompany that center to INCHON, KOREA.

5. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The Command Post Echelon, landed at INCHON, KOREA, on 15 September 1950, D-Day. The Regimental Administrative Center disembarked on 19 September 1950, at INCHON, KOREA. The Rear Administrative Center disembarked on 17 September 1950, at SASEBO, JAPAN, to join the Division Administrative Center by rail movement to KOBE, JAPAN.

6. OPERATIONS

a. Duties

The section was split into three groups during the period to perform normal functions and to carry out administration of the regiment.

(1) Command Post Personnel Duties (Regimental CP)

Internal arrangement of the Command Post in conjunction with other staff sections.

Routing of messages and memoranda.

Reporting of all casualties to Division after consolidation of battalion reports.

Maintenance of casualty records and strength reports. Submitting Section 3 of the Unit Report.

Maintenance of Regimental files.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX A TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

Matters of routine administration.

Maintenance of the Unit Journal.

Distribution of replacements received.

Collection and distribution of mail.

(2) Regimental Administrative Center Personnel Duties
(Regimental Train)

Maintenance of the Regimental locator files.

Maintenance of Unit Diaries.

Maintenance of Regimental Classification files and re-
cords.

Handling of general correspondence, records, and re-
ports.

The personnel and classification officer was also
assigned duty as Custodian of Registered Publications.

Typing of officer and noncommissioned officer fitness
reports.

Typing letters of condolence.

Typing recommendations for awards.

Typing official letters.

Preparation of station lists.

(3) Rear Administrative Center Personnel Duties (Division
Administrative Center)

Maintenance of service records.

Maintenance of unit files.

Maintenance of officer qualification jackets.

Routed all correspondence and memoranda to the proper
administrative group for appropriate action.

Preparation of IRC Cards.

Preparation of Casualty Cards.

Preparation of orders for adjustment of pay records.

7. ENEMY

No comment.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX A BLE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

8. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

a. Strength of units operating under peace T/O at beginning of period:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
H&SCo	33	203
ATCo	3	75
4.2 Mortar Co	4	125
1stBn	28	648
2ndBn	32	736
3rdBn	30	652
"A" Co, 1st Tank Bn	7	167
TOTAL	137	2606

b. Strength of units operating under war strength T/O at end of period:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
H&SCo	27	230
ATCo	4	101
4.2 Mortar Co	4	125
1stBn	41	838
2ndBn	41	838
3rdBn	40	822
TOTAL	157	2954

c. Casualties during period.

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
KIA	6	171
WIA	30	708
MIA	0	2
TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES	36	881
NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES	9	352
TOTAL	45	1233

d. Number of replacements received during period: Including personnel added as a result of reorganization under war tables.

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
	78	1705

e. Number of personnel returned to duty during period:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
	7	122

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX ABL E TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

f. Number of personnel transferred during period:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
	35	632

g. Number of Prisoner of War captured during period:

TOTAL 1852

h. Number of awards received during the period:

7	Silver Stars
2	Bronze Stars
<u>9</u>	TOTAL

i. Number of recommendations for awards submitted during the period:

TOTAL 101

j. Number of promotions made during the period:

70	Sergeants
<u>122</u>	Corporals
192	TOTAL

k. Mail received during the period:

Mail was received and dispatched regularly with the exception of the time spent aboard ship and a few days subsequent to the landing at INCHON.

l. Morale during the period:

Morale has been excellent throughout the entire period. There were no stragglers or court martials.

m. Health and Comfort Items received during the period:

Post Exchange boxes and Red Cross boxes were received throughout the period. Items such as magazines and newspapers were received at regular intervals and delivered to all units.

n. Number of entries in Unit Journal during the period:

TOTAL 826

9. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Comments on personnel accounting:

During the period covered by this report there were a number of personnel accounting matters of particular interest in view of the combat tests encountered in effecting the newly inaugurated Marine Corps personnel accounting system.

575W
1975

ANNEXABLE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(1) One of the most difficult problems initially was the timely submission of the daily unit diaries in combat. In order to accomplish the timely submission of the unit diaries in combat this regiment established a regimental administrative center to accompany the regimental train. This center was established to provide a location removed from the immediate battlefield in which the unit diary sections could accomplish their work. The center was composed of unit diary personnel as follows:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Regimental Headquarters	1	3
H&SCo		1
ATCo		1
4.2 Mortar Co		1
1stBn	1	5
2ndBn	1	5
3rdBn	1	5
TOTAL	4	21

The center was provided with a 6x6 cargo truck during each displacement with which to shuttle forward with the regimental train the files and equipment of the center. When established in the train bivouac each company was located so as to maintain its own identity, prepare its own diaries and mail them under supervision of the Regimental Officer in Charge. The basic organization proved workable in that the administrative center was forward enough to receive required information, while being far enough to the rear to receive little interruption of work during battle and to reduce the number of displacements. When provided two 6x6 trucks it was made mobile and was able to move forward as a unit with the supply train on an hours notice. One of the most serious difficulties confronting the center in the execution of its duties was the time lost due to rapid movement after landing. The center was not landed until D plus 4 due to tidal conditions and low priority. After landing, the regiment had crossed the HAN River and the center had to wait several days due to low priority to cross the river. Thereafter, the administrative center was able to join the regimental train and catch up with its backlog of work. It is important that special effort be made to keep the administrative center established in a position where it can receive information and work for manifest reasons.

(2) During the operations replacements and evacuated personnel returning to duty were directed to report to the Regimental Command Post. Many times these replacements arrived with excessive equipment such as seabags, handbags, and clothing rolls, while in some cases evacuated personnel returned to duty without arms, equipment, or adequate clothing. The regiment engaged in combat had a shortage of vehicles with which to return excess baggage to the rear and did not carry equipment in sufficient amounts to re-equip returning casualties. To solve this problem, Division commenced assuming responsibility for re-equipping personnel returning to the regiment and regiment prepared plans for its administrative elements at the Division CP to screen all personnel reporting in before sending them forward to regiment.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX ABLE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(3) Many times the Individual Record Cards were not received by the regimental administrative center when replacements were received. This necessitated the preparation of skeleton IRC Cards from assignment orders or rosters with no opportunity for verifying names, ranks, service, and MOS numbers with either the service record book or the individual. This resulted in numerous errors being recorded on the unit diaries. To solve this problem it appeared desirable to have the administrative elements screening replacements to prepare skeleton IRC's and casualty cards before assigning to battalion.

(4) It is highly desirable that blackout tents, lights, and other such necessary items of equipment be added to the tables of equipment for unit diary and service record sections. It is imperative that these sections work at night and out of the weather. At the present time, such equipment is not authorized specifically for these elements.

(5) The Service Record Book Section was separated from the regiment on Division Order at PUSAN, KOREA, on 12 September, 1950, and traveled independently to SASEBO, JAPAN, via ship, and then continued by rail to KOBE, JAPAN to join the First Marine Division Administrative Center. This travel, including packing and crating in preparation therefor, took place 12-18 September, 1950. The Division Administrative Center had sailed on 17 September, 1950, for KOREA, which necessitated this section moving with the 1st Armored Amphibious Tractor Battalion which sailed for INCHON, KOREA, 25 September, 1950, and arrived and disembarked 30 September, 1950. This section finally joined the Division Administrative Center on 1 October, 1950. During the entire period the service record section was unable to perform its functions and became far behind in its work. When finally established, it was necessary to work 12 to 16 hours per day to catch up. The following are some points of interest concerning service records:

(a) The combined service record section of the regiment has a total of 104 boxes of records and equipment amounting to $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons and requires four (4) 6x6 trucks to move.

(b) It is necessary that the service records remain in a rear locality in order that work can be accomplished and records remain secure free from the battlefield. However, it is a questionable matter whether it should remain as far to the rear as the Division Command Post. Responsible Commanders have little or no supervision over service records which remain too far from his command post. Service record markings and entries are so closely related to the preparation of unit diaries that it is believed that the service records should be more appropriately located with the unit diary sections in a regimental rear echelon located closer to the parent units. This would channel the flow of information to one locality and improve the exchange of information.

(c) Since service records often arrive after a replacement has been joined there has been some difficulty in preparing IRC Cards in time to be of value. On many occasions, the individual has been joined, wounded, and evacuated before the ser-

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX A BLE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

vice records were received. Skeleton IRC's should be prepared on each replacement prior to being assigned. Casualty cards should be prepared at the same time and this work should be accomplished in the rear echelon by the service record section.

(d) This regiment held the service records of hundreds of casualties which were evacuated to JAPAN for periods extending to several months before final transfers were effected. This delay in effecting final transfers caused the service records to be held inactive for a long period of time. It is believed a system for effecting an earlier transfer of evacuated personnel should be established.

(e) Page four (4) of the service record relating to chronological record is extremely difficult to maintain properly when the service records are maintained at a distance from respective companies. A more effective procedure for getting information to the service record section for entry must be developed.

b. Casualty Reporting

Casualty reporting procedures were made difficult initially by the lack of clear cut directions as to how such procedures should be executed in detail. The Marine Corps Manual does not specifically prescribe the details of the flow of such reporting in sufficient detail and careful instruction of personnel making such reports is required. The Division Order for the operation which established the reporting system was unfortunately classified Top Secret and thorough indoctrination of personnel handling casualty reporting duties was thereby delayed until aboard ship enroute. It was discovered after being in combat for a while that the entire system of casualty reporting depends on an aggressive search for and physical accounting for the wounded. Company First Sergeants often in the thick of battle could not get an accurate count on who was wounded. Constant liaison with aid stations is mandatory. Many times casualties are evacuated through aid stations other than their own so that telephone calls and liaison between echelons is required. When casualties are thus located, Company First Sergeants can be advised to submit casualty cards on those casualties for which cards have not been received. Prompt unit diary entries require that reports of casualties be forwarded to that section daily. Aid station reports of casualties combined with reports of deaths added thereto will give the unit diary section an effective report on which to prepare unit diaries.

c. Office Equipment

(1) During the period 6 September to 7 October, 1950, the S-1 Section performed its assigned duties with the following type office equipment:

- One (1) typewriter chest
- Two (2) typewriters
- Two (2) chests, fiber, 14x20 $\frac{1}{2}$ x15 $\frac{1}{2}$

(2) The above equipment is considered inadequate and outdated to perform the work of the S-1 Section in a war of movement such as occurred during this period. The present command post equipment is too bulky and cumbersome to carry by hand and transportation is always

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1975

ANNEX A TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

at a premium in the regiment. Improvement on design of command post equipment in the sections of the infantry regiment is indicated.

d. Recommendations

(1) It is recommended that on future operations the S-1 Section be divided into two (2) groups; a command post group consisting of the following:

S-1
Pers SgtMaj
Chief Clerk
Casualty Clerk
Clerk typist
One (1) Graves Registration NCO
Runner (Clerk)
Runner (Clerk)
Driver

And a Rear Echelon Administrative Group consisting of unit diary and service record personnel of the regiment, battalions, and separate companies as follows:

Asst S-1	Clerk typist
SgtMaj	Clerk typist
Pers Clfn & Assignment O	File Clerk
Clerk typist	Admin Clerk
Clerk	Each separate Company
One (1) Officer Ten (10) enlisted	Each Battalion

The administrative group should remain in a regimental rear area selected for security and working space. It may be best established within the area of the Division Command Post provided that such locality is within a reasonable distance of the regiment to insure a ready flow of information. This administrative group can well receive and process replacements and can handle much of the routine administrative paper work of the regiment.

(2) It is recommended that the casualty reporting system in combat be set forth in detail in a section or chapter in the Marine Corps Manual, in order that widespread knowledge of the procedures become standardized.

(3) It is recommended that office equipment for combat in the infantry regiment be modified to the extent that:

(a) Typewriters be portable yet with the same features as the standard typewriter.

(b) A case for the typewriter constructed of light, durable, waterproof material.

(c) A field desk or chest, 14"x20 $\frac{1}{2}$ "x15 $\frac{1}{2}$ " be constructed of light durable material, to replace the present field desk.

(d) A portable file chest 6"x18"x18" for filing 3x5 casualty cards, of light durable material, waterproof.

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3/jwt
1975

ANNEX A TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(e) Portable file cabinets 12"x15"x24" of standard size made of light durable material and that could be easily transported.

(f) That light weight blackout tents and illuminating equipment be specifically provided for in the T/E for the S-1 and administrative elements.

(g) That light, durable, portable stands for the chests and typewriters be designed.

(4) It is recommended that a small truck or trailer with office equipment installed be designed for administrative work in the field.

(5) That page number four (4) of the service record be dispensed with during combat.

3/24/50
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

23 December 1950

ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

S-2 SECTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The Intelligence Section, under the direct supervision of the Regimental Executive Officer, performed the following functions:

- a. Furnished the Regimental Commander with all available information of the enemy and of the terrain under enemy control.
- b. Recommended to the Commander additional information essential to the successful execution of the Commander's plans and initiated a systematic coordinated search for the required information by all collecting agencies.
- c. Collected, evaluated, and interpreted information derived from all possible sources.
- d. Reduced intelligence to a systematic form and distributed it to all concerned.
- e. Insured that intelligence was given due consideration in preparation of plans.
- f. Insured that counter-intelligence measures were taken to prevent information about friendly troops from falling into the enemy's hands.
- g. Insured an adequate supply and distribution of maps.
- h. Coordinated requests for aerial photographs.
- i. Maintained liaison with subordinate units and intelligence officers of higher and adjacent units.
- j. Trained intelligence personnel.
- k. Exercised general supervision over all intelligence activities in support of and attached to this command.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

The Intelligence Section was organized insofar as practicable, in accordance with the current Tables of Organization as follows:

a.	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>MOS</u>
	Major	S-2	1	0302
	1stLt	Asst S-2	1	0302
	MSgt	Intell Chief	1	0231
	TSgt	Intell Man	1	0231
	SSgt	Chief Scout Observer	1	0231
	Sgt	Scout Observer	1	0231
	Cpl	Scout Observer	2	0231
	Ifc	Draftsman	1	1411
	Ifc	Clerk-typist	1	0231

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(Cont'd)	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>MOS</u>
	I/c	Intell Man	2	0231
	I/c	Scout Observer	1	1536
	I/c	Intell Man	1	1378

b. The following personnel from the 163rd Military Intelligence Service Detachment, U. S. Army, were attached to this section during the period as a Prisoner of War Interrogation Team:

<u>RANK</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>MOS</u>
Cpl	Interrogators	2	0320
	Civilian Interrogators	2(Korean)	None

c. Interpreters:

The needs for a regiment for interpreters varies as to the situation. During similar combat operations each battalion should have a minimum of three interpreters, two for interrogation of prisoners at the battalion headquarters, and one for use with patrolling units and for propaganda efforts. The Regimental Headquarters during similar type operations needs a similar number of interrogators for the same purposes. During defensive and occupation of an area type operations, battalions require an interpreter with each company and four with battalion headquarters. Regiment requires eight interpreters during the same type of action. The additional interpreters required for numerous patrols, screening civilians, and performance of civil affairs functions.

It was found that military interpreters were able to command more respect from prisoners and the native populace than were the civilians attached, and it is recommended that whenever possible military personnel be assigned particularly at company and battalion levels.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

As presented in Paragraph 3 of the basic report, 5th Marines Special Action Report.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

As presented in Paragraph 4 of the basic report, 5th Marines Special Action Report.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The entire S-2 Section was embarked aboard the same vessel to facilitate movement and the rapid dissemination of information as it arrived in Regimental Headquarters.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

As presented in Paragraph 6 of the basic report, 5th Marines Special Action Report.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

7. ASSAULT PHASE

The S-2 Section landed in two groups, one with the Regimental Commander and the other with the Executive Officer. This division of the section was found to be very satisfactory for the type of terrain encountered. However, were it desirable to establish an OF as soon as practicable, a team of scout observers would be landed with a battalion headquarters.

8. ENEMY TACTICS

As presented in Paragraph 8 of the basic report, 5th Marines Special Action Report.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence operations during the action were, on the whole, fairly effective. No groups of enemy were met that were not previously known and their general positions established. Due to the large amount of information concerning small mobile groups of enemy, who had decamped by the time patrols could reach them, some intelligence was disregarded by small unit commanders.

As a result of operations it is felt that the Table of Organization for war is adequate for the basic needs of a Regimental Intelligence Section in the field, however, it is not possible to maintain continuous OF's in a moving situation with the Scout Observers allotted would not allow for scouting missions to be executed by the intelligence section while an OF was being manned.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Due to the fast moving situation insufficient time existed between the issuance of operation orders and the execution thereof to form and execute an effective intelligence plan. Directives received required that operation orders be issued on the regimental and battalion level almost consistently after darkness and the time of attack was normally scheduled for dawn or shortly thereafter. It was, therefore, difficult to make proper employment of collection agencies. Front line elements were often too exhausted to conduct extensive patrols to their front from their night defensive positions, thus the need for an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon organic to the regiment became apparent.

b. The lack of communication facilities for an intelligence radio net between battalions and the regiment, restricted the dissemination of information between the battalions and the Regimental Headquarters. This was particularly true in regard to flash reports and other reports of immediate tactical importance. Telephonic communications were unreliable during rapid advances and the need for a radio intelligence net proved urgent.

c. During the period, friendly secret agents were passed through the Regimental lines on order from higher authority, however, no intelligence information was received concerning the findings of these agents. It was recommended that in future similar instances, information be supplied to Regiments with the results of such activities.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

d. The present Tables of Equipment provide for only one (1) blackout tent and one (1) coleman lantern for use jointly by the operations and intelligence sections. One tent and one lantern are insufficient space and light for the proper operation and these two sections should be authorized one blackout tent and two (2) coleman lanterns each.

e. The S-2 Section was restricted in the execution of its scouting and observation missions by the lack of a sufficient number of Scout Observers to man an observation post twenty-four hours a day and also carry out other scouting missions required in such open warfare. The need for an Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon similar to that employed on a Regimental level in the Army is recommended to provide an intelligence agency for close in reconnaissance work.

f. The Tables of Equipment do not provide the S-2 Section with a suitable type of map or plotting board. The section has improvised map boards with materials locally available, but they have not been entirely suitable. A light weight folding board, approximately three by four feet with a shoulder strap and carrying handle enclosed in a waterproof cover with a zipper opening should be designed and made standard equipment for similar staff sections in combat.

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1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

23 December, 1950

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

1. The following enemy Order of Battle was gathered mainly from Prisoner of War sources and has not been otherwise confirmed. The date on which the information was obtained is indicated.

16 Sep 50: 269th Regiment (Unconfirmed):

One (1) contact was made in INCHON with this unit.

506th Regiment:

The 1st Battalion arrived in SEOUL from PYONGYANG, on 16 Sep 50. The 5th Company, 2nd Battalion was contacted in SEOUL.

18th Division:

The code name for the 18th Division was the 863rd Unit and the 2nd Regiment was the 868th Unit. The following are the Units reported in contact:

2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment
3rd Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment
3rd Battalion, 2nd Regiment
4th Battalion, 2nd Regiment
1st Regiment
22nd Regiment

The 1st Regiment with 500 men arrived in the FUPYONG area on 17 Sep 50 with twenty (20) 45mm Mortars, fifteen (15) AT guns, and thirty (30) trucks. The 2nd Regiment was similarly organized except its strength was 600 men. Eight (8) tanks joined this regiment from SEOUL. The unit code name changed daily. The AAA Company's organization was comparable to that of the 17th Division.

18th Regiment:

The 5th Company, 2nd Battalion, 18th Regiment was contacted near INCHON. Its headquarters was located at Middle School in SEOUL.

16 Sep 50 120th Regiment:

One (1) POW from the 120th Regiment reported his Regiment in the vicinity of TA 9648.

17 Sep 50 Headquarters, Navy:

Five (5) POW's from Navy Headquarters were captured just east of INCHON. They located one Navy Headquarters in the National School near the South Gate of SEOUL.

18 Sep 50 1st Air Force Division:

The first contact with elements of the 1st Air Force Division was made at KILPO Airfield, 18 Sep 50. The Commander was reported to be Chinese trained. He was Brigadier

3/jwt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

General WAN YONG, age 40, 5' 6" tall. Below are the units identified:

Air Force Division Headquarters
1st Company, Engineer Battalion, Fighters Regiment
3rd Company, Engineer Battalion, Fighters Regiment
3rd Platoon, Gunners Company
2nd Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment
2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment
Finance Company, 3rd Technical Battalion
Supply Company

The normal arms were rifles and sub-machine guns. No heavy equipment for the engineers was reported or captured. Morale was low.

18 Sep 50 3rd Division:

The following units of the 3rd Division were reported:

1st Battalion, 1st Regiment
3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, 107th Regiment
27th Battalion, 107th Regiment
32nd Battalion, 107th Regiment
Field Artillery Battalion, 107th Regiment

The Regimental Commander was reported to be Colonel HAN CHOI HAN, who fled with the 32nd Battalion. It was reported that there was but one (1) Regiment, the 107th, formed but the 1st Regiment was later identified. The 1st Regiment had 1,000 men and each Battalion of the 107th Regiment had 900 men. The men of the 1st Regiment changed to white clothing and retreated to SEOUL on 19 Sep 50.

226th Regiment:

This Regiment was also called the "West Coast Unit" and was first contacted on WOLMI DO Island. At that time it had 700 men. Sixteen (16) POW's were captured from the Heavy Machine Gun Company, 1st Battalion which formally had 200 men. This unit was contacted at TA 9447-C-1. The POW's reported their Regiment retreating toward SEOUL. The Supply Company was reported issuing white jackets to the Regiment. The 76mm Artillery Battalion and 45mm Weapons Company and Transport Company (horse-drawn) was reported as part of this regiment. The Signal Unit (TMGINGA) was reported in the PUL YONG area.

18 Sep 50 877th Unit (Air Forces):

The 3rd Technical Infantry Unit of the 877th Unit was stationed at KIMPO Airfield with Headquarters, 3rd Battalion. This Battalion was reported to have three (3) companies with 300 men each,

3/3wt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

4th Independent Battalion:

A POW Sergeant identified Major LUNG CHAN SO as the Commanding Officer of their unit and reported that he had died 17 Sep 50. This unit originally had 400 men, but only five (5) men remained on 18 Sep 50.

19 Sep 50 Army General Headquarters:

A Major from G-3, General Headquarters, was captured by this regiment and interrogated by the 1st Marine Division. For further information see 1st Marine Division Periodic Intelligence Reports.

2nd Regiment:

This Regiment was known as the "SEOUL Unit". The 1st Battalion was Unit 300; the 2nd Battalion, Unit 175, and the 3rd Battalion, 351st Unit. It was organized on 11 Jul 50 at PYONGYANG and arrived in SEOUL 13 Jul 50 with 500 men armed with rifles. Two hundred (200) men of this regiment crossed the HAN River, two hundred (200) remained in SEOUL and one hundred (100) were sent home due to sickness. The 2nd Battalion scattered upon contact with our forces. Approximately 1600 troops were quartered at Regimental Headquarters at Middle School, SEOUL. The 1st Company with fifty (50) men armed with rifles was given the mission to attack KIMPO Airfield. They sent thirty (30) civilians ahead of the troops in order to cover their attack. One (1) Sergeant later surrendered himself and forty-nine (49) privates. The Regimental Commander was Colonel LEE KYONG SUN. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions were reported in TA 0863 using caves as hiding places.

21 Sep 50 7th Regiment:

The 1st Company, 2nd Battalion was reported in the vicinity of HUGOK Mountains on 21 Sep 50.

38th Regiment:

A POW from the 1st Platoon, 3rd Company, 1st Battalion was taken prisoner on Hill 68 on 21 Sep 50.

78th Regiment:

The Regiment was formed with new recruits at SARIWON in July. They were armed with machine guns, rifles, and two (2) mortars. The men had eight (8) days training prior to moving south. The Regimental Commander was Colonel PAK HAN LIN and the Chief of Staff was Lieutenant Colonel KIM WAN SOK, the former Supply Officer at PYONGYANG. The 3rd Battalion Commanding Officer was Major KIM YONG CHIL and the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, was Major TSOO KWONG SHIM. On 3 Oct 50, the Regimental Commander was reported to be Colonel LI FON KUN and the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion was reported to be Major KIM IN KIL. The following units were reported in the 78th Regiment:

3/3/5
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

21 Sep 50	<u>Units</u>	<u>Code</u>
	78th Regiment	567 Unit
	Medical Battalion	
	Motorcycle Company	
	Reconnaissance Company	
	2nd Company, 1st Battalion	SAHZA (Lion)
	3rd Company, 1st Battalion	
	6th Company, 1st Battalion	
	Weapons Company, 1st Battalion	
	2nd Company, 2nd Battalion	563 Unit
	3rd Company, 2nd Battalion	
	Mortar Company, 2nd Battalion	
	3rd Battalion	TAE YANG SAN
	76mm Gun Company	
	Engineer Platoon	

This regiment, while defending SEOUL, suffered many casualties. Some organizations being so reduced they were disbanded. The 1st Battalion was reported to have eighty (80) men remaining on 27 Sep 50.

79th Regiment:

This Regiment, which was known as the "SARIMON Unit" or Unit 79 had two (2) Battalions in the Regiment with a total of 1,000 men. The 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, of this regiment was contacted in the vicinity of the KWANJON-NI area.

22 Sep 50 17th Division:

The 17th Division, consisting of three (3) Regiments, was formed at PYONGYANG on 28 Aug 50. The 2nd Regiment arrived at SEOUL, on 17 Sep 50 and had seven (7) vehicles with two (2) 75mm and five (5) 45mm guns. The 1st and 3rd Regiments were preparing to move to SEOUL at this time with 3,000 troops and it was later reported that both regiments were sent to the TAEGU front but were recalled to defend SEOUL. The AAA Company of this division was equipped with four (4) 37mm guns. One POW stated that the word "Tomau" meaning comrade was used by the officers and men when talking to one another instead of using personal names. During the defense of SEOUL this division suffered many casualties and attempted to reinforce itself with impressed men from the YONGCHON area. Further reports indicated that twenty-five (25) of the thirty-five (35) doctors of the SINGI JU area were forced into the Army and after a short period of training were sent into the field with commissions as Captains and Majors.

22 Sep 50 559th Unit:

The 559th Unit, which was formed at KAESONG and consisted of 500 men who were armed with rifles, two (2) mortars, and machine guns. The 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion was identified.

Below is the reported W/O of the Staff Sections within this division:

3/jwt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

<u>Job Designation</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Division Cultural Advisor	Colonel (Also acting CO).
Chief of Staff	Lieutenant Colonel
Division Propagandist	Major
Judge Advocate General	Major
Division Personnel Officer	Captain

The following is a reported T/O of the listed units:

<u>Unit:</u>	<u>No. of Troops:</u>
Engineer Battalion	300
Infantry Company	200
Artillery Battalion	100
Machine Gun Company	80
Communications Platoon	50
Reconnaissance Company	100
Supply Section	20

23 Sep 50 3rd Regiment:

This regiment arrived at SEOUL from CHORWON on 23 Sep 50 with 120 men.

24 Sep 50 25th Brigade:

The following list of code names and/or numbers were used by the 25th Brigade:

3126	25th Brigade	
6786	2nd Company, 1st Battalion	
632	4th Battalion	NAKTONG
	1st Battalion	TAN BUK SAN
	Engineer Battalion	CHONGCHON GANG

The Brigade which was formed on 18 Aug 50 at CHORWON consisted of 2,000 men in four (4) battalions. Later it was reported that the Brigade had nine (9) battalions totalling 7,000 men, each battalion having 350 to 400 troops. The Brigade moved from CHORWON on 15 Sep 50 by train arriving at SEOUL on 19 Sep 50. There were 3,000 troops without weapons left at CHORWON. The Commanding General was reported to be Major General WOL KI CHAN, age 45, who reportedly studied in Russia in 1947. Additional officers were reported as follows:

Chief of Staff	Lieutenant Colonel FAK, YONG
Mortar Battalion CO	Captain KIM, SOK TAK
Engineer Battalion CO	Major FAK
S-2 Mortar Battalion	Captain KIM, SUNG HWAN
Battalion Cultural Officer	Senior Lieutenant FAK, PO HAN

The last elements of the Brigade leaving CHORWON on 22 Sep 50 were reportedly as follows:

3/jwt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

24 Sep 50 (Continued)
25th Brigade:

Four (4) Hvy Wps Battalions, 570 per	2,280 men
One (1) Infantry Battalion	570 men
120mm Mortar Battalion	150 men
Engineer Battalion	250 men
Heavy Artillery Battalion	200 men
Brigade Artillery Battalion	250 men

POW's reported that on 22 Sep 50, the Brigade suffered approximately 40% casualties, both killed and missing in action, while defending the city of SEOUL. On 25 Sep 50, three (3) battalions lost about 500 additional men while defending Hill 100 in TA 1958. The 2nd Company made a "Mad Charge" at the same location and was almost completely annihilated. The defenses constructed by the Brigade in their sector were comparatively good. Of the eighteen (18) 120mm Mortars issued at SINCHON railroad station (SEOUL) on 23 Sep 50, nine (9) had broken parts and were unserviceable. The Brigade Artillery Battalion received ten (10) 82mm Mortars at the same time and place. The 1st, 2nd, and 4th Heavy Weapons Battalions, 1st Infantry Battalion, Engineer Battalion, Reconnaissance Company, a Guard Platoon, and a Mortar Battalion were located in TA 1758-1757 on 24 Sep 50. The morale was extremely low.

1st and 2nd Telephone Platoons	36 men
Wireless Platoon	20 men
Staff Platoon (Operators)	15 men
Signal Supply Platoon	15 men

25 Sep 50 Volunteer Army:

The 2nd Platoon, 13th Company, Volunteer Army was first reported in combat against the 5th Marines on 25 Sep 50 in TA 1860. The Volunteer Army was formed on 20 Jul 50 at SARIWON, North Korea with a strength of 3,000 men. One (1) platoon of 35 men was made up of deserters from the 73th Regiment and sent to the hill at TA 1858 on 25 Sep 50.

9th Division:

The Heavy Machine Gun Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, 9th Division was first contacted west of YONGSAN in the southern sector of KOREA on 5 Sep 50. The 1st Battalion and 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment were contacted near SEOUL on 26 Sep 50. Many POW's from these units were taken during this period.

1st Regiment:

The following units with the indicated code names were reported to be in the 1st Regiment:

3/jwt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

25 Sep 50 1st Regiment: (Cont'd)

1st Company, 1st Battalion	O-BAL(5 shots)
1st Battalion	CHONGCHON-GANG
3rd Company, 2nd Battalion	

The regiment was reported to have 1,000 troops, each of the two (2) battalions having 450 troops. The regiment was formed at YONGYU, on 18 Jun 50 and arrived at SEOUL on 22 Sep 50. The rifles for the regiment were issued at EHWA Women's University. The 1st Battalion which counter-attacked our positions on 22 Sep 50 had seven (7) mortars, two (2) heavy machine guns, and five (5) light machine guns.

26 Sep 50 2nd Division:

One (1) POW was captured from the 2nd Division this date. There was no further contact made with this division.

10th Division:

One (1) POW from the 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 10th Division, was taken by our forces near the city of SEOUL. No further contact was made.

14th Division:

One (1) POW from the 2nd Regiment, 14th Division, was captured near the city of SEOUL. No further contact was made with this division.

27 Sep 50 43rd Division:

The 346th Tank Regiment, 43rd Division was formed in CHUK HONG and went into action on 22 Sep 50. The tanks were delivered to the 346th just before entering combat. The 3rd Regiment of the 43rd Division arrived in SEOUL on 23 Sep 50 and was organized as follows:

4th Infantry Battalion	100 men
Tank Battalion	87 men
AAA Battalion	80 men
NCO Battalion	100 men
H&S Battalion	150 men
Automatic Rifle Company	130 men
Engineer Units	(Unknown)
Signal Unit	20 men
Supply Unit	30 men

27 Sep 50 31st Brigade:

The 1st Battalion, 31st Brigade was formed at SEOUL on 10 Sep 50 at TA 2260. It was a Volunteer Unit, but became a regular army unit on 19 Sep 50. The 1st Battalion

3/jwt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

27 Sep 50 31st Brigade: (Cont'd)

had 500 men at TA 2058-K on 26 Sep 50. The 45mm Artillery Company of the 1st Battalion was formed on 6 Sep 50 in SEOUL. It had two (2) 45mm guns and two (2) 82mm mortars. Troops were formerly farmers and the officers were regulars in the North Korean Army. No live ammunition was used in the training of this organization.

70th Regiment:

This unit was formed in SINULJU on 13 Aug 50. It arrived in SEOUL on 9 Sep 50 with 4,300 men. The Regiment was composed of four (4) battalions of 1,000 men each with four (4) companies per battalion. Contact was made with elements of the 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, and an Engineer Company.

122nd Unit:

Contact was made with elements of this unit on 26 Sep 50 but it was not contacted again.

571st Unit:

The 1st Regiment was identified.

Volunteer Unit (Special):

Seven hundred (700) civilians were formed into a defensive unit at TA 2058-C on 7 Jul 50 for the defense of the city of SEOUL and were armed with bamboo poles fixed with bayonets.

28 Sep 50 17th Brigade:

This Brigade was known as the PYONGYANG Unit and the 2nd Regiment of the Brigade as Unit 122. The Brigade was formed in PYONGYANG with three (3) Battalions. Two (2) battalions with 350 troops each bypassed the city of SEOUL on 12 Sep 50 proceeding toward OKCHON but returned to SEOUL on 15 Sep 50. The Battalions went to Hill 296, TA 1860-Y on 17 Sep 50. One North Korean POW, who was a former member of the Chinese 8th Route Army, stated that 4,000 North Koreans from the 8th Route Army joined the 17th Brigade on 17 Aug 50. The 1st Regiment with 4,000 men departed, from PYONGYANG on 4 Sep 50 for the TAEGU sector. The Brigade Artillery Battalion departed on 6 Sep 50 and the 2nd Regiment with 2,500 men departed on 9 Sep 50. The 3rd Regiment with 2,000 troops remained in PYONGYANG. The 1st Regiment was considered to be the elite unit while the 2nd and 3rd Regiments were composed of recruits, students, and farmers. This Brigade suffered many casualties.

3/jwt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

29 Sep 50 98th Regiment:

This unit was formed in SARIWON and arrived in SEOUL on 21 Sep 50 with 1,000 men. The regiment was in the vicinity of TA 1860, but retreated upon contact with our forces. On 4 Oct 50, the regiment was reported to have 2,300 troops.

1 Oct 50 13th Infantry Division:

The 13th Infantry Division was formed in SINUI JU, North Korea, near the Manchurian Border in March 49 with 10,000 troops. The following units were reported to be in the Division:

19th Infantry Regiment	2,500 troops
21st Infantry Regiment	2,500 troops
23rd Infantry Regiment	2,500 troops
723rd Artillery Regiment	1,000 troops
Division Transportation Unit	70 troops
Anti-Tank Battalion	200-300 troops
Self-propelled Artillery Bn	200 troops
Engineer Battalion	300 troops
Signal Battalion	300 troops
Medical Battalion	(Unknown)

The following equipment was reported to be in the Table of Organization as indicated:

Infantry Regiment

6-Gustoba-67, 1½ ton trucks
4-120mm Howitzers
2-3-45mm guns
15-82mm mortars
6-45mm mortars
4-50 cal AA machine guns

Artillery Regiment

25-ZIS-150 4½ ton trucks
17-Gustoba-51, 1½ ton trucks
12-105mm guns
25-76mm guns

Self-propelled Artillery Battalion

8-SF 76mm guns

Anti-Tank Battalion

11-Gustoba 67 trucks
2-Gustoba 51 trucks
200-300 Anti-Tank Rifles

Division Motor Transport Section

4-ZIS 150 4½ ton trucks

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3/awt
1975

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX BAKER TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
(CONTINUED)

1 Oct 50

Engineer Battalion

1-Gustoba-51 truck

Signal Battalion

1-Gustoba-51 truck

Medical Battalion

2-trucks

One-third (1/3) of the troops in this Division had served more than one year. Two-thirds (2/3) were recruits. The morale was below average. The Communistic and Cultural training was not fully carried out. The entire Division arrived in SEOUL on 7 Jul 50.

27th Brigade:

The unit number of this Brigade is 635 and it was formed in KUM CHON, North Korea on 25 Jul 50. Its seven (7) battalions were in MUNSAN, South Korea on 30 Sep 50 with 5,000 troops. The 4th Battalion had 500 men, six (6) mortars, two (2) 82mm mortars, sixteen (16) heavy machine guns, fifty (50) sub-machine guns, and seventy (70) rifles. The Headquarters Company, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies, 1st Battalion and the Heavy Machine Gun, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion were all reported to be in KUMCHON-NI.

65th Engineer Unit:

Three (3) POW's identified this unit in TA 1076-Y.

4 Oct 50

77th Regiment:

This regiment was formed in HAEJU on 10 Sep 50 with 6,000 men. The regiment entrained for SEOUL, and was strafed by one (1) U.S. aircraft. The regiment fled from the train with the commanding officer and the train returned to HAEJU.

32nd Regiment:

On 24 Sep 50, 500 men from the 32nd Regiment arrived in SUWON and were ordered into the defense line there. There has been no further information received from this unit.

3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

24 December 1950

ANNEX CHARLIE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

S-3 SECTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The S-3 Section, under the direct supervision of the Regimental Executive Officer, performed its functions as outlined in paragraph 219 of the Staff Manual, 1948 (NAVMC 1022-DFI). No special organization or functions confronted the S-3 Section in the performance of its duties.

2. ORGANIZATION

<u>RANK</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Major	S-3	1
Lieutenant	Asst S-3	2
SSgt	Section Chief	1
SSgt	Asst Section Chief	1
SSgt	Radiological Safety NCO	1
Sgt	Clerk	1
Pfc	Clerk-Driver	1
Pfc	Draftsman	1

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Due to the urgency of planning and lack of time, the S-3 Section was required to prepare plans on a 24 hour a day basis in the several days available. Coordination of plans with other sections of the staff, with subordinate staffs, and with the operation section of Division left much to be desired.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

The S-3 Section had just participated in combat and no special training or rehearsals as related to the S-3 Section specifically was necessary.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The S-3 Section was embarked in its entirety with the Regimental Command Post.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT ASSEMBLY AREA

No comment

7. ASSAULT PHASE

The S-3 Section was divided for landing with part of the section landing with the Regimental Commander and the remainder landing with the Executive Officer in the conventional manner. No unusual circumstances presented themselves related to the section specifically.

