

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

ANNEX BAKER TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT FOR INCHON, KOREA, LANDINGS FIRST MARINE DIVISION

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FIRST MARINE DIVISION
"ANNEX BAKER" TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
for
INCHON, KOREA, LANDINGS, 15Sept1950

DOWNGRADED AND
DECLASSIFIED

July

1. INTRODUCTION

The general purpose of this report is to set forth an account of the complete operations of the Division G-2 Section from the time planning commenced under the Far Eastern Command to the completion of the liberation of Seoul and subsequent "mopping up" operations in the area north and east. Specifically, this report is made in order to portray the enemy situation from the time of our landing through the last days of the period covered.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

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a. The G-2 Section was composed primarily of those organic Marine Corps Personnel who carried out the functions of Intelligence, Aerial Photograph Interpretation, Order of Battle, Drafting and Language sub-sections, but there was also attached for this period a Military Intelligence Service Detachment (163d MISD) and a Counter-Intelligence Corps team (441st CIC Team), both furnished by the Far Eastern Command and composed of U.S. Army commissioned and enlisted personnel with such Korean Nationals as were required for Liaison, Interpretation and Translation purposes.

b. The organization and personnel of the G-2 Section with its attached units is shown as Appendix III hereto.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Intelligence planning for the amphibious landing at Inchon, Korea was initiated aboard the USS Mt. McKinley on arrival in Tokyo, Japan, of advance elements of the Division staff. Planning was predicated on the preliminary draft of X Corps Operation Order No. 1 dated 28 August 1950. From the outset numerous obstacles were encountered, which were to multiply as planning progressed. Despite the fact that the proposed objective area had, at one time, quartered U. S. Occupation Forces, there was an abysmal lack of information on which to base the planning. This was especially true with regard to that beach and hydrographic data so vital to the conduct of amphibious operations.

A briefing by the staff of ComPhibGru One (Attack Force Commander) signaled the official commencement of operational planning. The picture presented by this briefing was most alarming. The abnormally high tidal range, peculiar to the area, which at low tides bared extensive mud flats; the continuous sea wall fronting all likely landing beaches, and the dangerously restricted approach channels located on either side of Wolmi Island were factors of grave concern. Wolmi Island was immediately recognized as the most critical terrain feature in the area, and it was readily apparent that a landing on the mainland would be both difficult and costly, without its prior reduction and seizure.

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Before further planning could be effected, it became necessary for the G-2 Section to make a complete study of the area. This effort was limited,

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initially, to the collection and study of beach and hydrographic data. Source material consisted, principally of Janis Publications, Strategic Engineering Studies, Naval Attache Reports, Photographic Interpretation Reports, and interview with former Occupation personnel. In all of the above the intelligence sections of the attack force and landing force staffs worked hand in glove.

A workable picture was formulated, from which the G-3 Section was able to make a tentative selection of beaches and plan a scheme of maneuver. At this point it became necessary to "fit the beach to the plan" as it were, and determine to mathematical exactness the capabilities and limitations of the selected beaches.

From a study of the tide tables for the area, and extensive photographic interpretation, it was determined that landing craft could negotiate the mud flats only on tides higher than 25 feet. It was further determined that the duration of tide above this level averaged only 3 to 4 hours, and that once the tide had fallen below this critical level, further landing would be impossible until the next high tide period. It was imperative, therefore, that the maximum in troops and supplies be landed during this 3 to 4 hour period. Much speculation arose over the ability of LVT's to traverse the mud flats, which were notoriously soft and slimy. In spite of all efforts the answer was never satisfactorily determined, and planning, necessarily, proceeded on the basis that they could not.

The next problem to be resolved was that of the sea walls. Special photographic coverage, at hourly stages of the tide, revealed these walls to be of such height as to preclude the dropping of ramps at any stage of the tide. After much thought it was decided that ladders of extremely light weight, and with forked ends, would be the most suitable expedient. These ladders made of aluminum and manufactured in Japan reached the assault troops, in some instances, at the last hour prior to landing.

Sadly lacking as was information on the objective area, more so was that on the enemy in the area. PW interrogation reports received from the 8th Army, engaged on the southern front, were the primary source of this enemy information. At the instigation of the Division G-2 Section future PW interrogations were slanted toward the Inchon area. However, since the area was so remote from the main communication arteries very few PWs had passed thru and consequently were unfamiliar with character or number of the enemy forces located there. Special agents were purportedly working the area. However, their findings, whatever they may have been, were never communicated to the section. Photographic Interpretation showed the area to be honey-combed with defensive installations. However, most appeared to be unoccupied, and daily aerial observation reports revealed almost completely negative activity. Shortly before departure from Kobe, the initial estimate of the enemy situation as prepared by X Corps was received. This estimate placed between 1500-2500 enemy troops in the immediate area. Those consisted, principally, of the 107th Security Regiment with Headquarters at Kimpo airfield. Inasmuch as there was no other source of enemy information available to the section, this estimate was accepted in its entirety. Surprisingly enough, it proved to be quite accurate.

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Throughout the course of the planning much attention was directed to the matter of graphic aids. Most of the problems encountered here have been made the basis for recommendations contained in paragraph 10 of this report. Suffice it to say that the maze of command channels, lack of equipment and personnel, in addition to time limitations, were such that these very necessary aids were neither made available in sufficient quantities nor in time to be of more than limited aid to the subordinate units.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No formal training was scheduled for this period; all personnel received on-the-job experience concurrently with the accomplishment of the mission of the section. No rehearsals were conducted.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. The ADC Group, which included the below named G-2 personnel in addition to the entire MISD and CIC units, completed loading in Pusan, Republic of Korea, on 11 September 1950, and with the exception of drivers who accompanied their vehicles, embarked on board the USS Cavalier for transportation to the target area:

Lt. Col. E. G. VAN ORMAN
Capt. W. E. BRANDON
TSgt. W. J. BURK
Sgt. H. R. JOHNSON
Sgt. J. SASSEBERGER
Cpl. W. A. BONINE

b. The portion of the G-2 Section in the CG group completed loading and embarkation at Kobe, Japan on 11 September 1950 and sailed from that port on 12 September aboard the USS Mt. McKinley and USS George Clymer.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

(See Unit History for the period from 1 - 15 September 1950).

7. OPERATIONS

a. Assault Phase.

(1) Summary of Enemy Operations during period — See Appendix 1 to Annex Baker (Chronological Narrative of Enemy Operations).

(2) Operation of G-2 Section.

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a. ADC Group - The ADC Group landed as scheduled on Green Beach, Wolmi Do, at approximately 1830, 15 September 1950. Since the island had been secured since before noon, the landing was nothing more than movement from the beach to the CP site which was located initially on the southern end of the island. Intelligence administrative activities, as with other staff sections, were at a minimum during the first night ashore by reason of movement into the CP area after dark and under inclement weather conditions.. Radio contact with front line units was established soon after reaching the CP and served as the only means of communication between the ADC Group, the CG Group still aboard ship and subordinate elements for the initial eighteen hours. The SCR 610 was the radio used, with contact being intermittently good and bad, but still sufficient to provide adequate communication. The CP displaced to the eastern outskirts of Inchon at approximately 1600, 16 September, and assumed control as the CG Group completed the ship-to-shore movement. Such movement was completed at approximately 1800, 16 September.

b. CG Group - Formal intelligence operations by the G-2 Section were commenced on 14 September 1950 aboard the USS Mt. McKinley (AGC-7) and were officially marked by the opening of the G-2 Journal at 1600 on that date. A continuous flow of information from the various ship's radio and teletype nets was established and this information was duly entered in the Journal, on the Situation Map, in the Work Sheet and file. The bulk of the enemy information thus received was originated by the various gunfire ships and support aircraft constituting the advance force, which was then engaged in Pre D-Day bombardment of the objective area. Additional information, in the form of situation reports and intelligence summaries originated by agencies of the Far East Command, amplified the above, with the resultant effect that the section was able to formulate a fair picture of enemy activity in the objective area. However, radio silence being in effect the intelligence processed from this information, being in accord with previous estimates and expectations, was not disseminated to either the ADC Group or the subordinate echelons. On D-Day, the Division Intelligence Net was activated and by 1400 communication with the ADC Group established. The usual difficulties were encountered, and communications between the ADC and CG groups were practically nil. However, regular intelligence summaries were dispatched to the subordinate echelons via the ships communication system.

