

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**SPECIAL ACTION REPORT INCHON-SEOUL
VOL II OF III FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
[NOTE: FOLDER 1 OF 2]**

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**FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
 INCHON-SEOUL *Part II*
 15 SEPT 50 - 7 OCT 50**

VOLUME II OF III

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
FOR THE
INCHON - SEOUL OPERATION
15 SEPTEMBER - 7 OCTOBER 1950
VOLUME TWO

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INCHON - SEOUL

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*Previously submitted to Distribution List by
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division ltr
serial 048-50 of 5 Dec 50.

ANNEX ABLE ABLE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1ST MARINE DIVISION
Hungnam, Korea
24 November 1950

From: Officer in Charge
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Subj: Special Action Report for 1 Sep - 7 Oct 1950
(Administrative Center)
Ref: (a) Div GO No 16
(b) Div GO No 14 with 2 modifications
(c) CG ltr ser 15-50 FE of 9 Sep 1950
(d) Cinc AdmCenter ltr 9/mes of 14 Oct 1950

1. This report, submitted in accordance with reference (a), covers the activities of the 1st Marine Division Administrative Center from 1 September - 7 October, 1950. The mission was to relieve commanding officers, during operations, of as much administrative work as possible and to safe guard records.

2. Organization.

See reference (b) for detailed organization.

Headquarters.

Division Inspector, Area Auditor, Assistant Adjutant, Secret and Confidential Files Officer, Classification Officer, and their assistants. 6 officers, 14 enlisted.

Infantry and Artillery Regiments.

1 officer and 12 enlisted (3 enlisted from each battalion and H&S Company).

Separate Battalions.

1 officer and 2 or 3 enlisted (varied with number of personnel).

All Disbursing Sections.

Postal Section (less detachments with assault units).

3. Reference (c) contained specific duties assigned to the officer in charge. Reference (d) was the report by the officer in charge submitted in accordance with reference (c).

4. The Headquarters of the Center and Division Disbursing Office set up at Camp Carver, Kobe, Japan upon disembarking on 1 September, 1950. Unit detachments joined on 9 September. The Center embarked on the USS THOMAS JEFFERSON on 17 September, disembarked at Inchon, Korea on 22 September and joined Division Headquarters on 24 September. It functioned as a part thereof during the remainder of the period covered by this report.

5. The Center performed its mission by relieving commanding officers of administration details during operations and safe guarding records.

6. Administration work could not be maintained up-to date because:

a. Space was unavailable during ship movements for all offices to set up.

b. Lack of electric lights for offices.

c. Insufficient personnel assigned to Center. This was overcome during quiet periods by augmentation from parent units.

d. Excessive time required to handle service record books. The new service record book requires typewritten entries which necessitates removing pages therefrom. The former service record book is superior to the present one in this respect.

6. Recommendations.

a. That in operations of this kind an Administrative Center be part of a rear echelon, out of the combat zone, so that such work may be done under the best of conditions and without interruption. Transporting the gear and records amounting to about 7500 cubic feet and 65 tons would also be saved. The number of personnel set forth in reference (b) should be sufficient to accomplish the work required.

J. A. White

J. A. WHITE

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ANNEX BAKER BAKER TO 1ST MARDIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FSCC
USS MT MC KINLEY
24 Oct 1950

From: The Coordinator
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Subj: Special Action Report for period 15 Aug-7 Oct 1950
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. Purpose: The purpose of this action report is to give an account of how the doctrine of Fire Support Coordination, as described in USEF-63, Chapter 13, and current directives and decisions of Commandant of the Marine Corps, worked under combat conditions. This report covers the period from 15 August 1950 to 7 October, 1950.

2. General: In order to fully appreciate the analysis contained in this report it is necessary to keep certain basic facts in mind, otherwise the problems herein described and recommendations for solving these problems, while pertinent to this operation, may not prove to be pertinent to subsequent operations. The basic facts to keep in mind are:

1. This was not a typical amphibious operation because:
 - A. The planning phase was shorter than what came to be known during World War II as "Normal", i.e. 30-60 days or even more.
 - B. Embarkation was unusually complicated and there was no rehearsal.
 - C. The landing and assault was not followed by a consolidation phase but developed into a land-warfare type of operation for which the Marine Division is not primarily intended.
2. All of the enlisted personnel of the FSCC were not as familiar with their duties as they should have been because of:
 - A. The rapid reconstitution of the Division.
 - B. Time limitations which precluded thorough and complete orientation of all hands on their duties and responsibilities.

3. With the above basic facts in mind it can now be pointed out that three officers and one enlisted of the FSCC departed Camp Pendleton via air on 15 August, 1950, and arrived TOKYO, Japan 18 August, 1950. Planning started aboard the USS MT MC KINLEY upon reporting and continued until D-day, 15 September, 1950. The remainder of the FSCC, meanwhile, departed San Diego via ship on 16 August, 1950, and arrived KOBE, Japan 29 August, 1950. Division air and naval gunfire representatives of FSCC worked throughout the planning phase with opposite numbers on the staff of ComPhilGrOne. The artillery representative worked in conjunction with G-3 until the arrival of the artillery regiment on 29 August 1950, after which he planned with the CO, 11th Marines and coordinated plans with air, and naval gunfire representatives. On 4 September, 1950, USS MT MC KINLEY departed TOKYO and arrived KOBE 6 September, 1950. At this time the artillery regimental commander, artillery liaison officer, and target information officer reported aboard MT MC KINLEY and participated in the planning until D-day. On 7 September, 1950, the assistant coordinator and target information officer departed KOBE and joined USS TOLEDO at SASEBO, Japan, and observed the pre-D-day bombardment which commenced on

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D-2 days, 13 September, 1950. These officers rejoined USS MT MC KINLEY on the morning of D-day. Throughout the planning phase, a liaison as close as practicable was maintained with Tenth Corps in an effort to coordinate plans, SOP's and SOI's. Like other units and staff sections of 1st Marine Division, the FSCC was confronted with numerous problems, not characteristic of the typical amphibious operation, due to time limitations and separation from combat elements.

Movement to the objective was uneventful from the point of view of the FSCC. Material and 90% of FSCC personnel moved in USS JACKSON, the remainder of personnel in the MT MC KINLEY.

Pre-D-day operations were carried out with certain modifications being introduced due to enemy reaction. The build up of enemy defenses necessitated a two (2) pre-D-day bombardment in lieu of the one (1) day originally planned. Enemy mines caused firing schedules to be altered somewhat. Such coordination as was necessary was effected by Commander Bombardment Force. Representatives of 1st Marine Division were consulted and kept informed of all changes and damage assessment.

On D-day, coordination was effected by scheduled naval gunfire bombardment and scheduled air strikes. When artillery landed on WOLMI ISLAND at H-hour (About 1800 on D-day) such additional coordination as was necessary was effected in the FSCC room of MT MC KINLEY. This FSCC room (heretofore called Joint Operations Room) operated on a joint basis with staff officers of 1st Marine Division and ComPhibGrOne conferring and consulting with each other. No controversy was evident. Having been jointly planned, fire support was jointly executed. In relation to the Attack Force, the Landing Force FSCC functioned in an advisory capacity only. This procedure prevailed until the early evening of D-day plus 1, when at 1700 (approximately) the FSCC personnel of 1st Marine Division aboard MT MC KINLEY moved ashore and took up position in TA 9148*. Control and coordination remained in MT MC KINLEY. FSCC material from USS JACKSON arrived TA 9148W at 1400, 17 September, 1950. 1st Marine Division FSCC assumed responsibility for coordination of supporting arms ashore as follows:

AIR.....0630, 16 September, 1950

ARTILLERY.....1500, 17 September, 1950

NAVAL GUNFIRE.....1800, 18 September, 1950

4. On 19 September, 1950, at 0900, forward echelon FSCC displaced to TA 0656J, and opened immediately. Rear echelon followed at 1600 same date. Forward echelon again displaced forward to TA 2155T on 29 September, 1950, at 0930. Rear echelon followed at 1300, 30 September, 1950. From this time until returning to the staging area for reembarkation, coordination of supporting arms lessened. The tactical situation (with small task units spread over a wide area) precluded effective coordination of fire support and developed, rather, into a coordination of allocation of means.

It has been pointed out above that, following the landing and assault, the action assumed the characteristics of land-warfare. The division was in a relatively fast moving situation, on a wide front, and over rough terrain. The FSCC was thus confronted with the problem of maintaining adequate communications. This was, actually, the only major problem encountered. The following facts are significant:

A. The SCR-300, used for the division Naval Gunfire net, was found to be inadequate over the ranges involved and further, would not adequately remote for operation from the FSCC at distances dictated by terrain encountered during this operation.

*All target areas described herein refer to map of KOREA, 1:50,000 AMS L751

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- B. The SCR-610, used for liaison with the artillery regiment (regimental tactical net), while better than the SCR-300 was not completely satisfactory due to range limitations. This limitation was overcome by using the SCR-193 (borrowed from the artillery regiment), on the artillery command net.
- C. The AN/MRC-6 and AN/GRC-9 proved to have inadequate remote capabilities under normal operating conditions found in the objective area.
- D. The AN/VRC-1 performed satisfactorily for close air support functions.
- E. This operation disclosed nothing new concerning wire communications, but simply confirmed long known truths, i.e., long distances between units demands large quantities of wire, requires much maintenance, and is subject to severance by friendly vehicles and enemy patrols.

Since the only major problem which confronted the FSCC was that of communications, a recommendation concerning communications is made herewith:

If it is contemplated that the Division will, in the future, be employed upon missions which sooner or later assume the characteristics of land warfare, then the FSCC should be equipped to meet this requirement. This will include replacing SCR-300's with MF/HF equipment on the Division Naval Gunfire net. Or, as an alternate solution, splitting the Division Naval Gunfire net into regimental nets and a Division Naval Gunfire net to include FSCC and regiments only. This latter plan will involve no change in types of radio sets but will necessitate an additional SCR-300 for each regiment.

The SCR-610 (presently used for liaison with the artillery) is unsatisfactory for this purpose and under these conditions. A MF/HF radio set is considered necessary to meet the requirements.

For air, it is recommended that one additional AN/VRC-1 and one AN/GRC-9 be provided for the division Tactical Air Control Party for use during displacement of the Division CP. Continuous around the clock operation also requires that standby equipment be available for the Division Tactical Air Control Party.

5. This operation brought to light other problems which warrant study and consideration. Following is a list of the problems and a recommendation in connection therewith:

PROBLEM: The difficulty of accurately keeping friendly front lines plotted on the situation map.

RECOMMENDATION: That all commanders repeatedly emphasize the importance of timely reports from subordinate commander, FO's, spotters, LnO's, and whoever may have information concerning front line locations. This information, in turn, must be expeditiously passed to the FSCC.

PROBLEM: The less than completely satisfactory location of the FSCC within the Division CP. This is a difficult problem to solve. During the operation the Assistant Coordinator was consulted concerning location of the FSCC but any choice was necessarily limited since security is a definite consideration and can be adequately attained only within the confines of the Division CP. It was thus frequently necessary to locate on low ground which aggravated an already difficult communication problem.

RECOMMENDATION: That a member of the FSCC accompany the group making the reconnaissance for a new Division CP, then, within limits, the most advantageous locale can be selected.

PROBLEM: A lack of correct understanding of the mission and functioning of the Supporting Arms Center (SAC) employed at the infantry regimental and battalion levels. During the past operation various degrees of efficiency were displayed in utilizing non-organic supporting arms. The wide range in degrees of success in this usage has led to the thought that some clarification is necessary in defining the makeup and functioning of the Supporting Arms Center. The most successful usage of SAC by some units definitely supports the concept of a SAC as hereafter described.

The Supporting Arms Center is composed of three highly specialized officers and their teams, namely - artillery, naval gunfire, and air. These officers are assigned to the infantry units to insure the maximum efficiency in support of the infantry's efforts by weapons not organically assigned to the infantry. They control supporting arms that warrant a specialist's advice as proven through the years, and to achieve the maximum usage, in a minimum of time, and with the greatest efficiency. They must be controlled from a central point - the SAC.

It is recognized that coordination between the Supporting Arms Center controlled weapons (Artillery, Air, Naval Gunfire) on the one hand and organic infantry support weapons on the other is essential, but it is suggested that this is a function of the S-3 and not the SAC. It is logical that the Weapons Company Commander may be a wise choice in effecting this coordination, but his capacity while so acting is that of Assistant S-3 rather than coordinator of SAC. The Weapons Company Commander certainly knows the capabilities of his organic equipment and knows when heavier support is needed. When this need is recognized it should be turned over to the SAC where the need will receive specialized treatment ensuring the selection of the correct non-organic supporting arm or arms to deliver any needed assistance in the least time. Because of the many problems in each of the above mentioned arms such as ammunition, weather, terrain, and immediate availability, it is considered to be most practicable that SAC be allowed to function as they were intended to function, i.e., to coordinate air, artillery, and naval gunfire, which is an all time-consuming assignment if properly executed. No member of the SAC should be used to coordinate weapons in addition to air, artillery, and naval gunfire. The additional responsibility will definitely effect the efficiency of the supporting arm which that member may control.

RECOMMENDATION: That at the earliest practicable time the Division Fire Support Coordinator and supported unit commanders concerned confer with a view of attaining the maximum potential from their respective SAC's and thus afford greater and more efficient support of the infantry effort.

PROBLEM: The hardship imposed upon the division air officer by virtue of numerous duties in addition to that of supervising close air support. The air officer is burdened with such responsibilities as assignment and use of VMO aircraft, questions regarding frequencies to be utilized, conferences, and other administrative matters. As a result his supervision of the all-important duty of close air support suffers.

RECOMMENDATION: That additional qualified aviation personnel be made available to assume duties over and above those concerning close air support in order that the air officer can give his undivided attention to his primary duty.

PROBLEM: The duplication of frequencies for the TAR, TAO, and artillery spot nets between division and Corps. This resulted in a critical overcrowding particularly of the TAR net.

RECOMMENDATION: That separate frequencies be assigned by Corps.

PROBLEM: The desirability of close support aircraft dropping their bombs

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prior to returning to base. There has developed, and it is believed rightly so, the concept that priority for use of supporting arms should be in the order of artillery, naval gunfire, and air. However, since close support aircraft do not normally return to base armed, and since indiscriminate drops are wasteful it is believed desirable to employ aircraft on what might normally be an artillery or naval gunfire target when their time on station is coming to a close.

RECOMMENDATION: That this change in accepted concept be recognized.

PROBLEM: The lack of mobility of TACP's and SFCP's. Bulky and heavy equipment presently available to these teams renders them less mobile than is desirable.

RECOMMENDATION: That the number of men in the TACP's be reduced and that those remaining be equipped with vehicular transport and equipment. That the number of men in the SFCP's remain the same, and that they be equipped with vehicular transport.

PROBLEM: That of providing the Target Information Officer with a relief. Tables of Organization provides for only one TIO. Since the FSCC operates on a 24 hour basis this is, obviously, inadequate.

RECOMMENDATION: That an additional qualified TIO and one qualified NCO be provided to augment this section of the FSCC.

SUMMARY: The past operation demonstrated clearly that the basic idea and the basic doctrine of the FSCC is sound, that the FSCC has a definite and important service to render, and that this can be accomplished smoothly and efficiently. There is nothing to indicate, nor has it been suggested by word or action, that the prerogative of any general or special staff section has been infringed upon. It is believed that seldom, if ever, has the supporting arms rendered more efficient and adequate support to the infantry effort. The record speaks for itself.

J. H. BROWER,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps.

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1stMarDiv (Reinf), FMF
In the Field
0800, 1 November 1950

ANNEX CHARLIE CHARLIE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL
ACTION REPORT

AIR SECTION

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Air Section of the 1st Marine Division was a combination of the Air Section, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and of the Division Tactical Air Control Party. The senior forward air controller of the Division Party acted in the capacity of air officer during the planning period and until the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was disbanded. The two separate parts of this section, thus constituted, did not physically join into a unit until D Day plus two. The air section formerly with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade formed the advance echelon, ADC Group of the 1st Marine Division Air Section, and landed on Wolmi-do on the evening of D-Day. The remainder of the Air Section came ashore with the AGC Group of the 1st Marine Division and a merger of the two was accomplished at the 1st Command Post established ashore by the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. During the operation, the Air Section did not act as an independent unit but was integrated with the Fire Support Coordination Center and its actions, therefore, were governed by the activity of that unit.

b. The following paragraph OPERATIONS is intended only as an indication of the activities and movement of the Air Section. The actual control of aircraft and recording of strikes and damage reports remained the responsibility of the Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two. The report of this section is included as appendix one to this annex. The Air Observers Section was a unit attached to VMO-6 and their report is appended as appendix two to this annex.

2. OPERATIONS

a. 22 August - 6 September

(1) The senior forward air controller of the Division Tactical Air Control Party, acting in the capacity of Division Air Officer, arrived with the air-transported group of the Division Command Post at Tokyo, Japan and embarked aboard the U.S.S. MT Mc KINLEY (AGC-7) and began the planning for the forthcoming operation.

b. 7 - 12 September

(1) Planning for the forthcoming operation began at Pusan University, Pusan, Korea by the Air Section of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on a limited scale. Overall planning was contained aboard the U.S.S. MT Mc KINLEY at Tokyo, Japan.

(2) A search was made of shipping in Pusan Harbor assigned for brigade shipping in an attempt to locate suitable shipping for VMO-6. LST 079 was finally selected because of its relatively free top deck space which would allow limited operation of one helicopter in event of necessity.

(3) All radio equipment was recrystallized to conform to the 1st Marine Division SOP-SOI.

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c. 12 - 14 September

Enroute to the objective.

d. 15 September (D-Day)

(1) Air support and coordination of supporting arms was conducted aboard the Mt McKinley.

(2) The Air Section with the ADC Group landed at Wolmi-do about 1900.

e. 16 September

(1) Two helicopters were brought ashore from the LST 0079 at 0830 for the purpose of registering batteries of the 11th Marines who were established on Wolmi-do.

(2) The ADC Group moved to TA 9247E on the eastern outskirts of Inchon and began establishing the Division Command Post.

f. 17 September

(1) The Fire Support Coordination Center moved ashore and began operation. Control was still effected aboard the ADC.

(2) An airstrip was established near the Division Command Post and VMO-6 began displacement ashore.

(3) A suitable location was found for the Air Support Section of MTACS-2 at TA 9347T, approximately three miles to the east of the Division Command Post.

g. 18 September

(1) The Air Support Section of MTACS-2 moved into position and began operation.

(2) A request was made to the Amphibious Force commander by the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division that control of close air support aircraft be passed ashore as of 1800. On approval of this request, full coordination of supporting arms began ashore.

h. 19 September

(1) The Air Section monitored the Tactical Air Request Net during all operating hours, dawn to dusk, and effected necessary coordination between air and other supporting arms. Radio reception was poor due to the location of the FSCC and the distance from tactical air control parties. It became impossible to monitor all mission requests and coordination had to be effected mostly by direct wire to the Air Support Section.

(2) The forward echelon of the Air Section displaced to the new Division Command Post in the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield at 1400 and arrived at 1600.

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i. 20 September

(1) The forward echelon of the air section operating with the forward echelon of the FSCC effected necessary coordination during the morning and until the move from Inchon was completed about 1400.

(2) The Air Support Section, MEACS-2 completed its displacement and was again located on high ground approximately two miles to the east of the Division Command Post.

j. 21 - 29 September

(1) The Air Section continued in operation within the FSCC during this period. The communication problem remained, primarily due to location, and coordination was very satisfactorily carried out by means of the direct wire system with the Air Support Section.

k. 30 September

(1) The fire support coordination center displaced to the new Division Command Post at Seoul and began operations at 1130.

l. 1 - 6 October

(1) The Air Section continued operation within the FSCC.

(2) The engaged units of the Division were beyond the range of Naval Gunfire and coordination between artillery and air operations was usually effected at regimental level. The Air Support Section, which had displaced forward with the Division Command Post was well established to carry out their mission of communication with all Division Tactical Air Control Parties due to their selection of high ground for setting up their communications facilities. The direct wire line between the FSCC and the Air Support Section was the primary means by which air artillery coordination was effected.

3. COMMENTS

a. During this operation the main effort of the Air Section within the fire support coordination center was towards continuous and direct communications with the air support section of MEACS-2. Relocated to secondary importance was direct contact with the tactical air control parties of the Division. Several factors were responsible for this procedure. The distance from the FSCC to the front lines, abnormally long for Division operations, made communications difficult because of intervening rough terrain, and the location of the FSCC was chosen with reference to proximity to the general staff sections rather than communicatable terrain. The air support section of MEACS-2 operated as an organic unit of the 1st Marine Division, was logistically supported by the Division, and was located usually within three miles of the command post. Two factors governed the location of this section: (1) primarily high ground facing the prospective front line positions, and (2) secondarily, within convenient direct wire distance from the FSCC.

The attention given to the location of the air support section was in a large measure responsible for the effectiveness of close air support during this operation. When the Division command Post was displaced to a barracks area in Seoul the air support section was

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located on a terraced area mid-way up the side of "South Mountain" overlooking the city itself. From this position clear and strong reception was continuously made with tactical air control parties operating with "Task Units" as much as forty miles distant. The tactical air request net was sometimes the only means of communication with these units and tactical messages were relayed via this net.

On the other hand, the Division Command Post and the FSCC were located in such a manner that "South Mountain" was between the CP and the front line units. Only during certain parts of each day did information come to the air section directly over the TAR net.

Although a very satisfactory and efficient system of coordination was effected by the air sections by use of a direct wire line to the air support section, the optimum of operations could have been obtained if the FSCC had been located in the immediate vicinity of the air support section.

In the event that communications between the FSCC and the TACPs had been excellent during the entire operation, there still remained the chance that the one message meaning disaster for front line units would be missed by the monitors in the FSCC for the reason that they only monitor while the air support section exercises the actual control of the radio nets and of the aircraft themselves. In this respect, it is always possible for a transmission to be blocked to one receiver and not another. The controlling agency and the coordinating agency must work from the same radio or have direct access to the same radio to insure the highest efficiency possible.

b. The utilization of Republic of Korea Marine Corps troops as part of the task organization of the 1st Division necessitated formation of additional tactical air control parties in order to provide these forces with air support. These control parties were drawn from the established T/O of ANGLICO and the Division units were therefore continuously short at least one forward air controller. Upon recommendations previously made, the allowance for the tactical air control party of each battalion now includes two forward air controllers and future like situations can be more satisfactorily handled.

These additional forward air controllers emphasize an existing difficulty which should be given some serious consideration.

Including the Division Air Officer there are now twenty-four naval aviators on the T/O of the Marine Division. Recommendations have also been made to increase the liaison squadron attached to a Marine Division to ten liaison type aircraft and ten helicopters. It is reasonable to assume that between fifty and sixty Marine officers, naval aviators will be serving with a Marine Division in the near future.

Provision should be made, either in the activities of the liaison squadron, or separately, for these aviators, especially the forward air controllers, to continue their proficiency in high performance aircraft and satisfy administrative requirements peculiar to naval aviators i.e. log books, report of flight time

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to the bureau of aeronautics, etc.

c. The value to the Marine Division of the assigned liaison squadron has increased immeasurably with the inclusion of the helicopter in its complement of aircraft. In addition to the helicopter the use of the liaison plane as a tactical air control party airborne has altered some of the concepts for the utilization, organization and employment of this squadron.

(1) With many diversified missions to perform, artillery spot, though still of primary importance, is no longer the controlling mission. For this reason the squadron should not be attached to the artillery regiment for operational control.

(2) The observers carried in the liaison plane have been furnished by the artillery regiment and used for both gunnery and tactical observation missions. The air observer section of the 1st Marine Division joined with the gunnery observers to form a composite observer section. This section billeted and operated with VMO-6 during the entire operation and was considered a part of that squadron. For future operations the ~~artillery~~ observer section should be part of the VMO organization.

(3) The helicopter does not replace the liaison plane for observation missions. It can be used in this capacity however, and it does replace the light plane for strictly liaison type missions. Consequently the requirement for an air strip near front line units is of lesser importance. At the same time it imposes a great maintenance problem upon the squadron. Therefore the airstrip chosen for the liaison squadron should be of semi-permanent construction, capable of twenty-four hour maintenance and can be located well behind the front line units.

(4) There is a definite need for a completely new aircraft to replace the OY liaison plane. The primary missions of this plane would be artillery spot and airborne control of close support aircraft. To satisfy this requirement its communication must be versatile with at least four MUF transceivers (one for TAO, one for TAR, two for arty spot) and a standard VHF radio. It should be armored against small arms fire yet retain the maximum visibility. It should cruise around eighty-five knots but be capable of speeds up to one hundred and fifty knots. It is suggested that a high-winged plane with side-by-side seats enabling the pilot and observer to closely coordinate their actions yet leaving each free to perform his own mission might be the correct design approach.

The airborne observer has a difficult, responsible and dangerous mission. To venture over front line positions in the present liaison plane and expose himself to small arms and anti-aircraft fire day after day and hour after hour has a disintegrating effect upon one's nervous system.

The argument is usually raised that the artillery observer need not go beyond the front line units. In any event the aircraft must fly near the front lines and at an altitude between one thousand to twenty-five hundred feet in order to register artillery on pin-point, camouflaged targets. The best results are obtained when the observer is relatively unrestricted as to his zone of action.

Against an enemy superbly trained in camouflage there is no substitute for a well qualified aerial observer. The tactical observer

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spent much of his time during this operation searching for targets in enemy territory. On many occasions it became necessary to drag an area as low as fifty feet before targets could be discerned. On these occasions the observer became the only means by which aircraft could be brought onto the target. The usual method was to dive on the target and mark it with a smoke hand grenade. By utilizing this technique and derivatives therefrom, the observers and pilots of VMO-6 operated as supplementary tactical air control parties airborne in instances where no other means of control was possible. During the early part of the operation, until the request net became overcrowded, the tactical air observer operated on the tactical air-request net.

(5) This forward air controller, airborne, could be utilized very effectively in the air-tank and air-infantry-tank team.

(6) Transportation of the liaison squadron to the objective area has always been somewhat of a problem. The only acceptable method is to carry them aboard an aircraft carrier. The Navy is understandably reluctant to accept this ultimatum because it greatly reduces the efficiency of the carrier for a considerable length of time and puts it completely out of action during the time when the squadron is launched since the OY must be brought up from the hanger deck and the wings installed on the flight deck before it can be launched. To prepare the squadron for fly-away takes a major portion of a day during an important phase of the amphibious operation. In lieu of the carrier, VMO-6 was transported aboard an LST for this operation which necessitated rough handling of the OY aircraft in loading and particularly in unloading over the assault beaches. The top deck of the LST was cleared of obstructions and reserved for operation of helicopters. It must be clearly understood that helicopter operation from the LST was originally intended to be strictly limited and on the order to "emergency" operations. In addition to those restrictions of operation which readily come to mind; i.e. difficulty of handling fuels and lubricants, maintenance problems; the main limiting factor for use of the LST is its inability to accommodate more than one operating helicopter. The operation of the one helicopter is restricted to calm weather with a very shallow swell.

Keeping in mind the high maintenance factor of the helicopter and the proposed changes to the liaison aircraft, which would make it adaptable to carrier operations, it is proposed that in future operations a "jeep" carrier should be made available to the VMO squadron. This small carrier should be reserved for use during the entire amphibious phase of an operation. Both the liaison plane and the helicopter would then be available beginning at H-Hour. Efficient and complete maintenance of aircraft and helicopter could be conducted twenty-four hours per day.

In this respect it is well to remember that there are no aircraft suitable for landing force observation missions operational and/or carrier based at this time and that there is no substitute for a trained and qualified aerial observer.

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d. Aircraft from the carrier forces did not have gridded close support maps of the entire objective area at any time during the operation. After leaving the beach, three pilots reporting into the air support section often had no maps at all covering target areas where Division forward air controllers were requesting missions. In spite of this fact these planes continued giving excellent close air support during the entire operation by virtue of continuous and positive control by the tactical air control party with which they were working. It is contended that well disciplined aviators and trained, competent ground controllers can provide efficient close air support under the most trying circumstances if communications can be maintained.

e. A difficulty existed in maintaining a continuous element for efficient coordination of air within the fire support coordination center matters arose requiring action by the air officer as a member of special staff. From the moment of landing until the Division Command Post was established at Seoul, aircraft were working somewhere in the Division zone of action almost continuously during daylight hours. To keep informed of this aerial activity, all affecting the operation of the Division, required a mind free of extraneous activity. Concurrently with air support requirements questions regarding medical evacuation by helicopter, liaison assignments for helicopters, employment and frequencies for OV aircraft for various type missions, air-delivery, search and rescue and many other problems relating to the operation of the air officer as a special staff officer had to be answered and acted upon.

f. With full consideration and appreciation to those who have attempted to weld such a heterogeneous group of people into a composite organization it is a considered opinion that there is no place for ANGLICO in the organization of the Marine Division.

During this operation a very excellent maintenance organization was established by the Air and Naval Gunfire Company. Teams were formed to effect repair and replacement of faulty equipment and were sent to the regimental and battalion control parties daily. This critical task, however, could be accomplished by agencies other than ANGLICO. The air section itself could have done it, given a small amount of extra equipment and two or three technicians.

In respect to supplying their units with food, clothing, weapons and similar accoutrements it was found that it was much easier for one officer and nine men to obtain their needs from the organization with which they were working rather than come to the ANGLICO Command Post.

In peacetime there is little the company can do to train the forward air controllers. These officers report into the 1st Marine Division from the Tactical Training Unit, Amphibious Base, Coronado, California after completing a detailed course for forward air controllers. What is needed to complete this education is actual experience with a battalion or regiment using aircraft arranged for by the Commanding General in his training program. The forward air controller needs to be furnished with men (also trained at TTU Pac) and equipment (all radio equipment comes directly under the control of the Division Signal Officer) and assigned to the unit with which he will operate and become a permanent entity in the organization. When the term

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of an exercise where aircraft might be utilized is propagated the forward air controller should be on the ground floor. Too often plans are firmed up before ANGLICO is notified to furnish a tactical air control party.

There is a tendency to view ANGLICO as a vast reserve of officers available for various jobs forever cropping up within the Division. In some respects this is understandable when the officer strength is viewed in relation to other units of similar size. There are twenty-three forward air controllers alone.

The proposition that the battalion or regimental commanding officer might not see an ever present need for a forward air controller and so assign him additional duties is also an uncontroversial issue. However, the officer is still working within the organization and learning the traits of the people with whom he will work. Moreover, he is just as well off as he would be as mess officer or property officer of ANGLICO and he would be in a position where any ideas for improved techniques could be developed in cooperation with the people who must accept and use them.

The idea of the Air and Naval Liaison Company is sound. There must be a repository of trained personnel who are continuously improving techniques of close air support and who are available for replacement. There is also the continuing problem of training forward air controllers and the communication personnel that will be attached to the tactical air control party. Operations with the U.S. Army and Air Force in Korea have definitely shown that they have yet to grasp the full significance of the Naval, Marine Corps type of close support nor the one essential element that makes it effective; direct and positive control of aircraft at or near the front lines of the engaged force. In future combined operations in order to fully employ close air support it will be necessary to furnish Army ground units with the means to control aircraft.

In this respect an ANGLICO training unit would be indispensable but it should not operate on the level of the Marine Division.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That an air support section similar in composition to the air support section Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two be established, maintained, and trained by aviation units on the basis of one section per Marine Division.

b. That for field operations the air support section be assigned to the Marine Division for operational control and logistical support.

c. That the fire support coordination center be organized and trained as a integral unit with all equipment and personnel under control of one organization, perhaps Headquarters Battalion.

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d. That for field operations the air support section be further assigned for coordination control with the FSCC and that the coordinator and the OinC of the air support section plan their activities in unison.

e. That the organization so comprised be considered as a service element of the Division Command Post but not an integral part thereof, and that they locate with particular emphasis upon communicatable terrain within a three mile radius of the Division Command Post.

f. That the air section of the FSCC be composed of three Marine officers, naval aviators, trained for their duties within the FSCC and seven enlisted men. That the equipment of this section be limited to one reliable MEF radio, i.e. a TCS mounted in a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck or an AN/GRC-9 mounted in a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck plus cargo jeep, 1 trailer and 1 accessories. That the radios employed by the air support section be connected into the remote units of the air section, FSCC, for monitor purposes only. That all air-ground transmissions emanating from this combined organization originate in the air support section. Coordination to be conducted by close liaison between the two agencies by direct personnel contact, by direct phone lines and by monitoring the request and direction nets.

g. That the Division Air Officer be divorced from the organization of the FSCC, and continue his duties as a special staff officer, keeping the aviators assigned to the FSCC free to concentrate upon that all important task of providing the Marine Division with air support at the right place, at the right time, and in correct quantities.

h. It is further recommended that the number of enlisted men assigned to regimental and battalion tactical air control parties be reduced to seven and that they be equipped with one cargo jeep and trailer in addition to the radio jeep.

i. That a new type of liaison aircraft be designed.

j. That the following missions be assigned the VMO Squadron:

(1) Coordination with the forward air controller in control of close support aircraft.

(2) Control of support aircraft in conjunction with the air-tank team.

k. That the mission and assignment of ANGLICO be reconsidered.

l. That an air observer section, tactical and gunnery, be established in the VMO squadron and that the administration and flight section of the squadron be augmented to provide for the forward air controllers of the Division.

J. N. CUPP,
Major, U. S. Marine Corps,
Division Air Officer.

APPENDICES:

1. Air Support Section
2. Aerial Observation

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1stMarDiv (Reinf), FMF
In the Field
1200, 16Nov50

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX CHARLIE CHARLIE TO 1STMAR DIV SPECIAL
ACTION REPORT

AIR SUPPORT SECTION

AS AULT PHASE

The Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 departed Chinhae Naval Base on the 10th of September 1950 aboard the LST Q079 and arrived Pusan on the 11th of September to load supplies and equipment in preparation for an amphibious landing with the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced). Departed Pusan in convoy on the 12th of September aboard the LST Q079 and arrived at Inchon on the 15th of September, docked on the 16th and started unloading supplies and equipment. On the 17th, personnel departed by 0700, arrived at target area 9347T and set up for operations, but did not control any aircraft. Remained at this location from the period of 17 September to the 20th of September 1950. On the morning of the 20th, personnel and equipment were moved to a new location at target area 0757S and set up operations. Remained at this location from the period of 20 September to the 29th of September 1950. On the morning of the 29th, personnel and equipment moved to a new location at target area 2157G and set up operations. (Map references 1/50,000 - 1000 meter grid.)

Aircraft on Station and Missions Completed

17 September	No control
18 September	37 controlled 8 missions
	3 search and attack 4 CAS 2dBn 1stMar 1 CAS 3dBn 1stMar
19 September	80 controlled 14 missions
	8 search and attack 1 CAS, 1stMar 4 CAS, 1stBn, 5thMar 1 CAS, VMO-6
20 September	109 controlled 22 missions
	13 search and attack 2 CAS, 2dBn, 1stMar 2 CAS, 1stBn, 1stMar 3 CAS, 3dBn, 5thMar 1 CAS, 1stMar 1 CAS, 1stBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA
21 September	104 controlled 14 missions
	9 search and attack 1 CAS, 3dBn, 5thMar 3 CAS, 2dBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA 1 CAS, VMO-6

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22 September

72 controlled
24 missions

8 search and attack
11 CAS, 3dBn, 5thMar
3 CAS, 1stBn, 5thMar
2 CAS, 1stBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA

23 September

72 controlled
25 missions

13 search and attack
3 CAS, 2dBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA
1 CAS, 32d Inf Regt, USA
1 CAS, 3dBn, 5thMar
3 CAS, 1stBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA
1 CAS, 1stBn, 1stMar
2 CAS, 3dBn, KMC
1 CAS, 7thMar

24 September

103 controlled
26 missions

16 search and attack
2 CAS, 2dBn, 5thMar
3 CAS, 3dBn, 7thMar
3 CAS, 2dBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA
1 CAS, 1stBn, 5thMar
1 CAS, 1stBn, 1stMar

25 September

140 controlled
30 missions

17 search and attack
2 CAS, 2dBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA
3 CAS, 3dBn, 5thMar
1 CAS, 7thMar
1 CAS, 3dBn, 1stMar
1 CAS, 2dBn, 31st Inf Regt, USA
1 CAS, 1stBn, 5thMar
2 CAS, 7thMar
1 CAS, VMO-6
1 CAS, 2dBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA

26 September

102 controlled
31 missions

20 search and attack
3 CAS, 1stBn, 1st Marines
1 CAS, 2dBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA
1 CAS, 2dBn, 1st Marines
1 CAS, 1stBn, 31st Inf Regt, USA
2 CAS, 2dBn, 31st Inf Regt, USA
2 CAS, 2dBn, 7th Marines
1 CAS, 2dBn, 31st Inf Regt, USA

27 September

106 controlled
32 missions

11 search and attack
5 CAS, 2dBn, 1st Marines
4 CAS, 3dBn, 7th Marines
2 CAS, 1stBn, 5th Marines
4 CAS, 1stBn, 7th Marines
1 CAS, 2dBn, 7th Marines
1 CAS, VMO-6
4 CAS, 3dBn, 32d Inf Regt, USA

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28 September	67 controlled 9 missions
5 search and attack	
1 CAS, VMO-6	
1 CAS, 3rdBn, 187th Airborne	
2 CAS, 1stBn, 7th Marines	
29 September	93 controlled 6 missions
2 search and attack	
1 CAS, 1st Marines	
2 CAS, 2ndBn, 1st Marines	
1 CAS, 3rdBn, 7th Marines	
30 September	93 controlled 30 missions
17 search and attack	
1 CAS, 7th Inf Div, USA	
4 CAS, 1stBn, 17th Inf Regt, USA	
4 CAS, 2ndBn, 7th Marines	
3 CAS, 1stBn, 7th Marines	
1 CAS, 1stBn, 187th Airborne	
1 October	87 controlled 27 missions
14 search and attack	
6 CAS, X Corps	
1 CAS, 2ndBn, 7th Marines	
1 CAS, 7th Marines	
1 CAS, KMC, 17th ROK	
1 CAS, 2ndBn, 5th Marines	
3 CAS, 3rdBn, 7th Marines	
2 October	76 controlled 15 missions
5 CAS, 3rdBn, 5th Marines	
2 CAS, 7th Marines	
6 CAS, KMC, 17th ROK	
2 CAS, 1stBn, 7th Marines	
3 October	46 controlled 15 missions
2 search and attack	
2 CAS, 7th Marines	
5 CAS, 1stBn, 7th Marines	
3 CAS, 3rdBn, 5th Marines	
3 CAS, 3rdBn, 7th Marines	
4 October	53 controlled 11 missions
3 search and attack	
1 CAS, 1st Marines	
2 CAS, 1stBn, 7th Marines	
2 CAS, KMC, 17th ROK	
2 CAS, 3rdBn, 7th Marines	
1 CAS, 2ndBn, 32nd Inf Regt, USA	

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1stMarDiv (Reinf), FMF
In the Field
0800, 6Nov50

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX CHARLIE CHARLIE TO 1STMARDIV SPECIAL
ACTION REPORT

AERIAL OBSERVATION

Two (2) Naval Air Observers (Tactical) and three (3) NAO(T) Arty embarked on USNS WEIGEL (APA) 15Aug50 at San Diego, California for transportation to Kobe, Japan. The WEIGEL sailed 16Aug50. Aerial observation schooling was conducted enroute. Arrived Kobe, Japan 29Aug50.

Immediate preparation was undertaken for departure to the INCHON - SEOUL area, Korea. Distribution of aerial observers, pilots, and aircraft was as follows:

Division Chief Air Observer boarded USS MT MC KINLEY at Tokyo, Japan 3Sep50.

One (1) NAO(T) boarded USS GEORGE CLYMER at Kobe, Japan 9Sep50.

One (1) NAO(T) Arty boarded LST Q019 and two (2) NAO(T) Arty boarded LST Q094 at Kobe, Japan 8Sep50.

One (1) NAO(T), two (2) NAO(T) Arty, nine (9) pilots, four (4) HO3S-1, and two (2) OY aircraft boarded LST Q079 at CHINHAE Korea 9Sep50.

One (1) pilot and one (1) OY boarded CVE USS SICILY, and one (1) pilot and one (1) OY boarded CVE BADOEING STRAIT at SASEBO, Japan 11Sep50.

The USS MT MC KINLEY sailed from Tokyo, Japan 4Sep50, and arrived Kobe, Japan 5Sep50.

LST Q079 sailed from Chinhae, Korea 10Sep50 and arrived Pusan, Korea 10Sep50 and loaded two (2) OY aircraft.

Sailing points and dates for INCHON, Korea:

LST Q019	9Sep50	Kobe, Japan
LST Q094	9Sep50	Kobe, Japan
LST Q079	11Sep50	Pusan, Korea
CVE USS SICILY	12Sep50	Sasebo, Japan
CVE USS BADOEING STRAIT	12Sep50	Sasebo, Japan
USS GEORGE CLYMER	13Sep50	Kobe, Japan
USS MT MC KINLEY	13Sep50	Kobe, Japan

All ships arrived off Inchon, Korea 15Sep50, carrying a total of 3 NAO(T), 5 NAO(T)Arty, 11 pilots, 6 OY aircraft, and 4 HO3S-1 aircraft. The first reconnaissance flight was flown at 0640, 16Sep50 over WOLMI-DO Island. The first artillery spot flight was flown at 1030, 16Sep50 over INCHON. Aerial operations on 16Sep50 were conducted entirely by ship-based HO3S-1 aircraft.