8. ENEMY TACTICS

See Basic Report

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX CHARLIE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

The section as constituted functioned effectively and no changes in tables of organization or functioning is indicated except for the desirability of adding several runners to the section T/O. Almost without exception too little time existed between the time of receipt of orders and the time of execution. Most of the time operations moved so rapidly that the Regimental Commander would have to make an on the spot decision and orders prepared and issued in fragmentary form. Extensive use was made of runners, radio, and liaison officers to deliver orders. Several means of delivering orders were usually paralleled.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Difficulties experienced by the S-3 Section were generally of an administrative nature as follows:

(1) The present heavy field desk proved excessively bulky for field work. Two small fiber field desks of equal or improved characteristics would be more useful for a Regimental S-3 Section.

(2) A lighter and better designed CP tent would be an asset. The present CP tent is too bulky for the working space it provides. It does not afford sufficient space for the S-3, S-2, and Supporting Arms Liaison Sections. There is a definite requirement for a separate tent for each of these sections.

(3) The addition of two runners is recommended for the S-3 Section.

3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

24 December 1950

ANNEX DOG TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

S-4 SECTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The S-4 Section performed in general the functions outlined in paragraph 220 of the Staff Manual, 1948. This report outlines the logistical problems encountered and lessons learned as relates to the S-4 Section during the subject period.

2. ORGANIZATION

S-4	Major
Asst S-4	1stLt
Emb Officer	1stLt
S-4 Clerk	SSgt

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

The period from 6 September, 1950, to 15 September, 1950, was utilized in planning for and equipping the regiment for embarkation and for the landing at INCHON, KOREA. Planning and equipping was complicated by combat action, just preceding embarkation from 1 September to 5 September, which involved a rail and motor movement of thirty-five (35) miles followed by three (3) days of combat, and a motor move of seventy-five (75) miles. After the final move the regiment was reorganized to war strength and embarkation plans prepared in three (3) days.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

None

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The regiment commenced loading on naval vessels at PUSAN, KOREA on 6 September, 1950, completing on 12 September, 1950. Troops were embarked on 12 September, 1950, and the S-4 Section embarked with the regimental command post.

6. MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE AREA

The Regiment moved to INCHON, KOREA on board naval ships, arriving 15 September, 1950. The Embarkation Officer was transferred to the control vessel upon arrival to represent the regiment in logistical control during the landing.

7. ASSAULT PHASE

a. Operationally, a number of unusual logistical problems were encountered throughout the period. Some of those problems were:

(1) An excessive tide in the harbor of INCHON, with a tidal range of thirty (30) feet restricted the unloading of landing craft to the peak hours of each high tide.

(2) A river crossing in LVT's and a supply line extending across an unbridged river.

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3/jwt
1975

ANNEX DOG TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(3) Supply of two (2) battalions 10 and 14 miles from the Regimental Supply Dump. At one time it was necessary to supply one (1) battalion over fourteen (14) miles of territory which had not been entirely cleared of enemy.

(4) The difficulty of transporting heavy weapons of the battalions with T/E transportation.

(5) The difficulty of obtaining signal supplies now listed as general supply items.

b. Tidal conditions at INCHON prevented the continuous unloading of small craft. No supply vehicles were landed in the first high tide. Two (2) LST's with a mixed load of one hundred (100) tons of Class I, III, and V supplies were beached for unloading by the attached Shore Party Teams to alleviate the immediate supply problems on landing. Supply vehicles came ashore during 16 and 17 September, 1950, and thereafter Regimental vehicles picked up supplies and effected unit distribution. Division provided unit distribution after 18 September, 1950.

8. ENEMY

No comment

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

Embodied in paragraph seven (7) of the basic report.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Recommendations

(1) That a higher number of Shell, Illuminating, for 60mm and 81mm mortars be included in the Unit of Fire.

(2) That the difficulty of transporting heavy weapons of the battalion weapons company be overcome by replacing the T/E vehicles with four (4) 3/4 Ton Trucks, WC.

(3) That normal signal items, now listed as general supply items; six-inch lineman's pliers, field message books, and friction tape, be returned to signal supply.

(4) That bulky, heavy field desks be replaced by lighter, smaller, and sturdier desks.

(5) That at least one (1) officer, and one (1) enlisted be added to the authorized allowance for the S-4 Section.

(6) That all gas burning equipment be converted to permit use of 80 octane gasoline.

(7) That improved illuminating equipment be developed.

(8) That the war time T/E include two hundred (200) canteens, plastic, 2 1/2 gallon per infantry battalion.

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3/jwt
1975

ANNEX DOG TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(9) That lighter and less bulky galley equipment be developed. A mobile kitchen to serve a company is recommended as the basic unit.

(10) That all fuzes employed with mortar shells be capable of super-quick detonation.

3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

24 December 1950

ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

SUPPLY OFFICER REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

This report covers those phases of the regimental service function which relate specifically to supply. Even though the Supply Officer coordinated all elements of the Service Platoon, including Motor Transport and Ordnance, they are covered by separate reports. The Supply Officer functioned as a Special Staff Officer of the Regimental Commander.

2. ORGANIZATION

Supply Officer
Asst Supply Officer
Regimental Accountable Officer
Administrative Section, Supply and Accountable Office
Warehousing Section
Commissary Section
Ordnance Section
Maintenance Section

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Operational planning was accomplished in conjunction with the Regimental S-4. It was the primary responsibility of the Supply Officer to advise the S-4 and Commanding Officer on technical and special matters relative to procurement, material, supply movement, unit supply capabilities, and distribution to using units. Preliminary planning was limited largely to the execution of these functions in support of plans prepared.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No comment

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Supply functions executed were aimed primarily at procuring and distributing supplies and equipment to the task organization. Computation and arrangement for resupply shipments to sustain the organization were effected.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

No comment

7. ASSAULT PHASE

a. No effort was made to maintain on hand and carry Class II and IV supplies during combat. Classes II and IV were requisitioned from Division service elements as required. Classes I, III, and V were carried. The quantities of Classes I, III, and V carried generally conformed to experience tables contained in FM 101-10 adjusted to meet the tactical situation and available transportation.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

b. In addition to supply functions performed the Service Platoon collected, or caused to be collected, enemy and friendly salvage for movement to rear areas. Salvage evacuation was accomplished by returning salvage in transportation bringing supplies forward. Contact parties from the 1st Ordnance Battalion for ordnance repair were arranged when the situation permitted to repair weapons and avoid weapon replacement.

c. The procurement of Class II equipment and supplies was effected through informal requests to supply agencies as requirements developed. This method of Class II supply requisition was employed since it was not practicable for the Supply Section to carry Class II in combat. Therefore, the resupply of Class II was essentially limited to that required for immediate replacement. The replacement and supply of Class II was generally difficult due to the inability of supply agencies to fill or acknowledge requisitions submitted. Re-requisition and follow-up to another agency of supply was necessary for critical items of short supply and most times these were not filled requiring a third requisition usually to the agency of which the first request was made.

d. Due to short supply of Class II, personnel without equipment returning from hospitals and other casual units were extremely difficult to equip even after much time consuming effort. Recommendations were submitted so that replacements, returning casualties, and casuals be completely equipped in an area removed from the battlefield prior to sending them forward to regiment.

e. The Service Platoon made up the basic element of the Regimental Supply Train for displacement and during combat. During these times the Regimental Supply Officer was held directly responsible for the local security of the train as well as the supervision of supply functions. Without augmentation the personnel available in the Service Platoon for local security at the same time that supply functions were being executed appeared too small at times in view of extended distances from supporting infantry. It therefore appears appropriate that consideration always be given to retaining infantry protection of supply installations until they can be displaced to within local security distance of reserve elements.

8. ENEMY TACTICS

No comment

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

The regiment never lacked for sufficient supplies with which to conduct operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. In this operation over extended distances the Regimental level of supply was of vital importance to the conduct of operations from day to day. Many times incoming supplies went from truck to firing weapon and constant awareness and effort was required to keep supplies up. The supply elements of the regiment not only supplied organic infantry units but requisitioned, processed and distributed supplies to all attached elements as well. These attachments normally

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX EASY TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

included artillery, tanks, engineers, Amvico, and signal elements and other varied type units. The resulting effort required, placed considerable strain on a supply section organized to support the organic elements of the regiment. Some supply augmentation should be made to a reinforced regiment.

b. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that a basic reorganization of the Section be considered to include at least two Staff Noncommissioned Officers in the warehousing or material handling section and that the supply section be augmented habitually when substantial attachments are made in combat. Under combat conditions the Materials Handling Section is the primary operating unit of regimental supply and its capability to perform its functions strongly influence the potency of the Regimental Supply effort.

3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

24 December 1950

ANNEX FOX TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

Annex FOX deals with the Motor Transport phase of the report. It covers the organization, planning, loading, difficulties, along with comments and recommendations as pertain to motor transport maintenance in the 5th Marines during the period 6 September to 7 October, 1950.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. The Regimental Maintenance Section consisted of fifteen drivers, four mechanics, and a maintenance officer. In this section were tools, parts, and equipment sufficient to handle most repair other than major base maintenance jobs and welding. The maintenance system established was that battalions should take care of preventive and organizational maintenance as facilities or experience would permit. If the battalion required assistance, the vehicle would be sent to Regimental Maintenance for repair. If regiment could not effect repairs the vehicles were sent to 1st Motor Transport Battalion Shops. The Regimental Maintenance Section performed up to field maintenance in most instances during the operation.

b. Each battalion, separate company, and attached unit operated its own organic vehicles under parent control and prescribed drivers and organic maintenance personnel assignments. Each battalion possessed personnel and equipment necessary for driver and organizational maintenance. Separate companies and attached units sent vehicles direct to Regimental Maintenance for repairs and adjustments.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. Motor maintenance planning consisted of estimating spare parts requirements and planning an effective system of motor repair which would produce the greatest quantity of work in the fastest time. Types and amounts of spare parts required were arrived at by an estimate of the condition of the vehicles on hand, which had been previously used in training and in combat, a study of the road and weather conditions likely to be encountered, the loads to be carried, the type of driver available and from combat experience gained in operations in South Korea.

b. Due to anticipation of rough roads and extreme loads to be hauled, it was determined that the largest percentage of spare parts should be running gear (tires, tubes, springs, shock absorbers, and axles) and not motor parts as is normally the largest requirement. The Regimental maintenance truck was loaded with spare parts accordingly and were issued as units of the Regiment needed them. While the parts proved to be the minimum required, it was fortunate that regiment had such spare parts available because of the overall critical shortage of spare parts. A minimum number of vehicles were out of operation for repairs longer than a day or two at the time.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX FOX TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

a. Many of the vehicle operators were new as far as service vehicles were concerned. Training of these drivers emphasized preventive maintenance and drivers' maintenance procedures. Special attention was given to lubrication in the short periods of training time available.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

No comment

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

No comment

7. ASSAULT PHASE

a. The Regimental Maintenance Officer and the Headquarters and Service Company Maintenance Section supervised driver and organizational maintenance for the regiment. Maintenance functions which could not be performed by battalion maintenance personnel were brought to regiment and repaired or sent to a higher echelon if the work couldn't be performed with the means at hand. The Regimental Maintenance Section performed many repair tasks which should have normally been performed by higher echelon maintenance sections. Since such service was extremely limited and too long to accomplish it was necessary for regimental maintenance to perform field and sometimes base maintenance to alleviate a shortage of vehicles during combat. The extended overland operations made it difficult to make and maintain effective contact with Division supporting elements. The overall supply of parts and accessories was extremely short and difficult to obtain. Every vehicle that had to be abandoned or had been destroyed by fire was habitually salvaged and cannibalized completely to provide spare parts as an only alternative in keeping vehicles running. This effort required continuous long hours of work on the part of the motor maintenance section.

8. ENEMY TACTICS

No comment

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

The regiment had an almost 100% effective operating status of vehicles throughout the period. This is noteworthy in view of the fact that most of the vehicles had undergone months of operation in training prior to leaving the U.S.A. and had been through combat operations in Southern Korea.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. In order to provide a more balanced motor transport unit to support an Infantry Regiment in similar operations and still remain mobile and flexible, the following recommendations are submitted herewith:

(1) That the Regimental Maintenance Officer be redesignated as the Regimental Motor Transport Officer.

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3/2wc
1975

ANNEX FOX TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(2) That a Master Sergeant, with appropriate MOS, be included in Tables of Organization as maintenance chief.

(3) That a wrecker, a one-ton parts trailer, and one acetelyne welding set be included in regimental Tables of Equipment. This additional equipment is considered an essential requirement for organizational maintenance and should not be viewed as a recommendation to enlarge maintenance responsibility at the regimental level.

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3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

26 December 1950

ANNEX GEORGE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

MEDICAL SECTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to present the particular method of care and evacuation of wounded used in this Regiment; to describe the changes made in the original plan of evacuation; why the changes were made and how they were accomplished.

The mission of the Regimental Aid Station is two-fold: (a) the care and evacuation of casualties of the Headquarters and Service Company; (b) the supervision of all the Regimental medical activities professionally and logistically.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

The original Regimental Aid Station contained:

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Regimental Surgeon	1	LtCmdr (USM)
Asst Regimental Surgeon	1	Lt (j.g.) (USM)
Regimental Dentist	1	LtCmdr (USM)
Corpsmen	12 plus	2 HIC
Dental Technicians	2 plus	1 DTC

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

During the planning phase the Regimental Surgeon was separated from the Division Surgeon and concurrent planning was thus rendered difficult. The Division Medical plan was received prior to embarkation, however, and the medical plan for regiment was derived therefrom. The plan prepared, emphasized normal evacuation procedures for an amphibious landing with the regiment being supported directly by a collecting platoon. During extended land operations in South Korea, the Regimental Aid Station had served as a collecting station, and had enlarged the aid station facilities somewhat to include 9 "KD" ambulances. These ambulances were turned over to the supporting collecting platoon.

As many medical supplies as could be carried were obtained for the Regimental Aid Station with emphasis upon plasma, morphine, dressings, litters, and blankets. Twenty-four (24) rubberized waterproof communication bags were requisitioned and these were filled with plasma, morphine, dressings, and splints. Each battalion was issued six (6) of these bags and the Regimental Aid Station retained six (6). These bags were light enough to be carried easily by one man and allowed adequate dispersal of supplies. The heavier supplies were distributed in the plan for landing among the personnel not carrying the rubberized waterproof bags. Blankets were to be landed in small water repellent blanket packs.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Brief refresher talks and discussions were held for all medical personnel of the Regimental Aid Station. The site chosen for the proposed CP and Aid Station on landing were carefully pointed out to the medical personnel on both maps and aerial photos to insure that an understanding of evacuation sites and procedures were understood.

3/cir
1975

ANNEX GEORGE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

In the rush of turning the 9 "KD" ambulances over to the collecting platoon the vehicles were inadvertently placed aboard one vessel while their drivers remained with their parent unit aboard another. No serious difficulty resulted, for the vehicles were landed by the Regimental Motor Transport Officer during general unloading and were turned over to the regular drivers. Such incidents, however, point out the need for careful supervision of loading plans by respective commanders to insure drivers remain with their vehicles. Other loading of medical personnel and equipment proceeded according to plan.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA.

The Assistant Battalion Surgeon of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines became ill enroute and this necessitated his remaining aboard ship. The Regimental Headquarters was embarked with the 1st Battalion and the Assistant Regimental Surgeon was transferred to the 1st Battalion as replacement prior to landing. The Regimental Dentist was designated to remain aboard ship initially to act as rear echelon of the Aid Station in the absence of the Assistant Regimental Surgeon. He was to land on order with medical supplies and insure their safe arrival on the beach.

7. ASSAULT PHASE.

The original plan of evacuation for the amphibious landing, that is the direct evacuation from the Battalions to Collecting Company was carried out and worked well until the Regiment made the HAN River crossing. Direct evacuation continued for the assault phase of the crossing but, beginning September 22 it became necessary for the Regimental Aid Station to commence functioning as a Collecting Station for the following reasons:

- a. Moderately heavy casualties without additional Medical support.
- b. Lack of organic transportation in the Battalions, and especially in the attached Korean Marine Corps units.
- c. Extended lines of evacuation. When attempting to evacuate direct, the ambulances were not only enroute too long but it was necessary that there be an intermediate station enroute where the cases could be checked for shock, hemorrhage, tourniquets loosened, etc.
- d. Ease in air evacuation. The Regimental Aid Station serving as a Collecting Station was relatively more secure from enemy fire than Battalion Aid Stations and easier to find from the air.
- e. To assist the Battalions in supply, and to support them with casualty care at a close distance. The unexpectedly heavy casualties, often in quantity at night, occasionally left the Battalion Aid Station swamped and unable to do complete work. The Regimental Aid Station was therefore able to assist them in placing cases in better traveling condition. This was particularly true on one occasion when the 1st Battalion Aid Station came under shell fire and received a number of casualties among their own medical personnel.

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3/clr
1975

ANNEX GEORGE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

In order to accomplish the mission of collecting casualties, the Regimental Aid Station required augmentation and upon request was increased by one (1) doctor and nine (9) corpsmen. Transportation for evacuation was plentiful on supply vehicles returning to the rear and use was made of many available vehicles - 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, amphibian tractors, LUKW's, Personnel carriers, as well as ambulances. LUKW's and Amphibious tractors were used to cross the river initially until a ferry was installed.

Due to the change in the weather, blankets came into critical supply the night of September 23, 1950. There were none available in the 5th Marines nor in units supplying the 5th Marines. The next day this situation was alleviated by a supply from Shore Party, and by September 25th many blankets were available. All other supplies were plentiful and available on short notice.

8. ENEMY TACTICS.

It has been the policy to establish the Regimental Aid Station within the Headquarters and Service Company perimeter of defense. Aid Station personnel are instructed to dig in as soon as possible and to take advantage of available cover. They were also instructed in the use of small arms prior to the invasion.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION.

The following numbers of casualties were evacuated through the Regimental Aid Station:

<u>MARINES</u>	<u>ROKS</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>POWS</u>
793	175	212	80

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended that when the line of advance is along one main avenue of approach and when the chain of evacuation is extended as in this operation, the collecting sections of the clearing companies be placed directly under Regimental control for the following reasons:

a. Ambulances nearby at regiment can be dispatched as required to the various units.

b. The length of haul from regiment to the rear is usually the longest and the ambulances of the collecting section can be used for this purpose instead of the organization ambulances.

c. The Regiment usually occupies a control and intermediate point along the line of evacuation and is therefore physically in a good position to check patients and direct ambulance activities to the Clearing Section. This recommendation does not apply to the system of evacuation in effect for an amphibious landing; it applies in extended overland operations or restricted roadnets only.

3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

26 December 1950

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

CHAPLAINS' SECTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The mission of the Chaplains' Section is:

(1) To bring men to God and God to men by:

- (a) Providing adequate spiritual and moral leadership.
- (b) Making adequate provisions for formal worship services.

(2) Under the Regimental Commander, to assist in maintaining a high state of morale.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. Table of Organization (*denotes wartime complement only)

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>RANK/RATE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
Regimental Chaplain	LCDR(USN ChC)	4100
Asst Regimental Chaplain	LT(USN ChC)	4100
*Chaplain	LTJG(USN ChC)	4100
Clerk	Cpl	5243
Clerk	Cpl	5243
*Clerk	Cpl	5243

b. Present Organization

	<u>RANK/RATE</u>	<u>SERV. NO</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>CHURCH</u>
Regimental Chaplain Orlando INGVALDSEN, JR.	LCDR	223739	4100	Lutheran
Assistant Chaplains				
Lawrence R. PHILLIPS	LT	351175	4100	Cong. Chr.
Bernard E. HICKEY	LTJG	527073	4100	Roman Catholic
Clerks				
Earl R. BUHMAN	Sgt	1087903	5243	Roman Catholic
Paul B. BARGER	Pfc	649497	5200	Methodist

c. Duties

(1) Regimental Chaplain

(a) The Regimental Chaplain is a member of the Regimental Commander's Special Staff. As such he is:

1. Present at all Staff Conferences which includes the Special Staff.
2. Advises the Regimental Commander in matters relating to the Chaplains' Mission.
3. Acts as representative of the Regimental Commander in those matters relating to the Chaplains' Mission.

(2) Assistant Chaplain

(a) The duties of the Assistant Chaplains are:

1. To conduct such Religious Services and functions as his Church requires.
2. To assist the Regimental Chaplain in the accomplishment of the Chaplains' Mission.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Chaplains were assigned and accompanied troops to the objective, as follows:

ECDR O. INGOLDSTAD, JR., 2/5 on USS CAVALIER (APA 37)
LT W. G. TARRANT, 1/5 on USS HENRICO (APA 45)
LTJG B. L. HICKEY, 3/5 on USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No comment.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. Regarding Embarkation

(1) Regimental Chaplains should maintain a full supply of consumable non-perishable church equipment crated and ready at all times for embarkation. This would include:

1000 New Testaments (American Bible Society preferred because of Prayers and Hymns inserted which makes it possible to be used for field services)
500 Protestant Prayer Books
500 Catholic Military Missals
500 Rosaries
200 Field Hymn Books
1 Portable Field Organ

(2) The Church Affiliation of Ship's Chaplains are taken into consideration so that, insofar as possible, a Protestant and Catholic Chaplain may be on each transport.

(3) Chaplains' office equipment is Line # 2 material for shipping. As such, it may or may not be available during the voyage; but by personally contacting the Regimental Embarkation Officer, certain pieces of equipment can be made accessible for use during the trip and combat unloading.

b. Regarding Debarkation

(1) Chaplains debark and go ashore in company with the Aid Station of the battalion to which they are operationally attached.

(2) Supplies and equipment of minimum nature, depending on operation, accompany them.

(3) Remainder of supplies are to accompany the Administrative Section of Regiment.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Church Services were held aboard ship.

7. OPERATIONS

30 Aug - 6 Sep - 5th Marines were in reserve at MASAN and in action west of MIRYANG, KOREA. This phase is covered in a previous report.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

During this time the Chaplains were informed that there would be an amphibious landing in the near future, and that one Chaplain was to accompany each battalion.

6-12 Sep - Protestant and Catholic Services were held at various dock areas at PUSAN and on various ships on which our troops were embarked.

15 Sep - Chaplains landed with Battalion Aid Stations at INCHON, KOREA. Chaplain INGOLDSTAD received a minor shrapnel wound.

15-17 Sep - Because of rapid advances and separated zones of battalions, no interchange of Chaplains between battalions was possible, nor were Services conducted. Wounded were attended.

18-19 Sep - Catholic and Protestant Services were held in 2/5 and 3/5.

20 Sep - The HAN River was crossed and the Regiment advanced toward SEOUL; Chaplains remaining with respective battalions.

22 Sep - Chaplain TARRANT was wounded by mortar shrapnel and evacuated. Division Chaplain was requested to send a replacement.

23 Sep - Lieutenant L. R. PHILLIPS, ChC, USN, joined the Regiment. Chaplains were then assigned as follows:

LCDR O. INGOLDSTAD - 1/5 and 2/5 Aid Stations
LT L. R. PHILLIPS - Regimental Aid Station
LTJG B. L. HICKEY - 3/5 Aid Station

On this day, heaviest casualties to date were received by 2/5; 91 passing through the Aid Station, and many dead were unable to be removed from the field of action. This action continued the following day for 2/5 with 125 casualties, but moderated on 25 September with 65 casualties and advance to outskirts of SEOUL.

26 Sep - Protestant and Catholic Services were again held in Regiment, 1/5, and 3/5.

27 Sep - 3/5 reached Capitol Building in SEOUL and mopping up activities continued to 29 September.

29 Sep - Chaplains were reassigned as follows:

LCDR O. INGOLDSTAD, JR. - Regiment
LT L. R. PHILLIPS - 2/5
LTJG B. L. HICKEY - Regiment

This enabled Chaplains HICKEY and INGOLDSTAD to work on letters to next of kin while Chaplain PHILLIPS accompanied 2/5 on a separate mission some ten (10) miles away from the Regimental CP.

30 Sep - 4 Oct - Mopping-up in SEOUL and advance northwest of SEOUL; furthest point of advance being eighteen (18) miles reached by the 3rd Battalion.

5 Oct - 5th Marines moved to assembly area, INCHON, preparing to embark for next operation.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX HON TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

8. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. In spite of the activity attendant to the loading of ships, Chaplains can, and did hold numerous Services so that all units had opportunity for Worship before being separated on ships not having Chaplains.

b. Opportunity was also given so that each man could have his own personal Testament or Prayer Book. The Chaplains' Section of the FUSAM Base Command was very helpful and generous in giving needed supplies. Catholic and Protestant Chaplains should be concerned, prepared, and offer supplies to men of other Faiths.

c. Assignment of Chaplains to the same battalions for an operation may appear to be the best employment of Chaplains. However, in a Regiment going through several operations, it has proven best to rotate the Chaplains between the battalions so that the men of various Faiths in each battalion may have the closer services of Chaplains of their own Faiths at some time during the campaign.

d. In this operation, it was somewhat difficult for Chaplains without jeeps to move to battalions other than their own for Services due to the bulk of Testaments, Prayer Books, Hymn Books, and other Chaplains' supplies to be carried.

e. The system whereby the Division Chaplain was able to replace a wounded Chaplain in less than 24 hours was very commendable.

f. The Regimental Aid Station also served in this operation as a Collecting and Clearing Station. In this arrangement, it is very desirable to have four (4) Chaplains to a Regiment so that one Chaplain could be at Regiment at all times. 762 casualties were handled by Regimental Aid Station during the period 15-30 September.

g. Burials were accomplished under supervision of the Division Chaplain by Chaplains of supporting organizations. In a shorter or less extended operation, it would be well if Chaplains of units to which the deceased belonged could also conduct their Funeral Services.

h. It was commendable that a Division Memorial Service could be conducted prior to departure from the area.

i. The system of assembling all next of kin and burial information by the Division Chaplain was of invaluable help to Regiments whose personnel records are not available in combat.

j. Chaplains again did their best to conduct themselves and offer their services in a manner of inspiration and helpfulness to the men of this command.

k. During the period, the Chaplains' Section operated in accordance with the following:

(1) Under Battle Conditions

(a) It has been found advisable to have one Chaplain and Clerk with each battalion. Chaplains and Clerks remain administratively attached to Regimental Headquarters and Service Company,

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX HOW-TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

but are attached to the battalions for operational control. Assignments are made by the Regimental Chaplain. At opportune times, Chaplains are rotated between battalions so that each battalion may have the benefit of each Chaplain's particular Ministry.

(b) Chaplains may, and should, use their initiative to visit other battalions so that both Protestant and Catholic Services are frequently held in each battalion. If possible, the Regimental Chaplain should be informed beforehand; otherwise, he should always be informed as soon afterward as possible of the Services that are held by the Assistant Chaplains.

(c) Although there is no Table of Equipment for the Chaplains' Section, the equipment recommended for this type of operation for each Chaplain is:

1. Jeep and trailer, in which are carried:

- a. One typewriter, chest, and office supplies.
- b. One portable Altar Kit. (Supplied by Navy)
- c. Adequate Testaments, Prayer Books, and Religious supplies. (Supplied from Religious Sources)
- d. One portable Organ and Hymn Books. (Supplied by Navy)
- e. Two camp stools.

(d) In addition to clerical and musical abilities, Chaplains' Clerks should be qualified jeep drivers, and as far as possible, be assigned to Chaplains of similar Faith.

(e) The Chaplain's base of operation shall be the Aid Station of the organization to which he is operationally attached, and in no case shall he leave the battalion without notifying proper authority in the battalion.

(f) It has become a cherished custom and tradition for Marines to hold a Memorial Service for their departed comrades before leaving the theater of action. These and Funeral Services are normally conducted under the supervision of the Division Chaplain. At times, the Regiment may be on a separate mission and these Services will be conducted by the Regiment. A tested and satisfactory type of combined Funeral and Memorial Service is as follows:

1. Setting:

One Marine who knew departed stands at the head of each grave. Funeral party assembles at foot of Cemetery. Chaplains facing funeral party.

2. Service:

- a. Catholic Prayers, Scripture.
- b. Protestant Scripture, Prayers. Regimental Chaplain says: "Let us all kneel in honor and memory of our departed comrades while the Chaplains go to each grave for the grave-side service." (Funeral party and Marines at each grave kneel).
- c. Chaplains go to respective graves for grave-side service. Regimental Chaplain says: "Let us stand."
- d. Catholic Prayers, Scripture.

3/jvt
1975

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

- e. Protestant Scripture, Prayers.
- f. Lord's Prayer by all.
- g. Benediction.
- h. Firing of three volleys.
- i. Sounding of Taps.

(f) (Continued) If it is to be a Memorial Service only, 2.b. of the Service may be:

Regimental Chaplain says: "Let us all kneel in honor and memory of our departed comrades while the Chaplains lead us in prayer." (Funeral party and Marines at each grave kneel while Chaplains turn and face toward graves and offer Prayers of Intercession and Blessing.

(g) Letters to next of kin should be written by the Chaplain most closely connected to the deceased. Copies of such letters are sent to the Division Chaplain. Letters are not mailed directly to the next of kin, but are sent, signed and unsealed, in a larger envelope to:

Commandant of the Marine Corps, (Code DGU),
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington 25, D. C.

where they are mailed. This is to prevent letters being mailed to next of kin who have not been officially notified. Extreme care should be taken that dates and grave numbers are the same as the official records show.

(2) In Bivouac or Rest Area

(a) A Chaplain's Office for all Chaplains of the Regiment is maintained in a centrally located, easily accessible position. It should be so arranged that each Chaplain has a private room for consultation and an outer office for clerks.

(b) Although there is no Table of Equipment for the Chaplains' Section, the equipment necessary includes desks, typewriters, file cabinets, chairs, book cases sufficient to accommodate the staff.

(c) If the Bivouac Area is unimproved, three storage tents should be provided. One to be used as an office, and the other two together to form a Chapel.

(d) The Regimental Chapel should also be located in the central part of the Regimental area, close to the Chaplain's Office, and used only for Religious Services. These Services would include daily Catholic Mass, Protestant Bible Classes and week-day Services in addition to the Sunday Services.

(e) While it is desirable that Chaplains are out visiting the units of the Regiment, at least one Chaplain should be available for call as required.

(f) When battalions have their own messhall, the method of regular liaison with each battalion is for each Chaplain to spend the hour or two preceding and following the noon meal with a different battalion each day.

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1975

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(g) General supervision and preparation of duty rosters and Chapel schedules is the responsibility of the Regimental Chaplain, although he may delegate such details as he sees fit.

(h) The senior enlisted clerk is in charge of all enlisted personnel assigned to the Chaplain's Section and responsible for their proper performance of duty.

(i) Assignments to specific duties will be made by him, subject to the approval of the Regimental Chaplain. Such duties include typing, file, upkeep and cleaning of Chapel and offices, music for Chapel Services, etc.

(j) Each Chaplain is to conduct such Religious Services and functions as his particular Church requires, but planning and scheduling of same is coordinated by the Regimental Chaplain.

1. In conclusion:

(1) The Chaplains' Manual, NavPers 15664, 1949 edition, is the guide and authority for the Chaplain's duties.

(2) Common sense in the rapidly changing conditions of battle, remembering to pursue the goal of "Bringing men to God and God to men" under all conditions and at all times is the constant and unchanging norm for all Chaplains.

3/clr
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines,
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force,
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

26 December 1950

ANNEX ITEM TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ORDNANCE SECTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION:

The Ordnance Section of the 5th Marines was responsible for the procurement, storage and issue of all Class V items, supervision of the Ordnance maintenance function, and related staff functions pertaining to Ordnance.

2. ORGANIZATION:

The Ordnance Section consists of the following personnel:

One (1) Officer with rank of CWO
Two (2) TSgt, (One Ordnance Supply Chief)
(One Ammunition Technician)
One (1) SSGT, (Ordnance Supply Chief)
One (1) Corporal, (Unit Supply Clerk)

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING:

The Ordnance Section procured from the Brigade Ordnance Section at FUSAN a basic load of ammunition for all Battalions, and requested Ordnance maintenance contact parties for the repair of all ordnance items in the hands of the Regiment.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS:

Not applicable.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION:

The Ordnance Section block loaded twenty (20) tons of ammunition, peculiar to weapons used in the 5th Marines aboard trucks which were later to be loaded on LST's (Landing Ship Tanks) to follow the assault landing.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA:

Not applicable.

7. OPERATION

The Ordnance Section moved as part of the Service Platoon in the Regimental train. There was at least one (1) days supply of ammunition in the Regimental Ammunition Dump most of the time. This supply was retained mobile loaded aboard trucks when transportation availability permitted and moved in conjunction with the Regimental train where immediate delivery could be made on request to the assault battalions.

The below listed ammunition was issued by Regimental Supply during the period 15 September - 26 September which included the period of greatest activity:

<u>Type of Ammunition</u> <u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Amount Expended</u>
CART, Ball, carb, M1	68,150

3/clr
1975

Inchon - Seoul Opns

~~ANNEX I-11-10~~ 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

Type of Ammunition Nomenclature	Amount Expended
<i>Cont Ball Contain M1</i>	<i>18,150</i>
CART, AP, Cal..30, M2	118,570
8rd clips	
CART, AP, Cal..30, M2 in cartons	45,000
CART, Blt 4AP, 1Tr (M2&M1)	240,000
CART, Ball, Cal..45, M1911	2,000
ROCKET, WP, M10, 2.36"	96
ROCKET, HEAT, 3.5"	42
SHELL, HB, M49A2, w/EPD <i>60</i>	2,028
52A1	
SHELL, Ill, M83A1, w/f <i>60</i>	96
M65	
SHELL, snk, WP, M302, w/f <i>75</i>	140
PD M52A1	
SHELL HB, M43A1, w/f PD <i>81</i>	3,468
M52A1	
SHELL, HB, M56, w/f TM77 <i>81</i>	238
SHELL, HB, M56, w/f PD M53 <i>81</i>	347
SHELL, smoke, WP, w/f M57 <i>81</i>	240
SHELL, HB, M13 w/f PD M9 <i>4.2</i>	1,122
SHELL, smoke, WP, M2 <i>4.2</i>	254
GRENADE, Frg, MKII	2,950
GRENADE, Ind, Ill, MK I	175
ADAPTER, Gren, proj, M1A1	192
FLARE, Trip, para, M48	28
FLARE, Trip, M49	48
CART, Cal..30, AP, 5rd clips	45,300

The Ordnance Section contacted the 1st Ordnance Battalion to provide contact parties to repair all weapons that were turned into the Ordnance Section for repair. This eliminated many requests for items from the Ordnance Supply Company. All weapons that couldn't be repaired by contact parties were sent back to the Ordnance Maintenance Company for repair or salvage.

During the operation the 1st Ordnance Battalion did field maintenance repair on the following:

30 BAR
350 M1 Rifles
176 Carbine
12 Pistol, Cal..45
17 Machine Gun, Cal..30, M1917A1
5 Mortar, 81mm
7 Mortar, 60mm
6 Launcher, Rocket, 3.5"

The below listed weapons were received as replacements from Supply Company, 1st Ordnance Battalion:

65 BAR
122 M1 Rifles
30 Carbines, M2
8 Machine Gun, Cal..30, M1919A4
2 Machine Gun, Cal..30 M1917A1
2 Mortar tubes
24 Barrel, Machine Gun, Cal..30, (heavy)

3/clr
1975

ANNEX ITEM TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

6 Barrel, Machine Gun, Cal. .30, (light)
3 Sight, M4, for 81mm and 60mm mortar
1 75mm Recoilless gun

8. ENEMY TACTICS.

Not applicable.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION.

No comment.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. It is recommended that in similar overland fast moving situations that the Regimental Supply train be authorized five, (5) trucks, 6x6, 2-1/2 tons, for use for mobile ammunition supply.

b. That a salvage section be included in the organization of Battalion Headquarters to provide positive assistance in the recovery of all usable ordnance or other salvage items.

c. That the Division Ammunition Supply Point be located as near as possible to the assault forces and that Division deliver ammunition to Regimental Supply Points whenever possible to do so.

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1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

26 December 1950

ANNEX JIG TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to present the communication procedures that contributed to the overall success of the 5th Marines during the period 6 September - 7 October, 1950, (the INCHON-SEOUL Operation).

2. ORGANIZATION

The organization of the Communication Platoon of Headquarters and Service Company, 5th Marines, is comprised of the following sections:

a. The Radio Section is organized on the Table of Organization series "K" 1097, and consists of a Technical Sergeant as Radio Chief with twenty-six (26) fully qualified radio operators and technicians.

b. The Wire Section, also organized under Table of Organization series "K" 1097, consisting of a Technical Sergeant as Wire Chief and twenty-four (24) fully qualified wiremen and technicians.

c. The Message Center Section, organized under Table of Organization series "K" 1097, consists of a Staff Sergeant as Message Center Chief and eleven (11) message center personnel.

d. Platoon Headquarters consists of two officers, the Communication Officer and the Assistant Communication Officer, the latter being charged for the most part with duties of Signal Supply and Repair Officer. Two Master Sergeants complete the Headquarters group, one assigned as Administrative Communication Chief and the other assigned as Operations Communication Chief.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Planning for the communication elements of the 5th Marines commenced upon the receipt of signal instructions from higher echelon which included operating instructions and frequency assignments for the Division. The supply of communication items and expendable supplies commenced as soon as they were available after arriving at PUSAN. The regimental plan for communications was written and approved and distribution was effected prior to the departure for the objective area. The 5th Marines, having been in contact with the enemy 3 - 5 September prior to joining the Division, found that little planning time remained.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

There was no training and rehearsal phase for the Communication Platoon of the 5th Marines. There was no time allotted for such a phase and any information or explanation of situations was covered by the use of daily conferences during the afloat phase. These conferences were accomplished from the level of the Communication Officer down to the Communication Chiefs and the Section Chiefs, already mentioned. Many hours were spent on the part of the Section Chiefs in the briefing of the remainder of the Platoon. It is an established fact that this type of briefing was well presented as there was not one man who, at the time for him to play his part, did not know what to do, how to perform it and why he was performing the task.

3/clr
1975

ANNEX JIG TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

The loading and embarkation phase was carried out to the letter of the standing operating procedure, an advance message center was established "S" day minus four and remained in operation continuously and was aided in their operation by a field wire installation on the pier which placed the Regimental Commander in communications with all elements in the task organization. The signal equipment was properly combat loaded. Communication priorities were established and maintained. Equipment for the initial communications of the landing force was kept in the sleeping compartments with the personnel.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA.

As far as the communication phase in the movement to the objective area, there was no activity with the exception of the already mentioned conferences. Upon the arrival at the objective area, radio silence was lifted for the landing force and the required radio nets were manned.