On the morning of D-Day a native boat approached the Command Ship, and a FRUFEC team consisting of 4 US and two ROK officers was taken aboard. Much valuable information was gathered from this team, and they were immediately sent to join the ADC aboard the USS Cavalier, with instructions to land with and render any possible assistance to that group. At the same time, Lieutenant Shaw, USNR, temporarily with the G-2 Section of the 1st Marine Division as a linguist guide, was dispatched to Wolmi island for the purpose of interrogating PW's captured during the initial assault, who, it was reported, were surrendering willingly.

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The night of D-Day was relatively and unusually quiet, and by early morning on D / 1 the assault echelons had reached the O-1 phase line. At this time word was passed that the advance echelon of the CG Group would be landed that afternoon. The landing of the advance echelon was quite uneventful, and by 1700 of D / 1 this echelon had joined forces with the ADC group on the outskirts of Inchon. The landing of the main echelon was quite uneventful joining the ADC group at 1700 on D / 1 and by 2400 the first formal Periodic Intelligence Report of the Inchon campaign had been promulgated. At noon of the following day (D / 2) the remaining elements of the G-2 section had arrived.

b. Exploitation Phase:

(1) Summary of Enemy Operations During Period.

See Appendix II to Annex Baker (Chronological Narrative of Enemy Operations).

(2) Operation of the G-2 Section.

(a) Intelligence functioning, as a whole, followed normal academic lines involving the collection of information from all possible sources, recording and collation, then evaluation and interpretation prior to subsequent dissemination to subordinate, adjacent and higher units in Periodic Intelligence Reports, Intelligence Summaries, Special reports and Individual Messages. This function was performed by the Combat Intelligence Sub-section within the G-2 Section and involved primarily the maintenance of G-2 Journal, Work Sheet and Situation Map, plus the inherent administrative details that accompany such functioning. The official enemy situation was maintained on a 1:50,000 scale map of Korea while a secondary map of the overall Korean situation was maintained on a 1:250,000 map. Personnel were divided into two watches which performed the duties of collection and collation of information. They maintained the G-2 Journal, Intelligence Work Sheet and the Situation Map. The administrative group of the Combat Intelligence Sub-section handled the clerical work which included the reproduction of Periodic Intelligence Reports, Overlays, Intelligence Bulletins, Special Reports and the maintenance of current map inventory and for the dissemination to lower units of all maps required during the operation. Another enlisted man was assigned as NCO-in-charge of all section property and the maintenance of records relative to that property.

(b) The operations of the aerial photo interpretation sub-section of the G-2 Section are covered in Appendix IV to Annex Baker. In general, such operations were conducted independently of routine intelligence functioning. Counterintelligence operations for this period were conducted by the 441st Army CIC Team and are covered in Appendix V to Annex Baker. The G-2 Section's counterintelligence officer and one of the NCO's were attached to the CIC Team throughout the operation. Prisoner of war interrogation was conducted by the 163rd Military Intelligence Service Detachment. A report of this detachment's operations is made in Appendix

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VI to Annex Baker. A language officer from the G-2 Section was sent to each infantry regiment to assist in the handling and interrogation of prisoners of war, and the collection of any pertinent information from local civilians or from captured documents. In addition, when requested by the regiment concerned, MISD personnel were dispatched to conduct or to assist in the interrogation of prisoners.

(c) Intelligence was disseminated in the form of Intelligence Annexes with Appendices, Intelligence Bulletins, Intelligence Memoranda, Periodic Intelligence Reports and Special Reports as well as through other communication mediums in which radio, telephone, messengers and field messages were utilized.

(d) In addition to the MISD and CIC Teams, Republic of Korean Army liaison officers were attached to the G-2 Section to assist in the interrogation of prisoners, the translation of documents and to serve as interpreters between military personnel and the civil populace.

8. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, PROBABLE ORDER OF BATTLE, AND EQUIPMENT

a. Enemy Tactics:

(1) General

(a) Our accumulated knowledge of the enemy's military tactics, prior to our landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950, consisted almost in its entirety of knowledge about the enemy's offense, by reason of the fact that, from the very outset of the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea in June until 15 September, he had continually carried the attack southward and against the U.N. Forces. With but few exceptions, UN Forces were forced to take a defensive stand and hence were denied the opportunity to study large scale enemy defensive tactics from actual combat. Thus it was that our assault landing was made with relatively little prior knowledge regarding the enemy's probable reaction to a large scale offense of this nature, particularly when it involved penetration into the very heart of his newly acquired domain.

(b) As it turned out, the tactics of the North Koreans on the defensive were dictated, not by previous precepts engendered by Russian, Chinese Communist or even Japanese instructors, but by the circumstances in which the enemy forces in this area suddenly found themselves -- that is, comparatively weak as regards manpower strength available immediately for a proper defense, and weaker still by reason of the fact that many of those troops on hand were recent conscriptees without the benefit of adequate military training, some lacking any military training whatsoever and many poorly armed. This latter fact unquestionably played a major role in the

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type of resistance against which our troops executed a landing and against which they proceeded for the greater portion of the distance to Seoul. The enemy was forced into one kind of maneuver when, with well-trained and well-disciplined troops, he might possibly have adopted another. He was forced to delay our advance all the way back to Seoul when he should ordinarily have been expected to take a determined stand under the favorable conditions in the Inchon port area. In view of the nature of the terrain on which he defended, he could have conducted an extremely stubborn defense, had he commanded high caliber troops — troops such as those which were first committed in the Communist invasion of South Korea. The prime example of his circumstances at that moment occurred in the capture of Wolmi Do, the island which covered the entrance into Inchon's harbor. The island itself was commanding terrain and was interlaced with defensive trenches, honeycombed with underground troop shelters and covered with well prepared gun emplacements which commanded excellent fields of fire. In addition, it had a defending force of some 400 to 500 men, the bulk of which survived the air and naval preparatory bombardments. Yet our troops took over the island with unbelievably low casualties, capturing approximately 150 prisoners and killing those remaining.

(c) Almost the contrast of this situation occurred several days later on the outskirts of Seoul when our advancing troops suffered heavy casualties in overcoming extremely stiff enemy resistance along a commanding ridgeline. This high ground was later found to have been defended by more capable troops than we had previously encountered, led by well trained and combat-tested officers and noncommissioned officers who had previously served in the Chinese Communist Forces.

(d) Another factor which dictated his tactics on this occasion was the obvious fact that the enemy was not expecting a landing at Inchon, at least, not at this time. He probably considered that a landing of this size and force was completely unfeasible over the beaches available to an invading unit. Document translation has since indicated that he considered that some sort of landing could be made by U.N. Forces here but these same documents revealed that only desultory steps were taken to establish a suitable defense commensurate with the importance of the port. This also goes back, probably, to the basic weakness throughout the whole defensive structure in this area — the fact that almost all well organized and well trained units were committed around the southern perimeter in an effort to take Taegu and other important centers. This weakness was further amplified by the inherently poor coordination between the various branches and arms of the enemy military service. In this instance, the defending force was part of an independent marine regiment ordinarily under Naval control but probably at this time under the tactical control of the Seoul area defense command, an Army responsibility, although still relying on Naval logistical support. A combination of all of the foregoing weak points in his military

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structure resulted in a series of enemy delaying actions from Inchon all the way to Seoul, despite the fact that several thousand reinforcing troops moved into the area very quickly in an attempt to frustrate our movement. Still the disorganization and resultant weakness of the enemy units was too great to be mastered in such a short period of time.

(e) For a brief span of three days and a few thousand yards, the enemy abandoned his delaying tactics in favor of a determined stand on the outskirts of Seoul, such a defense being staged on previously well prepared high ground and by troops either determined enough to die in their positions and behind their guns, or by troops who were literally forced by combat-wise leaders to maintain their positions or be killed in the withdrawal. This same type of defense was also conducted for at least two days along the thoroughfares of Seoul as streetfighting raged from house to house and from intersection to intersection.