The following flights were conducted on 16Sep50: 4 reconnaissance, 3 Arty spot, 8 utility, 1 rescue, for a total of 11.0 hours. The following were results of the above operations: 3 registrations, 1 pilot rescued.

17Sep50; On 17Sep50 all aerial observers, pilots, and aircraft were transferred ashore to the Inchon airstrip (a road) adjacent to the Division CP. Flights conducted; 3 reconnaissance, 2 arty spots, 9 utility, 1 rescue, 3 beach recon for a total of 16.4 hours. Results of operations; 2 registrations, 1 pilot rescued, observed enemy withdrawing from Kimpo Airfield.

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5 October

35 controlled
7 missions

- 3 search and attack
- 1 CAS, 1stBn, 17th Inf Regt, USA
- 1 CAS, 3rdBn, 32nd Inf Regt, USA
- 2 CAS, 2ndBn, 7th Marines

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18Sep50: On 18Sep50 aerial observation operations entered a daily schedule of flights from dawn to dusk. One (1) OY aircraft was destroyed on landing by hitting 4 wires across road at Inchon, Korea. Pilot, 1stLt J. D. COTTON, observer, Capt R. F. DYER. Flights conducted; 8 recon, 6 arty spot, 14 utility, 5 evacuation for a total of 37.2 hours. Results of operations; 6 registrations, 2 fire missions, 2 directed airstrikes, 7 casualties evacuated, located 1 strong point.

19Sep50: Flights conducted; 6 recon, 4 arty spot, 11 utility, 7 evacuation for a total of 29.7 hours. Results of operations; 4 registrations, 3 fire missions, 2 directed air strikes, 7 casualties evacuated.

20Sep50: Aerial operations was transferred from Inchon airstrip to Kimpo airfield. Flights conducted; 9 recon, 7 arty spot, 29 utility, 6 evacuation for a total of 43.8 hours. Results of operations; 2 registrations, 4 fire missions, 6 casualties evacuated, located 2 strong points, 2 arty pieces, and observed enemy withdrawing into Seoul across the Han River employing 8 boats.

21Sep50: 1 OY aircraft was abandoned in flight due to enemy ground small arms fire. Pilot, 2dLt E. E. GAUDETTE, observer, Capt R. E. McCLAN. One HO3S-1 aircraft was destroyed on the ground during an attempted rescue. Pilot 1stLt A. E. BANCROFT. Flights conducted; 8 recon, 7 arty spot, 9 utility, 3 rescue, 13 evacuation for a total of 42.2 hours. Results of operations; 5 registrations, 2 fire missions, 1 directed airstrike, 2 pilots rescued, 13 casualties evacuated, observed enemy withdrawing into Seoul across the Han River at 2 points employing 18 boats.

22Sep50: Flights conducted; 3 recon, 9 arty spot, 9 utility, 14 evacuation, 2 arty spot in F7F aircraft for a total of 37.9 hours. Results of operations; 6 registrations, 3 fire missions, 1 directed airstrike, 14 casualties evacuated, located 1 enemy strong point.

23Sep50: Flights conducted; 10 recon, 5 arty spot, 1 utility, 6 evacuation, 2 rescue for a total of 30.2 hours. Results of operations; 5 registrations, 4 fire missions, 2 directed airstrikes, 6 casualties evacuated, 1 pilot rescued, located strong point being reoccupied.

24Sep50: 1 OY aircraft wing was destroyed on landing at Kimpo Airfield. Flights conducted; 1 recon, 5 arty spots, 7 utility, 19 evacuation, 1 resupply, 1 recon in F7F aircraft, for a total of 25.6 hours. Results of operations; 5 registrations, 3 fire missions, 23 casualties evacuated, located 1 battalion of enemy troops, observed enemy withdrawing east within Seoul.

25Sep50: Flights conducted; 5 recon, 4 arty spot, 10 utility, 16 evacuation, 2 rescue for a total of 25.1 hours. Results of operations; 4 registrations, 2 fire missions, 2 directed airstrikes, 17 casualties evacuated, 1 pilot and 1 aircrewman rescued, observed enemy withdrawing north from Seoul.

26Sep50: The rear echelon consisting of 4 pilots, 2 OY aircraft and 4 HO3S-1 aircraft arrived at Kimpo Airfield. Flights conducted; 6 recon, 4 arty spot, 26 utility, 9 evacuation for a total of 29.2 hours. Results of operations; 3 registrations, 1 fire mission, 3 directed airstrikes, 9 casualties evacuated, located 1 strong point, observed enemy withdrawing from Seoul.

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27Sep50: Flights conducted; 9 recon, 6 arty spot, 6 utility, 9 evacuation, 1 rescue for a total of 34.1 hours. Results of operations; 6 registrations, 1 fire mission, 10 directed airstrikes, 11 casualties evacuated, observed enemy withdrawing north from Seoul.

28Sep50: Flights conducted; 5 recon, 7 arty spot, 21 utility, 11 evacuation, 1 rescue, for a total of 36.1 hours. Results of operations; 6 registrations, 2 directed airstrikes, 14 casualties evacuated, located 1 strong point, observed enemy withdrawing north from Uigonbu.

29Sep50: 1 OY aircraft was shot down with loss of 1 NAO(T) Capt E. E. RIVES, and capture of 1 pilot, 2dLt T. D. ODENBAUGH, by the enemy. 1 HO3S-1 aircraft with 1stLt A. S. BANCROFT as pilot, was shot down by enemy from strong point located on 28Sep50. Flights conducted; 6 recon, 2 arty spot, 17 utility, 5 evacuation, 2 rescue for a total of 18.3 hours. Results of operations; 3 registrations, 1 directed airstrike, 5 casualties evacuated, located 3 enemy small caliber AA positions.

30Sep50: 1 OY aircraft made a forced landing within friendly territory due to engine failure. Pilot Major V. J. GOTTSCHEK, observer, Capt R. F. DYER. Flights conducted; 2 recon, 6 arty spot, 25 utility, 1 evacuation, 1 rescue for a total of 20.5 hours. Results of operations; 3 registrations, 1 casualty evacuated, 2 pilots rescued, located enemy in strength on hilltop north of Seoul.

1Oct50: Aerial observation operations shifted from the dawn to dusk flight schedule to a stand-by status at Kimpo Airfield. Flights conducted; 2 recon, 1 arty spot, 14 utility, 4 evacuation, for a total of 12.5 hours. Results of operations; 2 registrations, 2 fire missions, 4 casualties evacuated.

2Oct50: Flights conducted; 1 recon, 3 arty spot, 19 utility, 2 resupply, for a total of 14.9 hours. Results of operations; 2 registrations.

3Oct50: Flights conducted; 1 recon, 1 arty spot, 29 utility, 1 evacuation, 1 rescue for a total of 16.4 hours. Results of operations; 1 registration, 1 casualty evacuated, 1 pilot rescued.

4Oct50: Flights conducted; 3 recon, 30 utility, 1 evacuation, 1 resupply for a total of 13.4 hours. Results of operations; 1 casualty evacuated.

5Oct50: Flights conducted; 1 recon, 1 arty spot, 25 utility, 1 rescue, for a total of 16.3 hours. Results of operations; 1 registration, 1 pilot rescued.

Total flights conducted: 16Sep50-5Oct50:

Reconnaissance	94 flights	125.1 hours
Artillery Spot	85 flights	185.5 hours
Utility	319 flights	132.2 hours
Evacuation	127 flights	72.0 hours
Rescue	16 flights	14.9 hours
Resupply	4 flights	2.0 hours
Beach Recon	3 flights	1.2 hours
TOTAL	648 flights	505.9 hours

Appendix 2 to Annex "CC" to 1stMarDiv Special Action Report

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Results of operations: 16Sep50-5Oct50

69 Registrations
27 Fire missions
11 Pilot rescues
139 Casualties evacuated
28 directed airstrikes
4 message drops

By conducting the above 27 fire missions and 28 directed air-strikes during aerial flight the following are the estimated results of such operations: 1665 enemy troops killed.

Destroyed

5 machine guns
1 40mm anti-aircraft gun
20 76mm field artillery pieces
3 mortars
1 anti-tank gun
2 tanks (T-34)
1 armored truck
42 trucks (6X6 class)
2 busses
7 jeeps
2 staff cars
2 fuel dumps
2 ammunition dumps
1 road block
6 harracks (burned)
2 towns (burned)

Damaged

1 76mm field artillery piece
1 tank (T-34)
4 trucks (6X6 class)
1 jeep
1 factory

The below name compliment of aerial observers during this operation conducted the following number of aerial combat missions:

Maj Michael F. WOJCIK	20 Flights	33.7 hours
Capt Edwin E. RIVES	16 Flights	26.7 hours
Capt E. E. HAMMEBECK	16 Flights	33.1 hours
Capt W. F. DYER	21 Flights	23.0 hours
Capt Robert E. McOLEAN	24 Flights	35.5 hours
2dLt Billy C. MARKS	19 Flights	35.6 hours
1stLt Thomas R. BRAUN	17 Flights	29.6 hours
1stLt James P. MARIADES	34 Flights	49.0 hours
TOTAL	167 Flights	266.2 hours

The HO3S-1 aircraft were employed for artillery spot missions only when no other type aircraft was available. During the operation, such a situation occurred on 16Sep50, when only ship-borne aircraft were capable of conducting such missions and during the forenoon of 17Sep50, prior to the landing of OY aircraft. The HO3S-1 aircraft was employed thereafter to conduct all utility, evacuation, rescue, resupply, and staff and general officers reconnaissance missions.

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The OY aircraft was employed exclusively for reconnaissance and artillery spot missions throughout the operations. All such missions were conducted beyond friendly front lines. Two (2) OY aircraft were utilized as Tactical Air Request planes, operating on a frequency capable of radio contact with high performance aircraft, to conduct missions of directing airstrikes against ground targets, and such other reconnaissance missions that were assigned by assault battalion Forward Air Controllers. However, all OY aircraft were employed to direct airstrikes by conducting marking dives upon ground targets and also marking such targets with smoke grenades.

F7F type aircraft was employed for two artillery spot missions and one reconnaissance mission into areas which proved to be too hazardous for the unarmed, unarmored OY type aircraft.

The following recommendations are submitted as the result of the above operations:

1. HO3S-1 aircraft should never be employed for artillery spot missions or aerial reconnaissance beyond friendly front lines whenever any other type aircraft are available.
2. Assigning 2 interpreters to the observation squadron would greatly assist in the rescue flights conducted by the HO3S-1 type aircraft.
3. Observation aircraft, being of an unarmed, unarmored type, should never be ordered on missions that are beyond their capabilities. It was proven in this operation that such missions were ordered time and time again where the enemy was known to be well defended by anti-aircraft weapons as well as by small arms fire. Such missions resulted in the destruction of 2 OY aircraft and the damaging of several others. It is recommended that personnel who assign missions to VMO aircraft, be indoctrinated in the capabilities of VMO type aircraft in order that they can carefully weigh the possible results of a mission against the probable loss of the aircraft, a trained pilot, and trained aerial observer.
4. The aircraft allowance of a VMO squadron should be 12 OY aircraft and 8 helicopters. Such aircraft should be well armored consistent with flight characteristics.
5. It is highly recommended that the OY type aircraft be equipped with VHF radios. The excellent results of directing airstrikes via direct communications between observation aircraft and the high performance type has been proven in this operation. Observers can spot targets with greater ease and accuracy, request air power, direct airstrikes, and then carefully evaluate results. This method has also been praised by several pilots of the fighter type aircraft who participated in such directed strikes.
6. With the increasing demand for Tactical Air Request missions in addition to the normal type of tactical observation missions, it is recommended that the present War T/O be increased from 3 to 5 Tactical Air Observers. If such an increase is approved, greater coverage of tactical observation and tactical air missions can be accomplished. It will also lessen the effect of combat flying fatigue which is a prevalent deterrent to efficient coverage of assigned missions.

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7. Because of the varied type missions executed by OY type aircraft, the present doctrine on command relationships should be changed so that the WMO Squadron is attached only to the Division Headquarters, not to the artillery regiment.

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1stMarDiv (Reinf), MEF
In the Field
2000, 20Nov50

ANNEX DOG DOG TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Ref: (a) Paragraph 11401, Marine Corps Manual
(b) DivGenO to 16

1. INTRODUCTION

This report endeavors to set forth some of the ways in which this operation differed from a normal amphibious operation, some of the problems encountered, and to summarize briefly the Naval Gunfire Support received by the 1st Marine Division in the Inchon-Seoul, Korea Operation.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. The organization of the Naval Gunfire Platoon was, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the T/O K-1853, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, Signal Battalion, Marine Division, MEF. It was impossible to follow this T/O completely for the following reasons:

(1) RCT-5 was already overseas in South Korea and their Naval Gunfire Teams were organized on a peace time basis.

(2) RCT-1, with its ANGLICO Detachment, was being formed at Camp Joseph E. Pendleton, Oceanside, California, on a war strength T/O.

(3) RCT-7, with its ANGLICO Detachment, was then not a part of the 1st Marine Division but joined later during the operation.

(4) Augmentation personnel were carried overseas to bring the Teams with RCT-5 up to war strength when the RCT rejoined the Division.

b. The Division Naval Gunfire Officer was Lieutenant Colonel L. S. ERASER, U. S. Marine Corps.

c. Naval Gunfire Teams participating in the operation and their commanders were as follows:

(1) Division Naval Gunfire Team: 1 Officer USN, 14 enlisted USMC. Lieutenant Commander Bruce E. ANDERSON, USNR, Team Commander and Assistant Division Naval Gunfire Officer.

(2) (a) RCT-1, Regimental Naval Gunfire Liaison Team. 1 Officer, USN and 11 enlisted, USMC. Lieutenant Commander Lloyd R. MITCHELL, USN, Team Commander.

(b) Three Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties, each consisting of a Liaison Team with 1 Officer, USN and 10 enlisted, USMC and a Spotting Team with 1 Officer, USMC and 10 enlisted, USMC.

1stBn, 1stMar: Liaison Team, Lt(jr) William C. HRUSKA, USN.
Spotting Team: 1stLt William H. MACKLIN, USMC, Spotter.

2dBn, 1stMar: Liaison Team, Lt(jr) Joseph B. JOCHIM, USN.
Spotting Team; 1stLt Raymond B. SPICER, USMC, Spotter.

3dBn, 1stMar: Liaison Team; Lt Elisco A. MAGNI, USN.
Spotting Team; 1stLt John J. BOZIK, USMC, Spotter.

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(3) (a) RCT-5 Regimental Naval Gunfire Liaison Team. 1 Officer, USN and 11 enlisted, USMC. Lt Jerry C. RAGON, USN, Team Commander.

(b) Three Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties, each consisting of a Liaison Team with 1 Officer, USN and 10 enlisted, USMC, and a Spotting Team with 1 Officer, USMC and 10 enlisted, USMC.

1stBn, 5thMar: Liaison Team; Lt Carl O. GREWE, USN, Spotting Team; 2dLt Morlo W. ALLEN, USMC.

2dBn, 5thMar: Liaison Team; Lt Ernest J. BELOR, USN. Spotting Team; 1stLt Eston E. CARPER, Jr., USMC.

3dBn, 5thMar: Liaison Team; Lt Stanley C. BANKS, USN. Spotting Team; 1stLt Joseph R. WYERSKI, USMC.

(4) (a) RCT-7, Regimental Naval Gunfire Liaison Team. 1 Officer, USN, and 11 enlisted, USMC. Lt Robert G. GEORGEY, USNR, Team Commander.

(b) 3 Battalion Shore Fire Control Parties, each consisting of a Liaison Team with 1 Officer, USN and 10 enlisted, USMC and a Spotting Team with 1 Officer, USMC and 10 enlisted, USMC.

1stBn, 7thMar: Liaison Team; Lt Evan A. JARBOE, USN. Spotting Team; 1stLt John A. REMES, USMC.

2dBn, 7thMar: Liaison Team; Lt(jg) Leo D. McHILLAN, USN. Spotting Team; 1stLt John E. DOLAN, USMC.

3dBn, 7thMar: Liaison Team; Lt(jr) Robert G. HAYS, USN. Spotting Team; 1stLt John K. DIVERLY, USMC.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. This operation did not conform to the usual concept of an amphibious campaign. Planning on this campaign did not start until 19 August 1950 with a Target date of 15 September. This limited planning to a much shorter time than is normally allowed for an amphibious operation. Much of the planning was executed with a great shortage of intelligence concerning enemy installations, targets to be expected and enemy forces that might be encountered. Fire control maps were not available until the end of August and then it was necessary to use 1/50,000 maps for fire control purposes.

b. Gunfire planning was completed by about 2 September and Annex FOX, Naval Gunfire Support to 1st Marine Division Operation Order 2-50 was completed on 4 September and issued by 8 September. A schedule for one (1) day preliminary bombardment (Appendix F to Annex FOX to 1stMarDiv OpnO 2-50) was prepared by ComPhibGru ONE and it was requested of CTG 7 that this scheduled bombardment be delivered on at least three different days prior to the landing. Final agreement was reached that bombardment would commence on D-2, and if necessary it would be repeated on D-1 Day. Two days of limited pre D-Day bombardment were executed. Ships involved

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in the pre D-Day bombardment were the same, minus the LSMs, as those used on D-Day.

c. The whole operation was directly influenced by unusual tidal conditions that existed in the area. D-Day was selected on 15 September so that there would be an early morning high tide shortly after sunrise and another high tide about an hour before sunset. Further influencing the selection of D-Day was the fact that spring tides would exist that day. The tidal range during the spring tides was from approximately a minus .5 feet to a plus 31.2 feet. The high tide was necessary in order to effect the assault landing.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Due to the manner in which the Division was assembled, no preliminary training exercises and rehearsals were possible. RCT-5 with a Brigade staff were in Korea prior to the commencement of planning for the operation. RCT-1 was assembled at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton between 1 and 15 August, equipped and embarked for Japan. RCT-7 was assembled from units in the Mediterranean and joined the Division after the operation had begun. With the Division assembled in this manner it was not possible to conduct any consolidated training exercises and rehearsals.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The first echelon of the Division staff left Camp Pendleton on 15 August 1950 by air, arrived at Haneda Air Base, Tokyo, Japan on 18 August 1950 and reported to the USS MT MCKINLEY. The second echelon of the Division staff followed about three days later by air. The various units of the Division then at Camp Pendleton loaded out from San Diego and sailed for Kobe, Japan, where the combat loading phase of the operation was accomplished. RCT-5 combat loaded out of Pusan, Korea at the same time the Division elements were reloading at Kobe, Japan.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Loading was completed at Kobe on 12 September and units proceeded independently to the objective area. RCT-5 sailed independently from Pusan. All units arrived and assembled at the objective area about midnight on 14 September.

7. OPERATIONS

a. The landing was executed in a very constricted area. The channel leading into Inchon was very narrow, flanked by many islands, and at low tide many rocky shoals and flats existed. This greatly affected the selection of the location of the fire support areas. Areas were very limited. It was necessary to place direct support destroyers very close to the landing beaches and to anchor them in set positions. Cruisers had to be anchored in locations where most of the land mass was beyond the range of their secondary batteries. During D-Day after L-Hour and about 3 hours prior to H-Hour one of the cruisers had to be withdrawn from its fire support area in order to make room for the transports carrying the troops. See Appendix 3 to Annex FOX to 1stMarDiv OpnO 2-50.

b. Fire support ships consisted of 2 US Heavy Cruisers, 2 British Light Cruisers, 6 US Destroyers and 3 LSMs. The two British Cruisers posed a problem in communications in that differences in accent and enunciation made it difficult to understand their transmissions part of the time. This problem seemed to decrease somewhat as the operation progressed and as the operators became more accustomed to the accent.

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c. This operation further differed from the normal amphibious operation in that instead of a normal beach assault followed by consolidation of the final beachhead, the Marines executed a beach assault and then swung into a land warfare type of operation involving a rapid advance for the Kimpo Airfield some 12 miles away and for Seoul about 20 miles away. The front over which the Division was operating was much greater than a Division is normally expected to cover with the result that units were at great distances from each other part of the time.

d. The rapid advance soon took most of the Division units out of range of naval gunfire and the wide front (over 20 miles at times) over which they operated greatly exceeded the range of present radio equipment. The nature of the terrain over which the operation was conducted also greatly hampered radio communications. Much of the terrain was mountainous; this coupled with the excess ranges involved was apparently beyond the capabilities of the AN/MRC-6, the AN/GRC-9 and the SCR-300, with which the Naval gunfire teams were equipped. Naval Gunfire communications throughout the whole operation were generally less than satisfactory.

e. The 1st Marine Division landed at Inchon initially in a strength of two RCTs with supporting elements. The third RCT with its supporting elements joined the Division about a week later in the operation. All RCTs had their supporting ANGLICO teams (see T/O K-1853) with them initially in the operation.

f. It is believed that all of these conditions influenced the operation greatly. These conditions should be kept in mind in the study and evaluation of this report.

g. NARRATIVE

15 September 1950: The assault commenced on the objective of Inchon. The initial landing was made during the early morning high tide on the island of Wolmi-do on beach GREEN by one BLT of RCT-5. The final landing was made during the evening high tide on beach RED at the city of Inchon by RCT-5 and on beach BLUE south of the city by RCT-1.

Fire support ships assigned for these landings consisted of 2 CAs, 2 CLs, 6 DDs, and 3 LSMs. Each BLT was assigned a DD as direct support ship. RCT-1 was assigned a CL and RCT-5 a CA in direct support of the regiment. One CA was held in general support for the Division.

All ships participated in accordance with Annex FOX (Naval Gunfire Support) to 1st Marine Division OpnO 2-50, in the preparation fires. (Appendix 2 to Annex FOX to 1stMarDiv OpnO 2-50) for the L-Four landing, and in scheduled fires up to the H-Hour landing, CL 1 withdrew from the fire support area at H-3 Hours so that part of the area could be used for the transport unloading area.

Communications over the attack force NCF control net was good initially. However, considerable congestion and interference from CW and other amphibious nets were noted. Communications over the Div NCF net, SCR-300 series radio, was very unsatisfactory. There was much interference on the Division set aboard the AGC from CW and also from other amphibious voice nets, some of which were

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AM instead of FM. This was believed to be caused by the crowding of so many radio sets aboard the AGC. Also to be considered is the fact that the AGC was about 15000 yards from the beach. Satisfactory communications on this net could not be established.

During the night of D-Day it was not feasible to use illuminating fire from the direct support ships in close support of RCT-5 units to any great extent. This was because the ships were so close to the landing beaches. The general support ships could not deliver illuminating fires due to extreme ranges. The necessary concentration of shipping in a very restricted area did not permit the moving of gunfire support ships around to position them in areas from which they could best deliver supporting fires.

16 September D/1: The ships assigned gunfire support roles continued to provide naval gunfire. This fire consisted of call fire missions from the direct support ships and deep supporting fires controlled by air spot from the general support ships. Attempts to establish communications with the Division units on the Division NGF net from aboard the AGC were unsuccessful. Early in the afternoon of D/1 the advance party of the Division NGF team got ashore. The team equipment was partially ashore so communications could be attempted. Late in the afternoon the main body of the Division CP personnel went ashore. By about 1900, communications were established on the Attack Force NGF Control net and the Division NGF net. These communications were not steady but were very irregular. However, the Division team was able to arrange for night harrassing and interdiction fires on this night. A watch was maintained during the night on both radio nets. Scheduled night fires were fired and a few call fire missions were fired.

(2) Exploitation Phase

17 September D/2: Communications during this day were spotty. Considerable interference from CW was noted on the Attack Force NGF Control net. Communications on the Division NGF net were sporadic depending upon the location of the other sets operating in the net. The Division CP was located in TA 9148, and was behind a series of hills which shielded the Div radios from those of the RCT and BLT NGF teams. The Div SCR-300 was set up on top of the FSCC building in an attempt to maintain communications on the Div net, but this was only partially successful as the location was not high enough. Communications continued to decrease on this net all day long. The BLT Shore Fire Control Parties commenced operating on the Attack Force NGF Control net as a means of last resort to continue communications. Even on this net communications grew quite sporadic and at times quite crowded as one station would attempt to relay for another one.

The FSCC equipment got ashore during the late forenoon and by midafternoon was commencing to operate as a unit.

The Naval Gunfire Officer was finally able to get the night scheduled fires arranged. Telephone carrier to the AGC was the most reliable method of communications over which to arrange scheduled fires. Some call fires were again fired during the night. Illumination fires were scheduled again for this night.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining front line data, partly due to communication difficulties and partly due to the troops moving so fast that the Shore Fire Control Parties did not actually know the location of their front lines.

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18 September D/3 - Support of the advance of RCT-1 and RCT-5 was continued with naval gunfire. A heavy preparation was fired on the high ridge overlooking the KIMPO Airfield prior to the Jump-off of RCT-5 in the attack on the airfield. RCTs were beyond the range of the DDs so it was necessary to assign one CA to RCT-5 for support plus one DD for general use along the Kumpo Peninsula. One CA and one CL were assigned to RCT-1. Communications were steadily becoming worse due to movement of liaison teams and the range becoming greater. Communications on the SCR-300 were nearly non-existent. As a result much of the traffic was sent over the attack force control net. Communications on this net were becoming very sporadic and the necessity of relaying between stations further served to hamper communications on this net.

Naval gunfire control was passed ashore to the 1stMarDiv at 1300.

During the afternoon and night harassing fires were delivered against enemy positions on the east side of the Han River. Night interdiction fires were arranged. They were mostly deep supporting harassing fires fired into target areas where enemy activity had been noted prior to darkness. Few illuminating missions were fired due to RCTs being beyond the range of illuminating ammunition.

The Shore Fire Control Party from BCT 3/5 was ordered to report to Lieutenant Colonel Hagenah with the KMC Unit operating with the 5th Marines on the left flank.

19 September D/4 - General support continued with one CA assigned to each RCT-5 and RCT-1. RCT-1 was now beyond effective range of the CL. One DD was still assigned to the Kumpo Peninsula for coastal targets. The 32nd Infantry Regt came ashore and was assigned to the Division for control, and operated on the Div Right Flank. This unit was assigned a CL for naval gunfire support. This unit had considerable difficulty establishing and maintaining communications on the spotting net assigned.

During the day, the NGF team with the KMC Bn moved into position in TA 0363. At this location the DD assigned did not have sufficient range to support this unit. It could only cover the Northwest coast of the peninsula and several thousand yards inland. No heavy ships were available to assign this mission at that time.

At 0900, the forward echelon of the FSCC displaced to Oeoso-Ri at TA 0656 and opened immediately. The rear echelon followed at 1600. On displacements the Assistant Div NGFLO with one half of the team went forward with the forward echelon. The Div NGFO and remainder of the team followed with the main body of the FSCC. Corps Forward elements arrived and took over old CP.

Night supporting fires were scheduled for both RCT-5 and RCT-1. Specific fire missions were not received from the KMC unit so no fires were scheduled for that unit. Corps had communication with 32nd Inf and arranged their scheduled night fires.

Communications at the new CP were even poorer than at the old CP. The location of the FSCC within the CP was not selected with respect to permitting the best use of communication facilities. The SCR-300 was mounted on top of the building but no appreciably better results were obtained.

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20 September D-5: Naval Gunfire support continued. A preparation was fired for RCT-5 for the crossing of the Han River by its direct support ship. Later in the day RCT-5 reported it was out of range of its direct support ship, and the 32nd Inf Regt reported it was beyond range of its CL and urgently needed a gunfire support ship. The CA assigned RCT-5 was shifted to the 32nd Inf. Throughout the day, the 32d Inf seemed to have trouble communicating with its direct support ship. Two different spotting frequencies were assigned them for use.

RCT-1 reported that it needed certain supplies and repairs. These were dispatched via the chain of command as called for in the initial administrative order.

The KMC NGF team moved to TA 9964. Night scheduled fires were planned for the two CAs in support of RCT-1 and the 32d Inf.

The BB Missouri was made available for fire missions about 1200. She was given the initial mission of providing deep supporting fires conducted with her own aircraft as spotter on targets of opportunity in the vicinity of Seoul. An attempt was made to get her to provide night harassing fires on four specific targets in the City of Seoul. Her response indicated that she could not fire these missions as it was beyond her range. While it was beyond her maximum effective range of 32000 yards, it seemed to be within her maximum range according to OP 1188 and USF 66, Fig 10-1, of 42,345 yards and within her capabilities, particularly for harassing fire. Seoul was about 39000 yards from her anchorage. An attempt was then made to place her fire on targets in the Kumpo Peninsula which were within her maximum effective range. She couldn't accomplish this because "she would have to fire over a line of ships". No further effort was made to use the fire of this ship. Communications were very poor. Great difficulty was experienced in obtaining front line information.

The NGF Team with KMC Unit on Kumpo Peninsula reported much enemy activity.

21 September D-6: Continued gunfire support of the operation. The NGF Team with the KMC Unit reported that they had received an early morning attack. The 32d Inf reported that they had no further use for naval gunfire so the CA that was in support of the 32d was moved in company with a DD to a berth North of Inchen and was placed in direct support of the Kumpo Peninsula task unit. Targets of opportunity were taken continually under fire from about 1400 to 2400. Several close support unobserved missions were fired into hidden areas in the terrain. One such mission was followed up by an attack by the 11th Company, KMC in which 100 prisoners were taken. The company commander reported many enemy troops were killed by the fire.

Gunfire teams from the 5th Marines were recalled to ANGLICO where their equipment could be worked over prior to other use.

Night scheduled fires were set up for the Kumpo Peninsula task unit and RCT-1. Night harassing fires on Kumpo included areas across the Han River and the avenues of approach to the perimeter of the position.

Efforts were made to obtain better communications. Radios were moved around within the CP to obtain better communications with little success. Front line information was hard to obtain from all teams.

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RCT-1 teams reported that the supplies and equipment they had requested had not reached them. Investigation showed that the supplies had been short-stopped by the communications officer of RCT-1 and passed to infantry units. ANGLICO instituted their own supply of special items and repairs.

22 September D/7 - Continued gunfire support of Kumpo Peninsula task unit and of RCT-1. One CA assigned to each. As a result of last night's harassing fires no morning attack developed on the Kumpo Peninsula.

Naval Gunfire control passed to Corps at 1800.

Night scheduled fires were set up for RCT-1 and for KUMPO Peninsula. The SCR-300 was moved to a nearby hilltop TA 0656 Oboe outside the CP in an effort to gain better communication with the KUMPO team. This was successful as long as the team was on high ground. When they moved, communications again went out. Front line information hard to obtain.

RCT-7 ashore and requesting gunfire support ships. None available for assignment.

23 September D/8 - Continued gunfire support of RCT-1 and of the Kumpo Peninsula task unit. In the early morning, a close support mission was fired by the LNO through the KMC Company Commander. This was necessary because the area the company occupied was blanketed by a heavy ground fog and the LNO could not observe. The Company Commander reported excellent results.

Late in the afternoon RCT-1 was out of effective naval gunfire support range. Relieved ship assigned to RCT-1. Ship retired to resupply ammunition.

Set up night scheduled fires for both KUMPO and RCT-7 from one CA. As a result of previous call fire missions and night harassing missions, no enemy night fires were received in the Kumpo area. Front line information hard to obtain. Communication again very spotty.

24 September D/9 - Continued gunfire support of KUMPO Peninsula. The 2d CA returned resupplied with ammunition. Changed the Shore Fire Control Party in the area. One team from RCT-5 relieved the one already out there and carried out supplies. RCT-7 was requesting gunfire support ships. Moved one CA into position where it could provide some gunfire support for RCT-7 at extreme range. RCT-7 was unable to contact the ship on two spotting frequencies assigned. Night scheduled fires were set up for both KUMPO and RCT-7. Communication were very poor.

25 September D/10 - Communications good with KUMPO team, which was located on Hill top TA 9865U. Communications to RCT-7 were fair to poor. Continued support of KUMPO unit with CA with DD escort and one CA to RCT-7. Communications between CA and RCT-7 not satisfactory.

Placed radio on a far hill in the Artillery CP TA 0755 Oboe where we were able to maintain better communications with KUMPO.

Scheduled night fires for KUMPO.

26 September D/11 - Called in all of RCT-1 teams except spotters who remained as assistant air controllers with RCT-1 air teams.

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CA with RCT-7 withdrawn. Out of range of ship and no communications between RCT-7 and ship.

Scheduled night fires on KUMPO from both CAs. Communications only fair. Much interference on attack force net from CW. The Shore Fire Control Party reported considerable interference from an airfield in Japan on the spotting net in use. Shifted frequencies for Spotters.

Directed by G-3 to send one Regimental Liaison Team and one additional Bn Shore Fire Control Party from the RCT-5 NGF section to KUMPO to report to the 187th Airborne Infantry which was at KIMPO Airfield and forming the KUMPO TASK UNIT with the mission of cleaning up all enemy resistance on the KUMPO Peninsula. NGF Teams were unable to locate the 187th CP at KIMPO and returned to the area for the night.

27 September D/12 - Continued support of the KUMPO area. Communications very poor due to movement of the gunfire team.

NGF teams ordered out yesterday and unable to locate the 187th Infantry, joined them this morning and proceeded towards KUMPO Peninsula.

Scheduled night fires for both CAs in KUMPO Area.

28 September D/13 - Assigned 1 CA and 1 DD as gunfire support units for KUMPO Task Unit. Communications very poor.

Scheduled night fires for both CAs on the KUMPO Peninsula.

29 September D/14 - Forward element FSCC moved forward to new CP, location in Seoul, TA 2155.

Notified by Corps in the forenoon that both CAs were assigned to KUMPO Task Unit for gunfire support.

Notified by Corps of the night fires scheduled for KUMPO. Communications very poor.

30 September D/15 - Remainder of FSCC displaced forward to the new CP. Radio communications with KUMPO Task Unit non-existent from the FSCC area. Corps notified Div of the night fires KUMPO Task Units was employing. Communications with Corps very difficult. Front line positions on KUMPO not known.

1 October D/16 - Investigated hill behind FSCC for possibility of radio use. The Carrier Platoon was already operating on that location.

Called in RCT-7 Naval Gunfire Teams.

No Naval Gunfire activities.

2 October D/17 - Sent out two Bn Shore Fire Control Parties and one Regt Naval Gunfire Liaison Team from RCT-1 to act as communications and liaison teams with LtCol Hagenah with the KMCs East and North of Seoul. Situation on Kumpo not clearly known. No Naval Gunfire activities.

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3 October D/18 - No gunfire activities. Went to the top of twin peaks mountain in middle of Seoul to test communication. Could barely contact one CA using the AN/MRC-6. Could not contact personnel on Kumpo Peninsula.

4 October D/19 - Kumpo secured. All gunfire ships released by Corps. Secured all gunfire nets. Naval Gunfire Teams remained on KUMPO as Liaison teams with LtCol Harrison with KMC units who relieved 187th Infantry.

5-6 October, D/20 and D/21.

No activity. Normal routine in FSCC.

7 October - Closed CP at Seoul and moved to Ascom City.

4. Results of Naval Gunfire Support.

a. General - Due to the unsatisfactory aspects of communications and the exceptionally wide area over which the operations were conducted no accurate count of missions fired, targets destroyed, and ammunition expended was possible. Many of the missions fired were unobserved as far as direct results were concerned. Considerable numbers of missions were fired on area targets where the enemy had been seen to take cover, where the enemy was heard at night, and on areas where intelligence reports indicated the presence of large numbers of enemy. Little opportunity was presented to use Naval Gunfire in destruction missions after the initial landing was effected.

b. Illumination - Such records as were available indicated that during the first few days of the operation, over 401 rounds of 5" illuminating shells were fired. All illuminating missions were fired at odd intervals during the night. Illuminating fires seemed to have effect on our own troops and the enemy seemed reluctant to move during periods in which illuminating shells were fired.

c. Other Missions -

(1) Nearly all missions fired were deep supporting missions. Considerable numbers of air spot missions were fired for which no records were available. Such records as could be obtained indicated that of some 22 missions fired by ground spotters, using 5" AAC, 336 rounds were fired, and that during the first few days of the operation over 412 rounds of 5" AAC were fired. These were usually neutralization missions fired on troops reported in an area and on an occasional mortar or artillery position. Records on six inch missions were very meager and indicated a total of 209 rounds fired, most of which were used on harassing fires. Records indicated that over 1093 rounds of 8" HC were expended during the first few days of the operation. Many more rounds of 8" ammunition were expended in long range supporting fires, before the end of the operation. On at least two nights during the second week of the operation, 8" AP ammunition was expended by the cruiser firing because it had used up all of its HC prior to withdrawing for resupplying its ammunition.

(2) It is interesting to note that during the period 19-21 September when no supporting naval gunfire could be brought to bear on the Kumbo Peninsula that considerable night activity developed and was followed by early morning attacks. On 21 September when night harassing fires were resumed with 8" LC ammunition night activity was greatly reduced and early morning attacks ceased in the area. The enemy appeared to have a very healthy respect for night harassing fires and was particularly anxious to avoid 8" harassing fires.

5. Comments and Recommendations

a. Supply and Maintenance of Radio Equipment

Supply and maintenance initially was required to be handled along the chain of command. This resulted in delays in requests for equipment, or repairs for radios that could not be accomplished at a lower echelon. In one instance it developed that the Signal Officer of one RCT was "short stopping" supplies such as batteries and a replacement radio and diverting these supplies to infantry use. This was discovered and a system was instituted in which all requests for NGF supplies and replacements were sent to CO, ANGLICO, who then made service runs to handle the situation. This seemed to work much more satisfactorily.

b. Supply of non-signal items to Naval Gunfire Teams

The basic supply of rations, gasoline, clothing and PX supplies at times developed into a problem. With the 5th Marines who had had an ANGLICO Detachment operating with them for some time this proved to be no problem. With RCT-1 which had been recently organized, the Naval Gunfire Team did not fair so well. There was a great reluctance to provide gasoline, and rations, and other supplies were even harder to obtain. It was necessary upon occasion to carry gasoline to these teams. RCT-7 was the most recently organized and the Naval Gunfire Teams with that RCT reported great difficulties in obtaining any supplies from the RCT. It is felt that continued operations together will tend to minimize these problems and that as the RCTs become accustomed to supplying the attached units this problem will disappear.

c. Changing of Call Signs

During the operation, call signs on radio nets were changed at least three times. On one occasion the change was effective before it was received. Insufficient copies of the new call signs were put out to the using units, with the result that operators were not familiar with the new calls as they went into effect. This resulted in the immediate compromising of the new calls by radio operators receiving an old call and then announcing over the radio what the new call should be and informing the other operator that his call was not "BLADE" anymore but that it was now "DUDLEY". It is recommended that when it becomes absolutely necessary to put out new call signs that such lists be published far enough in advance and in sufficient numbers for all using echelons to receive them before they go into effect.

d. The MAW Radio

The radio MAW was provided to all naval gunfire teams. This radio was presumably provided to enable communications with spotting aircraft. Two channels were provided for "Air Spot" usage. However,

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crystals for neither of these channels were available. All teams carried these M.Ws and reported that they did not use them once and that they were nothing but excess baggage.

The Naval Gunfire Teams unanimously recommended that these radios be deleted from the T/E. The Division Naval Gunfire Officer concurs.

c. Inadequacies of present T/E Radios

Present radio equipment, AN/MRC-6, AN/GRC-9 and SCR-300 proved entirely inadequate as far as communications were concerned. Communications were generally unsatisfactory as has been mentioned before.

(1) The AN/MRC-6 is used primarily on the Attack Force Naval Gunfire Control Net. Frequently it was able to receive transmissions but was unable to transmit to the other station trying to communicate with it. Even then it was not always possible to receive the other stations on the net. It is considered that the AN/MRC-6 radio transmitter does not have sufficient power to transmit satisfactorily over distances up to 20 miles and terrain as was encountered in this operation.


It is recommended that, if the Marine Corps expects to conduct many operations of the nature of this one, that the AN/MRC-6 be replaced in the Naval Gunfire Teams with a radio of more power for both transmitting and receiving, such as the SCR-193.

(2) The SCR-300 was entirely inadequate for communications over the Division Naval Gunfire Net due to both range and terrain restrictions. It is considered that there are two solutions to this problem. These solutions may be stated as follows:

(a) Provide a new and more powerful portable radio set capable of operating at least 20 miles or more over hilly or mountainous country, for the use of all Naval Gunfire Teams operating on the Division Naval Gunfire Net.