7. ASSAULT PHASE.

Communications for the assault phase were accomplished by the use of portable equipment. There were no radio failures during the ship to shore phase and communications with both higher and lower echelons were established in a minimum of time. Higher power equipment and mobile equipment arrived at the Command Post on schedule and were ready for the move forward of the Regimental Command Post the following day when the attack toward KIMPO Airfield was launched. There is no change indicated in the mission of signal communications in the assault phase or the exploitation phase whatsoever. The one and only mission remains to provide communications in as many forms as are necessary for the commander to exercise control over his units.

8. ENEMY.

No problems arose from the enemy in the form of radio countermeasures.

9. ESTIMATED RESULT OF OPERATION.

The estimated results of communication operations were good to very good. In some cases the performances of certain types of equipment were far beyond the expected. The commander was provided at all times, with means of communication that kept him abreast of the situation and the regimental staff was at all times provided with functional communications that kept them informed of the situation enabling them to advise the commander of information peculiar to their specialty.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

From the standpoint of earlier operations, it was apparent that the regiment had to have some added facilities in the form of radio and wire equipment to enable it to carry out the assigned missions over long distances. This was accomplished by the augmentation of a carrier link system and a more powerful radio transmitter and receiver for point to point nets when the regiment was separated

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3/clr
1975

ANNEX JIG TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

from either its subordinate units or from higher echelon. Personnel were furnished with this equipment and fitted into the task organization of the platoon. Recommendations for personnel increases are not necessary. The platoon as organized under the war tables of "K" 1097 are satisfactory for the accomplishment of the mission. Equipment recommendations are:

a. Replace all present wire with WD-1-TT. Wire W110-B and wire W-130 were either too bulky for easy movement or too light for effective use. One issue of the WD-1-TT proved to be the outstanding wire that was used.

b. A lighter weight switchboard could be utilized but would have to be of the same quality of those currently in use.

c. The table of equipment for the communication platoon should include adequate transportation for the supply and resupply of the regiment reinforced. The requirements for transportation were particularly emphasized in overland operations similar to this. Often the signal officer had to supply numerous attached units as well as the organic battalions and the weight of supplies proved quite heavy. On a number of occasions these supplies had to be first picked up at higher echelon far to the rear and then delivered to subordinates.

d. The addition of a 4x4 one quarter ton jeep in the message center proved to be a valuable asset for scheduled and special messenger service. This item should be included in the tables of equipment for the Regiment, particularly for extended overland operations when messenger runs were so extended..

3/clr
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines,
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force,
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

26 December 1950

ANNEX KING TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ARTILLERY LIAISON REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION.

a. The purpose of this annex is to present the particular procedures employed by the artillery liaison section operationally attached to 5th Marines during the period 6 September - 7 October 1950.

b. The artillery liaison officer had two clearly defined responsibilities:

(1) To act as the artillery advisor for the Regimental Commander and as the Coordinator of the Supporting Arms Center.

(2) To act as liaison officer for the Battalion Commander 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.

c. As the artillery advisor, the liaison officer was responsible for the preparation of preparatory, interdiction, and harassing fire plans for the Regimental Commander's approval. To intelligently do so the artillery liaison officer was required to keep himself continuously informed of the tactical situation, and the proposed schemes of maneuver.

d. As the Coordinator of the Regimental Supporting Arms Center he: (1) Acted in the capacity of a section head for the combined Air, Anti-tank, 4.2 Mortar Company, Tank, Naval Gunfire Liaison and Artillery liaison Sections. (2) Coordinated preparatory and harassing artillery, naval gun, and mortar fires and air strikes.

e. As liaison officer to the artillery battalion commander, he performed all duties consistent with normal artillery liaison.

2. ORGANIZATION.

The artillery liaison section, in the absence of an established table of organization, was constituted as follows:

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Artillery Liaison Officer	1	Major
Asst Artillery Liaison Officer	1	Captain
Section Chief	1	SSgt
Wire Chief	1	Sgt
Radio Chief	1	Sgt
Wire Team Chief	2	Cpl
Wiremen	6	Pfc
Radionen	2	Pfc
Driver	1	Pfc

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

a. The artillery liaison section was divided into two parties for the amphibious landing at LUCHON. The first party, with the artillery liaison officer in charge consisted of the Section Chief, two radionen, and three wiremen. This party was equipped with a 610 radio and the necessary equipment for minimum telephone communication upon landing. The second party, with the assistant artillery liaison officer in charge consisted of the Wire Chief and one Wireman. This party was equipped with additional telephones and combat wire to supplement liaison communications after landing.

3/cir
1975

ANNEX KING TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

The remainder of the section, consisting of the two Wire Team Chiefs, the Radio Chief, two Wiremen and the Driver, was assigned to remain with the section's vehicles aboard ship. The section was equipped with the following transportation.

- 1 - 1/2 ton 4x4 truck, Radio Jeep - 608 Radio
- 2 - 1/2 ton 4x4 truck, cargo jeep, wire w/trlr
- 1 - 1/2 ton 6x6 truck, cargo w/trlr

b. A number of artillery plans of fire were prepared within the zone of action of the 5th Marines during the planning phase at PUSAN. These fire plans were designed so as to provide preplanned fires for elements of the regiment based on several possible schemes of maneuver. Overlays were prepared and distributed to the artillery liaison officers with the infantry battalions, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and the 11th Marine Regiment. The various series of fires were to be adjusted, controlled or cancelled by the battalion liaison officers in accordance with the requirements of the infantry elements at the time. The entire plan was based on the assumption that the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, would land on VOLMI-DO Island in sufficient time to allow daylight registration and thence be able to support the main landing of the 5th Marines on Red beach of INCHON. The tide range and the short period of daylight remaining after H-hour, among other factors, resulted in the inability of the battalion to accomplish registration. The end results of the planning was therefore nullified.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS.

Briefing on the intelligence situation; the schemes of maneuver of the division; the scheme of maneuver of the regiment; and school on individual duties was conducted enroute to the Objective area.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

The section, less the 2 1/2 ton 6x6 cargo truck with the driver, and the 1/2 ton 4x4 radio jeep and the driver was loaded and personnel embarked aboard the USS HENRICO, APA 45. The cargo truck was loaded aboard the LST 914; and the radio jeep aboard the USS PICKAWAY, APA 222.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

The section, less the personnel noted, sailed from PUSAN on the 12th of September, 1950, and landed at INCHON on 15 September, 1950.

7. OPERATIONS.

a. Assault Phase.

The artillery liaison section, due to the inability of 1st Battalion, 11th Marines to land and register prior to darkness was unable to function in artillery support of the assault phase of the landing at INCHON. The coordination of air and naval gunfire support for the landing was effected at the attack force-landing force level.

b. Exploitation Phase.

The period extending from the assault landing to the capture of SEOUL inclusive was characterized by the execution of normal

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3/clr
1975

ANNEX KING TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

artillery liaison functions. Due to the open nature of the terrain the functioning of the Supporting Arms Center was not particularly complicated. The most difficult problem encountered during the entire operation by the artillery liaison section was one of communications. The open and extended nature of operations placed a strain on artillery communications. The period immediately prior to the capture of SEOUL through the seizure of the city found the entire communications system between the liaison sections, the forward observer sections and the artillery battalion dependent upon radio. Wire communications was not established because of a natural obstacle, the HAN River. The artillery Battalion and Regiment were unable to be contacted by wire until they crossed the river.

8. ENEMY.

No comment.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION.

The infantry was never without artillery support in quantities required. Even when infantry battalions operated on detached missions an artillery element normally accompanied it. The coordination of supporting arms was effectively and rapidly accomplished throughout.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

As mentioned above, all communications between the supported regiment and the supporting artillery battalion during the period subsequent to the crossing of the HAN was by radio. The HAN River, physical battle losses, and excessive periods of operation caused radio communications to fall short of perfection. The resupply problem, due to the congested river crossing, further hampered attempts to improve the communications. The experience confirmed the fact that a more effective and reliable system of communications for artillery battalions should be developed. It is felt that the present 610 radios and the 619 radios are not suitable, and should be replaced with more reliable sets.

RECOMMENDATION -

1. That the present 619 radio with a wet cell battery be replaced with a dry cell battery; or, a long-life wet-cell battery capable of a minimum operating time of seventy-two (72) hours.

2. During the entire INCHEON-SEOUL Operation, the effectiveness of enemy mortars and high velocity weapons was particularly good. The harassing fires delivered at night by the enemy was accurate and at times heavy. However, a very sharp decrease in the volume of this fire was noted whenever night fighters or other aircraft were on station. While high performance night fighters are effective for partial prevention of this harassing fire, the vulnerable periods at twilight and dusk could be impeded by the addition of artillery spotting aircraft. Their slower flight characteristics and the presence of experienced observers to bring observed artillery fire on these targets would do much to complete the elimination of enemy harassing and interdiction fires. It is therefore recommended that artillery liaison planes be considered, consistent with operational and maintenance capabilities, as supplementary aircraft for night flying and subsequent adjustment of artillery fire on located enemy targets.

3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

26 December 1950

ANNEX LOVE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

NAVAL GUNFIRE REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The following Naval Gunfire Special Action Report, covering the INCHON-SEOUL area operation, is submitted to cover the period 6 September - 7 October, 1950.

b. The assigned mission of the NGF Team was to provide liaison for the 5th Marines with naval gunfire support elements during the landings at WOLMI-DO and INCHON, and the subsequent advance inland while within range of naval guns. The team worked closely with the Division NGF Officer and the FSCG.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. The team was attached to H&S Company, 5th Marines, and was organized as follows:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
NGF Liaison Officer	Lt, USN	1102	1
Team Chief	TSgt	0849	1
Radio Chief	Sgt	2533	1
Radio Operator	Sgt	2531	1
Radio Operator; Driver	Cpl	2531	1
Radio Operator; Asst Driver	Cpl	2500	1
Radio Operator	Cpl	2531	2
Radio Operator	Cpl	2543	1
Radio Operator	Cpl	2500	1
Radio Operator	Pfc	2533	1
Radio Operator	Pfc	2500	2

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. Plans were formulated as to:

(1) The order in which personnel and equipment were to be landed.

(2) Radio nets to be activated during the ship to shore movement, upon landing, and after all personnel and equipment were ashore.

b. Directives under which operating were:

(1) Regimental Operation Order Number 15-50.

(2) NGF Annex GEORGE to ComFibGru One Operation Order Number 14-50.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

a. Training was conducted as follows:

(1) Instructions on standard spotting and general bombardment procedures.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX LOVE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(2) Extensive radio drills.

(3) Use of authenticator tables and shackle codes.

b. There were no opportunities for conducting rehearsals.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. Equipment was loaded as follows:

(1) Man-rack equipment consisting of one (1) AN/GRC-9 radio and accessories, one (1) SCR-300 radio, two (2) EE-8's, and one (1) reel of telephone wire were carried on board by operating personnel, and remained in their possession throughout movement to, and arrival at, objective area.

(2) Jeep trailer, loaded with remaining equipment and accessories, was loaded into a hold of the USS HENRICO.

(3) Radio jeep, AN/MRC-6, was loaded on an LST.

b. Personnel were embarked as follows:

(1) Jeep driver and his assistant were embarked on the LST on which the radio jeep was loaded.

(2) One (1) officer and ten (10) enlisted personnel were embarked on USS HENRICO with H&S Company, 5th Marines.

6. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase

(1) D-Day, 15 September, 1950.

(a) The NGF Liaison Officer and seven (7) enlisted personnel of the team, with one (1) AN/GRC-9 radio and accessories, one (1) SCR-300 radio, two (2) EE-8's, and one (1) reel of telephone wire, debarked and landed at RED Beach, INCHON, with the forward elements of the Regimental CP. Three (3) enlisted personnel of the team, and trailer remained on board.

(b) During the ship to shore movement, communications were established on the Division common and Regimental spotting nets. As no targets of opportunity were sighted, no fire missions were conducted. Approximately five (5) minutes prior to reaching the beach, operators checked out of the nets, broke down radios, and prepared to "hit the beach".

(c) After landing, the NGF team moved into the Regimental CP, and reestablished communications on the Division common and Regimental spotting nets. At approximately 2245, the driver and his assistant reported to the Regimental CP with the radio jeep, and communication was established on the NGF control net. No fire missions were conducted.

(2) D + 1 Day

(a) The NGF Liaison Officer and driver, with radio jeep, moved with the forward echelon of the Regimental CP, maintaining continuous communication with general support ship on the Regimental spotting net. Other members of team, with man-rack equipment, moved with rear echelon, or by any means of transportation available, reestablishing communications on the Division common and NGF control net upon arrival at new CP.

3/cir
1975

ANNEX LOVE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(b) At approximately 1820 the three (3) members of the team, who had embarked on the LST, reported to the Regimental CF with trailer. A continuous watch was maintained on the Division common, NGF control, and Regimental spotting nets. No fire missions were conducted.

b. Exploitation Phase.

(1) D / 2 Day, 17 September 1950

(a) At 0845 the general support ship was assigned to the NGF spotting team, 2nd Battalion, for the direct support of that battalion. The entire Regimental NGF team moved with forward echelon of the Regimental CF, maintaining continuous communication on the Regimental spotting net, and reestablishing communications on the Division common and NGF control nets upon arrival at new CF.

(2) D / 3 Day

(a) The entire team moved forward with the forward echelon of the Regimental CF, maintaining continuous communication on the Regimental spotting net, and reestablishing communications on the Division common and NGF control net upon arrival at new CF.

(3) D / 4 Day

(a) A continuous watch was maintained on the Division common, NGF control, and Regimental spotting nets. From 1945 to 2400, slow area fires were delivered on objectives ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, and DOG on the north side of the HAN River, using 8"/55 Cal, HC, fuse quick ammunition. The 2nd Battalion spotting team observed and spotted for those missions, relaying information and spots to the fire support ship through the Regimental NGF Team.

(4) D / 5 Day

(a) From 0000 to 0530, heavy concentrations of area and preparation fires were delivered on objectives ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, and DOG on the north side of the HAN River. The same ammunition and procedure was used as for fires delivered during the night of D / 4 Day

(b) From 0600 to 0630, unobserved preparation fires were delivered on objectives ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE and DOG, fires being lifted from objectives ABLE and DOG at 0620. 8"/55 caliber, HC, fused quick ammunition was used, and the Regimental NGF Team controlled the missions.

(c) At 0700, the general support ship was released, and the spotting net secured, as friendly troops had advanced beyond range of naval guns. A continuous watch was maintained on the Division common NGF control nets.

(5) D / 6 Day

(a) The Regimental NGF team was permanently detached from the 5th Marines and ordered to ANGLICO, 1st Signal Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), FMF.

7. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION.

As no material targets were fired upon, and those fires that were delivered were preparation and area fires, evaluation of the effectiveness of NGF could not be made. However, the accuracy of delivered fires was excellent, an average of only three (3) spots being necessary for adjustment of MFI.

8. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Coordination of supporting arms during the operation was excellent, all of the Supporting Arms Liaison Officers carried out their operations in the vicinity of the Supporting Arms Center.

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1975

ANNEX 106 TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

Here, all fire missions were coordinated under the direction of the Artillery Liaison Officer. Final plans or decisions were then referred to the Regimental Commander for final approval.

b. During the operation, the various NGF teams experienced difficulties in establishing and maintaining communications, transportation of personnel and equipment, and delivery of illuminating support. These difficulties are listed in detail below:

(1) Communications

(a) The number of stations assigned to the NGF control and Division common nets appeared excessive for efficient operation.

(b) Excessive interference from other frequencies sometimes made communication impossible.

(c) Radio discipline on the NGF control and Division common nets was very poor.

(d) The T/E allowance for the Regimental NGF Team does not provide sufficient radios for guarding all assigned nets.

(2) Transportation

(a) The only means of transportation assigned to the various NGF liaison teams is a radio jeep. This was utilized by the NGF Liaison Officer, with driver, to keep in close contact with their respective unit commanding officers and staff. As no organic transportation was provided for the remaining personnel and equipment, segments of the team were often widely separated while on the move. This resulted in the Liaison Officer being out of contact with most of his team, and with no means of access to all assigned radio nets.

(b) No organic means of transportation is assigned to the NGF spotting teams. Due to the rapid advance of front line troops, the time involved in setting up and breaking down radio equipment, and the lack of transportation, it was often impossible for the spotting teams to reach suitable OP's for timely support of their units.

(3) Illuminating Support

(a) During the night of D-Day, the battalion spotting teams were unable to deliver effective illuminating support, due to the close proximity of direct fire support ships to own front lines.

c. Prior to the operation the various NGF teams were detached from ANGLICO, 1st Signal Battalion, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF, and permanently assigned to the 5th Marines. Under this organization, repairs, supply, and administrative details were handled very efficiently, and presented very few problems to the teams.

d. On 21 September, 1950, the NGF teams were detached from the 5th Marines, and on 26 September, 1950, permanently assigned to ANGLICO. Under this organization, the NGF teams are to be assigned as attached units to the organizations which they serve in combat, during any future operations. Repairs and supply of equipment, and administrative details are to be handled by ANGLICO. Due to the long

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3/jwt
1975

ANNEX LOVE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

distances normally between QF's, and the additional transportation involved, it is believed that personnel and equipment will suffer. Personnel currently appear to feel that they do not "belong" to any definite organization.

e. It is recommended that:

(1) A study be conducted of the stations currently assigned to the NGF control net, with a view towards reducing the number, and that strict radio discipline be enforced on this net.

(2) Battalions be eliminated from the Division common net, and an additional net be established between each Regiment and its respective battalions. This would necessitate the addition of one SCR-300 radio to the T/E allowance of the Regimental NGF Liaison Teams.

(3) An additional AN/GRC-9 radio be assigned to the Regimental NGF Team, in order to correct the situation listed in paragraph 8.b.(1)(d) above.

(4) A personnel carrier, with mount for AN/GRC-9 and SCR-300 installed, be assigned to the Regimental and each Battalion Liaison Team. This would provide organic transportation for all members of the teams, and would allow communications to be maintained on all assigned nets while on the move.

(5) A cargo jeep and trailer, with vibrator pack and mount for AN/GRC-9 installed, be assigned to each Battalion Spotting Team. This would allow a sufficient number of team personnel to reach suitable QF's in time to support rapidly advancing troops.

(6) Direct support ships initially be assigned fire support areas from which they can deliver effective illuminating fires over the landing beaches, and after troops have advanced inland, moved to area from which the maximum range of their guns may be utilized.

(7) The various NGF teams be assigned to the units which they serve as an organic part of their organization.

3/jwt
1975

Headquarters, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

26 December 1950

ANNEX MIKE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The following Tactical Air Control Party Special Action Report, covering the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL area operation, is submitted for the period 6 September - 7 October, 1950.

b. The primary duties of the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) at Regimental level was to plan the use of air support and to monitor the (TAR) Tactical Air Request Net and keep the Regimental Commander, S-3, and (SAC) Supporting Arms Center, advised as to the nature of missions requested for air support made by the subordinate battalions. The missions requested were coordinated with other Supporting Arms for safety reasons and to serve as a means of preventing duplication of effort. The above was accomplished in the past operations by close physical contact with Artillery, NGF, and 4.2 Mortars, and coordinated by the Artillery Coordinator in the Supporting Arms Center.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. The TACP was temporarily assigned to H&S Company, 5th Marines, and was organized as follows:

War Tables of Organization call for one (1) officer and ten (10) enlisted men to form the TACP. The officer served as the Forward Air Controller (FAC). One Staff Sergeant, four Corporals, and five Privates, were utilized as communication personnel assistants and vehicle drivers.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. Plans were formulated as to:

(1) The order in which TACP personnel and equipment was to be landed.

(2) Radio nets to be actuated during the ship to shore movement, upon landing, and after all personnel and equipment were ashore.

(3) The planning for air support was accomplished in most part by higher authority. The Regiment had no opportunity to submit detailed requirements or participate in detailed planning.

b. Directives that were followed:

(1) Regimental Operation Order Number 15-50.

(2) Air Annex MIKE to ComFibGru One Operation Order Number 14-50.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

a. Training was conducted as follows:

(1) Extensive radio drills.

3/jwt
1975

ANNEX MIKE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(2) Briefing on enemy situation and scheme of maneuver of the Regiment enroute.

(3) Use of equipment and current authentication tables and shackles codes.

b. There were no opportunities for the conduct of rehearsals.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. Equipment was loaded as follows:

(1) Man-pack equipment consisting of one (1) AN/GRC-9 radio and accessories, one (1) MAM radio, two (2) EE-8's and one (1) reel of telephone wire were carried on board by assigned operating personnel, and remained in their possession throughout movement to, and arrival at objective area.

(2) Radio jeep trailer, AN/MRC-6, loaded with remaining equipment and accessories, was loaded into the hold of the USS HENRICO.

b. Personnel were embarked as follows:

(1) One (1) officer and ten (10) enlisted personnel were embarked aboard the USS HENRICO with H&S Company, 5th Marines.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

No comment

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase

The FAC Officer and seven (7) enlisted personnel of the party, with one (1) AN/GRC-9 radio and accessories, one (1) MAM radio, two (2) EE-8's, and one (1) reel of telephone wire, debarked and landed at RED Beach, INCHON, with the forward elements of the Regimental CP. Three (3) enlisted personnel of the party remained aboard, two (2) (Driver and Assistant Driver), came ashore with radio jeep while the others came ashore with H&S Company waves.

The ship to shore movement communications were established on the TAD and TAR nets enroute to the beach.

After landing, the TACF moved into the Regimental CP. At approximately 2000, the Driver and his assistant reported to the Regimental CP with the radio jeep, and communication was continued with the jeep radio. No air strikes were controlled by the Regimental Team during this phase.

The FAC Officer and driver, with radio jeep, moved with the forward echelon of the Regimental CP, maintaining continuous communication on the TAR and TAD nets. Other personnel moved with the rear echelon. Air missions commenced at 0630 and continued through the day with illumination missions conducted during the night. The TACF monitored air nets throughout the day and kept the Regimental Commander advised.

ANNEX MIKE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

b. Exploitation Phase

(1) 17 September - 6 October, 1950. On 17 September, aircraft were on station at 0600, but it was 0800 before a mission was called. Throughout the day, aircraft flew close support missions and conducted a few search missions. From 17 September to 6 October, air support was conducted with great success. Terrain characteristics were such that target identification was not complicated. Aircraft was available in plentiful numbers and battalions made extensive use of air. Aircraft on station over moving columns could be called onto targets in short periods of time. The support could only be termed superlative and all that could be desired. The procedures were those normal to Marine Corps usage.

8. ENEMY

No comment

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

As air targets were abundant, the wise use of Air by the Battalion Commanders made this operation outstanding from the standpoint of close air support. The effective use of Air contributed greatly to rapid advance and rapid seizure of objectives with relatively low casualties. The system of close air support as developed by the Marine Corps proved sound and effective in all respects. Marine Infantry is aware of and employs air support with the same understanding as it employs its Artillery.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The coordination of Supporting Arms during the operation was excellent. All of the Supporting Arms Liaison Officers in Regimental Headquarters executed their operations in the Supporting Arms Center as a team. The coordination of air support with other arms was effected by the Artillery Liaison Officer, with final plans or decisions reached, then approved by the Regimental Commander. Plans of support to attacks were quickly formulated with Liaison Officers expeditiously preparing their recommendations to fit into the overall plan.

(1) Communications

The need for improvement in communication occurs chiefly at battalion level. A lighter and more reliable portable VHF (MAW) radio is required. The power supply for the present MAW radio is the burdensome problem because of the underdependability of such power supply, and the constant need of recharging the wet cell batteries. It may prove to be a great improvement if aircraft should be equipped with MHF radio sets to facilitate control.

(2) Possible Improvements of Techniques and Procedures

(a) The need of two (2) Air Controllers at battalion level is manifest. This would, as with other Supporting Arms, provide a Forward Observer as well as liaison. The use of the NGF Spotter as an Assistant (FAC) Forward Air Controller when naval guns were out of range, proved very successful in a number of cases and

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3/jwt
1975

ANNEX MIKE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

bespeaks well of the value of a second FAC if assigned. It is of interest that in many cases, Company Commanders and Artillery Forward Observers have controlled air strikes by calling the strike information back to the Battalion CP by any means of communication available. The Air Officer would then, by the use of his radio jeep, request the mission, and pass the strike information direct to the aircraft for execution. Adjustments were similarly made. The possibilities of not only adding a FAC Observer but of adding to the flexibility of close air support by using the Artillery FO's in the above described manner deserves study. It is believed that the methods of obtaining and controlling air strikes by forward elements is limited only by the means that front line elements have in communicating with the FAC.

(b) Recommend that more experimentation be conducted employing tanks in air spotting. A mobile armored spotting and controlling vehicle would greatly aid the FAC in moving forward into positions under fire to provide close observation.

(c) On at least one occasion, a night fighter was called in on a close support mission. Further development in this field would be highly desirable.

(d) Many times ground forces did not take full advantage of neutralization after air strikes and move out quickly. Training to emphasize rapid advance after strikes is indicated. In this connection, a positive signal of the final plane in a strike may be desirable. A signal not discernable to the enemy with planes continuing dry runs may be useful.

(e) The maps issued all pilots should be of a uniform grid. Special attention should commence early on such maps.

(f) There appears to be a need for other types of Aircraft Rockets. Possibly, HE Anti-Personnel and Wt War Head Rockets could be developed. Present rockets, while very accurate proved ineffectual at times against troop concentrations.

(g) The present 20mm guns used by support aircraft seem to have a very high rate of malfunctioning and improved designs should be studied.

(h) Aircraft at times appeared to fire rockets from too high an altitude resulting in inaccurate impact.

(i) Napalm was perhaps the most feared weapon used against the enemy. There was a definite requirement for the availability of more napalm. In this connection, there is a need for research to improve the activation of napalm. There were an estimated 30% duds in napalm dropped in this operation.

(j) It is necessary that all newly assigned FAC's be thoroughly briefed on necessity for proper check loading of his radio equipment for amphibious landing to insure that each loading affords no errors.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
3/jwt
1975

ANNEX MIKE TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

(3) Miscellaneous Comments on Use of Close Air Support

(a) During the operation in the INCHON-SEOUL areas, the 5th Marines was able to conduct air support with a great degree of flexibility. Due to the terrain and the fast moving situation, other Supporting Arms were often outdistanced, out of range, or unable to go into position to fire on fleeting targets quickly enough, therefore air found itself in a natural position to provide support required and was used extensively. After KIMPO Airfield was secured, and marine support aircraft were operating from both land and carrier bases, there were an abundance of aircraft on station at all times for close support missions.

(b) Due to heavy small arms and anti-aircraft fire encountered around the SEOUL area, it became necessary to use VF aircraft for reconnaissance missions on many occasions. It was not good practice to send OY aircraft behind enemy lines since there was not only great danger of them being shot down, but their availability became quite critical. VF aircraft on reconnaissance functioned very well but added training to perform this function is mandatory.


(c) It is recommended that sufficient OY's be made available to provide one continuously on station during daylight for controlling air. Such OY can be employed as an airborne FAC and in addition can be used to confirm reports of friendly and enemy activity TAO missions which would be of vital tactical importance. Such aircraft could, but not necessarily, replace the Tactical Air Observers and absorb the two functions into one assignment.

(d) On occasions, night fighter aircraft reported to this unit for air support missions during hours of darkness. No satisfactory means of night fighter control was known or employed, however, the presence of aircraft over the front lines had the strong effect of silencing almost all enemy artillery and mortar fire. Night hecklers should be continued as they saved many lives. The aircraft were requested to drop ordnance on enemy gun flashes or targets of opportunity well in advance of friendly lines. The distance the support can be provided in front of troops can be foreshortened with training and newly developed techniques.

(e) The most effective weapon used by this unit in KOREA was the napalm, since the majority of the targets were troops dug in. Besides the destruction effect, napalm had a great demoralizing effect, as was borne out by IOW interrogation. As was mentioned before, napalm was never available in the quantity requested by Infantry Commanders.

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SPECIAL ACTION - REPORT -



PERIOD

30 AUGUST 7 OCTOBER 1950

1ST BATTALION 5TH MARINES

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, FMF,
In the Field, Korea

7 October, 1950

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Maps: Map of Korea, 1:50,000, AMS L571.

- Sketches:
1. Inchon Landing
 2. Battalion Operations South of Han River
 3. Attack of Hill 105
 4. Battalion Operations North of Han River

1. INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted in accordance with a directive received from the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines and paragraph 11401.2a, Marine Corps Manual. The purpose of this report is to provide a concise, complete record of the actions in which this unit participated during the period 30 August to 7 October, 1950. Missions assigned this battalion were issued by the next higher echelon, the 5th Marines.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

BLT 1/5	37 Officers	1026 Enlisted	LtCol G. R. NEWTON
H&S Company			Capt W.E. GODEMIUS
TACP			1stLt J. W. SMITH
FCF Liaison			Lt C. O. GREVE, USN
Arty Liaison			1stLt J. J. SNYDER
"A" Company			Capt J. R. STEVENS
"B" Company			Capt F. I. FENTON, JR.
"C" Company			1stLt P. E. PEDERSEN
Weapons Company			Maj J. W. RUSSELL
Korean National Police Platoon			SSgt J. L. WILLIS

At various times, as noted in paragraph 7, elements of the following units were attached, depending on whether the Battalion was in assault or reserve:

75mm Recoiless Gun Company, 5th Marines

One Platoon 4.2" Mortar Company, 5th Marines

3rd Platoon, Company "A", 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division

Detachment of "B" Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division.

Detachment of Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

The schedule, as set forth by higher headquarters, required this Battalion to be ready in all respects to embark aboard ship at Pusan, Korea on 11 September, 1950. All organizational equipment was prepared and vehicles loaded for an amphibious landing. The

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preliminary planning of the Battalion consisted of reorganization and resupply. The reorganization consisted of joining a rifle company and additional sections for the Weapons Company. These units were newly arrived from the United States. The rifle company was designated as "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

Military maps of the landing area were received by this Battalion on the afternoon of 10 September, 1950. These maps were not used for preliminary planning prior to this Battalion's embarkation aboard ship at 1400, 11 September, 1950, inasmuch as an operation order had not as yet been received. The Battalion supply train carried sufficient water, rations and ammunition to last for a period of one day.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

Training aboard ship consisted of physical drill, instruction on amphibious techniques, briefings of the landing operation to take place at Inchon, estimate of the enemy situation, review of technique of combat in built up areas, debarkation drill and the use of scaling ladders and cargo nets as it was planned that the first five boat waves were to land shortly after the tide began to rise and the scaling ladders and cargo nets would be needed as an aid in reaching the top of the sea wall from the LCVP's hold "bow on" to the sea wall.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Upon arrival at Pusan, Korea on 6 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 commenced combat loading of the USS HENRICO, (APA 45) continuing on a 24 hour schedule, until loading was completed on the morning of 11 September, 1950. The first element of the Battalion to go aboard ship was the Battalion cooks who embarked on 6 September, 1950, followed by the messmen on 7 September, 1950. The main body of the Battalion commenced embarkation at 1400, 11 September, 1950. Embarkation was completed at 1600, 11 September, 1950.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The USS HENRICO (APA 45) sailed from Pusan, at 1450, 12 September, 1950, and was underway for a period of three days, arriving at the transport area off the port of Inchon at approximately 1300, 15 September, 1950. Troops began disembarking at 1530, with the first assault wave hitting Red Beach I at 1733.

7. DETAILED COMBAT NARRATIVE

On 30 August, 1950, while in 8th Army Reserve, 3 miles west of Changwon, Korea the Battalion Commander was summoned to the Regimental Command Post and given information as to the general scheme of maneuver for the proposed landing at Inchon. After a short briefing, orders were received to return at 0800 the next morning for further planning and conferences. At 0800 on 31 August, the Battalion Commander returned to the 5th Marines Command Post, only to receive orders that the 1st Battalion would be prepared to move by 1200 to Miryang for operations against the enemy in the Youngsan sector. The single map of Inchon was turned in and no further planning was possible until the Battalion was returned to Pusan, Korea on 6 September after three days of continuous fighting in the Naktong River Bulge in the vicinity of Youngsan. The Battalion casualties during the period amounted to 11 KIA, 84 WIA.

The lead elements of BLT 1/5 arrived at Pusan, Korea at 1810, 6 September, 1950 with the last element arriving at the assembly area at 2130. Upon arrival at Pusan, a directive was received

stating that at 0001, 13 September, 1950 the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would be deactivated and would be absorbed by the 1st Marine Division, FMP under the command of Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC.

During the period 7 September through 11 September, 1950, while waiting to board its assigned ship, the USS HENRICO (APA 45), the Battalion was reorganized and resupplied. Although billeted in a warehouse on the dock at Pusan, the men of the Battalion were fed aboard the USS HENRICO. The Commanding Officer of the USS HENRICO (APA 45), Captain Fradd, also allowed the Battalion the use of the ship's showering facilities. A limited amount of training, consisting of small arms firing for the Battalion and a conditioning hike for the newly arrived "C" Company was accomplished. The Battalion also furnished a detail of 25 instructors to train the Republic of Korea Marines in the firing of rockets and mortars. The USS HENRICO was being combat loaded and readied for embarkation of BLT 1/5 at this time.

On the night of 10 September, 1950 all companies were alerted to make preparations to board ship on order because of an approaching typhoon. Actual embarkation of the Battalion commenced at 1400, 11 September, 1950. After embarkation was completed at 1600 that date, the ship remained tied to the dock at Pusan until 1450, 12 September, 1950 when it got underway with BL T 1/5 and H&S Company, 5th Marines as the major units embarked. Also aboard were a group of war correspondents from leading American and British newspapers.

On 13 September, 1950 all units were informed of the overall mission of the 1st Marine Division and the specific mission of BLT 1/5. A series of briefings on the plan of operation of BLT 1/5 and on the estimate of the enemy situation were conducted regularly while enroute to the Objective area.

On 14 September, 1950 the Battalion supply sections issued ammunition and rations to the companies for further distribution to the troops. Upon debarkation, each man was to carry a basic load of ammunition, one days C-4 ration, and two canteens of water. During the afternoon of the 14th, a debarkation drill was held for all embarked troops and all boat teams of the first five waves were briefed in the use of the scaling ladders and cargo nets to be employed in clearing the sea wall at the landing beach.

On the morning of 15 September, 1950, all units completed last minute preparations and the Battalion stood by to disembark on order. For graphic picture of the Inchon landing see sketch Fo 1. As the ship neared the transport area, all troops were ordered to their compartments. At 1530, the assault wave began disembarking from the USS HENRICO into the landing craft and proceeded to the rendezvous area. At this time, word was received that H-hour had been postponed for 30 minutes. During the approach of the landing craft to the beach, an intense naval and air bombardment of the landing area took place. Immediately prior to the arrival of the assault wave at the beach, LSM(R)'s fired a 2,000 round rocket concentration on the landing area. An air strike was called on Observatory Hill by the 1st Battalion FAC, 1st Lt J. W. Smith, as he was enroute to the beach, using portable equipment in the landing craft. At 1733 the first wave arrived at the sea wall on Red Beach I and disembarked the troops through the use of scaling ladders. Three of the initial landing craft utilized holes blasted in the sea wall to unload their troops. The first three waves, consisting of 14 boats, carried "A" Company, commanded by Captain J. R. Stevens. "A" Company, with the mission of taking battalion objective No. 1 and their portion of the O-A line,

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landed amid heavy small arms fire and intermittent mortar fire coming from trenches and bunkers on the beach, from the exposed left flank, and from battalion objective 1 (Cemetery Hill). The left flank of Red Beach I was strongly defended, in contrast to a fairly weak defense on the right flank. "A" Company assaulted objective I. Captain Stevens, at 1755, fired an amber star cluster signifying the seizure of objective I. "A" Company completed their assigned mission of securing their portion of the O-A line at 2240. The casualties suffered by "A" Company and attachments during this period amounted to 1 Officer and 7 enlisted KIA, 28 enlisted WIA.

The 4th and 5th waves, composed of "C" Company, commanded by First Lieutenant P. F. Pedersen, landed at H + 20 with a 5 minute interval between waves. Due to motor failure of an LCVP in the Company Commander's boat wave at the rendezvous area, the entire wave was delayed by order of the boat wave commander, and Lt Pedersen did not land with his boat team until the 6th wave had landed. The organization of "C" Company on the beach was delayed inasmuch as units of BLT 2/5 were over-lapping into the 1st Battalion's zone of action. It should be noted at this time that there was a great deal of confusion on Red Beach from H-hour to H + 180 due to the inability of coxwains to land in their assigned areas; units were intermingled and commanders had difficulty in organizing their commands. Added confusion was caused when a beached LST fired its 40 and 20mm cannon's over the heads of the troops on the beach, and on objective I and ABLE while they were being occupied by our forces. The second platoon, under the command of Second Lieutenant B. L. Magness, with the 60mm mortar section commanded by Second Lieutenant M. A. Merritt attained Regimental Objective ABLE at 1845, but due to the lack of communication facilities or the proper signal flare equipment, they were unable to notify the Battalion Commander that the objective had been taken. This lack of communication with the Battalion Commander resulted in friendly fire being delivered on Objective ABLE while it was being occupied by elements of "C" Company. Due to the difficulty "C" Company was experiencing in reorganizing, and inasmuch as the units of "C" Company on objective ABLE were unable to inform the Battalion Commander or the Company Commander of their presence on the objective, the Battalion Commander deemed it necessary to order "B" Company, which had landed in support of the Battalion and was intact, to seize and occupy Regimental Objective ABLE. The rapid approach of darkness also influenced the Battalion Commander's decision to have "B" Company seize and defend objective ABLE. During this time Lt Pedersen reported to the Battalion Commander that he was reorganizing his company on the beach. The Battalion Commander ordered "C" Company upon completion of reorganization to assume the mission of Battalion Reserve.

"B" Company upon attaining objective ABLE discovered that the 2nd platoon of "C" Company was occupying the right flank of the objective and had visual contact with "F" Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. "B" Company Commander, Captain Francis I. Fenton, Jr., contacted the Battalion Commander and notified him of the presence of the 2nd platoon of "C" Company. The Battalion Commander, ordered "B" Company Commander to leave this platoon in position and to occupy and defend the left portion of objective ABLE and to tie in with the right flank of "A" Company. This was accomplished at approximately 2330. The remainder of "C" Company reorganized, and as ordered took up positions to the rear of objective ABLE, and assumed the mission of Battalion Reserve for the night. At 2240 on 15 September, the Battalion Commander reported to RCT-5 that objective ABLE was secured and by 2345 all units had made contact with adjacent units and had

org nized for the night. Casualties suffered by "B" Company during this period were 6 WIA, "C" Company suffered 5 WIA.

Weapons Company, which had landed after "B" Company, was placed with "C" Company in support of the Battalion to the rear of objective ABLE. The Command Post established ashore at 1755 and initially located at TA 8950-R-2 displaced at 0230, 16 September, 1950 to TA 8949-E-1.