(f) Once Seoul had been taken by our troops, the enemy reverted once more to his previous tactics of delaying in every manner which was possible the further advance of the Division toward the town of Uijongbu.

(2) Specific

(a) The enemy's defensive tactics which he employed in an effort to slow down and halt our advance from Inchon eastward were built around his defense of the high ground, such defense being staged on either the military or topographical crest or on the reverse slope. Not so much a defense in depth, a high ground defense system usually consisted of a series of independent positions, each organized within itself. His high ground defense is invariably characterized by the use of many automatic weapons positions and a generous sprinkling of mutually-supporting light or heavy machine gun emplacements, if time has allowed their construction, with individual, shallow, rifleman's trenches scattered throughout. Where defensive positions had been prepared in haste, the only emplacements were individual prone-type foxholes which tended to be too shallow to afford maximum protection against artillery fire.

(b) His defense of that position might vary from light to very heavy, depending on the type of soldier making up the defending force. Where he stubbornly held his position, the enemy made good use of his ample supply of ammunition, making the capture of the ground costly and painstaking. He generally stayed until driven out by the infantry assault or by artillery and air strikes, at which time he quickly pulled back to another piece of high ground where the operation began again in the same general manner.

(c) His main defensive line itself may have been to the rear of a 15 to 20 man outpost which was usually set up with small arms and automatic weapons to delay and hold up the advance at critical points along the low ground.

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(d) In addition, where his defense centered around a principle road, as it did along the Seoul-Inchon highway, the enemy laid extensive minefields that served to retard our advance. It is significant, however, that most minefields were hastily prepared, sometimes camouflaged and sometimes merely laid on top of the ground, and very rarely covered by enemy fire. The mines themselves were either anti-vehicular or anti-personnel and of either wooden or metal construction. Especially in Seoul did the enemy cover his retreat from the city by mining thoroughly all routes of advance which we had to use.

(e) The enemy's defense on occasions was also supported by mortars and artillery which he tried to use to stop our advance but they never appeared in large enough volume to hold up movement for any great length of time. These artillery and mortar tactics were effective in at least one instance against the advance of the 1st Marines toward Yongdung-po when air and counterbattery fire had difficulty in locating the enemy weapons. He also employed similar artillery fire against the 5th Marines on the outskirts of Seoul and in front of his main line of resistance.

(f) Another aspect of his defense appeared in profuseness in Seoul in the form of roadblocks. These roadblocks usually consisted of sandbagged emplacements surrounded by AT and AP mines and appeared, prior to Seoul, at road junctions and critical points in the road. In Seoul, the enemy had constructed roadblocks at intersections and had staggered them intermittently along the thoroughfares between intersections so as to give continuous cover to the movement and defensive action of enemy troops. These roadblocks were generally defended by machine gun and antitank fire and in many cases turned out to be stubborn pockets of resistance that had to be blasted out before movement could be resumed.

(g) One of the primary facets of the enemy's defense tactics was the counterattack which he used almost consistently after the initial disorganized state of rout from Inchon had been overcome. His counterattacks, usually of company size or smaller, were most commonly conducted just prior to or at dawn and generally against limited objectives, resembling in nature somewhat the banzai-type of attack used by the Japanese during World War II. It was usually a frontal attack although on occasion might have been marked by enveloping attempts, and was, of a necessity, a quickly planned operation and utilized those troops available in the area who could be rapidly organized into a striking force. The attacks were sometimes preceded by a brief interval of artillery or mortar fire, the assault itself commencing on a flare or whistle signal, and stopping only when heavy losses had been incurred by the enemy force.

(h) If armor was available and the terrain permitted, it was used to support the enemy counterattacks. However, the fact that tanks were limited to the roadnets made them extremely vulnerable to our air and

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ground anti-tank fire. In at least one instance, the tanks moved forward against our lines without any infantry protection.

(i) Outstanding in the enemy's conduct of his defense was his ability to camouflage. Individual camouflage was exploited to the maximum by each soldier who utilized grass, weeds, leaves and any other natural growth that could be used for that purpose.

j. The North Koreans also carried an extra suit of civilian clothes solely for the purpose of a quick change when the situation demanded. If a unit became overrun and disorganized, the soldiers usually changed into these clothes and became part of the countryside or one of the many refugee groups always on the roads. If such a change would expedite his activity, the entire unit would change into white clothes and operate tactically while thus attired. In one instance, a counterattack and an attempted envelopment began with the approach of several apparently non-hostile "civilians" to the near proximity of an outpost, onto which they hurled many hand grenades and then fled. Concealed enemy troops nearby took up the attack by assaulting the position from the front and flanks. The attack was repulsed with heavy enemy casualties but friendly casualties were also heavy.

(3) Summary

The enemy's operation, with the exception of a brief determined stand near and in Seoul, was one of a varying moderate to a strong delaying action. His first reaction following his initial disorganization was an attempt to contain our advance until such time as sufficient reinforcements could arrive and initiate a counteroffensive. In view of the scarcity of reinforcements and our own rapid advances, this never materialized.

b. Enemy Organization.

(1) The NK Infantry Division.

(a) The standard North Korean infantry division is composed of three infantry regiments, organized on the triangular system of military organization, with an organic artillery regiment, a transportation battalion, an AT battalion, a signal battalion, an engineer battalion and a medical battalion. The organizational strength is approximately 10,000.

(2) Organization of Units in Seoul Area.

(a) The 18th NK Division and one regiment of the 9th NK Division were the primary standard North Korean units which opposed the advance of the Division from Inchon to Yongdung-po. The 18th was considered to have been at a strength of at least 8,000 while the 3rd Regiment of the 9th Division probably contained 2,000 to 2,500 troops, many of which were committed to the defense of ground lying within the U. S. Army 7th Division zone. This was also true of one regiment of the 18th Division.

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[REDACTED]

(b) In addition to the two units above, PWs and captured documents revealed that there were approximately 30 units of different sizes, designations and organizational structures taking part in the defense of the Seoul area at one time or another. The committal of such units, many of which were administrative, service or training units, is indicative of the desperate straits in which the North Korean high command found itself at that time and pointed to the extreme shortage of well-organized and well trained combat units in this area.

(c) Significant among this large number of newly identified and newly-organized units was the confirmation of the presence of the 25th and 27th Infantry Brigades; the 25th conducted a determined defense of the high ground just west of Seoul's city limit and the 27th arrived in the general area around the first of October, stopping in the vicinity of Suyukyon. In general, PW information indicated that these brigades were hastily organized during September and that they consisted principally of recruits, with an overall aggregate strength of from 3,500 to 5,000. PW information on the 25th Brigade indicates that it consists of two infantry battalions, four heavy machine gun battalions, one engineer battalion and a mortar battalion. PWs have also reported that the officers and noncommissioned officers of this brigade were former members of the Chinese Communist Forces, a fact which tends to explain why this unit made such a determined stand in front of the Division advance on Seoul.

(d) The 27th Brigade, according to PWs, is composed of two infantry battalions, five heavy machine gun battalions, an engineer battalion and an artillery or mortar battalion. It is highly probable that these two units, the 25th and 27th Brigades, provide the general organizational pattern of most North Korean brigades. The presence of these two brigades, plus other such organizations throughout North Korea, leads to the obvious conjecture that these units, hastily thrown together under a provisional organization to meet an emergency situation, were designated as brigades with a view to developing them, both in size and organizations, to divisional status at some time in the near future.

(e) In addition to the divisions and the brigades identified in the defensive action at Seoul, there was also included a large number of either independent regiments or regiments whose subordination remained undetermined. Many of these followed the standard North Korean infantry regimental organization while the remaining were obviously formed hurriedly as stop-gap units with the principal aim being to move the largest number of men to the Seoul area as rapidly as possible. Most of them fell in the infantry organization class while there were some which were identified either as artillery, mechanized or security regiments. Among those moved into this area was a tank regiment without any tanks and an artillery regiment with almost no artillery. They were thrown into the line for the most part as riflemen.

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c. Enemy Strength and Order of Battle.