(b) If no suitable equipment can be produced it is believed that the following is feasible using present equipment. Break the Division Naval Gunfire Net at the Regimental level. Provide each Regimental Team with an extra SCR-300 and provide three (3) more frequencies for Naval Gunfire use in order to establish three new nets - one for each Regiment consisting of the Regimental Team as net control with each of its three (3) Bns operating direct to regiments on that net. The last solution would reduce the number of stations on the Division Naval Gunfire Net from 13 to 4 thereby providing much more rapid communications between regiments and Division. By careful selection of set locations, it is believed that communications could be satisfactorily maintained. In addition, the Regimental radio would be much closer to its Battalion's radios and would be able to maintain better contacts with the battalions. Using separate nets as described here, important communications between Regiment and battalion could be handled simultaneously in all Regiments. This would relieve much of the congestion of the present Division Naval Gunfire net when it is functioning.

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Proposed new Division and Regimental NGF Nets.

(3) The radio AN/GRC-9 does not have a sufficiently powerful transmitter to operate over distances up to 20 miles over terrain as was encountered in this operation. While it is admitted that the AN/GRC-9 is portable it is not readily useable while being man packed. It is not capable of continuous use while being carried. The operator must stop, assemble the radio and generator, and then retune both before he can operate. This all consumes time that might otherwise be used in running a fire mission while the Bn is on the move.

(a) It is recommended that a radio with such characteristics as high portability, greater transmitting power and capable of being operated continuously be provided for the use of all spotting Teams requiring a radio for transmitting fire mission.

(b) In the event that such a radio cannot be obtained, it is recommended that a cargo jeep be provided for each Bn Spotting Team in which to mount the Vibrator Pack along with the AN/GRC-9 to permit continuous operation while on the move.

f. Inadequacies of remoting equipment

Present remoting equipment for all three radios was found to be somewhat less than satisfactory. Due to the locations which were selected for CPs and the location of the FSCC or SAC in the CP it was very often necessary to locate radio sets at considerable distances, in some cases up to one half mile, from the CP in order to gain better communications. These distances were usually beyond the range of remote units presently provided. This may have been a combination of poorly operating equipment and inexperienced operators. The SCR-300, remoting unit, would not operate satisfactorily through the AN/TTC-1 equipment in the FSCC.

It is recommended that remote units capable of continuous satisfactory operation over distances of up to 1 miles between radio and remote be provided.

g. Transportation Inadequacies

It is considered that inadequate transportation is allotted the Naval Gunfire Teams. Personnel packing radios, generators, wire reels, telephones and equipment cannot be expected to carry their own personal packs at the same time and still operate efficiently. Personal packs when packed as called for in the administrative order impose a load of about 60 pounds on the individual. This is too heavy to expect a man to carry and fight at the same time. Add to this the weight of various communication man packs and the resultant load is more than a man can adequately handle. The procedure of dropping the lower half of the pack on the beach to be loaded in some conveyance to follow at a later date does relieve the man of some of the weight he has to carry but is not satisfactory solution for the problem. Where this was done, the entire pack sections were lost in some cases, and in others packs were broken into and rifled of their contents. Resupply of the items lost at this particular time is usually not practical. In fast moving situations, it is desirable that men have only their combat equipment to carry.

It is recommended that each of the Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams and Spotting Teams be assigned a one quarter ton 4x4 truck and a one quarter ton trailer to provide a means of transporting heavy packs and equipment, in order that they may be able to devote more attention to providing the communications required.

h. Employment of Naval Gunfire Teams when beyond Range of Naval Gunfire

In this operation, most of the units were beyond range of naval gunfire support by D-3, and all were beyond range by D-10. No doctrine has been set up or suggested as to what use will be made of NGF teams when the troops are beyond range. In this operation, 2 Regimental NGF Liaison Teams and 4 Bn Shore Fire Control Parties were sent out with Korean units as liaison and communication teams where they rendered invaluable service. The other use to which these personnel may be put is that of replacement of communication personnel that have been lost in action throughout the Division.

None of the schools or USF publications deal with this problem at all, and when it arrives Naval Officers who have been trained for liaison duties only become suddenly quite perturbed because "this isn't what they were trained for". It is recommended that some sort of doctrine be established concerning this problem and that such doctrine be taught in the schools and be entered in the USF series of publications as such.

i. Use of CW in operations

During the past operation, very few of the operators were able to use CW. In a few cases where interference was high and voice communications were impossible the spotting teams shifted to CW and were able to conduct fire missions immediately. It is believed however that insufficient use was made of CW in this operation. The main reason for this being that few of the operators were qualified CW operators. This was a result mainly of filling up teams to T/O strength with men capable of operating voice radio and not much more. This was done as a result of a scarcity of qualified personnel initially.

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It is recommended that more attention be given to the CW qualifications of personnel assigned to Naval Gunfire Teams and that once assigned that more attention be given to maintaining the CW training at a useable level.

j. Front Line Information

Throughout the operation, front line information was at a premium. This was due partially to very rapidly moving front lines with the resulting confusion, to the lack of adequate communication, and a lack of appreciation on the part of liaison personnel of the importance of keeping higher echelons informed of the local front lines and situations.

It is believed that this condition will improve with additional training and experience.

k. Effectiveness of Naval Gunfire

(1) Naval Gunfire seemed very effective throughout the operation. It had a deterring and demoralizing effect on the enemy when called down on top of him. When used at night either as illumination or harassing fires it has a tendency to cause the enemy to limit his movements, and in cases caused a cessation of early morning enemy attacks. Naval gunfire was quite effective in forcing the dispersal of large groups of enemy and where used against bodies of troops effected considerable casualties. As a rule, naval gunfire when used, greatly hampered and limited the enemy's movements and development of the situation.

(2) The effect of naval gunfire on our own troops was very good. When illuminating fires were employed our troops could see and spot enemy movements in the area of illumination and this relieved the tension caused by not being able to see what was happening and of straining both eyes and ears in the darkness. When used during the daylight hours it gave the troops a great psychological lift.

1. Doctrine as set forth in USF 60 and 66 seems to be adequate and effective with the exception of the recommendations regarding radio nets as set forth in (c) above.

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HqBn, 1stMarDiv,
(Rein), FMF
Hungnam, Korea
9Dec50

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Subj: Special Action Report for period 29Aug50 to 7Oct50
inclusive

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

This report describes the planning, logistical build-up, movement to the objective area, and the participation of this Battalion in the Amphibious Assault at Inchon, Korea, and the subsequent action up to and including the capture of Kimpo Airport and Seoul, Korea. The report covers the period 29 August, 1950, to 7 October, 1950, both dates inclusive. During the period covered this battalion was assigned the mission of furnishing administrative and logistical support, and personnel for the security of the Division Command Post. In addition, the Battalion was required to process, re-equip and resupply all replacements and returning casualties who needed any type of equipment or supplies.

The next higher echelon was the 1st Marine Division, FMF.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Organic

UNIT	STRENGTH		COMMANDER
	USMC	USM	
Headquarters Battalion	115/850	9/20	LtCol. M. T. STARR
Headquarters Company	101/606	9/18	Maj. F. SIMPSON
Military Police Company	7/128	0/0	Capt. J.H. GRIFFIN
Reconnaissance Company	7/116	0/2	Capt. K.J. HOUGHTON (Relieved by 1stLt. R.E. CROSSMAN on 19Sep50)

(b) Attached Units

	USA		
163rd Counter Intelligence Corp Detachment	7/8		Capt. M.F. DOUGHERTY
441st Military Intelligence Security Detachment	5/12		1stLt. F.F. ASANO

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Preliminary planning consisted mostly of plans for the defense of the Division Command Post and the messing and supply of personnel of the Command Post.

(a) Operational Planning

No operational planning, other than the above, was

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carried out. The Military Police Company and the Reconnaissance Company were assigned to the operational control of the Division by Operation Order #2-50 which covered the amphibious assault.

(b) Personnel Planning

Personnel planning began prior to movement overseas and included the build-up of the Battalion by personnel from the Headquarters Battalion, Second Marine Division. This additional personnel brought the entire Battalion to full war strength, less one Platoon each of Reconnaissance Company and Military Police Company and less one section of the Division Band which were at the time attached to the First Provisional Marine Brigade in Korea.

On 25 July, 1950, the Reconnaissance Company, while still at Camp Pendleton, received orders to the Korean Theater. The orders specified the strength of the Company to be embarked at two officers and twenty seven enlisted. The remainder of the Company was transferred to Headquarters Company and kept intact. The Reconnaissance Company departed Camp Pendleton on 29 July, 1950, via MATS. Upon arrival in Japan it was embarked aboard an APD, the USS HORACE A BASS, and carried out several missions as a raiding and reconnaissance party, operating up and down the East and West coasts of Korea. The Company rejoined the Battalion at Camp Sakai, Japan, on 5 September, 1950, and the Reconnaissance personnel previously assigned Headquarters Company rejoined their parent Company. The Company was then up to full war strength less the detachment with the Brigade.

The Military Police Company was at full war strength less the detachment with the Brigade.

The Headquarters Company was approximately ten percent over strength despite the fact that one section of the Division Band was with the Brigade.

Division Operation Order #2-50 indicated that the Division would be joined enroute to the target area by the First Provisional Marine Brigade, bringing the entire Division up to war strength, less one Regimental Combat Team (7th Marines), for the assault; the staff of the First Provisional Marine Brigade would be embarked as the Assistant Division Command Group; upon landing at the target area the detachments of Reconnaissance Company and Military Police Company and the one section of the Band would revert to their parent units bringing these units to full war strength.

A Division Administrative Center was established on 10 September, 1950, at Camp Carver, Kobe, Japan. Attached to the Administrative Center were 1 officer and 3 enlisted of the Battalion Headquarters and 9 officers and 64 enlisted from the Division Staff.

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(c) Command Post Supply Planning

Supply planning provided for storage of all camp equipment, personal foot lockers and seabags, including all but 10 days of class II expendable supplies at Kobe. It was further planned to ship these items to the Battalion in turn-around shipping to arrive at the target area within two weeks after Dog-Day.

(d) Motor Transport Planning

The combat loading of the vehicles was planned and executed in preparation for loading out.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

There were no rehearsals. Training consisted mostly of instructions regarding Command Post security, uniforms, traits, habits, and manner of fighting of the enemy.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The Battalion arrived in Kobe, Japan, on four different ships, USNS WEIGEL, USNS BUCKNER, USNS MEIGS, and USNS MARINE PHOENIX, on 29 August, 29 August, 1 September, and 2 September respectively. Upon arrival all personnel were sent to Camp Sakai, near Osaka, Japan, except for a few personnel remaining at the docks for unloading and reloading ships, and those members of the Division staff connected with this work.

The combat loading and embarkation planning for the projected amphibious assault was begun immediately.

The Division Commander and the general staff, consisting of 17 officers and 8 enlisted had flown to Tokyo, Japan, arriving there on 19 and 22 August, and had commenced the operational and logistical planning for the assault at Inchon. This group boarded the USS MT MCKINLEY (AGC 7) in Tokyo on 22 August and arrived at Kobe on 5 September.

The Battalion was fully occupied during the loading and embarkation phase, 29 August-10 September, unloading, sorting, and combat loading ships. Due to the exceptionally short time allowed for completion of this task it was necessary to work all personnel exceedingly long hours. The situation was further aggravated by a typhoon which hit the dock area and Osaka on 3 September, 1950. Much equipment was damaged but only a negligible amount actually lost. However, work on the docks was delayed about two days because of the damage by the typhoon.

The Battalion, less the Administrative Center, embarked on 9 and 10 September, 1950, on assigned shipping as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>NO. OF PERS.</u>
USS MT MCKINLEY (AGC 7)	Division Command Group	36/86

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<u>SHIP</u>	<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>NO. OF PERS.</u>
USS ACHERUAR (AKA 53)	Battalion Motor Transport	4/39
	Reconnaissance Company	6/91
	Reproduction and Photographic Section	3/30
USS GEORGE CLYMER (APA 27)	Division and Battalion Staff	30/274
	Military Police Company	4/57
USS CYRUS NOBLE (APA 218)	Division Postal Section	0/5
USS TOLEDO	Division G-2	1/0
LST 1138	Traffic Platoon att to 1st Marines	1/28

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Due to expectations of another typhoon all ships sailed ahead of schedule in the early morning of 11 September, 1950.

Upon sailing, troops were informed of the target area and briefed on the details of the assault. Troops were further briefed as to Command Post, defense, uniforms, insignia and customs of the enemy.

The Battalion arrived in the transport area on 14 September, 1950, (D-Day minus one) and began preparations for disembarking. On 12 September, 1950, the First Provisional Marine Brigade and all organizations or detachments reverted to their parent organizations in the Division in accordance with Commanding General, 1st Marine Division Message 100202Z of September, 1950. Personnel of the Brigade Headquarters Company were transferred to the Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. One platoon of Military Police joined administratively from the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and was attached to the Fifth Marines for operational control.

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase

15Sep: Two platoons of Military Police Company, one with the Fifth Marines and one with the First Marines, landed on D-Day with the organizations to which they were attached.

The Assistant Division Commander's Group landed on Wolmi-do Island at H-Hour, 1730.

The Division Command Post remained aboard the USS MT MC KINLEY (AGC 7).

16Sep: The remainder of Military Police Company landed at 0600.

The Battalion Commander and Staff and a part of the Division Special Staff disembarked at 1430, but failed to reach shore until 0900, 17 September, 1950.

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The Division Command Group and the remainder of the Division Special Staff commenced landing from the Command Ship.

Reconnaissance Company, less a small detachment, landed and was assigned the mission of screening the right flank of the Division. The Company conducted patrols in this area and exposed large caches of enemy arms, ammunition, and explosives. No enemy were engaged. The Company was under the operational control of the First Marines.

Military Police Company established a prisoner of war stockade in Inchon. They also furnished traffic control on the Division Main Supply Route.

Division Special Services Section remained aboard the USS CLYMER as a part of the ship's platoon.

b. Exploitation Phase

17Sep: Division Command Group and Division Special Staff completed landing.

Upon arrival ashore the Battalion Command Post was established at the Division Command Post. Upon arrival thereat and under the direction of the Division Headquarters Commandant, Battalion elements immediately, with personnel available, set up a perimeter defense. The Battalion defended the north, west, and a portion of the south sector of the Command Post area. The remainder was defended by the 1st Signal Battalion and VMO-6. One section of the Division Band and the rocket teams from the Headquarters Commandant Section were implaced on the perimeter the first night. Thereafter the rocket teams were held in reserve in the center of the Command Post area due to the number of tank approaches available to the enemy. No enemy fire was received in this Command Post.

Reconnaissance Company continued to carry out its assigned mission of screening the right flank of the Division.

Military Police Company continued their operation of the prisoner of war stockade in Inchon, and the traffic control on the Division Main Supply Route.

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces in Korea visited the Division Command Post and the prisoner of war stockade.

18Sep: Reconnaissance Company was relieved of its assigned mission by the 32nd Infantry Regiment reinforced by the 73rd Tank Battalion.

The galley was set up and began serving hot food.

19Sep: Remainder of Division and Battalion elements completed disembarking.

Perimeter defense of the Command Post was continued by the Band Section and Battalion personnel.

Reconnaissance Company arrived in Command Post at 0130, pending assignment to the Fifth Marines for operational and tactical control. At 1230, the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, directed the Reconnaissance Company to reconnoiter

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the area across the Han River in the vicinity of Haen-ju Village. Upon successful completion of this mission the remaining personnel were to land, join the reconnoitering party, and seize the ground adjacent to the village. The Company Commander, Captain Kenneth HOUGHTON, took a patrol of 13 men, swam the Han River, reconnoitered the enemy beach and the village, and, sighting no enemy signalled the remainder of the Company, embarked in LVT's, to begin moving across the river. At this time the reconnaissance party and the main landing force were taken under intense and accurate small arms, artillery and mortar fire from a large group of enemy located on the high ground of the right flank of the beach. This prohibited the landing. Casualties sustained were Private First Class Robert L. BOWERS, Jr., USMC, killed in action and Captain Kenneth J. HOUGHTON, USMC, wounded in action. The company was removed from the area at 0500, 20 September, 1950.

The Assistant Division Commander with other members of the Division Staff, including the Headquarters Commandant, Deputy Chief of Staff, Assistant G-1, and Signal Officer, reconnoitered the area around Kimpo Airport for a suitable Division Command Post site.

20Sep: The Division Command Post was displaced to an abandoned Army dependents housing area, approximately one mile south of Kimpo Airport.

Battalion elements displaced forward commencing this date. The displacement was accomplished by the Battalion Motor Transport Platoon with augmentation from the Motor Transport Battalion.

One Band Section was organized into four machine gun squads, and with personnel of the Battalion and Division Headquarters were placed on the perimeter, the rocket teams being held in reserve.

The crossing of the Han River was executed in force by the Fifth Marines with the Reconnaissance Company attached. The Reconnaissance Company carried out normal assigned missions with the Fifth Marines in the approach to Seoul. During daylight hours they conducted numerous patrols for the purpose of determining enemy strength and location of the enemy and also performed normal infantry duty with the regiment. During darkness they were assigned to the security of the Regimental Command Post.

Military Police Company was relieved of the prisoner of war stockade at Inchon by the X Corps and commenced displacement to the new Command Post.

21-28Sep: The mess hall was set up and commenced serving hot food.

During this period normal administrative functions of the Battalion were carried out. Unit Diaries were current by 24 September, 1950.

Sporadic artillery or mortar rounds were received in the Command Post area, however no injuries were sustained from enemy fire in the Command Post.

The first mail was received in the Command Post on 22 September, 1950.

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One traffic platoon of Military Police Company remained attached to each regiment of the Division. The Headquarters and Police Platoons established a prisoner of war stockade in the Command Post and during this period processed approximately twenty-nine hundred prisoners of war.

The Division Administrative Center arrived in the Command Post on 24 September, 1950.

Fifteen man security patrols were sent out daily. On one occasion they found much enemy ammunition and arms and received nine avowed Communist civilians from the citizens of one village.

Hot showers were provided commencing 24 September, 1950.

The weather was mostly clear but very cool at night.

Numerous personnel returning from hospitals began reporting to Division Headquarters. The Headquarters Battalion was charged with billeting, messing, and equipping and transporting these personnel to their parent units. The Battalion joined and transferred eleven officers and three hundred twenty-eight enlisted replacements, and also processed six hundred thirty casualties who were not joined.

29Sep: The Division Command Post was displaced to Seoul and set up in a Japanese barracks area on the south edge of the city. The Command Post opened at 1600 this date. The displacement was accomplished by the Battalion Motor Transport Platoon augmented by DUKW's which forded the Han River downstream from the pontoon bridge which had been set up by the engineers.

Large amounts of American-made ammunition and individual equipment were found at this Command Post, which had evidently been abandoned at the withdrawal of the South Korean forces from the area. Small amounts of Russian-made ammunition and equipment were also found in the Command Post area.

29Sep: Reconnaissance Company reverted to Division control on 29 September, 1950, reported to the Command Post at 2200 and went into bivouac in the Command Post on that date.

Military Police Company continued the support of infantry regiments with one platoon attached to each regiment. Military Police also patrolled Seoul.

The Battalion mess hall was set up and operating upon the opening of the Command Post.

The Military Police Company established and maintained a prison in Seoul and interned in this prison all prisoners of war captured by the Marine Corps elements.

On 29 September, 1950, Captain Edwin RIVES, USMC, Air Observer, was killed when his aircraft was struck by anti-aircraft fire and his plane crashed behind enemy lines. The body was retrieved by advancing Marines on 1 October, 1950.

30Sep: Reconnaissance Company established security at the American Embassy building in Seoul and set up one platoon on the high ground at the north of the Division Command Post for flank security.

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The Division Exchange opened a store in this Command Post and the Division Special Services Section opened a theatre and provided movies and one stage show presentation by Korean entertainers.

The weather grew progressively cooler at nights but was comfortable during the day. Small wood stoves were found in the Command Post area and were put to use by all personnel.

1-6Oct: The Battalion was located in the Division Command Post which was located in an abandoned Japanese Military Barracks on the southern edge of Seoul.

Reconnaissance Company was in bivouac in the Command Post area and was assigned the mission of the security of the American Embassy in Seoul. A force of two squads was maintained at the Embassy for this purpose. One platoon was employed on the high ground just north of the Command Post for general security from that flank. The remainder of the Company was occupied with overhauling the Company's equipment.

Military Police Company continued to patrol Seoul and the Division Main Supply Route. The Company maintained a prison in the City of Seoul through which were processed 909 prisoners of war. One traffic platoon was attached to each infantry regiment for operational control. Company Headquarters was located in the Division Command Post area.

The Battalion Headquarters continued normal routine.

The Battalion mess provided hot food. A mess was set up for officers adjacent to the enlisted mess.

Hot showers were available.

No enemy fire was received in the Command Post area.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. CATES, visited the Command Post on 2 October, 1950, and remained until 4 October, 1950.

On 6 October, 1950, the Military Police Company was relieved of the operation of the prisoner of war stockade in Seoul by X Corps. The Company displaced to Ascom City, Korea, and continued to furnish traffic control on the Division Main Supply Route.

7Oct: The Inchon-Seoul operation was officially ended.

The Division Command Post displaced to Ascom City, Korea, about 8 miles east of Inchon, and officially opened thereat at 1600 local time.

The displacement was accomplished by the Battalion Motor Transport Platoon with augmenting DUKW's. Due to traffic congestion on the only bridge across the Han River it was necessary to obtain DUKW's which forded the river.

Reconnaissance Company, having been relieved of security at the American Embassy in Seoul and security of the Command Post north flank this date, displaced to the Division Command Post at Ascom City.

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Military Police Company furnished traffic control in the dock area at Inchon and continued the patrolling of the Division Main Supply Route.

The Battalion Headquarters continued normal routine at the Command Post in Seoul.

1st Marine Division Embarkation Order #2-50 was received. All elements of the Battalion were ordered to be embarked with Embarkation Group Able with the exception of the Assistant Division Commander's Group, which was to be embarked with Group Charlie, and three traffic platoons one of which was to be embarked with each Regimental Combat Team.

8. ENEMY

Units under operational control of the Battalion were not in contact with the enemy (See Paragraph 7). All information regarding enemy organization, strength, deployment, probable order of battle, and equipment was covered in Division directives and no additional information is available.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

In addition to carrying out its mission during the campaign the Battalion received invaluable experience and knowledge regarding actual operations in the field. Administering the Battalion was much delayed at first by Command Post displacement. However, by the last displacement only a very few hours were lost from normal routine due to displacement. The Battalion Administrative Section with the Division Administrative Center was much delayed by such moves.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Supply

1. Comments

The mission of the Supply Section of this Battalion is to furnish thorough and timely logistical support to the Division Headquarters and the Reconnaissance and Military Police Companies. It is considered that generally the Supply Section was able to carry out its assigned mission, but encountered considerable difficulty and delay because of the additional work load caused by the additional personnel in the Division Command Post and the casualties who had to be clothed and equipped. The average strength supported in the Division Command Post was approximately fourteen hundred. During the operation the Battalion processed, clothed and equipped approximately 1000 replacements and casualties returning from hospitals. Sixty-five percent of the Class II supplies were left in Kobe with the expectation that they would be shipped in turn-around shipping to the Battalion at the Target Area within two or three weeks after the assault. These supplies were never received. The situation was further aggravated due to the loss of approximately seventy-five percent of the Class II supplies which were loaded in the assault shipping and off

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The loss was caused by the lack of port and unloading facilities beyond the control of this Battalion. (See below).

Class I - Ample water was available at all times from water points situated in the Command Post. Initially Baker type rations were adequate to a minimum degree only, due to the absence of essential components, bread and flour, for periods of up to three days. The items of boned chicken, ham chunks and dried beans were never received during the entire operation. Spices and seasonings have been received in only a few instances and then in inadequate quantities.

Class II - As stated above, approximately nine percent of the Class II supplies of the Battalion actually were received in the Target Area. Replacement supplies were not immediately available. Items of clothing, individual equipment and stationary could not be obtained in adequate quantities at any time during the operation. Generally the issuing of supplies to casualties was given first priority inasmuch as the most of them arrived with nothing except the clothes they wore, which in some cases included pajama tops and hospital house slippers.

Class III - The supplies of this property was adequate.

Class IV - The supplies of the property was not required.

Class V - The supply of this class property was inadequate.

The present Table of Organization for supply personnel in this Battalion is considered inadequate for field operations for the following reasons:

1. In this type operation the Division Command Post displaced at least once each week requiring division of the supply personnel into two echelons which caused considerable delay and greatly affected the efficiency of the section.
2. Due to the additional personnel attached to the Division Command Post who are normally expected to require logistical support by the Battalion.
3. Due to necessity for this Battalion to equip all casualties returning from hospitals and to furnish certain items of supply to all replacements.

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that additional personnel be assigned the Battalion Supply Section as indicated in Appendix 2. The difficulties encountered due to shortages of supply personnel will be further alleviated by the formation of the Casual Company as recommended herein.

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(b) Mess

1. Comments

The Battalion mess, which is normally expected to feed approximately one thousand persons fed an average of 1600 persons and at times as many as two thousand due to exceptionally large drafts of casualties and approximately three hundred others who happened to be in the Command Post on official business at meal time during this period. It is considered that the mess, although handicapped by lack of certain components of rations and displacing of the Command Post was able to carry out its mission of furnishing mess facilities to the Command Post and the portions of Military Police and Reconnaissance Company which were in the Command Post.

2. Recommendations

It is considered that with the additional personnel and mess equipment recommended for the Casual Company the Battalion Mess Section will be able to properly feed all personnel who will normally be expected to be messed in the Command Post.

(c) Motor Transport

1. Comments

The Motor Transport Section of the Battalion was able to perform its normal functions but shortages of transportation became evident which required augmentation and assignment of additional vehicles. During the displacement of the Command Post and to transport casualties augmentation was required. Additional vehicles were assigned as follows: 19 additional jeeps, 3 trailers, one ten two-wheel, 8 1/4 ton trailers, 2 300 gallon water trailers, two wheel, all in addition to the augmentation mentioned above. Even with the additional trucks cargo, 1/4 ton 4x4 there was never a sufficient number to take care of the requirements.

Military Police Company is considered to be handicapped by its lack of light combat vehicles for traffic control and posting sentinels.

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that additional vehicles as listed in Appendix I be authorized for the Battalion Motor Transport Platoon. It is further recommended that the additional Motor Transport personnel as listed in Appendix 2 be authorized the Headquarters Company for assignment to the Motor Transport Platoon.

It is recommended that the five trucks, 1 1/2 ton, 6x6, personnel carriers, currently authorized the Military Police Company, be replaced by ten trucks, 3/4 ton, 4x4, personnel carriers, and that the additional motor transport personnel listed in Appendix I be authorized the Military Police Company in order to maintain the additional vehicles requested.

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It is further recommended that it become doctrine to attach ten additional trucks 2 1/2 ton cargo, 6x6, to Headquarters Battalion beginning with the loading phase of each operation, to be combat loaded with equipment of Division Headquarters and Battalion Headquarters. These trucks would be released immediately after unloading them at the Division Command Post ashore. This would greatly facilitate proper handling of equipment and supplies and rapid movement of items of necessity to the Command Post.

(d) Administration - Administrative Center

1. Comments

As previously stated, one officer (assistant adjutant) and three enlisted men were assigned to the Division Administrative Center for maintenance of service records, health records, and most of the files. This section was displaced as frequently as the Division Command Post and was barely able to perform all of its duties due to the unstable situation, rapid and frequent moves and loss or damage of typewriters and other equipment.

Shortly after arrival ashore the Battalion was required to join and transfer 8 officers and 310 enlisted from replacement drafts which aggravated the already difficult situation.

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that the Administrative Center be established and retained at a rear air head during the entire operation.

It is further recommended that a Staff Sergeant, MOS 3413, be authorized the Battalion Headquarters in war to handle all pay matters for the section.

(3) Administration - Forward Echelon

1. Comments

Due to preparation of the Unit Diary separate from the Administrative Center Section, rapid displacement and the extra work caused by casualties, the forward echelon of the Battalion administrative section was able to carry out its functions to a minimum degree of efficiency. Submission of tactical reports was delayed due to the work load of normal administration. However, it is considered that the reports were generally of proper and accurate substance and contained beneficial information for future planning.

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that the Unit Diary be prepared in the Administrative Center and that information be channelled to that center by Company and Battalion level administrators.

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It is further recommended that an administrative trailer be designed for housing of Battalion level administrative sections in the forward area. This would greatly facilitate prompt and accurate submission of information as well as preventing damage and loss of equipment.

(f). General

1. Comments

It can be seen from this report that the manner of handling casualties and replacements during this operation was very impracticable. The additional burden placed on all sections of the Battalion considerably decreased the amount of service furnished the Division Headquarters and the two tactical companies.

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that a Casual Company be authorized the Headquarters Battalion in the War Table of Organization. Appendices 4 and 1 contain a recommended T/O and T/E for this Company.

M. T. Starr
M. T. STARR

APPENDICES:

1. Recommended Additional Equipment
2. Recommended Modifications to T/O K1987
3. Recommended Modifications to T/O K1903
4. Recommended T/O for Casual Company

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY EASY TO 1ST MARINE
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Recommended Additional Equipment:

Military Police Company

- 1 Generator, alternating current, portable, gasoline engine driven, 7.5 KW, Cycles 60.
- 10 Trucks, 3/4 ton, 4x4, plus carrier (to replace 5 trucks 1 1/2-ton).

Reconnaissance Company

No recommendations (Operationally under Division control)

Motor Transport Platoon

- 5 Trailers, 1-ton, 2 wheel, cargo.
- 2 Trailers, water, 300 gal. 2 wheel.
- 2 Trucks, 3/4 ton, 4x4, cargo.
- 10 Trailers, 1/2-ton, cargo.
- 10 Trucks, 1/2-ton, 4x4, cargo.

Increased maintenance equipment sufficient to maintain increased vehicles.

Casualty Company

- 2 Chests, typewriter, wood, small.
- 3 Chests, record, fiber, company. L. 19-3/4" W 10 1/2", H 19 1/2".
- 1 Chest, tool, company, complete.
- 2 Desk, field.
- 50 Tents, pyramidal, complete.
- 2 Tents, storage, complete (w/fly, pins & poles).
- 2 Tents, hospital ward, complete.
- 1 Chest, administrative, small.
- 3 Hooks, brush, w/handles, 11 1/2" blade.
- 3 Kits, barber, complete
- 1 Machine, computing listing, portable, hand operated, w/o stand.
- 1 Machine, numbering, 6 wheel, 8 movement.
- 3 Mauls, wood, reinforced head, w/handle, head diameter 8", length 10", length of handle 36"
- 5 Mattocks, pick, w/handle, weight 6 lb.
- 3 Paste, office, semi-liquid, w/brush or spreader, in jars, cap, oz 4 to 6.
- 3 Perforators, paper, desk, non-adjustable, 2 holes round, center to center 2 3/4".
- 4 Picks, railroad, point & Chisel end w/handle, wt 7 lbs.
- 4 Searchlights, electric portable, 6" w/4 batteries.
- 1 Sharpener, pencil.
- 5 Shovels, general purpose, long handle, plain back strap pattern, round point size #2, width of blade 9 1/2", length of blade 11 3/8", length of handle 46" to 52".
- 2 Stands, folding, field desk.
- 12 Stools, camp, folding, canvas seat 14" x 17".
- 4 Tables, folding, wood masonite top, olive green finish size 24" x 26".
- 2 Trucks, 2 1/2-ton 6x6 cargo.
- 1 Truck, 1/2-ton 4x4, cargo.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY EASY TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY EASY TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Recommended Additional Equipment:

Casualty Company (Continued):

- 1 Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, cargo.
- 2 Trailers, 1-ton, 2 wheel, water, 300 gallon, capacity.
T/A items based on level of 300 individuals.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL STARR

FREDERICK SIMPSON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

OFFICIAL:


J. A. WEATHERSPOON
Second Lieutenant, USMC,
Battalion Adjutant

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EASY EASY TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

APPENDIX 2 TO [REDACTED] TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS TO T/O K-1987

Change lines indicated to read:
(Changes underlined)

Line No.	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9
10	LtCol (BnComdr; HqComdt	0109	(1)P			0302	(1)P	
add	Maj (BnExecOff)	0109	(1)P			0109	(1)P	
Medical Section								
48	HM3							<u>(4)</u>
49	EM							<u>(5)</u>
After Line								
58 add	MSgt (GenSupplyChief)					3019		<u>(1)C</u>
add	TSgt (GenSupplyChf)					3019		<u>(1)C</u>
61	Cpl (UnitStockman)					3011		<u>(4)C</u>
128	Sgt (Motor VehicleDispatcher)					3534		<u>(2)C</u>
140	Cpl (AutoMechanic)					3516		<u>(3)C</u>
147	Cpl (Truck Driver)					3531		<u>(12)C</u>

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL STARR:

FREDERICK SIMPSON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

F. W. Simpson
F. W. SIMPSON,
Second Lieutenant, USMC,
Battalion Adjutant.

APPENDIX 3 TO MARINE BATTALION TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Recommended modifications to T/O K-1903
 Change lines indicated to read:
 (Changes underlined)

MP Company

Line	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
After line 11 add	SSgt (Motor Vehicle Dispatcher)					3534			(1)c
After line 15 add	Sgt (Automotive Mechanic)					3516			(1)
16	Cpl (Automotive Mechanic)	3516		(1)		3516			(2)
20	Cpl (Truck Driver)	3531		(1)c		3531			(6)c
40	Cpl (Truck Driver)	3531		(1)c		3531			(2)c

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL STARR:

FREDERICK SIMPSON
 Major, U. S. Marine Corps,
 Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

F. A. Simpson
 Second Lieutenant, USMC,
 Battalion Adjutant.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX EASY EASY TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT


RECOMMENDED T/O FOR CASUAL COMPANY

Line	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	Captain (Company Commander)					0109		(1)	P
	Lt (Company Execo)					0302		(1)	C
	MSgt (Sergeant Major)					0149		(1)	C
	MSgt (Infantry Chief)					0319		(1)	C
	MSgt (Infantry Unit Leader)					0316		(1)	C
	SSgt (Infantry Unit Leader)					0316		(3)	C
	Lt (Property Off)					0302	or		
						3015		(1)	C
	MSgt (Supply Chief)					3019		(1)	C
	SSgt (Unit Stockman)					3013		(1)	C
	Cpl (Unit Stockman)					3011		(2)	
	Cpl (Clerk Typist)					0143		(1)	
	Cpl (Cooks)					3371		(3)	
	Pfc (Truck Driver)					3531		(2)	C
	Cpl (Mechanic)					3516		(1)	

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEAR

FREDERICK SIMPSON
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

OFFICIAL:


J. A. WINTERS
Second Lieutenant, USMC
Battalion Adjutant.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX EASY EASY TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ANNEX FCX FCX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1st Service Battalion,
1st Marine Division, FMF,
Masan, Korea.
30 December 1950.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF.
Subj: Special Action Report for the period 28 August - 7
October 1950.
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16.

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The purpose of this report is to outline the activities of the 1st Service Battalion, 1st Marine Division, FMF during the subject period; to present problems encountered and the action taken to overcome those problems; to present comments and recommendations for consideration; and to present in some detail the operation of the subordinate organic elements of this Battalion.

b. This Battalion was assigned the mission of providing logistic support for the 1st Marine Division, FMF and attached units for Class I (Rations), Class II and IV General Supply, Class III (POL); to establish dumps for the receipt and issue of those supplies up to a depth of ten (10) miles inland from beach dumps at INCHEON; and to provide such other services as directed by higher authority.

c. The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF was the next higher designated echelon.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. The 1st Service Battalion, 1st Marine Division, FMF commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. BANKS, USMC was organized under the war strength Table of Organization R1758.

b. Upon embarkation at KOBE, Japan for the assault landing at INCHEON, this Battalion was organized as follows:

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
Battalion Commander					LtCol. Charles L. BANKS USMC
Headquarters Company	11	124	2	8	Capt. M. "L" HOLLADAY USMC
Supply Company	14	284			Capt. R.A. MOREHEAD USMC
Support Company	4	223			Capt. R.L. SINCLAIR USMC
Maintenance Platoon	1	42			CWO. J.R. MALONE USMC

9 Officers, 147 enlisted personnel USMC and 4 USN enlisted serving with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade prior to the arrival of the 1st Marine Division, FMF in Korea, were administratively joined on 12 September and joined this Battalion physically after the landing at INCHEON.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

a. Preliminary planning was conducted enroute from the United States to Kobe by this command with the purpose in mind of unloading and segregating Division supplies and equipment carried by this Battalion in the minimum of time and with the

ANNEX FOX FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

least confusion. Toward that end, data was compiled to indicate the various ships on which supplies and equipment were loaded and the tonnage and cube by Class on each ship. In addition, a Battalion Memorandum was published assigning supervisory unloading responsibility to various individuals to insure rapid and expeditious unloading and segregation of Division Class I, III and II and IV General Supplies carried by this organization and enroute from the United States. This assignment of supervisory responsibility greatly aided in the expeditious unloading, segregation, and delivery of supplies to the appropriate staging areas for reloading for the support of the Division for the invasion of INCHON.

b. Planning for the logistic support to be furnished the 1st Marine Division by this Battalion was carried on concurrently with unloading and reloading at Kobe and also while enroute to the objective area. In this respect, landing serials were prepared and furnished to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division while at Kobe and 1st Service Battalion Administrative Order 1-50 was published to guide subordinate units and to provide them with information on the missions assigned in support of the 1st Marine Division, ashore.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS.

a. Enroute to Kobe, Japan from the United States, this organization conducted daily schools aboard ship for both officers and enlisted. The enlisted training program consisted of instruction in basic military subjects with emphasis on small arms instruction and map reading. Due to limited facilities for instructional purposes, an adequate training program to cover all subjects in detail could not be undertaken. The instructions so received by the personnel during this period greatly aided in their conduct ashore during the subject campaign.

b. The officers' school was conducted daily with the purpose of acquainting all officers in the Battalion with the organization and operation of the staff sections and subordinate units within the Battalion.

c. No training was conducted during the loading period at Kobe as all personnel were being fully utilized in unloading and loading of Division supplies and equipment for the operation against INCHON.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

a. This organization arrived at Kobe, Japan on the USNS MEIGS on 1 September 1950 and unloading of Battalion organic supplies and equipment was immediately commenced. This unloading was completed at 1430 on 2 September 1950.

b. In accordance with Division Embarkation Order 1-50, this Battalion made preparation for the out-loading of assigned shipping with Class I (Rations), Class II and IV General Supplies and Class III (POL) for support of the 1st Marine Division, FME and attached units for the invasion of INCHON.

c. In order to insure that assigned loading was accomplished on schedule, a control office under the cognizance of the Battalion S-4 was established on the USNS MEIGS for the purpose of coordinating, supervising and controlling the loading and unloading of Battalion organic

ANNEX FOX FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

supplies and equipment, and those classes of Division supplies for which the Service Battalion was responsible. The control office was also charged with the responsibility for the preparation and prompt submission of all reports required by higher headquarters on the progress of loading and unloading.

d. During the loading phase, some difficulty was encountered in preparing Class I and III supplies for loading aboard various ships within the Embarkation Groups as some of the Group staffs were not present in the Kobe area. In addition to the above, supplies to be loaded were arriving from the United States which called for unloading and reloading simultaneously. Despite the fact that supplies were dispersed over a wide area of the Kobe waterfront, the Ration and Fuel Platoons, Supply Company completed loading of all required Class I and III supplies to meet sailing schedules.

e. The loading of Division Class II and IV supplies was accomplished on schedule. As in the case of Classes I and III, unloading and reloading was being carried on simultaneously. As ships arrived from the United States, supervisory personnel were assigned to the various ships to insure that loss of time in segregation of cargo being unloaded would be kept to an absolute minimum. The main obstacle to a more expeditious unloading and outloading of Class II and IV General Supplies was the condition in which the supplies were being received off the ships. A good many of the boxes and crates being unloaded had either been damaged through handling or through pilferage thus necessitating repacking, recrating, and remarking of those supplies before they could be reloaded on assault shipping. Despite this extra work, loading of Division Class II and IV supplies was completed at 1100 on 10 September 1950.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA.

a. During the movement to the objective area, daily critiques were held by the Battalion Commander for the purpose of briefing the officers and NCO's of the 1st pay grade. These briefings consisted of talks on the INCHON area, plans for the Battalion operation ashore, sanitary and health conditions in the INCHON-SEKUL area and discussion on orders and memoranda received from Higher authority. After each briefing, officers and NCO's mustered their respective units and briefed them on the information received at the meetings. The Commanding Officer stressed the importance of passing on all available information to the enlisted personnel of the command so that they would be acquainted with the situation, and would be able to more intelligently serve the Battalion ashore.

b. This Battalion arrived in the objective area in the early afternoon of 15 September 1950 and was prepared to land on order.

7. OPERATIONS.

15 September - 1st Service Battalion, 1st Marine Division, FMF arrived off INCHON, Korea and commenced preparations for debarkation on order.

ANNEX FOX-FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

16 September - Commanding Officer, elements of Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Section of Supply Company and the Fuel and Ration Platoons debarked at 0620 and landed over RED Beach, INCHON at 0920. At 1000, the Battalion Command Post was established ashore at TA 9447 How and at 1400, a Class I and III Supply Dump was established at TA 9447 How with the first issue from the Dumps being made at 1700. A site for the 1st Marine Division Cemetery, Inchon was selected by representatives of the Battalion and Division Headquarters and approved by the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

17 September - Balance of the Battalion debarked and landed with the exception of one hundred fifty (150) men left aboard the USS UNION AND USS SEMINOLE to complete unloading of those ships. By 1200, Class I and III Dumps Number One were in full operation providing both supply point and unit distribution.