As scaling ladders were used for the first time by Marine Units in the landing, inquiries were made as to their practicability. Captain J. R. Stevens, "A" Company Commander had the following comments to make:

"Boat 1-4 used aluminum ladders equipped with large hooks which were used to hook over the sea wall. These ladders proved extremely effective. The wall was estimated to have been at least 10 feet high and all reports are that unloading would have been very difficult if not impossible without the use of these ladders. In debarking it was estimated that each boat was unloaded in less than two minutes with a minimum of casualties.

The hooks on the wooden ladders proved ineffective. However, the ladders were placed vertically against the sea wall and the troops were able to disembark rapidly."

For graphic picture of BLT 1/5's operations south of the Han River see sketch No. 2.

At 0400, 16 September, 1950, a verbal order was received by the Battalion to move to an assembly area and to assume the mission of Regimental Reserve. At 0630, an operation order was received from RCT-5 confirming the warning order received earlier. At 0910 BLT 1/5 began movement to the designated assembly area. While on the move, additional orders were received directing the unit to proceed to a more forward assembly area. Orders were once again received to move to a third assembly area still further advanced. At 1930, the Battalion moved into an assembly area at TA 9750 X 2.

The Battalion Commander at 1900 attended a Regimental Conference at which time plans for the following days operation were issued. At 2300, an operation order was received directing this Battalion to move out behind BLT 2/5 at 0700, 17 September, 1950.

BLT 1/5, was unable to get underway until 1125, 17 September, 1950 because BLT 2/5 had been held up. At 1125, this Battalion moved out in trace of the 2nd Battalion. Movement continued very rapidly throughout the afternoon. No enemy resistance was encountered. During the late afternoon BLT 2/5 swung to the left to capture Kimpo Airfield. BLT 1/5 continued forward and at 1900, objective EASY was seized and occupied by "A" Company, which was later strengthened by the addition of "B" Company. After seizure of objective EASY, the Battalion set up in defense positions for the night. The Battalion Command Post was located at TA 0655-W-4.

At dawn on 18 September, 1950, "B" Company Commander reported to the Battalion Commander that there were enemy troops to his left flank advancing in direction of Kimpo Airfield, attacking 2nd Battalion, the Battalion Commander immediately called for artillery and mortar fire to be added to the fire "B" Company was already bringing down on the flank and rear of the enemy. At the same time he ordered "C" Company to attack in order to cut off their retreat.

The coordinated fire of the 1st and 2nd Battalion, plus the attack to the rear and flank by "C" Company caused confusion in the enemy ranks, which forced him to make a hasty and disorganized withdrawal, suffering heavy casualties. Enemy resistance was light as they fled to objective FOX. The retreating enemy were again brought under artillery fire called for by units of BLT 1/5 and BLT 2/5. "C" Company, who had halted for the second artillery barrage were ordered to continue the attack and seize objective FOX, which was accomplished against light opposition at 0930. During this time the remaining elements of the Battalion remained in position. The remainder of the day was spent with all units conducting patrols, capturing of 31 enemy, and various types of equipment, which included a large quantity of medical supplies found in an abandoned enemy aid station to the rear of objective FOX. At 1600, BLT 1/5 displaced the Command Post to TA 0656-S-4. At 2110, the Battalion was ordered to send out a patrol of one platoon to locate an enemy radio team, believed to be located at TA 0959-B-2. "C" Company Commander was ordered to dispatch the patrol immediately. The patrol, led by Lt Magness, departed at 2130, encountered no enemy opposition enroute to the designated area. The patrol was engaged in a minor fire fight with an undetermined number of enemy on the return trip, but suffered no casualties. The patrol had no success in locating the enemy radio team, and returned to the Battalion area at approximately 0200, 19 September, 1950.

At 2200, 18 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 was ordered to prepare to move out in the attack to seize Hills 80 and 85 at 0700, 19 September, 1950. At 0615, "C" Company began to receive heavy small arms fire and sporadic mortar fire from Hill 118. The Battalion Commander immediately called for artillery, mortar fire and an air strike on this position.

At dawn, groups of enemy, ten to fifteen per group, were observed advancing along the road toward the air field on the left of "C" Company. Other groups were moving across the rice paddies to the front of "C" Company's position. The advance of these groups was covered by heavy small arms and mortar fire. The enemy was taken under fire by 81mm and 60mm mortars located on the reverse slope of objective FOX. The "C" Company machine guns on the left flank played a major part in stopping and containing the attack. As the enemy were being held by "C" Company, "D" Company was ordered to attack and envelope Hill 118, which was directly in front of objective FOX. Preceding the attack a heavy artillery barrage and an air strike were delivered. "D" Company quickly moving in under this preparation succeeded in taking its objective which resulted in the surrounding and destroying of 100 enemy troops with no casualties to "D" Company. This move also enabled "C" Company to move forward and take the ridge to the left front with light casualties. Hill 118 was secured at 1055.

Approximately 500 enemy were involved in the attack on "C" Company's position. It was estimated that the enemy suffered 80% casualties, with 56 enemy prisoners being taken. The casualties suffered by our forces were as follows: "E" Company, 1 WIA; "C" Company; 2 KIA, 6 WIA. "B" Company's casualty occurred in defense of Hill 118. At 1310, the Battalion Command Post displaced forward and at 1325 was located at TA 0957-M-1. "B" Company and "C" Company consolidated their positions on Hill 118 while waiting the arrival of tanks to assist in the attack on Hills 80 and 85. A large number of enemy troops were observed on Hill 80 by "B" Company. Due to the Battalion FAC not being able to observe from the Battalion CP, Captain

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Fenton called for and directed an air strike on that position causing many casualties and succeeded in routing the enemy from Hill 80. At 1430, the 3rd Platoon of "C" Company, commanded by Lt Dawo moved southwest along the highway, covered by company machine guns and mortar fire directed at Hills 80 and 85. This platoon seized and occupied Hill 80 at 1545. The 1st Platoon, commanded by Lt Corbet, supported by a platoon of tanks moved in column behind the 3rd platoon at an interval of approximately 500 yards, seized and occupied Hill 85 at 1650. The platoon of tanks remained to the rear of Hill 85 as a covering force. The 2nd platoon leading the company supply train moved to the rear of Hills 80 and 85. The 2nd platoon reinforced by Korean National Police was assigned the task of clearing the villages to the rear of Hills 80 and 85.

Upon occupation of Hills 80 and 85, "C" Company was subjected to artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. This enemy fire continued until night fall. A perimeter defense was set in on the reverse slope of Hills 80 and 85, with the company making all preparations to defend the position for the night. "A" Company remained in the position occupied the previous night. "B" Company was set up in their position on Hill 118. The Battalion Command Post was located at TA 0957-M-1 with H&S Company. Weapons Company occupied positions behind "B" Company on the reverse slope of Hill 118.

At approximately 1600, 19 September, 1950, the Battalion Commander was summoned to the Regimental Command Post. At this time, the Battalion Commander was informed that BLT 1/5 would withdraw to an assembly area at Kimpo Airfield when relieved by BLT 1/1. At 2030, BLT 1/1 began relief of BLT 1/5. Upon relief, units of BLT 1/5 proceeded independently, by foot, to the airfield. At 0130, 20 September, the last elements of this battalion arrived at the assembly area. The Battalion Command Post was located at TA 0557-I-2.

For graphic sketch of BLT 1/5's operations north of the Han River see sketch No 4.

At 0145, 20 September, the Battalion Commander received an operation order from RCT-5 directing BLT 1/5 to cross the Han River on order, and after crossing to assume the mission of Regimental Reserve. The Battalion remained in its assembly area at Kimpo Airfield throughout the morning. At 1330, units of this battalion began embarkation aboard the LVT's in which they would cross the Han River. At 1355, the first LVT's left the assembly area and arrived at the Han at 1455. Crossing of the river was begun immediately. No enemy encountered. When the river crossing had been completed the Battalion disembarked and began a route march to the tactical assembly area located at TA 1063-F-4, arriving there at 1700.

At 1830, orders were received from RCT-5 to dispatch one company to objective ABLE (Hill 125) for flank security of the river crossing area and to clear out snipers which were harrasing personnel in the vicinity of the Han River crossing. "C" Company was assigned this mission and completed occupation of objective ABLE at 2130.

At 0730, 21 September, 1950, the battalion started in route march to objective DOG, "C" Company brought up the rear of the column after leaving its position on objective ABLE.

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The Battalion proceeded in route march along the railroad tracks toward the city of Seoul. At 1050, the battalion established the Command Post at TA 1361-J-3. At this time "A" and "B" Companies were ordered to attack and seize Hill 96. "A" Company jumped off in the assault of the hill located just to the right of Hill 96, this position to be used as the intermediate objective in the assault of Hill 96. At 1200, an air strike was put on the objective. The air strike was immediately followed by an artillery barrage. As the artillery barrage lifted, "A" Company jumped off in the attack supported by fire from tanks located along the railroad tracks, and at 1315 they had seized and occupied Hill 96. "C" Company, following in trace of "A" Company, swept through the rice paddies and then moved around to the left flank of "A" Company to take over the assault for the seizure of Hill 68. "B" Company moving on the Battalion left flank, continued the attack and at 1335 seized and occupied its objective, Hill 40. Throughout the attack, the assault companies were under moderate small arms fire the rear elements of the Battalion were being harassed by sniper fire. All enemy fire was coming from the direction of Hills 96 and 68. With the support of machine guns and mortars of "B" and "C" Companies, "C" Company swept the ridge and occupied Hill 68. Occupation of Hill 68 was completed at 1730. After Hills 40 and 68 were occupied by "B" and "C" Companies, "A" Company occupied the ridge between Hills 40 and 68. During the days operation, the following casualties were incurred: "A" Company, 5 WIA including 1st Lt Eubanks, Company Executive Officer, "B" Company, 1 KIA, 1 WIA; "C" Company, 1 KIA, 1 WIA. At 1600 the Battalion Command Post displaced and set up at TA 1559-R-1. At 1730, all companies had attained their objective, consolidated their positions and were dug in for the night. Throughout the night, the Battalion positions was subjected to intermittent artillery and mortar fire.

For graphic sketch of action of Hill 105 see sketch No. 3

At 0730, 22 September, 1950, the Battalion Commander ordered an attack on Hill 105. The scheme of maneuver was that "B" Company attack along the railroad tracks supported by a platoon of tanks and fire from "C" Company. This attack was to be coordinated with an attack launched by the ROK Marines on the high ground to the front of Hill 104 in their zone of action. The railroad tracks was to be the boundary line between the 1st Battalion and ROK Marines. The tanks which were to support "B" Company were committed to the aid of the ROK Marines who were having difficulty in launching their attack. The initial plan call for an attack with companies in column.

At 0745, this plan was changed in that "A" Company, would pass through "C" Company and advance to the base of Hill 105, at which time "C" Company would envelope the objective from the right. "B" Company was to remain in position and deliver fire support from these positions on Hill 40. At 1030, "A" Company moved out with the 1st Platoon, in command of TSgt McMullen leading, and secured the high ground around the radio station. Capt Stevens passed the 2nd and 3rd Platoons through the 1st platoon to set up a base of fire from which he could support the attack on Hill 105. As the platoons were moving into position they received heavy enemy automatic and small arms fire from the front and left front of Hill 105. This fire pinned "A" Company down. During this fire Lt Mann, Platoon Leader of the 2nd Platoon was killed and Lt Schimenti, Platoon Leader, 3rd Platoon was severely wounded.

During "A" Company's move, "C" Company had moved to the extreme right of the Battalion zone of action sweeping the rice paddies as it moved, and arrived at the low ground to the right flank of Hill 105.

"D" Company who had remained in their original positions were ordered by the Battalion Commander to send a two platoon patrol back to the vicinity of Hill 68, to investigate a reported 400 enemy soldiers in that area. This patrol was lead by 1st Lt J. Hancock, Executive Officer of "D" Company. This patrol departed at 1235. The remaining platoon commanded by Lt Schryver returned to the Battalion Command Post as a security force. "D" Company's patrol returned to the Battalion Command Post at 1500, with a negative report.

At 1500, "C" Company with the 1st and 3rd platoons supported by a section of machine guns attacked Hill 105. The 1st Platoon commanded by Lt Corbet, was immediately pinned down by heavy enemy machine guns and small arms fire, from his front and right flank. At this time the 2nd Platoon commanded by Lt Magnoss swung to the right rear of the company's zone of action and both the 2nd and 3rd Platoons awaited the coordinated attack which was ordered with "E" Company.

At 1545, the Battalion Commander ordered "E" Company to pass through "A" Company and attack the west portion of Hill 105, in their zone of action. At 1720, after an intense mortar, artillery and air preparation, "E" and "C" Companies assaulted Hill 105, supported by fire from "A" Company. "E" Company attack with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons, seized the west portion of Hill 105, with the 1st Platoon taking the low ridge to the rear of Hill 105. "C" Company enveloping from the right with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons seized the east portion of Hill 105. The objective was secured at 1735.

During the attack on Hill 105, "A" Company, machine guns and "C" Company mortars delivered supporting fires. Excellent supporting fire was delivered by the 81mm Mortar Platoon of Weapons Company. This platoon was commanded by Lt Alderman, and had their fire directed by Lt Tuloy the Battalion F.O.

After reaching the crest of Hill 105, "E" and "C" Companies consolidated their positions despite heavy small arms fire and sporadic artillery and mortar fire. Due to the fact that "E" Company occupied the larger portion of the objective and that their 1st Platoon was occupying low ground to the north of Hill 105, which was under heavy fire, the 3rd platoon of "C" Company was attached to "E" Company for filling the line. As soon as was practical, the 1st Platoon of "E" Company was withdrawn from the low ground and placed on Hill 105 for support. At 1800, Hill 105 was secured and a perimeter defense established for the night. The casualties suffered by the attacking companies in the taking of the hill were; "E" Company, 1 KIA, 6 WIA; "C" Company, 9 KIA, 17 WIA; "A" Company, 2 KIA, 8 WIA.

During the attack of Hill 105 supplies were being rushed to the assault companies by jeep. Many mines were encountered on the roads. One jeep struck a land mine, injuring the driver, killing the rider and destroying the jeep. At 1030, 22 September, mortar and artillery fire fell in the Weapons Company area causing 1 dead and 15 wounded. At 1705, that afternoon a concentration of artillery shells fell in the Battalion Command Post and supply area, killing 5 and wounding 18.

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At 0200, on 23 September, 1950, a counter-attack of approximately 50 enemy came up the east side of Hill 105 penetrating the 3rd platoon of "C" Company, overrunning a machine gun, killing the gunner and the assistant gunner. The penetration was sealed off and enemy repulsed.

Throughout the following day "D" and "C" Companies remained on Hill 105 and were subjected to intense small arms fire, sporadic mortar and constant fire from several high velocity flat trajectory weapons on the forward slope and either side of the hill. Movement was impossible during daylight hours. Water, rations and ammunition was supplied these positions only after darkness, at which time the small arms fire subsided. The Battalion's position remained unchanged on the night of the 23rd.

At 0450, 24 September, 1950, the enemy, approximately 50 in strength, again counter-attacked in the same area as they had the night before. The counter-attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

At 0700, 24 September, 1950, "C" Company was ordered to send one platoon to the right rear of Hill 105 on the Han River to secure a portion of the river bank for the landing of elements of the 1st Marines and to guide these elements into positions on the right flank of Hill 105.

At 0900, the patrol returned to its position on Hill 105 after accomplishing the mission.

At 1010, orders were received for the Battalion to move to Hills 216 and 296 and effect relief of BLT 3/5 and assume that battalion's mission of protecting the left flank of RCT-5.

At 1230, "A" Company began movement to the rear followed by "G" Company less the 3rd platoon, which remained with "D" Company on Hill 105. At 1400, elements of the 1st Marines moved around the right flank of 105 and moved towards the high ground to the front, thereby allowing "D" Company with the 3rd platoon of "C" Company to withdraw at 1630 when ordered by Battalion Commanding Officer. The number of casualties suffered by the Battalion while seizing and occupying Hill 105 were: 27 KIA, 72 MIA.

At 2000 all units of BLT 1/5 had effected relief of BLT 3/5, "D" Company was placed in Battalion support. The Command Post was located at TA 1760-V-2.

At 0100, 25 September, 1950, "A" Company in its positions on Hill 296 repulsed a minor counter-attack. At 0300 an operation order was received directing the Battalion to move out, on order, in trace of the 3rd Battalion, with BLT 1/5 in reserve. The Battalion's positions would be occupied by elements of the 1st Reconnaissance Company.

At 1830, the Battalion was relieved in position by the 1st Reconnaissance Company and this Battalion moved out in route column to a new assembly area in the vicinity of TA 1850-V-2, arriving there at approximately 1900. At 2300, orders were received from the Commanding Officer of RCT-5 to move out immediately in trace of BLT 3/5. This Battalion moved out and contacted BLT 3/5 at 0100, 26 September, 1950, but inasmuch as BLT 3/5 did not continue the attack this Battalion remained in position at TA 1959, in the vicinity of "Chosen University". The Battalion set up a perimeter defense in this area and remained there until 1100, 27 September, 1950.

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At 0200, 27 September, 1950, LIT 1/5 received orders directing the Battalion to move out on order following LIT 3/5 in trace to Middle School. Upon reaching Middle School, the Battalion made a left wheeling movement and seized Hill 338. At approximately 1045, orders were received to move out, and at 1100 the Battalion moved out in route column with "A" Company leading, followed by "B", "C", and Weapons Companies. At 1300, "A" Company had reached Middle School, turned to the left and taken up positions on Observatory Hill in preparation for the assault of Hill 338. They were supported from this position by a section of 75mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon, one platoon of machine guns and the 81mm mortar platoon from Weapons Company. "C" Company moved on through the city to the Government Buildings and there, with the support of a platoon of tanks, they moved up that portion of the city that lies between Hill 338 and the Palace Grounds, moving in the direction of Hill 342. "B" Company, with Weapons Company, took up reserve and support positions around Observatory Hill with the Command Post being located at Ta 2059-S-3. At 1300, following an air strike and heavy artillery and mortar preparation fires, "A" Company launched the attack against Hill 338. Just prior to the attack, a squad of Korean National Police was sent to clear the section of city between Observatory Hill and Hill 338.

As soon as the Korean National Police had accomplished their mission of clearing the section of the city in the path of "A" Company, the 1st platoon, commanded by Lt Trapnoll, was assigned the mission of seizing the high ground to the front. This was accomplished against moderate resistance. The 2nd platoon, commanded by Lt Collins, was then committed to the left of the ancient wall that runs along the slope of Hill 338, and abreast of the 1st Platoon, their mission being to seize the portion of Hill 171 in their zone of action. As the attack continued, the 1st and 2nd platoons came under heavy mortar and small arms fire. While being held up, an air strike was called on the right portion of Hill 171. After the air strike lifted the 2nd platoon was still subjected to severe small arms fire and could not advance. The 1st Platoon, supported by fires from 81mm mortars and 60mm mortars, "A" Company and Weapons Company machine guns, attacked and over-ran the enemy on Hill 171. This action enabled the 2nd Platoon to move forward and secure their objective. The 3rd Platoon, commanded by TSgt Bolkow was passed through the 1st Platoon with orders to attack Hill 225 in line with the 2nd Platoon. Hill 225 was taken with light resistance, the 3rd Platoon, upon taking its portion of Hill 225, was ordered to attack to Hill 338, which was accomplished with light resistance. Hill 338 was secured at 1850. "A" Company set in defense positions on Hills 225 and 338.

During "A" Company's attack, "C" Company had progressed through their zone of action and proceeded up the slope between Hills 342 and 338, swinging to the left along the ancient wall moved up Hill 338 to tie in with "A" Company. Casualties for the day were; "A" Company 4 KIA, 7 WIA. LIT 1/5 remained in position for the night with no enemy activity. The Command Post was located in Middle School, at Ta 6059-S-3.

At 0700, 28 September, 1950, LIT 1/5 was directed to give fire support to the 7th Marines on Hill 342, but was unable to do so, as information as to their front lines was not available. At this time "A", "B", and "C" Companies were assigned sectors of the Battalion zone of Action in which to patrol. The mission was to seek and destroy all remaining enemy and to confiscate all enemy material. At 0800 all patrols had departed from company positions.

No enemy resistance was encountered, although there were many prisoners taken and large quantities of all types of enemy material was found and reported. At 1800, orders were issued for all units to proceed independently to the Battalion Assembly Area at Middle School, leaving one platoon of "A" Company on Hill 338. At 1600, all units of the Battalion were in the Assembly Area. "B" and "C" Companies were ordered to dispatch one platoon each to assigned areas in the Battalion Zone as outposts. The Battalion established local security and remained in the Assembly Area during the night.

On 29 September, 1950, the Battalion utilized the building of Middle School for offices and barracks. At 1200, all out-posts were recalled to the Assembly area and an interior and security guard was established on a 24 hour basis. At 1700, the Battalion received 57 new replacements which were distributed to the companies. The period spent at Middle School was utilized for re-organization and administrative details.

At 1115, 30 September, 1950, the Commanding Officer of BLT 1/5 ordered "C" Company to be prepared to entruck at 1300 and report to the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/5 at TA 0865-A-3 for further orders. At 1300, "C" Company departed Battalion Assembly Area and at 1700 reported to the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/5 for further orders. At 1350, the Korean National Police, attached to BLT 1/5 were ordered to send out three patrols of one squad each to investigate reports that North Korean Soldiers were located in the northern sector of the Battalion Zone. At 1600, these patrols departed from the Battalion Assembly Area, and remained over night, returning the following morning at 0700, 1 October, 1950, with 21 prisoners, both civilian and military.

At 1930, 30 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 received a one hour stand-by order to move out. BLT 1/5 remained in this status until 1430, 1 October, 1950, at which time word was received to begin movement to an assembly area at TA 1764. At 1530, BLT 1/5, less "C" Company, began route march, arriving at designated assembly area at 1730, with the Command Post being established at TA 1764-M-3. The Battalion dug in and established local security. At 1945, orders were received from RCT-5 that the Battalion, on the following morning would send out two patrols to assigned sectors and also to provide a security detail for BLT 3/5's supply train. At 2040, "C" Company rejoined the Battalion. There was no enemy activity during the night. At 0830, 2 October, 1950, BLT 1/5 Patrols 1 and 2, which were supplied by "A" Company, departed from the Battalion Assembly Area. The patrols covered their assigned routes meeting negative enemy resistance. Mine fields were located by both patrols. Information gathered from civilian sources indicated that small groups of enemy were raiding the villages. At 1900, the patrol returned to the Battalion Assembly Area. At 1940, the security guard for BLT 3/5 supply train departed BLT 1/5 Assembly Area. While enroute a truck overturned on a soft shoulder in the road slightly injuring three men of the security guard. The S-4 of BLT 3/5 supplied two jeeps and trailers to reload the supplies from the damaged truck and to deliver them to BLT 3/5. The security guard returned to the Battalion Assembly Area at 0800, 3 October, 1950.

At 0745, 3 October, 1950, Patrol 1 and 2 formed from "C" Company departed the Battalion Assembly Area. Patrol 1 returned at 1500 and reported engaging in a slight fire fight with an undetermined number of enemy. One member of the patrol was wounded in the hand. At 1640, Patrol 2 returned to Battalion Assembly Area. Patrol reports indicated that the groups of enemy reported by the previous patrols had been withdrawing to the northwest.

At 0930, "B" Company provided a security guard to a company a supply train to BLT 3/5. This security guard returned at 1345, reporting that no enemy had been encountered.

During the night of 3 October, 1950, BLT 1/5 remained in the assembly area. At 2040, the Battalion received orders that on the following morning they would send a strong patrol in the area covered by patrol 1 of that day. At 2236, orders were received that the Battalion would provide one rifle platoon (reinforced) with 2 sections of "A" Battery, 50 AAA (U.S.A.), as security element of BLT 3/5 supply train. Weapons Company was assigned this mission.

At 0745, 4 October, 1950, "B" Company (reinforced) with 1 squad of "B" Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, and one section of 81mm mortar platoon, departed from the assembly area to patrol to the northwest to the village of Sadok, to destroy enemy that had been reported in that area. "B" Company (reinforced) patrolled to the village of Sadok and returned with no enemy contact. Four mine fields were found along route of patrol and were destroyed by the detachment of engineers. A total of 82 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were destroyed.

At 0830, the supply train departed BLT 1/5 assembly area with security elements attached and returned at 1600, reporting no activity while enroute to and from destination. The Battalion remained in assembly area and no enemy activity was encountered.

At 1130, 5 October, 1950, the Battalion, upon order of RCT-5, untrucked in preparation for movement to 1st Marine Division Assembly Area at Inchon, Korea. At 1245, the 1st serial was underway and by 1600 the last serial had arrived at the new assembly area. The Battalion was billeted in buildings of the Jinsin Electrical Works.

On 6 and 7 October, 1950, BLT 1/5 remained in the assembly area and began reorganization and resupply.

3. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH

a. ENEMY TACTICS

On 15 September, 1950, when this Battalion landed at INCHON, KOREA, and estimated 2200 enemy troops of the SEOUL Defense Garrison were defending. Due to the intensity of our attack the enemy withdrew under cover of darkness to high ground along the Seoul-Inchon Highway and fought a delaying action until 22 September, 1950, when the main defense positions on the outskirts of Seoul were attained by the Battalion. This delaying action consisted of small groups tactically dug in and concealed on ridge lines overlooking the routes of approach to Seoul. Armed with rifles and automatic weapons, the tactics employed by these groups was to open fire on our advancing elements at long range, delaying our advance until such time as our artillery, mortar or air were directed on those positions. The enemy forces would then retreat, sometimes in a disorganized manner, and at other times using orderly methods. During our advance to Seoul, the enemy reinforced the delaying forces with elements of the Seoul Defenses. This action was due to the high losses of the enemy through casualties and prisoners and his need to delay our rapid advance to gain time to prepare defensive positions in Seoul and reinforce the Seoul defenders.

On 22 September, 1950, the enemies main defenses of Seoul were met by this Battalion at Hill 105, overlooking the city. At this time the enemy employed a deliberate defense. From well entrenched positions along the base of the ridge and forward slope of the ridge

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the defenders concentrated heavy automatic and rifle fire on the advancing elements. These weapons commenced firing at long range, continuing their fire throughout the attack. Though heavily hit by mortar and artillery fire, the enemy held their ground until killed or driven from their positions by our infantry. Upon attaining the crest of the ridge, the assaulting forces were met by fire from defense positions on the reverse slope of the ridge.

From the period 2 to 5 October, 1950, the Battalion was bivouaced at TA 1764 M (KYONGSONG Sheet 65261, 1: 50,000). During this time extensive patrolling was conducted. The nature and tactics of the enemy encountered at this time was of a defeated and confused attitude. Groups of from 2 to 50 were encountered and reported hiding in the hills throughout the patrol areas. Upon contact the enemy fled without attempting to hold the ground he occupied. During the night the enemy resorted to guerilla tactics against villages, robbing the native of rice and animals for food, and murdering and kidnaping natives. At no time were defenses attempted by enemy units. The patrol discovered numerous mine fields along the road networks leading north from Seoul. These mines were crudely buried without pattern and were easily distinguished during daylight. Anti-tank mines were of a Russian wooden (non-magnetic) type and in most cases were booby trapped. Anti-personnel mines employed a pull type fuse, and were emplaced to cover the anti-tank mine field.

At 0600, 18 September, 1950, approximately 300 enemy were in position on the ridge line between "B" Company and "C" Company, having moved there during the night in preparation for an attack on Kimpo Airfield in DLT 2/5 zone of action. From the position of the enemy it was ascertained that no prior knowledge of our position was in the hands of the enemy; indicating a lack of reconnaissance patrolling by enemy units, plus a lack of communication between retreating forces and the attacking force. When this attacking force was fired on by DLT 2/5 from the front and this Battalion from the flank, it completely disrupted the enemy attack, causing the force to retreat in panic, individually and in small groups.

At 0530, 19 September, 1950, 0200, 23 September, 1950, and 0430, 24 September, 1950, elements of the Battalion were counter-attacked by enemy units. These units were approximately of platoon strength. The attacks were directed at the highest point of the ground occupied by our forces, and at machine gun emplacements. During the attack on 23 September, the enemy was successful in over-running a machine gun emplacement, capturing the gun and withdrawing down the ridge. The attacking enemy used rifles, sub-machine guns and grenades in the attempts to over-run our positions. The attack of 24 September, was well organized in that a base of fire was employed from a small ridge, firing automatic weapons onto our positions, while the assaulting force moved in to hand grenade range. Hand grenades thrown by our men proved the most effective in these three attacks, and the enemy was reluctant to continue the attack through a barrage of hand grenades.

During the advance from Inchon to Seoul the enemy used artillery and mortar fire mostly against rear command posts and supply trains. At times their fire appeared to be of a "hit or miss" nature, with many rounds falling harmlessly in rice paddies and on unoccupied ridges. At other times the mortar and artillery fire was accurately placed on our rear area positions and definitely indicated observed fire. Most of their firing was done in early evening after our planes were off station and not yet dark enough to observe their positions by the flashes. Enemy barrages were never concentrated to any extent; a six round barrage being the heaviest fired on an

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

one position at one time; at other times it was sporadic fire. Only limited artillery and mortar fire was placed on our front line positions. However high velocity 45mm anti-tank and 85mm T34 tank cannons were fired quite extensively against our front line positions, utilizing a traversing system of fire. This fire was not very effective against our entrenched positions, as it was a blast effect into the side of the hills from low ground, rather than shrapnel falling into positions from above.

The use of brush and scrub pine for extensive camouflage from air and ground observation was found throughout this campaign.

The use of napalm on enemy positions by air was very effective in breaking the enemy's positions; causing the defenders to become disrupted and flee in panic.

b. ORGANIZATION

During the naval gun fire and air bombardment preceding the landing at INCHON, many of the defending enemy were either killed or driven to the rear. The remaining enemy organized into small pockets, the largest group defending Observatory Hill. This group employed many automatic weapons which delivered a large volume of fire on the landing beach. During the drive to Seoul the enemy was organized in groups of 50 to 150 men, these troops defended the high ground in squad strong points, covering avenues of approach and critical positions. The enemy in the Seoul area fought a weak but more organized delaying action, conducted in the above manner, until we contacted their main line of resistance. This was the most organized force met. The enemy numbered about 600 to 900. The enemy had a large number of automatic weapons and was supported by mortar fire. He also utilized high velocity anti-tank weapons against personnel. After the MLR was broken the enemy became disorganized, defending in small pockets of 15 to 50 throughout Seoul. Beyond the city the enemy became completely disorganized, hiding in hills in the day time and proceeding north during the night. POW's reported Communist civilians in these small groups with the soldiers. The POW's also reported that they had small arms and automatic weapons. POW's reported that the enemy sent from North Korea did not, in several cases, have weapons. It was reported that although there was a shortage of individual weapons, plenty of ammunition was available.

c. STRENGTH

The approximate enemy strength defending INCHON was 2200. An estimated 150 enemy were killed and 51 POW's were captured. During the drive to Seoul contact was made against approximately 600 to 900 enemy; of these 150 to 250 were killed and 186 prisoners were taken. In the Seoul area this Battalion came into contact with approximately 900 to 1200 enemy and destroyed approximately 300 and captured 154 prisoners.

d. DEPLOYMENT

When this Battalion landed at Inchon the enemy was deployed along the high ground overlooking the landing beaches. Entrenched emplacements were found on this high ground. The enemy also utilized buildings for firing positions. From the outskirts of Inchon to the edge of Seoul, the enemy was deployed in small groups on the high ground along the route of advance. These positions afforded him commanding observation and long range fire. When driven from these positions they would retreat over the ridge line to low

ground for rapid movement to the next defensive position. In the defense of Seoul, the enemy was found to be entrenched at the base of the forward slope, on the military crest of the forward slope, and on the reverse slope. Their individual fox holes were approximately 20 feet apart. In many cases the defense positions were a series of trenches. The enemy attempted to hold these positions, giving ground only when driven from the positions. During our patrolling actions north of Seoul, the deployment of the enemy was in groups of 2 to 50, hiding in the high, irregular, mountainous terrain, running when contact was made with our patrols, and having no apparent order of withdrawal.

In many instances during our advance from Inchon small groups and individual North Korean soldiers would hide in caves, rice paddies, houses, etc., and allow our advancing forces to pass by; then they would resort to sniping from the rear.

e. PROBABLE ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

1. The enemy encountered on 15 September were elements of the Seoul Defense Garrison, approximately 2200 in strength. The enemy was well equipped with machine guns and small arms, with some mortars.

2. On the 16th of September POWs taken stated they were from the 1st Battalion. Documents were found in Inchon belonging to the 3rd Company, 1st Battalion.

3. On 17 September the Battalion moved to Ojang-Mian (0655, Kyongsong sheet 65261, 1:50,000), stragglers were picked up who stated they were from 548th Medical unit. This POW stated 5,000 enemy were in Seoul. One POW stated about 8,000 enemy in Seoul. Other units encountered or reported in this area were: 5469 Unit, 1st Bn, 43rd Tank Regt; Vehicle Bn 31st Regt. (500 in the Regiment); 340 Unit, 43rd Regt.

4. On 18 September this Battalion captured a prisoner from the 1st Bn, 24th Air Regt, and from the 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt. (1200 in the Regt). This POW stated there were about 20- 122mm AAA pieces in Seoul. Three POWs from the 1st Plat, 1st Engr Co, 3rd Bn, 77th Unit were captured (700 men in the unit). One POW was captured from the 1st Co, Engr Bn, 1st Air Div, Unit 885, stationed at Kimpo Airfield. This POW stated that approximately 300 enemy were defending the airfield.

5. On 19 September this Battalion encountered the 25th Brigade. Elements of other units which this Battalion encountered or captured POWs were:

2d Co, Engr Bn, Air Division.

1st Co, 1st Bn, Air Div.

2nd Co, 1st Bn, Air Div

2nd Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt, 3rd Div

3rd Co, 1st Engr Bn.

2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 2nd Regt, 18th Div.

1st Co, 2nd Bn, 18th Regt. (Seoul Regt).

2nd Bn, 2nd Regt.

2nd Bn, Seoul Regt.

Unit 351, 2nd Bn, Seoul Regt.

1st Bn, 2nd Regt.

42nd Regt.

1st Co, 1st Engr Bn, Air Div.

2nd Co., 2nd Bn, 3rd Div.

Unit 506, 2nd Bn.

6. On 22 September enemy artillery was observed being moved into position at 185ER (Kongsong sheet, 6526 I, 1:50,000). Took two prisoners who stated they were members of Heavy Weapons Company.

7. On 25 September, two prisoners from the 3rd Battalion, 25th Brigade, stated 700 enemy would oppose our front. One prisoner captured from Artillery Company, 73th Regiment.

8. On 27 September, one POW was taken from 5th Co., 3rd Bn, 1st Regt, 563 Unit, which came from Seoul four days before.

9. On 28 September, one prisoner was captured who stated he was from the 18th Division.

10. The enemy units, or elements thereof, either encountered or from whom we obtained prisoners from 15 September to 28 September were as listed below:

15 September: Seoul Defense Garrison

16 September: 1st Bn, Seoul Defense Garrison

17 September: 548th Medical Unit.

5469 Unit.

1st Bn, 43rd Tank Regt.

Vehicle Bn, 31st Regt. (500 in Regt)

340 Unit 43rd Regt

42nd Regt

269 Unit

18 September: 1st Bn, 24th Regt

3rd Bn, 2nd Regt

1st Plat, 1st Engr Co., 3rd Bn, 77 Unit
(700 in Unit)

1st Air Div, Unit 885. (Himpo Airfield, 300
in Unit)

1st and 3rd Companies, 1st Bn, Air Div

19 September: 25th Brigade

2nd Co, Engr Bn, Air Div

1st Co, 1st Bn

1st Co, 1st Engr Bn.

2nd Co, 1st Bn.

2nd Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt, 3rd Div

3rd Co, 1st Engr Bn

2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 2nd Regt, 18th Div

1st Co, 2nd Bn Seoul Regt

18th Regt

Unit 351, 2nd Bn, Seoul Regt

1st Bn, 2nd Regt

2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 3rd Div

22 September: Heavy Weapons Company

25 September: Artillery Regiment, 78th Regiment

27 September: 8th Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Regt, 563 Unit

28 September: 18th Division.

f. EQUIPMENT

The individual NKPA infantryman was equipped with either the manually-operated, bolt action, Russian long rifle (NOM.-7.62mm, "MOSSIN-NAGANT", M1891/30) with bayonet, or the manually operated carbine (NOM.-7.62mm "MOSSIN-NAGANT" M1924/27), or the automatic submachine gun (NOM.-7.62mm "SHKAPIN" PPSH M1941). The riflemen carries one bandolier of ammunition containing approximately 100 rounds in 5 round clips. The automatic submachine gun men with one or two drums, holding 71 rounds each. Each had a minimum of hand grenades.

Other weapons and equipment found to be used against this Battalion were:

7.62mm "DEGTYAREV" DP Light Machine Gun.

7.62mm "MAXIM" M1910 Heavy Machine Gun. (The use of this machine gun was not as extensive as on the southern front, and was not found at all until the Battalion reached Seoul.)

45mm Anti-tank gun M1942

76mm Field gun M1942, "ZIS 3".

122mm Howitzer, M1938

82mm M1937 Battalion Mortar

120mm M1938 Regimental Mortar

Medium tank, T-34, w/85mm gun.

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Anti-tank mines, Russian made, wooden, non-magnetic. These mines were bobby-trapped in most cases.

Anti personnel mines, Fragmentation.
(Russian made).

Equipment captured by this Battalion:

Three (3) 37mm anti-aircraft guns, M1939.

Two (2) 45mm anti-tank guns, M1942.

Two (2) 82mm Battalion mortars, M1937.

Four (4) 120mm mortars

Ten (10) 6x6 trucks

Six (6) Russian made.

Four (4) U. S. Army Trucks

Two (2) Jeeps, U. S. Army.

One (1) 1949 Chevrolet Panel Truck.

Sixty (60) cases 7.62 small arms ammunition.

Two-hundred (200) cases of dynamite.

Communications equipment (including wire tapping equipment).

Engineer equipment (including picks, shovels, and two (2) generators)

Medical equipment (including two cases of narcotics).