(1) The order of battle of enemy units defending the Inchon-Seoul area was both difficult to determine and to maintain with any degree of specific accuracy. This was due largely to both our rapid advances and the speed with which the enemy reacted to our landing by dispatching reinforcements into our zone in the form of numerous units which were hurriedly organized and on which there was no history by reason of their never having been previously committed to action. The order of battle picture bore out the belief that the enemy had sent the bulk of his well organized units to the southern perimeter, leaving the defense of Inchon and Seoul in the hands of newly organized combat units and administrative and support units which were organic to the North Korean Peoples Army Headquarters in Seoul. In addition, and to further complicate the situation from the order of battle standpoint, reorganization of these Seoul defense units continued throughout the defense and unit designations were changed as a consequence. An example of this was the transition of the Seoul Defense Regiment to brigade status and then finally into the 31st Infantry Division which generally contained most of the independent defense units around Seoul. By reason of their heterogeneous nature, it was extremely difficult during the operation to determine the subordination of most of the units within the overall defense scheme, and such a situation resulted also in the lack of such knowledge on the part of prisoners. Too, the heavy influx of PWs during the early stages of the attack made complete interrogation impossible and as a result many PWs were not interrogated. Throughout the entire operation it is estimated that 1000 PWs were not interrogated at all.

(2) The Order of Battle of the units which opposed the advance of the Division from the time of the landing at Inchon until the capture of Uijongbu, north of Seoul, is given below, indicating any known subordination, probable strengths and code and APO numbers.

(a) 18th Rifle Division - Code 863.
(Strength: 8,000 - 10,000).
(301 PWs)

1st Regt
2d Regt
3d Regt Code 565.
22d Arty Regt Code 506.
Engr. Bn.
AA Bn.

Brief history. The 18th Division was formed around the 18th Brigade which came from Chorwon to Seoul around the middle of August, 1950. The Brigade consisted of two regiments while at Chorwon and was probably organized early in August. A third regiment was added at Seoul, originally being organized as the 70th Regiment at Sinjiju. The artillery regiment joined the division at Seoul early in September. The 18th Division was

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also referred to as the Seoul Defense Division and was the only unit of division strength in the area. For the employment of the division against our advance, an armored regiment and probably a mechanized regiment were attached.

- (b) 9th Rifle Division (Elements).
Code 315. (23 PWs)

3d Regt (Strength: 2,000)

Brief History: The 3d Regiment of the 9th Division was not ordered to the southern perimeter along with the 1st and 2d Regiments but ended up in Seoul at the time of our invasion. It was one of the reinforcing units thrown into the enemy's efforts to halt our progress between Inchon and Yongdung Po. The bulk of the 3d Regiment is believed to have been used against the Army units on our right flank.

- (c) 17th Rifle Division. Code 122.
(Strength: 3,500) (41 PWs)

Headquarters
2d Regiment
76mm Arty Bn
AA Co.

Brief History: Originally organized as a brigade to take part in the southern offensive, the 17th was committed in the South in a piecemeal fashion and as a mechanized brigade. When the UN invasion began, those units in the South were withdrawn to the Seoul area where it was reorganized into a division, utilizing other units which had been brought into the area from the North. It subsequently withdrew northward through Uijongbu.

- (d) 25th Infantry Brigade Code 632
(Strength: 4,000 - 5,000). (179 PWs)

2 Infantry Bns
4 HMG Bns
1 Engineer Bn
1 Mortar Bn
1 76mm Arty Bn
1 Tank Bn

Brief History: The 25th Brigade was organized at Chorwon as a security unit but had to be committed as a regular infantry brigade at Seoul around the 20th of September. The brigade was led by officers and NCOs who had previous combat experience with the CCF and was the unit which formed the backbone of the Seoul defense organization on the northern outskirts of the city against the advance of the 5th Marines.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- (e) 27th Infantry Brigade Code 635.
(Strength: 5,000) (123 PWs)

2 Infantry Bns
4 HMG Bns
1 Engineer Bn
1 Mortar Bn

Brief History: The brigade was organized on 11 August 1950, in Kumchon, N.K., and was set up as a defense unit, as evidenced by the number of machine gun battalions. It came down into the 1st Marine Division zone near Suyuhyon on 1 October and withdrew in front of the 5th Marines advance two days later to the North.

- (f) 226th Marine Regiment (Elements)
(Strength: 3,000) (183 PWs)

Headquarters
1st Battalion
2d (Mechanized) Bn.
Replacement Bn.
Rcn, Sig, and Mortar Companies

Brief History: The 226th was charged with the defense of the port of Inchon and was supported by two companies of the 918th (Coast) Artillery Regiment. Under naval control and dependent on the Navy for logistical and administrative control, this unit probably had subordinate units in several west coast ports, Inchon being the best defended. Tactically, the units in Inchon probably looked to the NKPA in Seoul for orders. Much of the troop strength was newly conscripted and poorly trained.

- (g) 918th (Coast) Artillery Regiment
(Elements) (Strength: 200)
(2 PWs)

2d Bn, 4th and 6th Cos.

Brief History: The 918th Artillery Regiment (Elements) was apparently in support of the 226th Marine Regiment during the defense of Inchon, and was armed with 76mm guns. Only two companies (2d Bn) were in Inchon with the regiment's other subordinate unit disposed in west coast port cities on a similar mission. All told, the 918th had three battalions. The headquarters was located at Chinnampo along with the 3d Bn. Each company had 4 76mm guns and 48 troops. The two companies at Inchon were wiped out or scattered by Naval and air bombardment.

[REDACTED]

(h) 42d Mechanized (Tank) Regiment
(Strength: 500) (11 PWs)

1st Bn
Auto. Rifle Bn
Engineer Co.

Brief History: The 42d Regiment was organized at Sinuiju around 7 August 1950. Arrived in the Seoul area early in September and was attached to the 18th NK Division. Had 18 tanks. The 42d took part in the enemy defense between Inchon and Seoul and led the strong counterattack on 17 September against the 1st Marines in which 14 enemy tanks were knocked out by a combination of ground and air attacks. In addition, the senior officers of this unit were believed killed in the engagement.

(i) 43d Tank Regt. Code 346
(Strength: 500) (56 PWs)

Headquarters
Auto. Weapons Bn
(2 Tk Bns)
(AA Machine Gun, Engr and Ord Cos)
(Sig and Rcn Plts.)

Brief History: Originally at Pyongyang, this regiment became part of the Wonsan Defenses on 22 August with 10 - 15 tanks. It was ordered to Seoul and arrived there on 23 September to take part in the defense there. The most notable action of this unit was its counterattack against the 1st Marines in Seoul at 0200, 26 September, in which at least 4 tanks were lost to our artillery and AT fires.

(j) 19th AA Regt Code 586.
(Strength: 1200) (5 PWs)

1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
AA MG Bn

Brief History: Organized and trained in Pyongyang in July 1949 and came to Seoul area on 29 June 1950. Two Bns had 37mm, 1 Bn had 85mm and 1 Bn had 12.7mm AT MGs.

(k) 76th Independent Regt. 42d Div.
Code 563 (Strength: 3,000) (218 PWs)

[REDACTED]

Headquarters
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
Artillery Bn
Mortar Co
Signal Co.

Brief History: Organized about 24 July at Munchon and was stationed in the Wonsan area until 17 September when it was ordered to Seoul. The regiment was part of the reinforcing troops for Seoul's defense and was opposite the 5th Marines. The regiment was apparently able to withdraw from Seoul intact.

(1) 78th Ind. Inf. Regt.
Code 567 (Strength: 2,000) (528 PWs)

Headquarters
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
Arty Co (76mm)
Trans. Co
Engr. Plt.
Rcn. Plt

Brief History: Organized and trained at Sariwon 16 May 1950. Came to the Seoul area about 20 September and entered combat against the 5th and 1st Marines. Regt suffered heavy casualties. PWs also stated that a large percentage of troops in regiment were Communists, especially officers. The regiment conducted consistently a stubborn defense.