18 September - Class I and III supply Dump Number two (2) was established in the vicinity of PULCHAN, Korea for issue of rations and fuel to Division units. One officer and three (3) enlisted from the Salvage Platoon, Support Company set up a salvage dump at Dump Number Two (2) and commenced salvage operations. The first dead were interred in the 1st Marine Division Cemetery on this date.

19 September - The Battalion Command Post displaced from its location at INCHON to a location in the vicinity of KIMPO Airfield. Class I and III Dump Number three (3) was established in the KIMPO Airfield area and issues of rations and fuel to Division units was commenced. Salvage operations by the Salvage Platoon continued during the period with salvaged items being returned to respective service units for reissue.

20 September - During the period, the General Supply Platoon, Supply Company, commenced movement of winter underwear from Combat Service Group warehouses at INCHON to establish a Class II and IV Dump in the vicinity of KIMPO Airfield.

21 September - Class II Dump Number 1 was established in the vicinity of KIMPO Airfield for the issue of Class II clothing and general supplies as available. Ships' Platoons left aboard the USS UNION and USS SEMINOLE debarked and joined the Battalion ashore. Distribution of Class I and III supplies to river crossing sites in support of the 1st Marine Division continued during the period.

22 September - Class I and III Dumps Number Four were established and placed into operation at YONG DONG PO. During the period, the Battalion was engaged in making unit distribution of sweaters to front line units.

23 September - The Laundry Platoon, Support Company established laundry and shower facilities in the vicinity of YONG DONG PO.

ANNEX FOX FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

24 September - The Division Bakery operated by the Bakery Platoon, Support Company, 1st Service Battalion was established at YONG DONG PO. Class I and III Dumps Number 5 were established by the Ration and Fuel Platoons, Supply Company north of the Han River in the vicinity of ferry crossing BAEER. Class I and III Dumps Number Two were secured at 2000 and all supplies moved to forward Division dumps.

25 September - Class I and III Dumps Number 6 were established by the Ration and Fuel Platoons, Supply Company north of the Han River in the outskirts of SEOUL. Division Bakery commenced production of bread.

26 September - The Battalion Command Post was displaced from its location at KIMPO Airfield to YONG DONG PO. The first Division supply train arrived at the YONG DONG PO railhead from INCHON and unloading by Service Battalion personnel was commenced immediately. The General Supply Platoon, Supply Company commenced operations at YONG DONG PO and requisitioned supplies for its Dump in accordance with Division Supply Bulletin 30-50.

27 September - Normal Battalion functions were performed during the period. In addition, the Typewriter Repair Section, Maintenance Platoon commenced operations on an "on call" basis. During the period, the Division Bakery commenced issue of bread to Division and attached units.

28-29 September - Normal Battalion operations were conducted.

30 September - Class I and III Dumps Number Seven (7) and a Salvage Dump were established in the city of SEOUL for supply and service to Division units. The 1st Marine Division Cemetery, INCHON operated by the Graves Registration Section, Support Company was redesignated the United Nations Cemetery, Inshon, Korea.

1 October - Normal Battalion operations of supply and service conducted during this period.

2 October - Class I and III Dumps Number Three, Five and Six were closed at 0900 per Commanding General, 1st Marine Division message 011153Z.

3 October - One laundry unit and one shower unit was displaced from the Han River and set up in the area occupied by the 7th Marines.

5 October - Company Commander, Supply Company with the Platoon Leaders of the Fuel and Ration Platoons conducted a reconnaissance in the INCHON area of locations assigned by the Division G-4 for establishment of Class I and III supply dumps for support of Division troops returning to that area.

6 October - Class I and III Dumps Number Nine established at INCHON. A laundry and shower unit was installed and placed in operation in INCHON for service to Division units assembling in that area. Battalion commenced preparations for movement from YONG DONG PO to the INCHON area.

ANNEX FOX FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

7 October - Battalion continued routine operations and also preparation of its equipment and supplies for movement to the INCHON area.

8. ENEMY

a. During the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL action, this Battalion was credited with the capture of 15 enemy prisoners of war. On 16 September, one (1) Korean Naval Lieutenant was captured at the selected site of the Battalion Command Post at INCHON by the Battalion S-3 and turned over to Military Police authorities for disposition. At Dump Number Two (FULCHAN), isolated groups of bypassed enemy were captured and turned over to the Division POW stockade. During the period of the operation, Battalion installations were subject to intermittent enemy small arms, mortar and artillery fire. No damage was done to any installation operated by this Battalion due to enemy action. This Battalion was not in contact with any organized enemy resistance during the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS.

a. The flexibility of organization of the various subordinate units of the Battalion enabled this organization to furnish supplies and services to Division units in accordance with assigned missions and in this way, aided the Division in accomplishing the mission assigned to it for the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. During the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation, the organic motor transport of this Battalion was used to move supplies from rear supply points to forward Division dumps, and to make unit distribution of supplies to units and for normal housekeeping functions of the Battalion. Although augmented at various times by other motor transport equipment of the Division, the workload placed on the Motor Transport Section required that drivers work during all hours of the day and night. As only one driver is authorized per vehicle, a great deal of strain was placed on vehicle operators during certain phases of the operation.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Table of Organization of the 1st Service Battalion be increased to authorize an allowance of two (2) drivers per Truck, 2½ ton, 6x6 cargo. This increase would insure that vehicle operators would not be required to operate a vehicle for any prolonged period of time and would thus reduce the possibility of motor vehicle accidents occurring due to fatigue of the operators.

b. During this operation, this Battalion was required to place numerous convoys of Class I and III supplies on the road to insure that supplies were available where needed. During these movements, trucks would break down necessitating undue delay in getting supplies to the points where they were needed. In addition, this Battalion has other equipment that if it breaks down on the road, would require some other form of prime mover than a 2½ ton truck to move it to its destination.

ANNEX FOX FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

RECOMMENDATION: In view of the number of convoys required to be operated by this Battalion, it is recommended that one (1) Wrecker 2½ ton be authorized this Battalion to facilitate the movement of vehicles and trailers that have become unserviceable on the road due to mechanical and/or other failures.

c. In order to carry out the mission of logistic support and service to the 1st Marine Division during the subject operation, it was necessary to maintain and operate several dumps at different locations simultaneously in addition to the operation of salvage dumps, graves registration services and other services for which this Battalion was responsible. In order to adequately maintain an efficient supply service and to insure that supplies and equipment are furnished within a limited time after receipt of the request, it is mandatory that suitable communications facilities be available and in operation at all times to effect prompt service. As this Battalion is only authorized 1 Switchboard, BD-72 and twelve (12) telephone, TEB, delay at times was encountered in the receipt of requests for supplies due to the limited lines available both incoming and outgoing. In addition to limited telephonic communication facilities, this Battalion is authorized only one Radio Receiver (Tactical Alert). In a fast moving tactical situation as existed during this operation, the Battalion Commander should have more adequate means of communication with higher authority. A radio set tied in with the Division Logistical net would have kept the Battalion Commander better informed as to logistic requirements of front line units and would have facilitated more expeditious delivery of supplies and equipment to forward dumps.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Table of Organization for the Service Battalion be changed to authorize the following allowances of communication personnel and equipment:

- 12 Operators, Radio, Low-speed
- 1 Radio Repairman
- 1 Switchboard, BD-96
- 30 Telephone, TEB-8
- 3 Truck, ½Ton, 4x4, radio-equipped (TCS)

The above telephone and radio equipment would permit the Battalion Commander to keep abreast of the logistical aspects of the operation as they occur, and provide better service to Division units in the Supply of Class I, III and II and IV General Supplies.

d. The Maintenance Platoon, Support Company is organized to operate shoe and textile repair units to provide repair of shoes, items of canvas, minor repairs to other items of General Supplies, and to furnish typewriter repair facilities. In accordance with directives from higher authority stating that only required items of organic equipment would be taken that would insure the successful culmination of the capture of INCHON, the Commanding Officer received permission to leave the shoe and textile repair trailers at Kobe for shipment in subsequent echelon shipping. In view of the above, the personnel of the Maintenance Platoon did not provide any services for the Division during the operation except for minor typewriter services. The Maintenance Platoon therefore was an

ANNEX FOX FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

invaluable source of manpower for augmentation of the various platoons operating the Division supply dumps.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Maintenance Platoon, Service Battalion be deleted from the Table of Organization of the Service Battalion as a separate administrative unit and that it be incorporated as a platoon in the Supply Company, Service Battalion. This recommendation is predicated on the fact that when the Platoon is not operating its own equipment it will be furnishing personnel to augment supply installations operated by the Supply Company. In addition, when operating it will be working in close proximity to the Class II and IV General Supply dumps to facilitate rapid turning of repaired salvaged items. Inclusion of the Maintenance Platoon in the organization of the Supply Company would also relieve the Platoon Commander of the necessary administrative details inherent in a subordinate unit.

e. **COMMENT:** Due to the nature of the missions assigned this Battalion for logistic support and services to Division Units, the tasks of necessity, must be performed both night and day to insure the successful and expeditious completion of these missions. During all phases of loading to include preparations of supplies and equipment for shipment from Camp Pendleton and at Kobe, lighting facilities were at a premium. During the subject operation, lighting equipment as available had to be borrowed from other Division units for use at night in the Fuel, Ration and General Supply dumps to facilitate the unloading and reloading of supplies.

RECOMMENDATION: In order to assist and aid in loading, unloading and for use in dumps and warehouses operated by this organization, it is recommended that four (4) portable floodlight trailer units be authorized as additional equipment in the Tables of Equipment for this Battalion. These trailers organic to the Battalion would insure that lighting facilities when required would be immediately available for use.

C. L. Banks
C. L. BANKS

ANNEX FOX FOX TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

1st Service Battalion,
1st Marine Division, FMF,
Masan, Korea
30 December 1950

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

1. Organization The Graves Registration Platoon was activated as such on 20 July 1950 under T/O K1713 (War) at Camp Pendleton, Calif. Three complete sections were formed at this time along with Platoon Headquarters, while a fourth was already in operation with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the Masan, Korea area.

One medical corpsman and one dental technician were assigned to the Platoon in Kobe, Japan just prior to the unit's embarking for Inchon.

The T/O as augmented is considered adequate; however, a quicker job could be done charting teeth of unknowns if a second dental technician were assigned. With two, one could examine the teeth and call out the findings to the second who would record the data.

2. Missions The missions of the platoon are those assigned in Division SOP 1-1.

3. Landing Initially the Graves Registration Platoon was embarked aboard 2 ships. Platoon Headquarters and 3 sections were embarked aboard the USS GEORGE CLYMER, and one section was aboard the USS SEMINOLE. The latter section had been with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the campaign around Pusan. Inasmuch as neither unit had a landing serial some difficulty was experienced ashore by the Shore Party in handling the dead until a dispatch from the G-1 Section ordered the Graves Registration Platoon ashore. This has been corrected in two ways for future operations: (1) by attaching teams to the infantry regiments prior to outloading, and (2) by serializing the Graves Registration Platoon and its equipment. After receipt of the dispatch the Commanding Officer, 1st Service Battalion ordered the platoon ashore and it landed over Red Beach, Inchon, Korea on the afternoon of D plus 1.

4. Selection of Cemetery Site In the G-1 dispatch that Officer recommended that possible cemetery sites were located East of the city of Inchon along the Inchon-Seoul Highway. A site was selected on a hillside east of the city at TA 956-477 (Map of Korea, 1:50,000), and a bulldozer was sent from the 1st Engineer Battalion to prepare the ground and cut a road through. The site was selected on 1 September 1950, and the bulldozer worked the ground on 17 September 1950.

5. Collection of dead on beach Inasmuch as there were no Graves Registration personnel ashore initially the bodies were sent by the various units to the Shore Party Evacuation Station. Shortly after landing these dead were removed by the Graves Registration platoon and placed in a temporary morgue by Red Beach until such time as they could be taken to the cemetery for burial. In future operations the platoon will set up a temporary morgue on the beach where the Graves Registration teams attached to the infantry regiments will deliver the dead.

6. Plotting the cemetery In order to properly lay out a cemetery a transit, a prismatic compass, and a measuring tape are required; however, none of these items are included in the T/E of this organization. It is recommended that all three of

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

these items be included in a future T/E for the Graves Registration Platoon. The platoon rates three topographic draftsmen (1441) who are capable of using this equipment as required for laying out a cemetery.

A piece of string with knots at required lengths and a lensatic compass were used for laying out the entire first plot. After that a transit and tape borrowed from the Army Engineers were used to lay out plots 2, 3, 4, and the Korean plot.

7. Digging the graves Again an initial difficulty was experienced because of lack of equipment such as picks and shovels, the T/E allowance for such items being insufficient. It is recommended that an allowance of 25 picks and 25 shovels be established for the Graves Registration Platoon. The Commanding Officer, 1st Service Battalion solved this problem by authorizing the taking the picks and shovels from the battalion's vehicles.

Work was begun late in the afternoon of 17 September 1950 on digging graves, and when nightfall came not enough graves had been finished to bury the dead, and since the area was still not secure, work had to be stopped for security reasons.

On 18 September 1950 work continued and the first burials were made. A stake was driven at each of the graves four corners and string was strung around the stakes to mark the place to dig. On 19 September 1950 indigenous laborers were secured to dig the graves; however, the workers were slow and had to be augmented by Marines of this platoon. One problem that will present itself in grave digging is the removal of dirt. If it is thrown out the back it will fall on the row ahead, and if it is thrown out the front it will fall on the next row to be dug. This unit solved the problem by throwing the dirt on stretchers and carrying it off to the side. Periodically a bulldozer or grader will be required to remove excess dirt from the side of the cemetery.

8. Evacuating the dead As soon as possible a team of four men plus a weapons carrier and driver was attached to each of the infantry regiments to evacuate the dead to the cemetery. All other units were directed to deliver dead to the cemetery. Other teams were formed from the platoon to investigate reports of isolated burials and unburied bodies reported by various units and to evacuate any such dead to the cemetery. This plan worked well until the Han River crossing and the distance became too great for the regimental teams to evacuate to the cemetery. The problem was solved by placing morgues at the 5th and 1st Marine crossings. The regimental teams then evacuated the dead to the Han by weapons carrier where the bodies were transferred to LVT's which brought them to the morgue. Graves Registration personnel at the morgues unloaded the LVT's and placed the bodies in a tent where a team from the cemetery picked them up and brought them to the cemetery.

When the fighting became intense in Seoul two additional trucks with teams aboard were placed at the Seoul side of the 1st Marine crossing to assist any of the regimental teams that needed them. An officer from this platoon was placed at the Shore Party CP at this crossing to dispatch the teams, establish liaison and to expedite the evacuation of the dead.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

At all times the dead were covered as soon as they were found, and the trucks carrying the dead were covered to disguise their mission.

9. Naming of the Cemetery On 18 September 1950 the cemetery was named First Marine Division Cemetery, Inchon, Korea. On 30 September 1950 by order of X Corps the cemetery was redesignated as UN Cemetery, Inchon, Korea. A flagpole was erected by this platoon from local materials, and the UN flag was flown on 23 September 1950.

10. Burials After the required data was obtained bodies were wrapped in shelter halves and buried by Marines. The bodies were carried to the side of the grave by stretcher, and a rope was placed underneath the body at the shoulders and buttocks. Men standing on either side of the grave lowered the body, using the ropes as lowering lines. A man at the head and a man at the foot helped by holding onto the shelter half as the body was lowered.

11. Rites Chaplains of the faith of the deceased said religious services at each of the burials. These chaplains were assigned by the Division Chaplain. A joint memorial service was held on 6 October 1950, and on 8 October 1950 the 1st Marine Division, FMF, held a memorial service.

12. Marking of graves Graves were marked with crosses and Stars of David, as appropriate. An identification tag, or a substitute I.D. tag, was placed on each marker. ROK and KMC graves were marked with temporary name pegs.

13. Communications This platoon had no communication facilities whatsoever, and it is strongly recommended that telephone lines which tie in with the Division switchboard be strung to the cemetery and Graves Registration Platoon C.P.

14. Identification In most cases, identification was accomplished through identification tags, medical tags or personal effects. In the case of unknowns fingerprints and tooth charts were prepared.

Some difficulty was experienced with finding which was a man's last name on his dog tag. It is suggested that some system be established in the future for indicating a man's last name on the tag, such as underlining it.

15. Maps and Charts Maps were prepared showing the location of the cemetery and charts were prepared to show the occupant of each grave, these were forwarded to CMC (Code: DGU).

16. Enemy Dead Enemy dead were not interred in the cemetery, they were interred in a POW stockade cemetery in Inchon under the direction of the X Corps Provost Marshal.

17. Records A report of Burial, Nav Med-601, was prepared on each person of the Naval service interred. In the case of personnel attached to the 1st Marine Division or the 1st Marine Air Wing, the original was forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code: DGU), the duplicate to Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the triplicate to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, the quadruplicate to Medical Records Section,

APPENDIX 1-TO AMEX FOX FOX

Rear Echelon, 1st Marine Division, the quintuplicate to the cemetery file, and the sextuplicate to a Graves Registration Platoon file.

On Naval personnel not attached to the Marines the original and two copies were forwarded to BuMed via the activity carrying the man's records and a copy was filed in the cemetery file. When the unit carrying the man's records was unknown the original and two copies of Nav Med-601 were forwarded direct to BuMed.

The cemetery file was turned over to Inchon Base Command who assumed responsibility for care of the cemetery when the X Corps went aboard ship.

The Army made reports of burial on Army personnel and ROK's.

The Graves Registration Platoon made Reports of Burial, Nav Med 601, on all Korean Marine Corps personnel interred. These reports together with personal effects of the M.C.'s were turned over to Inchon Base Command.

18. Personal Effects Personal effects found on the dead were handled in accordance with Division SOP 1-1. Shipment was accomplished by turning over the effects to 1st Combat Service Group, FIF.

The personal effects to be handled by this unit are those actually found on the bodies only. Much difficulty was encountered through unit supply officers who sent effects the man had left behind with the supply train to the Graves Registration Officer for disposition. Because it was felt that these effects might have become lost if refused, they were received and handled by this unit. Actually the unit supply officer is charged with the responsibility of caring for the effects a man leaves behind, and in future operations this platoon will handle only those effects actually found on or nearby the dead.

Personnel of the infantry regiments should be told to leave the personal effects the dead are carrying in the man's pockets as these are sometimes the only way to establish identity.

19. Army Graves Registration Units: An Army unit from the 7th Division reported on 24 September 1950; it consisted of one officer and five men. They assumed the responsibility of reporting and processing Army dead. Interment and operation of the cemetery was accomplished by the 1st Marine Division Graves Registration Platoon.

About 30 September and Army Graves Registration Platoon from X Corps relieved the 7th Division unit, and 4 October this unit took over operation of the cemetery. Our platoon continued to care for and bury Marine dead.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

BURIED ON	1st Mar Div	1st MAW	USN	USA	MERCHANT SEAMEN	ROK	KMC
18 Sep	35	1	1				
19 Sep	10		2	1			
20 Sep	10						
21 Sep	28			2			
22 Sep	10			3			
23 Sep	24			5		2	2
24 Sep	29		1*	6		5	
25 Sep	28			9		7	1
26 Sep	12			1		5	3
27 Sep	72			11		4	
28 Sep	35	1		17		2	4
29 Sep	26			19		13	
30 Sep	29			12		3	
1 Oct	23			10		3	
2 Oct	20		1	4		1	
3 Oct	10			5			1
4 Oct	7		1	6		1	
5 Oct	4**			3			
6 Oct	1	1		10	2	1	
7 Oct	3						
8 Oct	1			1			
9 Oct				1			
10 Oct				1			
TOTAL	417	3	6	127	2	47	11

* On TD w/1st Mar Div fr COMNAVFE

**Plus 1 Reburial Previously reported.

1st Service Battalion
1st Marine Division, FMF,
Masan, Korea
30 December 1950

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

The Fuel Platoon, Supply Company was organized into a Platoon Headquarters and four (4) operating sections when this organization landed at INCHON on 16 September 1950.

During the embarkation and loading phase at Kobe, Japan the Fuel Platoon, Supply Company was engaged in receiving and loading various ships of the assault shipping with Class III products for use of the Division at INCHON. In addition to the responsibility of loading Division shipping with required amounts of Class III products, the Fuel Platoon also operated the Division Fuel dump for refueling vehicles being used in the Kobe Area.

Despite the fact that a great deal of unnecessary time was lost due to the fact that all Embarkation Group staffs were not located in the immediate Kobe vicinity thus necessitating delays in receiving required information for loading of Class III products within various ships within the Embarkation Group, the Fuel Platoon completed loading as scheduled and outloaded the following on Division shipping:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>CuFt.</u>
Fuel, Motor, 80 Octane	764,555	6,255,450	152,911
Fuel, motor, 72 Octane	79,750	652,500	15,950
Gasoline, unleaded, 65 Octane	30,750	249,750	6,105
Kerosene	12,760	104,400	2,552
Oil, Diesel	196,350	1,606,500	39,270
Oil, Engine, SAE 10	5,940	48,600	1,118
Oil, Engine, SAE 30	30,360	248,400	6,072
Oil, Engine, SAE 50	16,500	135,000	3,300
Lube, Gear, grade 90	16,500	135,000	3,300
Grease, GP #1		500	1,000
Grease, GP #2		500	1,000
Grease, WP #4		250	500

The Fuel Platoon, Supply Company landed over Beach RED on 16 September 1950 and immediately moved into an assembly area on the Beach. At 1400 on 16 September 1950, the Fuel Section established Class III Dump Number one at INCHON and commenced issuance of fuels and lubricants to Division units. From the time of its landing at INCHON on 16 September, the Fuel Platoon opened and operated a total of eight (8) Class III dumps and issuance of Class III supplies for logistic support of the 1st Marine Division. At the close of the period of this report, the Fuel Platoon was still operating two (2) Class III dumps in logistic support of the Division.

A few of the difficulties encountered by the Fuel Platoon during all phases of the operation was the lack of adequate lighting facilities for after dark work and suitable equipment for use in the fuel dumps for loading and unloading. Due to the energetic efforts on the part of all personnel involved, these difficulties were overcome. The Engineer Battalion cooperated to the utmost in the furnishing of mobile floodlight trailers for night work and Bay City cranes to assist in loading and unloading. The Bay City cranes were found to be better adapted for use by the Fuel Platoon than were the TD-14's which are organic to the Battalion due to greater mobility and length of the boom. It was also found that when operating several dumps simultaneously, the four (4) TD-14's authorized were not

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

adequate to handle the workload placed upon them and required constant maintenance by the Organic Motor Transport Section and the Engineer Battalion. During the subject operation, the Fuel Platoon Supply Company issued the following amounts of Class III products from its dumps:

	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Cube</u>
Fuel, Motor, 80 Octane-	331,430	2,711,700	66,286
Gasoline, 65 Octane	7,865	64,350	1,573
Kerosene	2,200	18,000	440
Oil, Diesel	28,270	231,300	5,654
Oil, Engine ASE 10	2,750	22,500	550
Oil, Engine, SAE 30	8,800	72,000	1,760
Oil, Engine, SAE 50	2,640	21,600	528
Lubricant, gear, #90	5,115	41,850	1,023
Grease, GP #1		2,870	197
Grease, GP #2		2,240	154
Grease, WP #4		815	92

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that two (2) Mobile Bay City Cranes and two (2) TD-14's be authorized for use of the Fuel Platoon in lieu of the present authorized allowance of four (4) TD-14's.

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1st Marine Division, FMF,
Masan, Korea
30 December 1950

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

During the embarkation phase at Kobe, the Ration Platoon, Supply Company was responsible for the segregation and issue of Class I Rations and water for loading aboard various ships of Division Assault shipping for transportation to the target area. To complete this loading on schedule, a representative of the Platoon was stationed in the Division Embarkation Office to act as liaison between the Ration Platoon and Embarkation Team Commands. Difficulty was experienced in obtaining adequate and expeditious information as to which ships within the Groups the rations were to be loaded in view of the fact that all Embarkation Group staffs were not located in the Kobe area. Despite this fact, loading of Division shipping with Class I supplies was accomplished on schedule with the following being loaded:

	<u>Rations</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Cube</u>
Charlie	264,000	1,804,000	484,000
5-In-1	80,000	496,000	1,280
PX	260,000	130,000	5,200
Baker	80,000	800,000	13,554
Water, gals.	110,000	800,000	7,000

On 16 September, 1950 the Ration Platoon, Supply Company landed on Beach RED at INCHON and moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of the beach. At 1400, the Ration Platoon established its Class I Dump Number one (1) and commenced issue of rations by 1600. From the period D plus 1 through D plus 7 the Ration Platoon received a total of over 200,000 rations, both emergency and Baker type and issued and delivered a like amount to Division units.

In addition, during this initial phase of the operation the Ration Platoon also received and issued water in 55 gallon drums that had been loaded by that Platoon in assault shipping at Kobe. During the period, the Ration Platoon operated a total of eight Class I dumps with two (2) in operation at the close of the period.

The main problem encountered by the Ration Platoon during the operation was that of unloading and loading at night. It was not always possible to obtain lighting equipment for proper illumination at night due to the heavy drain on lighting equipment requested by other units of the Division. The Platoon, nevertheless, continued its work as required and at the close of the period, had received and issued the following amounts of Class I supplies:

550,000	Charlie rations
220,000	Baker rations
110,000	5-In-1 rations
220,000	PX rations
70,400	Rice, native, rations
380,000	Water, gallons

The Ration Platoon has no comments or recommendations concerning any changes in the Table of Organization or equipment for this unit as the Ration Platoon as presently constituted is capable of performing Class I logistic support for a Marine Division (Reinf) in operations of a similar nature.

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1st Marine Division, FMF,
Masan, Korea.
30 December 1950.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

The Laundry Platoon, Support Company was used as a source of manpower to assist the other units of the Battalion in unloading and loading at Kobe.

During the period 15-20 September, laundry platoon personnel were used as ship's platoon personnel in the unloading of supplies and equipment from the LST 106 (USS UNICM). Upon completion of the unloading, the laundry personnel debarked and were immediately moved to the vicinity of Kimpoo Airfield and for two days, assisted in the handling of supplies at the Class I and III dumps.

On 23 September, 1950 the Laundry Platoon set up one laundry unit at "A" Company, 1st Medical Battalion and furnished that organization with laundry facilities until its displacement at the close of the period.

On 23 September, 1950 two (2) laundry units and one (1) shower unit were moved across the Han River set up and commenced furnishing laundry and shower units to personnel of the 5th and 7th Marines.

Upon completion of the occupation of Seoul, three laundry units were set up on the banks of the Han. These units were augmented by the Fumigation and Bath Platoon, 1st Combat Service Group. At this time, a clothing exchange was established whereby a man going for a shower would turn over all his clothing to the laundry, take his shower and receive a clean set of socks, underwear and utilities when he stepped out of the shower. During this period, every effort was exerted to shower and issue clean clothing to all personnel of the 1st and 5th Marines.

On 3 October, one laundry and one shower unit were displaced from the Han River and set up in the 7th Marines area north of Seoul for the purpose of facilitating laundry and bath facilities for personnel of that unit. This unit returned to INCHON with the 7th Marines on 7 October 1950.

On 7 October, the Laundry Platoon was operating two laundry units in support of Division units in the Seoul and INCHON areas.

From the time the first laundry unit was set up until 7 October 1950 the Laundry Platoon laundered 38,685 pieces of clothing and furnished 25,000 DIVISION personnel with showers.

From time to time during the operation, the Laundry Platoon experienced difficulty in keeping a sufficient amount of water available at all times to insure continuous operation of the laundry. The two main difficulties were that of insufficient water storage capacity and lack of adequate pumping facilities. Due to the excellent cooperation furnished by the Engineer Battalion in the loan of water storage tanks and pumping facilities, the water situation was solved satisfactorily.

Also, during this operation, considerable delay was encountered in placing units into operation when they had to be moved from one location to another. The laundry units are bulky and the draw bar hitches are not constructed of strong enough material to withstand movement over rough roads as was experienced during this operation. The tongues on the trailers would

1st Service Battalion,
1st Marine Division, FMF,
Masan, Korea
30 December 1950

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX FOX FOX

The purpose of this report is to show the operation of the Bakery Platoon, Support Company during the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation and to present comments and recommendations concerning the personnel and equipment of the Platoon.

The basic mission of the Bakery Platoon is to furnish bread and other bakery goods to units of the Division and attached units.

The Bakery Platoon was embarked aboard the AKA (106) USS UNION at Kobe, Japan with other units of the Service Battalion. Enroute to the objective area, the Platoon Leader conducted daily critiques in accordance with the desire of the Commanding Officer that all personnel be briefed in the missions of the Battalion ashore.

Enroute to the objective area, the Bakery Platoon was assigned to ships' unloading details for the unloading of the USS UNION. The personnel were thus engaged in ship unloading during the period 15-17 September. On 18 September, 1950 the Bakery Platoon debarked from the USS UNION and proceeded to the Battalion area in the vicinity of KIMPO Airfield. From 18-23 September, the platoon remained in the vicinity of the Airfield and furnished Battalion working parties as required.

On 23 September, a section of thirty (30) men proceeded to YONG DONG PO to prepare the selected site of the Division Bakery for operation. The remaining personnel of the Bakery Platoon joined the advance section on 24 September. During the above period, the platoon was engaged in cleaning up the building and putting equipment in operation in order to commence baking.

On 25 September, the Bakery commenced operation with three watches being established. Each watch consisted of between 20-30 personnel working on an 8 hour basis. The Bakery was then placed on a 24 hour operation basis. Issue of bread to Division units was made on the morning of 28 September.

During the period 28 September through 7 October 1950, the Bakery Platoon issued a total of 126,368 lbs of bread to Division and attached units. At the close of the period of this report, the Bakery Platoon was still in operation at YONG DONG PO.

Although the Division Bakery only set up its equipment once during the operation, it is considered that the present bakery is not mobile enough for fast moving operations due to its bulkness and difficulty of handling. The total cube and weight of all bakery equipment amounts to a total of 51,728 pounds and 2,207 cubic feet. It is recommended that a Marine Division be equipped with a Mobile Field Bakery unit to facilitate rapid displacement and insure a continuous supply of fresh bread for units at all times.



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1st Marine Division, FMF,
Masan, Korea
20 December 1950

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX FOX FCX

The following narrative briefly outlines the operations of the Salvage Platoon, Support Company during the INCHON-KIMPO-STOUL operation and the problems encountered during the operation with the steps undertaken to solve them.

During the period 15-16 September, 1950 the Salvage Platoon was used to augment Ships' Platoon personnel in the unloading of Battalion supplies from the USS UNCON. Upon arriving ashore on 17 September, the personnel of the platoon were used to augment the Fuel Platoon in the operation of its dumps.

On 19 September, a salvage detachment of 3 men moved forward with the Platoon Commander to Dump Number 2, TULCHAN and commenced setting up a salvage dump at that location. This Section continued operations at this dump and experienced considerable difficulty in the receipt of salvage at that location. This was caused by the fact that organizations were not complying with Division Administrative instructions concerning the return of all salvageable items to Class I dumps on all transportation returning rearward. In order to expedite the return of salvage, it became apparent that teams should be sent forward to assist the loading regiments.

On 18 September, three main contact parties were assigned to each of the Infantry Regiments and the Artillery Regiment. These proved to be very successful and were used extensively by Regimental Supply Officers in the Regimental CPs. Salvagable material was brought back to the Regimental CPs where it was segregated by the salvage section and then returned via truck to the Battalion salvage dump. Trips were made daily from the Battalion Salvage Dump to pick up any material on hand for return to the Dump for ultimate return to stock of the respective service unit.

In addition to salvage sections with each of the Regiments, a section also operated from the Battalion dump to make daily trips to aid stations, the Division hospital and other units to pick up any salvage available.

The above system was carried out throughout the operation and was still being continued at the close of the period.

As presently organized, the Salvage Platoon is capable of carrying out its basic mission of salvage, segregation of salvage and the return to the appropriate service unit of all segregated salvaged material. It is believed that the assignment of sections to the infantry and artillery regiments to aid in the return of salvaged material to the rear is feasible and is a recommended procedure in future operations.

1st Service Battalion,
1st Marine Division, F.M.F.,
Masan, Korea
30 December 1950

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX FCX FCX

The following report on the operations of the General Supply Platoon, Supply Company is furnished to show the operations of the Platoon and to make comments and recommendations concerning general supply matters coming under its cognizance.

The General Supply Platoon, Supply Company is charged with the mission of logistic support for Class II and IV general supplies and clothing for the Division and attached units. For the support of the INCHON-KIMPO-STALDI operation, the General Supply Platoon, in accordance with Division administrative orders, commenced preparations at Kobe, Japan to load and carry 30 days replenishment of Class II clothing and property required for the operation, initial chemical warfare requirements for the Division and an initial allowance of Class IV clothing and property for the Division.

Toward this end, the Platoon was engaged in unloading, segregating, repacking and recrating and outloading simultaneously at Kobe to insure completion of loading of assigned shipping. Due to limited shipping facilities Class IV supplies were left at Kobe for loading aboard subsequent echelon shipping.

At Kobe, the Platoon worked on a round the clock basis to prepare supplies for shipment. As supplies and equipment for outloading were en route from the United States, unloading and outloading was carried on simultaneously. Outloading was considerably hampered in view of the fact that a large percentage of the equipment and supplies had to be re-packed and re-crated prior to being loaded. This damage to boxes and crates was attributed to the poor construction of the packages, the number of times they had been handled, and the improper care in the handling. Although all this extra work was thrown on the personnel of the platoon, the loading of supplies was completed to meet sailing schedules.

The following supplies for support of the 1st Marine Division in its assault on INCHON were outloaded at Kobe:

Class II Clothing	1,300,000 lbs.	32,500 cubic
Class II Property	2,773,920 lbs.	69,348 cubic
Class II Chemical Warfare	800,000 lbs.	20,000 cubic

70,000 cubic feet of Class IV clothing and equipment was left at Kobe for loading aboard subsequent echelon shipping.

The General Supply Platoon landed at INCHON on 16 September 1950 and during the period 16-22 September, the personnel were used in the Combat Service Group general supply warehouse to augment Group personnel in segregation and issue of supplies and equipment.

On 21 September, a Class II dump was established by the Platoon in the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield. Supplies issued from this Dump were those supplies that were immediately required by forward Division units. These supplies were procured by sending trucks from the Battalion Motor Transport Section into INCHON and bringing the required from Combat Service Group stocks to the Dump for issue.

On 26 September, the General Supply Platoon commenced procuring and stocking supplies and equipment in accordance with Division Supply Bulletin 53-50. In addition to receiving and issuing normal Class II supplies and equipment during the remaining period of the operation, Class IV supplies commenced arriving at the Dump for issue to using units. As in the case of Class II supplies, Class IV clothing was issued to units as available on priorities and allocations as furnished and approved by the Division G-4.

During the period 15 September to 7 October 1950, the General Supply Platoon issued the following amounts of Class I and IV General supplies to Division units:

Class II Clothing	157,037 lbs.	19,276 cube
Class II Property	78,394 lbs.	10,548 cube
Class IV Clothing	155,535 lbs.	10,301 cube

The personnel of the General Supply Platoon under the current Table of Organization is considered adequate for the unit to carry out its mission of logistic support for Class II and IV Clothing and General Supply to units of the Division. However, it is recommended that the equipment authorized the Platoon be increased by the following:

- 2 Plane Loader, tracked type
- 3 Chests, carpenter
- 5 Machine, strapping, 1 1/2"
- 5 Machine, strapping, 5/8"
- 5 Sealers, strapping, 1 1/2"
- 5 Sealers, strapping, 5/8"

The above recommendation is based on the amount of repacking and recrating that had to be done by the Platoon at Camp Pendleton, San Diego, Kobe and again at ICHOM. Constant handling of the present containers plus the inherent disregard of handlers in taking the proper care and precautions during handling require constant repacking and recrating at each move of the Platoon. It is further recommended that steps be initiated to design a strong reusable box or container of a standard size and that in lieu of reusable boxes for clothing, bales with aesterproof insides be used as they will withstand much greater punishment.

As pallets are extensively used in warehousing it is considered necessary that 2 plane loaders be assigned the Platoon for use in its dumps and any warehouse that may be used. The above equipment organic to the Battalion would decrease delay encountered in procuring the required equipment from other Division organizations. It would also insure that they would at least be available as required.

As this organization was called upon to receive, issue, load and unload supplies on a 24 hour basis, the problem of lighting facilities at warehouse and dump areas was encountered. Although in most instances lighting facilities were procured from other Division units where local lighting facilities were not available, it is considered most feasible to have that equipment organic to the Battalion and thus insure that lighting would be available as required rather than have the Battalion dependent upon other units. It is therefore recommended that mobile floodlight trailers as recommended in paragraph 9.e. of Annex Fox-Fox be authorized for use of this Platoon in conjunction with other subordinate units of the Battalion.

[REDACTED]
ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FIRST SIGNAL BATTALION
FIRST MARINE DIVISION
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
[REDACTED]

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

A12

BHK:cef

1st Signal Battalion
1st Marine Division, FMF
HungNam, Korea
25 November 1950

From: The Commanding Officer, 1st Signal Battalion
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF

Subj: Special Action Report for period 1 September 1950
to 7 October 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

Maps: AMS, Maps L751, Sheets 6526I, II, III, IV, 6626 III,
IV, 6627 III (1:50,000)

1. INTRODUCTION.

This special action report is submitted to set forth the mission, and activities in support of its mission, of the 1st Signal Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, during the period 1 September 1950 and 7 October 1950. In this period the division accomplished outloading from Kobe, Japan, movement to the objective area off Inchon, Korea, assault landing in the Inchon area, movement inland from the Inchon beaches to the capture of Kimpo Airfield and the liberation of Seoul, Korea, and finally, a displacement from the Seoul area to Ascom City, Korea, from which point the division planned reembarkation and further operations as directed.

Throughout the period described above, the 1st Signal Battalion functioned as a separate battalion under the control of headquarters, 1st Marine Division. The mission of this unit was as follows: (1) to provide signal communication from division headquarters to all subordinate and attached units; (2) to provide tactical air control parties for infantry battalions, regiments and for division headquarters; (3) to provide shore fire control parties for all infantry battalions; (4) to provide naval gunfire liaison teams to infantry regimental headquarters and division headquarters; (5) to provide shore party communication teams to the shore party battalion; and (6) to provide necessary signal supply and repair facilities for subordinate units of the division. This unit operated in accordance with current division operation orders and annexes thereto and in accordance with COMSOP and SOI-2.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

1st Signal Battalion, 1stMarDiv(39-653) Major R. L. SCHREIER
Headquarters Company, 1st Signal Battalion (12-140)
Detachment, 205th Signal Repair Company, USA (1-17)
Signal Company, 1st Signal Battalion(9-196) Major GLAESER
Detachment, 4th Signal Battalion, USA (0-19)
Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company(16-189)Major OGLESBY
Carrier Platoon, Headquarters Battalion, FMF, Pac. (2-92)
1stLt. FERRANTO

3, 4, 5. PRELIMINARY PLANNING, TRAINING AND REHEARSALS,
LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

Since preliminary planning, training, loading and embarkation proceeded concurrently, these phases will be treated in the following paragraphs as a combined discussion. There was no rehearsal for the landing at Inchon.

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Preliminary planning for this organization commenced immediately on its arrival in Kobe, Japan on 2 September 1950. The battalion command post and most of the battalion operating elements had been embarked aboard the USNS MARINE PHOENIX for the voyage from San Diego to Japan and the ship was met at the dock in Kobe by representatives of headquarters, 1st Marine Division. These officers had with them Administrative Order Number 1 which directed that the bulk of this organization be temporarily billeted at Camp Shinodayama, Japan, until such time as personnel and equipment could be loaded aboard assault shipping in preparation for the Inchon landing. The remainder of the personnel, consisting of the air and naval gunfire teams and the shore party communication teams were ordered to report to the units to which they had been previously assigned, as soon as they could assemble and check their equipment. Accordingly, movement to Camp Shinodayama, Japan, of designated personnel was begun. Trucks were made available and on the evening of 2 September 1950, the first echelon, consisting of carrier platoon and the battalion supply officer, with members of his section, departed for Camp Shinodayama, Japan, arriving there at approximately 2400, 2 September.

Shortly after the departure of the first echelon for Shinodayama, a copy of Embarkation Order 1-50 was delivered and Annex BAKER of this document revealed that the ship assigned to this organization for the Inchon landing was to be the USS PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18). It was then known that the JACKSON was unloaded and docked in Kobe, so the battalion commander obtained permission from the commanding general to cancel that part of the signal battalions orders which directed it to proceed to Camp Shinodayama, and instead, permit it to go aboard the JACKSON directly, as its personnel and equipment was taken from the MARINE PHOENIX. The carrier platoon and battalion supply officer's section which had already been sent to Shinodayama, was recalled and directed to board the JACKSON. These orders were not received by this group due to the dislocation of communications by typhoon. Carrier platoon and battalion supply officer's section returned to Kobe and boarded the JACKSON at about 2300, 4 September.