One Hundred fifty five (155) drums (55 gal each) of gasoline.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

a. The landing at Beach Red at Inchon with seizure of objective paved the way for the seizure of Inchon, and high ground south of the town of Ascom the following day. The landing at Inchon was apparently a surprise to the enemy in that he apparently had not organized his defenses in depth in the area.

b. The next period of time found this Battalion attacking and seizing the high ground southeast of Kimpo Airfield. The seizure of this high ground split the enemy forces east and west of Yongdongpo-ri, and allowed the Battalion to place effective supporting arms fire on enemy troop movements and installations.

c. The following two day period found the battalion attacking and seizing the high ground east of Kimpo Airfield, and south west of Seoul on the south bank of the Han River. The seizure of this ground secured the right flank of the 5th Marines for the subsequent crossing of the Han River.

d. After crossing the Han River, the 1st Battalion attacking alongside the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines seized successive objectives on the right flank of the 5th Marines zone of action with the Battalion right flank resting on the Han River. The seizure of Hill 105 on the outskirts of Seoul permitted the landing on the right flank of the 5th Marines by the 1st Marines and their rapid entry into Seoul.

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e. The seizure of Hill 338 on the northwestern edge of Seoul by the Battalion denied close observation into the city of Seoul from this direction and placed the Pyongyang-Seoul Road under observation.

f. Patrol action carried out by the Battalion five miles northwest of Seoul uncovered mine fields, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, and destroyed and dispersed small bands of enemy who had retreated from Seoul in confusion. This action aided in keeping clear the routes of communication for following friendly elements.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMANDER:

a. The 3.5 Rocket has proven to be an excellent weapon against tanks and other targets when emergency required. It is recommended that rockets with the Inerga grenade principle be designed to further increase effectiveness, and that white phosphorous rockets be manufactured similar to that presently available for the 2.36" rocket launcher.

b. It is recommended that the TACP liaison team be increased to include a front line FO team consisting of three men with SCR 300 radio communications to the TACP liaison officer for the purpose of controlling air strikes forward of company front lines. It is not always possible with present TACP liaison party for the Battalion Commander to effectively control strikes forward of front lines and maintain control of TACP as is desired, unless the Battalion Observation Post is set up near or with observation of the front lines.

c. It is recommended that a simple and foolproof system for night control of aircraft by TACP liaison officer be devised.

d. It is recommended that the amount of illuminating shell in the UE be increased for defense against an enemy such as the North Korean, who apparently prefer to attack at night rather than in daylight, especially so when the air superiority by our forces is unchallenged.

e. The present bipod legs of the IAR are too long and heavy. In order for a man to fire the weapon, with the bipod legs on the ground, he will make a large silhouette and a better target. Experience in this Battalion has proven that men carrying IAR's are prone to remove and dispose of the bipods after their initial engagements.

f. Present C-4 rations have three wet, three dry, and two fruit components. In the attack in Korea experience of this Battalion shows that the men carry one wet, two dry and two fruit components. Usually one and sometimes two of the wet components are consumed. It is recommended that the fruit component be increased, and one wet component of the present C type ration be replaced by a wholly candy or sweet component. Heat tablets should be included in the ration itself to make the wet components more palatable, especially on cold and wet days.

g. Motor Transport presently assigned an Infantry Battalion is not sufficient. Motor Transport assigned to augment Battalion Motor Transport is easily taken away by higher authority which places the Battalion in a critical condition for Motor Transport. It is recommended that six 2½ ton 6x6 or equivalent be added to current T/E's for Infantry Battalions and T/O's be increased by six drivers.

h. It is recommended that a galley trailer(s) be assigned with appropriate prime mover instead of present type equipment. Too much time and effort is spent setting up present galleys instead of utilizing such time for preparation and distribution of food. The tastiness of food could be improved if $\frac{1}{2}$ the time presently spent in man handling stoves and ovens off and on trucks be spent in food preparation.

i. The landing plan at Inchon had two BLT's landing in assault on Beach Red. The scheduled waves of each BLT landed at corresponding times and utilized identical boat numbers. This resulted in confusion in the rendezvous area. It is recommended that boat teams in the same wave be assigned different numbers, for example in the first wave with each BLT using 7 LCVPs, BLT 1/5 use numbers 1-1 thru 1-7 and BLT 2/5 use numbers 1-8 thru 1-14.

j. During the planning phase for an amphibious beach assault, it is recommended that the BLT commander be consulted regarding air and naval gunfire support to be placed on the respective BLT's landing beach and that recommended targets be included in the air and naval gunfire plans, if possible.

k. The present state of air-ground training permits the use of support aircraft against targets within 150 yards, and with a calculated risks, within 100 yards of front lines. However; numerous occasions have arisen where control by the FAC has been difficult and accomplished only by relay of information from the company commanders to the FAC over the Battalion Tactical Net.

A need exists for an additional FAC with each battalion, who can be sent forward with light portable equipment to control air strikes on targets which can be seen only from front line positions.

l. All close air support received by this Battalion has been excellent, indicating the high state of air-ground coordination achieved by past training. Briefing of pilots at target areas is comparatively easy and accomplished with a minimum of time. It is to be noted that additional aircraft could have been utilized on numerous occasions if they had been available. All types of aircraft armament have been used effectively against enemy positions, but it is recommended that a higher percentage of Napalm, 500 and 1000 pound bombs be used against enemy strongpoints.

m. The personnel evacuation system from front lines has not proven adequate, and has been accomplished only by the utilization of headquarters and service personnel organic to the battalion. This has necessitated the use of supply, motor transport, cooks, communication and staff sections personnel to achieve the desired evacuation result. It is recommended that an evacuation company be made part of a Medical Battalion to accomplish evacuation of personnel.

n. The carbine in its present form with its light construction and automatic characteristics does not operate satisfactorily under conditions where moisture and sand are plentiful. A lighter version of the M-1 is recommended. It is also recommended that a sub-machine gun replace the pistol. More time in the Marine Corps should be spent on instruction and use of grenades. It is recommended that an impact detonation grenade be used by our infantry.

11. RECOMMENDATIONS OF STAFF SECTIONS:

- a. Annex ABLE - Artillery Liaison Party and Forward Observer.
- b. Annex BAKER - Battalion Communications
- c. Annex CHARLIE - Tactical Air-Control Party

ANNEX ABLE

ARTILLERY LIAISON PARTY AND FORWARD OBSERVER

1. Comments and recommendations for artillery liaison section and forward observer sections.

2. The present T/O of the Artillery Forward Observer Team calls for four (4) wiremen, including a wire team chief, out of the total of eight (8) personnel. It is the policy of the Liaison F.O. sections of "A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, to lay all forward observer lines from the liaison switchboard to the individual F.O. teams. In view, therefore, of the numerous displacements made by each F.O. team in comparison with the fewer number of liaison team movements, and considering the ensuing physical demands on the personnel of the F.O. teams, it is recommended that all wiremen be organic to and remain with the liaison section at the infantry battalion command post. The advantages of this method are as follows:

a. During periods when the F.O. teams are displacing rapidly and are operating solely on radio, wire personnel may be getting much needed rest at the C.P. and will be able to initiate wire lines rapidly, once the F.O. Teams have halted and call for wire.

b. Having wire personnel at the infantry battalion command post places them closer to the source of re-supply of wire and necessary accessories.

c. It is desirable that each F.O. team have absolute minimum of personnel when operating under fire. It is the opinion of the undersigned that this need be no more than the forward observer, his scout-sergeant, and the radio operator. The driver, then would remain with the wiremen at the infantry battalion command post.

d. The total number of wire personnel could be cut down to one (1) wire chief for the entire liaison-forward observer group, plus a minimum of two (2) wiremen per operating forward observer section, making a total of seven (7) wire personnel. It is further recommended that the rank of the liaison officer's scout-sergeant be not less than that of technical sergeant in order to achieve a seniority over the staff-sergeants of the F.O. Teams.

3. The use of the truck-mounted ($\frac{1}{4}$ ton) SCR-608 by the liaison officer, supplemented by an SCR-619 equipped with a cargo jeep mount and battery charger, has been found quite satisfactory. The additional radio for the Liaison Officer, with the added feature of its being adaptable for a battery-operated back pack, is desirable particularly in amphibious operations where the radio truck is not available to the Liaison Officer for several hours after he has landed with the infantry battalion headquarters.

A much lighter, simpler, and stronger radio for the forward observer teams is needed. The presently used SCR-610, although it breaks down to a two-man load, is still far too bulky and heavy

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for an F.O. team which does not normally have access to vehicle transportation.

The use of a primary channel for each battery's three F.O. teams and liaison section, plus the artillery battalion common fire direction frequency, is satisfactory, in theory, but the choice of frequencies made to date, with the resultant difference of no more than 0.2 megacycles, is not at all practical, by reason of the accompanying interference.

The use of the Emergency Switchboard (ED-13/GT) at the liaison officer's post has proved highly satisfactory.

4. It is strongly recommended that the present allowance of one (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 4x4 truck and one (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 2 wheel trailer per F.O. team and liaison section be changed to one (1) $\frac{3}{4}$ ton, 4x4 truck per F.O. section and liaison section. It is also recommended that each of these $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks be equipped with a battery charger PE-219 mounted at the forward end of the bed of the truck.

5. The continued use of an F.O. Team per rifle company is recommended. At times, however, it has been the practice of the Battalion Commander to employ an F.O. team with him on the battalion observation post. This practice has its advantages (where observation of the whole battalion front is particularly good) and when used, should make use of the F.O. team from the reserve rifle company. Normally, it is not recommended that the liaison officer and his section occupy the battalion OP with the Battalion Commander, inasmuch as the artillery liaison officer's sources of information and links with infantry staff section activities are effected best at the infantry battalion command post. Certainly, the actual control of fire missions should be solely left to the forward observers; the Liaison Officer should not fire missions unless called upon to replace an F.O. casualty.

The practice of keeping one F.O. team in position to observe and direct fires and cover the advance of another team with the assault rifle company until that second F.O. team obtains a good OP further along the route of advance has proved highly satisfactory.

ARTEX LAKE

COMMUNICATIONS

1. The below listed are the more important difficulties and their suggested corrections found during the recent combat period.

a. Experience has shown that the SCR-536 is inadequate for Marine Corps companies due to its limited range. A more powerful battery operated trans-receiver is needed that will have less weight and bulk than the SCR-300 but will approximate its range characteristics.

b. A lighter, more durable type wire is needed to replace the W/130 class. Current alloys, having better electrical characteristics and much higher tensile strengths are available to withstand the terrific punishment given an assault company's wire line.

c. A larger type dispenser, of duraluminum, is suggested to replace the CE-11 carrier. The present DR-6 weighs too much in comparison to the amount of wire it carries.

d. A lighter, less elaborate switchboard is needed at the battalion level. Elimination of all but one of the phantom circuits and the night alarm circuits plus a shock proof light metal case would account for a great decrease in weight.

e. The present EA-70, battery, used in the SCR-300, is a very good battery when one can be found that has not become discharged due to an extended period of "shelf life". In the present combat period, slightly less than half of all EA-70's received by this battalion have expired on the shelf. A less durable battery of certain shelf life specifications would be more acceptable.

2. Personnel authorized by T/O are found to be sufficient. However, it is suggested that one additional radio operator 2531, be added to the list to take care of the functional Intelligence Net.

TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY

1. The system of controlling close air support is generally satisfactory except in instances where hill masses masked the FAC from observing positions beyond friendly front lines. This was overcome by having artillery forward observers or company commanders spot for the FAC via the battalion tactical net or by wire. The aircraft remained under the control of the FAC. Although somewhat inconvenient and tying up the Battalion Tactical Net, this system accomplished the mission satisfactorily and with a minimum loss of time.

2. Alternatives to this system would be to: (1) have an air spot officer equipped with an SCR-300 or telephone accompany the company commander at the most advantageous observing position as the NCF spotter is now employed. The FAC of course would be similarly equipped to receive spot information from the observer and relay to the aircraft. Disadvantages: addition of another officer in an already crowded company C.P. (2) have the FAC himself and his team accompany the company holding the most advantageous piece of terrain and maintain contact with battalion commander for liaison purposes through battalion tactical net. Disadvantages: Crowding the company C.P., depriving the battalion commander of personal liaison, and loss of coordination among artillery, NCF and mortar liaison officers. This system is recommended only when a company is advancing far in front of the battalion headquarters and should have the benefit of supporting arms without the threat of communication difficulties, and when the FAC can operate his aircraft at his own discretion. This was done once during this operation when the FAC accompanied a company strength combat patrol five miles in advance of the battalion C.P. It is therefore recommended that artillery F.O.'s be trained as air spotters, and assist when required. Minimum training would be necessary, since the actual control would remain in the hand of the FAC.

3. Method of mission request is too long and unnecessary delay is caused between the initiating of the strike request and the actual mission being flown. In all missions where the FAC stated he will observe and control, he should be required to furnish only the following information in his request to the TADC:

- a. Whether mission is ordinary, priority or search and attack.
- b. Target area designation.
- c. Type of loading desired.
- d. Direction of attack.
- e. Time the mission is requested.

The aircraft should be turned over immediately to the FAC by the TADC without briefing, since experience has shown that the pilots have to be re-briefed by the FAC prior to running the strike. It should be the responsibility of the regimental air party to inform TADC of front lines, since this shackled transmission in the tactical air request takes about five minutes before heard correctly. Front lines should be given, however, in the request if the situation dictates.

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4. Marking of targets was done entirely by using 81mm mortar white phosphorous shells. This was done quickly and accurately and since the mortar liaison officer was alongside the FAC on the OP, the best and most rapid coordination was accomplished. This is recommended as SOP for future operations. The 81mm mortar has sufficient range to reach any distance beyond the front lines that is normally referred to as close air support.

5. Radio and Vehicular equipment of the TACP with few exceptions is unsatisfactory. During this operation, many failures occurred in both the VRC-1 jeep and the portable radios, AN/GRC-9 and MAF, largely due to the rough terrain over which equipment was moved. Details are as follows:

a. VRC-1 Radio jeep is top heavy, overweight and underpowered; thereby unable to carry additional equipment or tow a trailer. The above makes it restricted to follow at least secondary roads.

b. SCR-312 and SCR-191 MFH/HF radios are excellent, and can take the worst kind of punishment.

c. SCR-542 VHF radio, although an excellent transmitter and receiver, is not sturdy enough for extensive operation in the field. The rough terrain and roads over which this radio was carried during the operation caused this radio to drift off frequency, thus requiring re-alignment at frequent intervals. This maintenance requires a technician and test equipment.

d. Recommendations:

(1) That the VRC-1 radios be mounted on a sturdier and more powerful vehicle, such as a small weapons carrier.

(2) That the SCR-542 be further shock mounted or replaced with a sturdier set.

(3) That the TACP be assigned a cargo jeep and trailer to carry spare parts, water cans, gas cans, batteries, wire, sandbags, etc., that are now required to be carried on the VRC-1 jeep.

e. The AN/GRC-9 radio, while an adequate piece of equipment, is not sturdy enough for long operations in the field. The transmitter on this set failed twice during the operation due to being carried over rough terrain. The transmitter is not powerful enough at great distances when using the whip antenna to prevent other stations from blocking transmissions. As hand pack equipment, all bags should be designed to be carried on the back, rather than being shoulder slung. For example, the generator, although small and not too heavy, is a most cumbersome piece of equipment to carry up a hill. This team obtained a small bag for carrying spare microphones, headsets, and spare batteries, thus eliminating the large accessory bag.

f. MAF VHF radio is absolutely no good for field operations. The BB 54 wet cell battery leaks, has too short a life (averaging less than four hours), requires more than twenty hours for re-charging, and does not retain a charge for more than a day. The radio itself has too many channels, is too delicate for field operations, is too big and heavy to be carried long distances. It is recommended that this radio be thrown out and an entirely new set be designed having two crystal controlled channels, powered by dry cell batteries. The elimination of eight channels should eliminate at least some of the weight and most of the size.

This unit used automobile storage batteries, which were much more satisfactory, to replace the 3B54. However this latter is a heavy and difficult load to hand pack.

g. This team used the RM 52 and 53 remotes with W-110 wire, remoting from the VRC-1. Excellent results were obtained in both transmitting and receiving for the maximum distances used, of 800 yards.

6. Organization of the team as now established in the I/O is satisfactory except as noted above. However, it is recommended that the TACP be made an organic section in the infantry battalion headquarters. The training, supplying and coordinating would be simplified. Maintenance can be conducted within the battalion communications section, with a technician trained to repair equipment peculiar to the TACP attached to the regimental communication section.

7. Air operations and pilot technique were generally excellent. The following notes and recommendations are submitted:

a. Pilots releasing HVAR 5" at too high an altitude, causing them to fall short. From ground observation, it is recommended that rockets be released at not more than 2500 feet slant range from target.

b. Runs with napalm bombs should be low, flat, and at maximum speed to get maximum dispersion of the flames. Dive or glide runs tend to localize the dispersion.

c. It is recommended that maximum effort be exercised in developing techniques for controlling close support missions at night. The effect of aircraft over the front lines in neutralizing enemy artillery and mortars is outstanding, but due to lack of controlling with a maximum safety factor limited the actual striking of these emplacements unless visibility was excellent, and the target was beyond a thousand yards of the front lines. In addition it is recommended that night fighters be on station sufficient to cover the entire front at all times during hours of darkness.

8. Aviation ordnance recommendations are as follows:

a. That the F4U aircraft be replaced with the AD type aircraft for the Marine Corps as the close support weapon, since the payload and inherent accuracy of the aircraft is much greater.

b. That the .50 caliber aircraft machine guns replace the 20mm cannon in close support aircraft, which will more than double the strafing ammunition capacity.

c. Since it is understood that the number of napalm bombs is limited by the storage space required by external tanks, it is recommended that a napalm tank be especially designed that can be assembled aboard ship or in the field just prior to use, thus eliminating the large area now required for the tank. In addition, these tanks should be lightly constructed to insure complete breakage upon dropping. It was noted that many duds occurred during the operation when tanks did not break or only broke partially. Napalm has proved the most terrifying and effective weapon dropped on troops protected in trenches and fox holes.

9. Miscellaneous recommendations:

a. That flight loaders at least be equipped with binoculars to aid them in locating well concealed and small targets.

b. Eliminate the grid lines on the plastic map case. They do not seem to conform to any map scale and tend to clutter the map enclosed.

c. Issue a set of binoculars of a smaller size. Present models are too large and cumbersome to handle.

d. Equip members of the TACP with revolvers or automatic pistols rather than carbines. The carbine is difficult to carry when handpacking radio and associated equipment.

e. Issue a small bag of a light canvas construction with a plastic lining, which can be shoulder slung. Such a bag about the size of a map and dispatch case would be used to carry toilet articles and extra set of underwear and socks and the "C" type rations, thus eliminating the marching pack, which is difficult carrying with back packed radio equipment.

12. UNIT STATION LIST, 30 August - 7 October 1950

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER NO</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>
NEWTON, George R.	LtCol	05785	0302	Battalion Commander
OLSON, Merlin O.	Major	08163	0302	Battalion Exec Off
<u>S-1</u>				
FRITZ, Martin F.	2ndLt	028390	0130	30Aug-21Sept Bn S-1 & Adj (22 Sept WIA & Evac)
RABE, LeRoy D.	2ndLt	032059	0105	Bn Pers & Classification Officer; RO; 23 Sept- 6 Oct Bn Adj & S-1
<u>S-2</u>				
HANSEN, Dean B.	2ndLt	049628	0302	30Aug-4Oct Bn S-2 (4-6 Oct SKI)
<u>S-3</u>				
SMITH, Loren R.	1stLt	040624	0302	30Aug-4Oct Bn S-3; 5-6 Oct Exec Off "C" Co.
CRONIN, James T.	1stLt	035789	0302	23Sept-6Oct Ass't S-3
<u>S-4</u>				
MORROW, Clark D.	Capt	012480	0302	30Aug-2Sept S-4 (3Sept WIA and Evac)
PALATAS, Michael V.	1stLt	043532	0302	8Sept-21Sept S-4 (22 Sept WIA and Evac)
PARSONS, Harold L.	1stLt	047913	0301	22Sept-30Oct S-4
JENSON, Austin C.	2ndLt	049968	0301	22Sept-30Oct Ass't S-4 4-6Oct 1st Rifle Plat Commander, "B" Co.
DAVIS, Warren A.	CWO	042207	3010	30Aug-4Oct Bn Supply Off (5-6Oct SKI)
<u>H&S Co</u>				
GODENIUS, Walter E. G.	Capt	027175	4960	Commanding Officer
PETER, William J. Jr.	1stLt	033632	2502	Bn Comn Off
SMITH, James W.	1stLt	037073	7302	30Aug-26Sept TAGP; 26 Sept trans to 1st Sig Bn
ALLEN, Merle W.	2ndLt	049793	0302	30Aug-26Sept IGF Spot Off 3Sept-8Sept Bn S-4; 26 Sept trans to 1st Sig Bn
GRUWE, Carl O.	Lt USM	202155		30Aug-26Sept IGL0; 26 Sept trans to 1st Sig Bn
O'TOOLE, Daniel M.	Lt(jg)	503776	USNR	Battalion Med Off
LUHR, John P.	Lt(jg)	245658	USNR	23Sept-6Oct Ass't Med Off
FIJANI, Kenneth J.	Lt(jg)	191243	USNR	30Aug-14Sept Ass't Med Off (15 Sept SKI)
<u>"A" Co</u>				
STEVENS, John R.	Capt	014231	0302	Commanding Officer
SUBANKS, Fred F. Jr.	1stLt	036407	0302	30Aug-21Sept Exec Off (21Sept WIA and Evac)
CHAMBERS, Franklin R. Jr.	1stLt	046413	0301	22Sept-6Oct Exec Off
BLANK, Howard G.	2ndLt	043444	0302	60mm Mort Sec Ldr
TRAPLELL, Nicholas M.	2ndLt	049663	0302	24Sept-6Oct 1st Rifle Plat Ldr

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER NO</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>
MUETZEL, Francis W.	2ndLt	049792	0302	30Aug-17Sept 2nd Rifle Plat Ldr (17Sept WLA and Evac)
MAHE, Nathaniel, F. Jr.	1stLt	039194	0302	17Sept-22Sept 2nd Rifle Plat Ldr (22Sept KLA)
COLLINS, Edward E.	2ndLt	049743	0301	23Sept-6Oct 2nd Rifle Plat Ldr
LOPEZ, Baldomero	1stLt	049344	0302	8Sept-15 Sept 3rd Rifle Plat Ldr (15Sept KLA)
SCHIMMENTI, Joseph A.	1stLt	049106	0302	17-22Sept 3rd Rifle Plat Ldr (22 Sept WLA and Evac)
"B" Co				
FELTON, Francis I. Jr.	Capt	015170	0302	Commanding Officer
HANCOCK, John R.	1stLt	039554	0302	8Sept-6Oct Exec Off
SCHRYVER, Hugh C. Jr.	2ndLt	049849	0302	30Aug-4Oct 1st Rifle Plat Ldr; 5-6Oct S-2
MORRIS, Edward C.	2ndLt	050033	0302	3rd Rifle Plat Ldr
CHRISTOLOS, John N.	2ndLt	049920	0302	30Aug-29Sept 60mm Mort Sec Ldr; 30Sept-30Oct S2E; 4-6Oct 60mm Mort Sec Ldr.
"C" Co (From 6 September)				
PEDERSEN, Poul F.	1stLt	035894	0302	Commanding Officer
SCHENNING, Richard J.	1stLt	042275	0302	6Sept-4Oct Exec Off; 5-6 Oct S-3
CORBET, Robert E.	2ndLt	050384	0302	1st Rifle Plat Ldr
MAGNESS, Byron L.	2ndLt	050330	0302	2nd Rifle Plat Ldr
DAVE, Harold L. Jr.	2ndLt	050372	0302	3rd Rifle Plat Ldr
MERRITT, Max A.	2ndLt	050410	0302	60mm Mort Sect Ldr
Wpns Co				
RUSSELL, John W.	Major	07098	0302	Commanding Officer
SOLLOM, Almond H.	Capt	024382	0302	Exec Off
ALDERMAN, Harry L.	2ndLt	049788	0302	81mm Mort Plat Comdr
TULEY, Ralph H.	2ndLt	049907	0302	Ass't 81mm Mort Plat Comdr
BROWN, Dale L.	2ndLt	050020	0302	AT Assault Plat. Comdr
MCDONALD, Francis E.	2ndLt	049462	0301	6Sept-6Oct MG Plat Comdr

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ANNEX OB0E TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1975
C/wft

2d Battalion, 5th Marines
In the Field
1 November 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Special Action Report for period 6 September 1950
- 7 October 1950

Ref: (a) Regimental General Order No. 34

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to summarize the action of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, FMF from 6 September 1950 to 7 October 1950. The report was directed by the 5th Marines which is the next higher echelon. The 2d Battalion as part of the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division was assigned the mission of landing at 1730, 15 September 1950 on Red Beach, Inchon, Korea, to seize objectives within their zone of action and to be prepared to continue the attack on order.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

See Enclosure (1).

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

The Battalion Commander was informed on 31 August 1950 of the amphibious landing which was to be executed on 15 September 1950. Since the 2d Battalion, as part of the 5th Marines, was committed to action during the period 1 September - 5 September 1950 (see Addendum #1 to 2d Battalion Special Action Report, period 7 Jul 50 to 31 Aug 50) preliminary planning was limited to the preparation of orders.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No rehearsals were conducted. There was no training conducted during 6-11 September 1950 since the battalion was in the process of reorganizing after their last combat action. However, all newly issued weapons were test fired during this period.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. Organization for Embarkation. Assignment of shipping was received on or about 4 September 1950. No schedule, showing berthing of ships, date and hour loading was to begin, and date and hour of embarkation, was received.

The battalion moved by truck to the side of the ship at Pusan, Korea on the morning of 6 September 1950. An advance party of thirty-two (32) cooks and messmen were sent aboard the USS CAVALIER as advance party and the battalion opened its CP aboard ship on 6 September 1950. Due to the fact that the organization was billeted at the ship's berth, no other advance party was put aboard the ship.

General cargo had been loaded aboard the USS CAVALIER prior to its arrival at Pusan. Loading of Unit Cargo commenced at 2000, 10 September 1950 and was completed at 2200, 11 September 1950.

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b. Supplies and Equipment Embarked.

Class I Water: All organic water cans and water trailers assigned were filled; a total of about 3/4 gal/man. Rations: One (1) day "C" ration embarked as D-1 issue. An unknown quantity of rations had been embarked prior to arrival of the ship at Pusan.

Class II General Supply - initial allowance. Ordnance - initial allowance. Signal - initial allowance. Engineer - initial allowance. Motor Transport = 1 3/4 ton truck, 19 1/4 ton trucks, 15 1/4 ton trailers, 2 1/4 ton ambulances, and 3 1/4 ton radio jeeps embarked. In addition, some vehicles from 1st Motor Transport Bn were embarked.

Class III - 400 drums assorted motor fuel embarked. 50 gallons flama thrower fuel embarked.

Class IV - 15 local manufacture scaling ladders embarked.

Class V - Unit Basic Load embarked. There was approximately 645 tons of assorted ammunition embarked aboard the USS CAVALIER prior to its arrival in Pusan.

No special preparation of supplies and equipment was made for embarkation. There was no movement of equipment and supplies to the Cargo Assembly Area due to the fact that all supplies embarked at Pusan were in the organization bivouac area and the bivouac area was used as the Cargo Assembly Area.

c. Embarkation Points and Cargos Assembly Areas.

The unit bivouac area, embarkation point and cargo assembly area were one and the same place on Pier #2 at Pusan, Korea. Mechanical loading devices were not used as sufficient native laborers were available.

d. Control.

No special control measures were necessary due to the close proximity of the ship and the unit. Internal security posts were established in the unit bivouac area to prevent fire, sabotage, and pilferage of cargo. Wire communication was established to units of the 1st Marine Brigade upon arrival in the bivouac area.

e. Movement and Embarkation of Personnel.

There was no movement of personnel to the ship due to the proximity of the bivouac area. All units embarked on the evening of 11 September 1950.

f. Miscellaneous.

Unit Embarkation Officer - 1stLt Paul UFFELMAN.
Unit Billeting Officer - 2dLt S. I. DEGULIS. No other special assignments were made for embarkation.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The battalion completely embarked in the USS CAVALIER and departed Pusan, Korea on 12 September 1950 and arrived at Inchon, Korea on 15 September 1950. During this period debarkation exercises were held daily. All troops were briefed on their missions ashore; the briefings commenced

at the company level and continued down to the fire team. Wide use was made of aerial photographs, mosaics, maps, and beach studies.

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase.

15-16 Sep 1950 - See Enclosure (2). The battalion arrived in outer transport area at 1410, debarkation of troops and equipment commenced at 1453. All assault waves were in rendezvous area by 1630. The first (1st) wave hit the beach at 1731. Remaining waves landed on schedule against light enemy resistance. Wpns Co and H&S Co were taken under fire after landing on RED Beach at 1830 by LST-859 (one (1) dead, twenty-three (23) wounded). "E" Co secured Bn Obj 1 at approx 1810, encountering light resistance. "E" Co secured Bn Obj 2 at approx 1840, encountering light resistance. Regtl Obj CHARLIE was secured by "E" Co at 1845. "E" Co arrived on Regtl Obj BAKER at approx 1900, and "D" Co passed through "E" Co to secure high ground Fwd of Regtl Obj BAKER. "D" Co occupied this ground at 2100 after a brief fire fight. At 2043 a two (2) squad patrol from "F" Co plus a squad of ROK's were sent along MSR to O.A. Line with orders to pay particular attention to the grounds and buildings to the left of the MSR. This patrol returned at 2302 reporting that no every contact had been made. By 2145 "D" and "E" Cos had tied in their lines, with one (1) platoon of "F" Co on "D" Co's left tying in Bn with 1/5. "F" Co with one (1) platoon of tanks attached was dispatched to O.A. Line at 0001 with orders to establish defense line along the O.A. Line. At 0545 received Regtl Opn C 17-50 to make physical contact with 1st Marines on the right, and to continue the attack and secure Regtl Obj DOG and EASY. At 0630 "E" Co, in assault, passed through "F" Co. Sight contact was made with RCT-1 at approx 0730, physical contact not being made until 0830. "E" Co secured Regtl Obj DOG (TA 9249-M-N-O-R-S-T-W-X-Y) at 0900, "F" Co secured Regtl Obj EASY (TA 9349-M-N-O-R-S-T) at 0930 with no opposition. The Bn continued to the O-3 Line (TA 9747-A-9748-M), reaching it at 1100, and continuing the attack to commanding ground overlooking the FBHL. Bn dug in for the night at TA 9749-R to 9750-W to 9651-X. See Enclosure (3). No activity during the night.

b. Exploitation Phase.

17-18 Sep 1950 - (1) At 0545 "D" Co outpost sighted three (3) enemy tanks approx 1,000 Yds

17-18 Sep - to their front (TA 9950-K) moving toward
1950 their position. By 0600 a total of six
(Cont'd) (6) enemy tanks with 200 infantry in
support had been sighted moving down the
MSR towards our positions. The enemy
tanks were permitted to advance within
300 yards to our MLR, at which time they
were taken under fire by our tanks (600
yards range), 75mm recoilless rifles
(500 yards range), and 2.36" rockets
(75 yards range). (See Enclosure (3)).
The 2.36" rocket launcher team knocked
out one (1) T-34 tank, and assisted in
the killing of another. All six (6)
enemy tanks and their supporting infantry
were knocked out by coordinated fires.
(2) See Enclosure (4). The attack on
Kimpo Airfield, which was to have commenced
at 0700, did not actually commence until
0900 because of the tank-led counterattack
that morning. The Bn moved out in column,
with order of march being "E", "D", "F",
Wpns, 75mm Recoilless Rifles, and H&S Co.
The march was somewhat delayed due to
enemy fire. After eliminating those
pockets of resistance, particularly in
the village of Pulchon and Taejang-Ni,
the Bn's advance was again held up by the
inaccuracy of the map regarding roads.
After a detailed reconnaissance, the road
leading from Taejang-Ni to Regtl Objs
ABLE and BAKER was found, and the Bn, less
tanks and motor column moved down the road
to the Obj. The tanks and remainder of
the motor column, with one (1) platoon of
infantry attached moved down a road par-
alleling the Bn advance and departed from
the village of Taejang-Ni at 1630. "E"
and "D" Cos secured Regtl Objs ABLE and
BAKER at approx 1600, not meeting any
enemy resistance. The order was then
issued to take Obj CHARLIE (Kimpo Airfield),
with a coordinated tank-infantry assault.
"E" Co moved out with one (1) platoon of
tanks, its mission being to secure the
right portion of the airfield and the
buildings at the end of the strip. One
(1) platoon of "F" Co moved to South end
of air strip, knocking out two (2) enemy
machine gens. "D" Co moved out to secure
the left portion of the air strip. "F"
Co in reserve, following in the center.
"E" Co detached a platoon to secure the
road junction at TA 0656-D-3 & 4 and
began the assault on the airfield at
approx 1800. However darkness overtook
the companies before the airfield could
be completely secured, and the companies
set up for the night in company perimeter
defenses. (See Enclosure (4).) At approx
0100, the platoon from "E" Co at TA 0656-
D-3 & 4 was attacked by a force of approx
100 enemy. After repulsing five (5)
attacks, the Plat Comdr being out of
contact with the Co Comdr made the decision
to move his platoon back to the airstrip.
In the process of moving back, "E" Co was
contacted, and the platoon rejoined the Co.

17-18 Sep 1950 (Cont'd) - At approx 0500, "E" Co received an attack believed to be of company strength at their right rear and front. The frontal assault was broken up by 60mm mortar concentrations, and the assault on the right rear of the company was broken up by small arms fire. After breaking up the attack, tank-infantry teams moved out to mop up the immediate area. At approx 0100, a squad of enemy engineers made an attempt to blow up an underpass in "E" Co's zone. The patrol led by a lieutenant was wiped out. Verbal orders from Regtl CO directed that all three (3) rifle companies be ordered to search out and destroy enemy pockets of resistance in Bn E/A and villages around Kimpo Airfield. "D" Co was to clear the villages of Pupyong, Changson and Kwahoc supported by a platoon of tanks. At approx 1030 "D" Co w/Plat of Tks, two (2) sections HMGs, and 75mm Recoilless Rifle Plat was ordered to secure Regtl Obj DOG. After ten (10) minutes of NGF, Obj DOG was secured at 1145, no enemy resistance was met, and "D" Co was ordered to defend the ground they had taken.

19 Sep 1950 - In compliance with verbal orders from regiment "E" Co attacked and seized Hill 21 (TA 0563) at 0700. No resistance encountered, and no enemy activity. Received Warning Order at 1600 from Regtl CO for move across Han river.

20 Sep 1950 - Received Regtl Opn C 23-50 at 0200. Bn was ordered to move to unit assembly area at TA 1182 and cross Han river in LVT's commencing at 0715. Bn arrived unit assembly area 0620 and embarked on LVT's at 0645. Time to cross river was modified. Bn left unit assembly area at 0925 and commenced actual river crossing at 0955. Bn completed crossing at 1040, and was ordered to pass through 3/5, attack and seize Regtl Obj DOG (TA 1262 1161) (Hill 127) and Obj EASY (TA 1363 1362) (Hill 100), proceeding as near to Objs as possible in LVT's. Bn advanced to TA 1065-Y in LVT's and deployed. "D" Co assaulted Obj EASY, and "E" Co assaulted Obj DOG, with two (2) Plats of LVTA's in direct support. The high dike on either side of the Ch'angnung river made it impractical for a coordinated LVTA-Infantry attack. The LVTA's were ordered to high ground West of the Ch'angnung river, from which position they could support the assault with overhead fire. "D" Co secured Obj EASY at 1540, taking eight (80) prisoners and meeting no resistance. "E" Co moved to high ground at TA 1162-I-J-M-N-O to TA 1262-F-G-K-L-P-Q, meeting no resistance. "F" Co moved up and tied into the left rear of "D" Co. Sporadic Arty and Mort fire was received, commencing at 1800.

21 Sep 1950 - Sporadic artillery and mortar fire during early morning hours culminated in an attack on "E" Co at approx 0600. Arty, 81mm and 60mm Mort fire was brought down on the attacking force, which resulted in the disposal of the estimated 200 enemy at 0615. "E" Co moved to Hill 127 (TA 1161 to TA 1261). "D" and "F" Cos received MG fire from TA 1261-R, such fire being silenced after a five (5) minute Arty barrage. 3/5 and 1/5 began passing through Bn positions at approx 0730, the Bn then reverting to Regtl reserve. Bn supported 3/5 by fire in the assault of Hill 96 (TA 1459) and ridge line from TA 1461 to TA 1463. Bn retained present position until 1600 at which time it moved forward to take up positions on "D" Co ridge line at TA 1561-K to 1460-O, "F" Co on Hill 96 (TA 1459) and "E" Co minus one (1) Platoon on high ground at TA 1461-H to TA 1361-N. The other platoon of "E" Co occupied hill at TA 1361-Q-U. Cos were in position by 1800. Sporadic enemy mortar fire received throughout night.

22-23 Sep 1950 - Bn remained present position until 1700 when Bn CP displaced to Kuryong-Dong (TA 1461-V-1). Sporadic enemy mortar fire continued. Bn remaining in Regtl reserve until 1200, 23 Sep 1950.