(m) 513th Arty Regt. (Strength: 1,500) (33 PWs)

1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn

Brief History: This regiment was organized at Chorwon about 8 September. It moved by foot and arrived in Seoul around the 23d Sept and moved immediately into combat within the city of Seoul. The 513th was originally organized as an artillery regiment but were unable to bring artillery pieces with them. A 76mm and 5 45mm guns were acquired in Seoul and the rest of the regiment served as infantry. The remnants of this regiment probably went into the organization of the 31st Division prior to and just after the fall of Seoul.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- (n) 107th Security Regt.
(Strength: 2,500) (270 PWs)

Headquarters
27th Bn
32d Bn
31st Bn
33d Bn

Brief History: The 107th was a security unit with battalions located in different localities primarily to insure Communist security in South Korea. A quasi-military organization, the 107th Regiment's 32d and 27th Bns opposed our advance in the Kimpo Area. Most of the PWs from this regiment came from these two battalions.

- (o) 75th Infantry Regt. Code 578
(Strength: 2,000) (16 PWs)

1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
Sig Bn
AT Co
HMG Co
Mortar Co

Brief History: This regiment was organized around the end of July in Hamhung. It was ordered to Uijongbu on 20 September arriving on 30 September. It was too late to assist in the defense of Seoul but was used as a covering force for the withdrawal through Uijongbu. PWs were captured from the 1st and 2d Battalions only.

- (p) 10th Railroad Regt. (Brigade)
Code 584 (Strength: 900) (17 PWs)

3d Bn
4th Bn
5th Bn
Engr Co.

Brief History: This regiment was organized at Pyongyang late in June, 1950. Moving immediately to Seoul, its mission was to maintain the security of the railroad lines and to keep them in operation. All of the above units of this regiment apparently were committed to the defense of Seoul.

- (q) Air Force Division
(Strength: Unknown) (91 PWs)

No breakdown is known. Probably 500 men in the area prior to retreating.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Brief History: Elements of this division were stationed at Kimpo airfield and included personnel involved in all the operations of the field. When our troops approached the airfield area, most of the personnel from this unit withdrew across the Han River.

- (r) 31st Rifle Division or Seoul City Brigade
(Code 351) (Strength: 3,600) (345 PWs)

Headquarters
1st Bn
2d Bn
3d Bn
4th Bn
5th Bn
6th Bn
Mortar Battalion
Mechanized Company

Brief History: The 31st Division was the result of the amalgamation of the various independent units in Seoul who were thrown into its defenses. The final result was the formation about 20 September of the 31st Division. It continued to defend the city until forced to withdraw, and then it delayed our advance northward on Uijongbu. The basis for the division was the Seoul Regiment, identified as the 2d Regiment by several PWs. Due to the number of administrative, supply, security and training units in action when we advanced on Seoul, it is still almost impossible to form a picture of this division and its organization is indicated by the presence of battalions without regimental form in the division.

- (s) 36th Bn, 111th Security Regt.
(Strength: 750) (32 PWs)

Brief History: The battalion was organized as a separate battalion and was probably made one of the battalions of the 111th Security Regiment when it was organized. It was the only battalion of this regiment involved in the fighting around Seoul.

- (t) Rehabilitation Bn (Special Cultural Bn)
(Strength: 230) (16 PWs)

Brief History: The unit was organized on 19 September and contained NK prisoners serving sentence in Seoul. Officers were also former prisoners. Most were serving sentences for desertion. The battalion was employed against the 1st Marines west of Yongdungpo.

(u) A total of 428 prisoners were interrogated who did not know enough of their own unit to be further identified. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were not interrogated due to the heavy initial influx.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(y) The following units were identified but the number of prisoners captured was not sufficient to accept the presence of the unit. Further, many of these PWs were deserters or wounded from the southern front.

2d Engineer Regiment	1
22d Regiment	2
118th Regiment	1
286th Regiment	1
876th Unit	1
4th Regiment, 2d Division	1
534th Unit	1
315th Unit	1
1527th Unit	1
64th Artillery Battalion	3
47th Tank Regiment	1
97th Regiment	1
104th Security Regiment	2
13th Rifle Division	1
15th Rifle Division	1
10th Rifle Division	3
94th Regiment	3
571st Regiment	1
46th Tank Regiment	4
98th Regiment	2
559th Battalion	2
72d Regiment	3
77th Regiment	3
NCO School (?)	11

d. Enemy Deployment.

(1) Offensive:

The general scheme of enemy offensive deployment during the operation to liberate Seoul is of little significance by reason of the limited offensive moves made by the North Koreans and the small scale on which they were conducted. Generally, it might be stated that the deployment of his troops in limited counterattacks such as he staged against our forces consisted of the bulk of the troops on line and in the assault. There are no indications that there was over a reserve element held in the rear for the purpose of exploiting a break-through or that any unit larger than a platoon was used as a maneuver element to carry out an enveloping movement. Due to the short period of time in which he had to organize a counterattack, there was little opportunity to deploy his artillery in the support of his attacks, and by reason of the channelized tank approaches, the route of his supporting armor in such instances could always be anticipated.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(2) Defensive:

The deployment of his troops on the defense generally followed a certain pattern -- that of establishing the bulk of his troops along the high ground, leaving little apparent reserve in the rear to counterattack a break-through. When counterattacks were staged, it was probably by the same soldiers who had been in the defensive line. This failure to provide a mobile reserve was doubtless due to the fact that there simply were not enough capable troops available to handle both tasks. Their mortars and howitzers were intelligently and accurately employed to excellent advantages from close and long ranges, high and low ground positions, usually with such effectiveness as to indicate excellent observation of the fire. Mortars and ammunition being in plentiful supply, they were extensively used both in direct defense and for the purpose of harassing. Anti-tank guns were used against personnel as high velocity weapons. The dual purpose and anti-aircraft weapons encountered were applied almost entirely against ground targets. The artillery was not as troublesome as is usually expected, evidently due to the shortage of the weapons themselves and of trained personnel. When contrasted with the mortars and howitzers, the relative mobility, firepower and effectiveness of those weapons over the artillery, along with the plentiful supply of ammunition, the little use of artillery was not surprising. That some reserve on the battalion level was maintained in the Seoul area was later determined following the battle for that city but this apparently was nothing more than one of the defense phase lines to which more forward units could retreat when driven back from their positions.

e. Enemy Equipment.

(1) Individual:

(a) The individual equipment and uniforms issued to each North Korean soldier were kept to a bare minimum, allowing him just enough to operate. He received one military uniform, in most cases he also had a set of civilian clothes, food, 80 to 100 rounds of ammunition, two or three hand grenades, and a rifle or sub-machine gun. The troops opposing our advance apparently had an ample supply of both food and ammunition. Rations consisted of water, dry rice and a form of biscuits or hard tack, issued on a three-day basis. This was obviously sufficient to keep him in good physical condition since few appeared underfed and there were few complaints of insufficient food while in the North Korean Army from PWs.

(b) Relative to the individual uniforms, the 5th Marines S-2 reported: "Several variations of the standard Khaki cotton uniform have been found. The uniform consists of a close fitting jacket of Russian design with typical baggy trousers. Head gear is a simple visor cap with ear flaps. Sewn on the uniform on the chest and back portions of the coat

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and on the cap is a net of string intended to be used to fasten vegetation or other material to effect camouflage and concealment. Colored piping is normally placed along the trouser seams, on the cap and around the coat sleeves to indicate the branch or arm of service. Shoulder board insignia, although not worn in battle, can usually be found on the person or in the effects of the enemy.

(2) Individual and Organizational Weapons:

(a) Almost in their entirety, the weapons used by the North Koreans were either of Soviet manufacture or of Soviet design. Some exceptions to this occurred when U. S. weapons were found that had been captured by the enemy either from U.S. troops who formerly occupied this area or from ROK troops. These included M-1 rifles, carbines, AT guns and artillery pieces, primarily 105mm howitzers, and most were presumably issued to newly formed units in the Seoul area.