Although most of this organization's personnel had come from San Diego aboard the MARINE PHOENIX, there was considerable equipment and a few personnel which had arrived aboard other vessels. A great percentage of the battalions equipment and supplies had come in on the JACKSON and smaller segment had arrived in the BELGIUM VICTORY and the GREEN BAY VICTORY. By 1200, on 3 September 1950, all of signal battalions equipment, including signal supply, had been unloaded from these ships and final loading plans had been submitted to the commanding general for reloading on the JACKSON. There being no warehouse space available for this organization, all the equipment was stacked in the open on the Kobe docks. Personnel were still mainly aboard the MARINE PHOENIX, although an advance billeting detail of two officers and 25 men had already come aboard the JACKSON and the battalion elements which had previously been sent to Shinodayama had arrived there and had not at that time received their orders to return.

On the morning of 3 September, 1950, storm warnings were published and it was predicted that winds up to 85 miles per hour could be expected later in the day accompanied by rain. Attention was immediately given to the securing of this organization's equipment which was exposed on the dock and all possible efforts were made to protect the equipment. Tar-paulins were placed over a considerable part of the stock-piles and all of the supplies were lashed and nailed down.

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

By 1100 winds had increased to such volume as to make the security of the ships tied to the docks a matter of primary concern. This organization's personnel were put ashore from the MARINE PHOENIX and the JACKSON during the storm to assist navy personnel in securing additional lines from the ships to the docks. Gangways and ladders were carried away shortly after this and part of this organization's personnel remained on the dock throughout the storm performing the work described above.

When the storm abated at about 1700 on 3 September 1950, the entire battalion was placed on a 24-hour day schedule repairing storm damage to equipment and continuing with plans for combat loading aboard the JACKSON. At this time a dispatch was received from Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, to the effect that the plans for the Inchon landing could not be set back by reason of the storm and expressing confidence that all elements of this division could continue scheduled plans in spite of the damage caused by the storm. Division Embarkation Order Number 1-50, had directed this organization to complete loading by 2400, 10 September. Upon completion of segregation and checking of air and naval gunfire teams and shore party communication team equipment, these teams were dispatched to the units to which they were to be attached. The remainder of the combat equipment was loaded aboard the JACKSON. A small amount of combat equipment and the bulk of the camp equipment was stored in a dock warehouse because of shortage of space in assault shipping. At 1800 on 10 September, the battalion commander was able to notify commanding general that this organization had completed its loading and was prepared for further operations.

Preliminary plans for the Inchon landing, completed prior to the period covered by this report, assumed the communication platoon, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, then engaged in combat in the South Korean area, would form a part of this organization for the Inchon landing. This situation, coupled with the fact that the signal battalion, as then constituted, was an approximately equal combination of recently assembled 1st and 2nd Marine Division signal battalions, caused a training problem which, however resolved, could necessarily leave an insufficient amount of unit training accomplished. It was an accepted fact, however, that the state of individual training of personnel of this battalion was excellent since nearly all personnel were experienced in peacetime divisional training and a part of it, the brigade communication platoon, was already engaged in combat as previously stated.

By 4 September 1950, the following training and instructional material was made available for staff planning. This planning was conducted concurrently with loading operations in the Kobe area.

- 1st Marine Division Embarkation Order 1-50 (Secret)
- North Korean Soldier (Pamphlet)
- 1st Marine Division Administrative Plan 1-50 (Conf)
- Terrain Study, Inchon - Seoul area (Pamphlet)
- Division General Order Number 12

The elements of this organization who were a part of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade during the period of preliminary planning were able to commence their preparations for embarkation on 5 September 1950. The instructional documents listed above were the subject of training periods starting on 5 September 1950 and the communication platoon, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was designated by commanding general as the ADC communication group. This battalion element embarked at Pusan, Korea, aboard the USS CAVALIER (APA-37) on 11 September 1950.

On 6 September, One (1) officer and one (1) enlisted of the carrier platoon went aboard the USS MT MCKINLEY at Kobe to supervise the operation of the carrier terminal aboard that ship. Their mission was to establish and maintain communication with the 1st Marine Division Terminal which was to be set ashore from the JACKSON at Inchon. The carrier equipment aboard the MT MCKINLEY was army equipment and the personnel from this organization were aboard to assist in the operation of the terminal and provide advice as to its employment. The carrier platoon had had previous experience with a similar installation during DEMON III. At the time of completion of loading, the disposition of personnel from this battalion was as follows:

CG communication group aboard MT MCKINLEY	-	4-43
Main body aboard JACKSON	-	19-391
ANGLICO detachment, 1st Marines - LST 715	-	2-20
ANGLICO detachment, 1stBn, 1st Mar - USS NOBLE-	-	3-29
ANGLICO detachment, 2ndBn, 1st Mar - LST 1048	-	2-19
	LST 611	1-10
ANGLICO detachment, 3rdBn, 1st Mar - LST 742	-	1-10
	LST 802	2-20
ANGLICO detachment, 5th Marines - USS PICKAWAY-	-	0-40
Signal Company, SP communication team-LST 715	-	1-21
Signal Company, SP communication team-LST 883	-	1-14
Signal Company, SP communication team-LST 898	-	1-16
Rear Echelon at Kobe	-	1-20 (Including 17 USA)

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA.

The LST convoy departed from Kobe, Japan on 8 September 1950. The APA and AKA convoy departed from the same port on 10 September, 1950.

The instructional material, operation orders with annexes previously mentioned and maps along with the 1st Signal Battalion Operation Order 2-50, completed on 8 September, 1950, was made available upon departure from Kobe to all officers and men for intensive study during the period 10-14 September.

On 14 September 1950, a dispatch was received setting L-hour for 0830 on 15 September 1950. Preparations were completed for the opening of all radio nets at H-3 as was prescribed by 1st Marine Division Operation Order 2-50. At H-3 all landing force radio nets on the MT MCKINLEY (AGC-7) and the ADC command ship CAVALIER were opened up and passing traffic. These nets included Division Command ABLE, Division Command BAKER, Division Logistical and Tank-Infantry. Excellent cooperation was obtained from the ships concerned in providing ships facilities for establishment of these nets.

7. OPERATIONS.

a. Assault Phase:

The first elements of this battalion to go ashore were the ANGLICO teams attached to the battalions and regimental headquarters of the 1st and 5th Marines. Shore party communication teams from signal company attached to 1st Shore Party Battalion were next ashore. The tactical aspects of the operations of these teams are not considered in this report, since the mission of this unit included only administrative control of these teams.

The ADC communication platoon landed on GREEN beach on Wolmi-Do with the ADC group at 1630 on D-day. This group comprised the first signal battalion elements in support of division headquarters to arrive on the beach since the ANGLICO teams already described would continue to be closely associated with the units with which they were landed and the

shore party communication teams were engaged in hasty communication construction for elements of 1st Shore Party Battalion. The ADC communication group commenced wire and radio work immediately they arrived on the beach. The ADC command post was initially established on Wolmi-Do, TA 8849L, and from this location wire communication was installed to the 5th Marines whose initial command post was at TA 8951Y. Local wire construction within the ADC command post was completed. Initial radio circuits in which the ADC group functioned were, division command, Able and Baker nets, division tactical, division intelligence, division logistical control, division tank-infantry-artillery-LVT common, and infantry common. Later in the evening of D-day additional radio equipment of the ADC group was landed and radio facilities were expanded to include the following nets: task group commanders, amphibious common, corps common, and corps tactical. The following type of radio equipment were employed by ADC communications platoon in providing the radio facilities described above:

Division command Able and Baker	-	AN/MRC-6, TCS, AN/GRC-9
Division tactical	-	AN/MRC-5
Division intelligence	-	SCR-610
Division logistical control	-	SCR-193
Division tank-infantry-artillery-LVT common	-	SCR-610
Division infantry common	-	SCR-300
Task group commanders	-	SCR-399
Amphibious common	-	SCR-399
Corps command	-	AN/MRC-6
Corps tactical	-	TCS or 399

The ADC group remained in the initial command post location on Wolmi-Do Island during the night of D-day.

On the morning of D plus 1 the ADC command post displaced to Incheon, TA 9137C. Radio facilities were maintained throughout the displacement. This location was to become the initial command post ashore of the 1st Marine Division. At approximately 1600 on 16 September 1950, the main body elements of signal battalion began arriving at YELLOW beach. From this beach, signal battalion personnel and equipment was moved to the command post area. At 1630, the division command post moved ashore. By nightfall on 16 September, the bulk of the operating sections of signal company were ashore and engaged in installing additional communications facilities. The battalion commander came ashore and assumed control of the operation of this organization. Off-loading of battalion personnel and equipment from the ships was continued, subject to limitations imposed by tide conditions. The carrier platoon had landed one complete carrier terminal by 1900, 16 September, and had the equipment installed and operating by 2030 that same date. Communication was established to X Corps headquarters using similar equipment (previously described in paragraph 3) installed aboard the MT MCKINLEY. This communication consisted of two voice and one teletype circuit. This platoon's equipment included two terminal equipments, CF1-A, CF2-B, and six (6) relay units AN/TRC-4. The remainder of the carrier platoon equipment was landed early the following morning and kept available for use in displacement. There was no immediate requirement for the relay units but it will be shown that, later in the operation, these units were to be used to provide vital communications with the rapidly advancing regiments.

b. Exploitation phase:

During the night of 16-17 September radio and message center facilities proved adequate to the requirements for them. Teletype (thru Carrier) was established between Division and Corps (afloat on AGC-7) and handled large volumes

of traffic. Wire construction continued and for a short period of time on the morning of 17 September 1950, wire communication was actually established with both the 1st and 5th regiments as well as with most of the separate battalions of the division. (see figure 1 Traffic diagram for 17 September). (See figure 2 for division switchboard directory). On the afternoon of 17 September 1950, the 1st and 5th regiments displaced forward, the 1st moving to TA 0449W and the 5th to TA 0558C. There had previously been assigned to each regiment a five-man wire team from signal company of this battalion. These wiremen were able to maintain nearly continuous communications between the regiments and the division during the displacements of 17 September. On 18 and 19 September additional regimental displacements were effected and wire communication to these units became unreliable. On 19 September, the 1st Marines were approximately fifteen miles from the division and the 5th Marines were five miles away. In addition the wire routes to these organizations were along heavily traveled routes and considerable trouble resulted as lines were frequently broken. A forward switch was established which eased the situation somewhat. (See figure 2 & Line route maps).

During the period a heavy reliance was placed on radio communications, and messenger. The latter frequently driving great distances at night to deliver operation orders.

On 18 September 1950, a division reconnaissance party including from this organization the battalion executive officer, S-3, wire officer, and radio relay officer proceeded to the Kimpo airfield area, intending to determine a location for a division command post displacement. A location was selected at TA 07560 and, on the following day, the advance echelon of this organization moved to this location. On 19 September 1950, all operating elements of this organization (less one carrier terminal which remained at Inchon), were displaced to the new location and had established wire, teletype (to Corps) and radio facilities at this time. (For line route map and traffic diagram, see Figure 3 and 4). The carrier terminal which remained at Inchon maintained voice and teletype communications with X Corps headquarters (afloat) until the 22nd of September at which time it was secured. The forward carrier terminal had set up and was in standby status on the 19th and when the rear terminal was ordered secured on the 22nd the circuits were transferred to forward control without interruption of services.

Orders were issued on 19 September for the 5th Marines to cross the Han River on the morning of 20 September. It was anticipated that wire communication would be difficult after the river crossing was effected. The difficulties and problems of wire construction was the subject of a conference of the division signal officer, signal battalion commander, S-3, and radio relay officer on 19 September. The radio relay officer had previously suggested a temporary solution to the wire problem and he was on this day directed to proceed with assembly of four AN/TRC-1 radio relay equipments mounted in $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton cargo trucks with trailers and modified to serve as radio link terminals. The method of construction and manner of operation of these equipments is as outlined below:

A receiver, R-29 and transmitter, T-14C, are placed on the right and left fender wells of a $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton cargo truck. An antenna mast base is attached to the vehicle between and just in rear of the front seats. One antenna mast section is installed and the receiving antenna is then

DIVISION SWITCHBOARD DIRECTORY

ORGANIC UNITS

<u>1ST MARINE DIVISION</u>	<u>WESTERN</u>
1ST MARINE REGIMENT	WHISKEY
5TH MARINE REGIMENT	WARRIOR
7TH MARINE REGIMENT	WATCH
11TH MARINE REGIMENT	WOMAN
1ST AIR DELIVERY PLATOON	WING
1ST AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR BATTALION	WICHITA
1ST COMBAT SERVICE GROUP	WATSON
1ST ENGINEER BATTALION	WORLD
1ST MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP	WEATHER
1ST MEDICAL BATTALION	WALDO
1ST MILITARY POLICE COMPANY	WARE
1ST MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION	WORM
1ST ORDNANCE BATTALION	WILLIAM
1ST SERVICE BATTALION	WISDOM
1ST SHORE PARTY BATTALION	WAGE
1ST SIGNAL BATTALION	WHITE
1ST TANK BATTALION	WHEEL
FSCC	WESTERN SPORT
VMO-6	WACO

UNITS OUTSIDE DIVISION


<u>X CORPS</u>	<u>JADE</u>
COMBAT CARGO COMMAND	JIFNEY
2ND ENGINEER SPECIAL BRIGADE, USA	WALLACE
32ND REGIMENT, 7TH ARMY DIVISION	BROADWAY

(Figure 2)

Means of reproducing line route maps were not available to this organization at the time of printing this report. Figures 2a, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 may be seen in the Original or Duplicate copy.

Traffic Diagram
1st Marine Division, FMF

Effective
0800, 19 September 1950



Authenticated:

R. H. Kern
R. H. KERN
Capt., USMC

Figure 4

installed on it. A $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer, attached to the $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton cargo truck carries a similarly rigged transmitting antenna. Also carried in the trailer is the power unit, PE-75, and the supplies and equipment of a three man radio relay team to accompany the equipment. The purpose served by placing the receiving rather than the transmitting antenna in the $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton cargo truck is that this arrangement enables the operator to find the area which provides the maximum signal by moving the vehicle to various locations. When a site is selected a wire line is run from the receiving terminals of the equipment to the local telephone switchboard. In addition a telephone, EE-8 is hooked across the receiving terminals. When a call is placed the switchboard operator rings the radio relay line. The call also rings the EE-8 at the radio relay vehicle and that operator, by voice radio means, causes the desired distant radio relay terminal operator to answer. The distant radio relay terminal operator then rings his switchboard and the rest of the call is completed through normal telephone procedure. A later addition of a Voice frequency ringing equipment EE-101-A at the mobile unit and at the Division Carrier Terminal eliminated the need for the Mobile operator and the Carrier Terminal operator. With the ringing equipment the regimental switchboard operator merely rang through as with any wire line. This ringing impulse was transmitted and operated the drop on the Division Board. The same procedure worked both ways.

The two equipments described above were completed on 19 September 1950, and on the 20th, one was dispatched to the 1st Marines and another to the 5th Marines. The transmitter on the 1st Marines set was faulty and the equipment was returned, and repaired. The set at the 5th Marines was on the air and operating within an hour after arriving at that regiment's command post. The 1st Marines equipment was sent out again on 21 September. By 1800, on 21 September, both regiments were in contact with division by this telephone means and the problem of immediate, minimum telephone communication with distant activities was effectively overcome.

The first elements of the 7th Division, U. S. Army, began arriving on the beach on approximately 18 September 1950, and in order to provide lateral communication with them, a radio team with AN/GRC-9 equipment was temporarily assigned with the 32nd regiment of that division. Wire communication was also installed to that regiment. On 19 September 1950, four radio operators with 2 radios, SCR-300 were assigned to 1st Shore Party Battalion communication section.

On 20 September 1950, a radio team of three operators with an AN/GRC-9 radio was ordered to report to the division G-3 for assignment with a KMC battalion. These radio operators were to provide communication between the KMC organizations and division on the division command Able net. They carried necessary call signs, shackles, and authenticators.

An SCR-610 radio with operator was also provided on this day to augment 5th Marines communication platoon. The 5th Marines also had attached from this organization, two five-man wire teams with complete equipment including wire laying $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton cargo trucks. An assistant wire officer was ordered to accompany these wire teams and radio operators to insure their arrival in the 5th Marines command post. The reason for this precaution was that the 5th Marines was engaged in crossing the Han River on this date and the route to their command post was circuitous and difficult. This officer returned the following day, reporting that his orders had been carried out.

On 21 September, ANGLICO assumed the responsibility for resupply and maintenance of organic communications equipment in battalion, regimental, and division tactical air control parties and shore fire control parties. Discussion had been long underway on the question of whether the infantry unit communication section should handle the repair and resupply of ANGLICO equipment or whether the equipment remained a responsibility of ANGLICO even though it and the personnel working with it was attached to infantry units. Infantry units were initially charged with the responsibility for maintenance of ANGLICO equipment. However, since the infantry unit signal supply and repair facilities terminated in division signal supply it was felt that the time lost in channels of repair was a disadvantage that could be overcome by ANGLICO headquarters, keeping a continuing check on the equipment of its detached elements and establishing a repair section within the company. With this in mind, ANGLICO headquarters was charged with the maintenance of air and naval gunfire equipment. Frequent instances occurred of TACP's and SFCP's being so far removed from ANGLICO headquarters as to make it unfeasible to return equipment for repair. In these cases infantry signal repair channels were necessarily employed for this equipment. In the main, however, the maintenance was performed at ANGLICO headquarters, that unit performing repair on 80 AN/VRC-1's, 100 MAW's, 64 SCR-300's, 20 AN/GRC-9's, not including incidents where component parts or batteries are furnished, during the period covered by this report.

The arrival of division units in the Kimpo Airfield area commencing on 18 September, made necessary the installation of considerable wire facilities into that area. VMO-6, 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion and 1st Engineer Battalion were all located in that area by 20 September and arrangements were made with Communications Officer, Combat Cargo Command to run lines from these organizations into the combat cargo command switchboard in the airfield area and construct a 10-pair rubber cable from the division board to the combat cargo command board to handle traffic to and from these units. Many division elements which were later to support the 5th Marines on 20 September in their displacement across the river moved into the airfield area, thus creating an increased need for communications with those activities.


Another communication requirement in the Kimpo area developed on 19 September with the arrival of the 7th Marines command post at TA 0660H.

By 20 September all the units mentioned above had been provided telephone facilities with division. For details of instruction and routing of calls see line route map and traffic diagram for 20 September, 1950. (Figure 5 and 6).

At 0630, on the morning of 20 September 1950, the 5th Marine regiment began its attack which was to culminate later in the day with the successful crossing of the Han River and the establishment of the regimental command post at TA 1064H on the east side of the river. Two radio teams with SCR-300 radios were assigned with the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division at 0530 on the morning of 20 September. These radio sets were operating in the division infantry common net and 5th Marines tactical net. They were located at an observation post at TA 0661, from which point the commanding general observed the crossing being made by the 5th Marines.

Traffic Diagram
1st Marine Division, FMF

Effective
20 September 1950



Authenticated:

R. H. Kern
R. H. KERN
Capt., USMC

Figure 6

On 19 September, 1950, wire lines had been laid as far as the west bank of the Han River, TA 0861W and on 20 September following the crossing of initial elements of the 5th Marines, wiremen from this organization were engaged in continuing these lines across the river and to the new 5th Marines command post at TA 1064H. Weasels and LVTs were employed in this construction and wire was successfully installed on that day across the river at two places, TA 0861W and TA 1258V. Spiral four cable and field wire W-110-B were both used in this submarine construction to assure the effectiveness of wire communication. At 1700, on the 20th, wire facilities existed to the 5th Marines via the crossing at TA 0861W. The LVTs employed as previously described had proved invaluable in this wire construction both in the crossing operation and in carrying the lines inland to the command post on the far shore.

The volume of vehicular traffic in the crossing area, TA 0861W on the night of 20 September, made maintenance of wire construction to the 5th Marines difficult to the point of almost being impossible. Approximately fifty (50) wiremen from this organization were engaged in the effort to keep wire communication in with the 5th Marines. The process of crossing the river with wire caused great expenditures of wire as often conditions in midstream would necessitate abandoning a partially submerged cable and returning to try again with more wire. Efforts were made to find more suitable crossing locations to the south.

Five (5) officers and 88 enlisted joined this battalion on 20 September from Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. These men were originally with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

On the morning of 21 September, 1950, it was found that two five-man wire teams from this organization had not yet reported back from the job of laying wire across the river on the night before. One of these wire teams had been assigned to the 5th Marines as previously mentioned so no great concern was felt for their safety at that time, it being assumed that these men were on the other side of the river with the 5th Marines. The other wire team, using a weasel for wire laying on the night before, had last been seen in the vicinity of TA 0658I. They were at that time looking for the route to the cable crossing at TA 0861W. On 21 September, it was reported and later confirmed that this wire team had been ambushed, having three (3) men killed and two (2) wounded. Inquiries made of the 5th Marines communication officer revealed that the other wire team unaccounted for was not with the 5th Marines. On 21 September, 1950, it was found that this group had also been ambushed on 20 September and that two (2) of them had been killed and three (3) were missing and presumed to have been taken prisoner. Best information available indicated that this group had not crossed the river with the main 5th Marines elements but had remained on the near shore assisting in wire construction and it was while engaged in this work that they encountered ambush. Subsequent information indicates that both of these groups were ambushed considerably south of the main river crossing area and this fact suggests that their efforts at the time of their encounter were toward locating a more suitable crossing area for wire construction.

On 22 September, 11 officers and 107 enlisted joined ANGEICO of this battalion from the 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force.

The displacement of the 1st Marines on 22 September into the Yongdungpo area, TA 15520 coupled with the 5th Marines advance along the Yeigi main railroad toward Seoul made it readily apparent that wire construction would

be required generally along the west Han River bank toward Yongdungp'o-ri and thence across the river into Seoul. In addition, the 7th Marines command post had, on 22 September displaced across the river to TA 1264M, and Annex A to Operation Plan B-50 (Operation Overlay) and Division Operation Order 9-50 issued on 23 September indicated that the general line of advance of the division would be along the Han River toward Seoul.

On 21 September 1950, construction was begun on a five-pair field wire cable from the division command post along the main road paralleling the Han River toward Yongdungp'o-ri and the bridges crossing the river there into Seoul. This construction was completed to TA 1356A, and terminated there because the area from there to the previously mentioned railroad bridges was still in enemy hands. At this time it became a standard policy to include a five or ten-man security detail of riflemen from headquarters company to accompany wire crews on construction work. These security detachments were later to perform excellent service as will be shown.

On 22 September 1950, additional AN/VRC-1 mobile radio telephone equipments were sent to the 5th Marines and 7th Marines. Also on this day the Special Operations Company, U. S. Army was located at TA 0558H and a three-man radio team with a radio set, TBX-8, was assigned to that organization to provide communication with the division on the division command Able and Baker nets. Radio platoon of signal company of this organization at this time had operators and equipment assigned out in addition to their normal employment as is indicated below:

- To ROK Marines - Two (2) men with AN/VRC-6
- To 5th Marines - Four (4) men with TBX-8 and AN/GRC-9
- To ANGLICO - AN/VRC-1 (loan)

On 23 September 1950, this organization provided AN/PIQ loudspeaker equipment with operators for a representative of G-2 who used this equipment near front line areas to broadcast surrender instructions to enemy troops.

On 23 September 1950, the carrier platoon was directed to copy press schedules. When this press was submitted to the Division Chaplain for editing and publishing, the Chaplains office notified the carrier platoon that it could not publish the press because of a Staff directive against it since the Army Newspaper was generally available.

On 24 September, 1950, the number of units located in the Yongdungp'o-ri area had become so great as to require additional wire facilities. The 5th and 7th Marines were still so located as to be serviced through original cables across the Han River at TA 0861W. In addition to the 1st Marines in the Yongdungp'o-ri area there were advance elements, of 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 1st Service Battalion, 1st Ordnance Battalion and 17th Regiment ROK. To accommodate these activities a switch was installed at TA 1356A and the five-pair field wire cable previously constructed along the route was terminated there. A twenty-five (25) men group from this organization composed of fifteen (15) wiremen and ten (10) men security detachment was ordered to move to this terminal station and install and service telephone lines from there. Meanwhile, other elements, of wire platoon were engaged in constructing an additional five-pair field wire cable from the division to this switch, making a total of ten field wire circuits from the division to this switch. From this switch lines were laid to the units mentioned above as being in the Yongdungp'o-ri area. Access to the bridges across the Han River into Seoul was still denied because of enemy activity so on 24 Sep-

[REDACTED]

tember construction of lines from the switch to the river and across, terminating at TA 1557Q, was begun, LVT's procured from Baker Company, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion were used for this river crossing action.

These steps to install wire across the river in this location and at this time were dictated largely by the provisions of Division Operation Order 10-50, which called for the 1st Marines to cross into Seoul. Also, continued displacement of the 5th and 7th Marines toward Seoul from the northeast caused original lines laid to them to become too long and circuits laid these units via the projected new crossing would be much more satisfactory.

This cable crossing was considered quite hazardous since at that time considerable enemy activity was concentrated in the Seoul area and the location of the line terminal on the far shore was in a position which had not at that time been uncovered by the 5th Marines in their advance toward Seoul. Construction of ten circuits to the near shore of the crossing was completed on 24 September 1950. Following the crossing of the 1st Marines, ten lines were successfully installed across the river along a one-hundred (100) yard front and terminated as before described at TA 1657V.

On 25 September, and 26 September 1950, the necessary work was done to cut over the terminal equipment installed at the original switch at TA 1557Q and install a new switch at TA 1657V on the Seoul side of the river. For details of construction and routing of calls at this period, see line route map and traffic diagram (Figure 7 and 8).

On 26 September 1950, the radio operators and equipment previously shown on 19 September as being assigned to the 1st Shore Party Battalion and KMC, and one five-man wire team from the 5th Marines were returned to this organization after having completed the work assigned to them.

On 26 September, 1950, 11 officers and 68 enlisted joined ANGLICO from the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force.

On 26 September 1950, there occurred an event which justified the practice of assigning riflemen to wire construction teams. A wire construction crew had, at 0700 on the morning of 26 September 1950, begun laying two field wire lines from the switch at TA 1657V to the 1st Marines command post, then located at TA 2056H. This wire crew was accompanied by five headquarters company riflemen. The route of construction lay generally parallel to the Han River going south. As the wiremen were engaged in overheading previously laid wire they were fired upon in TA 1756A by what was later to be found to be two enemy snipers using automatic weapons. The wiremen did not have their weapons with them because they were mainly engaged in pole climbing. Four of the wiremen were thus pinned down by the enemy fire. Members of the security detachment had been in the rear of the wirelaying vehicles when the firing began and one of these riflemen was able to approach the house where the enemy was located, kick open a side door, and kill both snipers, thus enabling the wire construction work to proceed without interruption.

The rapid displacements of the 5th Marines had brought that organization on 26 September, 1950 TA 18580 from which location wiremen of this organization were able to construct lines to the newly installed switch at TA 1657V. When this construction had been completed it made possible the abandonment of the original crossing area lines for service to the 5th Marines. The lines to the 7th Marines were still over the original crossing route but, on 27 September, that organization displaced to TA 1961U, thus enabling wire to be run to them from the switch at TA 1657V.

[REDACTED]

All telephone trunk facilities with exception of those to 11th Marines now were via the cable to the Kimpo area on the cable paralleling the Han River with the switch at TA 1657V. This consolidation of wire trunks permitted greatly improved wire service and, for the first time since landing, the combination of radio relay telephone and metallic circuit telephone provided a complete division communication network.


On 27 September 1950, a division reconnaissance party departed the command post area and proceeded to Seoul to determine a location for a new command post. Members of this battalion included in the reconnaissance party were the battalion executive officer, S-3, signal company commander, carrier platoon commander, and wire officer. A location was decided upon in a former army barracks area at TA 2255L.

Beginning with the displacement of the 1st Marines across the Han River into Seoul on 25 September 1950, and continuing throughout the period of the liberation and consolidation of the city, the movement of the 1st and 7th Marines regimental command posts became nearly a regular daily occurrence. This frequent displacement caused communication problems concerning the regiments to be sharply increased. Maintenance of wire facilities to those regiments became a continuous process and there were periods when metallic telephone facilities did not exist. This fact brought more sharply into focus the many advantages of the radio relay telephone equipment which was now a common facility at the regiments. These vehicular radio telephone units were able to keep continuous contact with division throughout the regimental displacements and they were heavily employed.

For a long period prior to the operation the 1st Marine Division had been using radio frequencies in the 2000-3000 kilocycles band. Frequencies in this range were used on training problems in recent years and the same frequencies were assigned for the period of the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul operation. Radio communication was satisfactory with them until the entire complexion of the radio requirement changed starting on 20 September with the 5th Marine crossing of the Han River. Other division elements were soon also located across the river and the space and geographical considerations during the period showed marked disadvantages of the 2000-3000 kilocycle band. The frequencies proved satisfactory for night-time use but during the day they were unreliable because, at such a low frequency, only the ground wave presented a reliable transmission and the power necessary to communicate via ground wave over considerable distance could not be produced by MRC type radios.

Another fault with the 2000-3000 band presented itself in the form of interference from commercial radio stations operating on frequencies very close to 2000-3000 kilocycles. These commercial stations usually covered 15 to 20 kilocycles on either side of their assigned frequency and interference due to these stations was a major problem. Requests made to the division signal officer resulted in an additional assignment of frequencies on some nets and this overcame a part of the problem. However, there continued to be interference caused by harmonics of the afore mentioned commercial stations.

Message center messengers were having an increasingly difficult time in delivering traffic to the 1st and 7th regiments. On 26 September 1950, a four-man messenger team from this organization was attempting to deliver guard mail to the 1st regiment. After crossing the Han River, into Seoul by LVT, this group, driving a $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton



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Figure 8

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cargo truck was unable to proceed directly to the regimental command post. They asked directions frequently from various people and these directions proved misleading. The group found itself being fired upon and unable to proceed frontally or to either side. Since the route to the rear involved traversing several hundred yards without cover, their only course of action lay in leaving their vehicle and defending themselves in their location. The group was thus involved in a fire fight lasting more than two hours during which time one of their number was killed. A platoon of ROK eventually cleared the area enabling the remaining three messengers to proceed. The vehicle in which they had been riding had been riddled during the fire fight and was never recovered.

On 28 September, the advance echelon of this battalion left the command post in the Kimpo area at 0600. The only facilities for crossing the Han River were LVTs located at the crossing area at TA 1556W. The LVTs could carry only jeeps and trailers so the initial elements of this organization to reach the new command post were equipped only with $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton vehicles. Later in the day, army units had a type of ferry in operation which could accommodate heavier vehicles. Eventually this organization's heavy vehicles were able to cross via this means, but the priority system employed for using it was to cause a considerable delay in establishment of communication from the new command post. Previous instructions had been given the wiremen stationed at the switch at TA 1657V to construct from there a five-pair field wire cable to the new command post location. Vehicular radio equipments were in the initial concey to provide necessary communication facilities.

On arrival in the new command post area, radio, message center and local wire installations were completed. Radio communication included the Command "A", Command "B", Logistical Control and Task Group Commanders nets, all by means of mobile radio sets. The five-pair field wire cable construction was completed at approximately 1300 on 28 September 1950. Also at about 1300, a convoy of LVTs proceeded from the river crossing area along the river bank toward Kimpo Airfield and carried away the 10 submarine field wire circuits which represented the only telephone means existing at that time across the river. Loss of this submarine wire meant being out of wire communications with all units remaining on the west side of the Han River. As previously mentioned, this crossing was disposed to cover about one hundred (100) yards of river front. These units included 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 1st Service Battalion, 1st Ordnance Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Air Delivery Platoon, Combat Cargo Command, and the main division command post, still operating in the Kimpo Airfield area. The 1st Tank Battalion had displaced to the east side of the Han River on 26 September. At approximately 1400 on 28 September, a tank knocked down the lines between the division switch and the 5th and 7th Marine regiments as well as the lines to the 1st Tank Battalion. The lines to the 1st Marines remained intact, and at 1415 on 28 September the total wire communication from the new command post area was the five circuits to the switch at TA 1657V, from which location only the 1st Marines could be reached. Radio contact (CW) with the aforementioned units was reliable during this period, however. Ordinarily the radio relay telephone equipments would have been available to provide a telephone means to the 5th, 7th, and 11th Marines, but at this time the personnel and equip-

[REDACTED]

ment of carrier platoon were still at the river crossing trying to obtain sufficient priority for their transportation across the river on the previously mentioned ferry.

During this forward displacement contact with the mobile carrier teams was maintained through the rear command post at Kimpo. A duplicate carrier and mobile installation was displaced forward to take over control of the circuits when the equipment had been set up at Seoul.

When the submarine cables across the Han River were broken, the wire platoon of signal company immediately commenced reconstruction of the circuits. The cooperation of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion in this emergency was excellent and an LVT was directly made available to assist in the wire construction.

At 1700 on 28 September 1950, the division command post displaced to the new area. At 2100 on 28 September 1950, the carrier platoon equipment and personnel arrived in the new command post location and one hour later radio relay telephone service was operating with the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 11th Marines. At 2300 the submarine cable reconstruction had been completed and telephone service was restored across the river. For line routes and traffic routing see Figures 9 and 10.

The period 28 September to 30 September 1950, was one during which excellent communications facilities were constantly available and in use with the 5th Marines. This regiment had reached the Riko Girls School, TA 1958A and had installed its command post there on 28 September 1950. From this location two wire circuits to division via the division switch at TA 1657V were laid. Teletype facilities were installed by a phantom circuit using the existing telephone trunks. All normal radio channels to the 5th Marines were on a standby status during this period.


The same period of time involved continuous effort in maintaining communications with the 1st, 7th, and 11th Marines. These units were constantly displacing and by 30 September 1950, the 1st Marines were eleven (11) miles from the division command post, the 7th Marines were far beyond wire possibilities, and the 11th Marines were engaged in a displacement to TA 2760N from which location wire facilities were made available on 30 September. Normal radio facilities of the 1st regiment became inadequate with that units continual displacement and an SCR-399 radio with operators was sent to the 1st Marines on 30 September. This equipment, working with similar equipment of the division command post, enabled radio communications to be resumed.

The importance attached to the use of radio relay telephone equipment was illustrated on 30 September, when elaborate wire construction was performed between the location of the division radio relay terminals and the telephone switchboard. The initial radio relay terminal location in the Seoul area lay about one (1) mile from the division command post. All regiments were being reached from this location but, on 30 September 1950, the continuous displacements of the 7th Marines resulted in that organization being located beyond range of radio relay.

Reconnaissance to find another radio relay terminal location was conducted and a suitable location was found at TA 2256P. The only practical wire route to this location from the division switchboard involved over seven miles of construction. This was ordered and a five-pair rubber cable and a spiral four-cable were laid from the switchboard to the new radio relay terminal. This line proved difficult to maintain. Civilians repeatedly cut and stole sections of the line. It became necessary

Traffic Diagram
1st Marine Division, FMF

Effective
28 September 1950



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Figure 10

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for a radio relay installation at TA 2256P to relay the signals from that location to the initial radio carrier terminal one mile from the division command post. Relay installations were made to handle the circuits to the 7th Marines and for a short time the radio telephone circuit to the 5th. The carrier terminal installation to X Corps remained at the initial site near the division command post since it was impractical to move it to TA 2256P.

On 30 September 1950, an additional five-pair field wire cable was constructed between the division switchboard and the division switch at TA 1657V. On the night of 30 September, the division switch was cut out and all lines formerly serviced by it were run directly into the division switchboard. For construction details and routing of calls after the switch was cut out, see traffic diagram (Figure 11) and line route map (Figure 12).

On 30 September 1950, the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines had all moved to such distant locations as to make radio communications by using their organic equipment unsatisfactory. Carrier mobile units continued to function. This organization on that day dispatched a radio set SCR-193 to the 1st Marines, and a radio set SCR-399 with power units in K-52 trailers to the 5th and 7th Marines. Four operators and one technician accompanied each set. Use of these sets resulted in improved radio communications with these units.

By 1 October 1950, there had developed a considerable administrative section within the division command post. Various offices and activities opened which were not included in SOI-2 which assigned priority and telephone numbers to division activities. Examples of such activities were post exchange, Seoul Area Command (in Banta Hotel), Seoul area commanders administrative office, (in 1st Division compound), Seoul prison, AFRS radio station (in Banta Hotel), AFRS transmitters, (near division switch at TA 1657V), and others. In addition, the headquarters commandant requested phones be installed in the office of the headquarters battalion adjutant, headquarters battalion supply officer, headquarters battalion headquarters section, headquarters battalion galley, and headquarters company. The division switchboard was at that time using two switchboards, BD-96, and these were nearly filled to capacity with regularly assigned activities. To accommodate these additional requests for telephone service, an additional switchboard was installed in the headquarters battalion area. Two trunks from the division switchboard were laid to this board and all the activities mentioned above were provided phones with lines to the new board. Radio communications were reliable except for interference on Division Command Net from radio Seoul over which an Army Intelligence Unit broadcast propaganda periodically. Liaison was established with this unit and arrangements made to shift frequency during their times of operation.

By 2 October 1950, the communication requirements of the division had come well enough in hand to permit the organization to give a real effort to the reconditioning and servicing of its organic equipment. ANGLICO vehicles still attached to infantry units were of course unavailable for servicing and also unavailable were radio vehicles previously assigned to the infantry regiments. The battalion motor transport was able to perform organizational and field maintenance during the period 2-5 October 1950. This opportunity for servicing vehicles was the first such opportunity of the operation. The rapid movements of the division during the operation up to that time had caused nearly all of this organizations vehicles to be constantly in use.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On 3 October 1950, preliminary plans were announced for the displacement of the division command post to the Inchon area for reembarkation. The plan called for establishment of the command post in an area close to the original division location in Inchon at TA 9147C. Before any displacement had begun however, this plan was modified and the division location was changed to the ASCOM CITY area, TA 9851L. Division Administrative Order 12-50, issued on 4 October 1950, assigned staging areas for the elements of the division.

On 5 October 1950, a division reconnaissance party proceeded to the Ascom City area to determine the internal arrangement of the new command post. Included in this reconnaissance party were this unit's executive officer and wire officer.

Plans developing from conferences between the division signal officer and representatives of the Inchon Base Command and Second Engineer Special Brigade resulted in an assignment to army wiremen for construction of necessary telephone facilities in the Inchon staging area. These wire facilities were to be connected to the engineer special brigade switchboard and from there, trunk facilities existed to the X Corps switchboard in Ascom City. This organization's wire platoon was to construct trunk circuits from the new division command post to the X Corps switchboard and it was planned that this construction would provide sufficient telephone facilities to the staging areas.

No radio facilities were planned for the Ascom City area. No radio relay telephone installation was contemplated. Difficulties developing beyond the period covered by this report were to dictate that radio and radio relay installations be installed and that a great amount of wire construction be completed. For an account of such construction, see 1st Signal Battalion Monthly Historical Report for October, 1950.


At the end of the period covered by the special action report, this organization was engaged in maintaining communication facilities in the Seoul area, transporting equipment and personnel to an assigned staging area on the Inchon beach, and establishing communication facilities in the new division command post in the Ascom City area.

Division signal supply and repair platoon, an organic part of this unit is under the direct control of the division signal officer and is not discussed in this report.

8. ENEMY.

Examples of enemy communications countermeasures were infrequent. During the time the division command post was located at Inchon there were two instances of radio signal jamming on both the division command Able and Baker nets. On both occasions a shift to the secondary frequencies of these nets was successful in restoring radio communications. Two other instances of jamming were encountered on 21 and 22 September. These were directed only against a CW circuit and again a frequency shift solved the problem created by the jamming. In all cases the jamming was done by means of an oscillator on a single frequency and there was never an attempt made to jam more than a single frequency at a time. The location of the jamming apparatus was not determined in any case.

Enemy attempts at interference with wire communication were more varied. Two wire teams in vehicles were ambushed and several wiremen were killed or wounded as has been previously stated. On the night of 17 September 1950, an unidentified person, speaking in Korean, interfered with the lines between division and the 5th Marines.



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Figure 12

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

This unknown person had apparently tapped a phone on the line and spoke continuously for about 30 minutes, making the circuit unusable during that period. When the interference ceased the line was again used. There was no indication that an enemy was trying to gain intelligence by listening on the line, nor was the line cut or damaged. On the night of 30 September 1950, interference of the same type as before described was encountered, this time on the line between division and the 1st Marines. Again there was rapid talking for about a thirty (30) minute period and, at the conclusion of this, the line was once more usable. Both cases were probably the result of Korean commercial telephone companies attempting to repair their lines and cutting in on military field lines by mistake.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS.

It is felt that this organization has been able, throughout the period covered by this report, to carry out the mission which it had been assigned. Continuous communication was provided within the division. Problems were encountered that often resulted in temporarily reduced communication facilities. Such problems were all eventually solved, however, and each time their solution left this organization better prepared to meet the next than it had been to meet the last.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Established principles for the employment of communication personnel proved sound throughout the period of the Inchon, Kimp'o Seoul operation.