23-24-25 Sep 1950 - (3) See Enclosure (5). At approx 1100 the Bn Comdr was ordered to report to Regtl CP, where oral orders were issued to make the relief of the 2d ROK Bn. The Bn began moving out at approx 1200 in column of companies ("D", "F", "E", Wpns, and H&S). CP was established behind Hill 104 (TA 1659-R-2) at 1300. The Bn Comdr issued his order to "D" and "F" Cos, and the companies moved forward. "F" Co jumped off at 1500, with one (1) Platoon of tanks in direct support. "F" Co's objective was the right flank of Regtl Obj A (TA 1758-R-S, 3-W-X). "F" Co reached TA 1758-Q-U-V, then received intense HMG and small arms fires from TA 1758-I-N-R-W. One (1) Platoon of "F" Co reached TA 1758-H at approx 1800 but was forced to withdraw, after suffering heavy casualties. "F" Co was then ordered to dig in for the night. "D" Co was assigned mission of securing hill in TA 1758-H-I-J-E, TA 1759-Y-T, TA 1859-V. "D" Co reached nose in TA 1758-G-H, and received intense fire from TA 1758-I at approx 1830. "D" Co was ordered to dig in at its present positions for the night. Heavy concentrations of Arty fired harrassing missions throughout night. "E" Co dug in on Hill 104 (TA 1659) for the night. Regtl Opn O #26-50 received at 1915 assigning Bn mission of securing Regtl Obj A and M. H-Hour (0630) was preceded by a twenty (20) minute air strike and a twenty (20) minute artillery preparation. "D" Co reached base of Obj

23-24-25

Sep 1950
(Cont'd)

at 0810 and reported they were receiving fire from three (3) sides, but continued their forward movement to the high ground. "E" Co was committed at 1015 to take Hill 56 (TA 1758-I). By 1030 "D" Co reported their position at TA 1759+0 and "F" Co at TA 1758-P-U at 1030. An airstrike was made at 1050 on enemy positions at TA 1758-M-R-W-Y. "E" Co reported that at 1130 they had fire superiority over their objective. At approx 1300 "D" Co secured its objective. At 1320 a mortar round hit the Bn CP, wounding the Commanding Officer and four (4) enlisted personnel. Bn Comdr left CP at approx 1400, was relieved by the Bn Execo. Bn Comdr upon having his wound dressed, reassumed command of the battalion. At 1500 "E" Co jumped off in the attack. Reached TA 1758-M, and was held up by heavy fire from automatic weapons and HMG's located at TA 1758-W-Y. "E" Co extended their lines, clearing out the area down the slope at TA 1758-W-2 at 1630. At 1900 1st Plat, "E" Co pulled back in Bn Res on forward slope of Hill 104. No enemy contact made during night. At 0700, the Bn CP moved forward to TA 1758-M. At 0740 a ten (10) minute artillery barrage was brought down on Hill 72 (TA 1858-U-4). "E" Co moved forward under cover of the artillery barrage; and reached base of Hill 72 at 0920. After a five (5) minute 60mm mortar barrage, "E" Co began the movement up Hill 72 at 0930 and reached the top at 1003. "F" Co began to move up to Hill 72 at 1015 and reported at 1300 that they were receiving fire from Hill 105. Airstrike was called on Hill 105 at 1310, and "D" Co moved up to Hill 88 (TA 1858) at 1320. Artillery began preparation fires on Hill 105 at 1325. "E" Co jumped off in the attack at 1500. "E" Co occupied Hill 105 at 1515, and established front lines from TA 1957-1 to TA 1958-P. "D" Co moved into position at 1630, and tied in with "E" Co's left flank and had 3/5 tied in on their left flank. "F" Co moved into position at 1830, 25 Sep 50 from TA 1958-K to TA 1858-S. CP displaced at 1603 to TA 1958-P and set up in new location at 1735. (Ihwa Women's College). Some sniper fire during night. 81mm mortar platoon fired harassing missions until 2330.

26 Sep 1950

Bn in defensive positions. "E" Co on Hill 105 (TA 1958-P-5). "E" Co's lines ran from TA 1957-1-1 to TA 1958-P-1. "D" Co's lines tying in with "E" at TA 1958-P-5 and extending to TA 1958-K-2, tying in on left with 3/5, "F" Co tying in with "D" at 1958-K-5 and extending to TA 1858-S-5. CP was established at Ihwa Women's College (TA 1858-K-3). Enemy counterattack repulsed at 0530.

- 26 Sep 1950 - Intermittent sniper fire to Bn front and right front throughout early morning hours. "E" Co patrol in platoon size moved out at 0900 with the mission of eliminating enemy pockets and moving to railroad station at TA 2058-M-3. At approx 1300 patrol contacted 1st Marines 1,000 yards to Bn's right flank. No resistance encountered. "D" Co supported 3/5's attack by fire at 1200. No enemy contact made. Remained on defensive positions.
- 27 Sep 1950 - Verbal orders from Regtl CO ordered Bn to clean out enemy to Bn front, and make contact with 7th Marines on Bn left. "E" Co patrolled from TA 2059-M-5 to TA 1960-F-2. No resistance encountered. "E" Co made contact with 7th Marines at TA 1960-F-2 at approx 1300. Bn reorganized, eighty (80) replacements (two (2) officers) received. No enemy contact. In Regtl Res.
- 28 Sep 1950 - Patrol in platoon size moved to TA 1861-G via high ground and return, encountered no enemy. Bn received Warning O to be ready to move out to defensive positions Northwest of Seoul, with the mission being to protect the MSR and 1st Division's Northern flank. Company Commanders briefed on move at 2000. In Regtl Res.
- 29 Sep 1950 - Bn commenced move to Northern defensive positions at 1200. Movement of Bn completed at 1800. Dug in for night. No enemy contact.
- 30 Sep 1950 - Co's developed defensive positions. "E" Co moving to new position; one (1) Platoon at TA 1067 (Hill 109), one (1) Platoon at TA 1167 (Hill 88); to relieve "B" Co, 7th Marines. Limited patrols to front and flanks of company positions. No enemy contact.
- 1 Oct 1950 - "F" Co patrol made visual contact with Approx 250 enemy at 1100 on hill at TA 0469-F (Hach'on). A two (2) plane air strike was called on hill at 1147. "F" Co reinforced by two (2) tanks and one (1) platoon of 4.2" mortars moved forward at 1530. A mortar concentration was laid down at 1545, and a five (5) plane air strike was called in on enemy held hill. Result was that enemy withdrew and "F" Co sent patrol to hill top with no opposition. No other contact was made.
- 2-3-4 Oct 1950 - Extensive patrols made to Bn front and flanks. No enemy contact made.
- 5 Oct 1950 - Bn received order to move to Division Assembly Area at Incheon. Movement commenced 0900, completed at 1500.
- 6-7 Oct 1950 - In Division Assembly Area at Incheon. Bn reequipping and reorganizing.

8. ENEMYa. Assault Phase.

Opposition was not heavy in the 2d Battalion zone. It is estimated that a company was set up in a line defense to oppose us. There was a small amount of mortar fire, but this fell about H + 2 hours. A few automatic weapons were used but in no great strength. The main fire received during the night was from snipers which died off before morning. The enemy's morale was low and he was not as well organized as compared with enemy units contacted down south. Probable strength: 250 supported by 82mm mortars. Probable order of battle: elements of 1st Bn, 226th Regiment.

b. Exploitation Phase.

(1) See Enclosure (3) and paragraph 7.p.(1).

(2) The enemy was not heavily entrenched on the outskirts nor on Kimpo Airfield itself. His more determined defenses seemed to be on the high ground to the Northeast overlooking the airfield. The airfield was attacked and occupied against small enemy pockets and occasional snipers. At 0830, "Manzai" cries were heard in the outskirts of the airfield. At 0530, the enemy openly walked down the airstrip on "E" Co's left flank, while with another unit he attempted to envelope the right flank in conjunction with a small frontal attack. The attack on "E" Co was in approximate strength of one (1) company and was repulsed by about 0830. Probable enemy order of battle: 1st company, 1st engineer Bn, 1st Bn air security forces. Probable strength: around 500. A POW with the rank of Major informed us that Seoul headquarters received a report that fifty (50) guerillas had been dropped on Kimpo Airfield. He was then dispatched with 200 men to drive out the guerillas. It was his unit that attacked "E" Co and was completely surprised to find so many men and tanks present. He complained bitterly about the poor information given to him by his superiors.

(3) The enemy was very strongly entrenched on both the forward and reverse slopes of this ridge. There were foxholes dug all over the ridge, in no set pattern, but in what might be called lines of depth. He was in strength of about four (4) battalions consisting of over 3,000 men, supported by a heavy weapons company (45mm AT Co), and a 120mm mortars company of eight (8) guns. The enemy had a very large number of automatic weapons and light machine guns. He had over fifty (50) HMGs set up on the ridge with interlocking bands of fire. He also set up machine guns and automatic weapons in the wooded area on the left flank of "D" Co which gave them enfilade fire on "D" Co as they advanced. With such numbers and weapons, the enemy effectively set up a wall of fire as our troops advanced. He was very well supplied with ammunition as evidenced by his continuous heavy rate of automatic fire. Evidence later revealed the fact that this ridge was an old defensive training area. POWs indicated that the enemy force was a quickly organized force made up of elements of many units. Identifications were of the 25th brigade, Seoul defense regiment, 536th regiment, and Jin Ju regiment. No enemy artillery fire was received during the operation. Probable enemy order of battle: 536th regiment plus elements of Seoul defense regiment, supported by 45mm AT Co and 120mm Mortar Co. Probable strength: between 3,500 and 4,000.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONSa. Assault Phase.

- (1) 100 enemy dead.
- (2) Two (2) 76mm guns captured.
- (3) One (1) ammunition dump captured.
- (4) Enemy forced to withdraw.
- (5) Our forces' casualties: 7 dead, 49 wounded.

b. Exploitation Phase.

- (1) (a) 200 enemy dead.
(b) Six (6) tanks destroyed.
(c) Our forces casualties: 1 wounded.
- (2) (a) 100 enemy dead.
(b) 10 POW's.
(c) Kimpo Airfield captured.
(d) Our forces casualties: 4 dead, 19 wounded.
- (3) (a) Over 1,500 enemy dead.
(b) Six (6) 120mm mortars captured.
(c) Broke enemy MLR in 5th Marines Z/A.
(d) Our forces casualties: 79 dead, 217 wounded.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. No frontal assaults should be attempted against enemy positions unless situation dictates no other possibility.

b. Extensive use of flanking movements are recommended and serious consideration should be given to the use of double envelopments.

c. Napalm should be used more extensively in view of the enemy's tendency to defend from well prepared positions on reverse slopes.

d. Battalions should be augmented with additional personnel for the purpose of acting as stretcher bearers.

e. It is recommended that some provisions be made to help relieve front line battalions of the burden of transporting POWs to Regt during a time when an excessive number of POWs are being taken.

f. Battalions should be augmented with additional personnel to act as Ship's Platoon and upon completion of unloading may be utilized as replacements.

g. Observations on the effectiveness of Marine Corps weapons:

(1) Browning Automatic Rifle, M1918A2.

The use of the Browning Automatic Rifle in Korea was limited. The mountainous terrain and excessive heat made the BAR and ammunition too heavy and difficult a load for the average marine to carry in the attack. Many of the men discarded their BARs under these conditions and replaced them with M1s.

(2) M1 Rifle, Cal., 30.

This proved to be the most satisfactory weapon in the Korean operations. Its range, accuracy and rate of fire combined with the small problem of ammunition supply served to best meet the needs of the combat units.

(3) U.S. Carbine, Cal..30, M2.

This weapon proved to be extremely effective at ranges between 200 - 300 yards and its automatic fire was very accurate. The new 30 round magazines and pouches permitted each man armed with a carbine to carry 150 rounds of ammunition; 4 magazines in the pouch and 1 in the weapon. This supply of ammunition was considered to be ample for the weapon for any attack.

(4) 60mm Mortar, M2.

This weapon delivered very effective fire against the enemy particularly during the times when no other fire was available. As the company commander's weapon of opportunity, it proved to be invaluable.

(5) Rocket Launcher, 3.5".

Very capable weapon for knocking out tanks, but believe it should be confined to AT platoon in mountainous country as found in Korea. Front-line companies had little use for the launcher in assaulting ridges since practically all tank action was limited to roads. In the defense it is always possible to attach a section of the AT platoon to a company requiring it.

(6) Rocket Launcher, 2.36".

Extremely desirable. Very effective in knocking out machine gun positions and entrenched enemy. Especially good for latter and particularly useful in Korea for burning huts.

(7) Flame Thrower.

Found to be of limited use due to mountainous country, lack of suitable targets and lack of transportation for compressor.

H. S. ROISE

ENCLOSURE (1)

TASK ORGANIZATION

7Sep50

		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
ROKs		1	22

8Sep50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
ROKs		1	22

9Sep50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
ROKs		1	22

10Sep50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
ROKs		1	22

11Sep50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	206
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt JONES	1	53
ROKs		1	22

12Sep50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt JONES	1	53
ROKs		1	22

<u>13Sep50</u>		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt JONES	1	53
ROKs		1	22

<u>14Sep50</u>		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt JONES	1	53
ROKs		1	22

<u>15Sep50</u>		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	180
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	207
D Co	Lt SMITH	7	206
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	210
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	217
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt JONES	1	53
ROKs		1	22

<u>16Sep50</u>		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	168
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	190
D Co	Lt SMITH	6	198
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	6	209
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	207
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt JONES	1	53
Mine clearing detail, A Co, 1st Engr Bn			5
3rd Plat, A Co, 1st Tk Bn*	Lt SWEET	1	29
1st Plat, A Co, 1st Tk Bn**	Lt POMEROY	1	24

NOTE: * Detached 1830 this date.

** Joiner 1830 this date.

<u>17Sep50</u>		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		15	168
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	190
D Co	Lt SMITH	6	195
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	6	209
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	206
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5

17Sep50 (Cont'd)

	Off	Enl
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Lt JONES	1	53
Marines		
1st & 3rd* Plats, A Co, 1st Capt ENGLISH	3	55
Tk Bn		
1st Plat, A Co 1st Engr Bn Lt RICHARDS	1	29
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,		5
1st Engr Bn		

NOTE: * 3rd Plat joined at 1500 this date.

18Sep50

	Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co	15	168
Wpns Co	6	188
D Co	6	195
E Co	7	199
F Co	7	204
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Lt JONES	1	52
Marines		
1st & 3rd Plats, A Co, 1st Tk Capt ENGLISH	3	55
Bn*		
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,		5
1st Engr Bn		
ROKs	1	22

NOTE: * Detached at 1200 this date.

19Sep50

	Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co	15	169
Wpns Co	6	189
D Co	6	194
E Co	7	205
F Co	7	202
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,		5
1st Engr Bn		
ROKs	1	22

20Sep50

	Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co	15	169
Wpns Co	6	186
D Co	6	194
E Co	7	205
F Co	7	197
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,		5
1st Engr Bn		
ROKs	1	22

21Sep50

	Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co	15	169
Wpns Co	6	184
D Co	6	194
E Co	7	200
F Co	7	194
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,		5
1st Engr Bn		
ROKs	1	22

		Off	Enl
<u>22Sep50</u>			
3d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		13	166
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	3	184
D Co	Lt SMITH	6	198
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	193
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	195
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co			5
1st Engr Bn			
ROKs-		1	22

		Off	Enl
<u>23Sep50</u>			
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	167
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	185
D Co	Lt SMITH	6	193
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	7	201
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	148
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines*	Lt JONES	1	52
2d Plat, A Co, 1st Tk Bn**	Lt WINTER	1	29
3rd Plat, A Co, 1st Tk Bn***	Lt SWEET	1	24
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,			5
1st Engr Bn			
Tk Plat, AT Co, 5th Marines****			
ROKs		1	22

NOTES: * Joined at time 2/5 relieved KMG Pn.
 ** Joined at time 2/5 relieved KMG In and detached at 1730 this date.
 *** Joined at 1300 this date and detached at 1800 this date.
 **** Joined at 1800 this date.

		Off	Enl
<u>24Sep50</u>			
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	167
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	176
D Co	Lt SMITH	3	124
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	5	184
F Co	Capt PETERS	7	132
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt WEAVER		5
75mm Rec Gun Plat, ATCo, 5thMar	Lt JONES	1	52
3rd Plat, A Co, 1st Tk Bn	Lt SWEET	1	29
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,			5
1st Engr Bn			
ROKs		1	22

		Off	Enl
<u>25Sep50</u>			
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	165
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	171
D Co	Lt SEYDEL	3	128
E Co	Capt JASKILKA	5	150
F Co	Capt PETERS	5	103
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt WEAVER		5
3rd Plat, A Co, 1st Tk Bn*	Lt SWEET	1	29
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,			5
1st Engr Bn			
ROKs		1	22

NOTE: * Detached at 1800 this date.

26Sep50		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	165
Wpns Co	Maj SPIKER	6	168
D Co	Lt SEYDEL	3	118
E Co	Capt J. SKILKA	6	147
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	99
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt WEAVER		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,			5
1st Engr Bn			
ROKs		1	22

27Sep50		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	164
Wpns Co	Capt B. TEMIN	6	161
D Co	Capt SMITH	3	133
E Co	Capt J. SKILKA	6	136
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	133
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt WEAVER		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,			5
1st Engr Bn			
ROKs		1	20

28Sep50		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	166
Wpns Co	Capt B. TEMIN	5	171
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	161
E Co	Capt J. SKILKA	6	163
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	156
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,			5
1st Engr Bn			
ROKs		1	20

29Sep50		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	168
Wpns Co	Capt B. TEMIN	5	171
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	161
E Co	Capt J. SKILKA	6	163
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	157
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
Mine Clearing Detail, A Co,			5
1st Engr Bn			
1st Plat, B Co, 1st Engr Bn	Lt MEEKER	1	37
AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt BAILEY	4	102
ROKs		1	20

30Sep50		Off	Enl
2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	166
Wpns Co	Capt B. TEMIN	5	171
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	162
E Co	Capt J. SKILKA	6	162
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	158
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
1st Plat, B Co, 1st Engr Bn	Lt MEEKER	1	37
AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt BAILEY	4	102
2d Plat, 4.2" Mort Co	Lt BEARD	1	24
ROKs		1	20

10Oct50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		14	166
Wpns Co	Capt BATEMAN	5	175
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	161
E Co	Capt JASKIEWICZ	6	159
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	158
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
2d Plat, 4.2" Mort Co	Lt BEARD	1	44
AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt BAILEY	4	102
1st Plat, B Co, 1st Engr Bn	Lt MEEKER	1	37
ROKs		1	20

20Oct50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		13	159
Wpns Co	Capt BATEMAN	5	170
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	161
E Co	Capt JASKIEWICZ	6	159
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	159
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
2d Plat, 4.2" Mort Co	Lt BEARD	1	44
AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt BAILEY	4	102
1st Plat, B Co, 1st Engr Bn	Lt MEEKER	1	37
ROKs		1	20

30Oct50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		13	161
Wpns Co	Capt BATEMAN	5	170
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	165
E Co	Capt JASKIEWICZ	6	161
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	159
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
2d Plat, 4.2" Mort Co	Lt BEARD	1	44
1st Plat, B Co, 1st Engr Bn	Lt MEEKER	1	37
AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt BAILEY	4	102
ROKs		1	20

40Oct50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		13	162
Wpns Co	Capt BATEMAN	5	170
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	165
E Co	Capt JASKIEWICZ	5	164
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	158
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
2d Plat, 4.2" Mort Co	Lt BEARD	1	44
1st Plat, B Co, 1st Engr Bn	Lt MEEKER	1	37
AT Co, 5th Marines	Lt BAILEY	4	102
ROKs		1	20

50Oct50

2d Bn, 5th Marines	LtCol ROISE		
H&S Co		13	162
Wpns Co	Capt BATEMAN	5	169
D Co	Capt SMITH	4	162
E Co	Capt JASKIEWICZ	5	172
F Co	Capt PETERS	4	158
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar	Lt MOCKLEY	4	24
FO Pty, 4.2" Mort Co	Sgt GONZALES		5
2d Plat, 4.2" Mort Co	Lt BEARD	1	44
ROKs		1	20


6Oct50
2d Bn, 5th Marines LtCol ROISE
H&S Co 13 162
Wpns Co Capt BATEMAN 5 171
D Co Capt SMITH 4 167
E Co Capt JASKILKA 5 172
F Co Capt PETERS 4 166
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar Lt MOCKLEY 4 24
ROKs 1 19

7Oct50
2d Bn, 5th Marines LtCol ROISE
H&S Co 13 162
Wpns Co Capt BATEMAN 5 171
D Co Capt SMITH 4 167
E Co Capt JASKILKA 5 172
F Co Capt PETERS 4 166
FO Pty, B Btry, 11th Mar Lt MOCKLEY 4 24
ROKs 1 19

**THIS
SECTION
CONTAINS
OVERLAYS
REFER TO
ORIGINAL
FOLDER**

00002

3/5



SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FROM 30 AUG - 6 OCT

Annex PPTR to 5th Mar Special Action Report

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

3d Bn 5th Marines
In the Field
10 November 1950

From: The Commanding Officer
To: The Commanding Officer Fifth Marine Regiment
Subj: Special Action Report for period 30 August 1950 - 6 October 1950
Ref: (a) Division General Order No 16.
(b) Addendum No 1 to Division General Order No 16.
(c) Regimental General Order No 34.

EM: (1) EVACUATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

During the period covered by this report the initial mission of BLT 3/5 was to land at L-hour (0630) Dog-day (15 Sep 50) on Beach Green - seize and defend WOLMI-DO Island.

Subsequent missions of this battalion were as follows:

- a. To cross HAN River and establish bridgehead about 8 miles north-west of SEOUL (20 Sept 1950).
- b. To seize hills 216 and 296 and protect Division left (north) flank during the assault toward SEOUL (21-25 Sept 1950).
- c. To attack and seize Regimental Objective #2 commanding approaches to SEOUL (see overlay) (26 Sept 1950).
- d. To attack in zone of action to seize that portion of SEOUL in zone including the Government General Building and Division Objective #2. (See attached overlay No. #3) (27 Sept 50).
- e. While attached to X Corps, to provide inner and outer security screen during ceremony to re-establish the Government of Korea (29 Sept 1950).
- f. To conduct reconnaissance in force NW of SEOUL to SUYUHYON (TA 0481) to determine strength and location of enemy forces that sector and to destroy enemy within capabilities (1 Oct 1950).

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

The task organization of the Battalion for the period 1 September through 6 October 1950, is shown on Appendix One.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

On 30 Aug 1950 while in Regimental Bivouac SW of CHANG WON, 1st

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ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

movement, and scheme of maneuver ashore, based on the landing plan to be employed on WOLMI-DO. Each unit conducted intelligence briefings utilizing maps as issued, scale model of WOLMI-DO, and information provided in intelligence studies of the objective area.

On 9 Sept 1950, BLT 3/5 embarked aboard shipping as follows:

BLT 3/5 (-)	LSD 22
Co "G" (Reinf)	APD 123
Co "H" (Reinf)	APD 124
Co "I" (Reinf)	APD 125

On 11 Sept 1950, debarkation drills were conducted aboard the three assigned APD's by G, H and I companies. Rehearsal of ship to shore movement was conducted without landing of troops or vehicles. Boat team drills were conducted, movement to debarkation stations was rehearsed, and troops were drilled in lowering and lashing of weapons and equipment for debarkation.

On 12 Sept 1950, advance attack Force 90.1 sailed from PUSAN harbor en route to WOLMI-DO.

5. LOADING AND DEBARKATION

On 30 Aug 50 a warning order for outloading of the 3dBn, 5th Marines, for an amphibious landing was received. Immediate plans consisted of bringing the Companies up to T.E. in all classes of supply. No sooner had initial action been taken, when the plans were interrupted by the Bn being committed into action at YONGSAN, NAKTONG RIVER BATTLE AREA, KOREA, during the period of 2-6 Sept 50. On the evening of 6 Sept 50 orders were received from Headquarters, 5th Marines that the 3dBn would be relieved on position and would proceed by motor to Pusan. A great part of 7 Sept 50 was spent in closing station, billeting and arranging for the messing of troops. Notification was received that the previous warning order, to be prepared for an amphibious landing was confirmed. However, actual planning on Battalion level did not commence until 8 Sept 50.

Allocation of shipping for the battalion consisted of 3 APD's, 1 LSD and 3 LSU's. The loading of personnel and supplies commenced on 9 Sept 50 and were completed on 12 Sept 50, which was the sailing date. Difficulties experienced in the outloading consisted mainly of the shortage of time in which to accomplish the assigned tasks. It is to be noted that a reissue of all classes of supplies had to be made to replace those which were destroyed, damaged or expended in the 5 days of fighting prior to the Battalion's arrival in Pusan. Also, that the 3d Rifle Company, "I" Company, which was required to bring the battalion up to war strength, joined the Bn in Pusan. This therefore necessitated that certain items such as ammo, rations, weapons and clothing be reordered and issued in view of completely outfitting ITEM Company for the coming operation. On 13 Sept 50 it was officially announced that the Bn objective would be WOLMI-DO Island, and the landing date would be 15 Sept 50. The actual landing and subsequent operations ashore proceeded as planned.

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ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Movement to objective area by advance attack force 90.1 was uneventful. All units completed briefing of troops, and final preparations for the landing enroute.

Advance attack force 90.1 arrived in the objective area at 0430 15 Sept 1950.

Naval Gunfire and air bombardment commenced at 0545 15 Sept 1950 in accordance with schedules. (See Annexes Easy and Fox, Div Operation Order 2-50).

All units were boated at 0600 prepared to move to the line of departure.

7. OPERATIONS

The battalion commenced landing at L-hour with C and H Companies in assault, I Company in reserve. No enemy shore fire was received as waves approached the WOLMI-DO beach. All waves landed in accordance with the landing plan. BLT 3/5 commander landed at L/20 and officially assumed landing force control ashore at L/42.

For scheme of maneuver, objectives, times of seizure of Bn Objectives, see attached overlay No. 1.

Accurate and intensive pre-L-hour naval and air preparation fire rendered well prepared defenses relatively untenable and stunned the defenders so that they were rapidly overrun by assaulting troops. An estimated enemy battalion occupied WOLMI-DO prior to preparation fires on D-day. However assaulting troops encountered only small groups of remaining enemy mostly disorganized and armed with small arms, grenades, rifle grenades and automatic weapons. These groups were rapidly overrun and either killed or captured. The enemy failed to man numerous heavy caliber weapons located on WOLMI-DO.

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

WOLMI-DO was secured at 200800I (L/90). SO-WOLMI-DO was seized and secured at 1115 (L/4 hrs 45 minutes) by one reinforced squad of G Company supported by a section of tanks. An estimated enemy platoon (Reinf) was forced to surrender, die or swim into the sea.

The assault on WOLMI-DO and SO-WOLMI-DO resulted in 108 enemy killed and 136 enemy captured by assault forces. Bn casualties consisted of 17 personnel wounded in action.

After capture of WOLMI-DO, a defense was established in accordance with BLT 3/5 Operation Order 2-50, and preparations were made to advance Detachment Co A, 1st Tank Bn, across causeway to INCHON on order CO, 5th Marines. At 1715 a reconnaissance patrol with a four man Engineer mine removal team advanced across causeway to clear the causeway of mines and obstacles. This patrol returned at 1801I reporting the causeway free of obstacles. At 1805I the tank detachment advanced across the causeway to INCHON.

At H-hour (1730) the 5th Marines landed on Beach Red. At that time BLT 3/5 less 1st Platoon Company A, Shore Party Bn, reverted to control of CO 5th Marines. Supporting fires from WOLMI-DO to Beach Red were laid down by tanks and Bn Mortars and machineguns until masked by RCT-5 assault elements. At 2000I this Battalion advanced across causeway to assembly area. The crossing was without incident. The Bn closed in the assembly area at 2158I 15 Sept 1950, and established local security for the night. At 0545I 16 Sept 1950 CO 5th Marines Operation Order #17-50 was received directing 3d Battalion in Regimental Reserve to displace to forward assembly area in vicinity TA 9148W. CO 3d Battalion issued his Operation Order 3-50 at 0610I. 3d Bn closed in new assembly area at 0930, and was further directed to displace to TA 9448 STWXY. At 1140I CO 5th Marines Order 18-50, directing 3d Bn on order to attack and seize that portion of FBHL in zone of action, was received, and verbal orders to attack were received at 1215I.

At 1330I, G and I companies, commenced attack on assigned objectives supported by 81mm Mortar Platoon and Bn MG Platoon. H Company in reserve. The advance was rapid due to absence of enemy resistance. The FBHL in zone of action was seized at 1537I. (For scheme of maneuver and objectives see attached overlay #2). 3d Bn received no casualties and captured 12 prisoners. For Bn disposition see overlay #2.

G Company dispatched a patrol to secure the area west of Bn objective to the shore line. I Company established contact with elements of 2d Bn 5th Marines on right and patrolled to TA 9651WV and TA 9851F where ammunition dumps and an abandoned motor park had been observed. Patrols located an abandoned enemy and U. S. ammunition dump and the vehicle park. Location of these installations were reported to CO, 5th Marines.

For dispositions of FBHL on night of 16 Sept 1950 see attached overlay #2. The night passed without incident. Night illumination was provided by G/S ships in Inchon Harbor and was controlled by the NGF Liaison Officer attached to 3d Bn.

At 2330I 16 Sept 1950, CO, 5th Marines Operation Order 19-50 was received directing 3d Bn to be prepared on order on 17 Sept to move to forward assembly area in Regimental Reserve. At 0914I 17 Sept 1950 verbal instructions from CO, 5th Marines ordered the Bn to assemble in vicinity of TA 9751 RSTWXY and TA 9750 CDEHI prepared for further movement on order.

While in the above mentioned assembly area, at 1130 G Company observed an enemy MG to its right which was retarding the advance of the ROK Bn in that sector. Due to the failure of the ROK Bn to advance in assigned sector, the assembly area assigned the 3d Bn was forward of the assault elements of the ROK Bn. G Company took the enemy MG under fire from a building and reduced it. A G Company patrol assigned to clear enemy

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

troops from all buildings in the assembly area engaged an enemy force of unknown strength and killed 18 enemy personnel and caused the remainder to disperse. G Company received three casualties.

While enroute to forward assembly area at TA 9581, the Bn supply trains were fired on by an enemy force estimated at 30. Personnel in the trains and the South Korean Military Police platoon returned fire and rapidly dispersed the enemy. One known enemy casualty resulted.

At 1700 17 Sept 1950, the Bn was directed to occupy assembly area at TA 0354 and block roads in that area and to establish all round security for the night. The Bn completed displacement to the assigned assembly at 20051, and established all round security and road blocks as directed.

At 06301 18 Sept 1950 1st Platoon G Company patrolled the high ground to right (south) front of Bn assembly area to determine presence of enemy forces in area. (TA 0553 and TA 0554), and returned at 0803 with 3 enemy POW's. 2nd Platoon "H" Company departed at 0630 to search OJONG-NI village (TA 0455). The patrol returned reporting no enemy located in village but that natives reported approximately 50 armed troops left the village earlier that morning.

The battalion remained in the assembly area until it was directed by CO, 5th Marines to occupy positions on southeast end of KIMPO airfield with outposts at road junctions TA 0759P and TA 0358M. Displacement to the new assembly area was completed by 1800 18 Sept 1950 and a perimeter defense was established. At 1902301 "I" Company repulsed an attempted infiltration into 3d Bn positions (at TA 0756HM).

At 08001 19 Sept 1950, 3d Platoon, H Company (Reinf) seized Hill 79 (TA 0960) against no opposition. The platoon remained to outpost the hills. This hill overlooked the Han River and became the 3d Bn observation post which proved valuable later in planning for crossing of the Han River and provided one of the rare opportunities for personal reconnaissance and observation of the ground by Company and Platoon Commanders.

At 1917001 CO, 5th Marines issued verbal orders for the Han River crossing. The Division Recon Company had been ordered across the river at TA 0762 at 2000 19 Sept 1950, to seize objective Able, Baker and Charlie. (See attached overlay #3.) 3d Bn was ordered to cross in amphibian tractors at 04001 20 Sept 1950, and seize objective D and E, (See attached overlay #3.) securing the bridgehead and cover the crossing of the remainder of the 5th Marines. At 2130 19 Sept 1950, CO, 5th Marines Operation Order 22-50 which confirmed previous instructions was received directing the Han River crossing. Plans were rapidly made. Rifle companies had begun to move to forward assembly area (See attached overlay #3) while company commanders remained at the KIMPO assembly area to make final preparations and receive final instructions. At about 23301 it was learned that the Recon Company had met severe resistance and was forced to withdraw, without seizing their objectives. At 24001 the 3d Bn's mission was changed by CO, 5th Marines, and the Bn was assigned objectives "A", "B", and "C". Information was brought back by personnel of the Amphibian Tractor Bn that the proposed landing site was unsuitable for landing and plans were rapidly made to change the 3d Bn formation for the river crossing from a column of twos to a crossing by waves. This necessitated changes in plans, further study of aerial photographs and selection of new landing sites. At 0400 final plans were complete, troops were boated in LVT's and final movement to the forward assembly area on the south bank of the Han River commenced. H-hour had been changed to 0630 20 Sept 1950 and further changed to 0645 by CO, 5th Marines.

ANNEX PEEER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

Artillery preparation for the crossing was poor, with all fires falling short of assigned targets and in the water. The landing was made in column of companies, "I" Company landing first followed by "G" and "H" Companies. The Bn Commandor and advance CP landed at 0701. For scheme of maneuver and objectives see attached overlay #3.

The Han River crossing was opposed by an estimated company dug in on Hill 125 (TA 0862). The first waves received moderate to heavy machine gun fire and one LVT received a hit by an anti-tank weapon. All waves reached the north bank, and debarked troops at designated areas. LVT's were used to carry troops to their assigned objectives. Objectives B and C (see attached overlay #3) were inland one to three thousand yards and employment of LVT's in transporting troops to those objectives contributed greatly to the rapid seizure of the bridgehead. The crossing was completed at 0737.

The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and one AT weapon. Objectives were rapidly overrun, the major resistance being encountered on Hill 125. Objectives A, B and C were secured by 1040I 20 Sept 1950.

It was estimated that one enemy company (200) was wiped out in the bridgehead area. (The Bn suffered forty three casualties)

At 1042I, elements of the 2d Bn, 5th Marines crossed and passed through 3d Bn positions to attack assigned objectives D and E.

At 1515I, a Bn of ROK marines relieved the Bn on objectives A and B. The Bn then moved to an assembly area as shown on accompanying overlay No. 3 and remained in that area until 0705I 21 Sept 1950.

At 2215I 20 Sept 50 Regimental Operation Order 23-50 was received. This Bn was ordered to secure ridge line (TA 1463 to TA 1491) (Hills 125 and 160) by passing through 2d Bn on objective E and along road and attacking objective from south to north. The attack by G Company commenced at 0730I 21 Sept 50 and at 0820 attack was halted to permit 3d Bn to complete seizure of assigned objectives C and D. Attack was launched again at 0918 with G and H Companies in assault. G Company seized Hill 125 at 1150 with no opposition.

At 1045I 21 Sept 50, this Battalion received verbal orders from CO, 5th Marines to continue attack and seize Hill 216 (TA 1761) and Hill 296 (TA 1960). No direction of attack or zone of action was assigned. "G" Company was directed to seize Hill 104 (TA 1659) and continue attack up ridge line to Hill 296. (For scheme of maneuver, see attached overlay No. 3). I Company was directed to attack Hill 216 from south-west to northwest from TA 1560P4.

While attacking Hill 104 against moderate resistance, an overlay to accompany the verbal instructions previously issued at 1045 was received at 1220 21 Sept 50 which changed the zone of action of the 3d Bn and assigned the zone to the ROK Bn. CO, 5th Marines at 1530 directed that elements of the 3d Bn be withdrawn from Hill 104, regrouped on Hill 216, and attack Hill 296 in zone of action as assigned. The withdrawal from Hill 104 commenced immediately after the hill had been secured at 1401.

I Company secured Hill 216 at 1820 against light opposition. The remaining elements of the Bn were moved into the new zone of action. The maneuver was completed at 1750 and the Battalion set up a perimeter defense on Hill 216 for the night.

Continuation of the attack to Hill 296 at 0700 22 Sept 50 was ordered by CO, 5th Marines Operation Order 24-50. The objective was assigned to H Company who attacked and seized the objective at 0938 against light opposition consisting of long range small arms fire from Hill 338 (TA 1960). Enemy pressure against H Company, however, constantly increased during the day from an estimated company on the forward slopes on Hill 296. H Company supported by fires from one section of tanks continued attack down slopes of Hill 296 forcing the enemy to withdraw. Forty prisoners were taken.

ANNEX FIFTEEN TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

At 1250 extensive patrolling was commenced to the northeast, east and southeast. Pressure continued from north, southeast and northeast by enemy units attempting to regain ground. Throughout the day H Company received heavy artillery, mortar, AT and anti-aircraft weapons fire.

I Company was directed to patrol to the northeast of Hill 216 at 1200 23Sept50. One reinforced rifle platoon was utilized. The patrol was led by an enemy force estimated to be a company which was well equipped, defending the village of NOKPON-NI. The enemy was armed with small arms and automatic weapons. Contact with the enemy force was broken off at dark when the patrol withdrew to Hill 216. SGT SHAW (USMC) who accompanied this patrol and one marine were killed, and eleven were wounded. No estimate of enemy casualties could be determined. Sporadic mortar and artillery fires were received throughout the Bn sector during the day and night (22-23 Sept) inflicting light casualties. At 2100 22Sept50, CO, 5th Marines issued oral orders for 3d Bn to defend in present positions and to support attack of ROK Bn on right.

H Company repelled a counterattack by an enemy force of about 40 against their positions on Hill 296 at 2110. Throughout the remainder of the night H Company received sporadic small arms fire from their front. The remainder of the Bn defense sector remained quiet.

An estimated 150-175 casualties were inflicted on the enemy during this engagement.

During the day a captured 105mm Howitzer was employed by the Bn Weapons Company against enemy troop concentrations in the vicinity of NAKPON-NI. Results of these fires were unknown; however, several buildings in the area were demolished.

At 1045 23Sept50 elements of the ROK Bn were observed moving into the Bn zone on the right flank. At 1100 ROK troops opened fire with small arms on H Company positions. H Company was directed immediately to establish contact with the ROK Bn by patrol. The ROK Bn then failed to make any progress and appeared to be disorganized.

Supporting tanks of 3d Bn opened fire with 90mm guns and 50 cal. MGs on enemy positions in vicinity of TA 18690 with excellent results. Their supporting fires were continued throughout the afternoon 23Sept50. An estimated enemy company was destroyed. Then fires were delivered in support of the ROK Bn on the right.

Fire by 81mm mortars and "1" Co. MGs during 23Sept50 denied use of Seoul-Dongyang road to enemy in vicinity of Hill 216.

Elements of H Company on forward slopes of ridge SE of Hill 296 made contact with enemy at 1430 23Sept50 and remained in contact throughout the day. The Bn area received heavy artillery, mortar, and AT fires throughout 23Sept50 causing heavy casualties. Air and artillery fires were placed on the enemy artillery and mortar positions during the day with unknown results.

An enemy group of approximately 20 attacked H Company positions on Hill 296 at 0500 24Sept50 but the attack was repulsed rapidly with unknown enemy casualties.

CO, 5th Marines, Operation Order 26-50 received at 1850 23Sept50, directed 3d Bn to continue the mission of protecting the Division left (north) flank, and to support 2d Bn, 5th Marines who had relieved the ROK Bn in the zone to the right of 3d Bn position. H Company was directed by CO, 3d Bn to attack and seize the SE spur of Hill 296 in zone for the protection of the Division left flank, and to assist the 2d Bn by fire.

An enemy group of 30 to 35 cut H Company supply lines leading to Hill 296 at TA 1860 during early morning of 24Sept50. The enemy was dispersed by the Bn SM MP platoon supported by tanks at 0830, and the supply line was reopened.

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

H Company remained in contact with the enemy on forward slopes of Hill 296 until 1550 when G Company moved around the right flank of H Company and a coordinated attack was launched. Attack by H and G Companies against light opposition continued satisfactorily. On seizure of assigned objective, G Company occupied positions on SE spur Hill 296 to right flank of H Company position centered at TA 1959G.