(b) The North Korean weapons employed included the following:

Soviet 7.62mm TT-1930 (Tokarev Pistol).
Soviet 7.62mm PPSH-1941 SMG.
Soviet 7.62mm PPSH-1943 SMG.
Soviet 7.62mm M1891/30 Rifle.
Soviet 7.62mm DP LMG.
Soviet 7.62mm 1938 Carbine, and 1944 w/folding bayonet.
Soviet 7.62mm Maxim MG.
Soviet 14.5mm PTRS-1941 AT rifle.
Soviet 14.5mm PTRD-1941 AT rifle.
Soviet 82mm M1941 Battalion Mortar.
Soviet F-1 Defensive Hand Grenade.
Soviet RG-42 Offensive Hand Grenade.
Soviet 76mm Field Gun M1902/30.
Soviet 76mm Field Gun M1942
Soviet 122mm Field Howitzer M1938.
Soviet 45mm AT Gun M1942.
Soviet 120mm Mortar M1938.
Soviet SU-76.
Soviet 37mm AA Gun M1939.
Soviet Medium Tank T-34/85

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

a. The following are the estimated enemy losses for the period covered:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(2) Aerial Photographic Interpretation

As a result of this operation it is considered that a minimum of two photographic planes and one reproduction unit with Sonne-printers should be organically attached to, and continually under the operational control of, the Division in order to achieve the fullest possible efficiency in tactical photography. The weakness in photographic work both for interpretation and use by front line units is primarily attributed to both the lack of photographic planes on station over the Division zone and the lack of control of those photographic planes which were in MAG-33. It is felt that greater efficiency could be obtained by setting up standard photographic targets which would be flown in accordance with plans based on the tactical situation in addition to specific vertical and oblique coverage requested by subordinate units. Such coverage would include:

(a) Daily front line vertical coverage flown in late afternoon, developed, interpreted and dropped to front line elements for use the following day.

(b) Blanket vertical coverage of potential operational areas suitable for semi-controlled mosaics.

(c) High obliques taken by the Tactical Air Observer, with K-20 hand held cameras, of terrain immediately in front of infantry units to familiarize them with the nature of the terrain to their front. Where progress is rapid and the terrain changeable, this could be done easily.

(3) Language and Document Personnel

Many of the problems posed by the language barrier during the Inchon-Seoul operation would have been almost insurmountable without the use and assistance of natives who could speak English, many of whom were employed not only by the battalions and regiments to control native working parties, but were used at all levels to assist in intelligence functioning, working with interrogators and aiding in document translation. Much of the void occasioned by the lack of Marine Corps language personnel was filled by ROK Army, a Military Intelligence Service Detachment was attached to conduct prisoner interrogations and translate documents. In an independent operation under similar language condition, and without such an MISD, the amount of information from prisoners and documents would have been immeasurably lower. Without the help of ROK officers on battalion level tactical information from prisoners, natives and documents would have been non-existent. Of the three Japanese language officers in the G-2 Section, two were detached to regiments to aid in interrogation there. In addition, an MISD team of two men was sent down to regimental level to carry out interrogation.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(4) CIC Activities

(a) The Counter Intelligence activities conducted by this Division during its operations in Korea have greatly proved the need for trained Marine Corps Counter Intelligence personnel. The CIC Team attached to this Division was provided by GHQ, FEC and consisted of seventeen (17) U.S. Army CIC personnel. This team was augmented with one (1) Marine Counter Intelligence officer and one (1) NCO from the Division G-2 Section. Neither of the members of this team were experienced in the combat phases of counter intelligence; however, all of the members employed as agents were experienced domestic counter intelligence investigators.

(b) Counter Intelligence teams of two (2) agents and a Korean National interpreter were assigned to each infantry regiment's zone of operation in order to secure counter intelligence targets and to protect the unit from espionage, sabotage, and subversion and to help prevent guerrilla action. These teams were not assigned to the regiments for administrative or operational control; this control remained with the Division. Cooperation between these teams and regimental headquarters during the initial phases of the operation can be considered only fair, due mainly to the lack of experience in the employment of counter intelligence agents on the part of staff officers and to the lack of knowledge of Marine tactical employment on the part of the agents. These difficulties were rapidly overcome as the operation progressed. The prompt reduction of counter intelligence targets by the CIC team greatly assisted this division in the accomplishment of its assigned mission.

(c) The present provision in the Marine Division T/O is considered inadequate for operations such as the one from Inchon to Seoul if the U.S. Army cannot be relied on to furnish CIC detachments. And the need for CIC personnel will become even more acute where operations are conducted in a country where the civil populace may be considered hostile, such as in North Korea. Except for such a counterintelligence organization, there is no provision made in our T/O for personnel who can undertake a solution of the problems inherent with operating in Communist lands.

b. Recommendation:

(1) Map Distribution - It is recommended that maps be handled and distributed within the Division in accordance with FM 101-10, with allocations being set by the G-2 Section and distribution being handled by the Engineer Battalion.

(2) Aerial Photographic Interpretation. It is recommended that:

(a) The Aerial Photographic Section be normally located at the Photographic Squadrons reproduction unit, with a liaison officer at the Division G-2 Section.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) All delivery of aerial photographs be facilitated by use of air, either helicopter or OY.

(c) A Speed Graphic camera be added to the allowance of an API team to make terrestrial photographs of enemy installations and defenses.

(d) There be an increased allowance, either in the Division or Photographic Squadron, of photographic supplies, and especially photographic paper.

(e) A minimum of two photographic planes and one reproduction unit with Sonne-printers be organically attached and under control of the Division.

(3) Language and Document Personnel - In view of probable demands for language personnel in future operations, it is recommended that steps be taken to step up training of language personnel and that allowance be made in regimental and divisional intelligence section T/O's to include linguists, numerically more on the level with present U.S. Army figures for such sections. Especially is it recommended that interrogation teams be called for in the T/O and that training be conducted as such. There is also a need for language personnel in Division Staff Sections other than the G-2, for special assignments.

(4) CIC Personnel -

(a) It is recommended that the Marine Corps organize and train counterintelligence teams for employment with each Marine Division. From the experience gained in this operation it is believed that a division team should be composed of at least fourteen (14) agents, one team commander with the rank of captain and one stenographer. All agents should be commissioned officers, warrant officers or staff NCO's, 25 years of age or older, previous investigative experience, GCT of at least 120, and of congenial personality.

(b) It is further recommended that where Marine Corps employment in peace time does not allow for exercise of CIC personnel, that arrangements be made to attach such Marine Corps personnel to Army CIC units in Europe and the Far East for wider experience and training.

[REDACTED]

G - 2 SECTION ROSTER

-2	HOLCOMB, Bankson T., Jr.	COL	04658	USMC	9906
Asst G-2	VAN ORMAN, Ellsworth G.	LTCOL	05433	USMC	0802/0840
Asst G-2 (Combat Intell)	BABASHANIAN, John G.	MAJ	08611	USMC	0302/0230
Asst G-2 (OOB)	BRANDON, William E.	CAPT	021358	USMC	0301
Asst G-2 Tr 22Sep50-1stMar	STANFORD, Norman R.	CAPT	018891	USMC	0272/0840/0301
Asst G-2 (Language)	VAN BRUNT, Frederick B.	LSTLT	024978	USMCR	0230
Asst G-2 Tr 10Oct50-5thMar	WOODARD, Richard N.	LSTLT	025807	USMCR	0302
Asst G-2 (Language)	STONE, Elmer J.	LSTLT	027898	USMCR	0230
Asst G-2 (CIC)	PORTER, Kenneth R.	LSTLT	048147	USMC	0230/0210
Asst G-2 (API)	JONES, Edward H.	LSTLT	047323	USMC	1202/1440/0240
Asst G-2 (API)	COFFMAN, Raymond P., Jr.	LSTLT	049002	USMC	0302/0240
Asst G-2 (TIO)	RADWELL, Francis J.	2DLT	019778	USMC	0230
Chief of Section	CAMERON, Dougal H.	MSGT	259686	USMC	0211
21Sep50 Tr 7thMar	WOLFF, LeRoy H.	MSGT	245132	USMC	0230
22Sep50 Tr 5thMar	BARNYAK, George J.	MSGT	243715	USMC	0231/0267/0319
NCOinCharge API	O'GRADY, Walter H. III	TSGT	989241	USMC	0231
NCOinCharge Com Int	BURK, William A.	TSGT	276679	USMC	0231
NCOinCharge OOB	MARTIN, Robert E.	TSGT	362674	USMC	0231/0267
API	POE, Bernard O.	SSGT	286569	USMC	0231
Combat Intell.	FISHER, Wayne F.	SSGT	471139	USMC	0231
NCOinCharge Maps	WOOD, Edward N.	SSGT	398912	USMC	0231
API	PLOTT, Samuel C., Jr.	SSGT	363780	USMC	0241/0811
Draftsman	DOWER, Kenneth E.	SGT	648569	USMC	1441
Stenog	CRAWFORD, Jack (n)	SGT	654191	USMC	0131
NCOinCharge Property	ROEMER, John A.	SGT	1049312	USMC	0231
CIC	WALLACE, William D.	SGT	643732	USMC	0211
Clerk-typist	SASSENBERGER, Joseph	SGT	1084638	USMC	0143