One prominent fact that influenced the performance of the battalion was that this organization, less than a month prior to D-Day, had been hurriedly assembled and had had no previous unit training, not even a rehearsal prior to landing. Although doctrine implies universality, there were none-the-less points of divergence in methods and interpretation of orders.

Signal plans made in advance of the landing were adequate and valid in all major aspects. There were some minor points which will be listed below where the development of the tactical situation prevented absolute compliance with orders.

(1) The direction in signal annex that wire would be laid on the right side of the roads was slightly restrictive and was at various times subordinated to other considerations, such as the availability of pole lines or the likelihood of vehicular traffic eventually over-running line routes.

(2) Radio officers sometimes found it difficult to operate in certain radio nets with the equipment which was assigned. Stations in all radio nets were sometimes beyond range of MRC type radio sets and, when this was true, heavier radio equipment was employed.

(3) Frequency assignments occasionally did not permit the best propagation considerations to be met. This was especially true in the MHF spectrum.

(4) The message traffic during the operation did not permit message center officers to institute scheduled messenger services.

(5) The radio relay platoon was initially hampered by having only two frequencies assigned to it. As has been shown, the extensive operations of this platoon required additional frequency assignments. Oral permission was obtained from the X Corps signal officer to use whatever additional frequencies which were not in use. This solved the problem but caused some temporarily disrupted communications since finding additional frequencies entailed a trial and error method. During the period of the operation the radio relay platoon used at least ten (10) frequencies chosen by this method.

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Signal plans were carried out in all but the above listed minor points. Creditable independent thinking was done by unit communication officers and communication staff non-commissioned officers when one of the above listed situations arose.

Little benefit was derived from the army wire personnel and equipment from X Corps; just the opposite obtained in the case of the army radiomen and radios attached. Their equipment and services proved invaluable.

Allowance of equipment proved adequate in all cases except those to be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

The attachment of the Carrier Platoon, Signal Operations Company, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, proved to be one of the most beneficial innovations to this unit.

The operation of the radio carrier terminals with higher headquarters although standard in previous operations for marine division, proved to be a very valuable means of communication. A great deal of initiative, however, was exercised by members of the carrier platoon in adapting parts of the presently authorized equipment to use in constructing the jeep mounted single channel radio telephone relay set. This equipment provided reliable voice communication between infantry units, artillery units and division headquarters when the Hen River separated the infantry from division and direct support artillery headquarters. The descriptive section of the exploitation phase and the photographic section, following, give detailed accounts of the construction of this equipment. It is recommended that further experimentation in this field of voice radio communication be made to construct a communication item for use between division and regimental headquarters.

Although the only function of ANGLICO headquarters in combat is personnel accounting and maintenance of supply and equipment, both of these problems proved extremely difficult due to distance between parent unit and attached teams posing the following problems:

(1) Reporting of casualties was a slow process. All casualty reports had to be submitted by signal battalion headquarters. Reports were sometimes delayed three (3) to five (5) days pending receipt of accurate information.

(2) Resupply and repair of signal equipment required long runs by company headquarters, ANGLICO, over difficult roads to keep equipment serviced. The system of requiring infantry units to service signal equipment never functioned properly since they considered these elements as beyond their responsibility because they were signal battalion elements.

(3) Supply of non-signal equipment had to be handled similarly to signal equipment.

(4) Dissemination or reception of any information to and from teams was difficult because of the great number of teams and their usually distant locations.

To overcome these difficulties, the following recommendations are made:

(a) That when ANGLICO teams are attached to infantry regiments, they be required to deliver their casualty reporting cards to the unit to which attached, and that the commanding officer of that unit be made responsible for completing and forwarding of these cards. When a team is again returned to parent unit, or to another unit, they be required to carry their casualty reporting cards with them.

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION *SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

(b) That when ANGLICO teams are attached to infantry regiments, all classes of supply and all maintenance be made the responsibility of the unit to which attached.

With the adoption of these two principles, ANGLICO teams will have a responsible unit close at hand to see that their needs are taken care of.

This unit has already increased the number of liaison visits to each team to insure that personnel and equipment are receiving the proper supply, maintenance, and administrative support.

In order to allow company headquarters, ANGLICO, to properly combat load all the required ANGLICO equipment, the following transportation should be authorized by T/E for that headquarters:

ITEM	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6	0	0	2	2
TRAILER, 1-ton, 2 wheel	0	0	2	2

Addition of these trucks requires the following changes in T/O to company headquarters, ANGLICO:

JOB	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
Pvt (Truck Driver)(3500)	4	4	6	6

ANGLICO headquarters is currently authorized a total of four (4) radio technicians and radio repairmen, but is only authorized one (1) item of repair equipment, i.e. Test-tool set, AN/USM-3. In order that these repairmen may provide proper maintenance of all ANGLICO equipment during training situations, and when ANGLICO teams are returned to parent unit during combat situations, it is recommended that the following change to the T/E be authorized:

ITEM	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
Tool equipment, TE-113	0	0	1	1
Test equipment, IE-9-C	0	0	1	1
Test equipment, IE-12	0	0	1	1
Test equipment, IE-17	0	0	1	1
Maintenance equipment, ME-36	0	0	1	1
Maintenance equipment, ME-40	0	0	4	4
Tool kit, 10223	0	0	1	1
Power unit, PE-75	0	0	1	1
Power unit, PE-210	0	0	1	1

It is further recommended that each naval gunfire liaison team each tactical air control party and each naval gunfire spotting team be authorized one (1) truck, ¼-ton 4x4, and one (1) trailer, ¼-ton, 2 wheel. Allowance of these items by T/E for the air naval gunfire liaison company would be changed as follows:

ITEM	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4	4	4	39	39
TRAILER, ¼-ton, 2 wheel	4	4	39	39

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

In order to enable the motor transport platoon of headquarters company to properly maintain these additional vehicles, the following change in the T/O for that unit is recommended:

JOB	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
Cpl(Auto Mechanic)(3516)	2	3	5	5

Message center principles were adhered to and the result was efficient operation of that facility. Figure 13 gives a generalized picture of the day-by-day operation of the message center and an indication of the efficiency of the agencies in handling outgoing message traffic.

Radio equipment of an infantry regiment was not adequate in some phases of the operation. A distance factor often made it necessary that heavier equipment than that organic to a regiment be temporarily assigned from the signal battalion to assure communication.

On the operation, signal company had available the following heavy radio equipment: One (1) MBB-3, and four (4) SCR-399, two (2) SCR-399 equipments authorized by T/A, one (1) authorized by and obtained from the army, and one (1) attached from X Corps. The foregoing equipments are considered the minimum required in operations of this nature. It was frequently necessary to furnish regiments with radio sets SCR-399 in order to maintain radio communication; and consistently necessary to employ the transmitters in the MBB-3 to maintain radio contact with these regiments, X Corps, and naval units.

Little difficulty was encountered in obtaining shipping space, loading, or in unloading these equipments. A problem might exist, however, in moving these heavy equipments over a very poor road system, but this could be overcome by the inclusion of a TD-18 tractor in the T/E for signal battalion. This tractor would also be of inestimable value in digging in such equipments, in retrieving such equipments in wet or soggy ground, and in general utility missions in the signal battalion.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the T/E for signal company be changed to include the following:

ITEM	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
Radio set, SCR-399	2	2	4	4
Tractor-dozzer, TD-18	0	0	1	1

Motor vehicle maintenance on the whole proved very satisfactory. However, there were two items which caused some amount of difficulty. When MRC and VRC type radio vehicles were originally supplied, some deep water fording vehicle parts were not installed. Prior to departure from United States, some deep water fording parts had to be replaced. Since replacement of parts for these items were not available at the time, standard motor vehicle parts had to be installed to keep the vehicles operating. Again, as deep water fording parts had to be replaced during operations, replacement in some cases had to be effected with standard parts during short periods. This unit is now attempting to replace all standard parts with deep water fording parts as time and supply permits.

One particular item of deep water fording unit, i.e. distributor (stock number WO-A-15959 taken from Supplement to Ord-9) proved most unreliable due to condensation forming in the distributor. This in turn, caused rust to form and eventually shorted the distributor causing failure.

DIVISION COMMUNICATION AGENCIES, EMPLOYMENT OF IN HANDLING OUTGOING MESSAGE TRAFFIC

DATE	AGENCY					Total No. Messages	Average T.O.D.
	Visual	Teletype	Telephone	Msgr	Radio	Outgoing	
15 Sept	1	1		3	29	34	1 hr. 20 min.
16 Sept	1	1	1	2	34	39	1 hr. 45 min.
17 Sept		13		10	12	35	1 hr. 24 min.
18 Sept		8		12	13	33	1 hr. 18 min.
19 Sept		5	1	10	16	32	2 hr. 24 min.
20 Sept		1	1	13	19	34	2 hr. 18 min.
21 Sept		10	2	12	6	30	1 hr. 36 min.
22 Sept		18	1	11	9	39	1 hr. 18 min.
23 Sept		8	1	6	9	24	1 hr. 1 min.
24 Sept		11	1	11	6	29	1 hr. 24 min.
25 Sept		19		5	9	34	1 hr. 18 min.
26 Sept		15		5	12	32	1 hr. 12 min.
27 Sept		20		1	4	25	1 hr. 1 min.
28 Sept		18		3	9	30	1 hr. 3 min.
29 Sept		18			8	26	1 hr. 1 min.
30 Sept		14	1	6	9	30	54 min.
1 Oct		28		15	4	47	1 hr. 24 min.
2 Oct		21	5	8	3	37	1 hr. 24 min.
3 Oct		32	3	7	3	45	54 min.
4 Oct		26	4	9	11	50	1 hr. 30 min.
5 Oct		32	1	9	5	47	1 hr. 30 min.
6 Oct		39	7	12	12	70	42 min.
TOTALS	2	358	29	171	242	802	28 hr. 17 min.
Overall average T. O. D. of each message							1 hr. 12 min.

The classification of the above message was as follows:

URGENT - 17
 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY 122
 PRIORITY - 192
 ROUTINE - 330
 DEFERRED - 141

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Maintenance of power unit, PE-95 proved difficult at times. Motor transport supply does not stock the fan idler pulley (stock number 1024MB), the carburetor (stock number TL91870) or (TL91878), and the governor (stock number TL-91877). The stock numbers listed are taken from TM11-904 (Power units PE-95 A,B,C,F,G and H). Signal supply dis-claims responsibility for procuring the parts in question. Resupply, for the most part, was effected by cannibalization of equipment abandoned earlier in the Korean campaign (July 1950) by the U. S. Army. It is recommended that responsibility for procurement of the parts in question be definitely fixed.

Principles of wire construction and employment received a stern test. Single or double lines of any length proved unreliable and unsatisfactory. Hasty construction without previous route reconnaissance caused many hours of unprofitable work. The practice of assigning small wire teams to regiments for the purpose of installing and maintaining lines to division proved workable only during the assault phase of the operation. Thereafter, the distances involved, the traffic in the area, and the frequency of displacements made it impossible for a small crew with limited equipment to maintain lines. Wiremen from this organization so employed worked to the point of exhaustion to keep wire in but they were unsuccessful. The solution to the problem lies in a realization of the fact that methods of wire construction which were once considered appropriate for corps and higher echelon have now become division methods. Large wire crews, using heavy equipment, constructing five circuit field wire cables over a previously reconnoitered route formed the foundation for the periods of time when wire facilities were adequate. The use of rubber communication cable WC-534 showed disadvantages of such cable. The normal rough handling that was necessary in handling the cable previous to and during its construction caused defective circuits, short circuits and cross talk between circuits in the cable. Difficulties encountered with rubber cable clearly showed that field wire W-110, cabled as will be illustrated in the photographic section, is the most effective type of wire construction. Circuit troubles are less frequent and, when they do occur, they are more easily found and corrected than similar troubles in rubber cable.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the T/E of signal company be changed as follows:

ITEM	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
TRUCK, V-17/MTQ	0	0	1	1

Two (2) deficiencies in authorized personnel have been noted in battalion headquarters. The function of the Operations Section has included the preparation of traffic diagrams, line route maps, circuit diagrams and other diagrams and overlays which of necessity must be prepared by a draftsman. This unit has trained a corporal to perform these functions.

The logistic section is currently authorized one (1) lieutenant with duties as S-4 and with an MOS of 3010. Since this unit requires an organic accountable officer, it was necessary to assign this function to the officer authorized as S-4. Prior to the operation, it was demonstrated that one officer could not perform both as an S-4 and as organic accountable officer. Consequently, it was necessary to assign an additional officer to duties as battalion S-4.

It is recommended that the T/O for battalion headquarters, headquarters company be changed as follows:

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

	PRESENT ALLOWANCE		RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
Captain (S-4) (2502)	0	0	1	1
Lieutenant (Acct O) (3010)	0	0	1	1
Cpl (Wireman - Drafts- man) (2501)	0	0	1	1
Lieutenant (S-4) (3010)	1	1	0	0

b. Since the Signal Battalion, 1st Marine Division has never before been organized for combat operation, a discussion of staff functioning of this unit is appropriate to this report.

The functioning of the S-1 section has been in accordance with normal procedure as specified in the staff manual, 1948, and presents no new or unusual problem.

The functioning of a "2" section has been limited to reports to the division signal officer of enemy interference to means of signal communication and to reports to higher headquarters of contact with enemy patrols or ambushes by wire and message center teams. The S-3 has received and forwarded all such reports.

The S-3 section has been the unique section of this unit and warrants discussion in detail.

Normal directives received from higher headquarters (signal annexes to operation orders) have been translated into battalion operations orders as received. When a division operation order was received and reference was made to a previously issued signal annex as to existing standing operating procedures, the S-3 section issued an operation order detailing job work to the various companies by platoons or to attached platoons as the situation required. When emergency jobs were assigned by the division signal officer to the signal battalion or when changes in communication plans were indicated by a change in the situation, verbal orders were issued to the company or attached platoon commander concerned, followed by written orders in the next operation order issued by the battalion (operation order was normally issued daily in furtherance of operations above).

After directives were issued, the operations officer, either directly or by coordination with the appropriate executive or special staff officer, arranged for the necessary operational and logistic support for subordinate units assigned for the following support:

- (1) Keeping an operation map up to date to indicate command posts and location of front line elements.
- (2) Arranging for provision of rations for departing teams or teams absent at meal time.
- (3) Arranging for extra transportation when needed.
- (4) Providing security guards from Headquarters Company or ANGLICO for teams working in danger areas.
- (5) Making preliminary reconnaissances of wire or messenger routes and radio sites when required.

After orders were issued, the operations officer kept a log of job progress for relay to higher headquarters as required and to assist in preparing reports.

The S-3 prepared all operation reports such as circuit diagrams, traffic diagrams, line route maps, (in conjunction with wire officer) and daily and weekly operation summaries (S-3 section only) for submission to higher headquarters.

Continuous supervision was maintained by the operations officer, executive officer and the commanding officer on the progress of jobs assigned. Continuous liaison was maintained with the division signal officer and with the division G-3 to anticipate changes to the existing tactical situation.

[REDACTED]

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION-SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

The principle disadvantage to this system of operation was experienced by the division signal officer in keeping himself informed at all times of the exact status of work progress in jobs assigned. The insertion of one or sometimes two echelons of command between the division signal officer and the operating platoons necessitated some delay in forwarding of information. However, this disadvantage could be overcome by physical location of the signal battalion command sections in close proximity to the division signal officer. In two command posts, sections were located as much as five hundred yards from the division signal officer.

The S-4 section functioned as directed in Staff Manual, 1948. In addition, daily expenditure of equipment consumed ordered or destroyed, and daily requests for replenishment (both signal and non-signal) were consolidated by the S-4 and forwarded as appropriate to either the battalion supply officer or the division signal supply officer.

c. Ship to shore - No comments or recommendations.

d. Technique of beach assault - Recommendations appear under subparagraph 10. g. and concern shore party communication organization.

e. Naval gunfire support technique - Recommendations appear in paragraph 10. a. and concern ANGLICO table of organization and table of equipment.

f. Close air support - Recommendations appear in paragraph 10. a. and concern ANGLICO table of organization and table of equipment.

g. Shore Party - It is recommended that shore party communication teams be deleted from the Signal Company T/O and be incorporated in the T/O of the Shore Party Battalion. By having these communication teams in the shore party battalion, administration and logistics would be facilitated. Further, signal facilities within shore party battalion would be improved because of the closer control possible for the shore party battalion commander.


The shore party should be assigned responsibility for installation of much of the wire system in the beach area and to service elements. This responsibility would be assigned according to the operation plan and the elements scheduled to be located in the beach area.

It is further recommended that these shore party communication teams be authorized one (1) cable plow LC-61 per team. This equipment is necessary in beach areas where normally there are no existing pole lines and the presence of many tracked vehicles makes ground construction unfeasible.

h. Effectiveness of weapons - No comments or recommendations.

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

[REDACTED]


ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

i. Evacuation technique- Previously covered. No further comments or recommendations.

R. L. Schreier
R. L. SCHREIER

APPENDICES:

1. Consolidation of T/O, T/E Recommendations.
2. Photographic Supplement.

ANNEX GEORGE GEORGE TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

APPENDIX 1 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -
 INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL OPERATION

CONSOLIDATION OF T/O, T/E RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Table of Equipment.

a. Signal Company: (T/E K-1883).

ITEM	PRESENT		RECOMMENDED	
	ALLOWANCE		ALLOWANCE	
	Peace	War	Peace	War
ENGINEER EQUIPMENT				
Tractor Dozer, TD-18	0	0	1	1
SIGNAL EQUIPMENT				
Radio Set, SCR-399	2	2	4	4
Truck, V-17/MTQ	0	0	1	1

b. Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company: (T/E K-1853)

MOTOR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT				
Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel	0	0	2	2
Trailer, 2-ton, 2 wheel	4	4	39	39
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6	0	0	2	2
Truck, ¾-ton, 4x4	4	4	39	39
SIGNAL EQUIPMENT				
Maintenance Equipment, ME-36	0	0	1	1
Maintenance Equipment, ME-40	0	0	4	4
Power Unit, PE-75	0	0	1	1
Power Unit, PE-210	0	0	1	1
Test Equipment, IE-9-C	0	0	1	1
Test Equipment, IE-12	0	0	1	1
Test Equipment, IE-17	0	0	1	1
Tool Equipment, TE-113	0	0	1	1
Tool Kit, 10223	0	0	1	1

2. Tables of Organization.

a. Headquarters Company: (T/O K-1886)

UNIT	MOS	PRESENT		RECOMMENDED	
		T/O		T/O	
		Peace	War	Peace	War
COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL					
Captain (S-4)	:2502:	0	0	1	1
Corporal (Draftsman)	:2511:	0	0	1	1
LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY					
Lieutenant (Acct Officer)	3010:	0	0	1	1
MOTOR TRANSPORT					
Corporal (Auto Mechanic)	3516:	2	3	5	5

b. Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company: (T/O K-1853)

MOTOR TRANSPORT					
Private (Truck Driver)	:3500:	4	4	6	6

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION.

- PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT -

The tactical situation during the period covered by this report obviously precluded the possibility of maintaining a running photographic record of highlights. Other considerations more important than the effective recording of accomplishments governed the actions of personnel of this organization.

It is none the less unfortunate that it was not possible to maintain a complete photographic journal since personnel of this battalion accomplished many timely and imaginative solutions to the communication problems presented in the Inchon, Kimpo, Seoul operation.

To partially offset the disadvantage of no photographic record this organization was able, at a time subsequent to the period of this report, to take pictures resembling as closely as retrospection permits the actual situations in effect during the time of the operation.

Therefore, none of the photographs which follow are intended to represent a given operational situation. They are intended merely to expand the narrative and to aid the reader in understanding its content.

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INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION.

The following series of pictures are to illustrate various features of the employment of radio relay telephone:

- 11 - ("B" photo) CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

(See original copy)

(Photo "A")

- 12 - ("C" photo) CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
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(See original copy)

(Photo "B")

APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

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INCHON - KIMPO SEUL OPERATION

(See original copy)

(Photo "C")

Pictures A, B, and C show general appearances of mobile radio relay telephone system. This is the type set which was used at regiments for communication with division. Under actual operating conditions the position of the jeep and trailer was so regulated that the two beam antennas were beamed broadside to each other.

Aiming the antennas broadside to each other minimized interaction between the receiver and transmitter and permitted duplex radio telephone communications without removing the equipments from the vehicles.

(See Original copy)

(Photo "D") - 1b -

(See original copy)


(Photo "E")

(See original copy)

(Photo "F")

Pictures D, E, and F are close-up views of the installation in the $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton cargo truck.

- 1c -



APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

(See original copy)

(Photo "G")

In picture G, the equipment and supplies carried in $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer is shown.

(See original copy)

(Photo "H")

The equipment in convoy is shown in picture H. It is to be reemphasized that the set shown is capable of maintaining regular telephone service through the division switchboard during the time the displacement is occurring.

(See original copy)

(Photo "I")

A view of a typical terminal station is shown in picture I. Lines are run from this radio terminal station into the carrier terminal switchboard and incoming and outgoing calls are handled as was described elsewhere in this report.

(See original copy)

(Photo "J")

Picture J shows a view of the terminal equipment within the terminal station shown in picture I. Each set shown here is in contact with one of the various regimental sets.

APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

(See original copy)

(Photo "K")

Picture K is an additional view of the interior of the carrier terminal station. Shown here are the terminal bays CF-1A and CF-2B by means of which telephone and teletype communication was provided to COMPHIBGUL-1 afloat. This communication was all that was intended to be provided by the radio relay platoon when the operation was in the planning stage. The additional services provided by this platoon as shown in previous pictures were all developed during the operation as communication requirements dictated.

(See original copy)

(Photo "L")

Picture L shows the repair facilities of the radio relay platoon. Such a repair shop was a continuing necessity because of the rough use to which the regimental sets

APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

[REDACTED] - APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT - INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

were constantly subjected. On more than one occasion the mobile units at regiments drew enemy fire and had to be quickly moved. On these occasions the primary considerations necessarily were not for the judicious and careful handling of the equipment.

A continuous source of confusion in any new command post installation develops at the telephone switchboard, where wiremen are engaged in setting up the board, installing locals, constructing trunk terminals and trouble shooting. The resultant noise and loss of efficiency was a disadvantage which this organization overcame by the use of a construction center.

As the picture M below indicates, the construction center was a series of terminal strips, TW-184, mounted in a wooden box. Each numbered pair at the construction center was wired into its corresponding numbered pair in the terminal frame BD-97. The cable connecting terminal frame and construction center was usually about 100 feet in length. This permitted the construction center to be located near the main wire construction axis from the command post while the switchboard could be placed in a more desirable location within the command post area. All construction work terminated at the construction center, leaving the switchboard area undisturbed.

Another beneficial feature of the construction center lays in the role it plays in trouble shooting. When a line goes out the switchboard operator notifies the construction center chief of the fact by means of a direct line from switchboard to construction center. The construction center chief then disconnects the switchboard side of the faulty line and handles all calls from the trouble shooting crews as they check the line. This frees the switchboard operator from this time consuming task. When the line is repaired the construction center chief reconnects it to the switchboard and notifies the switchboard operator that the line is again available for use. Picture M below shows a partially completed construction center. The lines shown in the center of the picture are rubber cables connecting the construction center with the switchboard terminal frame. The switchboard and frame in this case are in an adjoining room. The lines at the left of the picture are those going to local subscribers and distant trunk routes.

(See original copy)

(Photo "M")

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
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The series of pictures shown below is to illustrate the method of construction of five pair field wire cable. This type of construction was heavily favored by this organization during the entire operation.

(See original copy)

(Photo "N")

Picture N shows the equipment necessary for the construction of five pair field wire cable. The axle mounts in the $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailer are simply constructed. The picture shows wire on DR-4s. Actually DR-5s were more extensively used. Another vehicle with trailer always accompanied the one shown to provide additional wire and to carry personnel and equipment. The usual size of a construction crew was 20 men. These were disposed as follows:

- 1 Driver
- 1 Man with the trailer to tend drums and prepare new drums for splicing.
- 8 Men to pull wire as truck advanced and to cable wire together using short pieces of wire W-130 for this purpose.
- 8 Climbers. These men, when they became used to working together, could overhead eight spans of cable at a time.
- 2 Ground men to assist climbers, cut tie wire, and perform other work as required.

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(See original copy)

(Photo "O")

Picture O is another view of the cable equipment showing how the wire is pulled from the reels.

(See original copy)

(Photo "P")

Picture P shows linemen preparing to tie cable on pole. As is shown, the wire has been cabled on the ground. Climbers on the seven poles to the right of the climber shown are also in the same position on their pole and they will work together to tighten all eight spans whereupon the climber shown will make a basket weave tie on his pole thereby dead ending all eight spans. Other climbers need

only to hand their span on a hook PF-201/GT on their pole or make a light tie to hold the cable against the pole.

The practice of maintaining message center, and radio central as separate activities was not desirable. A practice developed by marine units in recent years of making a combined message center radio central became standard in this division during the Inchon, Kimpo, Seoul operation. The next series of pictures shows an example of the close association of these activities.

(See original copy)

(Photo "Q")

(See original copy)

(Photo "R")

Pictures Q and R show views of message center installation. Door in picture R opens into radio central.

[REDACTED] - APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL
ACTION REPORT - INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OPERATION

(See original copy)

(Photo "S")

(See original copy)

(Photo "T")

Pictures S and T show radio central. Note desk at doorway in Picture S. This door leads into message center. At desk in picture S the radio supervisor handles all outgoing traffic given him by message center and delivers all incoming traffic to message center.

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[REDACTED] - APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL
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The wire laying weasel proved its value in numerous situations where the best wire routes lay through rice paddies, along railroad tracks, or in other areas where trucks or jeeps could not be used.


(See original copy)

(Photo "U")

(See original copy)

(Photo "V")

Pictures U and V show a crew installing lines through a rice paddy area.


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(See original Copy)

(Photo "W")

Picture W shows a typical Division switchboard installation.

- 1m -


APPENDIX 2 TO 1ST SIGNAL BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
INCHON- KIMPO- SEOUL OPERATION

ANNEX HOW HOW TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

A9

1ST MEDICAL BATTALION
HUNGNAI, KOREA
30 NOV 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF

Subj: Special Action Report for period (25Sep - 7Oct50)

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to outline the highlights of the 1st Medical Battalion's activities in support of the 1st Marine Division during the initial amphibious assault at Inchon and the subsequent liberation of Seoul; to set forth the problems met and the methods used to solve them and to make recommendations based on the experience of the organization.

Detailed reports of subordinate organic units are attached as appendixes a, b, c, d and e. Considerations concerning special staff sections, as applicable, are incorporated in the body of this report.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

The battalion was set up according to the war strength table K 1558. Both numerical and personnel classification for Navy and Marine enlisted was at authorized strength with the exception of "C" Company which had organized with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade as a Collecting and Clearing Company on the basis of peace time table K 1525. Officer and enlisted personnel obtained from elements of the 2nd Medical Battalion and from various stations were integrated into the battalion. Upon departure from the continental limits of the United States the unit consisted of an H&S Company, two hospital companies and one collecting and clearing company. Company "C" (Collecting and clearing) was added at the target area when this group arrived with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The battalion organization was completed when the Collecting and Clearing Company "E" which had formed with the 7th Marine Regiment, arrived at the target area with that organization on D-Day plus seven and was immediately joined.

"H&S" plus the two hospital companies functioned as a division hospital unit during most of the action. Clearing platoons of the collecting and clearing companies operated hospital type installations. The collecting platoons of "E" and "D" Companies were divided into three sections of sixteen men each in support of an infantry battalion. The collecting platoon of Company "C" was divided into two sections to support any two battalions "on the line". Following the amphibious phase of the operation the battalion was augmented by three surgical teams temporarily attached from ComPhib Group One. Each of these teams was composed of three medical officers and ten hospital corpsmen. One team had, in addition, one medical service corps officer. These teams functioned with organic units of the battalion.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

This was limited because of the brief time factor involved. Approximately two weeks were allowed to organize four companies at war strength prior to embarkation. A series of conferences was held with newly arrived company commander and other key officers to indoctrinate them in matters pertaining to the organization and functions of a marine division and its supporting medical components. Missions and methods of accomplishment, schemes of handling and evacuating casualties to meet varied situations, problems of organization, administration and operation were discussed at length on the basis of experiences during the past war. One lecture was given to all officers on matters of general planning and preparation for combat. A scheme of preloading vehicles was borrowed from previous experience. It was found that with careful planning, initial supplies and equipment, sufficient for field hospital type care of casualties with facilities to hold a maximum of fifty patients at any one time, could be loaded on the vehicles assigned to a company. This scheme had been practiced by another medical battalion and was instituted in planning for this operation. Vehicles were loaded aboard ships by priorities to insure the initial arrival of the most critical items. The purpose of the plan was to establish capabilities of mobility, especially for the collecting and clearing companies, and to obviate the difficulties and delays attendant upon transfer to the beach, assembling and further transportation to a selected area sufficient supplies and equipment to establish a workable hospital or clearing unit.

4. OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Operation planning was not possible until reaching Japan. It was then learned that the division would engage in an amphibious landing and that the beaches and their approaches presented unusual conditions. Because of probable difficulties it had been decided to revert the clearing platoons, normally attached to the infantry regiments, to division control upon reaching the transport area. In this way these organic units could be more effectively deployed in meeting demands of the peculiar situation. It was agreed in consultation with the Division Surgeon that in the light of probabilities the initial location of the division hospital would most advantageously be just beyond (east) of the city of Inchon. A reconnaissance party consisting of the Commanding Officer of the Medical Battalion, the Company Commander of "A" Company and two marines (drivers) was organized and assigned a serial-number. It was planned that this group would precede the landing of the division hospital units, and in company with the Division Surgeon, select a location for the initial installation.

Most of the personnel of "H&S", "A", and "B" Companies had been embarked on one vessel and all equipment and supplies with motor transport personnel on another. Units were "serialized" to insure an ultimate landing of personnel and of supplies and equipment and to establish tactical priorities of the same.

Three casualty teams consisting of one medical officer and six hospitalmen, one from "A" Company and two from "B" Company, were hastily formed and embarked aboard separate LST's which were to beach during the landing. Their mission was the care of initial casualties and they would rejoin their units when this had been completed.

5. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

Prior to embarkation, approximately 50% of the battalion had received some field training although most of this was inadequate. Rapid turnover of enlisted navy personnel in "peace time" organization (both 1st and 2nd Divisions) plus the burden of organizational commitments apart from field training hardly accomplished the desired objective of preparing a nucleus of well equipped personnel on which to base a full war strength battalion. Despite shortcomings some personnel of elements received from Camp Lejeune and others in the original battalion at Camp Pendleton were fairly well prepared. "C" Company, already in Korea, with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade had had sufficient experience to serve as a background of training. Two administrative officers with the organic units had come from the 2nd Marine Division and had had considerable field training although no combat experience with the Fleet Marine Force. The others came from the 1st Marine Division and were equally well equipped. Two additional hospital corps officers had had no background of field experience. One administrative officer, later joined, had had combat experience with a Fleet Marine Force unit. Of the Medical Officers with the battalion, one had been with the 1st Medical Battalion, and one with a Fleet Marine Force Corps evacuation hospital. Three had been on one peace time training maneuver with the 2nd Marine Division several months previously. Of the others none but the Commanding Officer had had previous training or combat experience whatsoever. Because of the late arrival of most of the Medical Officers and many of the hospitalmen the short period prior to embarkation was necessarily utilized in assigning them and outfitting them with the necessary field clothing and equipment. In addition the operation of a dispensary, the procurement and preparation of equipment and supplies for loading and the details of organizing new units left little time for other training. As previously noted one lecture was given to all officers in medical operations in the field and several conferences were held with key officer personnel for the purpose of indoctrinating those with little or no previous experience or training. During the voyage to the target area a limited amount of training was feasible for the units embarked.

6. ARRIVAL AND DEBARKATION

Units of the battalion, except "E" Company, then enroute with the 7th Regiment, arrived simultaneously on D-Day. "H&S, "A" and "B" Companies, less their motor transport and property personnel were aboard one vessel; "C" and "D" Companies were embarked with the 5th and 1st Marine Regiments respectively. The reconnaissance group, plus "A" and "B" Companies debarked at 0545 on D-Day plus one and landed at approximately 0700 on Red Beach, Wolmi Do Island. The Clearing Platoon of "C" Company landed on Division order on D-Day plus three and the Clearing Platoon of "D" Company on D-Day plus five. The Collecting Sections of "C" and "D" Companies landed in support of infantry battalions to which they were assigned. "E" Company arrived with the 7th Regiment on D-Day plus seven and landed the same day. All units arrived ashore without incident. Vehicles of "H&S, "A" and "B" Companies commenced arriving the afternoon of D-Day plus one and by early morning of D-Day plus two, sufficient equipment was ashore to establish a hospital installation. The disparity of several hours between the arrival ashore of personnel and that of equipment was in part, at least, the

ANNEX HOW HOW TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

[REDACTED]

result of delay in calling the vehicle "serials". It had been the plan to call both vehicle and personnel serials at the same time. However, the hospital units debarked, it was afterwards learned, when their serial numbers were called in error. A unit of the Signal Battalion had been the intention. The vehicle and supply numbers were not called until later, when it was discovered that the personnel had landed.

7. ASSAULT PHASE

Not applicable to a Medical Battalion.

8. OPERATIONAL PHASE

D-Day -- All units of the battalion, less "E" Company and the supporting collecting sections of "C" and "D" Companies, were embarked in the transport area.

D-Day plus 1 -- The reconnaissance section and "A" and "B" hospital companies, less property and motor transport personnel and the three casualty teams aboard LSTs, landed early in the morning and moved to an assembly area near the railroad station in the city of Inchon. Vehicles began to arrive that afternoon and were assembled at the bivouac area. The reconnaissance group in company with the Division Surgeon made a reconnaissance east of Inchon and selected a school building as the location of the Division Hospital. A small advance party took possession and bivouaced there during the night.

D-Day plus 2 -- Remaining personnel and motorized equipment and supplies moved to the Division Hospital area and immediately commenced preparations to receive patients. At 1000 the remainder of "H&S" Company landed and joined the group. By 1500 the hospital was sufficiently prepared to receive casualties. Forty seven were admitted that day.

D-Day plus 3 -- The Clearing Platoons of "C" Company landed on order, remained uncommitted and bivouaced in the hospital area. The following plan of evacuation from the Division Hospital was initiated. All cases were given appropriate primary treatment. Those within a 10 day policy were held. Others, when their physical conditions warranted and when beach conditions permitted, were evacuated to a hospital ship and to pre-designated transports. This system was followed until an Army Evacuation Hospital was established on D-Day plus 14.

D-Day plus 4 -- Kumpo Airport had been taken by the 5th Marines and this unit was preparing to make a river crossing north of that area. Lines of evacuation to this regiment were becoming lengthy and promised to become further extended and complicated by the contemplated river crossing. Too, this area was well off the main paved road to Seoul and it was believed that a Clearing Hospital near Kumpo would serve excellently to give closer support to the 5th Regiment. Air evacuation from the airport was to be initiated the following day, an additional reason for having an installation in that area. A reconnaissance was directed by the Division Surgeon and this was immediately accomplished by the Commanding Officer of the Medical Battalion and the officers of "C" Company. Two buildings approximately one half mile northeast of the air strip were selected and "C" Company was displaced forward to operate a clearing hospital. Later that day one surgical team joined the battalion and was moved to the "C" Company installation to augment that unit.

ANNEX HOW HOW TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

[REDACTED]

D-Day plus 5 - "D" Company landed, assembled essential items of equipment and supplies and was displaced forward to join "C" Company in the operation of the clearing hospital at Kumpo. They were directed to keep their supplies and equipment loaded and intact as far as practicable, in order to remain mobile for possible independent commitment. A hospital corps officer was appointed as liaison with instructions to make daily runs to the "C"- "D" Company installation for the purpose of giving personal attention to supply and general needs of that activity. (This proved to be an excellent scheme, especially because of dependable communications and a distance involved of approximately fifteen miles from the Division Hospital to Kumpo Airport).

Air evacuation of patients commenced. Ten day cases were sent to the Division Hospital. Others, when their condition permitted, were moved to Japan by plane. All casualties were to receive appropriate primary treatment, to include major surgery when indicated.

D-Day plus 6 - No significant developments.

D-Day plus 7 - The 1st Marines had progressed to a point several miles east of the Division Hospital generally along the Inchon-Seoul highway. This unit had received heavy casualties when one battalion had been flanked early that morning. In order to evacuate casualties more effectively, a provisional collecting platoon consisting of the Executive Officer, seven hospital corpsmen and two marine drivers was formed. Several ambulances were assigned this unit which was then sent forward to operate in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post. Its mission was to serve as a "way station" in the handling of casualties, by establishing an interval point and ambulance "head" along the somewhat extended line of evacuation to the Division Hospital. By this means battalion aid station and collecting section ambulances could return promptly to the front line area. (This unit continued to move behind the regiment until the river crossing was made at Yong'Dong'Po. It remained in the vicinity of the crossing on the south side of the river until D-Day plus 14). "E" Company had arrived that day with the 7th Regiment, and joined the battalion at the Division Hospital area. This unit immediately commenced to assemble equipment and supplies from the beach and to prepare for future commitments.

D-Day plus 8 - No significant developments.

D-Day plus 9 - Two surgical teams landed and reported for temporary additional duty with the battalion. One was equipped with field clothing and essential individual equipment and sent forward to support the Clearing Hospital at Kumpo. The other team was sent to an activity at Inchon, established to treat civilian casualties.

Additional personnel and ambulances were sent forward to support the provisional Collecting Platoon which was receiving a considerable number of casualties.

D-Day plus 10 - Units of the 5th Regiment were approaching Seoul on the north side of the river and the river crossing at Yong'Dong'Po had been established. Roads on the north side of the river, west of Seoul, were poor and evacuation from elements there was again somewhat extended to the lower river crossing and thence to "C" Company at Kumpo. An excellent direct highway was thought to run along the south side of the river and connect the river crossing at Yong'Dong'Po with Kumpo Airport. A reconnaissance was made and established the fact that the road was clear and in excellent condition.

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Following this, casualties received at the provisional collecting station were directed to either the "C"- "D" Clearing Hospital, or to the Division Hospital, Inchon, as appropriate. Some 5th Marine casualties were beginning to cross at this point and it was felt that this might be a preferable route of evacuation for all casualties. This was to be investigated the following day.

D-Day plus 11 - Evacuation of all casualties when practicable via the upper river crossing (Yong'Dong'Po) was initiated. They were received by the provisional collecting station on the south side of the river and further evacuated in equal numbers to Kumpo and to Inchon. Some casualties continued to flow across the lower crossing but in considerably fewer numbers.

D-Day plus 12 - Civilian casualties had been noted to be numerous in the vicinity of Yong'Dong'Po. "E" Company was displaced forward to handle this exigency. The unit occupied a school house on the main thoroughfare of that city and began to receive casualties the following day.

D-Day plus 13 - By this time units of the Division had progressed well through Seoul and lines of evacuation had become extended, particularly from those units north and east of the city. "B" Company was displaced forward, occupied a school building in Seoul in the vicinity of the Division Command Post, and prepared to receive civilian and military casualties in separated sections of the installation. Military casualties falling within the 10 day policy were to be further evacuated to the Division Hospital at Inchon, others, when indicated, to the "C"- "D" location at Kumpo for evacuation by air.

D-Day plus 14 - "B" Company was receiving large numbers of casualties and was having difficulty evacuating them rearward. One surgical team at Kumpo and the provisional Collecting Platoon were displaced forward to support "B" Company in its operations.

D-Day plus 15 - By this time two events had taken place: (1) The line of evacuation rearward from the majority of elements of the Division had been broken by the establishment of the hospital; and (2) The 121st Evacuation Hospital (Army) had been established just east of Yong'Dong'Po. A thirty day evacuation policy was established by the X Corps and all casualties received at "B" Company falling within this policy were evacuated to that activity. Those outside this policy were evacuated to the "C"- "D" Clearing Hospital at Kumpo for further evacuation by air. Receipt of casualties was discontinued at the Division Hospital, Inchon. Approximately 425 casualties remained at this installation, most of them within the thirty day policy. Fifty of these were evacuated to the 121st Evacuation Hospital and approximately the same number were to be evacuated daily thereafter. Those which would be ready for duty within a few days were held and the few cases outside the policy were to be evacuated to the USS CONSOLATION when possible.

The surgical teams which had been assigned to the civilian casualties' activity at Inchon were displaced forward to support Company "E" at Yong'Dong'Po, which receiving large numbers of casualties from refugees returning to the city. The Battalion Administrative Section moved to Seoul in closer proximity to the Division Command Post in order to facilitate preparation and delivery of reports. The Division Medical Supply Section moved to Seoul also, in order to give closer

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support to battalion and regimental aid stations and to prepare for reequipping those units for possible future commitments.

D-Day plus 16 - Approximately thirty cases remained at the Division Hospital, Inchon. Further evacuation to the 121st Evacuation Hospital was discontinued to allow "B" Company more spaces for evacuation to that activity. The Evacuation Officer and five Army Ambulances with drivers placed under his control were displaced to "B" Company to support evacuation rearward.