CO, 5th Marines Operation Order 24-50 received at 1115 24Sept50 directed 1st Bn, 5th Marines to relieve 3d Bn on Hills 216 and 296 and directed the 3d Bn to continue attack toward the southeast.

Relief of I Company on Hill 216 by elements of 1st Bn was completed at 2230 24Sept50 and platoon of H Company which had remained on peak of Hill 296 was relieved one hour later by elements of 1st Bn, 5th Marines.

Throughout 24Sept50 moderate enemy artillery, mortar and AT fires fell on 5th Bn positions. 3d Bn casualties on 24Sept50 were 5 killed and 22 wounded. No enemy contact was made on night 24-25 Sept 50. 81mm mortars kept harassing fires to front of H Company during the night.

CO, 5th Marines, Operation Order 26-50 was received at 0455 25Sept50. 3d Bn was directed to seize and occupy objective 2 (see attached overlay No. 3). The attack commenced at 0636 with I Company on the left and G Company on the right. I Company followed in trace of H Company by 400 yards. Initial progress was slow due to heavy fire from Hill 338 and Hill 105 (TA 1958). Due to the heavy enemy fire being received from Hill 105 the Bn was directed to hold up attack until Hill 105 on right flank was secured by 2d Bn, 5th Marines. The attack was again ordered at 1435 and proceeded satisfactorily with G Company receiving no opposition and H Company receiving light opposition from immediate front and sporadic fires from Hill 338. The high ground on objective was secured at 1645I 25Sept 50. No contact was made with 2d Bn, 5th Marines on the right at 1650I.

At 1745I H Company was counterattacked by enemy force of 100-200 from the east and northeast. The attack was repulsed by H Company with supporting MG fires being delivered by G and I Companies. After repulsing counterattack, H Company was relieved on position by I Company at 1930. During the night 25-26 Sept 50 the enemy conducted probing action on the Bn front but no attack was received. At dawn 26 Sept 50, 100 enemy dead were counted to front of H Company lines.

On 26Sept50, the Bn continued the attack toward the southeast with I Company on left, G Company on right, with H following G Company in trace by 400 yards. The attack progressed against moderate resistance. The Bn objective, which was the high ground to the east of and commanding the approaches to phase line 3 was secured at 1840 26Sept50.

During the night of 26Sept50 the battalion was alerted to be prepared to continue the attack at 27Sept50 in the direction of MIDDLE SCHOOL and Government General Building.

The night of 26-27Sept50 passed without enemy contact.

At 0645 27Sept50 the battalion supported by tanks attacked assigned objectives (See attached overlay No. 4.) Initial progress was slow due to the congested area through which the attack was made, and poor visibility caused by haze and heavy smoke from burning buildings. Light resistance was encountered by assault units until phase line #3 was reached at 0750, 27Sept50. Resistance stiffened from minofields and roadblocks covered by automatic and anti-tank weapons which slowed the advance. At 0930 G Company made contact with the 1st Marines on right flank.

At 0950 the final assault on Middle School and small hill to north (Hill 79.5) was made and objectives were secured at 1015 27Sept50. G and I Companies were directed to reorganize and be prepared on order to continue assault on Government-General Building.

At 1200, G and I Companies were directed to continue the attack. The

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ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

attack moved rapidly, with the objective being taken at 1508 27Sept50. The North Korean flags flying from staffs on both sides of the central building were struck and the U. S. colors were raised in their place. Major operations in assigned sectors were begun immediately with companies patrolling vigorously against sporadic resistance.

Night defenses were established at 2100 27Sept50 after eliminating all resistance in the assigned sector. The Bn CP was located in the Government General Building.

The remainder of the night of 27-28Sept50 passed without contact with the enemy. At 0630 28Sept50 patrolling was begun to effectively clear the remainder of the Bn sector of all possible enemy infiltrators. All patrols covered assigned areas without enemy contact. During the course of patrol activity, contact was established with the 7th Marines on the left and maintained with the 1st Marines on the right.

At 2200 28Sept50 the I Corps formed Task Force TAPLETT composed of 3d Bn, 5th Marines, A Co, 1st Bn, 17th Infantry Regiment (USA), and the 1st Bn ROK Regiment. Task Force Taplett was assigned mission of providing inner and outer security at the GOVERNMENT GENERAL BUILDING during ceremonies at which the Korean Government was reestablished in SEOUL. GENERAL OF THE ARMY MAC ARTHUR, PRESIDENT RHEE of Korea and other military and state dignitaries were present at the ceremonies.

The security mission was successfully performed with security being provided from dawn until 1405 29Sept50 at which time the ceremony was concluded and all dignitaries had departed the area.

The 3d Bn reverted to control of CO, 5th Marines at 1405 and received a warning order to be prepared to displace to Regimental assembly area at Ewha University, SEOUL. Upon receipt of order the Bn displaced closing at Ewha University at 1645, 29Sept50.

At 0925, 30Sept50, warning order from CO, 5th Marines was received directing 3d Bn (Reinf) motorized to be prepared to conduct a reconnaissance in force to vicinity of SUYUHYON (TA 0481) commencing at 0600 1Oct50. The mission of the 3d Bn (Reinf) was to determine strength, disposition and armament of enemy forces along route to SUYUHYON and vicinity, and destroy or capture any enemy within capabilities. CO, 5th Marines Operation Order 30-50 was received at 1515 30Sept50 and movement from Ewha University to assigned forward assembly area (TA 1764) commenced at 1715. The Bn closed at the forward assembly area at 2030 30Sept50, established all round local security for the night, and made final preparations for the reconnaissance to northwest along SEOUL-PYONGYANG road. No enemy contact was made during night of 30Sept-1Oct50.

At 0430 1Oct50, screening elements of G Company departed the assigned IP (See attached overlay #5A) and advanced one to two miles forward of the Bn, screening the front, left and right flanks. The battalion advanced by bounds in approach march formation with G Company providing the advance party.

First contact with the enemy was made by the screening element at 1014 1Oct50 at TA 1076G where enemy roadblock was quickly reduced and 3 enemy were taken prisoners. (See attached overlay #5A). Only scattered enemy groups were encountered along the route of advance until mid-afternoon 1Oct50.

Along the route of advance many well prepared enemy positions were constructed, and anti-personnel mine fields were located around heavy weapons emplacements. Four casualties resulted when a flank patrol moved through a mined rice paddy, adjacent to the enemy emplacement at TA 1076G.

After clearing the roadblock, rapid progress was made and more poorly equipped prisoners were captured. No organized resistance was

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

encountered. Interrogation of prisoners indicated that the enemy occupied positions along route of advance but civilians continually reported that the enemy was withdrawing as 3d Bn advanced. At TA 0779X several camouflaged ox carts loaded with enemy weapons and ammunition were found abandoned.

At 1430 the advance party was directed to move out more rapidly screening the area thoroughly, and the companies within the main body began "leap-frogging" behind the advance party searching out either flank as the column advanced.

At 1540 leading elements encountered enemy groups armed with automatic weapons emplaced in the vicinity of road junction at TA 0779R. The advance party rapidly eliminated these positions - destroying seven enemy machine guns.

Movement into position for the night was delayed for approximately 45 minutes by an enemy machine gun set up on high ground to the north of the selected site. This installation was knocked out by H Company and the Bn took up positions as shown on accompanying overlay 5B at 1845 10ct 50, and established all round defense for the night.

At 0230 20ct50, an enemy force estimated to be a company in strength attacked 3d Bn positions from the southwest. The attack was repulsed by 0320 by heavy 50 caliber MG fires from attached tank company and 101 fires by I Company. At dawn 37 enemy bodies were found in the attack area. Valuable intelligence documents were found on the bodies of 3 enemy officers killed in the action.

The attack toward the objective continued at 0700 20ct50 with I Company assaulting Bn Objective C against negligible resistance, and H Company advancing at 0930 toward Bn objective B against no opposition. I Company occupied Bn objective A at 1100 meeting no opposition. SUYUHYON was searched but no enemy troops were located. All round defense was established with outposts and roadblocks as shown on attached overlay No. 6A. Patrolling of the objective area by I Company commenced on 20ct50 and one platoon (Reinf) searched out NAKU-RI (TA 0683). No enemy was located in that area.

Patrol activity continued on 3 and 4 Oct 50, (See attached overlays No. 6 and 7) with enemy contact being limited to small scattered groups of unarmed enemy who readily surrendered. Enemy minefields in the area were eliminated. Most bridges in the area were mined or booby-trapped. Engineer personnel attached to each patrol cleared the fields.

Many enemy weapons, quantities of ammunition, and explosives were located and destroyed throughout the patrol area during 3 and 4 Oct 50. Civilian and POW interrogation revealed that no organized NK forces were located within the SUYUHYON area. All indications were that the enemy had withdrawn farther north and that the majority desired to escape or surrender.

Elements of the 1st Cav Div passed 3/5 positions enroute North on MSR during afternoon 4 Oct 50. At 1700 4 Oct 50 a warning order from CO, 5th Marines, was received directing preparations to move to assembly area to be designated on order. CO, 5th Marines Operation Order 33-50 was received at 1200 5 Oct 50 directing the Bn to move by motor to Division assembly area at INCHON. Movement commenced at 1330, when 1st of 5 serials departed SUYUHYON area. The Bn cleared the SUYUHYON positions at 1445. Attached units reverted to parent organizations enroute. Bn closed at 1815 at Division assembly area in INCHON. Local security was provided as directed by CO, 5th Marines.

At the end of the period this Bn was in Division assembly area, INCHON, 3d Bn being located in JINSEN ELECTRICAL WORKS.

During the period covered by this report the 3d Bn killed an estimated 1199 enemy personnel and captured 592. (Estimate of enemy dead is

based on reports from units of this battalion and does not include casualties inflicted by long range fires.)

8. ENEMY TACTICS

At the time of our attack on Wolmi-do Island on 15 September 1950, the enemy used defensive tactics, but his troops on the island were for the most part newly inducted, poorly trained and were unable to use the weapons provided them because of the havoc caused by our preparatory fires. Enemy defensive positions were extremely well prepared, but the caliber of his troops and the pounding administered by naval gunfire and air prior to the landing neutralized their effectiveness. Resistance was so light as to almost classify the action as a delaying action. Rifle grenades were used for the first time against our forces by the enemy on So-Wolmi-do. Some mines were found in the roads leading to the crest of the island. The heavy mesh and barbed wire fence along the seawall from the south end of GREEN BEACH to the north end of the causeway leading to So-Wolmi-do was booby-trapped with AP fragmentation mines about every seven feet. Hedgehog type road blocks were found at the south end of green beach on the road leading to So-Wolmi-do.

In the movement to Kimpo Airfield from Incheon small groups of the enemy fought an ineffective delaying action, using small arms and grenades. Several rounds of artillery fire were received in the vicinity of the OP at Kimpo Airfield shortly after our arrival there.

Upon our crossing the Han River, the enemy opposed our landing with an estimated company. Moderate small arms and sporadic mortar fire was received by our forces. Enemy AT gun or heavy rifle grenade fire was received on LVT's during the crossing. The enemy generally withdrew southeast toward Seoul after our landing.

During the advance towards Seoul after crossing the Han River, artillery and possibly heavy mortar fire was received on 21 September at about 1400 from Hill 216 in TA 1761. Moderate delaying action was encountered in moving to Hill 296 in TA 1860Y.

At this point the enemy's MLR for the defense of Seoul was encountered and included prepared defenses, well dug-in. An almost fanatical defense was conducted from 21 September to 26 September by the enemy along his MLR, using accurate artillery and mortar fire and flat trajectory weapons, in addition to his normal small arms and machine guns. Tank fire was received by our right flanks on Hill 296 on 25 September and the left flank on the hill received an enemy counterattack at 1745 by several hundred enemy troops which was characterized by extremely accurate and heavy MG fire from Hill 338 and sporadic sniper fire from the village on the south.

On 26 September our forces entered the city of Seoul and proceeded to the vicinity of Hill 117 and the high ground directly to the south. The enemy had prepared roadblocks and delaying positions within the city and covered them with snipers and machine guns, one anti-tank gun was encountered. Resistance was generally extremely heavy.

On the following morning our forces moved further into the city where they encountered the same type of resistance but generally lighter than the preceding day. The Government General Building was taken at 1445 against heavy resistance which was reduced to ineffectiveness by our tanks.

On 28, 29 and 30 September, there was no enemy activity.

On 1 October this unit, operating as a motorized reconnaissance force, started for Suyuhyon village to the northwest of Seoul. A road block with mines was found at TA 1076Y which was not covered by fire. An extensive system of mines along the road and adjoining fields was left by the enemy. Three machine guns at TA 0679S held up our forces at about 1400. Enemy action was confined to heavy small arms fire towards end of day. On 2 October, the enemy hit our CP at 0230 with a force of company size. Burpguns, LMG's and small arms were employed. The attack was repulsed by 0415 and 67 of the enemy were killed. Our objective was gained later in the day against light but determined resistance, consisting mainly of small enemy units firing burp guns, LMG's and small arms.

From 2 October to and including 4 October, our patrols encountered no resistance from the enemy. Extensive mining was found in all surrounding areas. Most bridges had been prepared for blowing with either dynamite or bangalore torpedoes, but were not destroyed. Large quantities of enemy material was discovered and destroyed by engineers to our patrols.

No enemy activity was encountered on 5 October during our move to Inchon or on 6 October at Inchon.

Enemy Organization

The enemy organized his forces in the Inchon-Seoul area for a delaying action. Brigades, regiments and battalions, mostly composed of inexperienced troops, were assigned zones of responsibility. As they were forced to fall back, their remnants were reorganized into new delaying units or integrated into forces already present, whichever was most practicable at the time. The only organized defense encountered was in Seoul and vicinity, where the enemy conducted a fanatical fight in defense of the capital.

During the reconnaissance to Suyuhyon, the enemy placed small units on high ground, apparently to delay our forces as much as possible.

Enemy Strength

On Wolmi-do, enemy strength was estimated at one battalion.

In the Inchon-Seoul area, the enemy probably had available approximately 3000 to 4000 troops.

In our area around Suyuhyon, it is estimated that one battalion occupied the ground, but that no one unit in the area exceeded company size.

Enemy Deployment

The enemy deployed his forces on the high ground, generally with a defense line in depth on the reverse slope.

In city fighting, small disconnected groups manned road blocks and sniper posts.

The advance on Suyuhyon was characterized by small isolated groups of troops on high ground, lightly armed except in a few instances where machine guns were employed.

Probable Enemy Order of Battle

226th Regiment

1st, 2nd, 3rd Bns.

Heavy MG Co.

76th Regiment

1st and 3rd Bns.

Engineer Platoon

Seoul City Regiment

25th Regiment

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

3rd and 4th Bns.
74th Regiment
563rd Regiment
83rd Regiment
27th Independent Brigade
11th Regiment
36th Bn, Engineer Platoon

Enemy Equipment

The following equipment was used by the enemy against our forces:

- (1) Soviet 7.62mm TT-1930 (Tokarov) Pistol
- (2) Soviet 7.62mm PPSH-1941 Submachine Gun
- (3) Soviet 7.62mm MI891/3 Rifle
- (4) Soviet 7.62mm MI944 Carbine
- (5) Soviet 7.62mm DP (Degtyarev) LMG
- (6) Soviet 7.62mm MI910 Maxim HMG
- (7) Soviet 14.5mm PTRD-1941 AT Rifle
- (8) Soviet 82mm MI941 Battalion Mortar
- (9) Soviet F-1 Defensive Hand Grenade
- (10) Soviet RG-42 Offensive Hand Grenade
- (11) Soviet 76mm Field Gun MI939
- (12) Soviet 76mm Field Gun MI942
- (13) Soviet 45mm Anti-tank Gun MI937
- (14) Soviet 120mm Mortar MI938
- (15) Soviet T-34/76 Medium Tank

Intelligence Facilities and Information (Including Sources)

- (1) Form 75 - "Korea" - Joint Army Navy Intelligence
- (2) Terrain Handbook No. 65 - "Seoul and Vicinity" - Far East Command
- (3) Periodic Intelligence Reports - 1st Marine Division
- (4) Intelligence Summaries - 1st Marine Division
- (5) Intelligence Summaries - 5th Marines
- (6) POW Summary Reports - 5th Marines
- (7) Intelligence Research Project No. 5779 - "Soviet weapons known or believed to be in North Korean Peoples Army" - Department of the Army (G-2)

Use of Interpreters and Intelligence Chiefs in the Companies

Interpreters were assigned to the companies, insofar as possible, on the basis of one interpreter for each platoon. They were invaluable, being used to spot interrogate POW's, civilians in the areas being passed through or occupied and to keep curious civilians out of our positions. Patrols were able to get much information from villagers through the interpreters, learning of movement and armament of enemy forces, locations of enemy weapons and ammunition caches, mine fields, and also which of the villagers were communists, communist collaborators, criminals, or disguised enemy soldiers. Battalion interpreters were used to procure local villagers for labor purposes, further interrogate POW's for identification of enemy units and locations of same in our immediate area, inform villagers of curfew regulations, and to keep curious natives out of our installations.

Intelligence chiefs in the companies supervised spot interrogation of POW's, searched enemy dead for identification and documents and insured that vital information secured was transmitted by the most expeditious means to the battalion S-2. After each action, key personnel were interrogated as to enemy tactics, organization, deployment, strength and equipment while such information was still fresh in minds of the troops both officer and enlisted. Written or oral reports were then made to the S-2 as soon as possible.

Maps and Photographs Used

Maps

- (1) AMSL 751, Korea, 1:50,000

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

- (2) AMSL 751, Korea, 1:25,000
- (3) Inchon, 1:12,500
- (4) Seoul, 1:12,500
- (5) Maps in Terrain Handbook No. 65, "Seoul & Vicinity" - FECOM.

Photos

- (1) Wolmi-do verticals and obliques
- (2) Inchon Verticals and obliques
- (3) Portion of area on Road to Suyuhyon

Enemy Situation

At the time of our landing on Wolmi-do Island, the enemy situation was extremely obscure. He was believed to have about 4000 troops in the Inchon-Seoul area, with an undetermined reinforcement capability from both the north and south. As the situation developed, it was found that the great majority of his troops in the area were newly inducted poorly trained and willing to surrender if given the chance. The officers in his unit were the main obstruction to mass surrenders, as most POW's expressed the belief that their fellow soldiers would surrender if the officers would let them. Soldiers attempting to desert or surrender were promised extremely harsh treatment if caught by NK officers. The defense of Seoul was fanatical. Positions knocked out by our weapons were reoccupied again five minutes later, the process being repeated many times before the enemy MLR finally broke. Whether the enemy troops accomplished this at pistol point or were composed of fanatical volunteers is not known.

After the penetration of the Seoul MLR, resistance was heavy within the city, but once the city was reduced, the enemy seemed to lose most of his resistance, and it is believed his back was broken at this point, at least in the Seoul area, and possibly altogether.

Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Estimates of the enemy situation from higher headquarters were generally accurate in most instances during the planning period. During the subsequent operations, POW's and civilians were generally fairly accurate in the information they divulged, although they could not be depended upon when expressing the number of troops involved. Enlisted POW's rarely know their regiment, and occasionally had no idea to which battalion they had been attached. These factors, together with the constant shifting of enemy forces, and the renumbering of his units after reorganization, made it most difficult to produce an estimate of the enemy situation. It was only by sifting POW information, civilian reports of the enemy, actual contacts by our troops and measuring such information by past experience, that an estimate of the enemy situation could be produced.

Accumulation of Intelligence, Sources and Reliability

Intelligence was accumulated from many sources. Periodic intelligence reports from higher headquarters produced much worthwhile information. POW summary reports from regiment were extremely instructive. Interrogation of POW's by this unit produced spot information of value in the production of intelligence. However, the individual enemy soldier in this operation was generally newly inducted and his knowledge of military matters was most limited. Officers captured were generally able to give more information, but the caliber of officers encountered during this operation, with a few exceptions, was not high. Many officers had been in the service only a few months. As a result of the above circumstances, POW information was generally extremely limited and although practically all POW's freely gave such information as they knew, their reliability was not considered to be good.

Civilians were an excellent source of information regarding the enemy. Many times they walked considerable distances to bring us reports

of enemy gathering points, movements, and caches of weapons, explosives and ammunition. Our patrols were frequently guided by civilians to disguised enemy troops hiding in the villages, and many times the villagers gathered and turned over to the patrols guns and ammo hidden by the enemy in or around the villages. Civilian reports were on the whole reliable, except for numbers. Their conception of numbers seemed to be limited to "a few", "many", or "many many". When pressed for an exact or approximate number, anything from 100 to 1000 could be expected for the same body of enemy troops.

Documents taken from enemy dead were occasionally excellent sources of intelligence, maps showing enemy installations sometimes were found on dead officers, as well as tables of signal fires, rosters of organizations, reports on casualties and equipment, and other vital matters. The great mass of documents recovered from the enemy were generally useless, but the grains of wheat amongst the chaff were most important and well worth the constant sifting of the many papers involved. As far as could be ascertained, all documents were genuine and none were "planted".

Air reconnaissance was an invaluable source of intelligence information. Enemy troop and tank movements were spotted beyond the range of our ground observers and taken under fire by artillery and aircraft, thereby destroying their potential before contact with our troops. Enemy artillery and mortar positions were spotted and reported.

Artillery FO's and front line units submitted considerable intelligence information. Through their reports, it was possible to guide air to targets and to place artillery fire on enemy positions and concentrations.

All of the above sources of information were most valuable in the production of intelligence during the operation. Past experience in evaluating the sources of information was necessary.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

During the period covered by this report the 3d Bn, 5th Marines executed a successful amphibious assault on WOLMI-DO Island off INCHON, and subsequently executed all assigned missions during advance to SEOUL and SUYUHYON to the northwest.

The planning phase of the amphibious operation was exceedingly short due to the necessity of landing during the highest seasonal tide on 15 Sept 50.

On 15 Sept 50 the 3d Bn (Reinforced) landed on WOLMI-DO Island against light opposition. Accurate and heavy pre-H-hour fires by supporting Naval craft and air craft obviously stunned the enemy, which rendered him unable to properly man prepared defenses of the Island.

After landing of the assault waves, the dominating terrain on the island was rapidly overrun, making the remainder of the small island untenable for the remaining defenders. The island was secured at L+90 (0800I) on D-day.

Capture of WOLMI-DO permitted command of the INCHON harbor and the sea approaches thereto, also provided suitable artillery positions ashore for early support operations of the 1st Marine Division's assault inland, and provided landing sites for supporting troops, equipment, and supplies.

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

The mission was accomplished rapidly and with minimum casualties. The enemy suffered loss of his WOLMI-DO garrison, its equipment and supplies.

The second mission during the period as assigned by CO, 5th Marines was the seizure of that portion of the FBHL in its assigned zone of action. This mission was accomplished against no opposition and with no casualties.

The 3d Bn remained in Regimental reserve during the Regimental attack to KIMPO Airfield and with exception of occupying Hill 79 overlooking the Han on 19Sept50, was not assigned an assault mission until 20Sept50.

The crossing of the Han River on 20Sept50 was successfully accomplished. Only 13 hours elapsed between receipt of the warning order and the execution of the opposed river crossing in amphibious tractors. The operation resulted in the establishment of a bridgehead which permitted the unopposed crossing of the river by the 5th Marines, and other elements of the 1st Marine Division, during the advance to SEOUL. An enemy Bn was routed by the 3d Bn in the bridgehead area, with the 3d Bn receiving 43 casualties - 10 KIA & 33 WIA.

Upon seizure of assigned objectives in the bridgehead area, the 3d Bn continued movement toward SEOUL on 21Sept50, following the unopposed seizure of Hills 125 and 165.

The seizure of Hills 216 and 296 on 21-22Sept50 and the subsequent aggressive defense of those hills against continuous enemy opposition resulted in the successful protection of the Division left (north) flank and the destruction of numbers of enemy forces who attempted attacks on our positions. Despite high casualty rate on Hill 296, the 3d Bn was able to carry out its primary mission and additional missions of supporting advance of units to our right in attack on Hill 105.

In the attack from Hill 296 to Government General Building, SEOUL, the 3d Bn aggressively seized all assigned objectives. The attack to successive objectives and the high ground immediately west of the city of SEOUL continued against moderate resistance by enemy forces who were destroyed or forced to withdraw.

The attack through the built up areas of SEOUL on 26 and 27Sept50 was well coordinated. Constant pressure against the defenders in our zone forced them to withdraw or die. The Government General Building, seat of the Korean Government was seized at 1508H 27Sept50. The American colors were raised on the building at that time on order of CG 1st Marine Division.

On 28Sept50 the 3d Bn Reinforced, designated by X Corps as TASK FORCE TABLETT, provided security for the ceremonies at which the Government of South Korea was re-established in the Government General Building, SEOUL.

The reconnaissance in force from 5th Marines lines to town of SUYUHYON from 30Sept50 to 5Oct50 determined that the NK forces had been unable to successfully man an extensive MLR in that sector due to lack of personnel, arms and equipment, and that such forces assigned to defend the area disintegrated and were killed, captured or forced to withdraw as the 3d Bn advanced to its assigned blocking position.

An enemy counterattack against 3d Bn positions (CP) on night of 1-2Oct50 was repulsed with 67 enemy killed and no casualties sustained by our forces.

Patrols in the vicinity of SUYUHYON area captured or killed many enemy personnel that had lost contact with their parent units. Patrols also captured or destroyed quantities of ammunition, weapons and removed numerous mine fields and booby traps that the enemy had placed in vicinity of MLR.

The mission in the SUYUHYON area as assigned by CO, 5th Marines was successfully carried out with two enlisted Marines killed and eleven wounded.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The below recommendations are hereby submitted for information and future planning.

(1) It is recommended that the 6X30 field glasses be adopted for Company grade officers in place of 7X50 which are presently used for the following reasons:

1. The distance required by Company grade officers for observation does not exceed the range of the 6X30 glasses.

2. The size and weight is definitely an advantage to the person using them. Many captured prisoners who had been acting as snipers, admitted that they laid in wait for persons who were using or carrying field glasses, knowing that they were either officers or key personnel such as Forward Observers, for Artillery, Mortars or Naval Gunfire.

(2) It is recommended that during wartime an additional section called "Evacuation Section" be added to the Infantry Battalion T/O. This section should include additional corpsmen, vehicles, Graves and Registration personnel. During present operations the rate of casualties far exceeded facilities available in handling them, also the attack progressed so rapidly that at times it took hours to evacuate the wounded and in many cases it took days to recover the dead. This "Evacuation Section" should be charged with the responsibility of collecting the wounded, assisted by our own Medical personnel, and also to follow behind companies and mark the dead. It has been definitely proved that the sight of deceased companions and the murmuring of the wounded have a demoralizing effect upon the efficiency of combat troops, therefore too much stress cannot be placed upon this subject.

(3) It is a known fact that the greatest stimulant to combat troops is the expeditious delivery of mail. It is therefore recommended that Division revise its policy on incoming and outgoing mail so that any lapse of time currently existing be cut down to a minimum.

(4) COMMENTS Due to lack of sufficient organic transportation, assault companies have been unable to adequately carry necessary supplies and material to support operations over a 24 hour period. The conduct of land operations in temperate weather necessitates the wearing of heavier clothing and use of sleeping bags, etc. This increases the load carried by the individual during operations, and necessary for increased transportation.

RECOMMENDATIONS That Battalions be provided with sufficient organic transportation to permit companies to transport sufficient ammunition, supplies, equipment, heavy sleeping bags, packs, etc. while in the assault during extensive land operations.

(5) COMMENTS Due to terrain and distances over which units in Korea have been operating, radio communications within the battalion have proved inadequate and wire communications have proved impractical during the attack. Necessity for communications has caused the battalion not to be employed for intra-company communications, fire support missions, and administrative traffic, in addition to the traffic normal to the Bn tactical net. (SCR 536 has proved of little value in Korea).

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

RECOMMENDATIONS It is recommended that sufficient and adequate radio equipment with sufficient channels be provided to permit adequate and constant communications within the rifle companies in rough terrain and over long distances, between FO's and supporting units, and between battalion and its subordinate units. Tactical and administrative nets are considered necessary at the battalion level.

(6) COMMENT Throughout operations in Korea, 81mm Mortar Platoon observers have utilized the M-10 plotting board to reduce time and errors in calculating fire data for the initial round on the target. More rapid fires and greater accuracy resulted by employment of the M-10 plotting board.

RECOMMENDATIONS It is recommended that the M-10 plotting board be provided by the T/M for the 81mm Mortar Platoon of infantry battalions.

(7) The most readily apparent flaw in the intelligence organization of the battalion was the failure of company intelligence chiefs to produce much information. The battalion intelligence officer failed to make the companies "intelligence conscious" and did not fully indoctrinate either the company commander or the intelligence chiefs attached to the companies. This fault will be remedied before our next operation.

Interpreters attached to companies were invaluable, and it is recommended that each platoon have its own civilian interpreter in the future. It is also recommended that one civilian interpreter be attached to the mess section for handling laborers, one Korean Army Officer interpreter be attached to supply for acquiring and directing laborers, one attached to the Commanding Officer of the battalion, and two Korean Army Officers be attached to the S-2 section for interrogation of POW's and such other tasks as may be assigned.

During a motor march, it is recommended that a detachment of MP's with sufficient transportation to carry POW's be placed in the column near the S-2 jeep. Also, when the battalion is on detached duty, a detachment of MP's to operate a POW stockade should be provided.

(8) The below comments on effectiveness of current Marine Corps weapons and techniques are submitted for information:

(a) Current doctrines related to planning are considered sound. No variations from provisions of governing publications have occurred.

(b) Existing doctrines regarding command relationships are considered sound.

(c) The ship-to-shore movement at WOLMI-DO Island off INCHON was well executed, utilizing effective doctrine.

(d) The technique of beach assault on WOLMI Island was in accordance with current doctrine with the exception of the landing of three (3) LSU's in the third wave. This variation was necessitated by requirements for rapid landing of the entire BLT because of hydrographic conditions in the INCHON area. (Tide in that area ebbed exceedingly fast, permitting use of the approaches to the landing beach for a period of about one hour). The landing plan at WOLMI-DO was prescribed by Commander, Advance Attack Force 90.2, and the Landing Force Commander of the Advance Attack Force was afforded no opportunity to make recommendations concerning it.

(e) (1) Pre-L-hour Naval Gunfire support on WOLMI-DO was prescribed by Commander Advance Attack Force 90.2, without recommendations by the Landing Force Commander. The results of these fires was excellent. This Battalion sustained only seventeen casualties, all wounded, and the enemy was found to be in extreme shock when our forces landed.

Post-L-Hour fires delivered on INCHON in preparation for H-hour landings were pre-planned by Commander Advance Attack Force 90.2 and were controlled from WOLMI-DO. The effectiveness of these fires was excellent, with all targets destroyed.

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

(2) Naval Gunfire support was not employed by this Battalion in its conduct of land operations, except for illumination on the night of 17 September 1950. This night illumination was requested, delivered and controlled in accordance with existing doctrine.

Due to such limited employment of naval gunfire as requested and controlled by this Battalion, no further comment is made concerning the effectiveness of current Naval Gunfire techniques relating to fire support coordination.

(f) Close air support, as employed by the Marine Corps during operations in the INCHON-SEOUL-SUYOHYON area of Korea, followed current doctrine very closely with minor variations. One variation was during the landing on WOLMI-DO, when this Battalion was the only unit in action. During and following the landing, support aircraft were assigned directly to the Battalion and were constantly available for strikes immediately upon request.

The time interval of from twenty to forty minutes between the request and the strike, after the landing of all units of the 1st Marine Division, although expected by the necessity of coordination at higher levels, did not seem satisfactory. However, there is no solution to this.

Air was not used on targets that were suitable for artillery as had been done at times during the southern campaign. In the south, the practice had been to have aircraft expend their ammunition prior to returning to their base, at the end of their scheduled periods, on any available target. On the west coast, with a larger front and higher level coordination, aircraft were used to a better advantage against targets that required the capabilities of air to reduce them.

The accuracy of the pilots in support operations was excellent in most cases and was a good morale factor.

(g) No observation was made of Shore Party operations in this Battalion.

(h) All small arms, with the one exception as noted below, have proved entirely effective and adequate for operations in the Korean campaign. The Browning Machine Gun M1917A1 was not employed by this Battalion due to the inability of troops to carry this weapon in the rugged mountainous terrain (particularly in the southern sector). In both offensive and defensive operations the Browning Machine Gun M1919A4 was employed exclusively; however the M1917A1 Machine Gun could have been effectively employed in the defense and attack in the INCHON-SEOUL area where the terrain lent itself to employment of sustained machine gun fires. (Example: defense of Hill 296, 22 to 24 September and the attack to MIDDLE SCHOOL in SEOUL on 27 September). No M1917A1 Machine Guns were available to this Battalion during this operation.

The only exception to entire effectiveness of small arms as employed in this Battalion was the U. S. Carbine, M-2 when employing the M-2 (30 round) magazine.

The U. S. Carbine, M-2, itself proved to be an effective medium-range shoulder weapon whether employed in semi-automatic or full automatic fire, the principle limitation being in the new M-2 (30 round) magazine. This magazine gives poor service, requires undue maintenance to keep in working order, very often failed to function properly when filled to capacity, and does not stand up under combat conditions.

Both the 60mm Mortar M-5 and the 81mm Mortar M-2 proved effective in operations of this Battalion. The weapons were employed in accordance with standard doctrine for the employment of mortars.

The 3.5 inch Rocket Launcher M-28A1 was not employed against enemy tanks by this Battalion; however, the weapon was effectively employed in the attack through the streets of SEOUL, against roadblocks constructed of sand-filled rice bags behind which the enemy emplaced

machine guns and Anti-Tank weapons, and against buildings where enemy strong points were established. The 3.5 inch Rocket Launcher proved to be a light, highly mobile, medium caliber weapon for the infantry, its employment being limited only by the problem of ammunition supply.

The 2.36 inch Rocket Launcher M9A1 was not employed in this Battalion during the period covered by this report, due to the availability of the 3.5 inch Rocket Launcher. However, the 2.36 inch smoke rocket for marking targets is considered an effective use of the weapon. This weapon could be eliminated from the T/E when smoke rockets are made available for the 3.5 inch Rocket Launcher.

The ENERGA (Belgian) anti-tank rifle grenade was not employed by this Battalion. No comment as to its effectiveness can be made.

The Flame Thrower M.2-2 was employed only at WOLMI-DO against personnel in caves, but is considered a necessary and effective weapon for the infantry battalion. No targets for this weapon were presented in the SEOUL area, due to the nature of enemy defenses.

11. PERSONNEL

Throughout the period 1 September through 6 October 1950, the personnel section of the Battalion functioned in three echelons. One group of 3 enlisted men were attached to the 1st Marine Division Administrative Section. This group had in their custody battalion files and most of the office equipment. Another group of 5 enlisted men were attached to the 5th Marine Regimental Headquarters. This group was charged with publishing Unit Diaries, processing mail and handling Individual Record Cards. The third group of 3 enlisted men was attached to the Battalion Headquarters for the purpose of keeping Battalion Strength Reports, compiling casualty information and doing such other administrative work as is incidental to the Forward Command Post. The personnel section found that as a rule it was impossible to have close coordination between the various groups, and it is recommended that as much personnel processing as possible, including the use of Service Record Books be carried on in the Regimental Administrative section.

The strength of the Battalion, both organic and attached for the above period was as shown on Appendix One. Replacements were received on the dates and in the numbers indicated on Enclosure (1). Personnel evacuated as WIA, KIA, or sick and non-battle are as shown on Enclosure (1).

During the period, the morale of the Battalion was very good to excellent.

During the period, 592 prisoners of war were captured by the Battalion and all were evacuated to rear areas.

Mail was received regularly and was sent out whenever the Battalion paused.

The following awards were made during the period:

1 Silver Star

1 Bronze Star

There were 23 recommendations for awards outstanding at the end of period.

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 ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

12. UNIT STATION LIST 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, for Period 1 Sept-6 Oct 1950

H&S Company

TAPLETT, Robert D.	LtCol USMC	06678/0302	BnComdr
CANNEY, John J.	Maj USMC	06094/0302	BnExecO
WACHTER, John A.	1stLt USMC	047984/0302	Bn S-4, MTO.
FREDERICKS, Harold R.H.	1stLt USMC	047457/0302	Bn S-1, Adj.
SMITH, Lawrence W.	Maj USMC	08907/0302	Bn S-2
HERRICK, Donald L.	Capt USMC	014548/0302	Bn S-2
KELLEY, Hericulus R.H.	2dLt USMC	048634/2602	BnCommO, PltLdr CommPlt
SIMPSON, Dale W.	CWO USMC	035364/3025	Supply Officer
GREEN, Daniel (n)	1stLt USMC	035559/7302	Bn Air LiaisonO.
WAYERSKI, Joseph R. Jr.	2dLt USMC	049874/0301	Naval Gunfire LiaisonO
HARVEY, Robert J.	Lt(jg) (MC)	251999/USN	DnMedO.
BANKS, Stanley (n)	Lt USN	185644/USN	Naval Gunfire LiaisonO.

CHANGES DURING PERIOD

7 Sept 50 Joined:			
MOON, John H.	Lt(jg) (MC)	487754/USNR	AsstBnMedO.
8 Sept 50 Joined:			
di LORENZO, Lucius V.	2dLt USMC	049627/0302	Asst. S-1, Adj.
10 Sept 50 Joined:			
EME, Richard J.	1stLt USMC	042318/0301	S-1, Adj.
Detached:			
di LORENZO, Lucius V.	2dLt USMC	049627/0302	
28 Sept 50 Detached:			
FREDERICKS, Harold B.	1stLt USMC	047457/0302	
30 Sept 50 Joined:			
DODSON, Elmer H.	Capt USMCR	010691/0301	S-1, Adj.
ARAMOVICH, Ferdinand S.	1stLt USMCR	037548/0401	Supply O.
GRAHAM, Marion (n)	1stLt USMCR	037552/0301	Liaison O.

"G" COMPANY

BOHN, Robert D.	1stLt USMC	037498/0302	CoComdr
MIZE, Charles D.	1stLt USMC	037729/0302	CoExecO
DUNCAN, Edward D.	2dLt USMC	042622/0302	PltComdr 2dPlt.
COUNSELMAN, John D.	2dLt USMC	049744/0301	PltComdr 3dPlt.
JAWORSKI, Edmund W.	1stLt USMC	049342/0301	SocLdr 50mm Mort Sec.