CONFIDENTIAL

COB	JOHNSTON, Homer R.	SGT	1088634	USMC	0231
TIO-FSCC	LEMON, Harold L.	SGT	620577	USMC	0231
TIO-FSCC	WIRT, David E.	SGT	667753	USMC	0231
Draftsman	BROADWELL, Warren L.	SGT	1074599	USMC	1444
Combat Intell	BONINE, William A.	CPL	657170	USMC	0231
Stenog	LAREAU, John N.	CPL	1077010	USMCR	0143
Draftsman	BIAPORE, Louis P.	CPL	1074716	USMC	1411
Tr 21Sep50-5thMar	THOMAS, Everett L., Jr.	PFC	1046261	USMC	0143

441st CIC Team

DOUGHERTY, Millard F.	CAPT	01306990	9302
CLIFFORD, Charles E.	S/A	-	9302
FANCHER, Clarence R.	S/A	-	9302
FANNING, Leland K.	S/A	-	9302
FLOOK, Arnold R.	S/A	-	9302
HOLLOWAY, Geoffrey L.	S/A	-	9302
HUTCHERSON, Brian K.	S/A	-	9302
ITO, Woodrow S.	S/A	-	9302
KANE, James W.	S/A	-	9302
KILJIMA, Masaru	S/A	-	9302
LAMM, Joel C.	S/A	-	9302
LARSON, Gordon W.	S/A	-	9302
O'NEIL, Thomas F.	S/A	-	9302
TARBUTTON, Edmund H.	S/A	-	9302
TISDALE, Leonard I.	S/A	-	9302
WALTON, Samuel E.	S/A	-	9302
YAMAMOTO, George Y.	S/A	-	9302

Korean Police

CHOI TAIK SUNG	CAPT
KANG WON KOON	1STLT
KWON OH TAL	SGT
KIM CHIN HANG	SGT
KIM JOO YUNG	PVT
KIM CHUNG JOON	PVT
CHOI SHIN KIL	PVT
YON BYONG HAN	PVT
KIM CHIN KI	PVT
KWAK CHANG KOON	PVT
KIM HUNG HAI	PVT
KIM HYON CHANG	PVT
HONG CHONG HAI	PVT
LEE YONG KOO	PVT
KIM KYOO BYONG	PVT
KIM OON BAI	PVT
YOO CHAN HO	PVT
YANG KUM BOK	PVT
KIM CHUM HAN	PVT
CHOO JAI CHUL	PVT
SONG KWAN OK	PVT
CHA SUNG MIN	PVT
LEE CHUN SHIK	PVT
KWON SUNG MOON	PVT
JUN BONG SOO	PVT
KO BYONG KOON	PVT
HAN HYONG KOO	PVT
HWANG HAN SOO	PVT
YOON SON HAN	PVT
MYONG KWANG SHIK	PVT

Interpreters

LEE CHIN HO
HAN HUNG JO
KIM KWANG HOO
PAK NAM SUNG
LEE KEE HANG
COOK KWE NAM
LEE KUN HA
PAK KYONG OK
CHUNG MOO YONG
AHN DONG HO
LEE SANG SEOL

163rd Military Intelligence

ASANO, Fujio F.
UYEDA, Masao B.
HIGASHI, Roy Y.
ISHII, Yoshio
TORAKAWA, Sunao G.
ASADA, Shiichi
OKUMURA, Takeo
ANDO, Toshio
SHIMOMURA, Saburo
OZAKI, Cooledge
SUGIMOTO, Masaru J.
MATSUHITA, Masato
KIKIDA, Yasukazu
OKAMURA, Akira
KIMOTO, Takashi
TEIVANS, Leons
SUK Chin Pok
LEE Jong Kyu
CHUNG Kwang Su
IN Hack Kum
KOO Chang Mo
PAEK Sung Jun
PAK Dae Yong
HAN Myong Jin
MOON Dong Hyon
KIM Sun Rin

1STLT	01596964	9316-J
1STLT	0956827	9316-J
1STLT	01686624	9316-J
SGT	RA 30114942	0320-J
SGT	RA 19257755	0320-J
CPL	RA 30100078	0320-J
CPL	RA 30114657	0320-J
CPL	RA 10101786	0320-J
CPL	RA 39949741	0320-J
CPL	RA 16233564	0320-J
CPL	RA 19324464	0320-J
PFC	RA 19324464	0320-J
PFC	RA 16303345	0320-J
PFC	RA 10103562	0320-J
PFC	US 56003014	0320-J
PFC	RA 18282770	0320-J
Civilian		

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ROK Personnel

KIM Wan Hee
KIM Yun Chull
LEE Chong Yong
LIM Suk Sun

LT 60238
LT
LT

API OPERATIONS

1. Preliminary Planning for the Operation.

a. The Aerial Photographic Interpretation Team, as an integral part of the Division Intelligence Section, arrived in Kobe, Japan on 27 August 1950. The two interpretation officers in the Section were summoned to the USS Mt. McKinley (AGC-7) where the command echelon of the Division Staff was located, while the five enlisted personnel remained in the OTSU area for further training with the section chief. The commissioned interpreters from the 1st Marine Division collaborated with the ComPhibGru ONE interpretation team for the most expeditious and thorough exploitation of the photographic coverage supplied by Air Force and Marine Corps units. From the daily photographic missions flown, the combined team compiled defense overlays, mosaics, and target indices for naval gunfire and aerial bombardments in addition to substantiating reports from friendly espionage agents in the objective area.

b. After the arrival of the command ship USS Mt. McKinley at Kobe, the rear echelon of the Aerial Photographic Interpretation team joined the two interpretation officers on board the Mt. McKinley to reestablish the API Team. While the Division was mounting out, officers from this section were frequently called upon to discuss their findings of the beaches and hinterland region with infantry and shore party commands.


c. During the movement to the objective area, plans were made for securing daily progressive photographic coverage endeavoring to anticipate the regimental needs in the Inchon-Seoul Area. Comparative study was continued until the evening before the landing at Inchon. It should be noted here that the photographic requests submitted to ComPhibGru ONE for day by day blanket photographic coverage was returned with the notation of being impractical due to the limited amount of paper immediately available. (See Comments and Recommendations in Annex to the Special Action Report).