D-Day plus 17 - By this time, few primary casualties were being received at Kumpo. "D" Company with elements of its collecting platoon that had rejoined the unit, were displaced rearward to the Division Hospital location east of Inchon. The company immediately began unloading its vehicles and preparing its plans for combat loading.

D-Day plus 18 - "D" Company completed its combat preloading of organic vehicles, to be used as a demonstration for the other Collecting and Clearing companies.

D-Day plus 19 - "C" Company commenced evacuating the few casualties it was receiving directly to the 4th Field Hospital and combat preloading was started. Supplies and equipment were obtained from the Division Medical Supply Section and from the 6th Army Medical Depot. "B" Company commenced turning its responsibility over to civilian physicians and nurses who had been working at that installation for some days. An Army medical administrative group arrived to assist temporarily in handling the problems of supply. The company then began preparations to resupply itself and to commence preloading of vehicles. The Administrative Section of the battalion returned to Inchon to rejoin H&S Company.

D-Day plus 20 - All remaining patients in the Division Hospital, Inchon, were evacuated or returned to duty.

D-Day plus 21 - "B" and "E" Companies discontinued receiving casualties, all patients were evacuated, and preparations were begun for movement rearward. Casualties from the Division had become minimal in number inasmuch as the infantry units were being withdrawn. The few evacuated from forward elements were sent directly to the 121st Evacuation Hospital and the 4th Field Hospital, both Army staffed activities. The operational phase was completed.

Further activities were chiefly concerned with preparations for mounting out. Units of the Division were preparing to displace rearward to respective assembly areas in Inchon. Preliminary preparations for staging, combat loading and embarkation were already underway. "D" Company established liaison with the 1st Marines for planning purposes. Advance parties of "C" and "E" Companies moved to the Division Hospital location east of Inchon for the purpose of establishing liaison with the 5th and 7th Regiments, respectively. The Division Medical Supply Section moved by truck to the former Division Hospital location, Inchon, now designated as the assembly area for the Medical Battalion. An advance echelon of "B" Company moved to the assembly area and began receiving their supplies and equipment being moved from Seoul.

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D-Day plus 22 - "B" Company completed its movement to the assembly area. "C" Company likewise moved late the same day. Commitments of supporting motor transport units were extensive during this period and trucks were not available to the battalion. This necessitated the displacement of both companies on the same day with battalion equipment alone, a major undertaking considering the limited organic facilities.

D-Day plus 23 - An embarkation order was published and final preparations for mounting out were commenced immediately. Companies "C", "D" and "E" were to be attached to the 5th, 1st and 7th Regiments respectively.

D-Day plus 24 - "C" and "D" Company vehicles, equipment and supplies moved to the staging area and "C" Company personnel embarked.

D-Day plus 25 - "E" Company, which had remained at Yong'Dong'Po for mounting out preparations, moved directly to Inchon and embarked. During the next few days remaining units staged supplies and equipment, and by 0230 of D-Day plus 30 embarkation of all personnel and equipment had been completed except for a few vehicles yet to be loaded. The Inchon - Seoul mission had ended.

9. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

The results of the operation of the battalion are gratifying. Casualties were handled promptly and effectively throughout; largely due to the early support given troops ashore and the close support maintained by displacing units forward to key points in the natural lines of evacuation. The selection of Kumpo Airport as the location for a Clearing Hospital proved fortunate. Its proximity to the lower Han River crossing and to air evacuation facilities was an ideal situation to effectively support elements of the Division on the opposite side of the river.

The Division Hospital east of Inchon on the main highway to Seoul was well located on a good road facility. Casualties from elements operating generally along this improved highway could be evacuated to this Hospital several miles in a short time. When lines of evacuation became extended along this artery and threatened undue delay in evacuation, the innovation of a provisional Collecting Platoon near the Regimental Command Post to handle, sort and evacuate casualties to the Division Hospital was effective. The ambulance run of battalion and regimental aid vehicles was thus shortened and enabled them to return more promptly to handle other casualties. As a result the Division Hospital, well established in good buildings, could continue longer in a desirable location which could not be duplicated short of Yong'Dong'Po. When the front had moved well into Seoul and evacuation again became difficult because of the intervening river crossing, close support was maintained by placing a hospital installation in that city. The Clearing Hospital at Kumpo and the Division Hospital, Inchon, were both well located to act as holding and evacuating facilities for the forward hospital installation. At no time did the system of evacuation become critically compromised. Cases did not show ill effects attendant upon excessive delay in receiving definitive and hospital type care. This is shown by the unusually low mortality rate of cases received by units of the battalion. The availability of good and slightly or moderately damaged buildings and otherwise desirable locations was a fortunate factor in the experience of the operation. The advantages both to the patients and to the staff were many and contributed much to efficient handling and care of casualties and to their comfort and general welfare.

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The addition of three surgical teams to the battalion, following the amphibious phase of the operation contributed greatly to the successful handling of patients. Attached to units where most needed they augmented the capabilities of major and definitive surgery, thus lessening delay in definitive treatment when casualties were heaviest.

The results of preloading vehicles according to plan were satisfactory, although circumstances did not offer a fair or adequate trial of the scheme. At least one company was able to take advantage of it. In that instance they displaced several miles and were prepared to receive casualties in a matter of a few hours.

The scope of responsibility met by the battalion is impressive. The medical support of a Marine Division is the normal function of a Medical Battalion. In this operation it initially supported in addition to that, one ROK Regiment, the 7th Army Division, and several small X Corps units. In addition many civilian casualties were treated by units or detachments of the battalion. The number of casualties treated (figures approximate) are as follows:

ACTIVITY	Div Hosp (Inchon) (A & B Co's)	"B" Co (Seoul)	"C" & "D" Kumpo (YongDongPO)	"E" Co by Gas Cliff	Total
MARINES	987	518	1301	5	2811
NAVY	40	11	27	0	78
ARMY	152	18	188	0	358
ROK & KMC	108	21	186	7	322
CIVILIAN	26	615	315	952	1908**
POW	0	0	39	0	39
Totals by En Activity	1313	1183	2055	964	5515*

*Grand Total patients processed by all Battalion activities.

**Does not include many hundreds of casualties treated by a group of Army and Navy personnel at Inchon, which was supported by personnel of the battalion.

One result of importance is the tremendous stock of good will established among the natives by the consideration and medical care given to civilian casualties by personnel of the battalion.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. GENERAL

The performance of organic units was remarkable considering that they were, with one exception, newly formed and largely made up of personnel with little or no training and almost without exception ("C" Co) no combat field experience. Shortcomings were noted particularly in the functions of command and in the capabilities of planning and organization. This was obviously attributable to lack of training and experience and is no reflection upon the natural abilities or aptitudes of the leaders, a fact evidenced by the rapid adjustment to an entirely strange situation made by all personnel. A little slow by standards of seasoned units, officers and men soon learned the demands of combat operation and organized to meet them. It is more than probable that the experience fitted them admirably to perform initially with greater facility and efficiency in another operation. Once committed personnel almost without exception worked as though dedicated to their particular tasks. Considerable individual initiative and sense of responsibility was evident and the results are a credit to those concerned.

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Despite the abrupt indoctrination into a combat unit and the consequent lack of physical and psychological preparation of many officers and enlisted personnel there was no case of situational maladjustment; although casual observation of some of the personalities prior to embarkation had given cause for concern. It is only conjecture to say that this might have been otherwise if operational conditions had not been less than usually arduous for units of the battalion.

As is the case with all combat units, adequate supply is a sine qua non and a good measure of credit for the success of the units is due the property personnel who evidenced an intimate knowledge of their supplies. Needs were anticipated and could be satisfied promptly from well organized stocks.

b. PERSONNEL

(1) Training - much has been said in previous reports regarding the advisability of field medical training for a larger percentage of medical officers. It is mentioned here only for reemphasis. As to hospital corpsmen, training is equally important. Rapid turnover of these personnel observed in both major FIF activities not only fails to give many personnel sufficient training for field work but also deprived the peacetime medical battalions the benefit to function effectively in the field and thereby to act as adequate training media for uninitiated personnel. Too, units should be freed of all commitments other than field training. In this way full time and attention can be given to problems and methods peculiar to field medicine. A small peacetime battalion responsible for running a sizeable dispensary can hardly become a well trained nucleus for a full battalion immediately committed to combat operation.

The importance of good First Aid cannot be overemphasized. It is invariably beneficial to the patient, frequently lessens the complication of injury and occasionally saves life. In many instances lack of knowledge of its accepted principles and methods was evident in this operation. It is apparent that medical officers consider First Aid "beneath them" and that corpsmen have been inadequately trained. Hours of instruction and drill are required to train a good "first aid man". Even then occasional refresher exercises are necessary to retain competence. This is one specialty every navy corpsman should master as there is constant need for its application. Medical officers likewise should consider the technique more seriously and learn some of the principles which will be often found applicable in the field.

(2) Dental Section - This section is a part of H&S Company and consists normally of 18 (21 during this operation) Dental officers and 35 corpsmen; The complement was set up during the past war to augment regular dental service to personnel of a war strength division during intervals between combat. It has no opportunity to accomplish its purposes during combat. It was intended that it would operate as a part of a rear echelon, and it should therefore not be included in a combat task organization as was done on this operation. It is recommended that the dental section be brought to war strength only when there is an opportunity to fulfill its intended mission. The normal peacetime complement plus a Maxillo-facial team would be sufficient dental personnel for the battalion during combat.

In this operation dental officers and technicians were either assigned or voluntarily assumed numerous and varied tasks and were a great help in many instances to the activities to which they were assigned. Some of the Dental Officers

performed administrative duties and others were mere professional (non-dental) duties. At least two served as anesthetists after some practical supervised experience. The dental corpsmen likewise performed duties apart from their specialty, in many instances relieving others of necessary but menial tasks and freeing them for strictly hospital duties. This would appear to be a justification for including the full dental section in the combat organization but despite the considerable contribution made it seems prodigal of personnel highly trained for duties not applicable under combat conditions.

(3) Medical Specialties - There was a critical shortage of medical personnel with experience in anesthesia. The Junior Medical Officers were for the most part reluctant to undertake responsibility for long abdominal cases. One junior officer had had training in anesthesia and found it necessary to carry the burden of the anesthesia in the Division Hospital. At least two officers with some training in anesthesia should be made available to this unit.

c. ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT

These items for the most part proved adequate and sufficient. The laundry unit was recently deleted from the table of equipment allowance for the battalion. One was obtained by special request and proved invaluable in handling soiled hospital linen. A K-37 generator was obtained from the Engineer Battalion by loan when the hospital expanded and demands for power increased beyond the capabilities of smaller units.

d. VEHICLES

Field type ambulances (3/4 ton) were more practical for hospital use inasmuch as improved roads were available for evacuation of casualties. A critical shortage of this type of ambulance at the Division Hospital was alleviated by the assignment of a platoon of Army field ambulances. These were used chiefly to evacuate patients to the beach evacuation station. They served the purpose well and freed organic transportation for commitments forward.

The demands placed upon the transportation facilities of the Division Hospital apart from ambulance runs are many and varied. Unless controlled and coordinated, trips are duplicated, unessential runs are made and a critical shortage of available vehicles may exist when there is an urgent need for them. This situation threatened during the operation. It was promptly avoided by setting up a dispatching system to log all vehicles in and out of the compound and by placing a control system on transportation requests to better coordinate trips and to preclude non-essential runs.

e. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES (MEDICAL)

The quantity of medical supplies was adequate except for a few non-essential items stocked in insufficient amounts or in part lost in transit. Most items were readily obtained from naval ships in the Incheon Harbor. A few items essential to latest accepted practices were wanting. On the other hand there are many items which were non-essential or archaic and others which were provided in quantities far beyond any anticipated requirements. It emphasizes the necessity of continual review and revision of medical field units and supply blocks in order to keep step with medical progress.

One item of simple equipment which deserves specific mention is the "litter support". Two of these made in the general design of a "horse" thirty inches high will support a litter at convenient height for examination and primary treatment of casualties. By this means litters can be used as "tables". This method saves the patient handling and serves as a convenience to the Medical Officer and corpsmen treating large numbers of casualties. Several sets of these supports will comprise an adequate number of "tables" for receiving sections and recovery sections of a casualty station. "Horses" constructed of iron pipe, used by one battalion during the last war were found to be an invaluable asset. The few crude horses constructed of wood and iron pipe used during this operation were appreciated greatly by Medical Officers and hospital corpsmen, a fact which emphasizes their value. A project to develop a light, compact, similar type of support was begun at the Field Medical Research Laboratory, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, some months ago. It is highly recommended that this item be perfected as soon as practicable and made available to field activities.

ERRATUM

Reference paragraph 5, that portion which reads, "Of the others none but the Commanding Officer had had previous training or combat experience," is corrected to read, "Of the others none but the Commanding Officer and one Company Commander, had had previous training or combat experience."

ADDENDUM

PRIOR

The body of this report was prepared to the receipt of reports of subordinate units. This was done in order to record data as early as practicable following the operation when events were fresh in mind. Company reports were prepared later and additional comments, based on these appendixes are indicated in the interest of completion. These are presented as this addendum.

APPENDIX A

Page 3 - para (4) - It is noteworthy that 58% of casualties received by the Division Hospital (Inchon) were salvaged for further duty with their organizations under the existing evacuation policy. This creditable rate can be explained on the basis of several factors: (1) facilities and care afforded casualties (2) judgement in "sorting" (3) capabilities of holding large numbers of casualties long enough for reasonably accurate prognosis under the evacuation policy. The last factor is significant because it indicates an important value of the Division Hospital. Once established (i.e. when the tactical situation permits) this activity can salvage many cases for duty who would otherwise be evacuated out of the Division and in some instances out of the area. Delay in return to their organizations incident to transfer to ships and in some cases loss to the Division entirely is obviated by the field hospital. This is not usually as practicable for a clearing hospital because of its function and ordinarily limited facilities. For this reason the Division Hospital type of casualty station is essential if a high rate of depletion of personnel is to be prevented. The normal flow for casualties should be through that activity therefore once the complete medical facilities of the Division are in operation ashore. Exceptions are those casualties obviously lost from duty for an extended period. These can be evacuated appropriately to the Division Hospital or directly to more rearward activities (seaward or by air) as the situation and the condition of the casualties permit.

In this operation many casualties which were likely candidates for return to duty within existing evacuation policies were evacuated by air from Kumpo Airport. This occurred during the period of stress when the clearing hospital was burdened with large numbers of casualties and holding facilities were crowded. The situation might have been improved by increasing ward spaces by the use of tentage. This would have allowed time for sorting and more judicious evacuation. Those selected as probable candidates for duty under the evacuation policy could have then have been evacuated to the Division Hospital. This procedure was followed in fact, later in the operation and worked effectively. Had this been feasible throughout the percent of casualties from the Clearing Hospital salvaged for duty would have been much higher. (See comments under appendix C this addendum)

Page 6 para (2) - Personnel)

The table of organization provides for one psychiatrist in the Division Hospital. None, however, was provided for this organization. At least one trained general surgeon is every company is essential. The matter of anesthetists has already been discussed in the body of this report.

Perhaps the greatest handicap to the organization with respect to personnel, was the paucity of medical officers with more than elementary experience. This was particularly

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felt with regard to the treatment and sorting of battle casualties. Mostly young lieutenants (jg), they were insufficiently experienced in the practical application of basic principles of surgery to handle wounds properly without instruction and supervision. This imposed undue burden on the few more experienced heads who were often occupied with more complicated problems. In an operation of this kind the great preponderance of cases are battle casualties and therefore, in personnel planning the emphasis should be on officers who are familiar with the practical application of surgical fundamentals. The additional general experience of a proportion of lieutenants senior grade as provided for in the tables of organization complement would be more likely to meet the demands of the the situation, particularly if their experience had embraced some surgery.

Page 6 para (3) Personnel)

This would hardly be feasible. The engineering requirements of a Division Hospital cannot very well be anticipated and therefore planned. It would seem better to ascertain needs first and then request the advice and help of that group. This method has proven satisfactory in most instances in the past.

Page 6 - Item (1) Equipment

The surgical trailer is not yet accepted as standard equipment and it is classified as an experimental unit. It is generally approved in principle but the need for redesigning has been recognized for some time. A project for this purpose was being instituted at the Field Medical Research Laboratory, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in July of this year.

Page 6 - Item (2) (Water Supply)

Concur.

Page 6 - Item (3) (Electrical Power)

The larger type generator (37 KW) obtained from the Engineer Battalion was used during most of this operation. Personnel were furnished to run the equipment and it proved most satisfactory. It is a large heavy trailer which requires trained personnel to manage. The present allowance of generators adequately fulfills the initial needs of the hospital and does not require a 2½-ton prime mover. The large generator could not very well be brought ashore with the initial equipment because of the limited number of prime movers in the battalion which are already committed to trailers of high priority. By the time the hospital expands to the size the 37 KW is needed it should be available through the Engineer Battalion.

APPENDIX BAKER

- Para 10-B See comments on appendix in this addendum.
- 10-C " " " " " " "
- 10-E Comments on Dental Section covered in body of this Annex
- 10-F The matter of keeping basic allowance of medical supply and equipment in step with current needs to meet accepted standards of treatment is considered in the body of this report

ANNEX HOW HOW TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

APPENDIX CHARLIE

Page 3 - The buildings of this installation were hardly adequate to handle 500 casualties. Had they been, many cases could have been held for sorting and further evacuation to the Division Hospital as discussed earlier. Tent or quonset hut (available) wards would have increased holding facilities to the figures mentioned.

Page 4 - Using the figures in the table it is calculated that less than 18% of patients admitted were salvaged for duty as contrasted with the 58% from the Division Hospital.

This bears out the assumption made earlier. (See comments under appendix A this addendum).

Page 5 (Table) - The figure of 379 surgical procedures under the classification of compound fractures is misleading, inasmuch as the table is a breakdown of procedures rather than diagnoses. It is possible that most of these should have been placed in the last category (debridements etcetra) as it is unlikely major procedures were performed in the majority. Another table to show classification according to types of injury could have indicated the number of compound fractures.

Page 5 - para 10-B - The Clearing Hospital was ideally located in this operation. The proximity to the forward area and at the same time to the air facility provided for close support to the regiment and a ready means of evacuation. It is unlikely that this situation would often exist. Seaward evacuation during an amphibious operation remains the most dependable and it is to be kept in mind that assault landings are the normal maneuver for a Marine Division. Air evacuation if and when feasible and available may serve as a valuable adjunct to the evacuation system as it did in the instance. Its value of course would increase immeasurably if seaward evacuation is for some reason interrupted and air evacuation is in turn available. Another point to be kept in mind in this connection is that it is one of the principal purposes of the Division Hospital to provide holding and primary definitive treatment facilities for casualties when means of evacuation are not available.

Page 7 para E - (See note under comments Appendix Able this addendum)

The objections given are even more applicable with respect to a Collecting and Clearing Company which is intended to remain more mobile and should not therefore be overburdened with heavy equipment.

Page 7 para G (See previous comments)

Page 7 para H2 - The procedure outlined undoubtedly produced good results in this experience. However is at variance with current methods of many chest surgeons and may therefore be subject to debate

Enclosure B to Appendix Charlie (Collecting Platoon)

As in past operations there was much mismanagement, misuse and inefficient deployment of this "evacuation unit nemesis". Suffice to say that the whole matter of organization, function, operational control and deployment of this platoon needs thorough study and revision.

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[REDACTED]
APPENDIX DOG

(No comments)

APPENDIX EASY

Paragraph 10 -- Concur

H. A. JOHNSON

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[REDACTED]

APPENDIX A
TO
ANNEX HOW HOW
COMPANY "A" FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FIRST MARINE FORCE

Period Covered
17 August 1950
to
7 October 1950

1. INTRODUCTION:

The special action report of Co. "A", 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Marine Division is submitted in accordance with Para. 11401, 2a Marine Corps Manual, 1940. The purpose of this report is to supplement the historical records of the Marine Corps and provide recent information on experiences in the field to those concerned. Company "A", 1st Medical Battalion was assigned the mission in conjunction with Companies "B" and H&S of forming the Division Field Hospital during the Inchon-Seoul operations. As such, it was to receive casualties from the forward collecting and clearing companies, perform emergency surgery on severely wounded casualties; supply forward echelon medical units with supplies and equipment, provide medical and surgical treatment to those casualties which could be returned to duty in a short period of time and evacuate those casualties which would require prolonged convalescence. The next higher echelon for the purpose of administration, discipline and tactical operation was Commander First Medical Battalion, Commander Howard A. Johnson, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

Company "A" was formed at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California. Its' augmentation to wartime organization strength was accomplished only two weeks prior to departure from the Continental United States. The unit was composed of eight officers including one Commander, MC, USN, six lieutenants (Junior Grade), MC, USN, and one commissioned warrant officer, EC, USN. There were ten HMC and forty six other enlisted corpsmen. One Master Sergeant and twenty nine other enlisted Marine Corps personnel were attached to provide security, messing facilities, laundry service, and drivers and maintenance men for the vehicles. Company "A" was under the command of Commander Byron E. Bassham, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING:

Preliminary planning, planning schedules, logistic planning and operation planning were included in the general operations order of the division.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS:

The short time prior to embarkation from Camp Pendleton was occupied in outfitting of personnel and securing necessary equipment and supplies. Only one lecture on medical operations in the field was given the officers during this time. This was particularly unfortunate since of the medical officers only the Commanding Officer had previously served with the Marine Corps in the field and four of the medical officers reported for duty having just completed their internships. Daily lectures were given aboard ship which were of necessarily limited scope due to crowded facilities. While there was no opportunity for training as a unit prior to embarkation, a number of the enlisted personnel had served previously with the Marine Corps and their experience helped immeasurably in the initial organization during combat.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION:

The unit departed San Diego 17 August 1950 aboard the USNS Marine Phoenix and arrived in Kobe, Japan, 2 September 1950. A working party of twenty men with the Commanding Officer and Hospital Corps officer remained in Kobe to supervise the unloading and combat reloading of vehicles and equipment while the remainder of the company proceeded by rail to Camp Otsu, Japan. Vehicles and equipment were loaded aboard the USS Whiteside (AKA-90) along with drivers and necessary personnel for guarding and handling of supplies. On 9 September 1950 the remainder of the company embarked aboard the USS President Jackson (APA-18) and the ship moved to anchorage in the outer harbor.

6. MOVEMENT AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA:

On 10 September 1950 the convoy left Kobe for the target area. The company now having been informed of the nature of the amphibious assault contemplated could better plan for the accomplishment of its mission. In addition to assisting the ship's medical officer in the routine sick call for troops, plans were made to handle casualties aboard ship during the initial assault phase prior to commitment of the company. The convoy entered the outer harbor of Inchon, Korea at about 1700, 15 September 1950 as the city was under heavy attack from aerial and naval gunfire.

7. OPERATIONS:

It had been planned that a reconnaissance party consisting of the Division Surgeon, Medical Battalion Commander, and Company Commander, "A" Company would go ashore on D+1 to select a site for the Division Hospital. However, an error in calling the serials of the Signal Battalion resulted in landing the personnel of "A" and "B" Companies at 0545 on D+1 on Green Beach, Wolmi-Do Island. The companies bivouaced in a building near the Inchon railway depot and by afternoon the fighting had moved sufficiently beyond the city limits that the reconnaissance party could examine the area for a suitable hospital site. In the meantime vehicles and equipment were being unloaded and assembled in the bivouac area.

On scouting the area along the main Inchon-Seoul highway as far as the military situation would permit, a site was selected approximately two miles east of the city of Inchon. The site selected had been a former school in moderately good repair consisting of two main buildings. The larger, three stories in height, was selected for hospital use while the smaller two story building was used for medical supply, records and general administrative offices. A large playground was later used as a motor park, messing area, and for supply dumps. Having deemed the site adequate the commander of "A" Company returned with fourteen corporals and marines to secure the area and commence preliminary cleaning of the buildings. There was sporadic rifle fire throughout the area during the night and one of the guards posted was fired on during his watch.

At 0830 D+2 personnel of "A" and "B" Companies began to arrive at the hospital site. Equipment was installed as rapidly as it arrived so that it was possible to efficiently care for the first casualty who arrived at the hospital at 1300 on D+2. At 1700 the same day, the first of many major abdominal operations was performed. By midnight the hospital had admitted forty seven casualties.

An admission room was set up in a large alcove near the entrance to the building. Here one team of corporals secured preliminary record data while another team administered tetanus toxoid, penicillin and morphine, if necessary. The admitting medical officer then directed the patient either to the nearby shock room or appropriate ward.

[REDACTED]

The shock room was set up so that litters could be placed on saw horses and/or tables at convenient working height. Pooled type "O" blood was used in most instances alone or in conjunction with plasma and it is gratifying to report that no reaction was noted following its use although some of the blood was out-dated and flowed through the tubing with difficulty. Expendable recipient sets were used and likewise proved their worth not only in lack of reactions but also through the great amount of time saved through their use.

An operating room containing four tables was set up next to the shock room. Here all major surgery other than abdominal cases was performed. Debridements and minor surgery were usually performed in the shock room. All abdominal surgery was done in the two surgical trailers of the hospital companies. Despite the many disadvantages of the present surgical trailer, further discussed under Section 10, their use was felt to present the greatest opportunity for operating under relatively sterile conditions.

Central supply was located between the two operating trailers and the operating room. Two corpsmen were on full time duty here supplying sterile supplies and equipment not only to the hospital but to numerous other medical installations of the division and to Army and civilian medical activities until the latter were able to institute their own supply.

The following were also located on the ground floor of the hospital in close proximity to the aforementioned activities; A large surgical ward for immediate post operative care and for use as an evacuation ward, cast room, orthopedic ward and X-ray. The two upper floors were occupied by surgical and medical wards. When the patient load increased beyond the capacity of the building, tents were erected for convalescent surgical and medical care, venereal disease and for treatment of civilian casualties.

During the first three days of operation, the hospital received casualties directly from the front line activities as no collecting and clearing company had as yet been committed. During this period all X Corps casualties, including Marine, Army and Korean, were channeled through the Division Hospital. Following establishment of two collecting and clearing companies at Kimpo Airport, front line casualties were received only by helicopter and from the 7th Regiment. Casualties from the 1st and 5th Regiments were sorted at the aforementioned clearing station and transferred to the hospital in accordance with the evacuation policy. A ten (10) day evacuation policy was followed initially until 30 September when a 30 day policy was instituted. Evacuation of patients was to hospital ship until 1 October when the Army 121st Evacuation Hospital was opened. From that time, some patients falling within the limits of the evacuation policy were transferred to that activity for treatment and convalescence. It is of note that of 1287 military casualties admitted, 550 were returned to duty from the activity.

On 28 September "B" Company was displaced to Seoul to set up a forward hospital and on 30 September "A" Company discontinued receiving patients. By 5 October all patients had been returned to duty or evacuated and preparations were under way for mounting out. Loading of vehicles and equipment was begun aboard the USS Oglethorpe (AKA-100) and on 14 September the company less a detachment with vehicles and supplies were embarked on the USS Marine Phoenix.

During the operation two casualties occurred in Company "A". Robert Henry Rempel, Cpl, USMC was shot in the right thigh by a sniper while in the vicinity of Kimpo Airport on the night of 21 September 1950.

On 24 September 1950 Sergio M. Martinez, HM2, USN was shot and killed while standing at the entrance to the hospital, presumably by a sniper. A search was immediately made of the hospital and surrounding grounds and two suspected communists apprehended and turned over to the X Corps Military Police.

8. ENEMY:

Not applicable.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:

Results of the Division Hospital at Inchon, Korea are explained in the following tables.

MILITARY CASUALTIES HOSPITALIZED

<u>Date</u>	<u>Adm</u>	<u>Evac</u>	<u>Duty</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>DOA</u>	<u>Remaining</u>
9-17-50	47	0	1	2	0	44
9-18	114	18	14	1	1	124
9-19	120	36	27	0	0	181
9-20	84	39	64	0	1	162
9-21	125	36	20	0	0	230
9-22	76	39	32	0	0	235
9-23	101	67	49	0	0	220
9-24	69	34	15	1	1	238
9-25	56	24	37	0	0	233
9-26	103	47	23	0	0	266
9-27	139	33	30	0	0	342
9-28	122	71	35	0	0	358
9-29	62	68	75	0	0	277
9-30	62	102	64	0	0	173
10-1	0	84	44	0	0	45
11-2	1	4	5	0	0	37
11-3	0	6	4	0	0	27
11-4	1	0	2	0	0	26
10-5	<u>5</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	1287	716	564	4	3	

Total Surgical Patients 1007
 War wounds 764

Total Medical Patients 280
 Venereal 45
 Psychiatric 35

Comparison of types of wounds.

Extremities.	391
Wounds, multiple	152
Buttocks and back	78
Head	37
Neck and face	35
Chest.	26
Abdomen.	23
Eye.	16
Burns.	13

Resume of surgical procedures.

Major abdominal.	30
Repair of small bowel.	19
Repair of large bowel.	5
Repair of urinary bladder.	4
Nephrectomy.	1
Laceration of liver.	5
Laceration of diaphragm.	7
Appendectomies	5

Other surgical procedures.

Urethral repair.	2
Enucleation of eye	8
Tracheotomy	1
Maxillo-facial repair.	4
Amputations, extremities	4
Fractures.	84

No totals are available on number of debridements, suture of lacerations and other minor surgical procedures.

Total deaths (military personnel) after reaching hospital.	4
Total deaths following major surgery	1
Percentage survival after reaching hospital	99.68

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Personnel.

1. It is self evident that medical practice in the field offers unique problems not encountered in the usual Naval or civilian practice. It is often a difficult adjustment both professionally and psychologically and the officer or man whose previous duty has been limited to shipboard or naval hospital may have difficulty in adapting to his new role. Therefore, it is strongly suggested that at least a six months course of duty through either a Field Medical School or with the Fleet Marine Force be established for all members of the U.S. Navy Medical Corps and Hospital Corps. In this way a large pool of trained personnel will be available for duty in time of emergency.

2. It is recommended that attention be given in the selection of medical officers for field hospital duty to insure that the following specialties are represented. One officer well trained in general surgery, one officer with training in anesthesia, an orthopedist and a psychiatrist.

3. In the operational planning, it is suggested that a small detachment from the Engineering Corps be temporarily assigned to the Medical Battalion for aid in the initial setting up of the Division Hospital.

Equipment.

1. Surgical trailer. We feel the trailer to be of definite value in establishing a mobile, well equipped operating room which can be quickly gotten into operation. However, in its present form it is far from ideal. It is too heavy requiring a 2½ ton truck for moving, too small for an entire surgical team to move about in and maintain sterility. Also it contains equipment not necessary for effective operation. It is difficult to maneuver and not sufficiently rugged for transportation over rough terrain.

It is suggested that the vehicle be built as a semi-trailer in order that it may be more maneuverable. The present gas fired autoclave cannot be in operation when an explosive anesthetic agent is being used and also limits the use of the trailer as an operating room because of the excessive heat it produces. We found that sterilization of linens and surgical instruments was better accomplished in a separate central supply room.

Means should be studied to reduce the present excessive weight of the vehicle and we feel that this might in part be accomplished by reducing its present height and using light metal folding sides and top which could be expanded outward and upward when in use.

2. Water Supply. In operation of the Division Hospital with laundry and shower facilities etc., it was found that our rate of water consumption with a patient load of 400 was about 5000 gallons per day. It is suggested that a 3000 gallon collapsible water tank be included in the normal equipment which can be kept as a reservoir and reduce the number of trips necessary with the present water trailers.

3. Electric power. It is recommended that the present 9.5 and 10 KW generators be replaced by a 37 KW generator. This heavy duty generator will serve the purpose of a number of the lighter machines and can be operated for a much longer period of time without repairs being necessary.

4. Medical supplies. In view of the rapid advance of medical knowledge frequent revision of the tablets of medical supplies and equipment are essential. Items such as the newer anti-biotics were often difficult to obtain and many of the more obsolete drugs remain among the supplies. In this connection it is also recommended that Gel-foam and/or Oxycel (which proved their worth in the repair of liver lacerations and checking other types of hemorrhage) supplant the present supply of Fibrin foam which we feel to be of little value for this purpose.

ANNEX HOW HOW, APPENDIX BAKER
COMPANY "B", FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION
FIRST MARINE DIVISION HOSPITAL
FLEET MARINE FORCE

PERIOD COVERING 17 AUGUST, 1950 TO 14 OCTOBER, 1950

1. This special action report of "B" (Baker) Company, First Medical Battalion, First Marine Division is submitted in accordance with Volume 1, Part E, Paragraph 11401, Section 2 (a), Marine Corps Manual 1940. It is the purpose of this report to give data concerning its activities in the period stated above in support of the First Marine Division attached to the X Army Corps in the operations in the Inchon, Kimpo and Seoul area of Korea. It was the purpose of this unit in conjunction with "A" (Able) Company, First Medical Battalion to establish itself as a Division Hospital and as such receive casualties from "C" (Charlie) Company, "D" (Dog) Company, and "E" (Easy) Company acting in their capacities as Collecting and Clearing Companies following the amphibious assault landings at Inchon, Korea starting 15 September, 1950. For this purpose this unit was to effect its landing on "D" plus 3 or 4, after the tactical advance inland was sufficient for establishment for its avowed purpose. The Division Hospital was established to give non definitive care to the seriously injured in which life saving measures were carried out and the patients were readied for further evacuation to either a Hospital Ship in support of the landing or hospital in rear areas, in this instance, Japan; and definitive care to the less seriously injured and medical casualties where treatment and/or convalescence would require less than ten (10) days. The next higher echelon for purposes of administration, discipline, and tactics was the Commanding Officer, First Medical Battalion, Commander H.A. Johnson (MC) USN.

2. The organization of this company consisted of seven (7) medical officers, one (1) Hospital Corps Officer, four (4) HMC and fifty seven (57) other hospital corpsmen and twenty-nine (29) enlisted marines including one (1) Master Sergeant. The company was under the command of LDCR James A. Kaufman (MC) USN throughout this period. For purpose of supplementing this company when it was operating separately in the Seoul area Navy Surgical Team #3 comprising of three (3) Medical Officers, one Medical Service Corps Officer, one HMC and nine Hospital corpsmen reported on 29 September and Navy Surgical Team #4 consisting of the same number of personnel less one MSC Officer reported on 30 September. These units were reverted to parent control, Task Force Commander on 6 October and 7 October, 1950 respectively.

3. The general operations order for the Division contained all the preliminary planning including logistics, schedules, and operations. For one week during the voyage from the continental limits of the United States to Kobe, Japan daily indoctrination and refresher lectures were conducted for all personnel of this command.

4. There were no rehearsals of any type conducted by this organization and as a company only reached its war time officer compliment two weeks prior to leaving the United States and it's enlisted compliment only one week before. Weapons were not issued until just prior to embarking aboard ship at Kobe, Japan for purposes of a com-

bat landing. What training that was in effect was only as a result of the individual experiences of separate men who had had previous duty with the Marine Corps, and the major portion of this being field training at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. There was no training as a unit at any time prior to actual combat operations.

5. Loadings and embarkation was accomplished at Kobe, Japan, starting 1 September, 1950 with debarkation from the USNS MARINE PHOENIX. Restaging of equipment brought from the United States with re-blocking and combat loading of vehicles was accomplished on the docks at Kobe, Japan. The majority of the personnel were embarked aboard the USS PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA 18) and vehicles and equipment were loaded on the USS WHITESIDE (AKA 90) along with drivers, guards, and such personnel necessary for handling of and accounting for supplies. This phase was completed on 9 September and the ships were moved to anchorage in the outer harbor in preparations to get under weigh.

6. The convoy departed Kobe, Japan on 10 September and put to sea for purpose of evasive action of a reported typhoon. This was only partially successful in that heavy weather was encountered for four days. Arrangements were made with the Ships Medical Officer to assist in the conduction of daily sick call, and plans were established to aid in the treatment of casualties that were to be received aboard that ship during the initial phases of the assault. The convoy arrived at Inchon, Korea in the afternoon of 15 September. The unit debarked at 0500 16 September, and proceeded ashore where the equipment was unloaded starting the afternoon of 16 September, and completed 19 September. This necessitated the personnel of this unit being ashore prior to any of the Collecting and Clearing Companies of the First Medical Battalion and before any of its equipment was in a position to be utilized.

7. The combat narrative is divided into two phases; first the assault portion in Inchon in which this Medical Company operated in conjunction and in coordination with "A" (Able) Company of the First Medical Battalion, and second in the operations in Seoul, Korea during which this unit operated alone. To prevent duplication the first phase will be discussed in Appendix Able report of "A" (Able) Company and not contained herein.

On 28 September, 1950 a reconnaissance party consisting of Capt E.R. Hering (MC) USN, Division Surgeon, Commander H.A. Johnson (MC) USN, Commanding Officer First Medical Battalion, and LCDR J.A. Kaufman (MC) USN went into Seoul, Korea and selected a boys school in the Southeastern portion of the city to establish a forward echelon of the Division Hospital. This school consisted of a main building in two parallel wings of 3 stories each with sets of buildings at each end of the main unit. There was a large gymnasium in one group and a large auditorium on the other end. There was, as well, a good sized athletic field behind the unit and this was used for a vehicle park. The gymnasium on the western end was used as a receiving ward for the Korean civilian casualties and the one story building housing classrooms immediately adjoining it were established as wards, thus

creating a separate unit in which civilian casualties could be treated and hospitalized. The military portion of this hospital was set up in the large auditorium just to the east of the main unit. This auditorium was large enough for an admitting section and a ward of 50 beds. The class rooms of the first two floors of the rear most of the main building were used as medical storerooms and wards of twelve (12) beds each. The forward most of the main buildings were used for officers on the first floor and quarters for the staff on the second and third floors.

While the reconnaissance was being conducted the company was being reequipped and the equipment was loaded aboard all available vehicles and upon return of the scouting party, the major portion of the company proceeded by convoy to Seoul but was detained at the Han River because of higher priorities of other organizations crossing the river via a make-shift ferry. The convoy did not begin to arrive at the area designated until 1200 the next day, 29 September, and began to receive patients at 1800 although the company hospital was ready at 1600. At this point Navy Surgical Team #3 arrived and was assigned to establish and organize the civilian portion of the hospital. In this capacity they were aided by trained civilian doctors and nurses on the second day of operation before the patient load became very heavy. On 30 September, the patient load became heavy and Navy Surgical Team #4 arrived to augment the staff since this company was operating with only five of its quota of seven Medical Officers available. Because of the position of this medical unit on the north side of the Han River and the difficulty of evacuation of patients across that river, the majority of all the casualties in the fighting in the northern portion of the City of Seoul and in the advance northward from there until all Marine units were taken out of the action were received at this hospital for processing after leaving the regimental and battalion aid stations. Following the establishment of the Army 121st Evacuation Hospital at Yong dong po-ri on 1 October, evacuation was aided by the augmentation of one Army ambulance platoon of 6 ambulances and two drivers and cases requiring between seven (7) and thirty (30) days convalescence were transferred to that unit until it was filled, and then the 4th Station Army Hospital at Ascum City took over that function. Cases requiring less than seven (7) days convalescence were retained for early return to duty and cases requiring more than thirty (30) days convalescence were transferred to Air Evacuation Center at Kimpo Airport through "C" (Charlie) Company, First Medical Battalion. All necessary minor surgical procedures were done at the time of admission in the section set up for admission evaluation and shock observation, while all major surgical cases were operated upon in the surgical trailer. This was in part necessitated by the lack of heat and light in the room set aside for that purpose. The following table explains the daily processing of the casualties received.

DATE	ADM	DISCH	TO AIR	EVAC	TRANS TO	DIED	RE-
		DUTY	C	CO.	ARMY HOSP.		MAIN
9-29-50	1	0		0	0	0	1
9-30-50	114	0		1	0	0	114
10-1-50	98	1		2	54	0	155
10-2-50	145	0		8	74	0	218
10-3-50	92	9		23	85	1	192
10-4-50	79	26		4	77	0	164
10-5-50	22	19		0	54	0	113
10-6-50	<u>17</u>	<u>28</u>		<u>0</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	568	83		38	446	1	0

Civilian patients processed..... 615
 Civilian patients hospitalized..... 87
 Total patients processed..... 1183

On 5 October the civilian section of the hospital was closed and all remaining patients, 65 in number were transferred to the City University Hospital of Seoul, which had been established in the interim for that purpose. Then the military section of the hospital ceased receiving patients at 1200, 6 October. The hospital was secured and moved back to rejoin the First Medical Battalion in the assembly area on 7 October in preparation for further proposed amphibious landings.

8. Not applicable

9. The results of the action of this hospital company in the Seoul area were as follows. (See "A" (Able) Company report for action results at Inchon, Korea.)