CHANGES DURING PERIOD

5 Sept 50 Dropped:			
DUNCAN, Edward F.	2dLt USMC	042622/0302	WIA.
7 Sept 50 Joined:			
PEARL, Roger W., Jr.	2dLt USMC	050136/0301	PltLdr MGPlt.
O'CONNELL, Lawrence G.	2dLt USMC	050141/0301	
21 Sept 50 Dropped:			
BOHN, Robert D.	1stLt USMC	037498/0302	WIA.
JAWORSKI, Edmund W.	1stLt USMC	049342/0301	WIA.
22 Sept 50 Joined:			
WESTERMAN, Jack (n)	2dLt USMC	049516/0302	PltLdr 3dPlt
26 Sept 50 Dropped:			
WESTERMAN, Jack (n)	2dLt USMC	049516/0302	WIA.

ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

COUNSELMAN, John D.	2dLt USMC	049744/0301 WIA.
30 Sept 50 Joined:		
BOYS, Myrl E.	1stLt USMC	047729/0302 CoExec0
CASHION, Dana B.	1stLt USMC	049919/0302 PltLdr 1stPlt
WIERS, Mason H.	2dLt USMC	041401/0302 MortPltComdr

"H" COMPANY

WILDMAN, Patrick E.	Capt USMC	024425/0302 CoComdr
LUTNICK, William A.	1stLt USMC	031949/0302 CoExec0.
LENNON, Thomas P.	2dLt USMC	049774/0302 MGPltComdr
TAYLOR, Warren H.	2dLt USMC	049872/0301 MortPltComdr
POST, Edward C.	2dLt USMC	049972/0301 Rifle PltLdr
di LORENZO, Lucius V.	2dLt USMC	049623/0301 Rifle PltLdr

CHANGES DURING PERIOD

17 Sept 50 Joined:		
ANDERSON, Ralph M.	2dLt USMC	049832/0302 RiflePltLdr
23 Sept 50 Dropped:		
LENNON, Thomas P.	2dLt USMC	049774/0302 WIA
LUTNICK, William A.	1stLt USMC	031949/0302 WIA
24 Sept 50 Dropped:		
WILDMAN, Patrick E.	Capt USMC	024425/0302 WIA
POST, Edward C.	2dLt USMC	049972/0302 WIA
25 Sept 50 Joined:		
FREDERICKS, Harold D.	1stLt USMC	049457/0302 MortPltComdr
WATTERSON, Donald E.	1stLt USMC	041686/0302 CoComdr
Dropped:		
TAYLOR, Warren H.	2dLt USMC	049872/0301 KIA
30 Sept 50 Joined:		
HACKNEY, Robert S.	1stLt USMC	045800/0302 CoExec0
1 Oct 50 Joined:		
WILLIAMS, John O.	2dLt USMC	049705/0302 RiflePltLdr
5 Oct 50 Dropped:		
HACKNEY, Robert S.	1stLt USMC	045800/0302

"I" COMPANY

WHITE, Harold T.	1stLt, USMC	045162/0301 CoComdr
WILLIAMSON, Wallace L.	1stLt USMC	048505/0302 Exec0
KRIEGER, Roy E.	2dLt USMC	049773/0302 RiflePltLdr
PETERSON, Willard S.	2dLt USMC	050177/0302 Rifle PltLdr
SPARKS, William F.	2dLt USMC	050309/0301 RiflePltLdr
TURNER, Thomas W.	2dLt USMC	050368/0301 PltLdr MGPlt
O'CONNEL, Lawrence G.	2dLt USMC	050141/0301 PltLdr MortPlt
PEARL, Roger W., Jr.	2dLt USMC	050136/0301 PltLdr AttMGPlt

CHANGES DURING PERIOD

4 Sept 50 Joined:		
MC MULLEN, Robert A.	Capt USMC	030452/0302 CoComdr
Dropped:		
WHITE, Harold T.	1stLt USMC	045162/0301
PEARL, Roger W., Jr.	2dLt USMC	050136/0301
O'CONNELL, Lawrence G.	2dLt USMC	050141/0301

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ANNEX PETER TO FIFTH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

20 Sept 50 Dropped:
SPARKS, William F. 2dLt USMC 050309/0301 WIA
23 Sept 50 Dropped:
TURNER, Thomas W. 2dLt USMC 050368/0301 WIA
24 Sept 50 Joined:
SNOW, Melvin W. 1stLt USMC 049303/0302 PltLdr RiflePlt
26 Sept 50 Dropped:
MC MULLEN, Robert A. Capt USMC 030452/0302 WIA
KRIEGER, Roy E. 2dLt USMC 049773/0302 WIA
SNOW, Melvin W. 1stLt USMC 049303/0302 WIA
29 Sept 50 Joined:
SHORT, Harold L. 1stLt USMCR 048485/0301 PltLdr RiflePlt
5 Oct 50 Joined:
HACKNEY, Robert S. 1stLt USMCR 045800/0302

WEAPONS COMPANY

EHRLICH, Murray (n) Maj USMC 012649/0302 CoComdr
HOUSE, Arthur J. Jr. 1stLt USMC 045272/0301 PltLdr 81mmMortPlt
PETERSON, Frank G. 2dLt USMC 047062/0302 Asst PltLdr 81mmMortPlt
WATTERSON, DONALD E. 1stLt USMC 041686/0302 PltLdr ATAPlt

CHANGES DURING PERIOD

4 Sept 50 Joined:
WHITE, Harold T. 1stLt USMC 045162/0301
19 Sept 50 Joined:
di LORENZO, Lucius V. 2dLt USMC 049627/0302 PltLdr ATAPlt
21 Sept 50 Dropped:
WATTERSON, Donald E. 1st Lt USMC 041686/0302
30 Sept 50 Dropped:
WHITE, Harold T. 1stLt USMC 045162/0302

R. D. TABLETT,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding.

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ENCLOSURE(1).

EVACUATED

Date	Bn Total		KIA		WIA		SICK		RET TO D		REPLACEMENT	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
SEP 1	28	675	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
2	28	675	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	28	673	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
4	28	643	-	-	2	19	-	11	-	-	-	-
5	27	630	-	2	1	13	-	6	-	4	-	3
6	29	668	-	1	-	4	-	-	-	5	-	-
7	37	1026	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	7	-	-
*												
15	36	991	-	-	-	15	1	4	-	-	-	-
**												
17	35	973	-	-	-	4	1	14	-	2	-	-
18	37	969	-	-	-	1	-	5	-	1	-	-
19	38	962	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	1	-	-
20	36	917	-	10	1	32	-	3	-	-	-	-
21	36	898	-	1	1	9	-	10	-	-	-	-
22	33	877	-	2	2	16	-	3	-	-	-	-
23	33	865	-	3	-	23	1	7	-	7	1	8
24	32	826	-	5	1	32	-	8	-	2	-	-
25	31	799	-	7	2	20	-	8	-	3	-	5
26	26	689	1	18	4	77	-	18	-	3	-	-
27	23	679	-	1	2	8	-	3	-	3	-	-
28	23	673	-	2	-	8	-	9	-	12	-	-
29	23	672	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	-
30	33	793	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	15	9	11
OCT												
1	32	781	-	2	1	6	-	3	-	-	-	-
2	32	778	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	5	-	-
3	32	785	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	5	-	2
4	31	782	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	2	-	1
5	31	782	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	33	831	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	6	1	54

* Bn was on board ship and in position where no changes were made
 ** No Change

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Appendix One To 3d Battalion Special Action Report,
 Task Organization of Third Battalion,
 5th Marines for the Period
 1 Sept through 6 Oct, 1950

XI

Name of Unit	Strength		Commander
1 Sep 50			
H&S	12	162	1stLt Harold B. FREDERICKS
"G"	5	206	1stLt Robert D. BOHN
"H"	7	205	Capt Patrick E. WILDMAN
Wpns	4	102	Major Murray EHRLICH
Total Bn	28	675	
ATT:			
Chap & Asst	1	1	
Korean Police	1	34	
Korean Civ	1		
Korean Army Off	1		
Col Sect, "B" Co, 1st Med		13	
2 Sep 50			
H&S	12	162	
"G"	5	206	
"H"	7	205	
Wpns	4	102	
Total Bn	28	675	
ATT:			
Chap & Asst	1	1	
Korean Police	1	34	
Korean Civilian	1		
Korean Army Off	1		
Col Sect, "B" Co, 1st Med		13	
11th Mar, F.O.	3	17	
3 Sep 50			
H&S	12	161	
"G"	5	205	
"H"	7	205	
Wpns	4	102	
Total Bn	28	673	
ATT:			
Chap & Asst	1	1	
Korean Police	1	34	
Korean Civilian	1		
Korean Army Off	1		
Col Sect, "B" Co, 1st Med		13	
11th Mar F.O.	3	18	
Brig Bandsmen		4	
4 Sep 50			
H&S	12	149	
"G"	5	191	
"H"	7	202	
Wpns	4	101	
Total Bn	28	643	

Name of Unit Strength Commander

No change from 7-15 Sept, 1950.

15 Sep 50

H&S	14	185
"G"	6	209
"H"	5	211
"I"	6	200
Wpns	5	186
Total Bn	36	991
ATT:		
Chap & Asst	1	1
Korean Police	1	33
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engr		10
Arty Recon Team	4	7

16 Sep 50

H&S	14	185
"G"	6	209
"H"	5	211
"I"	6	200
Wpns	5	186
Total Bn	36	991
ATT:		
Chap & Asst	1	1
Korean Police	1	33
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engr		10
Arty Recon Team	4	7

17 Sep 50

H&S	14	181
"G"	6	200
"H"	4	210
"I"	6	199
Wpns	5	183
Total Bn	35	973
ATT:		
Chap & Asst	1	1
Korean Police	1	33
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engr		3
11thMar F. O.	4	25

18 Sep 50

H&S	14	181
"G"	6	198
"H"	6	208
"I"	6	200

- 28 -

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 Name of Unit Strength Commander

Korean Army Officer 1
 Det Engrs 3
 11thMar F. O. 3 24
 Col Sect, "B" Co, 1stMed 12

22 Sep 50

H&S 13 176
 "G" 4 193
 "H" 6 193
 "I" 4 149
 Wpns 6 166
 Total Bn 33 877

ATT:

Chap & Asst 1 1
 Korean Police 1 33
 Korean Civilian 1
 Korean Army Officer 1
 Det Engrs 3
 11thMar F. O. 3 24
 Col Sect, "B" Co, 1stMed 12

23 Sep 50

H&S 13 177
 "G" 5 197
 "H" 5 175
 "I" 4 150
 Wpns 6 166
 Total Bn 33 865

ATT:

Chap & Asst 1 1
 Korean Police 1 33
 Korean Civilian 1
 Korean Army Officer 1
 Det Engrs 3
 11thMar F. O. 3 24
 Col Sect, "B" Co, 1stMed 12

24 Sep 50

H&S 13 173
 "G" 5 196
 "H" 4 145
 "I" 4 149
 Wpns 6 163
 Total Bn 32 826

ATT:

Chap & Asst 1 1
 Korean Police 1 31
 Korean Civilian 1
 Korean Army Officer 1
 Det Engrs 3
 11thMar F. O. 3 24
 Col Sect, "B" Co, 1stMed 12

Name of Unit

Strength

Commander

25 Sep 50

H&S	12	178	1stLt Richard J. EME
"G"	5	177	
"H"	4	134	
"I"	5	146	
Wpns	5	146	
Total Bn	31	799	
ATT:			
Chap & Asst	1	1	
Korean Police	1	31	
Korean Civilian	1		
Korean Army Officer	1		
Det Engrs		3	
11thMar F. O.	3	24	
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12	

26 Sep 50

H&S	12	176	1stLt Wallace L. WILLIAMSON
"G"	3	152	
"H"	3	104	
"I"	3	108	
Wpns	5	149	
Total Bn	26	689	
ATT:			
Chap & Asst	1	1	
Korean Police	1	31	
Korean Civilian	1		
Korean Army Officer	1		
Det Engrs		3	
11thMar FO	3	19	
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12	

27 Sep 50

H&S	11	176
"G"	2	151
"H"	3	101
"I"	2	103
Wpns	5	149
Total Bn	23	679
ATT:		
Chap & Asst	1	1
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		3
11thMar F. O.	3	19
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12

- 31 -

Appendix One

Name of Unit

Strength

Commander

28 Sep 50

H&S	11	173
"G"	2	151
"H"	3	98
"I"	2	105
Wpns	5	146
Total Bn	23	673
ATT:		
Chap & Asst	1	1
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		3
11thMar F. O.	3	19
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12

29 Sep 50

H&S	11	174
"G"	2	152
"H"	3	95
"I"	2	105
Wpns	5	146
Total Bn	23	672
ATT:		
Chap & Asst	1	1
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		3
11thMar F. O.	3	19
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12

1stLt Harold T. WHITE

30 Sep 50

H&S	14	185
"G"	6	159
"H"	5	152
"I"	4	152
Wpns	4	146
Total Bn	33	793
ATT:		
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		43
11thMar F. O.	3	19
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12

1 Oct 50

H&S	14	185
"G"	5	156
"H"	5	151
"I"	4	144
Wpns	4	145

Name of Unit	Strength	Commander
Total Bn	32	781
ATT:		
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		4
11thMar F.O.	3	18
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12
2 Oct 50		
H&S	14	185
"G"	5	160
"H"	5	148
"I"	4	145
Wpns	4	144
Total Bn	32	778
ATT:		
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		4
11thMar F. O.	3	18
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12
3 Oct 50		
H&S	14	185
"G"	5	160
"H"	5	150
"I"	4	144
Wpns	4	146
Total Bn	32	785
ATT:		
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		4
11thMar F. O.	3	18
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12
4 Oct 50		
H&S	13	176
"G"	5	160
"H"	5	156
"I"	4	143
Wpns	4	147
Total Bn	31	782
ATT:		
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		4
11thMar F. O.	3	18
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12

Name of Unit

Strength

Commander

5 Oct 50

H&S	13	176
"G"	5	160
"H"	5	156
"I"	4	143
Wpns	4	147
Total Bn	31	782
ATT:		
Korean Police	1	30
Korean Civilian	1	
Korean Army Officer	1	
Det Engrs		44
11thMar F. O.	3	18
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		12

6 Oct 50

H&S	13	175	1stLt Richard J. EME
"G"	6	169	1stLt Charles D. MIZE
"H"	5	172	1stLt Donald E. WATTERSON
"I"	5	170	1stLt Harold T. WHITE
Wpns	4	145	Major Murray EHRLICH
Total Bn	33	831	
ATT:			
Korean Police	1	30	
Korean Civilian	1		
Korean Army Officer	1		
Anglico Det		8	
Col Sect, "B"Co, 1stMed		6	

**THIS
SECTION
CONTAINS
OVERLAYS
REFER TO
ORIGINAL
FOLDER**

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ANNEX QUEEN TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

A9-11
RML/bgg

4.2" Mortar Co
5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
9 November 1950

From: Company Commander, 4.2" Mortar Company
To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Special Action Report for period 6 September to 7 October 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

(a) The purpose of this report is to give a chronological report of training, planning, and operations of the 4.2" Mortar Company for the period 6 September to 7 October 1950.

(b) The mission of the 4.2" Mortar Company was to provide heavy mortar support to the 5th Marine Regiment (Reinforced),

2. ORGANIZATION: The 4.2" Mortar Company organized in accordance with current tables of organization or provided elements to 5th Marines (Reinforced) Task Organization as follows:

a. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines

(a) 11-16 September 1950	4 man FO Team,	Sgt WEAVER, R. R.
(b) 16-17 September 1950	"	Sgt MARKS, G. E.
(c) 17-19 September 1950	"	Sgt GONZALES, C. E.
(d) 21-23 September 1950	"	Sgt WEAVER, R. R.
(e) 23-26 September 1950	"	Sgt SCOFIELD, B. J.
(f) 26-29 September 1950	"	Cpl WADSWORTH, R. M.

b. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines

(a) 11-16 September 1950	4 man FO Team,	Sgt GONZALES, C. E.
(b) 16-17 September 1950	"	Sgt SCOFIELD, B. J.
(c) 17-20 September 1950	"	Sgt WEAVER, R. R.
(d) 23-24 September 1950	"	Sgt GONZALES, C. E.
(e) 24-27 September 1950	"	Sgt WEAVER, R. R.
(f) 30 September to 5 October 1950	1 Officer 48 Men of 2nd Mortar Platoon. with FDC and FO party,	2dLt BEARD, W. O.

c. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines

(a) 16-17 September 1950	4 man FO team,	Sgt MARKS, G. E.
(b) 19-20 September 1950	"	Sgt GONZALES, C. E.
(c) 21-23 September 1950	"	Sgt GIETZEN, C. H.
(d) 25-28 September 1950	"	Sgt ANDERSON, A. A.
(e) 28 September to 1 October 1950	4 man FO team,	Sgt WEAVER, R. R.

d. 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company.

(a) 19 September 1950 2 man FO team, Sgt SCOFIELD, B. J.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

On 31 August 1950 this company was notified to be prepared to move to Pusan, Korea for embarkation prepared for an amphibious landing against the enemy. All weapons and equipment were inspected and training schedules written in preparation for the operation.

At 0800, 1 September, the 1st Marine Brigade was ordered into Eighth Army reserve near Miryang. On 2 September this company was committed to combat with the 5th Marines in the Yongsan Area. On 6 September the regiment returned from the Yongsan Area with their combat mission accomplished, prepared for the continuation of amphibious planning. 7-8-9 and 10 September were spent in readying men and equipment for embarkation for the Inchon operation. On 11 September the 4.2" Mortar Company embarked aboard the USS HENRICO (L.P. 45). 12-13 and 14 September were used for further training and briefing concerning the landing at Inch'on.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

The 7th to 9th of September was spent in readying men and equipmen for embarkation for the operation. No Rehearsals were conducted.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

At 2400, on 9 September 1950 the 3 trucks 6x6 assigned the company which contained all the mortars and ammunition were loaded aboard LST 799.

At 1000, on 10 September 1950 the detachment assigned to handle the equipment aboard the 3 trucks were embarked aboard LST 799.

At 2100, on 10 September 1950 the 4 trucks 4x4 with 3 1/2 ton trailers were loaded aboard the USS HENRICO, (APA 45).

At 1700, on 11 September 1950 the remainder of the 4.2" Mortar Company personnel were embarked aboard the USS HENRICO (APA 45).

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The 12th and 15th of September 1950 were spent at sea. The ships in which the Marines were embarked joined the remainder of 5thMa the shipping embarking the Division elements.

Early afternoon, 15 September 1950 the USS HENRICO anchored off the port of Inch'on, Korea.

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase: The 4.2" Mortar Company landed in the 11th wave on Red Beach at 1805 on 15 September 1950. The wave landed a little earlier than was previously planned. The company assembled at the designated point and set up security. LST 799, with the company trucks aboard, landed at 2130. The 2nd Platoon set up and registered immediately. The company at this time was in general support of the regiment.

Due to the rapid advance of the assault element the company followed the 2nd Battalion in route march formation until 1235 on the 16th of September. The 1st Platoon went into action to support the regimental attack on a ridge line near Division Objective 3 that straddled the Seoul Highway. At 1430, the 2nd Platoon displaced forward to another position 2000 yards on down the highway. The balance of the company joined the 2nd Platoon at 1730 and the company went into position behind the 3rd Battalion for the night.

b. Exploitation Phase: The company followed the 2nd Battalion, the advance Battalion in route march on the 17th. The motor column, with 4.2" Mortar personnel riding tanks, was ordered to proceed forward by the left flank of the assaulting column due to damaged bridges on the main route of advance. The company thus moved forward over exposed terrain all day and there into an assembly area on Kimpo Airfield at 2100. Fox and George Companies of the 2nd Battalion were set up to the immediate front. The 2nd Battalion received counter attacks during the night but no action was required of this company except for our local security.

The 2nd Platoon moved out behind the 1st Battalion on the 18th. The company less the 2d Platoon moved to a small village approximately 500 yards east of Kimpo Airfield shortly thereafter. The company continued in general support of the regiment although the platoons were separated.

The company moved to a position approximately 1000 yards west of the Han river on the 19th to support the river crossing by the Reconnaissance Company. Both platoons fired heavy preparatory fires and continued firing on call missions for the Reconnaissance Company for their crossing that night. The radio operator with the 4.2" Mortar Company Observer was the only operator able to maintain communications with the rear during the action.

The company loaded on DUKWS on the morning of the 20th for the river crossing. These DUKWS were not allowed to make the crossing that day so the company spent the night on the west bank of the Han River. Ferry crossings were stopped for the night because of a report of a large number of enemy on the opposite side threatening the bridgehead.

LVTs were furnished the company on the morning of the 21st. The company crossed the river and moved into an assembly area at the regimental CP and waited for the company vehicles to arrive. At 1700 the company moved to a position behind the 1st KMC Battalion attacking the center of the regiment. The company fired in general support of the regiment with priority of fires and harrassing fires for the 1st KMC Battalion. Received moderate and persistent counter battery fire in this position from enemy 120mm Mortars.

On the 22nd the company displaced forward to a position 200 yards to the rear of the 1st KMC Battalion's right flank company deployed on Hill 104. Continued giving this Battalion priority of fire and harrassing fire. Received heavy and accurate counter battery fire in this position from 120mm Mortars until patrols from the company were sent out, located and destroyed OP to the company's rear.

At about 0900 on 23 September 1950 elements of the 1st KMC Battalion from Hill 104 began to retire through the company position in face of an enemy counter attack. The company's Heavy Mortar Chief took a six man security section into position on the right flank of Hill 104. With the assistance of a 75mm Gun Section, and three tanks from the Anti-Tank Company they regained and maintained superiority of fire over the enemy until the 2nd Battalion, in regimental reserve, relieved the 1st KMC Battalion troops. The elements maintained covering fire until after the 2d Battalion had jumped off in attack.

The 2nd Battalion moved through the 1st KMC Battalion late in the afternoon of the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion received priority of fires from this company on the 24th and 25th.

The 1st Platoon was displaced to the Chosen Christian University grounds on the 25th. The remainder of the company displaced to the same position late in the afternoon. During the routine patrolling of our area checking for by-passed enemy personnel, a patrol from the 2nd Platoon discovered a 50,000 Watt Radio Station which had been used by the North Koreans three days previous. This information was immediately reported to the regimental S-2.

The 1st Platoon displaced to the Red Cross Hospital grounds in Seoul late in the afternoon on the 27th. Due to the favorable friendly situation no fires were called for.

The company moved into billets at the Ewha University on the 29th.

The 2nd Platoon moved out in support of the 2nd Battalion on the 30th.

The company, minus the 2nd Platoon, moved to an assembly area northeast of Seoul on the 2nd of October. The 2nd Platoon rejoined the company in the early morning of the 5th of October. The company moved to the regimental assembly area in Inch'on on the afternoon of the 5th.

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The company commenced reorganization and planning for future operations on the 6th of October 1950.

8. ENEMY

The enemy was believed to have employed his 120mm Mortars in a battery of 3 Mortars. They appeared to have an ample supply of ammunition in positions captured, yet they never seem to use the U. S. "fire for effect" method of adjustment. They did use a bracket for adjustment, however, when on target they fail to follow up their advantage with more than 5 or 6 rounds. They fired their concentrations 2 or 3 times a day. Once usually at dawn then once or twice in the late afternoon.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

The 4.2" Mortar Company fired one hundred and fourteen (114) missions plus harrassing fires from 2235 on 15 September to 1410 on 1 October 1950.

While firing the missions the results reported by the forward observers were as follows:

- (a) Destroyed three trucks loaded with troops.
- (b) Knocked out one tank.
- (c) Killed an estimated three hundred enemy troops.
- (d) Assisted in breaking up four counter attacks.
- (e) Destroyed six mortars. (Two confirmed as 120mm).
- (f) Neutralized four mortar positions.
- (g) Destroyed four field pieces.
- (h) Neutralized five field pieces.
- (i) Destroyed one Op to our rear by patrol action.
- (j) Destroyed or neutralized thirty automatic weapons emplace-

ments.

The majority of the missions were fired on reverse slopes, therefore, results were unobserved on these missions.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

During this operation a new technique of fire control was utilized. The two observers in the company were attached to the front line battalion OP teams. The battalion liaison teams were eliminated and fire requests went directly to the observer or through the regimental liaison officer. The communication from the front lines to the regimental CP were not dependable enough to rely upon for firing missions so all commands necessarily came through the observers. The observer was able to observe the entire battalion front better while working with the battalion OP than has been the case when working with individual rifle companies. This system while workable in that terrain is still unsatisfactory for less favorable terrain. It is believed absolutely necessary to have an observer with each front line rifle company with a liaison representative with each battalion CP to coordinate their work with that battalion. The observer is unable to observe and maintain effective liaison at the same time and both are necessary. The company commander tried to maintain liaison with each front line battalion during the last operation. However, it was found to be too much of a job for one man in such an extended situation.

It is recommended that the company be authorized a 4.2" Mortar observer Liaison detachment consisting of two forward observation teams and a liaison agent for each front line battalions with two battalions abreast to serve as coordinator of 4.2" fire in support of each battalion.

1stLt	Robert M. LUCY	049345/0302	USMC	Company Commander
2ndLt	Tom L. GIBSON	049976/0302	USMC	Executive Officer
2ndLt	Rollie D. NEWSOM	049997/0302	USMC	Gunnery Officer
2ndLt	Wendell O. BEARD	050060/0302	USMC	Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon.

Robert M. Lucy

R. M. LUCY

ANNEX QUEEN TO 5TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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ANNEX ROGER TO 5TH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1975

ANTI-TANK COMPANY, 5TH MARINES
WONSAN, KOREA
30 October 1950

From: Commanding Officer, Anti-Tank Company
To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Special Action Report for period 6 September to
7 October 1950.

Ref: (a) Para 11401 a Marine Corps Manual.
(b) Division General Order No. 16.

1. INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this report is to give a clear and concise summary of the action and results of action engaged in by this unit during the period covered. This unit was assigned the mission of giving direct supporting fire to infantry units and of providing Anti-Tank defense within the zone of action of the 5th Marines, 1st MarDiv, FMF.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: Not applicable.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING: Prepared personnel and equipment for combat loading for amphibious assault operation.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL: None.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION: Loaded equipment and personnel aboard APA 45, APA 37, and LST 914 as follows:
11 Sep 50 1515 75mm Recoilless Gun Platoon embarked aboard USS CAVALIER (APA 37) 1 Officer and 48 Enlisted USMC.
1800 Two (2) men embarked aboard USS LST 914 with vehicles and ammunition. CoHqs embarked aboard USS HENRICO (APA 45) 2 Officers, 23 Enlisted USMC and 1 Enlisted USN.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA: Sailed for objective. Briefed enroute to target area.

7. OPERATIONS:

a. Assault Phase

15 Sep 50 Arrived at Inchon Korea. 1750, 75mm Rec Gun Plt landed with elements of 2d Bn 5th Mar on intersection of causeway from Wolmi-Do and main land which was on right flank of Beach Red. Landing unopposed. 75mm Rec Gun Plt in boats 5-3 and 5-5 of the 5th wave landed prior to the 4th wave. 1st Section on right and 2d Section on the left. Reorganized upon landing and proceeded by road parallel to the railroad tracks, past the Nippon Flour Co. Set up for the night on the British Consulate Hall; position (63.2-32.4) Inchon Map 1:25,000. 1st Section on the right covering the main road leading to Seoul, 2d Section covering street leading to Inchon Railroad Station on left flank of 2d Bn 5th Mar Zone of action. No rounds fired. No casualties. 1820 CoHqs landed on Beach Red, 11th wave and received small arms fire. Company CP established with and liaison maintained in Regt CP area.

16 Sep 75mm Rec Gun Plt attached to 2d Bn 5th Mar. 0630 moved out and continued on Seoul Highway from Inchon. Branched off main highway on dirt road to Sogan Ni at 1230. Set up on spur of hill at 9547-E-3 (Sheet 652a-11) Inchon. Moved out

at 1530 to new position. Two (2) prisoners captured and turned over to 2dBn 5thMar S-2 Section. Set up for night at position (97-49 N-3 Inchon Sheet 1-50,000). CoHqs with Regt CP.

9
b. Exploitation Phase: 17Sep 75mmRecGunPlt Set up in same position 0630. Six (6) enemy tanks and two-hundred (200) enemy infantry attacked 2dBn 5thMar on main highway from Seoul. As tanks turned bend in road at (9750X1) 5 M-26 tanks and 75mmRecGunPlt opened fire on them. Company "A" tanks fired first shot and knocked out the lead tank and the second tank pulled into the rice paddy on the right side of the road. 75mmRecGunPlt opened up, range 600 yards. The 3rd Squad fired two (2) rounds of H.E.A.T. and two (2) rounds of H.E. at the third tank. The 3rd Squad also fired at the fourth tank which went into the rice paddies. The 4th Squad fired 1 round of H.E.A.T. on the second tank and 1 round of H.E.A.T. on the fourth tank. The 4th Squad also fired 1 round of H.E. at the 5th tank at a range of 650 yards. Results: One (1) tank knocked out by 75mmRecGunPlt, no casualties, and the enemy attack repelled. Moved out at 0945 with Weapons Co, 2dBn 5thMar. Reached Kimpo Air Drome at 2000. Set up for night with "E" Co CP at (05.7-58.7) Kyongsong Sector Sheet 6526-1 1:50,000. CoHqs at Regt CP.

18Sep At or about 0300 75mmRecGunPlt heard numerous voices speaking Korean. The Commanding Officer of "E" Company, 2dBn 5thMar gave orders not to open fire, since the voices sounded as though they came from the direction of the 2dBn 5thMar CP. Upon receiving small arms fire from this direction, 75mmRecGunPlt returned fire with small arms. The enemy was heard to cry out "Banzai" on three sides of the position. During the fire fight with the enemy, the CP group of "E" Company sent one fire team and one light machine gun to our assistance. At day break and the arrival of M-26 tanks on the scene, the attack was repelled. Elements of the 75mmRecGunPlt moved out to mop up any resistance. Casualties, 1 KIA, 25 enemy killed. At 0830, moved out and set up at (05.9-59.9) covering the occupation of hill to immediate north by 2dBn 5thMar. 1500 Tank Plt Joined AT Co from 1st Tank Bn; 1800 75mm RecGunPlt returned to Regt control, moved out and set up with Company tanks at (06.0-57.0) in Anti-Tank defense of Regt Zone at Kimpo Air Drome.

19Sep 75mmRecGunPlt attached to 3rdBn 5thMar, moved out at 1800 to assembly area. Moved out at 2200 to assembly area at Han-Gang River and prepared to embark aboard LVTs. 1st Section with "F" Co and 2d Section with "G" Co. PltHqs was divided equally between the two. Co(-) in assembly area preparatory to crossing river.

20Sep 0300 75mmRecGunPlt embarked aboard LVTs for the Han-Gang River crossing at the old ferry site opposite Haengju. During crossing units received small arms fire. LVTs delivered Sections direct to their objectives and they set up positions. 75mmRecGunPlt Comdr with 3rdBn CP group. Upon landing of the 2dBn 5thMar the 75mmRecGunPlt was attached for direct supporting fire. Set up on dike at position (11.5-64.0). 1800 Moved out and set up for night at position (12.5-62.8) No rounds expended. No casualties. Co(-) still in assembly area for crossing.

21Sep 75mmRecGunPlt remained in same position and at 0800 fired on block house and enemy troops at position (12.5-61.2) range 1400 to 1450 yards. 1st Squad fired (two (2) H.E., two (2) H.E.A.T. and one (1) W.P.), mission successful, enemy dispersed, and block house neutralized. Reverted to Regtcontrol, remained in position until 1700 and displaced forward to cover rear of Regt Zone (14.2-62.1) with rest of Co.

22Sep Company remained in same position.

23Sep 0600 75mmRecGunPlt moved out to assembly area in rear of hill 104 position (165-9R-1) in direct support of 1stBn Korean Marines. As the 1stBn Korean Marines advanced they received unusually heavy enemy small arms fire and withdrew, leaving the 2dSection, which advanced with them, completely uncovered. The 4th Squad's gun blew up while being fired. The gun was clean and the bore clear. No casualties. 2d Section withdrew to high ground and picked up two 30 Cal Light Machine Guns and fired on the enemy. One man was wounded, treated at 2dBn Aid Station and returned to duty. 1400 2dBn 5thMar came up on the line and took up position where the Korean Marines had withdrawn. 75mmRecGunPlt attached to 2dBn 5thMar. Set up position on hill 104 (16.8-59.3) 2d Section (16.2-59.0). The 3rd Squad fired three (3) H.E. and two (2) W.P. at a troop concentration and railroad tunnel. Results were unobservable due to large concentration of mortar fire. 1st Squad fired one (1) W.P. and three (3) H.E. at enemy Anti-Tank guns and enemy mortar positions. Results were unobservable due to air strike and mortar fire. Dug in for night on east side of hill 104 covering road. Co(-) remained in same position.

24Sep 75mmRecGunPlt remained in same position in direct support of 2dBn 5thMar. Co(-) moved to positions below 75mmRecGunPlt to cover road to front and river bed.

25Sep 75mmRecGunPlt attached to 1stBn 5thMar moved out at 0600 in rear of hill 293 to assembly area. At 1700 moved into position (18.3-58.9). Tank Plt remained in same position covering river bed and road.

26Sep 75mmRecGunPlt, attached to 1stBn 5thMar, moved out to position (18-58.5) and spent the night in covered area. Co(-) moved to assembly area (1858-S-1).

27Sep 75mmRecGunPlt attached to 1stBn 5thMar moved out at 0900 for the city of Seoul. Set up position at (20.9-59.5) observatory hill supporting the advance of "A" and "C" Companies on hill 338. 1st Squad fired nine (9) H.E. and six (6) W.P. at a range of 1350 yards at enemy CPs and enemy troops dug in along Seoul castle wall. Mission accomplished. Set up for night in 1stBn 5thMar CP perimeter position (20.59.7). Co(-) remained in Assembly area.


28Sep 75mmRecGunPlt remained with 1stBn 5thMar at Middle School, Seoul, Korea. Defensive positions maintained. Co(-) remained same position.

29Sep to 6Oct Anti-Tank Co attached to 2dBn 5thMar. Company minus moved out to Mung-gok Sector. Three (3) tanks attached to "D" Company, moved into positions for anti-tank defense. 1Oct two (2) tanks accompanied "F" Company patrol and fired on enemy, results undetermined. Two (2) tanks fired direct to "D" Company patrol, results undetermined. 2Oct One (1) tank fired on suspected enemy installation, results

undetermined. 90mm rounds expended: 36 rds H.E., 14 rds PAC, 4 rds W.P. and 1000 rds of Cal 30 LMG. 3-4Oct Remained in position, prepared embarkation forms. 5Oct Moved out with 2dBn 5thMar to Regt assembly area, Inchon, Korea. 6-7Oct Received supplies and equipment for unit. Prepared for embarkation.

8. ENEMY: Not applicable.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION: The results of this operation are influenced largely, as far as the 75mm Rec Gun Plt is concerned, by the absence of enemy tanks. Enemy tanks were not seen except for one morning when there were also five (5) M-26 tanks present. The largest part of our active participation has been as a direct fire support weapon for the infantry. This too was largely limited by the ability to obtain direct fire. The most effective employment was obtained when the 75mm Gun was set up on the OP hill. The best control was obtained by the Plt Condr being at the OP and maintaining communications with the gun sections by SCR-300 on the company channel.



Some Bn Condrs preferred that the SCR-300 stay on the Bn tactical net to receive fire missions but this was undesirable as the Bn tactical net is overloaded. When wire was available from the OP to the guns, this was ideal; but this was not possible in most cases due to the fast moving situation. Tank Plt encountered no enemy mechanized equipment.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The 75mm Guns can hit with pinpoint accuracy and can fill the gap between the front lines and the 81mm mortar and artillery fire. Small arms fire did not seem to be enough. Towards the latter part of this operation the enemy seemed to favor the reverse slope defense. This limited our employment somewhat. The four gun platoon seems to be too large for fast offensive operations. The platoon never employed more than two (2) guns at one time. Consequently, in the offensive we limited ourselves to one gun for each of our two sections, the additional men being used as relief gun and ammunition bearers due to the rugged terrain and long distance sometimes covered.

A. S. FAILEY

ANNEX ROGER TO 5TH MARINE REGIMENT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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1975

12. STATION LIST

Commanding Officer - - - - - LtCol Raymond L. MURRAY

Executive Officer - - - - - LtCol Lawrence C. HAYS, Jr. (WIA)
(6 Sep 1950 - 21 Sep 1950)
LtCol Joseph L. STEWART
(22 Sep 1950 - 6 Oct 1950)

S-1 - - - - - 1stLt Alton C. WEED

S-2 - - - - - Maj William C. ESTERLINE

S-3 - - - - - Maj Charles H. BRUSH, Jr. (SICK)
(6 Sep 1950 - 29 Sep 1950)
Maj Theodore J. SPICER
(30 Sep 1950 - 6 Oct 1950)

S-4 - - - - - Maj Harold WALLACE

Supply Officer - - - - - Capt John V. HUFF

Ordnance Officer - - - - - CWO Bill E. PARRISH (KIA)
(6 Sep 1950 - 17 Sep 1950)
WO Wilfred D. HOLDREN, Jr.
(18 Sep 1950 - 6 Oct 1950)

Communications Officer - - - - - Maj Kenneth B. BOYD

Medical Officer - - - - - LtComdr Chester N. LESSENDEN

Dental Officer - - - - - LtComdr Jack J. KELLY (Det)
(6 Sep 1950 - 19 Sep 1950)
Lt(j.g.) Morton I. SILVER
(20 Sep 1950 - 6 Oct 1950)

Chaplain - - - - - LtComdr Orlando INGOLDSTAD

ArtyLiaisonO - - - - - Maj Robert M. CALLAND (WIA)
(6 Sep 1950 - 22 Sep 1950)
Capt Raymond L. VALENTE
(23 Sep 1950 - 6 Oct 1950)

NGF LiaisonO - - - - - Lt Jerry C. RAGON (USN)

Tactical Air Control LiaisonO - - - - - 1stLt Leo R. JILLISKY

CO, H&S Co - - - - - Capt Ralph M. SUDNICK (WIA)
(6 Sep 1950 - 15 Sep 1950)
Capt Harold G. SCHRIER
(19 Sep 1950 - 6 Oct 1950)

CO, AT Co - - - - - 1stLt Almarion S. BAILLY

CO, 4.2 Mortar Co - - - - - 1stLt Robert M. LUCY

CO, 1stBn - - - - - LtCol George R. NEWTON

CO, 2ndBn - - - - - LtCol Harold S. ROISE

CO, 3rdBn - - - - - LtCol Robert D. TABLETT

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