2. Operation.

a. During the two days of assault prior to the landing of the General Staff, the API Section completed the final preparation for the operation ashore. Due to the previous denial of blanket photographic coverage, the section suffered a momentary lull until fully landed and in operation on the outskirts of Inchon.

b. On D / 2, the API team joined the Division Intelligence Section at the 1st Marine Division Command Post on the eastern outskirts of Inchon and communicated with all regiments to initiate transmission of photographic requests.

c. Initially the 1st, 5th and 11th Marines and the 1st Engineer Battalion were enthusiastic in submitting their requests for photographic



[REDACTED]

reconnaissance mission and interpretation requests, but it was soon evident that the time interval from origination of the request until delivery of photographs was not consistent with the rapid forward movement of the assault elements, and the 1st and 6th Marines virtually ceased requesting photographs. Efforts of the API team to anticipate the regimental requirements were hampered by the constant fluctuation of tactical plans. Definite pre-invasion targets such as Seoul and its environs were photographed and analyzed in the form of interpretation reports in which two-hundred and fifty targets were reported to the Fire Support Coordination Center and in API Reports as enclosures in the Division Periodic Intelligence Reports.

d. Generally, the flow of photographic reconnaissance followed the normal procedures established in World War II. Either a request for specific photographic coverage or photographic interpretation report was submitted to the Division Intelligence Section. The API team edited the request and submitted it to the operation section of the 1st Marine Air Wing, who in turn flew the photographic mission, developed the prescribed number of prints and delivered them to the Division. After plotting the photographs, constructing an overlay and interpreting the photographs, they were immediately dispatched to the unit requesting the photographs or report.

e. All targets identified were immediately reported to the FSCC. This was the most expeditious handling of the photographs ever attained in this operation.

f. As the operation progressed it became increasingly evident that the photographic requests of the API team were becoming mired in the intricacies of an additional administrative level due to control by the X Corps. The combat units engaged with the enemy consequently could not get adequate coverage within the prescribed time dictated by military necessities.

[REDACTED]

CIC OPERATIONS

1. This Special Action Report covers the Counter Intelligence Corps activities of the 441st CIC Team, who were attached to the 1st Marine Division for counter intelligence activities and logistical support, during the period 15Sep-7Oct1950. The assigned mission of this Team was to impede and destroy the action of enemy agents or hostile elements whose intent it was to penetrate the 1st Marine Division area of responsibility for the purpose of espionage, sabotage or subversion; to detect evidence of treason, sedition, subversive activities and disaffection within the ranks and among the civilians, American and indigenous, employed by or in the facilities operating for the 1st Marine Division. This CIC Team made direct reports to G-2, 1st Marine Division, and to the 441st CIC Detachment, GHQ, FEC, APO 500, this Team's parent organization.

2. This Team was composed of seventeen (17) members under the command of Captain Millard F. Dougherty. One (1) Marine Officer and one (1) Marine NCO from the G-2 (MAR CIC) Section were attached for duty. In addition, nine (9) Korean Nationals (Interpreters-Investigators) and thirty (30) Korean Police Investigators were attached to this Team.

3. Preliminary planning included the selection of twenty-five (25) Installation Targets (Project "Gamma") within the City of Seoul, Korea. These targets included buildings and installations occupied or utilized by the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) and the North Korean Government. Various foreign Consulates were included in this Project. Also included were selected lists of Koreans who were known to be either friendly or hostile to the United Nations Forces, and who were placed on "White" and "Black" lists respectively. This team operated under Intelligence Instructions 2, 3, and 4, Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK).

4. On 15 September 1950, advance elements of this CIC Team landed on Wolmi-do, Inchon, Korea and established a Control Point.

On 16 September 1950, the premises of the former Inchon Peoples Committee were searched and documents concerning the organization, structure, activities, list of personalities, and related items were obtained and exploited. Screening points were established in the East sector of the City, and assigned counter intelligence targets were searched and secured. Rightist organizations were organized, and were utilized in assisting in establishing order in some sectors of Inchon. Mines manufactured in USSR in July 1950 were discovered in the outskirts of the City, and interrogation disclosed that the invasion interrupted the planned mining of the harbor. Evidence was obtained on thirty (30) Koreans who were reported to have been murdered in the Inchon City Jail.

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On 18 September, Control Point was established at Kimpo Airport and the CIC mission was carried out in the surrounding countryside; no important subversives were discovered as all had fled the rapidly advancing Marines.


On 20 September 1950, this CIC Team departed Kimpo Airport enroute to Seoul; the Han River was crossed and the Team was with the 5th Marine Regimental Headquarters along the Kaesong-Seoul Road, and assisted in Screening refugees on this important MSR. The following day the Team was reorganized and elements were dispatched to the 7th and 1st Marine Regiments to assist them with their counterintelligence problems. The balance of the Team remained with the 5th Marine Regiment because it was believed that the personality and installation targets in Seoul could be reached more quickly along that route of approach. The Headquarters of this Team then returned to the 1st Marine Division Command Post at Kimpo Airport and continued to direct CIC operations under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 until 24 September 1950 when the Team was again reorganized as a unit in the Mopo Area of Seoul City.

Counter Intelligence successes in Seoul were varied; the limited personnel comprising a Team of this nature were confronted with a major problem inasmuch as many installation targets were high on the priority list and few personnel were available to accomplish the mission. However, installations of the highest priority were searched/and although few important personalities were apprehended, many valuable documents were secured, including recovered United States Army and Air Force Intelligence card files and consular documents. Intelligence reports indicated that the NKPA and the recently established communist Government in Seoul went to great lengths to remove and destroy valuable documents prior to their planned withdrawal to the North. Informants in Seoul revealed that an estimated fifty percent (50%) of the damage to buildings in Seoul was a result of a planned operation of arson similar to the Red Army's "Scorched Earth Policy" utilized in the defense of Stalingrad during World War II. Various atrocities were uncovered and reported to the officials concerned. Interrogations of former informants of the Seoul Political Security Police furnished much useful intelligence information of a political nature.

During the operation in Seoul, many informants were passed through Marine forward lines to obtain tactical information of immediate value to front line units. This Team, to counter the intelligence agencies of the NKPA, established screening points in Seoul in immediate rear of front line units to apprehend these enemy agents and stop the flow of information which would be of value to the enemy.

On 7 October 1950, this CIC Team turned over current intelligence documents and information to the CIC Team remaining in Seoul, closed out operations and moved to an assembly area in Ascom City (Inchon), Korea.

[REDACTED]


5. Comments and Recommendations:

It is recommended that a Team of Counter Intelligence Corps members from the CIC Center be placed on permanent duty with each Marine Division to enable both the CIC and tactical unit to become familiar with the operations of the other in order to operate together for the maximum efficiency. In order for the CIC Team to operate to the most advantage it is recommended that the policy established by the G-2, 1st Marine Division, of allowing CIC the maximum freedom of movement, be continued.



OPERATION OF MISD

1. General

a. The examination of Captured Enemy Documents and the Interrogation of Enemy Prisoners of War captured by the 1st Marine Division was the responsibility of the 163rd Military Intelligence Service Detachment. The mission of the Intelligence detachment was to obtain immediate tactical information of the enemy and report this information to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 1st Marine Division. A copy of all interrogation reports and translations of documents were forwarded to proper higher headquarters.

b. This detachment which consists of qualified Japanese, Korean, Chinese and Russian linguists also furnished language services to the 1st Marine Division. Linguists in the detachment were assigned to duties which best fit their abilities in order to perform and produce the best results.

2. Assault Phase


The advanced party of the MISD landed on Wolmi-Do at 2000 D Day. The night was spent in locating the Division CP. On the morning of D + 1, there were approximately 175 prisoners of war waiting in the Shore Party Stockade. Preliminary interrogation was conducted on all prisoners, while the Division CP was moving further inland from Wolmi-Do. To facilitate interrogation of the increasing number of prisoners being evacuated from the front, a separate stockade was contemplated near the Division CP.

3. Exploitation Phase

a. With the opening of the stockade in Inchon, a total of 1,466 prisoners were interrogated. Due to two separate stockades being located in Inchon for a short while, many prisoners by-passed the Division stockade which otherwise would have increased the total interrogated.

b. In the operations at Kimpo airfield, a total of 2,329 prisoners were processed and interrogated while the Division was located at SONG SAN-RI in vicinity of Kimpo airfield. The prisoners were captured in the vicinity of Kimpo and Seoul.

c. Through the authorization of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the detachment employed ten Korean Linguists which were needed in the interrogation of North Korean Prisoners of War who spoke only the Korean language. With the landing of the 7th Marine Regiment which did not have Korean Linguist personnel, the detachment obtained eight English-speaking Koreans from Inchon. All Koreans employed by the Marine Corps were examined for their linguistic ability in English and later screened by the Division CIC team.



d. Due to the lull in the combat operations in the Seoul Area, very few prisoners were held at the Mapo Prison. Prisoners interrogated here were found to be troops trained in administration, supply, headquarters and training. Tactical information dealing with the enemy was practically unobtainable.



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