Total casualties treated and processed .. 568
 Classification of casualties admitted:

Wounds received in action--KL C	211
Wound, Missile, Extremities (including three compound fractures)	111
Wound, Missile Chest	11
Wound, Missile Abdomen	8
Wound, Missile Head and neck	11
Wound, Missile Buttocks and hip	3
Wound, Missile Multiple	15
Wound, Missile Back	11
Wound, Puncture	1
Concussion, Blast	27
Fracture, Simple	5
Contusion, Abdomen	1
Contusion, Leg	3
Foreign Body, Eye	2
Abrasions	3
Surgical cases--non combat--Not KL C	132
Sprain, shoulder, ankle, back, knee	21
Hemorrhoids	11
Cellulitis	8
Blisters, Feet	32
Lacerations, non combat	6
Cyst, Pilonidal	1
Dislocation, Internal knee	4
Perforated ear drum	1
Hernia, Inguinal	5
Pes Planus	2
Burns, n.e.c.	5
DU (Surgical Observation)	11
DU (Orthopedic Observation)	26
Medical cases--non combat--Not KL C	225
Bronchitis	3
Diarrhea and Dysentery	18
Combat Fatigue	21
Tonsillitis	1
Chancroid	9

Medical cases--non combat--Not KL C (con't)

Gastro-entritis	30
Common cold	5
Broncho-pneumonia	1
Furunculosis	2
Fungus infection, feet	12
Pyorrhoea	1
Poisoning Therapeutic, Penicillin	2
Arthritis	1
Dermatitis, Impetigo	3
DU (Venereal Observation)	11
DU (Medical Observation)	105

Total Surgical Procedures	221
Major abdominal	9
Compound fractures	2
Amputations	1
Repair of traumatic tracheotomy	1
Simple fractures, debridements, sutures, lacerations, thoracentesis etc,	208

Total Deaths 1
(This death occurred during major surgery)

Percent survival after reaching station 99.82%
(Military only)
(No civilian deaths occurred while hospital was in operation)

10. Recommendations and Comments

A. Personnel. All medical officers in this medical company joined this unit within two weeks prior to departure from the United States. Four just entered the Navy within three weeks prior to their assignment to the USMC; two had previous duty in the Navy of a short duration but not with any Marine unit. Only one had had any previous experience with the USMC and that as a Battalion Surgeon for two years during World War II. The adjustment for the initial six was particularly hard in view of the rapidity with which it was necessary to commit this unit, and it is to their credit that the quality of their work was high and their attention to duty unflinching. It then becomes apparent that either there is an extremely small number of doctors having previous experience with the Marines or those having had such experience were not used. Obviously doctors who accept commissions in the Navy in preference to Army commissions do so because they prefer the manner of medicine as practiced in the Navy. Duty with the Marines then in its approximation to the Army type of warfare comes as a shock calling for a great deal of readjustment and usually leaving a feeling of bitterness at having been betrayed. To some, such duty is welcome and for those a branch of Marine Corps and Field Medicine should be established similar to the existing branches of submarine and aviation medicine. In this way the doctors suited psychologically to the necessary type of warfare could be trained and very possibly add something to Marine Medicine. A psychologically unsuited man can adjust and compensate but never add to the organization.

The adjutant and the enlisted personnel of this command were drawn largely from a

group under training in field problems at Camp LeJeune, and their experience and desire for such duty was largely responsible for any degree of success achieved by their willingness and in many cases initiative in carrying out assigned tasks. Their conduct as a unit cannot be praised too highly and recommendations were limited to more outstanding examples by the service-troop nature of this unit.

B. Surgical trailer. This equipment designed for rapid movement and ready utilization in which it served admirably throughout the campaign only because better facilities could not be utilized since rooms set up for operating rooms were without lights. The difficulties and short-comings with the existing surgical trailers were noted as follows. By attempting to group everything in small spaces for purposes of mobilization too much has been placed within the trailer making the space needed for actual surgery very confined and general anesthesia a real problem with the advent of intravenous supportive blood therapy now available. It is further hampered by possible cold weather operations in the freezing of attached water tanks and the only source of heat is the sterilizer heating units which cannot be used while a general anesthesia is in effect. The trailer itself requires at least a two and a half (2½) ton truck to move it and is very impractical for movement over distances in that it is cumbersome and difficult to maneuver. The movement across the Han River revealed its unmaneuverability and top heavy nature particularly on narrow roads and field terrain. It is recommended that a two and a half (2½) ton truck be fitted with a structure similar to the surgical trailer but equipped with two (2) sterilizers of a larger construction, which could also eliminate the large standard portable field autoclave #7-084-490, and should provide storage place for sterile supplies and surgical equipment. Thus it would be less top heavy, have its own means of locomotion, would not need attached water tanks, and can serve as a central supply unit. Attached to this would be a surgical tent in which could be placed two (2) surgical tables and sufficient room for all concerned. Where tents could not be used and where buildings can be utilized the truck apparatus can still function in its original purpose and a room in the building be converted for use as an operating room. In conjunction with this purpose it is proposed that.

C. A K-37 Generator be supplied to replace the K-9.5 generator now supplied with the surgical trailer. The smaller generator can only provide electricity for the trailer and it has been noted that the demands for electricity far surpass that meager supply either in the utilization of building or tents for lighting and the suction apparatus. Even in the utilization of the smaller generators for the trailer they are too light to run for long periods and break down repeatedly. The heavier type generators were "borrowed" both in the Inchon and Seoul establishments and usually two (2) were used to provide proper periods of servicing each machine.

D. The use of whole blood Type O Rh positive and negative was particularly effective

[REDACTED]

at the level of the Field Hospital and Clearing Companies where plasma had already been administered at Battalion Aid Stations. It was the deciding factor in the very high survival rate and was used at the rate of four (4) units of whole blood to every unit of plasma. The supply and resupply were handled adequately from ships initially and by air later. There were absolutely no reactions noted in all the units used, and Rh positive and negative blood were used indiscriminately without any attempt to warm the blood before use because of the urgency of need once a patient arrived and to avoid wastage by warming the units in anticipation of their needs. The only recommendation is that a supply should be available to be taken ashore on the initial landings ready for immediate use.

E. Elimination of unnecessary Personnel around Division Hospital:

While the attachment of unnecessary personnel to the Division Hospital is not according to the standard operations planning, the practice in this campaign has made it painfully clear that it is a hindrance to the operation of an efficient hospital, has a demoralizing effect on the personnel of the hospital company, greatly increases the house-hold tasks, and takes up valuable space. Included in this category are the Epidemic Disease Control Unit which serves no purpose in connection with operation of the hospital, and the Division Dental Section who collectively served no purpose in connection with their professional ability beyond the two dental officers who did the maxillo facial work. No more than one should be attached to each hospital company for their assigned purpose. Many of the functions performed by the younger officers such as assisting in anesthesia and minor debridments, which they performed well to their own credit, and are tasks that can be done by well trained corpsmen.

It is to be noted in this connection that the establishment of a civilian hospital on the same compound as a military installation, as well as the permission for the civilian proprietors or directors to maintain offices in the same installation led to added confusion in the traffic through the military hospital, and produced a marked increase in the material "Spirited away;" including blankets, clothing, and food which could not be properly guarded with all personnel working.

F. Equipment. 1) The Basic Allowances of Field Medical Supplies is glaringly short on the amount of plaster allowed and the supply was augmented before leaving the United States beyond that allowance or fracture work would have been hampered after the first three orthopedic patients were casted. The larger sized plaster rolls should be supplied as well as the allotted smaller rolls, preferably in the 6 and 4 inch sizes. One hundred (100) rolls of each in addition to the present allowance is needed. The allowances for each Hospital Company is based upon a bed capacity of 100 cots and in both locations this was shown to be completely inadequate, and the allowance should be increased to 250 bed capacity per Hospital Company. The census following the action at Inchon frequently reached over 400 patients and at the Seoul area over 200. Provisions should be made for Field Hospitals with the Marine Corps to buy material on the Open Purchases System. Such was not available to this unit and in attempting to for-see

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

needs in the Field and it tried to obtain material on a gratis basis from hospitals within the Continental Limits of the United States such institutions were reluctant to part with any needed material. Critical items in this regard are:

(a) Pontocaine, 10 mgm vials, for use in Spinal anesthesia where Procaine crystals have proven not to be effective clinically more than 15 to 30 minutes.

(b) d-tubocurarine, or a substitute for use by a trained anesthetist where general anesthesia is hazardous because of the proximity of open flames in the sterilizers.

(c) Priscoline for use in any cases of frostbite in Korea's reportedly cold winters.

(d) No. 15 gauge intravenous needles which should be available for the rapid administration of whole blood. The No. 18 gauge needle, largest now available, made it necessary with use of the refrigerated banked blood to pump blood into a surgical venoclysis. It is realized that while the practice of military medicine is an ever changing process and each campaign presents new and different problems, the attempt to anticipate these problems was rebuffed by the lack of provisions to take this into account. These are specific instances and no doubt in future operations there will be others, so the system should be available for others in the future to alleviate this difficulty.

4. A trained anesthetist should be part of the compliment of each medical company to function with a surgical team within the company. One medical officer with one year's training in anesthesia served in that capacity in this unit and was the only one so available in the Division Hospital. He worked without relief, and his unflinching duty was largely responsible for the very low death rate produced during surgery and in the hospitalization period. The addition of a trained anesthetist for each company would increase the capacity to handle major surgery adequately without the heroic efforts of one individual being necessary.

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APPENDIX CHARLIE
ANNEX ~~XXXX~~ HOW HOW
COMPANY "C" FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION
FIRST MARINE DIVISION FLEET MARINE FORCE

Period Covered
7 September 1950
to
10 October 1950

1. The Special Action Report of Co. "C", 1st Medical Bn., First Marine Division is submitted in accordance with Para. 11401, 2a MCM 1940. The purpose of this report is to supplement the historical records of the Marine Corps and provide recent information on experiences in the field to those concerned. Co. "C", First Medical Battalion, was assigned the mission of collecting and clearing casualties from the forward area; giving life-saving, surgical treatment to non-evacuable and gravely wounded combatants; supplying forward echelon medical units with equipment, supplies and replacement personnel; and providing preventive medical treatment and routine medical and surgical treatment to and evacuation of all personnel necessary. The next higher echelon for the purpose of administration, discipline and tactical operations was Commander First Medical Battalion, Commander H. B Johnson, MC USN.

2. Co. "C" was under the command of Commander Robert A. Freyling, MC USN until 18 September 1950 when he was relieved by Commander Harold A. Streit, MC USN, who had been executive officer. LCdr. G. K. Holloway, MC USN relieved Commander Streit as executive officer. At the same time Commander J. W. Metcalfe, MC USN and Lt(jg) D.M. O'Toole, MCR USNR were relieved and reassigned to other units. Lt(jg) Robert A. Mc Gowan, MCR USNR and Lt(jg) Thayer K. Morrow, Jr. MCR USNR were assigned to Co. "C" for duty on 19 September. Navy Surgical Team #2 augmented Company "C" on 19 September. The team was comprised of three medical officers, Lt. Robert A. Loeffler, MC USN, Lt. Harold V. Palmer, MC USN and Lt(jg) Cecil Glass, MCR USNR, and ten hospital corpsmen. The Epidemiological Disease Control Unit, which had been attached to Co. "C" in southern Korea was detached and reassigned to the 1st Medical Battalion. Lt(jg) Lewis A. Bryant MSC USN continued as Medical Service Corps officer. Seven HMC and seventy-two other hospital corpsmen were assigned and detailed to their respective departments. One MSgt. and nineteen other enlisted Marine Corps personnel were attached to provide security, messing facilities, and drivers and maintenance for the vehicles.

3. Preliminary planning, planning schedules, logistic planning and operating planning were all included in the general operations order of the division. Charts of the Inchon-Seoul area were studied for possible strategic locations for medical facilities. The officers of Co "C" attended a medical conference at Pusan aboard the USS Consolation. RAdm. Joel T. Boone, Inspector General,

[REDACTED]
Medical Department, US Navy and Commander A. F. Bigelow,
MSC USN presided.

4. Further training of the officers and hospital corpsmen was limited to consideration of details and problems expected in the Inchon-Seoul action. No rehearsals were conducted except for debarkation drills. Daily physical drills were conducted at sea.

5. Resupply of medical materials from the Army Medical Supply Depot, Pusan was accomplished by Lt(jg) L. A. Bryant and three hospital corpsmen before the company returned to Pusan with the Brigade from the action west of Miryang on 8 September. Reblocking of equipment and supplies and combat loading of vehicles was done in record time. The vehicles with their drivers and guards were loaded aboard the USS Cavalier (APA 37); USS Pickaway (APA 222) and the USS Seminole (AKA 107). The remainder of the company went aboard the USS Cavalier. Loading was completed on 11 September.

6. The convoy departed from Pusan about noon on 12 September 1950; and when the Brigade joined the 1st Marine Division on 13 September at sea, the company was designated as Co "C" 1st Medical Battalion. Upon arrival at Inchon on 15 September, D-day, the company remained aboard ship until general unloading commenced. Medical officers and corpsmen of Co "C" assisted the ship's surgeon and corpsmen with the handling and treatment of several casualties from the beach assault. Three cases with the provisional diagnosis of Japanese B. Encephalitis were evacuated to the USS Consolation for further diagnostic study and treatment. All of the patients were second battalion personnel that had just come from action with the 1st Provisional Brigade in the Miryang area, and all had received one dose of the vaccine on 3 August 1950. On 18 September orders to disembark were requested and received from the Division Surgeon. The company landed at the tidal basin and reported to Commander H. B. Johnson, 1st Medical Battalion, at the Division Hospital, Inchon, where the first night ashore was spent and preparations made to set up a clearing station and emergency surgical facility in a strategic forward area.

7. Capt. E. R. Hering, MC USN, Division Surgeon, selected the Kimpo airfield area for location; and the company was instructed to set up a clearing station and emergency surgical facility in a suitable spot. Commander H. B. Johnson and Commander H. A. Streit scouted the area within twenty-four hours after it had been secured by the Second Battalion, 5th Marines and chose the former officers' club and training school compound as the most satisfactory possibility for location. Two large, one-story, "T" shaped permanent buildings and thirty-eight quonset huts, all in fair state of repair except for plumbing and lighting, provided more than adequate floor space. This space, when considered with

[REDACTED]
its proximity to the airfield, offered the possibility for handling, treating and evacuating a very large number of casualties.

On the afternoon of 19 September the company proceeded by convoy and arrived at the selected compound at 1745. The men turned to and cleaned out the rubble-littered buildings, and by 2000 facilities were ready to handle a limited number of casualties. The first casualties were received in the early morning hours of 20 September. On 20 September arrangements for large scale evacuation of casualties were made with the air evacuation facility of the Air Force Transport Command through Lt. Gen. Tunner and Lt. Col. Mc Carroll. Arrangements for daily, large-scale delivery of whole blood were made with the Military Air Transport Command through Col. Hunter, and the first delivery of thirty-six pints of blood was delivered for use on 21 September. The subsequent demand was met very adequately. This included the use of 130 pints on one day when the casualty load was particularly heavy. On the afternoon of 20 September Company "D" 1st Medical Battalion joined the company. LCdr C. V. Anderson MC USN was company commander. Four other medical officers, one MSC officer and seventy enlisted personnel made up the company. Later, as the casualty load increased, physical facilities were enlarged to accommodate an estimated 500 patients. Two complete major surgical rooms were set up, and seven minor surgical tables were prepared. The professional personnel was further increased after request to the division surgeon by the arrival of Navy Surgical Team #3, consisting of three medical officers, Lt(jg) Vernon J. Merkle MC USN, Lt(jg) William R. Thomas, MC USN and Lt(jg) C. Woods, MCR USNR and one MSC officer, Lt(jg) Leland E. Byers MSC USN. Four dental officers, Lt(jg) J. J. Mc Hale DC USN, Lt. E. Schnoebelen DC USN, Lt(jg) B. Geltzer, DC USN and Lt(jg) Stanley Brzezinski, DC USN proved to be of tremendous value by helping with the minor surgery, helping with the evacuation, and assuming a great share of the general anesthesia load. One of the busiest evenings was on the 27th of September when some 121 casualties were received in the five hours between 1900 and midnight. Eight US Army Medical Corps officers, Capt. Richard M. Whittington, Capt. Ralph Thomas, Capt. Robert Brock, Capt. Ira B. Harrison, Capt. Arthur Adams, Capt. James J. Gibbs, Capt. William F. Mc Donald and Capt. Eugene T. Hupalowsky, part of the staff of the 4th Field Evacuation Hospital, were visiting that evening to become acquainted with the problems to be encountered in setting up a similar facility. Their generous help that night permitted complete processing of the large number of patients before daylight, as well as giving them a first hand view of the problems facing them when their activity was set up the first week in October. Hot showers and a Service Battalion laundry facility were established within a week after the clearing station was functioning. The following table

will serve to explain the overall function and usefulness of this activity:

**Military Casualties Processed
in Kimpo Area**

<u>Date</u>	<u>Adm.</u>	<u>Disch.</u>	<u>Air Evac.</u>	<u>DD</u>	<u>Trans.</u>
9-20-50	82	1	14	(2-DOA)	
9-21-50	62	1	64		19
9-22-50	231	7	188		
9-23-50	196	9	181	5	
9-24-50	241	8	272	1	
9-25-50	195	7	159	1	
9-26-50	270	2	121	3	20
9-27-50	208	11	193	3	51
9-28-50	31	11	78	5	37
9-29-50	90	6	45		24
9-30-50	11	1	30	2	16
10-1-50	20	3		1	15
10-2-50	22	1	10		
10-3-50	32	1	20	1	11
10-4-50	10	1			31
10-5-50	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>2</u>
Totals	1702	77	1375	24	226

Civilian patients 315
 POW patients 39

Total patients processed 2056
 (Does not include routine sick call or
 outpatients)

After the Seoul area was secured, the work of the Clearing Station and Emergency Surgical Facility was completed. All of the temporarily attached personnel were detached except two of the dental officers, and preparations were made to restock supplies and combat load for the proposed action in the north.

The company proceeded by motor convoy to the Division Hospital, Inchon on the afternoon of 7 October. The vehicles and the entire company were loaded aboard the USS Bexar, (APA 237) on 9 October.

8. Not applicable.

9. Results of the Clearing Station and Emergency Surgical facility at Kimpo are explained in the following table:

<u>Total Casualties Treated and Evacuated</u>	2056
Military personnel casualties	
(1st Mer Div, 7th Army Div, ROK & KMC)	1702
Civilian casualties	315
POW casualties	39

[REDACTED]

<u>Total Casualties Treated and Discharged</u> (Outpatients- Not processed)	87
--	----

<u>Total Surgical Procedures Performed</u>	1256
--	------

Major abdominal	42
Major thoracic	1
Compound fractures	379
Amputations	9
Trepanation	1
Simple fractures, debridements, suture laceration, plastic, thoracentesis, and others	824

<u>Total Deaths, Not Including DCA</u>	22
--	----

Death following major surgery	4
-------------------------------	---

<u>Percent Survival After Reaching Station</u> (Military only)	98.8
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10. Recommendations and Comments:

A. Personnel. During the periods of unexpectedly heavy casualty loads, the augmenting of the company by another medical company, two surgical teams and four dentists was the sine qua non for the efficient accomplishment of the primary mission.

B. Selection of site. The site for a clearing station is based primarily upon its availability and accessibility to the battalion aid stations and to the best evacuation facilities, preferably air. Unless there are very good roads to the rear, air evacuation, when it is available, is recommended.

A very large floor space all on the same level is most desirable because it permits greater efficiency in all respects. It is strongly suggested that the total working space be at least three times the space required by the average daily expected load of patients. In our experience this total working space has been calculated at 6,000 square feet per hundred patients. The space does not include the messing, supply and living quarters for the staff. If holding of the patients is expected beyond a minimum, additional space will be required.

C. Outline of casualty flow. The following chart explains in outline the recommended casualty flow in a clearing station. The estimated space requirements are based on 6,000 square feet of working space per hundred patients.

Patients from the 1st Marine Division, Army, ROK, KMC, POW and Civilians were evacuated to the Clearing Station by the Collecting Sections or helicopter or both through one or all of these facilities; Battalion Aid Station, Regimental Aid Station, Shore Party, Army, Civilian.

RECEIVING WARD

Receiving Ward Medical Officer selects critical cases for immediate emergency treatment.
All patients searched before entering ward and dangerous weapons removed.
Clinical and statistical chart started by records clerk.
Inventory of gear and stowage in safe place.
Prophylactic antibiotic and tetanus toxoid booster given.
Examined by receiving ward Medical Officer, who makes diagnosis on chart, prescribes plan of treatment--hold for duty, hold for evacuation, surgery--major or minor, does or directs emergency treatment.
Shock treatment given. Whole, matched blood is preferred in most cases.
Oxygen given via BLB mask. Fowler's position back rests for chest cases.
Relative available floor space on basis of 11 units is recommended as 2 units.

SURGERY

Major and Minor separated
Debridement
Casts
Central Supply
Relative floor space on basis of 11 units is recommended as 1 unit

EVACUATION WARD SPACES

Divide into litter and ambulatory, type of evacuation planned, holding, surgical, and medical.
Each case is held until it is safe for him to travel to next facility.
Holding policy is determined by the Division Surgeon.
Complete nursing care is available.
A records man and a Medical Officer are recommended to coordinate evacuation.
Recommended floor space on basis of 11 units is 8 units.

EVACUATION

DUTY BASE HOSPITAL DIVISION HOSPITAL HOSPITAL SHIP OTHER

[REDACTED]

D. Whole blood. An adequate and dependable supply of whole blood is the difference between failure and success in treating critically injured patients. In one 24-hour period over 130 pints of whole blood were administered. Over a period of ten days an average of seventy pints per day was used. Equipment for and the use of cross matched blood is recommended.

E. Electric power. A heavy-duty 37 KW generator (110-120 V - AC) is highly recommended to replace the 9.5 and 10 KW equipment because the lighter machines cannot stand up under the long hours of service required of them.

F. Helicopter landing. A helicopter landing-site should be well marked in an oiled-down or grassy spot within one hundred yards of the receiving ward. This site should be open on three sides and at least seventy-feet square.

G. Surgical trailer. It has been our experience that the surgical trailer, in its present form, is too small as an effective operating room, too big and heavy for the flexibility and mobility required of a clearing station and not constructed ruggedly enough for many moves over rough roads or in and out of ships' holds. Anesthesia is one of the major bottle-necks in emergency field surgery. An operation in the surgical trailer confines the anesthetist to one patient; but when the surgery is done in a large space, it is possible for the anesthetist to attend several cases at the same time. The trailer served adequately as a source and storage of sterile goods and a point of central supply. It is felt, however, that a vehicle of a much smaller capacity could be used to serve the same purpose. A standard portable field autoclave # 7-084-490 was more effective for sterilization than the equipment in the trailer because its heating time was half as long.

H. Notes on chest injuries. When there is hand-to-hand fighting, a relatively increased number of chest, abdomen and face injuries are brought into the clearing station. Every penetrating chest wound produces a hemo-pneumothorax, the extent of which depends upon the type and amount of injury. This activity handled 41 patients with recent chest wounds during the Inchon-Seoul action, and from that experience the following recommendations are made:

1. A diagnostic needle-thoracentesis should be made on every penetrating chest wound case, the status of which is in doubt.

2. All chest injury cases that have respiratory embarrassment enough to require oxygen or Fowler's position or both should have a water-seal drainage with a catheter in the intrapleural space. Some of these require active suction to help remove the blood and air; and for this a Wangenstein suction apparatus, trap bottle and spare plasma tubing are entirely satisfactory. The catheter pack can be made up with a minimum of one utility hemostat, a long piece of heavy silk or cotton threaded on a medium cutting needle, a #16F.

to #22F. plain urethral catheter with extra holes cut near the tip, and one #11. knife blade. The purse string is tied tightly after the catheter is in place, and the long ends of the suture material are tied back and forth over the catheter several times to prevent its slipping out of the chest. Local anesthesia is used, but in some critically hurt patients it is not necessary and should be omitted for the sake of speed. It is certain that at least five lives were saved by the use of this procedure during the interval covered by this report.

3. If it is possible, all chest injury patients that have had respiratory embarrassment should be allowed to rest quietly for at least twelve hours after they are considered to be stabilized before they are evacuated. This period of rest will allow a longer time for the hemorrhage and air leaks to be sealed off securely before they are subjected to any strain by the movements that occur during evacuation. It also permits interval observation and repeated suction drainage of the chest if necessary.

4. If the use of Fowler's position, catheter suction drainage of the chest and oxygen by nasal catheter or BLB mask along with the careful administration of sedation and blood or plasma, does not produce satisfactory improvement or stabilization within a few hours, an emergency thoracotomy is indicated and may be life-saving in patients that have the principal injury in the chest.

5. Severe trauma to the chest wall which fractures several ribs may produce a flail-chest deformity. After the defects in the chest wall have been made airtight with adequate suturing, the chest wall may sometimes be splinted satisfactorily with a snug extensive strapping with elastic adhesive or tape. Surgical splinting may be required.

6. Blood and mucus collecting in the trachea of the critically injured chest patient will soon drown him. Intratracheal intubation with suction will often provide considerable relief and contribute toward stabilizing the patient.

7. Practicable improvisation or attachments to the litters should be provided to allow patients with respiratory embarrassment to be placed quickly into high Fowler's position. Suggested specifications for this litter-attachment should include:

a. Inverted "V" shaped hinged steel rod construction. Use two inverted "V's", held rigidly parallel, with canvas for back.

b. Attach to litter pole with "C" clamp that rotates.

c. Width is same as litter.

d. Height sufficient to permit a head rest.

I. Photofluorographic survey. It is recommended that the personnel of the First Marine Division have a photofluorographic survey as soon as practicable.

J. Interstitial parasite survey. It is recommended

[REDACTED]

that the EDC units conduct a survey of the troops for intestinal parasites aboard one ship returning to the United States. Another EDC unit should conduct a similar survey aboard a ship bringing fresh troops out to the Far East area as a control.

K. Clerical. It is recommended that no attempt to complete "F" cards and "H"-8 forms be made in the field. The large number of forms required by the tremendous patient load could not have been handled by four times the available help and equipment without an impracticable delay in evacuation. An emergency medical tag properly filled out is considered enough medical history and record for patients at this echelon level. Many tags are made out hurriedly and under extreme stress. These may be more or less worthless, but there is usually enough time in a clearing station to complete or remake these tags.

In place of the finished "H"-8 it is easily possible to provide a mimeographed rough form which gives all of the pertinent facts. A copy of this form is found as Enclosure A.

It is suggested that for the purpose of facilitating the casualty report, a unified system of abbreviations be adopted, similar to that used by the Army, i.e.: WIA, DOW, DOA, etc. It is suggested for the purpose of simplifying clerical work and making better and more accurate diagnoses in the field that there be added to the back of the emergency medical tag a list of ten to twenty of the most common traumatic and medical nomenclature diagnoses with their numbers and a space to check each one. Between 80 and 90 percent of all the diagnoses in the field could be covered by this small list; and its use would eliminate a great number of the confused and weird diagnostic improvisations that arrive at the clearing station.

When more than seven copies of the casualty report are required, which is often the case, it is suggested that the report be cut on a mimeograph stencil at the clearing station and submitted to the casualty reporting officer for distribution.

L. Required reading. It is suggested that the required reading for medical officers anticipating duty with amphibious forces include Combat and Field Medical Practice; Navpers 10819 and selected abstracts from applicable Special Action Reports.

M. Critical list. Daily check of the medical material, felt to be critical to our effective function, proved to be of value. The critical list is composed of the following: Alcohol, Tr. Benzoin, Tr. Belladonna, Bismuth Subcarbonate, Brandy, Carbarsone, Cupric Sulfate dressings, Dextrose in water, Dextrose in saline, Ether,

[REDACTED]

Fungicidal powder and ointment, Merthiolate, Morphine, Paregoric, Thiopental, Petrolatum, Procaine, Green Soap, Talc, Whisky, Water for Injection, Aureomycin, Chloromycetin, Fibrin Foam or Gel Foam, Penicillin--crystalline, ophthalmic, procaine--, Streptomycin, Roller Gauze, 6" Plaster of Paris, Cotton-absorbent, Battle Dressings, Petrolatum gauze, Plain gauze, Adhesive plaster, Surgical sponges, Sheet wadding, Rubber airways, Hypodermic needles, Suture materials, Blankets, Litters, Whole Blood, Plasma, Tetanus Toxoid.

ENCLOSURE A

"C" CO 1st Medical Bn,
1st Marine Division, FMF

Case No.

DATE

Name in full, last name first.

Rate

Serv. #

Date of enlistment Race Date of birth Branch of Service

Organization (Co. Bn. Regt.) Designator (officer's only)

Diagnosis Dx # KL

Morphine _____ Whole Blood _____

Plasma _____ Penicillin _____

Streptomycin _____ Tetanus _____

BRIEF HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF INJURY OR ILLNESS & TREATMENT

DATE

DISPOSITION -- Duty _____ Trans _____

Evacuated _____

Action Report of Collecting Section

The Collecting Section of Company "C" 1st Medical Battalion disembarked from the USS Cavalier at 0700, 16 September 1950 and landed on Yellow Beach, Inchon in the van of the assault companies of the 5th Marines. While ambulances were not available, four 6 x 6 trucks were used without difficulty to evacuate the light casualty load to the beach.

By 18 September nine ambulances were in use, covering a twelve-mile route of evacuation to the Division Hospital, Inchon.

By 20 September the evacuation route was between the south bank of the Han River and the Clearing Station at Kimpo. When a beach-head on the north bank of the Han was secured, it was necessary to use DUKW or AMTR to move the casualties across the river to the collecting facility, with the help of the Shore Party.

During the night of 22 September four ambulances and eleven men were dispatched by the Division Surgeon to Yongdungpo to evacuate casualties from the 1st Marines. It was found that these patients were on the north bank of the river, and no other facilities were available to reach them except a bombed-out bridge. With skill and ingenuity while under sporadic enemy fire, the men improvised a workable catwalk across the wreckage and transferred safely eight litter and fourteen ambulatory patients to the south bank of the river.

During the final days of the assault on Seoul the collecting company evacuated patients from the 1st Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines, 11th Marines, ROK Army and the 7th Army Division.

The following recommendations regarding the function of the Collecting Section are submitted:

1. The Collecting Sections should come under the cognizance of the Regimental Surgeon. Certain elements of the Collecting Sections that were assigned to the Battalion Surgeon should continue to be under his cognizance.
2. Closer liason between the S-2 Section would be of great help in familiarizing the drivers of the ambulances with roads and conditions along the route of evacuation. Several drivers were led into enemy fire by lack of accurate directions or wrong information.
3. An Amphibious DUKW should be made available to the collecting Sections to help solve transportation problems that indicate its use.

APPENDIX DOG
To
ANNEX HOWE HOW
COMPANY "D", FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION,
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE.

Period Covered
10 August, 1950
to
3 October, 1950

1. The Special Action report of Co. "D", 1st Medical Battalion, First Marine Division is submitted in accordance with Para. 11401, 2a MCM, 1940. The purpose of this report is to supplement the historical records of the Marine Corps and provide recent information on experiences in the field to those concerned. Co. "D" First Medical Battalion, was assigned the mission of collecting and clearing casualties from the forward area; giving life-saving, surgical treatment to non-evacuatable and gravely wounded combatants; supplying forward echelon medical units with equipment, supplies and replacement personnel; and providing preventive medical treatment and routine medical and surgical treatment and evacuation of all personnel necessary. The next higher echelon for the purpose of administration, discipline and tactical operations was Commander of the First Medical Battalion, Commander H.B. Johnson, MC., USN.

2. "D" Company, First Medical Battalion, was formed at Camp Pendleton, California under the Command of LCDR. G.T. Anderson, MC., USN. Officers attached were William C. Adams, Jr., Lt(jg), MC., USNR., Ernest E. Ramey Lt(jg), MC., USNR., Ralph W. Jacobs, Lt(jg) MC, USNR., and Robert L. Smith Lt(jg); MSC, USN. Personnel included six chief hospital corpsmen, seventy one other hospital corps ratings, one M/Sgt., USMC and twenty-three enlisted marines, who were to furnish security, drivers and messing facilities. An additional medical officer, John H. MacLaughlin, Lt(jg), MC, USNR., was attached to the company at Kobe, Japan and was active during the interval covered by this report.

3. Preliminary planning, planning schedules, logistic planning and operation planning were included in the general operations order of the division.

4. Indoctrination of the officers as to organization and function of the 1st Medical Battalion in general and a collecting and clearing company in particular was begun at Camp Pendleton. Enlisted personnel attended daily classes given by the medical officers while under-way at sea, receiving instructions in organization, first aid, casualty handling, etc.. Daily calisthenics were conducted at sea and lectures on conditions apt to be encountered in Korea were given.

5. Loading of equipment and supplies was accomplished at Naval Station, San Diego, California. Embarkation was on 16 August, 1950, personnel and gear going aboard the USS Noble (APA 218).

6. The Noble departed San Diego, 17 August, traveled unescorted, and arrived in Kobe, Japan 2 September. Disembarkation began immediately and, leaving the Commanding Officer, Medical Service Corps Officer and twenty men to supervise unloading and reloading of our equipment and supplies, the company, under command of the Executive Officer, proceeded by rail to Camp Otsu, Japan, a U.S. Army base formally occupied by the 25th Division.

Physical fitness training for all hands was continued during our temporary isolation at Camp Otsu. Due to the hazardous health conditions of the adjacent community only one liberty was granted during our six day stay. The morale of the men, however, was high.

We returned to Kobe on 9 September and embarked once more on the USS Noble, now combat loaded and carrying the First Battalion, First Regiment, First Marines. The Noble departed Kobe 10 September. We hit very rough weather for thirty six hours but the morale of the men was still good when we joined convoy and sailed into the bay area of Inchon, Korea on the afternoon of 15 September. Naval gunfire and aerial bombing of the mainland was heavy as we approached.

7. For the impending landing our company was divided as follows: a headquarters section, consisting of the Commanding Officer, Medical Service Corps Officer, one chief hospital corpsman and three rated corpsmen (delegated to personnel and records); a medical supply section consisting of one chief hospital corpsman and one rated corpsman; a Service section consisting of one M/Sgt USMC and seventeen enlisted marines; a clearing section consisting of five medical officers, one chief hospital corpsman, twenty-one other hospital corpsmen; and three collecting sections, each with one chief hospital corpsman, sixteen hospital corpsmen and two enlisted marines as drivers. Each collecting section was attached to, and went ashore with, a battalion of the First Regiment.

The remainder of the company, consisting of the headquarters section, supply section, service section and the clearing section disembarked for the beach area on the evening of 19 September, obtained transportation from the Division Hospital and were bedded down for the night at the hospital, two miles east of Inchon. The chief hospital corpsmen in charge of the collecting sections on the initial landings were recalled to the company to resume their regular duties. All medical and organic supplies and equipment, clearing section vehicles, surgical

trailer, etc., were found in the dump at the Division hospital. The hospital, because of the heavy load of casualties and had freely appropriated "D" Company's supplies and equipment as needed.

Leaving the Medical Service Corps Office and the medical supply section at the hospital to arrange for resupply, the clearing section and the headquarters section moved up to Kimpo Air Field where they joined forces with "C" Company, 1st Medical Battalion. Companies "C" and "D" together set up a clearing hospital in an old aviation school building just north-east of Kimpo Air Field. A building of three large rooms was utilized for receiving, surgery and ward respectively. Gally and messing were set up in an adjacent building. Men and officers were quartered in quonset huts previously used as class rooms and work shops by the Koreans.

The hospital was known as Companies "C" and "D" Clearing Hospital, the two companies integrated under the over-all command of Commander H.S. Striet, MC, USN. Air evacuation from Kimpo to U.S. Naval Hospital, Fukuoka, Japan was established immediately.

Officers and men of "C" Company took the twelve hour shift, 0700 to 1900, "D" Company from 1900 to 0700. The inflow of casualties usually became heavy around 1600 and remained heavy until around 2400, the peak hour becoming later nightly as the line of evacuation from the front lengthened. Casualties were unloaded onto the front porch of the hospital, searched for explosives of any kind and admitted to the receiving room with priority to those most critically injured. The medical officer in charge of the receiving room rapidly scanned each incoming load of casualties for cases of shock, hemorrhage, etc. In the receiving room each casualty was tagged with a new, complete casualty sheet, a mimeograph form made up with spaces for all pertinent personal information, diagnosis, medications, treatment etc. This form was made up in duplicate, one copy containing personal information (for H-8's) going at once to our record office, the other, complete copy remaining with the patient straight through until he was evacuated. This form accompanying him took the place of H-8's, which it was impossible to complete under such conditions. A "shot" team gave each casualty with any open wound, streptomycin, Gram 1, penicillin, 600,000 units, tetanus toxoid (when available) one-half cc, morphine as needed and pre-surgical medication upon order from the operating team. All wounds that did not require

[REDACTED]

debridement or surgery were cleansed with soap and water, treated with antiseptic solution and dressed. All casualties were treated and transferred to the ward as rapidly as possible. All cases requiring transfusions or plasma were placed in a specific area of the receiving room for closer observation and frequent blood pressure recordings.

The debridement-minor surgery-orthopedic room was set up to accommodate six patients at once, each on his original litter placed on waist high stands (saw horses). A team of two corpsmen (if available) was assigned to each space and was responsible for setting up the sterile debridement set, cutting away the patient's clothing, cleansing the wounds and assisting the medical officer. Competent corpsmen were soon delegated complete management of minor cases, application of casts etc. Flushing wounds with a sterile saline solution after thoroughly debridement was stressed. All seriously contused wounds were left open. The use of intravenous demerol for control of pain in cases with fractures and or extensive wounds was found to be invaluable.

Pre-surgical medications and surgical preps were given in the receiving room, atropine being given to all surgical patients. One medical officer acted as anesthetist but two of the attached dental officers were trained, and became quite adept, in the administration of anesthesia.

Our forces were augmented by the temporary attachment of Navy Surgical Team #3, three medical officers and ten corpsmen, from 23 September through 25 September, inclusive. They worked a twelve hour shift, 1600 to 0400. During their stay we ran two major operating rooms during these hours, utilizing the two dental officers as anesthetists, allowing the medical officer supervising them to aid in the over-worked debridement room. The evening and early night of 27 September we were graciously assisted by eight U.S. Army medical officers who were visiting for the purpose of gaining information pertinent to the operation of a field hospital. They were a welcome relief to the doctors in the receiving and debridement rooms, for we had 208 casualties that day and had had 270 the day before.

We departed from Kimpo 3 October and traveled by motor convoy to the site of the Division hospital near Inchon where we inventoried our supplies and were prepared for combat loading on 4 October, 1950.

8. Not applicable

9. Estimated results. See Activity Report of "C" Company, 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Marine Division (covering period 7 September to 10 October 1950)

10. Recommendations and Comments:

See Activity Report of "C" Company, 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Most of these recommendations originated while the two companies were working together and we concur with all that are listed. We particularly emphasize the advisability of utilizing the mimeographed form, as mentioned in our report rather than try to complete form "H-8's" in the field. A copy of this mimeographed form is found as enclosure A in the Company "C" Special Action Report.

ACTION REPORT
COLLECTING SECTION

"D" Company
First Medical Battalion

Each of the three collecting sections of Company "D", 1st Medical Battalion, consisted of one Chief Hospital Corpsman, sixteen (16) Hospital Corps personnel, and two enlisted marines as drivers. Indoctrination and training of each section was the responsibility of the Chief Hospital Corpsman in charge; classes were organized prior to our embarkation and were continued while under-way at sea. Each section was assigned to a battalion of the 1st Regiment, 1st Marine Division, and in the assault phase of the Inchon-Seoul operation landed in support of its respective Battalion medical unit. Their function was to transport casualties from the Battalion Aid Station to the Clearing Hospital.

Each section was equipped with two jeep ambulances, eight litters, assorted battle dressings, morphine sulphate syrettes, and twelve units of human blood plasma.

On D-Day plus five, after the evacuation system was ascertained to be functioning properly, the Chief Hospital Corpsmen were returned to the Clearing section of the company and a competent rated corpsman was put in charge of each collection section.

The rapid advance of the assault troops often necessitated a long line of evacuation and difficulty was often encountered in contacting the

rapidly moving battalion aid stations. Additional and replacement ambulances were obtained from the motor pool of "D" and "C" Medical Companies.

A few corpsmen were rotated between the collecting sections and the clearing sections and, whenever practicable, collecting personnel were brought in to the Clearing Hospital for an over-night or half day stay so that advantage could be taken of our shower unit and laundry facilities.

Several men were recommended for decorations; two for the silver star, four for the bronze star and several for a letter of commendation with medal.

The collecting sections were returned to the company 4 October, 1950.

Comments and Recommendations:

1. Collecting sections should consist of less than fifteen men per battalion. Two jeep ambulances will suffice unless unusually heavy casualties are anticipated.

2. Liaison between the collecting sections and the battalion S-2 office should be established and the collecting sections provided with maps and sufficient intelligence data to guide their travel through combatant territory.

3. Battalion Medical Officers should be responsible for preventing the personnel of collecting sections going forward of the Battalion Aid Stations. Men of the clearing sections should not be utilized as litter bearers and duty corpsmen at the front.

4. All field officers should be familiar with orders concerning care of the dead. During action men of the collecting sections should not be delegated the duty of transportation and/or burial of the dead.

G.T. ANDERSON, LCDR MC USN
Commanding Officer